CabinetOffice

Guidance for Local Resilience Forums' Telecommunications Sub-Groups

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Document Revision History

Version	Date	Amendments	Issuing arrangements
v0.1	12/05/09	Initial version	For comments to Programme Manager for Telecommunications Resilience
v0.2	23/05/09	New paragraphs added; text put into CO document format.	For comments to Programme Manger and Resilient Telecommunications Strategy lead
v0.3	10/06/09	Information sharing pages added as annex A	For consultation with Regional Resilience Teams' telecoms leads.
V0.4	29/07/09	Changes based on RRT comments; also IBIS paragraph added and other minor redrafting.	For web publication

Contents

1. Purpose of guidance

1.1. This guidance seeks to bring together the developments in policy on the most effective way that the Telecommunication Sub-Groups (TSGs), established by Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) to co-ordinate local communications planning, can meet their objectives. These developments have emerged since the call for the creation of the Groups at the resilient telecommunications workshop organised by CCS in October 2006, and further development of the concept as set out in Bruce Mann's letter of 27 September 2007.

1.2. Since then, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat has hosted two further workshops - in February and November 2008 - dedicated to fleshing out the TSG concept through discussion with and between the local responder community and the telecommunications sector. We ran these events because we wanted the evolving sub-groups to be shaped not only by central policy needs, but by those who would make up their membership. This guidance is indebted to our responder colleagues who attended as it draws on the many excellent comments and suggestions that we took away from discussions.

1.3. The guidance further reflects developments in other areas of the Resilient Telecommunications Programme and work underway to review civil contingencies legislation.

1.4. The following will set out a final, updated Terms of Reference, which have been built on the original set of objectives annexed to Bruce Mann's September 2007 bulletin, and also start to define what both regional and national support for the TSGs will look like.

2. Terms of Reference for the TSG

Aim

2.1. The purpose of the Local Resilience Forum Telecommunications Sub-Group is to ensure that local responders and their partners within their area are able to communicate effectively even when faced with the most challenging circumstances.

Objectives

2.2. *Maintaining a Telecommunications Plan*

- To prepare, evaluate and review a telecommunications plan which should in general:

  ➢ Identify key local responders and resilience partners, the communication activities that underpin response arrangements, and current telecommunications arrangements;

  ➢ Provide a 'gap analysis' to identify shortfalls in the resilience of the arrangements when viewed against the requirement for communication and the registered local risks to telecommunications;

  ➢ Set out the steps to be taken to enhance the resilience of local telecommunications through a diversity of technical options and uptake of the privileged access schemes – the steps to include agreeing protocols and procedures for use of interoperability solutions;

  ➢ Establish arrangements for liaising with neighbouring LRFs;

  ➢ Establish arrangements for testing, exercising and reviewing the plan, including maintenance and testing of technical kit that is part of the plan.

The [note of the workshop held in London February, 2008](#) [PDF, 7 pages, 127KB] contains our suggested approach to constructing a Resilient Telecommunications Plan.

2.3.   *Co-ordinating the Mobile Telecommunications Privileged Access Scheme (MTPAS) for the local resilience area*

- To carry out actions as set out in CCS's process management document, which will include:

    ➢ Agreeing as a sponsoring body the allocation of MTPAS SIMs required by each entitled organisation, and liaising with the CCS and the Regional Resilience Team, as necessary, to clarify the total current list of local organisations the TSG is sponsor for;

    ➢ Maintaining a collated set of records for all organisations for which the TSG acts as Sponsoring body in the local resilience area;

    ➢ Reviewing periodically all records for the scheme, in particular the list of eligible organisations, and considering any additions or other changes;

    ➢ Carrying out a yearly audit of the number of MTPAS SIMS held by local eligible organisations, updating records to reflect any changes, and submitting all finalised details from the local audit to CCS.

2.4.   *Co-ordinating the local approach to resilient telecommunications*

- To be based on requirements rather than technology;
- To ensure that local responders' arrangements, both in terms of technical kit and response processes, are in accordance with each other;
- To promote the principle of diversification and the 'layered' fall-back improvement to resilience that this provides;
- To promote take-up of privileged access schemes;
- To stay in touch with the LRF - feeding back issues for information, discussion or endorsement as necessary, thereby ensuring continuing connection to the overall

strategic priorities set by the LRF.

2.5. *Working with neighbouring TSGs*

- Putting in place arrangements for liaising on cross-boundary issues with neighbouring TSGs; including
- Sharing plans for the purpose of ensuring that arrangements for communication are resilient across boundaries, and for good practice sharing.

2.6. *Engaging with the regional level*

- To escalate issues with a regional dimension to The Regional Resilience Team (RRT), through its telecommunications lead officer or at the periodic regional TSG Chairs' meetings;
  - To work with the RRT in any co-ordinated dissemination of good practice, providing examples where appropriate;
  - To work with the Regional Resilience Team in discharging responsibilities under the MTPAS scheme, for example:
    - ➢ Resolving any regional issues in relation to the Scheme, e.g. around the sponsoring of organisations that cross LRF boundaries;
    - ➢ Requesting / receiving RRT support during the roll out of the Scheme and its established audit periods;

2.7. *Becoming the centre for local communications knowledge*

- Monitoring relevant legislation and guidance to identify ways of improving existing plans;
- Identifying examples of good practice to enhance plans, sharing examples with others;
- Maintaining up-to-date contact details for all local communications partners.

3. The legal position and working with Category 2 responders

3.1.   Local Resilience Forum sub-groups, like the main Forum itself, are not statutory bodies with a legal identity or powers to direct their members.

3.2.   Although the LRF is established by CCA Regulations as the principal mechanism for local multi-agency co-operation, sub-groups are not mandated. As Emergency Preparedness states:

> *'Decisions about the number and composition of subgroups should be made locally…with the approval of the LRF'*.

3.3.   Again the right to invite/right to attend principle which can be used to arrange Category 2 representation at the LRF is not transferable to any sub-group.

3.4.   The legal powers and responsibilities that the TSG or any sub-group has reside in the CCA duty-holders who are its members. The duties in question will be to co-operate and share relevant information with other Category 1 and 2 responders. Useful clarification of the two duties can be found in the Expectation and Indicators of Good Practice Set for local responders that Cabinet Office published in December 2008. A link to this document is given below. It is worth mentioning that the status and functions of the LRF are being considered as part of a wide-ranging review of the CCA.   This is covered in more detail later in this guidance.

Expectations and indicators of good practice

3.5.   Cabinet Office has also produced a tailored Q&A in response to requests from both TSGs and telecommunications companies. This document, *Effective Information Sharing with Telecommunications Providers*, can be found as an annex (Annex A) to this guidance.

4. The TSG role in response

4.1.   In the event of an emergency disrupting or threatening to disrupt telecommunications, it is likely that members of the TSG will be required to provide advice and other intelligence to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group. This may be through contributing via a formally activated Scientific and Technical Advisory Cell (STAC), or through other means established by GOLD on the day. Further details of the possible involvement of the TSG in responding to an emergency can be found in Annex A: *Effective Information Sharing with Category 2 Telecommunications Providers.*

5. Assistance from the centre

5.1.   The Government recognises that it is essential for those responsible for local telecoms arrangements to be kept fully informed of developments at the centre. As policy holder for the TSGs, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat has pledged to support them in their work by:

- Arranging further workshops for TSG Chairs and members, which can be used to keep the Groups informed of developments from the Resilient Telecommunications Programme, and as a discussion forum;

- Ensuring effective communication channels between central, regional and local tiers are maintained;

- Implementing any relevant outcomes from Civil Contingencies Act Enhancement Programme;

- Maintaining and making available contact lists, for example, of TSG Chairs, Regional Resilience Teams' telecommunications leads, and organisations featuring on the national satcoms directory.

5.2.   Since 2006, funding from the Department of Health, CLG and the Home Office has provided for the establishment of an enhanced and resilient communications capability through the Interim Bronze Interoperability Solution (IBIS). IBIS allows for Airwave handsets to be purchased by police forces and distributed to partner responder organisations at the scene of an emergency or beforehand. The National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA), which manages IBIS, has produced guidance on the capability targeted at different Category 1 responders (issued through the Local Response Gateway), and encouraged LRF/TSGs to co-ordinate the scheme locally by producing Standard Operating Procedures. IBIS will operate at least until the roll-out of Airwave to fire and ambulance services has been completed and potentially beyond this.

5.3.   The Emergency Planning College (EPC) at Easingwold runs two courses covering telecommunications in the context of emergency planning and response. The *Telecommunications Basics for Emergency Planners and Business Continuity Managers* course offers a foundation-level introduction to the subject and can be attended either as a stand-alone course or as a preliminary to the more intensive *Resilient Telecommunications and Information Management for Emergency Response* course. This second-stage course aims at providing a knowledge base for the development of an action plan to maintain communications between emergency responders and their partners under emergency conditions. Attendance at these courses will particularly benefit those engaged in the work of TSGs in England and Wales and Strategic Co-ordination Groups in Scotland, and emergency planning and business continuity practitioners across the UK for whom effective telecommunications and ICT are critical. Further information can be obtained from the College web pages at:

Emergency Planning College (EPC)

5.4. Government also maintains close co-operation with the telecommunications industry through the Electronic Communication - Resilience and Response Group (EC-RRG). This industry-lead group was established to provide an emergency response capability for the telecoms sector through maintenance of the National Emergency Plan for Telecommunications and the National Emergency Alert for Telecommunications (NEAT). Further details of the Group and how its work can help with developing business continuity and emergency planning arrangements can be accessed through the link given below. The EC-RRG has also published a helpful guide explaining the telecommunications networks and the technology that is used. This can also be found at:

Electronic Communications Resilience and Response Group

6. Future developments

6.1. It is possible the future development of TSGs could be effected by the outcomes from CCS's current review of legislation under the Civil Contingencies Act Enhancement Programme (CCAEP). The Better Responder Engagement in Collaborative Working project, which is revising the collaboration chapter of statutory guidance on the Act, is considering among other things potential changes to the legal position of LRFs, new principles of engagement, a Code of Good Practice, and possible proposals for central resourcing of LRF secretariats. Other projects being taken forward include new guidance on information sharing, and the potential revision of the current lists of Category 1 and 2 responders and the duties that fall on them. Further details of the CCAEP can be found through the links below:

Civil Contingencies Act Enhancement Programme - Programme Initiation Document [PDF 30 pages, 443KB]

Civil Contingencies Act Enhancement Programme - Briefing Pack [PDF 8 pages, 285KB]

6.2.　We would welcome comments on both the content and style of this document. This will help to ensure that future updates reflect the needs of practitioners in the TSGs for whom it is intended. Comments and suggestions should be sent to *Telecommunications.Subgroups@cabinet-office.x.gsi.gov.uk*

Annex A

Effective Information Sharing with Category 2 Telecommunications Providers

Civil Contingencies Act (2004)

Introduction

This briefing has been produced as a result of dialogues with Telecommunication Sub-Groups (TSGs) and Telecommunications Network Providers.

The aim of this briefing is to clarify issues that have arisen in sharing information needed to enhance the resilience of telecommunications for local responders during an emergency. It is based on the provisions and requirements laid down in The Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and the supporting regulations and guidance.

This brief has been written for TSG and Local Resilience Forum (LRF) Members, Regional Resilience Teams and telecommunication providers. It includes a section at the end which provides links to further information on many of the subjects raised in the text.

A list of TSGs and their chairs can be found in the TSG Contact Directory here:
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/resilient_telecommunications/stakeholder.aspx

The definition of what we mean by Category 2 Telecommunications Network Providers can be found here:
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/ccact/cat2_info/telecoms.aspx#ecrrg

Current information on enhancing the resilience of telecommunications can be found here:
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/resilient_telecommunications.aspx

Cabinet Office
Civil Contingencies Secretariat
July 2009

Topics covered in this FAQ-based brief

What are TSGs?

Telecommunications Sub-Groups (TSGs) have been formed to act as a local focus for enhancing the resilience of responders' telecommunications arrangements.

Why were TSGs established?

Telecommunications Sub-Groups (TSGs) have been established in each Local Resilience Forum (LRF) area as an integral part of the Government's strategy for enhancing the resilience of responders' communications.

What is the role of TSGs?

A typical TSG Mission Statement is "to ensure that local responders and their partners within their LRF area are able to communicate effectively in an emergency even when faced with the most challenging circumstances". TSGs fulfil their mission by bringing together the relevant local responders and resilience partners into a planning group under the auspices of their parent LRF.

What are the longer term aspirations for TSGs?

Formally, most TSGs' roles are currently focussed on the preparation (planning) phase of an emergency.

However, as Telecommunications Sub-Groups (TSGs) mature they are expected to become the centre of knowledge on local arrangements for resilient telecommunications. They will not necessarily become a centre of expertise themselves, but they should develop contact-routes to appropriate people who will be able to offer expert advice as and when needed. Consequently, TSGs are recommended to engage at an appropriately senior level with all organisations that play a role in the local response to and recovery from emergencies.

As a consequence, TSGs will be in possession of important information that can assist the response to an emergency. For example, they will be able to identify key

organisations and people which, in relation to telecommunications, can assist in a multi-agency response.

Why were TSGs established at the LRF level?

Arrangements for preparing for, responding to and recovering from emergencies are co-ordinated at the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) level. Because organisational boundaries differ between emergency responders, LRFs in all parts of England and Wales, except for London, are based on territorial police force areas. Telecommunications Sub-Groups (TSGs) were established to integrate with this LRF structure.

How do TSGs fit into the local, regional and national resilience structure?

Telecommunication Sub-Groups (TSGs) act as a focus for enhancing the resilience of the telecommunications of the responder community in their local LRF (Local Resilience Forum) area. TSGs are to put arrangements in place to share plans with neighbouring LRFs with the objectives of ensuring that arrangements for communication are resilient across LRF boundaries and of providing a means of identifying, sharing and using good practice.

The Welsh Assembly Government and the English Government Office regions have each formed a regional telecommunications group for this purpose. The Government Office for the South East (GOSE) has the regional lead for telecommunications. Representatives of these regional telecommunications groups also meet to coordinate plans, exchange good practice, and resolve issues with each other and with central government. In addition, the regional leads in the Government Offices have agreed to provide support to the TSGs in meeting their objectives, for example, during the roll out and audit stages of Mobile Telecommunications Privilege Access Scheme. Separately, in the Electronic Communications Resilience and Response Group (ECRRG), central government meets with the telecommunications industry to discuss issues and to make plans.

How are TSGs enhancing resilience?

Early in 2008 Telecommunication Sub-Groups (TSGs) were given advice on how they could draw up a plan to enhance the resilience of local communications. The guidance suggested that the plan should to contain:

1. An assessment to identify key local responders and resilience partners, their communication requirements and their arrangements for telecommunications.

2. A 'gap analysis' to identify shortfalls in the resilience of the current arrangements for telecommunications when viewed against the requirement for communication and the local risks to telecommunications.

3. Steps to be taken to enhance the resilience of telecommunications and a timetable for undertaking any remedial actions.

4. Arrangements for liaising with neighbouring LRF areas.

5. Arrangements for testing and exercising telecommunications.

The Resilient Telecommunications Plan should be used to capture local knowledge about arrangements for telecommunications of local responders and their resilience partners. Additionally, the Plan may be used to identify how the resilience of these arrangements can be improved to ensure that local responders and their resilience partners are able to communicate effectively even when faced with the most challenging circumstances. The Plan may be used as a means for co-ordinating the approach taken to enhance resilience and to ensure that arrangements across responders and their partners are complementary and consistent.

What is the initial focus for the resilient telecommunications plan?

Telecommunication Sub-Groups (TSGs) were advised to focus initially on what was essential and practicable to achieve in the way of early improvements. The recommended priority was for local strategic-level, inter-organisational communications.

The local Multi-Agency Response Plan can used to identify organisations that will be involved in the response to and recovery from an emergency and their roles.

This provides a key starting point, identifying how responses to different emergencies are organised. It should also enable critical activities and their dependencies on communications to be identified.

These organisations may include utility companies important to local response and recovery (eg electricity Distribution Network Operators) and, most crucially to resilient telecommunications, planning should strive to include at least one telecommunications representative.

It is most important that these plans are focussed on the local situation and structures - as a consequence their aims and contents may differ considerably. The plans that have been produced are varied: some are long and detailed whereas others are short and high level. They are live documents and the intention is that they should be continually refined and updated.

What information are TSGs likely to seek in developing the plan?

Telecommunication Sub-Groups (TSGs) are likely to seek information to inform their assessment of the resilience of strategic-level communications between responder and partner organisations. TSGs will be seeking a wide range of information, and the nature of this will be largely dependent on where they are in developing their understanding of communications resilience.

At the outset, the information requirements may be relatively straight forward, for example, to enable them to map the technical means used by each organisation for different response scenarios. This capability mapping will establish what technical means are currently in use and what gaps exist. This establishes a back-drop for interoperability between organisations.

Subsequently, TSGs are advised to review the resilience of the communication arrangements against the relevant risks: both the direct risks to telecommunications and the indirect risks such as electrical power supply failures. For this purpose, they will use generic risks augmented by specific risk assessments contained in the local Community Risk Register maintained by the LRF.

What are Category 1 and 2 responders and how do telecommunications companies fit in?

Under the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) some organisations have special duties placed upon them. The Act divides local responders into Category 1 and 2 responders and imposes a different set of duties on each.

Category 1 responders are those organisations at the core of the response to most emergencies (eg emergency services, local authorities, NHS bodies). They are subject to the full set of civil protection duties.

Category 2 responders comprise the Health and Safety Executive, and transport and utility companies. These "co-operating bodies" are less likely to be involved in the heart of planning work but will be heavily involved in incidents that affect their sector. They have a lesser set of duties: to co-operate and sharing relevant information with other Category 1 and 2 responders. Utility companies include those telecommunications service providers that provide a telecommunications network in the UK.

Where can TSGs obtain telecommunications information?

Utilities and other organisations should be involved in the Telecommunication Sub Groups' (TSGs') work as appropriate for local circumstances. In particular, TSGs are advised to engage with the telecommunications suppliers identified in their Plan as providing services to key organisations. The information should concentrate on specific local issues, such as the implications for abnormal weather. This assessment should be informed by local critical infrastructures, for instance where infrastructures are co-located.

The significance of assessment of such sites was highlighted during the response to the 2007 floods in Gloucestershire when an electricity grid switching station was identified as also being an important telecommunications hub serving key organisations. Loss of the switching station would not only have resulted in wide-scale loss of power but also of local telecommunications.

Sir Michael Pitt's Interim Report into the 2007 floods stated, 'Category 1 responders should be urgently provided with a detailed assessment of critical infrastructure in their area' (Urgent Recommendation 10). As a result, verbal briefing on the existence of Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) in each LRF area has been provided to LRF Chairs by Police Counter Terrorism Security Advisors.

How can TSGs gather telecommunications information?

In order to share information relating to telecommunications it may not be practicable or necessary for organisations to attend a large number of formal meetings at the local LRF level. Instead, it may be more efficient to gather the necessary information through occasional focussed attendance at local (TSG) meetings, or through regional meetings or, by other means such as email or teleconferencing. As a last resort, the Civil Contingencies Act provides a Telecommunications Sub-Group seeking information from a Category 2 responder with a procedure for making a formal request.

How will a telecommunications provider know what is expected?

The Civil Contingencies Secretariat has published a set of expectations and indicators of good practice. This aims to clarify what is expected of Category 1 and 2 responders in England and Wales in relation to the duties within the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA), its Regulations and guidance, and the Resilience Capability Programme. The Expectations and Indicators of Good Practice outline mandatory requirements, optional elements of the CCA regime and examples of good practice. The examples of good practice provide a picture of what performance over and above compliance with statutory obligations might look like.

The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI), in association with the telecommunications industry, also provides telecommunications resilience guidance for organisations. The key messages can be summarised as follows: know your communications system requirements; talk to your provider; focus on the services required not the technology; provide the required level of resilience while being aware that resilience comes at a cost.

Why share information locally rather than regionally or nationally?

Information should be shared at an appropriate level where it will have the greatest effect of enhancing the resilience of communications. In general, Telecommunication Sub-Groups (TSGs) will not need to gather information about the resilience of core telecommunications, electricity and gas distribution networks since the resilience of these infrastructures is managed nationally.

However, TSGs may well need information on the resilience of local telecommunications access networks, for example to establish if there are any significant single points of failure. In these cases, TSGs need to understand the need to apply and adhere to government rules for protectively marking assets (such as documents and computer discs). Additionally, TSGs should be aware that requests for some information (e.g. detailed cable routes) may incur a charge from the provider of the information.

What kind of information might be shared locally?

Example 1 - A Telecommunication Sub-Group (TSG) Plan has identified that a mobile telecommunications service provider supplies services to several key responder organisations, initially the TSG wants to engage with this supplier.

The Plan has identified that in responding to a broad range of emergencies strategic inter-agency communications are focussed between a number of key sites such as the Multi-Agency Co-ordination Centre, a Strategic Health Authority and a Local Authority emergency planning centre. The plan has also established that despite their inherent lack of resilience, mobile communications are important. Further research by the TSG has identified base stations that appear to be relevant to these communications.

Sharing this information with the telecommunications service provider might reveal that the service provider was unaware of the local importance of these sites and if sites in the area were to be compromised, for example, by water inundation, those serving the key locations could usefully be restored in preference to others. In

exchange, the TSG would be able to share information on local sites that are particularly prevalent to flooding.

Example 2 - Traditionally all major cables are routed through the main telephone exchange. The Local Resilience Forum (LRF) / TSG is concerned that over time critical circuits carried by different fixed and mobile providers may all pass through this facility, thus causing it to become a single point of failure for local telecommunications critical to the response in an emergency.

The TSG makes a request to the relevant fixed and mobile providers to agree to share specific routing information with the TSG, under relevant commercial confidentiality caveats.

A short meeting with the relevant parties may be the most effective and efficient way of achieving the desired information sharing and of maintaining confidentiality.

Have there been any problems with sharing information?

Telecommunication service providers have stated that some requests for information have too often been broadly targeted and that such 'blanket' requests do not meet the requirements to focus on a risk-based analysis which prioritises local operational response requirements for individual areas. However, it can often be difficult for TSGs to make an initial targeted approach as very often there is limited telecommunications expertise at hand. We would hope that if the initial approach is interpreted as too broad it could be taken as an invitation to commence a dialogue that would quickly focus on enhancing the resilience of responder's telecommunications.

There may also be commercial confidentiality and competition issues, which again should be able to be resolved by building up the trust gained by telecommunication providers and responders getting to know each other through the TSG.

Neither TSGs nor telecommunication providers may currently be resourced to facilitate this detailed level of conversation, so both sides will need to make an extra commitment if this process is to be effective.

Is information gathering a one-way process?

No, the emphasis in the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) is on sharing information. Enhancing the resilience of communications is a two way process since it is very unlikely that any single participant will hold all the information necessary to enhance resilience. For example, the Community Risk Register will provide information that could assist a telecommunications provider take measures that would enable them to provide additional services tailored to particular responders. Besides, the currency of key information will change with time, for example information regarding threats can be particularly time sensitive.

How can TSGs assist telecommunications providers in responding to an emergency?

Closer liaison between local emergency planners and telecommunications providers, through the relationships built in the Telecommunication Sub-Group (TSG), can help the provider to maintain service and to reduce costs when an emergency occurs, as illustrated below.

Some telecommunications infrastructures, such as key Airwave sites and BT plc telephone 'exchanges' have generation capability that is used to maintain services in the event of local power failures. Awareness by TSGs of the locations of such facilities can assist their owners in expediting access for fuel deliveries or repairs in the event that the facilities become inaccessible, for example as a consequence of a police cordon or flooding.

If local responders are not aware of the need to sustain their operation under exceptional circumstances, they will be unable to plan ahead. Without planning, during the response to an emergency, there is a very real possibility that key infrastructures may be overlooked.

Despite looking similar on the ground, some facilities might be very much more important than others in maintaining service. Once aware of the importance of such facilities, TSGs can assist in planning to prioritise resources during the response to or recovery from an emergency and may be able to save telecommunications

providers' money. For example, during the flooding in the Gloucester area in summer 2007 ignorance of the importance of certain facilities resulted in them not being adequately protected. Their failure resulted in significant compensation claims of which it has been estimated only around one-third was recoverable through insurance.

How can TSGs ensure that their plans remain effective?

To be effective, Telecommunication Sub-Group (TSG) Plans should be regularly tested and updated. In addition, membership of TSGs may enable telecommunications providers to enhance the design of exercises and to learn from participating in them. Telecommunications is a fast-moving area: technical progress will result in changes that may not necessarily enhance resilience and those using telecommunications can readily change providers. TSGs will need to maintain contacts with service providers serving their area to assist in maintaining the currency of their plans.

What are the possible future directions?

As part of the Civil Contingencies Act Enhancement Programme (CCAEP), which is currently underway, the Government is reviewing the effectiveness of the duties placed on responders, including the duty to share information, to see if any changes are needed.

Where can further information be found?

Further details of the work of the Electronic Communications Resilience and Response Group can be found here:

http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/ccact/cat2_info/telecoms.aspx#ecrrg

An overview of the work of the TSGs, including the basic requirements for a telecommunications plan can be found here:

http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/resilient_telecommunications/stakeholder.aspx

Help with planning for specific disruptions to business and downloadable
Community Risk Registers can be found here:

http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/governmentcitizensandrights/dealingwithemergencies/preparingforemergencies/dg_176599

http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Governmentcitizensandrights/Dealingwithemergencies/Preparingforemergencies/DG_176587

Details of the different duties placed on Category 1 And Category 2 responders are
available on the Civil Contingencies Act web pages:

http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/ccact.aspx.

Sir Michael Pitt's final report (published December 2008) can be found at:

http://archive.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/pittreview/thepittreview/final_report.html

Full details of the formal procedures for requesting information are given in the
statutory guidance which supports Part 1 of the Act here:

http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/ccact/eppdfs.aspx

The latest version of Expectations and Indicators of Good Practice is available here:

http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/news/expectations_goodpractice.aspx

Further details on the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) can
be found on their website:

http://www.cpni.gov.uk/

Telecommunications-related guidance produced by the CPNI can be found here:

http://www.cpni.gov.uk/docs/telecommunications-resillience-v3.pdf

For further information on Business Continuity Planning Assumptions relating to
electrical power are here:

http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/governmentcitizensandrights/dealingwithemergencies/preparingforemergencies/index.htm

The Site Finder website operated by Ofcom that can be used to identify base
stations can be found here:

http://www.sitefinder.ofcom.org.uk/

Full details of the Civil Contingencies Act Enhancement Programme (CCAEP) can be found here:

http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience/preparedness/ccact.aspx