OPERATION TELIC LESSONS COMPENDIUM - MOD STATEMENT (5TH APRIL 2011)

The Ministry of Defence constantly reviews the performance and achievements of its three armed services, both in peacetime and on operations, to ensure that we continue to refine our tactical and strategic thinking and optimise the effect that our fighting arms deliver. The Operation TELIC Lessons Compendium (the Brown report), written by Lieutenant General Chris Brown (now retired), is one of a number of internal reports commissioned by the MoD to identify lessons learned from our experience of active and stability operations in Iraq.

The report was commissioned in September 2009 to cover the period from contingency planning for UK involvement in the military campaign, which began in 2002, to the end of July 2009 when UK combat forces left Southern Iraq. Its purpose was to contribute to the process of learning lessons from the planning, direction and conduct of the Iraq campaign by drawing together, inter alia, the four separate MoD reports covering the whole of the TELIC campaign.

Many of the Brown report's detailed recommendations are extremely valuable and are being taken forward, together with the detailed recommendations in the contributing reports. The report is therefore an important contribution to the Op TELIC lessons learned process. It does however contain some wider judgements which are not necessarily shared by the MoD. For this reason the report should not be taken to represent the views of the Government on the matters which it addresses.

In addition to Lt Gen Brown's report and the other reports which have examined the course of Op TELIC, MoD will consider what further lessons need to be taken forward in the light of the Iraq Inquiry's forthcoming report. In advance of that, we do not intend to issue a point-by-point commentary on the study.

Learning the lessons from previous operations and being ready to apply them in future contingency is an essential capability of today's armed forces. The planning and management of the current Libyan operations have benefited from this process, and the lessons from Libya will in turn be applied wherever appropriate in the future. For reasons of security that process cannot always be totally transparent.