



GMRF Exercise Naval

Gold Level CBRN Exercise

Venue – Hydra Minerva Suite Sedgley Park

17th July 2008

Final Report and Recommendations

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1 Introduction

The purpose of Exercise Naval was originally intended to be a strategic level validation of the Greater Manchester Resilience Forums (GMRF) 'Multi-agency CBRN Response Plan'. It was subsequently decided however, that this exercise also offered an ideal opportunity to simultaneously validate the 'Greater Manchester Strategic Recovery Guidance' (in final draft format) which would be an efficient and effective utilisation of resources and strategic level personnel from all agencies.

1.1 Exercise Planning

A multi-agency planning team was established to develop the exercise including representation from the GMRF Recovery Sub Group. This planning group comprised of tactical level personnel from all agencies involved plus staff from the GMP Hydra Minerva Training facility. To ensure the planning and flow of the exercise remained at the strategic level a member of the GMRF was invited onto the team. Colin Kelsey from the Lead PCT agreed to this request.

It was decided at an early stage of the planning process that media engagement during the exercise would be kept to a minimum. It was acknowledged by the planning team that for a real event of this scale, media management would be a major issue for Gold Control to deal with. However it was felt that media issues could start to take over the exercise at the expense of achieving the stated aim and objectives. It was felt by the team that media management should be addressed at a future major incident type exercise or even at a single issue media exercise.

As this was the first exercise of its kind in Greater Manchester there were a significant number of lessons identified in relation to the planning process. In the interest of keeping this report focussed on the issues emanating out of the exercise the CBRN Sub Group will put together a separate report specifically on the planning process to inform the development of any future exercises.

1.2 Acknowledgements

The chair of the exercise planning team would like to take this opportunity to thank all members of the team for their input and the amount of time they committed to the development and execution of the exercise. In addition thanks go to the actual participants who not only gave their valuable time to commit to the exercise but actively engaged throughout to make it a useful learning experience.

Thanks also to GMRF for funding the exercise.

2 Exercise Aim and Objectives

The aim and objectives for the exercise were as follows:

Aim: To validate the GMRF CBRN Response Plan and Recovery Plan during a strategic level command exercise

Objectives:

- To identify the roles and responsibilities of participating agencies within a Strategic Co-ordinating Group

- Demonstrate the multi-agency gold level response to a CBRN incident
- Test and challenge the procedures within GMRF multi-agency CBRN Response and Recovery Plans
- Reflect on key decision making processes within the SCG and individual agencies
- Identify the community impact of a major CBRN incident
- Identify the impact of a major CBRN incident on individual organisation's service delivery
- During plenary reflection, Identify and record areas of development for strategic command of a CBRN incident.

2.1 Pre-exercise awareness days

Prior to the exercise taking place two training awareness days were arranged the aim of which was to present exercise players (and other senior managers) with an insight into the complexities of a major CBRN incident and to enable them to consider in advance some of the key issues they may be faced with.

A number of short presentations were given which included the following subject matter:

- GMP Counter Terrorist Unit – Current threat assessment
- Overview of the 'Greater Manchester Multi-agency CBRN Response Plan'
- Overview of the role of the Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)
- Overview of the 'Greater Manchester Strategic Recovery Guidance'
- Overview of the 'Greater Manchester Mass Fatalities Plan' and the Recovery, Identification and Decontamination (RID) of fatalities process
- Case study of the Alexander Litvinenko incident (Polonium 210) – HPA perspective
- Overview of the format of the exercise

3 Exercise Scenario

The exercise scenario centred on the detonation of an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) by a *'suicide bomber'* at Victoria Railway Station, Manchester City Centre at approximately 08.30 hours. The device was of a back-pack construction consisting of 2kg of home made explosives (HMTD) packed with nails and other projectiles and containing a small quantity of the radiological substance Cesium 137.

This would result in approximately 25 – 30 fatalities and up to 100 additional casualties at the scene plus an area of contamination from the Cesium 137. The impact of this incident would be enhanced by the movement of two trains that were at the station at the time of the explosion. For the purpose of the exercise the trains were dispatched to Rochdale and Bolton stations respectively.

Extensive research was carried out as to the validity of this scenario and experts from the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) at Aldermaston, Met Office, Health Protection Agency and 11 EOD Regiment were consulted. The outcome was that this was considered both a realistic and viable scenario.

This scenario was generated specifically to be contained in Greater Manchester. The purpose of this was to enable the SCG in Greater Manchester to manage the incident without complicating the issue with the need for the establishment of a Regional Civil Contingencies Committee (RCCC) which had been exercised previously at 'Exercise Northern Synergy'.

4 Exercise Format

Exercise Naval was carried out at the GMP Hydra Minerva facility, Sedgley Park. The format for the exercise involved the establishment of three syndicates operating as **individual** Strategic Co-ordinating Groups (SCG) for the same incident and one syndicate operating as a Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG). All groups were supported by a Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) that operated as a separate syndicate. Additional agency specific technical support was available to participants throughout the exercise.

The intention was to split the exercise into four specific sessions to encompass the various stages of a CBRN incident in the initial 12 hour+ period. Following each session there was a comprehensive and facilitated plenary to enable a variety of issues to be raised and discussed. The facilitation of the plenary sessions was carried out by Graham White (ex Superintendent GMP).

The number of players for the exercise was comprehensive and a full list is attached as **appendix 1**.

4.1 Session One – First 45 minutes of incident

This session of the exercise involved the initial information gathering process and players remained as single agency units i.e. all GMP players allocated to syndicate 1, GMFRS syndicate 2, NWS syndicate 3, Local Authority syndicate 4 etc.

The purpose of this session was to determine if there was a synchronised flow of information through agency specific Command and Control structures and that individual strategic managers had a similar picture in their minds of events prior to the establishment of the SCG.

4.2 Session Two – 45 minutes to incident plus 3 hours

Session two of the exercise focused on the initial establishment of an SCG and the setting of a strategy for the incident. In addition the problems associated with the trains leaving the station was presented to each SCG for them to deal with. The STAC was convened to support the SCGs however it is acknowledged that a body of experts on this scale could not be assembled at a single location within the given timeframe.

To conclude session two an initial briefing of the RCG took place. For the purpose of the exercise this was carried out by members of SCG 1 and observed by all other exercise players by video link in the main auditorium. To ensure an element of synergy for the remainder of the exercise, the RCG aligned exclusively with SCG 1.

4.3 Session Three – Incident 6 hours plus

This session focused on the wider implications of the incident as the response phase and management of the incident scene were now established. This impacted very much on the work of the RCG and the links with the SCG and the STAC.

4.4 Session Four – Incident 12 hours plus

The aim of this session was to look at the longer term issues arising from the incident including the process for the recovery of contaminated fatalities at the scene. It was

also a session for individual syndicates to reflect on their actions so far and to plan a longer term strategy including the potential hand over of the strategic management of the incident from the SCG to the RCG.

Unfortunately due to the time constraints on the day a rearrangement of the exercise structure became necessary and session four had to be deferred. However, some of the key elements were discussed during an extended plenary at the conclusion of session three.

5 Exercise Feedback and General Observations

On completion of the exercise delegates were informed that an 'exercise feedback questionnaire' would be available for them to complete 'on line'. The reason for this was that it would allow players' time to reflect on the exercise and be more considered in their feedback.

From the feedback received it is clear that the aim and objectives for 'Exercise Naval' were met in full.

The results of the feedback are attached as **appendix 2**. The additional comments received have been considered to identify lessons learned and develop relevant recommendations.

The exercise enabled all participants to get a much better appreciation of the roles and responsibilities of other agencies operating within an SCG for a CBRN event. The establishment and integration with the STAC and Recovery Co-ordinating Group was a first for many present that again gave an appreciation of the role and function of these specific groups.

The immersive format of this Hydra Minerva exercise was both original in concept and ambitious in terms of organisation. The exercise was considered a success in that it not only met the stated aims and objectives, but also offered the opportunity to test three separate SCGs within the same exercise. A total of 43 senior level managers from the various Greater Manchester agencies took part. Although this required a significant commitment from all concerned the efficiencies of this should be considered when developing future Gold level exercises.

6 Key Learning Outcomes and Recommendations

A précis of the following Key Recommendations has been placed in table format for ease of reading and can be found attached as **appendix 3**.

6.1 SCG Issues

The ultimate aim of the exercise was to test both the GM CBRN Response Plan and the GM Recovery Strategic Guidance. From comments on the day and later in the written feedback, both plans appeared to be used comprehensively during the exercise and deemed to be fit for purpose, therefore they can be considered as validated. The overwhelming view was that both plans provided clear and relevant guidance which strategic managers could and should utilise during an event.

Recommendation (i) – From comments received and due to the complex nature of this type incident individuals should revisit the plans on a regular basis to ensure they remain familiar with the content and are prepared should an incident of this nature occur.

Owner - All potential SCG members

Both the CBRN Response Plan and Strategic Recovery Guidance are available on the Greater Manchester Virtual Work Group site. Due to the CBRN Response Plan being classified as 'Restricted' under the governments protective marking scheme, access to this plan is password protected. All agencies have personnel identified who can access the plan however if individuals wish to access this for themselves, then this can be set up through GMFRS who are administrators for the plan on the VWG.

Recommendation (ii) - It was requested that a high level 'aid memoir/event model' diagram should be developed to compliment the contents of the CBRN Response Plan for use by SCG members during a CBRN incident.

The CBRN Sub Group will develop this and include as an annex to the plan

Owner - CBRN Sub Group

6.1.1 It was highlighted during the exercise 'hot' debrief that it was in the region of 5 years since the last full SCG level exercise was carried out in Greater Manchester. It was also stated that involvement in an SCG is not something that can be 'just picked up on the day' of a major incident and the training and exercising of potential SCG members is an essential part in developing competence. Furthermore, the membership of an SCG cannot be restricted to a 'selected few' individuals i.e. members of the GMRF. An incident can occur at any time and in any location within Greater Manchester, therefore there is a potential for a significant number of strategic level managers in all agencies who may be required to be involved in a SCG.

The above learning outcome was also identified in the London Resilience Forum report 'Looking Back, Moving Forward' following the 7/7 bombings which states:

Further common training in the Gold role for all agencies was identified as a requirement and would be beneficial¹.

¹ London Regional Resilience Forum 'Looking Back, Moving Forward' Report - P6 Section 3.6

Recommendation (iii) – All agencies and local authorities should identify specific roles within their organisations with the requisite level of authority to participate in a SCG if required. Individuals operating within those roles will already possess the necessary skills and attributes to work effectively at the strategic level for normal day to day business however they should evaluate their ability to operate as part of a SCG and identify any training needs. In addition these individuals should participate in regular exercising to not only confirm their skills and/or address training needs but to also become familiar with their peers in other organisations.

Observation – For future development, organisations could identify personnel with the potential to operate at the strategic level in the short to medium term. Subject to the availability of places, these individuals could be invited to attend exercises and operate as a single group with their peers, purely from a training and development perspective.

Owner – All agencies

Recommendation (iv) – GMRF should agree to sanction and fund one full SCG level exercise per year. The theme should be agreed by GMRF and informed by the outcome of the Community Risk Register, National Capability Survey or other relevant and timely correspondence.

Owner - GMRF

Recommendation (v) – The organisation of a Gold level exercise is a very complex and time consuming issue. The exercise itself can only fully deliver on its stated aims and objectives if **all** relevant agencies are represented and facilitated by the appropriate level of personnel. Therefore there should be a commitment by all GMRF stakeholders to fully support any future GMRF sanctioned Gold level exercises.

When conducting an exercise at this level it is vital that the appropriate level of individual is nominated to attend. Although time is a premium for these people, nominees should avoid the temptation to delegate attendance to more junior members of their respective organisation.

Owner – All agencies

6.1.2 It was identified during the exercise plenary that there was a wide disparity across the agencies with regard to maintaining decision logs. For the purpose of the exercise there was a *loggist* allocated to each syndicate however this was a false representation of what would happen for a real incident. It was stated by one of the GMP Gold Commanders that they would in fact have a *loggist* appointed directly to them who would remain by their side for the duration of the incident. This currently is not a common practice across all other agencies. Discussion ensued as to the value of developing standard practice of maintaining decision logs across all agencies and consideration should be given to the implications of **not** keeping a relevant log, particularly post incident where decisions and actions could come under scrutiny in any subsequent inquiry (public or otherwise). The maintenance of decision logs is an **essential** requirement in the Gold arena and should also be considered at other levels of the command and control structure.

The issue of maintaining logs was also identified in the London Assembly report into the 7/7 bombings which states:

Unfortunately, it is not possible to examine in detail the London Ambulance Service's response to the Edgware Road explosion over the course of the morning, because records of the response were not maintained. The timeline provided to us by the London Ambulance Service contains no entries beyond 9.21 am, when it was recorded that an ambulance crew stated they were running out of equipment and requested an equipment vehicle. This failure to maintain records is not unique to the Ambulance Service; the London Fire Brigade has also commented in its debrief report on the failure to record information about its response and the need to do so in future.

The failure to maintain records of the response extends also to records of the times of arrival of the emergency services at the affected carriages of the bombed trains. A number of survivors from Edgware Road and Aldgate told us that they saw emergency services personnel outside the stations soon after the explosions, apparently having been instructed not to enter the affected tunnels. We have received no explanation as to why this might have been the case, and the absence of records showing the times of arrival of the emergency services in the affected carriages means that we cannot investigate the anecdotal accounts we have heard².

From a legal perspective the written log is a crucial piece of evidence in determining how the incident was managed. It is vital therefore that any submissions are accurate and timely and include the rationale behind any decisions made. It should also be considered that an investigation team will want to view and may ultimately seize individual agency incident logs.

Recommendation (vi) – All agencies should induct the process of maintaining incident logs into standard practice. This should include the identification of personnel from their own organisation who will carry out the *loggist* function, particularly for senior level managers and training individuals as appropriate.

Observation - The HPA currently run an accredited 'loggist' course that is funded by the Department of Health. It is recommended that individual agencies invest in this training to ensure a standard approach is achieved across all Greater Manchester agencies.

Owner - All agencies (Training and Exercise Co-ordinating Group to scope training provision)

6.2 STAC Issues

As stated in paragraph 4 a STAC was convened which for the purpose of the exercise a STAC was pre defined and assembled from the outset. However, it is acknowledged that for a real incident a full STAC would take a considerable time to fully assemble and location would be an issue.

The make up of a STAC would also vary considerably dependent on the nature of the incident. For this exercise the STAC included the following personnel and agencies:

² London Assembly Report of the July 7 Review Committee P52 Para 3.37 and 3.38

Scientific and Technical Advice Cell		
Name	Agency	Role
Dr Judith Chaloner	HPA (Chair)	Consultant in Health Protection
Dr Nick Gent	HPA	Consultant in Health Protection
Dr Julian Dunerdale	Radiological Protection Division	RPA
Annette Kennedy	Atomic Weapons Establishment	RPA (Police)
James Cairnes	Atomic Weapons Establishment	Scientific Advisor
Jan Hutchinson	Bolton PCT	Director of Public Health
Major Duncan Young	OC 521 SQN (11 EOD)	Bomb Disposal Advisor
Rita Wilkinson	Coroners Office	Dealing with fatalities
Alan Goodman	Met Office	Met information

6.2.1 The potential exists for an element of conflict with regard to who should chair the STAC. In this instance, as part of the exercise planning process, it was agreed that the HPA would act as chair. However for a real incident there is the possibility that the lead PCT could see it as a role for them. It should be emphasised that this learning outcome is based on evidence from exercises and events that have taken place **outside** of Greater Manchester and that we maintain a common sense approach to this situation.

The operation of the STAC in this exercise developed over the course of the day from the initial position of operating remotely from the SCGs (and the Recovery Co-ordinating Group) and communicating via the Exercise Control, to the point where members physically attended the SCGs and Recovery Co-ordinating Group to deliver advice and discuss issues in person. It was felt that face to face communication is the best approach.

Recommendation (vii) – There should be a clear protocol in place regarding the arrangements to convene a STAC. The initial request should be made via the Greater Manchester Health Protection Unit as local representative of the HPA. The size of the STAC will vary dependent on the scale and nature of the incident and if it is to operate at the Gold or Silver level (or both). There should also be a clear distinction as to who will chair the group dependent on the nature of the incident i.e. CBRN - Consultant in Health Protection (HPA), Pandemic flu - Director of Public Health (PCT) etc

Owner – GM Health agencies/Lead PCT

Recommendation (viii) – The location of a STAC should, as far as is reasonably practicable, be pre-determined, particularly for operating in support at Gold level. The availability of accommodation is a major consideration and it was felt on the day that the STAC functioned better co-located with the SCG, thus enabling personal access to SCG members and better communication. Although the STAC for this exercise involved personnel from external agencies i.e. Aldermaston it is possible for a relatively small core of individuals to co-locate an SCG and with the availability of appropriate IT, to communicate as required with external elements at remote locations.

Should the STAC be unable to co-locate at the SCG and also for resilience purposes, it is recommended that an alternative fallback location is identified and fitted with video conferencing technology and other necessary IT hardware.

Owner – GMP/GM Health agencies

6.3 Recovery Co-ordinating Group Issues

Primarily for exercise planning purposes it was agreed to convene the Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG) two hours after the start of the exercise. At the time of planning this was considered to be too early but a necessary to facilitate the running of the exercise within the desired timeframe. However as the exercise progressed it was acknowledged that the RCG should be established as soon as practicable. The initial work of the RCG should focus on the development of a Community Impact Assessment which will ultimately inform the Common Recognised Information Picture (CRIP) that Central Government will be monitoring.

The benefit of establishing a RCG in the early stages of the incident was demonstrated during the Alexander Litvinenko incident (Operation Whimbrel). The following extracts are taken from the debrief report:

A Consequence Management Gold Group (CMGG) was chaired and hosted at New Scotland Yard by the Metropolitan Police Service. It was decided that a Recovery Group would be set up to work in tandem with the CMGG until such time that the Recovery Group could take over responsibility for the incident. As most of the premises implicated in the incident were within the City of Westminster the City Council (WCC), it chaired the Recovery Group.

In any incident it is important to start thinking about the recovery phase as soon as is practicable. The first meeting of the Recovery Group was at Westminster City Council on 24th November 2006. The group ran alongside the investigation from the start, often meeting just before the CMGG so that the Gold group could be briefed fully on the recovery stages. This group proved to be extremely effective in co-ordinating the multi-agency response to the recovery phase across London³.

³ London Regional Resilience Forum Multi-agency Debrief Operation Whimbrel – p5 Summary of Incident Response and p12 para 11

Recommendation (ix) – The establishment of a RCG should be considered in the early stages of any major incident. The local authority representative at the SCG should then instigate this following the GM Strategic Recovery Guidance.

The role and remit of the RCG is contained in the GM Strategic Recovery Guidance. It is recommended that all relevant current multi-agency emergency plans include a short section on recovery and 'signpost' to this document.

Owner – GMRF

6.3.1 As with the STAC, the issue of location of the RCG was a point for discussion. It was acknowledged that the co-location of the RCG with the SCG is the best option. In this instance the RCG would also have direct access to the STAC which it would certainly require. However for the reasons discussed earlier (availability of suitable accommodation) this might not be possible. Similar to the STAC there should be an identifiable fallback venue(s) again fitted with the appropriate IT facilities. It should be noted that in the early stages of an incident the chair of the RCG will be required to attend the regular SCG briefings, therefore if it is not possible to co-locate the RCG with the SCG then the fallback venue should be in reasonable travel distance.

Recommendation (x) – The ideal solution in respect to the accommodation of both the STAC and RCG would be to co-locate with the SCG. It is acknowledged that GMP is fully aware of this situation and is actively trying to resolve the issue with the development of the Command and Control facilities at Sedgley Park.

For resilience it is suggested that an alternate strategic location for the RCG should be identified, should it not be possible to co-locate with the SCG. Although each local authority will have facilities that can be utilised for the longer term, it is recommended that a specific alternative venue is identified which can be used in the early stages of an incident that is in relatively easy travel distance of the SCG. This will enable the chair to attend the regular SCG briefings. Agreements should be in place for the use of another Local Authority's facilities if necessary.

Observation - The identified location should be facilitated with video conferencing technology. It would be expected that the Chief Executive or Director of the affected authority would in normal circumstances chair the RCG.

Owner – GMP/Local Authorities

6.3.2 The function and operation of a RCG is a new concept to which many people will be unfamiliar. Like the operation of an SCG, participation in a RCG is not something that can be picked up on the day of an incident and there needs to be more awareness of the remit of this group and relevant training for those who would be expected to be involved. This is particularly pertinent to local authority Chief Officers and Directors who will be required to chair the group.

Recommendation (xi) – It is recommended that a greater awareness of the role and responsibilities of the RCG is disseminated to all relevant personnel. The GM Recovery Sub Group has put together a training programme which includes a training package for use within organisations. It is recommended that all agencies use the training package as appropriate to deliver basic training on recovery to all relevant staff.

Owner – GM Recovery Sub Group

6.4 Sustainability

The issue of sustainability of strategic level officers for a long duration incident was discussed. It is acknowledged that individual agencies have a finite resource pool of senior managers with the requisite level of skills and authority to operate in the SCG/RCG arena. It is important for resilience purposes that arrangements are in place to request additional support from other Greater Manchester Local Authorities should it be required.

It is also noted that due to the fact that strategic management resources are so limited there may be the temptation for individuals to work beyond what time is reasonably acceptable. In a situation like this people will operate on adrenalin for a significant time period however, there comes a point when individuals will not be thinking clearly which will undoubtedly affect their decision making ability. In the event of a major incident there will be a reluctance to let go of the reigns however there must be a disciplined approach that can be assisted with the introduction of formal guidelines. This point is not specific to the Gold Command arena but pertinent to the entire Command and Control structure (at Silver and Bronze levels also).

Recommendation (xii) – All agencies should ensure that they have suitable and robust arrangements in place to support the respective Command groups with the requisite number of personnel. This may involve the invoking of mutual aid arrangements.

Agencies should also consider maximum work time periods that any individual should be involved with the incident. Human nature will dictate in the event of a real incident individuals with the best of intentions will work to the point of exhaustion that could have a negative impact on their decision making ability.

Owner – All agencies

6.5 Other Agency Issues

The Military representative from 11 EOD, initially located in the STAC, expressed concerns as to the lack of knowledge of the Detection, Identification and Monitoring, equipment provided by them at the scene within approximately 30 – 45 minutes from mobilisation.

Recommendation (xiii) - There should be further familiarisation training organised between the Military and emergency services to ensure there is clear knowledge and understanding of each others capabilities and that these are contained in relevant plans (agency specific and multi-agency).

Owner – Military and Emergency Services

6.5.1 The problem caused by the trains in the station at the time of the explosion that were then subsequently dispatched to other locations caused major management issues for this incident. During the planning of the exercise this was identified as standard practice from a British Transport Police (BTP) perspective which is clearly not conducive to the ideology of trying to contain the potential contaminant as much as is reasonably practicable.

This exercise scenario was kind in the extreme in that the trains remained within the county of Greater Manchester however, if the scenario had involved Piccadilly Station with its national rail links the problems would have been multiplied significantly.

Recommendation (xiv) - BTP should consider their current procedures for dealing with potential CBRN incidents at major railway transport hubs. It is acknowledged that any trains in the station at the time and not affected by the initial explosion should be moved out however, they should be held at a location nearby until it has been confirmed whether a CBRN material has or has not been involved. This will also assist in the investigation of the incident as the police will be able to take details off all people on the train rather than having them disperse at the termination of their journey.

Owner - BTP

7 Conclusions

Exercise Naval was on the whole a success and introduced a new concept in exercising at the strategic level. It sustained interest throughout and demonstrated efficiencies in the utilisation of strategic managers from all agencies.

The aim and objectives of the exercise were met in full and both the GM CBRN Response Plan and Strategic Recovery Guidance were validated.

The learning outcomes of the exercise centred on the role and function of an SCG and identified gaps in preparedness and training, particularly in relation to individuals who might be requested to be part of an SCG for a major incident. It cannot be assumed that a 'chosen few' will continuously facilitate the SCG function and agencies must address this and train personnel as appropriate. This includes attendance at strategic level exercises of the right level of personnel.

The issue of location of support structures to the SCG i.e. from the STAC and RCG was also identified. The exercise demonstrated that co-location is by far the best option to enable face to face communication and interaction to take place.

The early request by the Gold Commander for the establishment of a RCG was also a major learning outcome from this exercise. Reports following a number of high profile incidents aim some criticism at the fact that the management of the incident is

focused entirely on the immediate scene response with little regard to the impact on the wider community. Although the RCG will undoubtedly deal with the longer term issues the production of an early Community Impact Assessment will greatly assist the SCG in the management of the incident and development of strategy.

It is acknowledged that individual agencies will also have identified specific learning outcomes that may not be included in this report. These should be addressed internally however if there is any impact on other agencies they should be informed and any multi-agency plans amended as necessary.

Due to the time constraints on the day the issue of dealing with fatalities was not addressed. It is recommended that this issue be included in subsequent exercises.

8 Way Forward

GMRF to consider endorsing all or some of the recommendations in this report. The GM CBRN Sub Group will maintain an overview on progress and report back to GMRF as required.

Multi-agency CBRN exercising should now continue at both the Silver and Bronze levels. The development of exercise Naval has left a legacy in that a multi agency tactical level exercise utilising the Hydra facility and the same scenario is a viable cost effective option. Command and Control training for CBRN incidents has in the past been identified as a gap that this exercise could address with minor modifications. This would be of major benefit in particular to the CBRN Silver Commanders from the emergency services.

Appendix 1- List of Players in Exercise Naval

Syndicate 1 - SCG		
Name	Agency	Role
ACC Thompson	GMP	Police Gold Commander SCG Chair
ACFO Nolan	GMFRS	Fire Gold Commander
Steve Hynes	NWAS	Ambulance Gold Commander
Ch Supt Peter Holden	BTP	BTP Gold Commander
Mike Reardon	Local Authority	LA Gold Liaison
Tim Evans	NHS	NHS Commander
Kathy Settle	GONW	CMLO/GLT
Dr Rosemary McCann	HPA	Consultant in health protection
Brigadier Mike Griffiths	Military	Military Liaison Officer





Syndicate 2 - SCG		
Name	Agency	Role
ACC Hopkins	GMP	Police Gold Commander SCG Chair
ACFO Beckley	GMFRS	Fire Gold Commander
Paul Kudray	NWAS	Ambulance Gold Commander
ACC Thomas	BTP	BTP Gold Commander
Helen McFarlane	Local Authority	LA Gold Liaison
Mike Burrows	NHS	NHS Commander
Jennet Peters	GONW	CMLO/GLT
Dr Erika Duffell	HPA	Consultant in health protection
Lt Col Ray Carolin	Military	Military Liaison Officer





Syndicate 3 - SCG		
Name	Agency	Role
ACC Taylor	GMP	Police Gold Commander SCG Chair
AC Tony Ciaramella	GMFRS	Fire Gold Commander
Delwyn Wray	NWAS	Ambulance Gold Commander
Ch Insp Dave Oram	BTP	BTP Gold Commander
Anthony Rich	Local Authority	LA Gold Liaison
Laura Roberts	NHS	NHS Commander
Matt Hennessy	GONW	CMLO/GLT
Dr Marko Petrovic	HPA	Consultant in health protection
Wg Cdr Hugh Stewart	Military	Military Liaison Officer





Syndicate 4 – Recovery Working Group		
Name	Agency	Role
Jane Scullion	Stockport Council Assistant Chief Executive	Recovery Group Chair
ACC Sweeney	GMP	GMP Recovery
Nicola King	NHS	NHS Recovery
	United Utilities	UU Representative
Mike Chambers	GONW	Consequence Management Liaison Officer
Dianne Walker	Environment Agency	EA Representative
	GMPTE	GMPTE Representative
John Smith	GDS	GDS Representative
Julian Dearden	WRVS	Voluntary Sector
Paul Kirkham	Manchester Chamber of Commerce	Chamber of Commerce Representative





Scientific and Technical Advisory Team		
Name	Agency	Role
Dr Judith Chaloner	HPA	Consultant in health protection
Dr Nick Gent	HPA	Consultant in health protection
Dr Julian Dunerdale	Radiological Protection Division	RPA
Annette Kennedy	Atomic Weapons Establishment	RPA (Police)
James Cairnes	Atomic Weapons Establishment	Scientific Advisor
Jan Hutchinson	Bolton PCT	Director of Public Health
Major Duncan Young	OC 521 SQN	Bomb Disposal Advisor
Rita Wilkinson	Coroners Office	Dealing with fatalities
Alan Goodman	Met Office	Met information



Appendix 2 – Feedback to exercise Questionnaire











Appendix 3 – Précis of Exercise Naval Key Recommendations

Learning Outcome Ref Paragraph	Key Recommendation	GMRF Accept/Reject	Owner	Date of Completion
6.1 (i)	Due to the complex nature of this type incident individuals should revisit the plans on a regular basis to ensure they remain familiar with the content.		All potential SCG members	
6.1 (ii)	Develop a high level ' <i>aid memoir/event model</i> ' diagram for the CBRN Response Plan that SCG members can reference during an incident.		CBRN Sub Group	
6.1.1 (iii)	All agencies should identify specific roles within their organisations with the requisite level of authority to participate in a SCG. Individuals identified should participate in regular exercising to not only confirm their skills and/or identify training needs but to also become familiar with their peers in other organisations.		All agencies	
6.1.1 (iv)	GMRF should sanction and fund one full SCG level exercise per year. The theme should be agreed by GMRF and informed by the outcome of the Community Risk Register, National Capability Survey or other relevant and timely correspondence.		GMRF	
6.1.1 (v)	When conducting an exercise at Gold level it is vital that the appropriate level of individual is nominated to attend. Delegation to more junior members of respective organisations should be avoided.		All agencies	

Learning Outcome Ref Paragraph	Key Recommendation	GMRF Accept/Reject	Owner	Date of Completion
6.1.2 (vi)	All agencies should indoctrinate the process of maintaining incident logs into standard practice. This should include the identification of personnel from their own organisation to carry out the 'loggist' function on behalf of senior level managers and train individuals as appropriate.		All agencies (TECG to scope training provision with HPA)	
6.2.1 (vii)	There should be a clear protocol in place regarding the request for a STAC to be convened. The initial request should be made via the Greater Manchester Health Protection Unit as the local representative of the HPA. The size of the STAC will vary dependent on the scale and nature of the incident. There should be a clear distinction as to who will chair the group dependent on the nature of the incident i.e. CBRN - Consultant in Health Protection (HPA), Pandemic flu - Director of Public Health (PCT) etc.		GM Health agencies/Lead PCT	
6.2.1 (viii)	The location of a STAC should be pre-determined as far as is reasonably practicable, particularly for operating in support at Gold level. Although the STAC for this exercise involved personnel from external agencies i.e. Aldermaston it is possible for a relatively small core of individuals to co-locate at the SCG and with the availability of appropriate IT, communicate a required with external elements at remote locations.		GMP/GM Health agencies	

Learning Outcome Ref Paragraph	Key Recommendation	GMRF Accept/Reject	Owner	Date of Completion
6.3 (ix)	<p>The establishment of a Recovery Co-ordinating Group (RCG) should be considered in the early stages of any major incident by the SCG. The local authority representative at the SCG should then instigate arrangements following the GM recovery Strategic Guidance.</p> <p>Observation - all relevant multi-agency emergency plans should include a short section on recovery and ‘signpost’ to the GM Recovery Guidance document.</p>		SCG	
6.3.1 (x)	<p>Ideally the RCG (along with the STAC) should co-locate with the SCG. It is acknowledged that accommodation is an issue but GMP is aware and developing Command and Control facilities at Sedgley Park.</p> <p>Observation - An alternate strategic location for the RCG should be considered if it is not be possible to co-locate with the SCG. Although each local authority has facilities that can be utilised for the longer term, it is recommended that a venue is identified which can be used in the <u>early stages</u> of an incident that is in relatively easy travel distance of the SCG, to enable the chair of the RCG to attend regular SCG briefings. Agreements should be in place for the use of another Local Authority’s facilities if necessary. It would be expected that the Chief Officer or Director of the affected authority would in normal circumstances chair the RCG. The identified location should if possible be facilitated with video conferencing technology.</p>		GMP/Local Authorities	

Learning Outcome Ref Paragraph	Key Recommendation	GMRF Accept/Reject	Owner	Date of Completion
6.3.2 (xi)	There should be a greater awareness of the role and responsibilities of the RCG. The GM Recovery Sub Group has put together a training programme which includes a package for use within organisations. It is recommended that all agencies use the training package to deliver basic training on recovery to all relevant staff.		GM Recovery Sub Group/All agencies	
6.4 (xii)	All agencies should have robust arrangements in place to support the Command groups with the requisite number of personnel. This may involve the invoking of mutual aid arrangements. A protocol should be in place that determines the maximum time period that any individual should be involved with the incident.		All agencies	
6.5 (xiii)	There should be further familiarisation training organised between the Military and emergency services to ensure there is clear knowledge and understanding of each others capabilities. These capabilities should be included in relevant plans (agency specific and multi-agency).		Military and Emergency Services	
6.5.1 (xiv)	BTP should reconsider their procedures for dealing with potential CBRN incidents at major railway transport hubs. It is acknowledged that any trains in the station at the time and not affected by the initial explosion should be moved out however, they should be held at a location nearby until it has been confirmed if a CBRN material has or has not been involved. This will also assist in the investigation of the incident as the police will be able to take details of all people on the train rather than them dispersing at the termination of their journey.		BTP	

