



HMS ANTRIM
BFPO Ships
London

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The Commander in Chief Fleet
Eastbury Park
Northwood
Middlesex

8 July 1982

Sir,

OPERATION - REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

1. I have the honour to submit the Report of Proceedings of Task Group under my command from 7 April 1982 to 3 May 1982.
2. The Task Group was formed on 7 April 1982 when, with HMS PLYMOUTH (Captain D PENTREATH Royal Navy), I was ordered to detach from Task Unit 317.8.1, to rendezvous with RFA TIDESPRING (Royal Fleet Auxillary), and to proceed at best speed to ASCENSION ISLAND to arrive by 100800Z Apr 82.
3. The outline plan for Operation (CinCFleet AAA/19F 072230Z Apr 82) detailed RM Ships ANTRIM, PLYMOUTH, ENDURANCE (Royal Navy), and RFA TIDESPRING, with a RM Company Group embarked, to form a forward combined force to re-establish British presence in SOUTH GEORGIA. RFA FORT AUSTIN (Royal Fleet Auxillary) was to sail ASCENSION by 091200Z Apr to rendezvous with HMS ENDURANCE pm 11 Apr for solids replenishment, and to transfer rations/naphtha fuel for the RM Company Group. ANTRIM, PLYMOUTH and TIDESPRING were to embark the RM Company Group, stores and ammunition, additional naval personnel for ENDURANCE, and two Wessex 5 aircraft in TIDESPRING, at ASCENSION on 10/11 Apr and to sail by noon 11 Apr to rendezvous with ENDURANCE in vicinity 2600S 02000W on 14 Apr for RAS(L) ENDURANCE/TIDESPRING. Thence the Task Group was to proceed in company for SOUTH GEORGIA to arrive am 21 Apr and to be prepared for landing operations on arrival.
4. While on passage to ASCENSION ISLAND signals were received/intercepted (MGRM CDO Forces 19F/IRD 071340Z Apr 82 and CinCFleet 19F/IRD/QEX 080047Z Apr 82) from which the numbers of men and amount of ammunition/stores to be embarked were established. Proposals for embarkation were made in my 19F/IRD/QEX 082310Z Apr 82 which were not liked by MGRM Cdo Forces, who forwarded his preferred solution at his 19F/IRD/QEX 091254Z Apr 82. A compromise solution was forwarded at my 19F/IRD/QEX 091520Z Apr 82 which was the one eventually implemented and worked reasonably satisfactorily, although the accommodation and sanitary/hygiene arrangements of RFA TIDESPRING were severely stretched over the period of embarkation.

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5. Also while on passage work was put in hand to convert the Admiral's day cabin in ANTRIM to become the military operations room, by the erection of wall boards for maps etc and the provision of additional tables for planning teams. These arrangements were subsequently improved during the course of the operation to include a full military communications centre. For this a hole was cut through the deckhead into the starboard bridge wing to run aerial leads for VHF, UHF, and HF circuits, jury aerials being rigged on the bridge roof and foremast. This ad hoc arrangement proved very successful during the recce and landing phases.
6. It was apparent that HM Ships ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH would require a substantial amount of essential stores/ammunition to bring both ships up to endurance with the addition of the RM personnel. I therefore forwarded my intention to replenish both ships from RFA FORT AUSTIN after leaving ASCENSION (ANTRIM AAA/19F/LMM 082205Z Apr 82), demands to be placed after FORT AUSTIN had sailed to avoid compromise of Operation (CinCFleet AAA/ACA/19F 080112Z Apr 82).
7. ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH anchored off ASCENSION ISLAND at 100900Z Apr 82. A liaison party and stores working party were landed by helo prior to arrival to establish the embarkation programme, and embarkation of troops/stores by helicopter commenced at 1000Z. TIDESPRING, having been delayed by adverse weather, anchored off GEORGETOWN at 101400Z Apr 82. Embarkation of heavy stores and ammunition and M COY 42 Cdo personnel to her commenced on arrival by lighter and helicopter, and proceeded until 102200Z Apr, when work was terminated for the night to recommence at 10600Z Apr. During the evening of 10 Apr a Navigation Installation was transferred from HMS SHEFFIELD to HMS ANTRIM by ship's staff and set to work after some initial problems. This equipment has proved invaluable in the South Atlantic.
8. ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH weighed and proceeded at 110930Z to clear the anchor berths PLYMOUTH proceeded to rendezvous with RFA APPLELEAF to collect stores and replenish, while ANTRIM remained in the vicinity of ASCENSION continuing operations, and awaiting the completion of the stores lift and the embarkation of 845 Sqn C Flight in TIDESPRING. This was completed at 111130Z and TIDESPRING then weighed and proceeded being joined by ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH to the SW of the island. ANTRIM fuelled down track at 111330Z and then returned to the vicinity of ASCENSION ISLAND to await the arrival of further essential stores (cold weather clothing for all ships), while PLYMOUTH and TIDESPRING proceeded towards the rendezvous with FORT AUSTIN. While awaiting the arrival of the aircraft with the cold weather clothing, I was advised from ashore that ANTRIM was also to embark the Arctic equipment embarked in This was done concurrently with the cold weather clothing, completing at 120100Z Apr. ANTRIM then departed ASCENSION ISLAND at 22 knots to rejoin PLYMOUTH and TIDESPRING down track.
9. ANTRIM re-joined PLYMOUTH and TIDESPRING at 130700Z Apr shortly after the rendezvous had been made with FORT AUSTIN. Fortunately the weather allowed a southerly replenishment course and ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH both replenished stores/victuals/ammunition during the forenoon of 13 Apr. FORT AUSTIN had rendezvoused with ENDURANCE on 12 Apr and had transferred RM together with their command/signals/liason teams and stores for M Company 42 Commando.

10. During the replenishment with FORT AUSTIN, Major [redacted], Officer Commanding [redacted], Second in Command 42 Commando and Commander Landing Force, advised me that in view of the latest intelligence regarding Argentinian strength in SOUTH GEORGIA (CTG 317.0 AAA/19F 121230Z Apr 82) it was the military opinion that Task Group [redacted] should embark the [redacted] together with the surgical team from FORT AUSTIN. Accordingly I discussed this with your Chief of Staff, [redacted] on the Satellite Communication secure speech facility and received his approval so to do. This unscheduled transfer of an additional 70-odd men and a very large quantity of stores/ammunition took some time to prepare and could not be conducted while alongside FORT AUSTIN. Accordingly it was conducted by helicopter vertrep commencing at 131500Z; the HQ/signals elements [redacted] together with [redacted] /ammunition and the personnel of the surgical team, were transferred to [redacted] to PLYMOUTH, and the surgical team's stores and equipment to TIDESPRING. It was a long and complex operation, hindered by weather and aircraft availability, and was not finally completed until 140015Z Apr, when FORT AUSTIN was detached to join TG [redacted]

11. During the initial planning for the operation I became concerned about the capability of TIDESPRING to support the task group should the landing be delayed, or become extended through weather or other problems. Accordingly I sent my signal 19J/LMM 140133Z Apr proposing that BRAMBLELEAF be diverted for pumpover to a waiting position 500 miles NE of SOUTH GEORGIA. This was amplified in my 19J/142020Z Apr 82, after CLF and his staff had completed their initial assessment which indicated the requirement for up to the main landing.

12. HMS ENDURANCE joined the task group during the forenoon of 14 April and successfully conducted RAS(L) with RFA TIDESPRING that afternoon, using an ad hoc astern rig. Fortunately the weather conditions were favourable with only a slight swell, otherwise it is doubtful whether the fuelling could have been achieved.

13. The task group was now complete and proceeded south at ENDURANCE's best speed of 13 knots. A strict EMCON policy was imposed including measures against the SOSS. It is assessed that these measures were successful and that the group's approach to and presence off SOUTH GEORGIA was undetected until after the initial recce parties had been inserted, and that even then its exact composition was not established by the Argentinians.

14. Your orders for Operation [redacted] (CinCFleet Op Order 2/82 dated 121800Z Apr 82) was received by [redacted] at 0930 on 15 April and detailed planning commenced. The following threat assessment was made:

a. Surface: negligible, as intelligence indications were that all enemy surface forces were redeployed in home waters or involved in operations within the FALKLAND ISLANDS MEZ. These forces were being progressively out flanked the further south TG [redacted]

b. Sub Surface: slight. It was assessed that enemy submarine effort would be deployed in support of the FALKLAND MEZ.

c. Air:

(1) the offensive air threat from land based aircraft was assessed as nil from the mainland, and very slight from the FALKLAND ISLANDS. Intelligence indicated that progress in improving airfield facilities for the latter was slow, and in any case the weather pattern forecast for the SOUTH GEORGIA area militated against effective air operations. Carrier-based air attack from ARA VEINTICINO DE MAYO was possible if the carrier was deployed to within range, but this was assessed unlikely because of the UK SSN threat.

(2) there was a significant air reconnaissance threat from ARGENTINIAN P2 and C130 aircraft, and from the SOSS, it being assessed that information from the latter would be communicated to the ARGENTINIANS. The Task Group's strictly covert EMCON policy and routing was designed to minimize this threat.

d. Land Forces: intelligence reports on the forces in SOUTH GEORGIA were conflicting but it was assessed that there were probably 50-60 Marines at GRYTVIKEN and up to 20 in LEITH, with a further 15 "scrap metal workers" at the latter. This was based on the original landing figures and it was possible that reinforcements had been landed. Intelligence suggested that SOUTH GEORGIA might be stiffly defended but not "to the death" if confronted by superior force levels.

e. Weather: it was assessed that the weather would be a significant factor in the conduct of operations. Small boat/gemini operations from offshore would be impracticable, and most movement would have to be by helicopter. There was a likelihood of ice-bergs to the North and East of the island but discussion with HMS ENDURANCE indicated that our approach from this sector was feasible with proper caution, and would further increase the chance of remaining undetected. This approach was therefore made though in the event it proved that the ice-berg limit at that time was further to the East than forecast.

15. The main problem exercising my mind at this time was that of resolving the requirement to be in position to conduct the initial landings at first light against my perceived need to achieve the pumlover from BRAMBLELEAF before this, so that TIDESPRING, with the main landing force helicopter and troop elements embarked, was not impeded from quick reaction operations if required. Accordingly in my signal AAA/19J 162358Z Apr 82 I recommended implementation of an option to delay the landings to first light which would allow both for the pumlover to be completed, and for a reduced speed of advance of the force. The latter was as a result of advice from ENDURANCE that the forecast weather en route would severely reduce his SOA.

16. Meanwhile military planning was proceeding, and the concept of operations was forwarded at my AAA/19J 171202Z Apr 82. This envisaged a three phase operation. Phase 1 with recce objectives at edge of the and the in and the approaches to with the objective of recce correlation of intelligence by these teams, to be followed by Phase 3, Phase 2 was the gathering and The plan for the latter depended on the results of of the RM M COY Group and out envisaged on the, probably at forecast for Phases 1 and 2 was which meant that the military operation was planned This further reinforced my desire to achieve the BRAMBLELEAF/TIDESPRING pumlover as early as possible.

17. To meet the pumpover requirement you diverted BRAMBLELEAF towards South Georgia ordering her to rendezvous at 5300S 03400W (about 100 miles NE of the island) in your AAA/I9J 171700Z Apr 82 and assigning TACON to me in your AAA/I9J 172035Z Apr 82. BRAMBLELEAF reported her ETA at this rendezvous as 211500Z Apr which would have permitted the pumpover before landings took place in accordance with my proposed option to delay them until first light 23 Apr. I inferred implicit approval of this later date from your AAA/I9J 172120Z Apr 82, which referred to "capitalizing on your later date of approach!"

18. However, on 18 Apr your Chief of Staff informed me on the satellite secure speech system that, because of I was to be in position for the original date of 21 Apr. The pumpover was to take place as early as possible, compatible with operational requirements, so that BRAMBLELEAF could be released to support other elements of TF . Accordingly the course of the group was altered to the direct track for SOUTH GEORGIA, accepting our earlier entry into Argentinian air recce cover, and I reported my intentions in my AAA/I9J 181959Z Apr 82. I assessed that, given favourable weather conditions, the group would arrive 30 miles North of at 210600Z Apr, ready to commence , and that the

be on the night of 26 Apr. The pumpover would be conducted 22 Apr, or as soon thereafter as circumstances permitted, though this might entail retaining BRAMBLELEAF as late as 30 Apr. My priorities for the VICTOR MRR aircraft tasked in support on 20 Apr were for a shipping / ice-berg plot North and East of the island in advance of the group, thereafter to give advanced warning of any Argentinian surface deployments.

19. The next two days were spent in detailed planning and briefing, and in completing a considerable intership exchange of personnel and equipment to get the right people and things into the right places at the right time. It was decided that the insertion of the would be conducted by Wessex 3/5 from ANTRIM and TIDESPRING from a position while PLYMOUTH and ENDURANCE proceeded to the of the island

20. During the latter stages of the approach on 20 Apr the weather started to worsen with rapidly falling pressure and wind NW 25 knots. However, it was possible to maintain a sufficient SOA to reach the launch positions on time. Codeword , the authority to initiate was received p.m. 20 Apr.

21. ANTRIM and TIDESPRING were in position for the first but the weather was unsuitable with 25 knots of wind from the NW, 2 miles visibility with 400 feet cloudbase and a rapidly falling pressure at 965 mb. A weather recce was flown by ANTRIM's Wessex 3 at 0930Z, which found suitable conditions and was followed by an at 1100Z using this aircraft and TIDESPRING's two Wessex 5s. This was aborted by a heavy snowstorm. However, a further attempt was successful during a temporary improvement in conditions.

22. ANTRIM and TIDESPRING then retired to a holding position The weather rapidly deteriorated during the afternoon and evening with the wind backing SW and gusting up to 70 knots, both ships having to heave to until the storm abated during the morning of 22 Apr.

23. Meanwhile PLYMOUTH and ENDURANCE had proceeded to the East of the island during the day of 21 Apr conducting an ice and mership recce during daylight hours. The British Antarctic Survey base at ST ANDREW'S BAY was also visited and the personnel there warned that British warships were in the vicinity and that, for security reasons, this should not be revealed in conversations on the BAS field radio circuit. They reported having seen no Argentinian movements since the day of the invasion. ENDURANCE then proceeded into covering to seaward. This was at last light while PLYMOUTH remained finally achieved by the weather but was and suffered a windlass motor failure, as a result of which she had to buoy and slip her starboard anchor and three shackles of cable.

24. It had been intended to rendezvous with BRAMBLELEAF for pumpover on 22 Apr but, because of the weather, it was decided to postpone this. PLYMOUTH and ENDURANCE were ordered to remain in the comparative shelter to the East of SOUTH GEORGIA, while ANTRIM and TIDESPRING remained to the North, with BRAMBLELEAF holding in the rendezvous position.

25. At 221100Z Apr the called for immediate evacuation. The appalling weather experienced had prevented any progress, on the ANTRIM's Wessex 3 and both Wessex 5's from TIDESPRING were launched at 1200Z, but could not locate the party in heavy snow showers. After refuelling they were relaunched for a further attempt at 1330Z.

Its aircrew and passengers were transferred to the remaining aircraft but, on relaunching, The Wessex 3 returned to ANTRIM, landed its passengers and returned to the scene with a contact and established that, having recovered to ANTRIM and refuelled the aircraft launched again at 1630Z, and successfully e. The circumstances of this incident were reported in my signals AAA/19J 221500Z, 221547Z and 221725 Apr 82.

26. conducting the operation but did as the concept was priority was to gather intelligence on the enemy dispositions ashore, and it was therefore decided to The immediate into during the night 22/23 Apr. Accordingly I issued revised orders for the night in my AAA/19J 221958Z. PLYMOUTH and ENDURANCE were to land the back-up element of the ~~troop~~ troop at from , and ANTRIM was to , while TIDESPRING and BRAMBLELEAF held clear to the North. All ships were to rendezvous in position at 230900Z Apr for RAS and pumpover.

27. ANTRIM entered 230400Z and disembarked to . Considerable difficulty was experienced with launch, to the extent that at one stage it appeared that the operation might have to be abandoned. Indeed at 230800Z Apr, while proceeding to rendezvous

with the rest of the group, I
and
Accordingly I closed the coast and launched my Wessex 3 while
PLYMOUTH was ordered to take charge of the BRAMBLELEAF/TIDESPRING pumcover.
The was located in the vicinity of off the entrance to
and its . ANTRIM then opened
from the coast but remained within 25 miles to monitor the communication nets
for

28. At about 231130Z Apr I received a report from ENDURANCE that the BAS party at SCHLIEPER BAY had seen an unidentified aircraft overhead at 231030Z. This correlated with an I-Band aircraft racket held by ANTRIM and reported in my AAA/19J 231147Z Apr 82, which was identified as probable C-130 HERCULES in your AAA/19J 231345Z Apr 82. This aircraft, relieved by a second one, continued surveillance throughout daylight hours, closing PLYMOUTH and the tanker group to visual identification range at 231155Z Apr. All ships maintained radar silence and it is believed that the composition of the force was not established by the enemy.

29. At 231456Z Apr
, which was replied to by

Shortly afterwards your AAA/19J 231450Z Apr 82 ARA SANTA FE might be in the vicinity of SOUTH GEORGIA and ordering me to take appropriate precautions. This was further amplified in a DSS call with your Chief of Staff who informed me that there was firm intelligence to indicate that the SANTA FE was in the area and that it was most important to safeguard the two tankers. I also discussed with him the problem of the HERCULES/707 air surveillance that the group was under, and the vital need to be allowed the Rules of Engagement to deal with them as military assistance aircraft, particularly as they could locate and target the force for the SANTA FE.

30. Meanwhile I ordered PLYMOUTH, about 60 miles to the East with the two tankers and ENDURANCE, to break off the pumcover and withdraw south to clear the submarine area. Subsequently I ordered all ships to rendezvous about 40 miles North East of the island, which was accomplished at about 2200Z.

31. During the course of the afternoon a message was received from the reporting that the ice and glacier conditions in were such that no progress could be made

32. The whole aspect of the SOUTH GEORGIA operation had now changed completely. The problems with the

been gained, or would be in the immediate future except at capacity drastically, Both of the group's Wessex 5s had been lost reducing the the force was under surveillance from the air, and there was a high submarine threat.

It had been removed from ANTRIM's Wessex 3 in favour of capacity, and HMS BRILLIANT (), who had been detached to reinforce TG , could not join before a.m. 25 Apr.

33. I therefore made a complete re-appreciation which was outlined in my signals I9J 232225Z (SITREP and intentions) and AAA/I9J 232235Z Apr 82 (Appreciation). I assessed that SANTE FE could be in position to threaten ships off a.m. 24 Apr and that, with my remaining helo lift I could not re-dispose the landing force in time to make a viable landing before this. I further assessed that it was important to get a military base established ashore as soon as possible and that the assets available in ANTRIM would be sufficient to take LEITH. However, it would be disastrous military and politically to lose a ship without

having achieved the aim of re-capturing SOUTH GEORGIA, and so the operation could only be conducted if the risk was minimal.

34. I therefore issued the following instructions for the night of 23/24 Apr:

- a. PLYMOUTH, BRAMBLELEAF and TIDESPRIING to clear the MEZ to the North East overnight, complete pumlover during 24 Apr and rendezvous with BRILLIANT.
- b. ANTRIM to enter _____ to land troops at first light 24 Apr at _____ to take _____ to provide NGS as required and, on completion, withdraw at best speed to rendezvous with main group.
- c. ENDURANCE to proceed to _____ at first light 24 Apr, then to _____
- d. In the longer term the group would assume an ASW posture to prosecute the SANTA FE.

35. Shortly before ANTRIM was to detach for the _____ task the group again came under C130 HERCULES air radar cover. It was assessed that the risk of ANTRIM thereby being targetted to the SANTA FE and possibly trapped while _____ was unacceptable. This operation was therefore cancelled by my AAA/I9J 240220Z Apr 82, and ANTRIM proceeded North with the RAS group.

36. During the night further intelligence received from you indicated that SANTA FE's tasks were to land troops in SOUTH GEORGIA (presumably reinforcements) and to attack British ships in the vicinity. As all ships had been withdrawn from the approaches to _____ and _____ I assessed it probable that he would land his troops first and that there was a possibility that this would be during daylight on 24 Apr. and I ordered ENDURANCE, _____ of _____ to conduct _____ and _____ during daylight hours with AS12 armed Wasps, in the hope of catching the submarine on the surface as it entered. Also during the night the authorisation to engage Argentinian C130 and 707 aircraft engaged in surveillance of operations was received.

37. _____ (_____) was moved by you from his covering position _____ SOUTH GEORGIA into the areas immediately _____ to conduct operations against the _____ Welcome though this was, I was somewhat concerned about the danger or friendly interaction and the resultant implications of surface ship ASW capabilities. I therefore made a further re-assessment of the situation and my intentions in my AAA/I9J 241400Z Apr 82. The key to the situation was the neutralisation of SANTA FE, about which _____ BRILLIANT, and ANTRIM's _____ I therefore decided to conduct the BRAMBLELEAF/TIDESPRIING pumlover clear of the MEZ on 24 Apr and to replenish ANTRIM, PLYMOUTH and BRILLIANT on completion, before the warships returned South to commence operations against SANTA FE on 25 Apr. The plan was to operate clear of, but adjacent to, _____ in the hope of forcing SANTA FE to snort/use high speed to close us, thereby allowing _____ Concurrently we would attempt to draw the Argentinian

rece aircraft into missile range. TIDESPRING, with the main elements of M Coy RM embarked, would remain clear of the MEZ to the North, while ENDURANCE would take shelter among the ice-bergs on completion of operations in HOUND BAY.

38. During the afternoon of 24 Apr ENDURANCE reported being overflown by a BOEING 707 rece aircraft while in HOUND BAY and assessed he had been detected. Shortly afterwards he relayed an intercepted message from the BAS personnel at BIRD ISLAND reporting the sighting of two warships, two small jets and a BOEING 707 aircraft in their vicinity. ENDURANCE assessed that he was in a possible multi-threat situation and requested support. There was no collateral for the presence of enemy warships in the area, nor was it considered likely that the Argentinians had the capability to deploy in-flight refuelled ground attack aircraft over SOUTH GEORGIA, particularly since intelligence indicated that little progress had been made in improvements to the PORT STANLEY runway in the FALKLANDS. Nevertheless the threat could not be discounted. The pumpover was stopped and I issued revised instructions in my AAA/19J 241656Z Apr 82. BRAMBLELEAF was to proceed North West to replenish BRILLIANT en route and then as ordered by CTG 317.8. BRILLIANT was to close SOUTH GEORGIA at 25 knots on completion. ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH were to replenish from TIDESPRING and then proceed at 25 knots to join ENDURANCE in the vicinity of HOUND BAY, leaving TIDESPRING holding in a position clear of the MEZ to await further orders.

39. While ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH were replenishing contact was made with BRILLIANT through his Lynx helicopter, revealing that he was closer than anticipated. Accordingly the plan was changed, BRAMBLELEAF being released completely and BRILLIANT being ordered to replenish from TIDESPRING en route.

40. Shortly after this your AAA/19J 241525Z Apr 82 was received informing me that CONQUEROR's areas were being extended to cover the whole of the North and North East coasts of SOUTH GEORGIA. This effectively closed the whole of these sea areas to me for ASW operations except against surfaced submarines, and caused a further revision to my overnight plans. Nevertheless, ENDURANCE having reported no sign of SANTA FE during daylight on 24 Apr, I assessed it probable that the submarine would enter CUMBERLAND BAY that night, and that it was vital that we should be in a position to catch him on the surface at first light, when he could be expected to be departing.

41. Accordingly I ordered ANTRIM, PLYMOUTH and BRILLIANT to rendezvous in a position about 25 miles North East of CUMBERLAND BAY, clear of CONQUEROR's expanded area, at 250800Z Apr. ANTRIM's Wessex 3, armed with two Mk II depth charges, was to launch at 0800Z to be off the entrance to CUMBERLAND BAY by first light, one of BRILLIANT's Lynxes with Mk 46 torpedoes was to launch at 0830Z for surface search, to confirm or otherwise the presence of enemy surface units, and the Wasps from PLYMOUTH and ENDURANCE were to be at Alert 10 from 0830Z, armed with AS 12 in the anti surface role. ENDURANCE had again to be in the vicinity of HOUND BAY, which was in CONQUEROR's revised area, and so I obtained your permission for this. ASW weapons were tight except against a surfaced submarine, or a positively identified conventional submarine if submerged, although I assessed that it was unlikely that CONQUEROR would actually reach the CUMBERLAND BAY area much before 251600Z Apr.

42. ANTRIM's Wessex 3 launched at 0810 and shortly afterwards detected a surface contact 5 miles North of the entrance to CUMBERLAND BAY. This was positively identified as SANTA FE on the surface at 0855Z and the Wessex immediately attacked with its two Mk II Depth Charges both of which exploded very close to the submarine, one in fact bouncing off the casing into the water. BRILLIANT's Lynx was called in and dropped one Mk 46 torpedo which was believed to have run but did not acquire the surface target. (It is of interest that the SANTA FE's Captain, ~~later admitted that on signing the helicopter he decided to remain on the surface to avoid the torpedo threat; he did not bargain on Depth Charges and air to surface missiles!~~ PLYMOUTH's and ENDURANCE's Wasps were launched and made a number of AS12 attacks on the submarine, which was by this time returning to GRITVIKEN on the surface leaving a trail of oil. Several hits were made on the fin and it was assessed as disabled. However, the pressure was kept on until it had berthed alongside the BAS jetty at KING EDWARD COVE.

43. It was now obvious that our presence must be known to the Argentinian garrison, so the opportunity was taken while the helicopters were in CUMBERLAND BAY to conduct reconnaissance of any military dispositions. It was reported that there was no sign of any activity ashore, nor could any distinct observation posts nor defensive positions be seen although machine gun fire was reported. In consultation with the Commander Landing Force, Major ~~and~~ Officer Commanding

preparations were immediately put in hand, with all available embarked forces being brought to one hour's notice for landing at 1040Z. I also ordered TIDESPRING, with the main elements embarked, to close SOUTH GEORGIA forthwith and, with SANTA FE neutralised, requested you to clear CONQUEROR from the area to avoid possible interaction.

44. It was decided to conduct the initial landing with the troops available in ANTRIM, comprising M Coy Command element and ~~command~~ and signals troop and the M and AW troop, 148 Battery RA, and ANTRIM's RM detachment - ~~3~~. The remaining and RM detachments in PLYMOUTH, BRILLIANT and ENDURANCE, were to be held in reserve ready to conduct flanking landings if required. The main landing was to be made on the flat ground of the ~~landing zone~~ and of the high ground between it and ~~Pre-bombardment of the~~ was to be conducted by ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH with spotting provided by an NGSFO in one of ENDURANCE's Wasps.

45. Planning, briefing and preparations took about ~~of the~~ and the approaches to ~~and at 1400~~ commenced. The assault helicopter lift, provided by ANTRIM's ~~launched at 1430Z and~~ on time at 1445Z. These ~~rcraft~~ which was a very creditable effort. ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH continued supporting NGS ahead of the advancing troops, ANTRIM entering ~~at 1640Z to improve communications and to open arcs into the~~ area if necessary. The troops ashore met no opposition, and at 1705Z a white flag was observed to be hoisted alongside the Argentinian flag at ~~The advance continued with caution~~ and at 1715Z the Argentinian commander ashore notified surrender on VHF Channel 16

and warned that the area around [redacted] was heavily land-mined and that British forces should take care and be led through by the Argentinian garrison. ANTRIM's Wessex 3 was launched immediately with a medical team to evacuate any casualties. Fortunately there was only one, a sailor from the SANTA FE, who had been injured during the attacks on the submarine. He had been badly injured in the right leg, which had been amputated above the knee by the Argentinian medical team ashore, and was brought onboard ANTRIM for medical attention overnight, being transferred to the surgical unit in TIDESPRING a.m. on 26 Apr. There was some suspicion that he had trodden on one of their own mines at the time, but this subsequently proved to be false.

46. At 1730Z the Union Flag and White Ensign flew together over and the task of consolidation began. ANTRIM anchored off and commenced to ferry equipment and stores to the troops ashore who had some 140 prisoners to secure and guard. Structurally the buildings and facilities ashore were largely intact but there had been some looting/vandalism by the Argentinians and a major cleaning up operation was required. Technical Assistance from ANTRIM was provided to service the generating plant, electrical and fresh water services which were near breakdown because of neglect.

47. The surrender at 1715Z had, it was understood, included all Argentinian forces in SOUTH GEORGIA. At 1815Z I therefore detached PLYMOUTH and ENDURANCE, with one of BRILLIANT's Lynxes embarked, to secure LEITH with their embarked who were not required at [redacted]. BRILLIANT was ordered to remain at sea to patrol the offshore areas overnight while TIDESPRING, closing from the North, was ordered to an area inshore of BRILLIANT to prepare to disembark the remainder of M Coy and receive casualties.

48. PLYMOUTH's report of proceedings of the securing of LEITH is at Annex A. Suffice it to say that after, some initial defiance over the radio, the 13 Argentinian Marines, commanded by [redacted] agreed to surrender without fighting. Together with 39 civilian scrap metal workers this now meant that the task group had nearly 200 detainees and prisoners of war.

49. The Argentinian Commander Land Forces [redacted] and the Commanding Officer SANTA FE [redacted] were brought onboard ANTRIM at about 2030Z. In accordance with your instructions they were not interrogated. However, in conversation while being given a meal, LAGOS admitted that he had been sent with 20 men in SANTA FE to reinforce GRITVIKEN, but that he had not had time to strengthen the defences. (There was a great deal of weaponry and ammunition ashore). [redacted] was ambivalent about his orders in regard to sinking our ships but, although he alleged that he was returning to ARGENTINA, I was quite sure from his manner that he was tasked against us. Both officers had spent some time in UK on various courses, having stood by one of the Argentinian Type 42's in build, and spoke rather better English than they admitted. Regrettably, such had been the pace and unexpectedness of events, I had not had time to prepare a formal instrument of surrender before they were returned ashore that night, and this had to be completed on an opportunity basis on 26 Apr.

50. The 26, 27 and 28 Apr were spent in a complex and time consuming ship to shore, shore to ship and ship to ship transfer of personnel and equipment,

aggravated by gale force winds and snow showers which made conditions very difficult and, on occasion, distinctly hazardous. A further complication was added by the force continuing to be under surveillance by enemy reconnaissance aircraft, necessitating a continual air defence posture in case the aircraft could be lured close enough to engage, and in case an air attack was mounted.

51. Your I9F 261531Z Apr 82 ordered me to _____ (including _____ and NGFS personnel and stores into BRILLIANT and PLYMOUTH for transfer as soon as possible to TG _____. Fortunately it was decided not to garrison _____ as well as _____, but in the prevailing conditions it was not possible to complete all transfers until 281330Z Apr at which time both ships detached.

52. On 26 Apr I tasked _____, Royal Navy of HMS BRILLIANT to conduct a survey of the SANTA FE, assisted by technical officers from ANTRIM. He did so and reported to me that the submarine was in a dangerous state and likely to sink alongside the BAS jetty, but that he thought it feasible to move it across the bay to the old whaling station at GRITVIKEN. I approved this course of action and accordingly _____, assisted by _____ and a number of key Argentinian ratings moved the submarine under its own power later that day. While moving the submarine began to lose buoyancy and there was a tragic incident when the RM guard in its control room shot dead a senior Argentinian technical rating, Chief Petty Officer. The latter moved quickly to start the LP air pumps to maintain flotation, which was misunderstood by the guard as an attempt to scuttle the submarine. I reported this unfortunate affair in my CTG 317.9 AAA/19J/WSC 262012Z Apr 82 (Fatal Accident), and convened a Board of Inquiry, the results of which were forwarded at my letter 502/4 dated 5 May 1982. Chief Petty Officer _____ was subsequently buried in the GRITVIKEN cemetery with full military honours on 30 Apr. The guard, bugler and pall-bearers were provided by ANTRIM, and the ceremony was attended by _____ and a number of his shipmates.

53. On completion of _____ Apr, ANTRIM, ENDURANCE and TIDESPRING continued with consolidation of SOUTH GEORGIA. ANTRIM provided additional support to M Coy, RM in clearing up and setting to work in GRITVIKEN, and supplied enough food to bring the garrison up to _____ TIDESPRING completed disembarking M Coy personnel and stores and embarked all the Argentinian prisoners of war and detainees. ENDURANCE started work at LEITH, clearing a considerable amount of booby-trapping, explosives and ammunition, and contacted all BAS/TV personnel on the island on the BAS radio net acquainting them of the situation, and warning them to be ready to be collected at short notice. _____ was therefore less than enchanted to be shaken in the middle of the night 28/29 Apr for a Prime Ministerial enquiry (MODUK 19F/19J 282225Z Apr 82) which alleged that no contact had been made with the BAS/TV personnel since the island had been re-captured. Indeed the party from the LYELL GLACIER walked into GRITVIKEN on the morning of 29 Apr, and I met them there.

54. The Master of TIDESPRING and I were becoming increasingly concerned about the conditions under which the prisoners had to be accommodated in TIDESPRING. Besides severe overcrowding, discomfort and lack of sanitary facilities, the extreme cold, against which little protection could be provided, was thought to be a danger to health. Some unrest and defiance had occurred, particularly in the group in which was _____ and, at the Master's request, I transferred _____ to ANTRIM where he was kept in close custody in a spare cabin. Because of the requirement to pump over between BRITISH ESK and BLUE ROVER it appeared probable that the latter and PLYMOUTH could not arrive at SOUTH GEORGIA

before 7 May to take over guardship duties. Delaying the departure of ANTRIM and TIDESPRING until then would mean that the prisoners would remain in these poor conditions for nearly three weeks, ten days of which would have been spent, apparently doing nothing, in the extreme conditions off SOUTH GEORGIA. I therefore made my signal I9J 301810Z Apr 82 proposing that ANTRIM and TIDESPRING departed early for the latter to reach warmer water, which would leave SOUTH GEORGIA with only ENDURANCE as guard ship for 2 - 3 days until PLYMOUTH arrived. In the circumstances, with the main group approaching the Falkland TEZ and under surveillance, I considered this a justifiable risk.

55. ENDURANCE was ordered to cease operations at LEITH p.m. 29 Apr, and to proceed to pick up BAS/TV personnel from their various locations around the island, so that they could spend a day at GRITVIKEN to sort personal belongings, stores, equipment, etc before embarking in ANTRIM for an estimated departure date of 3 May. Meanwhile ANTRIM collected BAS stores from LYELL GLACIER, and

56. Your I9F/LDQ/LMQ 011045Z May 82, which ordered ANTRIM to embark BAS parties and sail from SOUTH GEORGIA not later than 021200Z May, was received at 1300Z on 1 May. ANTRIM immediately closed ENDURANCE, who was at the Western end of the island, for an early transfer of BAS personnel, and returned to GRITVIKEN to land them for their visit. TIDESPRING was also sailed, to proceed North towards warmer water as soon as possible.

57. BAS personnel, plus ANTRIM personnel who had been ashore assisting M Coy, were re-embarked from GRITVIKEN a.m. 2 May, and ANTRIM departed at 1200Z to re-join TIDESPRING. ENDURANCE was left in local command to progress the tasks required, which were detailed in my I9J 011630Z May 82.

58. ANTRIM, PLYMOUTH and TIDESPRING rendezvoused in position 5000S 04400W, about 200 miles North West of SOUTH GEORGIA, at 031200Z May. PLYMOUTH replenished from TIDESPRING, who then detached in company with ANTRIM for ASCENSION ISLAND. On detaching the duties of CTG 317.9 were assumed by Captain D PENTREATH, Royal Navy of HMS PLYMOUTH.

59. ANTRIM and TIDESPRING made an uneventful passage North, coming under intermittent surveillance by Argentinian BOEING 707 reconnaissance aircraft. Rendezvous was made with TU 317.0.4 (HMS ANTELOPE, RFAs SIR GALAHAD, SIR LANCELOT, SIR TRISTRAM, SIR PERCIVAL, SIR GERAINT and PEARLEAF) at first light on 7 May. Captain ASTIZ, all BAS/TV personnel, mail and stores were transferred to ANTELOPE. I then assumed the duties of CTU 317.0.4 and proceeded South with the LSL group, while ANTELOPE and TIDESPRING continued to ASCENSION ISLAND. ANTRIM's participation in Operation PARAQUAT was complete.

60. The following comments are submitted:

a. Bad weather was expected off SOUTH GEORGIA, but that experienced during the week of the operation exceeded all expectations. High winds and frequent snow showers made flying operations marginal for much of the time, and boat/gemini operations impossible except in sheltered bays. Many risks had to be taken and safety considerations ignored, in order to achieve the aim. It was very fortunate that no casualties resulted.

b. The terrain of SOUTH GEORGIA is much more inhospitable than it appears to be according to the maps, as the reconnaissance parties discovered. Both GRITVIKEN and LIETH are land locked by rugged mountains making frontal approaches the only viable option in Winter conditions. Had the Argentinians made any significant preparations, these natural defensive positions would have proved hard nuts to crack, and the task group, even before the loss of the two Wessex 5s, would have been short of assault-helicopter lift.

c. The presence of the SANTA FE put a completely new complexion on the operation and, had we not been able to neutralise it so early, it would have resulted in a very extended timescale.

d. Communications with you through the satellite MRL and the secure speech link, were excellent throughout. The latter was particularly useful for exchanging real time intelligence and information, particularly in regard to the SANTA FE, and contributed greatly to the successful conclusion of the operation.

in ENDURANCE made an on, but were very over-worked. The provision of back up, or of a further team with in the group, would have been very welcome.

e. An unexpectedly large number of prisoners and civilian detainees were taken. Processing this number without trained personnel and linguists proved difficult and time-consuming. As many of them were illiterate and of low intelligence, getting the bare information required by the Geneva Convention was not easy, let alone attempting to elicit the additional facts requested by MODUK.


f. The mounting and conduct of the operation was at a very high need to know classification throughout. No press releases were therefore made, or even considered, by me as CTG, it being assumed that your staff would extract what facts were required from my situation reports. After the landing a few press releases were made at your request, which were difficult to compile within the continuing high classification. This led to an acerbic exchange of signals between myself, the Captain of the Fleet, and the Fleet PRO. It was appreciated that disinformation regarding the composition of the force was important, but some of the factual inaccuracy of the media reports that filtered back was disappointing and annoying. The BBC World Service was very valuable in keeping me informed of diplomatic events, but its speculation about military movements was not so welcome - and positively the reverse when it was announced on the very morning on which we arrived and inserted the first recce landings that: "a British force is poised off SOUTH GEORGIA". The difficulties are well appreciated, but it is recommended that in future operations of this covert nature all press releases are made by your staff, based on filtered factual information from the commanders on the spot, and that the latter not be invited to make them separate from his operational reports.

61. In conclusion I am glad to report the successful completion of Operation , in accordance with your directive for the minimum loss of life and damage to installations. I am also proud to record that the officers and men of the task group, and of the embarked forces, conducted themselves magnificently during the operation in very arduous and unpleasant conditions.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant



Annex:

- A. Commanding Officer HMS PLYMOUTH's Report of Proceedings for the re-occupation of LEITH 25-26 Apr 82.

Information:

Flag Officer First Flotilla



The Captain
Sixth Frigate Squadron
HMS Plymouth
BFPO Ships

226

The Commanding Officer
HMS ANTRIM
South Georgia

29 April 1982

Sir,

1. I have the honour to submit the following report of proceedings of Her Majesty's Ships PLYMOUTH, under my command, and ENDURANCE for the period 25-26 April 1982 when detached from HMS ANTRIM, while reoccupying Leith, South Georgia.
2. The action off Cumberland Bay on 25 April 1982, when PLYMOUTH's and ENDURANCE's Wasps had successfully engaged the Argentinian submarine SANTA FE with AS-12 missiles, and PLYMOUTH had subsequently fired 166 rounds of HE at various NGS shore targets in the Grytviken area had whetted our appetites for further action, and it was with eager anticipation that I received your orders to proceed to Leith at 1815 with ENDURANCE in company.
3. PLYMOUTH and ENDURANCE proceeded to the west and stood off Leith while PLYMOUTH's Wasp carried out an armed recce of the area, which appeared from the air to be totally deserted. Having heard of the mining at Grytviken, I decided against any airlift of into the immediate surroundings of Leith, and so while ENDURANCE was able to make contact with the enemy on VHF Ch 16, I flew where they encountered some of the
4. Meanwhile the Argentinian Military Commander at Leith was invited on the radio to surrender owing to the presence of far superior forces and the earlier capture of Grytviken. The reply came back that 39 civilians at Leith were willing to surrender but that the Argentinian Marine detachment was not prepared to do so. The civilians were then ordered to clear the area and proceed to Stromness while the Argentinian Marines later announced they were ready for whatever action was necessary! The scene was therefore set for military action and it was decided to hold a combined O Group on board HMS PLYMOUTH at 2100Z, both ships being anchored in Husvik at that time. Plans were made to land all troops by boat at 2300 on the promontory between Husvik and Stromness, but this was later changed when
5. However just as PLYMOUTH was getting under weigh at 2245, the Argentinians at Leith reported that they were after all prepared to surrender and it was agreed that they would call again at 0800 to receive detailed instructions for surrender. PLYMOUTH then landed the remainder of our , and proceeded to sea for the remainder of the night, while ENDURANCE landed her at 0600, having re-anchored at the entrance to . The Leith to await the Argentinian surrender. As a magnificent multicoloured dawn broke at 0900 on 26 April 1982 the white flag could be seen at the flagpole set before the only inhabitable building in Leith and a party of 12 Argentinian Marines then moved in single file behind the buildings and made their way towards Harbour Point and surrender. Two other Marines who had been 'missing' for some hours, were later traced nearby. It was also learned that Leith had been heavily mined by the Argentinians.


6. PLYMOUTH had by this time anchored off Leith and at 1100 a formal Surrender Instrument was signed onboard by the Senior Argentinian Marine Officer in the presence of ENDURANCE and myself and a number of officers and men from both ships. This brief and most unusual ceremony was followed by urgent discussions with the Argentinian Officer over the safe and timely removal of the demolitions and mines which cluttered the foreshore and approaches to Leith. It was agreed that a party of six Argentinians would make safe the 500 - 600KG of explosives together with ENDURANCE, while PLYMOUTH arranged to embark 37 of the 39 civilian scrap metal men and 6 of the marines as POW. ENDURANCE took the balance of 8 Marines and 2 civilians as POW, and remained at Leith throughout 26 April to complete mine-clearance operations.

7. Having (who had conveniently come across a magnificent reindeer and whose carcass arrived by vertrep) mounted guard on the extremely smelly and dishevelled POW's. PLYMOUTH proceeded to Grytviken to land the captives; however this proved impracticable as neither TIDESPRING nor Grytviken camp was prepared to take them. Conditions ashore at Leith, Stromness and Husvik were also unsuitable for housing these men and since the weather had deteriorated making boating impossible and anchorage in Leith was thoroughly unpleasant, I retained the 43 onboard - thus PLYMOUTH had a very trying 24 hours as a prison-ship, and no one was sorry to see them leave the following day.

8. ENDURANCE sailed from Leith on 27 April having marked all outstanding mines remaining to be cleared; two further days work will be required to complete this operation.

9. Both ships were very pleased to have been so directly involved in the re-occupation of Leith and although military action was not after all required to dislodge the enemy forces, the conduct of all concerned in the re-occupation was most creditable. I was also glad to have the advice and local knowledge of ENDURANCE.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your Obedient Servant



Enclosure:

1. Photos (already handed to the Commanding Officer HMS ANTRIM)


Information:

The Commanding Officer HMS ENDURANCE
Ministry of Defence Naval Historical Branch

OF

LIST OF ANNEXES

- A. COMMANDING OFFICER, HMS PLYMOUTH'S 226 DATED 29 APRIL 1982
- B. INTELLIGENCE
- C. WARFARE
- D. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
- E. COMMUNICATIONS
- F. AVIATION
- G. METEOROLOGY
- H. PREPARATIONS
- I. MARINE ENGINEERING
- J. WEAPON ENGINEERING
- K. LOGISTICS
- L. PEOPLE
- M. PRISONERS OF WAR
- N. MEDICAL
- O. PUBLIC RELATIONS



INTELLIGENCE R.O.P. FOR OPERATION

GENERAL

1. 35 years of intelligence effort directed largely against a single target has produced a generation of officers at sea, ill-prepared to assess the capabilities and efficiency of a non Warsaw Pact country such as Argentina. Janes', the wardroom encyclopaedia, and hearsay from Portland did not provide a reassuring basis for threat assessment during the initial planning stage. There was a strong feeling that more information should have been readily available including orbat, availability and disposition of forces in what was essentially a friendly country. Having no microfiche capability, ANTRIM lacked even the background information of 'Form at a Glance'. The days before the comprehensive DIS briefs arrived were spent briefing from library, magazine and personal information. This provided a good basis for subsequent INTREPS and the deluge of techint. BRITMISS provided a useful updating facility although subsequent allocation of an MRL and poor HF reception prevented it being monitored after the first week. CTF 317 daily Intreps were avidly read and provided valuable background as well as current intelligence.

ASSESSMENT

2. In the absence of any hard information about enemy force disposition and intention the worst case of Soviet-Argentinian collusion was assumed and SOSS countermeasures conducted - apparently successfully. Boeing 707's were not taken into account as military long range recce assets until actually detected. The submarine threat was assessed as possible, but unlikely providing the group was routed far enough east of the direct route between Ascension and South Georgia. A move eastwards by the Argentinian carrier group was confidently expected either in response to a detection of TG 317.9 or to intercept the amphibious task group later. Having remained clear of long range air attack, the SOSS, and passed the period of likely interception by the carrier group, only the submarine threat remained. As time passed and the likelihood of invasion of the Falklands grew - providing a promise of many more submarine targets much closer to Argentina - the threat appeared to diminish. Against this background the information on the SANTA FE provided by ENDURANCE and CTF 317 was timely and had an immediate effect on planning. Despite the limited staff available in ENDURANCE and the need for offline encryption in ENDURANCE, GCHQ, CINCFLEET and ANTRIM, the promptness with which this vital intelligence was processed and promulgated was very commendable.

INTERROGATION

3. A valuable opportunity was lost as a result of the initial instruction (CTF 317 AAA/19J 171950Z APR 82) to confine questioning to ascertaining identities. After capture many prisoners, whether through shock, natural disposition or lack of training showed willingness to talk, explain and justify themselves. Unfortunately by the time further guidance was received (CTF 317 AAA/19J 271305Z APR 82) the prisoners had been transferred to TIDESPING and to some extent, regained their confidence and were less likely to volunteer information. A fear of a hostile reception, and other possibly more serious consequences on their return to Argentina, rendered officers such as (SANTA FE) susceptible to sympathetic handling. In retrospect this could have been much more effectively exploited.

ARA SANTA FE

4. Considerable quantities of technical and communications material were recovered from the submarine. Current crypto material, the TGN associated offline cryptographic machine and recent logs had been ditched. As the submarine was watched more or less continuously from the initial attack until returning to King Edward Cove and nothing was observed to have been thrown overboard, the submarine's immediate vicinity alongside was searched by ANTRIM's divers but without success, apart from recovering the BAS Base Commander's bag of crypto presumed to have been ditched during the Argentinian invasion. A limited amount of analysis was carried out onboard by the ship's SCO and Flight Observer. The results were signalled (Appendix 1) and the original material transferred to the CT element in HERMES. The value of this is not yet known.

BBC

5. Great credit is due to the BBC World Service for the speed and accuracy of their reporting, which on occasion exceeded both immediate precedence and TOP SECRET CODEWORD classification. Although generally informative the service was inopportune and, in speculating about an imminent South Georgia invasion while recce was being conducted, positively counter productive. The wider political comment did however provide a useful background to ROE signals which could otherwise have been read in a vacuum.

LIST OF SIGNALS RELATING TO INTELLIGENCE
ARISING FROM SANTA FE

(All DTG's APR 82)

CTG 317.9 AAA/19J/UAJ 161445Z (DINNER TALK)
" " 271233Z (SITREP 1)
" " 271620Z (SITREP 2)
" " 271700Z (GENERAL)

HMS BRILLIANT 19J 171703Z (CO's ASSESSMENT)

CTG 317.9 AAA/19J/UAJ 281140Z (TORPEDOES)
" " 282240Z (SITREP 4)
" " 282245Z (SITREP 3)

WARFARE R.O.P. FOR OPERATION

TASK

1. The nature of the objective of Operation the forces at our disposal the assessed threat against us and the requirement to remain covert for much of the time dictated that many of the procedures and tactics regularly practised to counter the Soviet threat were just not appropriate. Consequently, each decision, whether it be related to posture, reaction to threat or strategy was of necessity thought through as the operation progressed.

COMPOSITION OF FORCE

2. Until the arrival of HMS BRILLIANT, detached from Task Group to provide additional helicopter lift capacity and improved ASW, the task group comprised:

- a. HMS ANTRIM
- b. HMS PLYMOUTH
- c. HMS ENDURANCE
- d. RFA TIDESPRING

3. All RN units carried elements of accommodating M Company 42 Commando Royal Marines. The command element were carried in HMS ANTRIM

4. Although the task group possessed an AAW, surface warfare and ASW capability, this was thinly spread with two main body ships to protect.

THREAT ASSESSMENT

5. a. Surface It was considered unlikely that the limited resources of the Argentine Fleet would be committed to supporting a distant operation in South Georgia when the potential threat to the Falklands loomed larger. Daily intelligence sitreps supported this assessment.
- b. Air Reconnaissance aircraft (C-130 and 707) had the capability to keep the force under surveillance. Canberra bombers were assessed as having the range to conduct bombing attacks but without radar the threat was minimal and the requirement to remain covert dictated a passive AAW policy.
- c. Anti-submarine In view of the small number of submarines available to the Argentine Navy, the distance from their base and a considered higher priority around the Falklands, the submarine threat was estimated to be almost non-existent. Subsequent events proved this to be a serious miscalculation. A passive sonar policy was adopted on passage to South Georgia. This was changed to an active policy, with decoys streamed and activated once the submarine threat became apparent.

OVERALL POSTURE

6. It was decided that State 2 Condition Y provided the answer for normal passage/cruising in the low threat environment. This provided adequate weapon crews to react initially to a developing threat and a degree of watertight integrity, bearing in mind also the increased risk from ice around South Georgia. Action stations, State 1 Condition Z was frequently practised and was assumed when the threat from the SANTA FE was at its greatest.

7. On passage to South Georgia the need to remain undetected remained paramount. A totally silent EMCON was therefore adopted, with ships darkened. When crossing shipping lanes deceptive lighting was also used. Until an assessment by CINCFLEET that the force was outside RORSAT coverage, regular reactions were taken to deny the SOSS information - these included closing all ships to within 1200 yards of each other at the appropriate times. Apart from one BEAR D sortie which overflowed just before arrival at Ascension, our passage to South Georgia was undetected as far as we know.

8. During the insertion phases a largely silent posture was adopted again, tailored only to allow the objectives to be achieved.

9. After South Georgia had been recaptured the air threat was considered at its greatest. During daylight both radars and sonar were active to achieve early warning of an impending attack. At night the ship went silent, relying on ESM for warning.

SIGNALLED ORDERS

10. The usual range of OPGENS were produced to signal CTG intentions although the overriding aim was to remain flexible in our response to situations as they developed. It was noted that some of the Opgen formats are heavily slanted towards a Soviet threat and needed some careful thought to order, for instance, ASMD reactions against an enemy using our own EXOCET system.

11. Daily sitreps and intentions were sent both to CTF and the task group.

TRAINING ON PASSAGE

12. It was difficult to conduct regular training for ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH with such a restrictive EMCON. However, SAG procedures, NGS drills and SAU approaches were practised. ASMD was also rehearsed internally on a regular basis. Recognition training took place daily.

AAW

13. No AAW occurred other than the tracking of several reconnaissance flights by Hercules aircraft before and after the taking of South Georgia. These flights never closed within 42 miles, remaining well outside Seaslug range. The use of fictitious callsigns and imaginary supporting ships was employed on AAWC net to confuse any comint capability possessed by the Hercules.

ASW

14. 184 sonar was operated in the passive mode for most of the time, although a full SCR crew was closed up throughout. The opportunity was taken to identify several sources of self-noise which had led to false alarms in the early stages. 184 was used in the active mode to detect ice whilst patrolling off South Georgia after the reoccupation. Uncharted pinnacles and the coastal shelf caused several non-sub contacts whilst operating close inshore. Water conditions were reasonable throughout with an average layer depth of 70 metres.

ASV

15. There was no anti-surface warfare activity, although a confusing report from BAS on Bird Island indicated they had sighted 2 small warships and small jet aircraft on or about 22 April.

NCS

16. At 231330Z Apr ANTRIM and PLYMOUTH closed Cumberland Bay in order to establish an east/west gunline to the north of the bay. Airborne spotters requested harrassing fire on Brown Mountain which commenced at 1414Z. With H-hour established as 1445Z PLYMOUTH commenced the bombardment of the foreshore (Horse Head) whilst ANTRIM provided spreading bombardment on the assault landing site (Tussock Flats). Engagement of Tussock Flats ceased 30 seconds before first helicopter touchdown. On completion of the landing, indirect bombardment was provided to Brown Mountain and Brown Ridge until ANTRIM entered Cumberland Bay for direct bombardment at approximately 1640Z. On entering the bay it was noted that the 'white flag' was flying at Grytviken and 'hold fire' was ordered. In all, 69 rounds were fired by ANTRIM and 120 rounds by PLYMOUTH.

OPERATION RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. The following ROE signals received were relevant to Forces.
 - a. MODUK AAA/J9F/JEE 161938Z (HIGH SEAS ROE SERIAL 1/82)
 - b. CTF 317 AAA/19J 191820Z (ROE WITHIN 200NM ZONE SERIAL 2/82)
 - c. CTF 317 AAA/19J 192105Z (ROE WITHIN 200NM ZONE POST APPROVAL FOR OPERATIONAL 3/82)
 - d. CTF 317 AAA/19J 201430Z (INSTRUCTION TO USE ROE 3/82 PRIOR TO AUTHORIZATION OF)
 - e. MODUK AAA/19J/JEE 270735Z (ROE POST REPOSSESSION OF S.GEORGIA SERIAL 4/82)
 - f. MODUK AAA/19J/JEE 010740Z MAY 82 (ROE UPDATED SERIAL 5/82)
 - g. CTF 317 AAA/19J 201359Z (DEFINITION OF HOSTILE INTENT)
 - h. MODUK AAA/19F/JEE 141446Z (EXTRA ROE AND DEFINITIONS)

All DTG's APR 82 unless stated.

2. The ROE received were easily understood, requiring only one clarifying signal (CTG 317.9 AAA/19J/JEE 202020Z APR 82) to redefine the status of the varied aircraft used by the Argentinians for reconnaissance. Whilst no specific reply was received, the request was overtaken by the directive to close South Georgia and ambush the Hercules (CTF 317 AAA/19J/ 241455Z APR 82).
3. The lack of the ROE to "Hack the Shad" at an early stage served to illustrate the many adjustments to be made to the modus operandi we have learnt to expect. Similarly, the aggressive definition of 'hostile intent' and the early granting of rule 205 was a welcome and unexpected increase to the flexibility of operations allowed to the Task Group.
4. It is felt that a more extensive brief on the diplomatic negotiations would have been a useful adjunct to the political policy statement included in the ROE. This greater awareness, from a more reliable source than the BBC World Service, would have served to increase local confidence that the Task Group was implementing the given rules with the same intent as they were issued.

OPERATION

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - COMMUNICATIONS

1. Despite difficult conditions, an unfamiliar task and high traffic loads communications during the operation were generally satisfactory and met command requirements.

Strategic Communications - SCOT

2. SCOT was essential to the conduct of the operation for the following reasons:
- a. HF conditions deteriorate rapidly south of 35S and regularly become impossible across the band in these near auroral conditions particularly during frequent magnetic storms and at night from about 0300Z to sunrise. Even with directional aerials, wide frequency changes and the use of forward facilities at Ascension daily outages were unavoidable.
 - b. HF silence was essential to achieve surprise.
 - c. GROWLER, fitted at FOF1 request for SPRINGTRAIN, was initially viewed with some suspicion as likely to encourage 'back seat driving'. In the event it proved indispensable for 'crisis management' at a time of overloading of circuits and special handling cells. The long delays and unreliable connections through Oakhanger and UKZE improved steadily, but the dedicated access afforded by the MRL was essential for achieving timely response on sensitive issues such as ROE.
3. The importance of SCOT is not reflected in its onboard support in terms of documentation, spares and personnel training. All appeared wanting in the light of defects that occurred. Remote diagnosis using the engineering channel was not really effective and the single very competent and willing maintainer was worked to his limit over long periods. The rapid provision of an FDMA channel during the period of the CDMA fault was however most impressive. The stronger signal this provided also improved reception which on CDMA had been frequently degraded during weather and atmospheric disturbances. It was fortunate that after 6 months of not being used FDME worked immediately. An initial delay in setting up an SRL is caused by having to solder a bridge to achieve 50 rather than 75 baud working. While the reasons for 50 baud working on HF MRL's is understood, it appears unnecessary at SEF, where it results in the loss of one third of circuit capacity at a time when such capacity is important.
4. The workload generated by non-SCOT fitted ships in company and joining under HF silence was considerable. Although both an area broadcast rerad and a task group broadcast were provided at UHF, ships were frequently required to operate out of range and backlogs quickly accumulated. Combined with the offline crypto problem (see below) the MCO workload for @3& units exceeded that when providing flag and TG broadcast facilities for over 20 SPRINGTRAIN units. The moral is that a non-SCOT fitted warship becomes a liability when operating covertly at long range whether alone or in company be it off South Georgia or in the Iceland-Faeroes gap.

Offline Traffic

5. The supersession of the KL7 by outfit TLA has generally been successful - neither of ANTRIM's equipments gave any trouble, but a literalised message when garbled or incorrectly encrypted offers less scope for patching, and is more likely to require rerunning. The combined effects of TARE loading and many rerun requests lead, on occasion, to Immediate precedence traffic taking over 24 hours to be received and decrypted. There were many instances of incorrect system indicators and incorrect encryption of Northwood originated traffic and Northwood failing to break traffic correctly received elsewhere within the Task Group. Standards soon rose however and delays reduced accordingly as the operator progressed.

Morale

6. Mindful of recent concern over LRO and RO1(G) retention the effect of prolonged 1 in 2 watchkeeping was closely monitored. Although the cumulative tiredness of 50 days continuous and busy watchkeeping produced occasional mistakes and frayed tempers attributable to tiredness, there were remarkably few problems. (Even after this operation the 16-18 year olds particularly showed commendable resilience after lengthy air attack and knowing there was an unexploded bomb in an adjacent compartment - some 70 days of continuous 1 in 2 rota). The only conclusion that can be drawn is that providing the aim is clear they are well motivated and make light of the unfavourable comparison between their watchkeeping load and that of other members of the ship's company.

Land Forces

7. During this and subsequent operations ANTRIM embarked considerable numbers from a wide variety of land force units. The particular requirements of

Ops Room (Admiral's Day Cabin) and the relocation of one of the ship's AN/ARC-52s. ^{the Military}
Control of the assault was achieved quite effectively using this equipment.

! serviceability was good throughout. The ship provided rear link communications for all embarked units (including subsequently CLIFFI & Staff) without difficulty. UHF TACSAT was used effectively from the bridge roof.

Equipment

8. After the various UHF, HF and SCOT problems experienced in January and February there was a certain amount of apprehension about likely equipment availability, which in the event was unjustified. Extreme weather conditions led to frequent intermittent drift in the SCOT transmitter local oscillator which was eventually alleviated by providing extra heating in the SEC. The defect in CDMA was the result of a power surge following a generator failure. However, overall equipment availability was excellent. The continuous use of both SCOT outputs prevents an HF standby broadcast being kept in sync. and it was fortunate that neither BID 940 had defects. There would now appear to be a requirement for a third BID 940 in ships such as a DLG regularly using both SCOT outputs.

AVIATION R.O.P FOR OPERATION

EMPLOYMENT

1. Prior to the aircraft was configured for maximum range with the 195M Sonar removed and a drop-tank fitted to the port carrier. Considerable practice was achieved in the surface search and targetting role. A completely silent and darkened launch sequence was developed with a low level transit to 15nm before the first climb and radar transmissions of two sweeps. The "pop-up" technique for building the surface picture was found to be effective and free of EW interception. The need for HF silence, however, required the helo to stay at height during targetting to gain good UHF communication.
2. The helos were employed during the transit to SOUTH GEORGIA mostly in the HDS/loadlifting role meeting the constant military requirement for troop and equipment movements between ships. The removal of the aircraft sonar equipment produced a lift potential of approx. 2000lbs and judicious removal of some of the support framework for the sonar allowed easy access to the rear of the aircraft. A stick of eight fully kitted troops was found to be a comfortable balance between power, bulk and weight accepting the lack of seating in the aircraft and the slight restriction to the ease of use of the cabin mounted GPMG.
3. Prior to the main force landing the aircraft was reverted to the full ASW role, the equipment being refitted and set to work in approx. 13 hours. The expected time was in the order of two to three days based on previous experience. Even with the sonar refitted, 6 troops in fighting order could be carried if a slow evacuation is accepted on arrival at the LZ.

DECK OPERATIONS

4. Ranging and spreading of the aircraft posed the greatest problem in achieving a completely darkened operation, the hangar and deck lighting being biased to the retention of night vision rather than visual concealment. Start up, engagement and take-off was achieved silently and darkened by a sequence of torch flashes from the pilot. The Secure deck lights and Horizon Bar were required for recovery but rigidly controlled by the FDO.
5. The requirement for Gridlock prior to launch placed high reliance on the tele-briefing system which proved to have a low serviceability in high humidity and was extremely prone to corrosion. The Ops/Flight Deck CCU was employed to pass tactical information to the Observer. A system of hand signals was devised to pass wind speed and direction to the pilot prior to launch.

ENGINEERING

6. Conversion of the aircraft to surface search role was achieved within 24 hrs. The sonar equipment was found to be relatively easy to remove. However, the framework of the submersible unit, anti-vibration mountings for the Control Indicator and support frames took approx. 12 hrs to extract, and although saving little weight, gave greatly increased access to the aircraft cabin for emplaning/deplaning.

7. Although the circumstances of Operations ~~and~~ ~~provided~~ ~~more than adequate preparatory time~~, it is considered that the adoption of war-time paint schemes is an unnecessary drain on training and maintenance time. It is recommended that R.N. aircraft should be finished 'as close as possible' to the war-time scheme at all times. If this is not considered desirable, then all flights should hold paint schemes and paint as permanent stores.

AIRCRAFT SERVICING

8. Prior to guidance from the Air Engineering authority, servicing was carried out on a 'common sense' basis. Flexible servicing operations were never extended beyond the 10% allowance and in such cases where extension could be necessary, for operational reasons, the possible consequences were scrupulously examined. Although defect rectification increased working hours as it arose, the continuance of the Flex-op servicing routine was not found to be a problem.

ARMAMENT

9. A GPMG was fitted to the aircraft at the starboard after cabin window. The gun mounting, acquired from RFA TIDESPRING Flight required the local manufacture of a lower mounting bracket which was not available at the time.

To achieve light exclusion for the Observer's benefit and reduce wind and temperature loss in the cabin, a locally manufactured plywood insert was made for the window frame. This fitted outboard of the mounting with the gun removed and was located by the normal window jettison lugs. It was removed by operating the jettison lever and pulling the panel inboard.

METEOROLOGY

11 APRIL - 3 MAY 1982

1. The major problem encountered was the collection of sufficient relevant data from which to formulate a forecast. At ASCENSION there were no RATT or FACSIMILE broadcasts that were both relevant and readable. On the way south BUENOS AIRES FACSIMILE transmissions were readable from 30°S but all their products were not drawn up east of 70°W and south of 40°S. Their RATT transmissions were readable south of 45°S and included observations from the "excluded facsimile zone". These, together with CINCFLEETWOC information, provided sufficient to be able to draw up one chart per day to establish cyclonic and anticyclonic centres. Frontal positioning was generally not achieved, leaving the barograph and veering winds as the only reliable indicators of a front upwind.
2. HMS ENDURANCE being equipped with a SATFAX receiver was better able to achieve frontal positioning and was thus made Met forecaster for the Task Group. However, her SATFAX reception was frequently degraded by interference, and with the reallocation of all her communication equipment to the operation, her forecaster was left with no dedicated Met RATT receiver, thus HMS ANTRIM forwarded all relevant observations and information, including forecasts translated from Spanish transmitted on the BUENOS AIRES RATT.
3. CINCFLEETWOC products improved slowly throughout the period as the amount of information getting to them improved. Of particular value was the synoptic review produced later in the period. FACSIMILE reception on the promulgated frequencies was never achieved.
4. The attached sheet show a 12 hourly record of conditions experienced.

OCEANOGRAPHY

5. Initially the submarine threat was considered as very low so bathy stocks were reserved. Later as the threat was assessed higher bathies were taken inside the military exclusion zone which showed a layer at between 50 and 70 Metres.

OPERATION

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>WIND</u>	<u>WEATHER</u>	<u>VISIBILITY</u>
110600ZAPR	8S 14W	E 3	FINE	GOOD
1800Z	8S 14W	E 5	FINE	GOOD
120600ZAPR	10S 15W	E 6	FINE	GOOD
1800Z	14S 16W	E 6	FINE	GOOD
130600ZAPR	18S 18W	E 6	CLOUDY	GOOD
1800Z	21S 18W	E 5	CLOUDY - SHOWERS	MODERATE
140600ZAPR	25S 19W	E 7	CLOUDY	GOOD
1800Z	26S 20W	NE 4	PARTLY CLOUDY	GOOD
150600ZAPR	29S 21W	E 4	FINE	GOOD
1800Z	32S 22W	NE 5	FINE	GOOD
160600ZAPR	34S 23W	NE 4	FINE	GOOD
1800Z	37S 23W	N 6	FINE - HAZE	GOOD
170600ZAPR	40S 24W	S 6	OVERCAST	GOOD
1800Z	41S 25W	W 3	CLOUDY - SHOWERS	GOOD
180600ZAPR	43S 27W	S 3	OVERCAST - RAIN	GOOD
1800Z	45S 27W	W 4	CLOUDY	GOOD
190600ZAPR	46S 28W	W 4	CLOUDY	GOOD
1800Z	49S 31W	NW 5	OVERCAST - DRIZZLE	POOR
200600ZAPR	50S 32W	NW 3	OVERCAST - MIST/FOG	POOR
1800Z	52S 34W	SW 7	OVERCAST - RAIN	POOR
210600ZAPR	54S 37W	NW 6	OVERCAST - RAIN	MODERATE
1800Z	54S 37W	W 10	CLOUDY - SHOWERS	MODERATE
220600ZAPR	54S 37W	S 9	FINE	GOOD
1800Z	54S 37W	W 6	PARTLY CLOUDY - SHOWERS	MODERATE
230600ZAPR	54S 36W	SW 6	OVERCAST - DRIZZLE	MODERATE
1800Z	54S 36W	SW 8	FINE	GOOD
240600ZAPR	53S 35W	SW 8	FINE	GOOD
1800Z	51S 34W	NW 4	CLOUDY	GOOD
250600ZAPR	53S 35W	NW 5	PARTLY CLOUDY - MIST	MODERATE
1800Z	54S 36W	N 5	CLOUDY - FOG	POOR
260600ZAPR	54S 36W	NW 5	FINE	GOOD
1800Z	54S 36W	SW 5	CLOUDY - SNOW SHOWERS	MODERATE
270600ZAPR	54S 36W	SW 6	FINE	GOOD
1800Z	54S 37W	SW 10	FINE - BLOWING SPRAY	GOOD
280600ZAPR	54S 37W	W 6	FINE	GOOD
1800Z	54S 36W	W 3	PARTLY CLOUDY	GOOD

WINDS ARE GIVEN IN BEAUFORT SCALE

<u>DATE/TIME</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>WIND</u>	<u>WEATHER</u>	<u>VISIBILITY</u>
290600ZAPR	54S 37W	W 4	PARTLY CLOUDY - MIST	MODERATE
1800Z	54S 37W	W 5	PARTLY CLOUDY - SHOWERS	GOOD
300600ZAPR	55S 36W	W 5	FINE	GOOD
1800Z	54S 37W	SW 6	PARTLY CLOUDY	GOOD
010600ZMAY	54S 37W	S 6	FINE	GOOD
1800Z	54S 37W	W 4	PARTLY CLOUDY - SNOW	MODERATE
020600ZMAY	54S 38W	SW 5	FINE	GOOD
1800Z	53S 38W	SW 9	FINE - BLOWING SPRAY	GOOD
030600ZMAY	51S 43W	SW 7	PARTLY CLOUDY	GOOD
1800Z	49S 43W	SW 6	CLOUDY	GOOD

WINDS ARE GIVEN IN BEAUFORT SCALE

PREPARATIONS

1. ANTRIM's preparations for _____ and _____ involved all departments and covered many aspects in the transition from peacetime operating to being ready for war.
2. The following subjects are in note form for ease of reading and brevity.

FCD 1

3. This charge document was of no real value in ANTRIM's preparations for war against the Argentine. It is related almost exclusively to the UK, NATO, Soviet scenarios and the graduated response to a state of tension.

ANTRIM War Orders

4. Proved adequate as a 'check off list'.

Paint Scheme

5. Considerable man hours were expended painting/toning down "pretty" colours on the upper deck and on the helicopter.

War Planning Briefs

6. A series of briefs were prepared on a variety of subjects and presentations given to officers, Senior and Junior Rates as appropriate. Subjects covered listed in CTM 14/82 (Appendix 1).

General Drills

7. These periods of quite short duration proved effective and "popular". They included:

- Action Stations
- Emergency Stations
- Fire/Flood/Emergency Cable Runs in both Section Bases
- First Aid Party Training
- Weapon Drills - Chaff C/D, NGS, Surface/AA, Exocet, OTHH
- Torpedo Countermeasures

RECOGNITION TRAINING

8. Frequent training periods allocated for OOW's and Upper Deck Crews.

Cold Weather

9. a. Notes from Iceland Ops are adequate to ensure units are well prepared for the weather. Probably overprepared since icing risk around S. Georgia and Falklands is not as high as that experienced during the Cod War.
- b. Cold weather clothing provided is adequate. The suits for lookouts and aimers etc are particularly good and liked by the wearers. As ever "pussers" sea boots, whilst big enough to accommodate the extra socks, are dangerous to use whenever a degree of agility is required.

RAS

10. a. RASing using all the likely rigs before arrival in the area is essential: in particular check of rigs to provide Avcat and oils. ANTRIM changed one of TIDESPRING's rigs - No. 8 - to provide 3 inch Avcat supply. Selecting rigs to be used is helpful, allowing ship to remain rigged for probe, Jackstay QRC and stern fuelling. Whilst unfashionable, do not forget Jackstay QRC, it will remain connected better than probe in bad weather.
- b. FOST's insistence on training two defence watch fuelling crews has paid off; both now very proficient.
- c. Storing - became the art of "embarking anything given the will". In particular ammunition transfer methods have included:
- (i) Seacat : Vertrep in net
 - (ii) Cartridge : Vertrep in RAS bag
 - (iii) Torpedoes : Vertrep on DDT recovery strop
 - (iv) Shell : On light Jackstay using emergency supply bags

Boatwork

11. Upper deck crews were exercised in lowering a number of _____ quickly and quietly using two rigs. Required for 'real' _____.

12.

HMS ATTRIM
at Sea

CTM 14/82

7 April 1982

WAR PLANNING BRIEFS

1. It is in the interest of us all to be both materially and mentally prepared for Operation To that end, a cell has been set up, consisting of the Navigator and SCO, to direct a series of briefs on selected subjects. These briefs will normally be held in the Wardroom at 1730 after my daily brief, and all officers are invited to attend. Selected briefs may then appear on CCTV.
2. Officers nominated at Annex A are to assume a "special responsibility" for their particular subject, and may be invited to brief it themselves or to prepare a written brief.
3. Some subjects are by their nature "one off" whilst others are a continuing daily story. An effort has been made to indicate a priority system.
4. The planning cell is available for guidance on length, pitch and content of briefs.

Annex A to
CTM 14/82
dated 7 April 1982

Brief Title	Title Expansion	Responsible Officer	Periodicity	Priority
Ascension.I preps	Welfare - Familygram Wills - Letters	Cdr/Cdr S All DOs	1 Off	High
ANTRIM Preparations for War	"Whole ship" training Readiness	Cdr/HODs	Daily	High
Warfare Preparations	State of training State of preps Lessons learnt Areas of concern	Ops	Daily	High
Weapon effectiveness	State of weapons Radars-ESM-Comms Confidence level	WEO	Daily	-
Opdefs	-	MEO/WEO	Daily	-
Enemy Forces	a. Orbat, hardware tactics b. Morale, preparadness	1st Lt SCO	Daily 1 Off	Pre Asc Pre Asc
Political State	Present & forecast moves by UK and Argentinian and other Govts	Cdr/Cdr S SCO	Regularly	-
Courses open to Task Gps.	Extrapolate ANTRIM's likely employment if possible	Ops/ 1st Lt	Regularly	Post Asc
Environment	Met Oceanog & effects on ships	SIO/NO	1 Off	Pre Asc
Whereabouts	Popular place names Distances to steam Escape routes with action damage	DNEO/NO	1 Off	Post Asc
Exposure	Survival Seasickness Life raft drill & conduct	MO/ 1st Lt	1 Off	Post Asc
Geography Lesson	Argentina -all Chile -Orbat Chile -Background Brazil -Orbat Brazil -Background S Africa -Orbat.& Background	FLOBS FC 1/2 S/Lt W FC 1/2 S/Lt B S/Lt P	1 Off 1 Off	High Post Asc

Brief Title	Title Expansion	Responsible Officer	Periodicity	Priority
Geography Lesson	NZ & Aus -Orbat only	S/LT T	1 Off	Post Asc
Electronic Deception	Own Radar & Comms Effect of Weapons performance.	WEO/DWEO	1 Off	Pre Asc
Weapon effect planning	Own Air Assets - incl Harrier	Flt Cdr	1 Off	Best Asc
Foul/Cold weather Ops	Ship preparation and operational effects	MEO/WEO/NO/1st Lt		Pre Asc
Prisoner Handling	a. Argentinian survivors b. Our own reaction to interrogation	Cdr/FLOBS		Post Asc
Intelligence/Reference Library	Useful back copies of Nisums/NIR/Int defence review/Air magazines ets	CBO/SIO		Now
Table Top Tactics	Teams to discuss and play out possible scenarios	All Warfare Officers	Regularly	

OPERATION

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - MARINE ENGINEERING

1. Machinery Operation and Availability

Throughout the period the main machinery has been reliable although every opportunity has been taken to shut down boilers and other machinery as the tactical situation permitted for normal maintenance tasks. Whilst in Defence Watches, the G6s have been at immediate notice and one ODG has been running continuously. This has had the effect of more than doubling the normal running hours per engine. The prolonged periods of steady steaming have been beneficial to fine system tuning and for a 7 day period feed losses were reduced to a consistent 16-18 ton/day.

2. Significant Defects

The failure of the starboard main feed pump on 26 April 1982 (OPDEF ME 16-82) was the most serious defect during the operation. Coming as it did whilst the ship was at the furthest point from the airhead, the delivery of the replacement rotating assembly took one month to reach the ship. The removal of the old FWL pump shaft was particularly difficult and showed up a lack of high grade hacksaw blades and suitable heavy duty burning gear onboard. The port evaporator fresh water pump also gave considerable cause for concern (OPDEF 19-82) until such time as a complete replacement pump arrived. The use of 6Po ballast tank as an extra fresh water tank holding 50 tons greatly cushioned the potential problem as did the marked drop in fresh water consumption as the temperature dropped and defence watches commenced.

3. POL

RFA TIDESPRING supported the ship superbly during this operation and supplied good clean water free fuel throughout. Maintaining adequate stocks of lubricating oils however was somewhat of a problem. To reduce usage of NEOX a policy of only running stabilisers when absolutely necessary was adopted with success. In addition the slow reception rate of bulk lubricating oil (600 gal/hr) made it necessary to embark at every opportunity. It is most fortunate that the embarked military force provided their own supply of petrol for Geminis because during the earlier phases of the operation very few RFAs carried petrol stock for issue.

A very limited supply of petrol was subsequently found at the BAS Base, King Edward Point.

4. Cold Weather Preparations

The advice given in C in C Fleets Cold Weather Manual was most valuable although the weather proved to be much milder than anticipated. In retrospect some of the upper deck preparations, in particular the use of LG 380 and Kilfrost, were undertaken too soon whilst the weather was mild resulting in excessive wastage of these materials. It was found essential to place black heaters in the engine compartments of all boats and to store the batteries in the warm if the boats were to start when required.

5. Hull Aspects

The heavy weather encountered off South Georgia was responsible for opening up several hull cracks which are known Class defects but also one in the deckhead of the cabin flat at 84 Station starboard. The excessive flexing of the ship also caused several firemain leaks in the midships portion of the ship. The overall hull preservation has proved very satisfactory although some areas of grey paint applied in less than ideal conditions at Ascension washed off during the period.

6. Personnel

The ships policy of a freeze on job changes during the period ensured a high degree of proficiency throughout the operation. In addition there was a refreshing amount of ingenuity and initiative displayed throughout the department in the knowledge that any form of base support was far away. Machinery breakdowns drills could not be programmed but opportunities have been taken to exercise on a limited scale as frequently as possible. Task book training continued throughout and Fleetboards for A/LMEM and A/POMEM were conducted towards the end of the Operation.

7. Assistance to BAS Base

A party of ME personnel spent 5 days ashore in the BAS Base King Edward Point restoring facilities shortly after the recapture. They made a significant contribution to the rapid restoration of essential services to the Base.

OPERATION

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - WEAPON ENGINEERING

Preparations for War

1. Preparations for war began on 2 April when SPRINGTRAIN 82 was terminated and ANTRIM was ordered to proceed south. They continued until a Defence Watch posture was assumed on 19 April. There was thus plenty of time to bring weapon equipment and the department to a state of readiness.
2. Transfer of ammunition and other essential stores took place on 2 April between ships proceeding south and those returning to UK. Vertrep and light jackstay were used without difficulty.
3. The following preparations were completed by 19 April:
 - a. All uncrated Seaslug missiles prepared for firing.
 - b. Seacat missiles in Ready Use magazines fitted with appropriate guidance crystals. Launchers loaded.
 - c. 2 in no. Mk 46 torpedoes prepared for firing and 2 in no. depth charges stowed in stretchers in the magazine at 15 mins notice (the time taken to fit primers and detonators).
 - d. Weapon systems prepared for firing, maintenance in date wherever possible with particular attention being paid to PSL routines.
 - e. Balloon tracking was carried out on passage to Ascension Island, as were GWS2 overall system tests.

Cold Weather Preparations

5. These were carried out in accordance with BR 2553 Chap 4 and CincFleet's Cold Weather Preparations publication which provided much good guidance. In fact weather conditions in the South Atlantic were not as severe as had been expected and ingress of water into upper deck fittings was the biggest problem throughout the period.

Unusual Requirements

6. A MAGNAVOX SATNAV MX 1102 RN was transferred from HMS SHEFFIELD at Ascension Island and fitted. Aerial rigging and provision of ship's course and speed inputs were required.
7. A Military Ops Room was established in the Admiral's Day Cabin requiring HF and UHF communications. Additional wire aerials and the ship's spare AJE UHF aerial were rigged between the bridge roof and foremast yards. There were no RADHAZ or apparent mutual interference problems but it is possible that MF DF accuracy was degraded.
8. After the re-capture of South Georgia it was discovered that the Grytviken BAS Base telephone exchange had been vandalised by the Argentine invaders and the field telephone network was in a state of disrepair. Services were restored over a period of two days.

Major Defects

9. OPDEFS WE 77/82 and 82/82. Sonar 182 cables were initially prone to water ingress until this was prevented by fitting additional 'O' seals, grease packing connections and sealing them with self-vulcanising tape. Two cables were expended before these lessons were learned and equipment unfamiliarity through under use was the cause of early difficulties.
10. OPDEF WE 80/82. SCOT was defective in the ODMA reception mode for a period of 2 weeks. Although SATCOMS were maintained in the FDMA mode, the Secure Speech (GROWLER) facility was not available from 27 April to 13 May. Diagnostic advice provided by the SCOT Field Services Team using the FDMA engineering channel and a defective pec in the CDMA receiver replaced.

Defence Watches

11. A two Defence Watch posture was assumed from 19 April to 3 May. The following worked a straight 1 in 2 routine:
- a. WEO/DWEO in the Ops Room.
 - b. GWS 2 and DAB teams.
 - c. Junior ratings.

The remaining specialist officers and senior ratings worked a 24 hour call-out routine and a Chief Petty Officer ran the watch from the Weapon Section Base (EMR).

12. Local SOC's were carried out every watch by Weapon Controllers and Quarters Officers as were T.I. checks by Directors. Additionally daily PSL checks were carried out every watch by the GWS 2 teams. The remaining equipment was taken for PSL checks whenever the situation allowed and within EMCON constraints. A generally high equipment availability was achieved throughout the whole period due to the stable environmental conditions and constant attention.

OPERATIONREPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - LOGISTICSVictualling

1. HMS ANTRIM had no solids support during Operation A RAS(S) on 13 April 82 from RFA FORT AUSTIN, herself already somewhat depleted after 5 months in the Gulf, provided a basic endurance of 60 days for the ship's company of 500 and an additional 150 Marines [REDACTED] embarked within the Group, but no fresh fruit, vegetables or eggs were available and few potatoes. As re-supply dates were not known, rationing was introduced. Breakfast consisted of an egg (until they ran out) bacon or sausage, beans or tomatoes, and one slice of bread. No cereals. Lunch was reduced to soup and rolls and the main meal was taken in the evening, without puddings. Apart from prolonging the endurance, this pattern of feeding lent itself readily to instant conversion into action messing or action snacks for the inevitable day light air raids or other threats: it also proved enduringly popular with the ship's company.
2. A good stock of rolls, oggies, pies and sausage rolls was made and frozen down for use as additional action snacks and was replaced as soon as possible after use. The deep fat fryers were shut down when the ship went into defence watches although the lack of fresh potatoes would have curtailed the supply of chips anyway.
3. The lack of fresh fruit and vegetables caused some concern and no bran, wholemeal flour or other substitutes were available to provide roughage. The ship was without fresh potatoes for 10 days, eggs for 15 days, vegetables for 30 days and fruit for 34 days, but this had no obvious impact on health or morale.
4. The Senior Rates' Dining Annex, 1N Stbd, and B Shell Room beer cage, 4Ea, were taken up as additional victualling stores, the former containing 18 days balanced dry diet above the water line and the latter bulk stores of flour. The Floodlighting Store in the Exocet Power Room, 1D1, was also utilised for toilet rolls and some dry provisions. In addition to dispersing victualling stocks around the ship to minimise the likelihood of action damage depriving the ship's company of food, these measures increased the endurance from 45 to 75 days.

Stores

5. The 13 Apr RAS(S) with FORT AUSTIN provided few naval stores and stocks were about 50% on starting the Operation. A MATCONOFF organisation was set up within the group but with three such disparate units as a DLG, Type 12 and a TIDE class tanker the degree of mutual support was limited. No other support was available.
6. The initial UK red colour coding given to the group failed to take into account that it was already well south of Ascension. In the event no urgent requirements arose which could only be satisfied directly from the UK.

7. ~~less urgent demands placed on the UK were promptly airfreighted to Ascension but there was no means of sea-freighting them to South Georgia. Even after the despatch vessels arrived the lengthy sea journey meant that this remained the weak link in the logistic chain.~~

Cold Weather Clothing

8. ER 96 Appendix 21 scales of cold weather clothing are broadly sufficient for a DLG. Detailed refinements will be proposed separately. The clothing gave adequate protection against South Atlantic weather provided extreme cold weather top garments were worn.

Extreme Cold Weather Clothing


9. None is scaled to be carried in a DLG but it is essential for operating in extreme latitudes and served its purpose well in the South Atlantic. A DLG has the capacity to carry some sets and this should be utilised. Separate proposals will be made.

Support for Other Units

10. , whose own stores had been hastily assembled on leaving the UK, required a range of naval and victualling stores and these were provided where possible from ANTRIM's already depleted stocks. Specifically canteen and general naval stores were supplied to the South Georgia garrison and a large quantity of bedding, cutlery and messtraps to RFA TIDESPRING to assist her with transporting 200 POW from South Georgia to Ascension.

Organisation

11. The Supply Department was not run in Defence Watches, there being no advantages and some penalties in keeping up half the personnel overnight. Two cooks worked throughout the night baking bread and preparing the night meal; one steward remained on duty overnight to cater for the needs of the defence watch officers and the duty SA slept in the stores office, on immediate call. One steward was given to a Type 22 frigate to make good her complement, one was provided to the laundry when the Chinese left, three extra were given to the Communal Party to release defence watch seamen, and a cook and an SA, SMAC 233 trained, became full time members of the flight deck crew. Defence watch working and the operational situation reduced the normal demands on the Supply Department and a satisfactory level of service was maintained despite the severe dilution of supply personnel.



'Don't shoot! I think it's a dinner invitation.'

Secret weapon of the wardroom

I began to invest high hopes in the effect on the enemy's morale of that dinner which our officers served those captured Argentine officers on board one of our ships after we took South Georgia. Word might by now have spread among the Argentine forces that this is what they can expect unless they quit the islands immediately. They'll think twice about taking us on now that some of them have felt six inches of cold, British food inside them. They'll know that a nation which can serve up lethal stuff like an average British service dinner is not a nation to be trifled with, that is, if they ever dared to eat one of our trifles.

And there's plenty more where that dinner came from. Panic could even now be spreading among the Argentine brass hats that this is how the barbarous British treat captured officers. The choice is theirs. There is still time for them to avoid raising knife and fork against us.

TIMES - 26 MAY 1982

Under the weather

Geoffrey Taylor, who was the consultant physician to the 14th Army in Burma in the last war, is worried that the Falklands task force may be riddled with malnutrition. He cites nutritional studies in a National Maritime Museum publication, *Starving Sailors*, as showing that obesity, alcohol and over-consumption of refined carbohydrates afflict the Navy.

Taylor says his own pilot surveys showed early signs of B group vitamin deficiencies in more than one third of naval personnel, and inadequate vitamin C in almost a third. Studies in the United States, he says, show that hypochondriasis, hysteria and depression occur when blood levels of vitamin C begin to fall, even before such visible clinical signs as he noted appear. Stress and heavy smoking depress vitamin C levels and diminish resistance to cold conditions, which, like sea sickness, will make things even worse.

According to official figures, the standard mortality rate in the British Armed Forces for cancer, coronary heart disease, gastrointestinal diseases and cirrhosis of the liver is the highest of any occupational group in the UK.

If we want to be sure of winning, Taylor says, we should send a nutrition unit to the task force, make sure the men's intake of vitamin C is boosted to the 150 mg daily the Russians

recommend for cold conditions, provide whole wheat bread and stop overcooking the vegetables.

OPERATION

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - PEOPLE

When the signal to proceed south was received on 2 April the initial concern was for family reaction to the unexpected programme change and how they were to be informed: particularly crestfallen were the 18 members of the ship's company with Easter weddings planned. Too much reliance was placed on 'Link Wires' for informing NOK, particularly those living outside the Base Port areas. Some people took time to accept the high level of security suddenly imposed on ANTRIM's movements and many considered their families had a right to know exactly where the ship was and her expected employment: this view was mainly held and voiced by a minority of Senior Rates.

In addition to intensive warfare preparations there was a major assault on a range of administrative matters including, Wills, Power of Attorney, Geneva Convention ID Cards, Boarding School Allowance claims etc, to ensure all was cleared by the time we reached Ascension Island. Ascension Island was a significant milestone on the way to South Georgia: it virtually signified the point of no return with the total failure to date to achieve any diplomatic solution: many were now well aware that the likelihood of armed confrontation was very real indeed. The initial bravado of "Stuff it up the Junta" was slowly replaced both by a greater degree of realism and apprehension: much of the apprehension was caused by concern for families and girl friends and was largely dispelled when the first very supportive batch of mail was received. BBC World Service broadcasts were listened to avidly, the Daily Oak extracts from the press assumed great importance and the Commander's nightly CCTV "SCUTTLEBUTT" programme became compulsive viewing.

Overcoming ingrained, almost intuitive peacetime attitudes was difficult but gradually a hardening of attitude was achieved: part of the problem was due to the 'it will never happen to us philosophy.'

Interest, involvement, excitement and anticipation mounted as the group headed south, met FORT AUSTIN and ENDURANCE,

Throughout the period 21 April - 2 May when ANTRIM was involved in the South Georgia operation morale was high, professionalism was manifest, disciplinary problems were non-existent and the performance, attitude and response of the young sailors was moving and very encouraging.

OPERATION

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - PRISONERS OF WAR

References:

- A. CTF 317 AAA/19J 171950Z APR 82 (POW GUIDELINES)
- B. CTG 317.9 AAA/19J 201345Z APR 82 (POW/BAS CIVILIANS)
- C. MODUK AAA/19J 221345Z APR 82 (POW AMPLIFICATION)

1. Once the guidelines had been established (References A - C) the problems encountered were:
 - a. Number anticipated was doubled after crippling of SANTA FE and capture of her ship's company.
 - b. Ashore in GRITVIKEN M Coy and the numbers of prisoners strained accommodation available to the limits.
 - c. The 'ARTUSO INCIDENT' complicated the already tortuous administrative process.
 - d. Requirement for separate handling of the military element, the 'Scrap Merchants', the non-Argentine nationals and Captain Astiz.
 - e. Collation of information required by CTF, MODUK and the FCO, already difficult due to language barriers and comprehension, was further hampered by weather, geography and communications between detached units.
 - f. Habitability standards, required by Geneva Convention, were of constant concern particularly when prisoners were embarked in the somewhat spartan accommodation available in TIDESPRING.
2. That the prisoners arrived in good order at Ascension Island without any deterioration in health or morale owed much to the unstinting efforts of the Captain of TIDESPRING, his officers and men.

OPERATION

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - MEDICAL

Medical Staff: Surgeon Lieutenant
POMA(O) , Royal Navy
MA

Additional Surgeon Lieutenant Commander

The operation was highly successful from a medical view point. Foul and cold weather briefings plus commonsense, prevented any serious injuries up to the first troops insertion.

On 22 April the [REDACTED] troops requested evacuation from [REDACTED] due to imminent cold injury. During this exercise both Wessex 5's crashed at low speed on the glacier. All survivors were rescued within two hours, and after rewarming, one minor case of frost nip, the odd jarred shoulder and back, and a laceration of RT cheek and eye was the total casualty list.

On 25 April 82 the submarine SANTA FE was attacked with depth charges and AS12 missiles. She returned to Grytviken which was subsequently captured. There were reports of a hundred plus casualties and the Medical Officer HMS ANTRIM joined the Medical Officer 42 CDO M Coy ashore to assess the situation. Thankfully only one casualty was found - a Leading Seaman submariner who had his right lower leg shot away by an AS12 missile through the fin of SANTA FE. An Argentinian Medical Officer had already debrided and packed the above knee amputation. He was casevaced to ANTRIM for further resuscitation and thence to TIDESPRING for care by the surgical team. An Argentinian CPO was shot dead on the submarine during a move on 27 April 82.

Medical facilities in Shackleton House for M Coy 42 CDO was found to be good, dental treatment being given before our departure.

Overall a successful operation with minimal casualties.

OPERATION

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS - PUBLIC RELATIONS

1. Experience during Operation _____ and _____ indicated that, conditioned by peace-time practices as we are, a major re-think of policy and procedures is necessary when engaged in hostilities, particularly when the operation concerned is covert, as was _____.
2. Because _____ was conducted under a high security caveat, no press releases were made, or even considered, until a request was received from Northwood. As the operation was still being handled at high classification, a suggested release at the same classification was therefore signalled for vetting and dissemination as seen fit in UK. It was understood that it was still necessary to conceal the actual details of how the operation had been mounted and of the composition of the task group, so as to deny any information to the enemy.
3. ANTRIM was informed that making press releases at high classification to CinCFleet inhibited their handling at home, and that they should be made in the normal way to MODUK(Navy). However no classified information was to be released, but there was no clear guidance as to what was classified and what was not. Two further daily reports of activities were therefore made to MODUK(Navy), classified CONFIDENTIAL on the assumption that appropriate vetting would be applied. (It was felt that UNCLASSIFIED releases about penguins, albatrosses and ice-bergs would be fatuous in the circumstances).
4. This procedure was also declared unsatisfactory so, after an acerbic exchange of signals between ANTRIM, the Captain of the Fleet, and the Fleet PRO, no further press releases were made by ANTRIM during Operation _____, or indeed during the remainder of Operation _____. It is noted that this procedure has not been followed by many other ships, reading the July 1982 edition of the Navy News it almost appears as though this publication has been included in the distribution of their Reports of Proceedings!
5. The difficulties in this age of mass media and high speed communications are appreciated, particularly when a large press and TV contingent is embarked in the force. Fortunately ANTRIM's "faceless men of the South Atlantic" reacted with cynical amusement, rather than active resentment, to the widely inaccurate and misleading reports about the re-capture of South Georgia, accepting that it was valuable 'disinformation' at that stage - and their forbearance was rewarded when the awards for the operation were announced.
6. However the sensational, inaccurate and, too frequently premature reports of damage and casualties, which caused much distress to our people at home, were most strongly resented, and press-pestering of next of kin was seen as a gross invasion of privacy.
7. It is strongly recommended that, in any future conflicts or operations of this nature, the policy be firmly established and understood by all concerned for all news releases to be centrally controlled and vetted, either by MOD or the Fleet Commander, and that they should be based on the factual reports made by the Commanders on the spot. "Human interest" and eye-witness accounts have, undoubtedly, an important part to play, but there is a proper time and place for them - which is not necessarily while the events described are still going on.