

PART 1.5 – RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Panel found that they could not recommend any measure, short of a significant adjustment to Defence LF policy, that will prevent recurrence. They concluded that, as long as the operational requirement for helicopters to LF remained in place, and with it the need to continue training, the risk of over flight of a horse, causing the rider to be unseated, remains extant. However, the Panel recommends that consideration be given to the following.
2. **Management of Operating Risk.** Comd JHC (ODH) should implement a pan platform entry, for the risk to third parties from LF, in the JHC Risk Register. Part 1.4 Para 28
3. **Communication with the public.**
 - a. ACAS should continue to engage with the horse riding community, educating them on the requirement for military LF training and stressing the importance of high visibility clothing in improving detection ranges. Part 1.4 Para 25
 - b. ACAS should examine replacement of the current, very limited LFA booking procedure with a computer based system, such as CADs. Information sourced this way should be made available to an improved MOD website, accessible by interested parties such as the horse riding community. Part 1.4 Para 25
4. **Helicopter pilot training.** Commanding Officers of rotary wing flying training establishments should ensure their staff continue to stress the need to identify and avoid horses when conducting LF. The 2003 fatality should be used to highlight the importance of so doing. Part 1.4 Para 24
5. **Chinook OCF.** OC 18(B) Sqn should ensure that:
 - a. OCF Course specifications (C-specs) are improved to ensure the syllabi taught are accurately reflected in the supporting documentation. Part 1.4 Para 20
 - b. Instructors are provided with instructor specifications and guides to ensure standardisation of course output and development of QHI/ QHCIs. Part 1.4 Para 20
6. **RAF Odiham management of aircraft.** Station Commander RAF Odiham (DDH) should:
 - a. Improve management of RAF Odiham based aircraft by:
 - i. Ensuring there is a clearly defined structure for managing incidents, removing any ambiguity over who assumes command in such a situation. Part 1.4 Para 17
 - ii. Issuing incident management instructions to include guidance on the need to report RIDDOR injuries to the HSE. Part 1.4 Para 30

RESTRICTED – SERVICE INQUIRY

- | | |
|---|------------------|
| iii. Including an appropriate entry in the CSMIP listing minimum actions for instances other than a major crash. | Part 1.4 Para 17 |
| iv. Establishing greater use of sqn discreet frequencies and henceforth cease the inefficient practice of utilising ATC to pass operational messages. | Part 1.4 Para 17 |
| v. Reduce inefficiencies produced by the geographical separation of the 18(B) Sqn DA from the engineering line. | Part 1.4 Para 23 |
| b. Ensure clarity in authorisation for sorties operating down to not below 50ft AGL. | Part 1.4 Para 23 |
| c. Restate the importance for RAF Odiham personnel to preserve data following air safety occurrences. | Part 1.4 Para 17 |