Department for
Transport

TRANSEC Annual Report
April 2008–March 2009

July 2009

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£14.35

TRANSEC'S aim

To protect the travelling public, transport facilities and those working in transport primarily from terrorist acts, and to retain public confidence in transport security.

Requirement to report

During the passage through Parliament of the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990, ministers gave an undertaking that an annual report would be produced on the development and implementation of the National Aviation Security Programme (NASP). A similar undertaking was given for maritime security. Channel Tunnel and rail security have also been covered in previous reports.

Contents

Foreword

This year has been one of great challenge both for TRANSEC as the regulator of transport security and for the transport sector itself. Over the year, the country's level of threat from terrorist attack remained at "severe", meaning an attack was highly likely. Transport operations continue to present attractive targets. Although the level of threat is always under review, it is essential to keep our focus and not to become complacent.

On 21 December 2008 we marked the 20th anniversary of the bombing of PanAm flight 103 over the town of Lockerbie. On that day, 270 people lost their lives, and it is a salutary reminder of why transport security remains so important.

The publication by Government in March 2009 of its revised counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) was a landmark, underlining the range and scope of the response required in the face of such a sustained and complex threat. We are using the opportunity of this annual report to place TRANSEC's contribution in the wider context of the work of our home Department and that of the counter-terrorist community. The report also provides detail on new and continuing areas of achievement such as:

- developing a personnel security regime that can deal with the insider threat, including consulting on a requirement for overseas criminal record checks;

- legislating for airport security within the Home Office-led Policing and Crime Bill;

- working with the aviation industry internationally to increase security;

- developing a programme to deliver secure and resilient transport networks serving the 2012 Olympics;

- responding to an increasing level of piracy off the east coast of Africa;

- working with British Transport Police (BTP) to expand their passenger screening programme;

- moving towards transposing the EC directive on port security; and

- testing our resilience to emergencies such as pandemic flu and co-ordinating the Department's response to the heavy snowfalls in February 2009.

In the coming year we need to remain alert to developments in the nature of the threat and be nimble in our response. More effort will be spent on anticipating future scenarios so that security measures are better aligned to them.

We are working now even more closely with partner organisations, whether from the transport industry or from wider Government at home and overseas to deliver effective, proportionate and sustainable transport security and resilience, and will continue to do so in the future.

Niki Tompkinson

Director of Transport Security and Contingencies

1. Introduction

1.1   The Transport Security & Contingencies Directorate (TRANSEC) was set up as a separate unit within the Department for Transport (DfT) following the Lockerbie bombing 20 years ago.

1.2   As the transport industries' security regulator, TRANSEC devises and enforces security measures that take account of the nature and magnitude of the threat. The measures also consider the financial and operational costs to the industry and the consequences of a terrorist attack. However, responsibility for delivering and paying for carrying out security measures rests with the regulated industries.

1.3   The industries currently regulated are aviation, maritime, railways (including London Underground, the Docklands Light Railway (DLR) and Glasgow Subway), the Channel Tunnel and the movement of dangerous goods by road and rail. As the Regulator, the Directorate has responsibilities for all modes of transport and operates both at home and overseas.

1.4   Department for Transport (DfT) ministers are directly accountable to Parliament for the security policies and the programmes that TRANSEC directs industry to implement. These are underpinned by the following legislative powers (see text box).

TRANSEC's legal basis

This includes:

- Aviation Security Act 1982;
- Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 (AMSA);
- Channel Tunnel (Security Order) 1994;
- Relevant sections of Railways Act 1993 (sections 119–21);
- EU regulation for aviation and maritime security;
- European Commission Regulation 2320/2002;
- Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001;
- Civil Aviation Act 2006;
- Railways and Transport Security Act 2003 (section 121A);
- Railways Act 1995 (section 54);
- Carriage of Dangerous Goods and Use of Transportable Pressure Equipment (Amendment) Regulations 2007.

1.5   Since the attacks on 11 September 2001, TRANSEC has also become increasingly embedded in the counter-terrorism community, and its work is very much a part of the Government's overall counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST), which was revised and re-launched in March 2009. The strategy is divided into four principal workstreams:

- *Prevent* the radicalisation of individuals;

- *Pursue* those who pose a terrorist threat;

- *Protect* by reducing vulnerability to attack; and

- *Prepare* for the consequences of an attack.

1.6   TRANSEC's work falls mainly within the protect and prepare themes (see text box).

Where transport security fits with Government's high-level objectives

- *DfT Departmental Strategic Objective 3:*

To contribute to better safety, security and health and longer life-expectancy through reducing the risk of death, injury or illness arising from transport, and promoting travel modes that are beneficial to health.

- *Government Public Service Agreement 26:*

Reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism.

1.7   TRANSEC's place within wider Government security and resilience activity is illustrated in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1 TRANSEC's place within wider Government security and resilience activity

Department for Transport	HMG Counter-Terrorism Programme (CONTEST)
Policy teams Aviation Directorate, Shipping and Ports Policy, Regional and Local Transport, National Networks Group	**Home Office** Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism
	Foreign & Commonwealth Office Counter-Terrorism Dept, UKREP, Embassies
Specialist teams Economics, Legal, CSAU, Communications	**Cabinet Office** National Security and Civil Contingencies' Secretariats
International & Better Regulation	**JTAC** and Intelligence Agencies
TRANSEC	
Private Office and Parliamentary	**Olympic Security Directorate**

Developing transport security programmes

1.8   Two fundamental principles underlie our development of transport security programmes:

- *Risk management*, where analysis of the threat is set against the vulnerability of potential targets and the consequences of an attack, thus providing an evaluation of the risk faced. The risk is managed by introducing appropriate measures, where practicable, to bring down the level of risk to an acceptable level;

- *Proportionate and practical measures* are developed whose costs are balanced against the risk, are not unduly burdensome to industry and are practicable and sustainable.

1.9   TRANSEC's research programme provides evidence to ensure that security measures and techniques are effective in countering the threat. It also helps us understand the potential impact on transport users and industry. Details can be found on the following pages.

This year

1.10   We have been developing our own strategic framework which will ensure that all of our activities contribute to the delivery of effective, proportionate and sustainable transport security and resilience through four goals (see paragraph 1.13).

1.11   The strategy takes as its starting point the need to work in partnership with the transport industry and its users, and with other security stakeholders (such as the police and intelligence agencies). Although TRANSEC is the regulator for transport security, it is well aware that effective measures will only be developed if it develops and implements measures with those who understand how best to make them work in practice. The measures must also complement the other activities of security stakeholders such as the police.

1.12   We are also acutely aware that those who deliver security have to pay for it. The current economic climate poses particular challenges to both the regulator and the regulated that need to be met with sensitivity and rigour.

Figure 1.2 Transport security and resilience strategy

Reduce risk

Minimise impact

Effective, proportionate and sustainable transport security and resilience

Retain confidence

Enhance resilience

1.13 We have identified four strategic goals as the major cornerstones of the strategy (Figure 1.2), on which we will be building our programme of work over the next five to ten years.

1.14 The first two, reducing the risk and enhancing resilience, are our natural territory. The challenges come from the ever-changing range of threats and hazards that we have to counter. Whilst the last two goals, retaining confidence and minimising impact, have always been an important factor in TRANSEC's work, we believe that we should give them more focused attention over the coming years in order to provide a robust "reality check" on proposed security measures and to better understand and measure the impact of our programmes.

2. Aviation

History

2.1 Of all the transport industries' security programmes, the national aviation security programme (NASP) is the most mature, having been in place since the mid-1970s. The broad thrust of the programme is that every person and item being placed on public service aircraft are subject to security screening, and that aircraft are searched on entry to the secure zone of the airport. This high level of security reflects the history of attacks against aviation, its international nature and the potential consequences of an attack.

2.2 The most substantial recent change came in August 2006, when it became clear that a capability existed to create viable bombs from readily available items, including liquids. To counter this threat, the Government moved swiftly to impose restrictions on liquids that could be taken through search areas into aircraft cabins and successfully argued for these to be extended internationally.

2.3 As well as the threat to aircraft and passengers, airports themselves present a potentially attractive target for terrorists, as was shown by the attempted vehicle bomb attack at Glasgow airport on 30 June 2007. Since 2003, Multi Agency Threat and Risk Assessments (MATRAs) have been produced jointly by all security stakeholders at airports, the regulatory authorities and industry. These assessments identify the threats to airports from terrorism and crime, and the roles and responsibilities the different agencies have for addressing them. This has established a culture of more effective joint working.

2.4 Furthermore, given the effectiveness against the Glasgow attack of the measures that had already been put in place to protect the terminal building, we advised all UK airport operators to take further steps to deter and obstruct vehicle borne attacks and issued new guidance for airports on the security of landside areas.

2.5 Since the 11 September 2001 attacks, a small and highly effective network of TRANSEC aviation security experts, based overseas, has advised British airlines on the security of their overseas' operations. They also work with overseas governments to develop their aviation security capability and to share best practice.

This year

2.6 New legislation, reform of the industry/DfT oversight arrangements of aviation security and continuing work with international partners continue to strengthen existing security regimes.

Legislation

2.7   The Policing and Crime Bill currently before Parliament will require the majority of airports to carry out a robust threat assessment process that builds on the existing MATRA methodology. Security stakeholders will also be required to collectively agree, and deliver, a local airport security plan with a subsequent agreement reached to allow the police to recover dedicated policing costs.

2.8   Following extensive consultation, ministers hosted a conference in November 2008 with the Home Office, our partner organisation for this work, at which industry members were able to gain a better understanding of what the new regulatory framework behind the legislation will mean for them. To support introduction of the new security planning process, development of comprehensive guidance is well under way, with contributions from both industry and police colleagues.

2.9   The first "common threat assessment" was issued to all UK airports in December 2008. This provides all those responsible for delivering airport security with a single source of intelligence and analysis on threats posed by domestic and international terrorism, as well as wider criminality. The assessment will continue to be issued on a six-monthly basis.

Working on security with the aviation industry

2.10   A newly constituted National Aviation Security Committee (NASC) was created this year. It brings together senior aviation representatives and the Secretary of State bi-annually to discuss aviation security matters at a strategic level and now includes European operators. A smaller executive committee (ExCO) has been formed to help NASC focus on current security matters and to determine what recommendations should be made to the Secretary of State about future priorities. This will lead to closer Government/industry collaboration to devise improved regimes that are proportionate to the risk and workable in practice.

International

2.11   Work continues to protect UK airline operations overseas through engagement with key international partners to assist them in building their aviation security capability. To that end, an extensive programme of assessments of UK airline operations overseas has been undertaken. We have also hosted a number of inward visits to demonstrate the UK's approach to aviation security. In addition, a number of aviation security projects have been delivered in North and East Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Countering Terrorism and Radicalisation Fund. The projects include the delivery of training for airport X-ray screeners and security managers, the provision of explosive detection equipment which will be rolled out this year, and assisting countries to put in place a counter-MANPADS (Man Portable Air Defence System) regime to protect civil aviation against potential surface-to-air missile attacks.

2.12   The European Union (EU) has taken on an increased level of competence for setting and maintaining security regulations. Work is currently in hand to bring together our regulations into a single regulation (EC 300/2008) and to produce an additional regulation detailing the UK's requirements for heightened security measures. Both will be ready to meet the EU deadline of April 2010.

2.13   The new regulation provides us with an opportunity to review our current measures and will potentially bring greater accountability under the NASP for smaller aircraft (hitherto referred to as "general aviation") above certain thresholds. During the run-in to implementation, we will be liaising with the general aviation community to make these measures workable for them whilst still providing the necessary level of security.

Critical workers' identity card

2.14   We have been supporting the work of the Identity and Passport Service (IPS) in the delivery of improved identity services, including the roll-out of national identity cards. An independent review of personnel security published in July 2008 (see paragraph 5.8 for further details) concluded that UK identity cards are a useful addition to identity assurance. Manchester and London City airports will be in the first wave of airports to issue voluntary ID cards to airside workers.

Cargo

2.15   A new single direction on cargo (SDOC) will be issued by mid-2009. It will amalgamate and revise the existing cargo security directions on aircraft operators and regulated agents.

2.16   As part of its work to ensure that cargo policy remains fit for purpose, the team also expects to deliver an impact assessment on trans-shipment cargo and will continue work on creating a known consignor extranet, which should be operational in 2010.

2.17   As discussed above, we will be aligning current cargo directions with the requirements of EC300 by 2010 and will continue to maintain the network of 1200 known consignors across the UK.

3. Maritime

History

3.1 Before the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the UK was one of the few countries that had a maritime security programme in place. Following those attacks, the Department for Transport (DfT) played a leading role in the adoption by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in 2004 of its International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) code. The Code details security-related requirements for Governments, port authorities and shipping companies, many of which built on UK best practice.

3.2 Since then, the DfT has introduced further measures and implemented international requirements for both ships and ports, many of which have built on UK best practice. Port security authorities have also been encouraged to undertake joint agency threat and risk assessments similar to those carried out at airports.

This year

Legislation

3.3 In October 2005, the UK played a leading role in the adoption of the Protocol to the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation. This Protocol requires parties to criminalise the use of a ship as part of a terrorist act. It also establishes an international legal basis to counter the proliferation and trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials on the high seas. We are seeking an early Parliamentary opportunity to introduce the legislation that will allow the UK to ratify the Protocol. Once it comes into force, it will improve the effectiveness of international co-operation, in compliance with international law, to combat terrorist acts at sea.

Piracy

3.4 Piracy has been much in the news this year. Although piracy is not regarded as a terrorist matter because of its economic rather than political motivation, TRANSEC takes the UK's lead in policy development in this area. It provides the relevant advice on preventative measures, as these are similar to the on-board protective measures for preventing a terrorist attack. We also liaise between operators and other parts of Government, as well as with the Royal Navy, on response issues. During the year we have particularly improved our links with the Royal Navy's UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) unit, based in Dubai, which provides local real time advice and information to shipping transiting the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.

Port Security Directive

3.5 Much work has been undertaken this year, including a formal public consultation, in moving towards transposition of the EC Directive on Port Security. The effect of the transposing regulation will be to extend the focus of port security from the ship, and the area immediately surrounding it, to all areas of the wider port estate directly concerned with commercial maritime operations. Formal transposition of the Directive is due to take place this summer.

War risks

3.6 Amongst TRANSEC's lesser-known responsibilities is its role in the provision of war risks insurance and in protecting the Government's interests in those wrecks which it owns as a result. This year an American salvage firm has made a claim in the Tampa Bay District Court for ownership of two First World War shipwrecks that it claims are abandoned, but which the UK Government asserts are the SS *Laconia* and the SS *Cairnhill*. These ships were insured by the UK Government when lost and are therefore the property of the Secretary of State for Transport. TRANSEC is leading work in collaboration with the DfT legal team, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Embassy in Washington to challenge the salvor's claim, which we believe to be false, and to establish the Government's ownership of the two wrecks. This is particularly important because one of the ships, the SS *Laconia*, was carrying a potentially valuable cargo of silver coins, and we would expect to recover a considerable sum from any successful salvage operation.

4. Rail, light rail and metro

History

4.1   Protective security programmes for the rail network were developed during the 1970s and 1980s in response to Provisional IRA attacks and in conjunction with the work of the British Transport Police (BTP). The Department for Transport (DfT) took responsibility for railway security from Railtrack in 2000 and introduced a national railway security programme in 2001. These programmes were reviewed and expanded following terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, with an emphasis on staff and public awareness.

4.2   Security arrangements for the London Underground network were also developed to counter the threat from Irish Republican terrorism, particularly through the extensive deployment of CCTV in stations and on platforms. DfT assumed responsibility for the regulation of security of the London Underground in 2003. It has also regulated the security of the Channel Tunnel in co-operation with France since operations began.

4.3   Passenger screening trials to test the ability of available equipment and dogs to detect explosives, or traces of explosives, took place on the London Underground in 2006. These trials showed that screening equipment and dogs can be effective in an underground environment, and BTP now carries out highly visible and regular dog patrols at tube stations with a number of additional trained dogs.

4.4   Trials of vehicle access control measures at major railway stations using the National Barrier Asset in 2007 showed that deployment of such temporary measures was difficult because of the weight of the barriers and the need for comprehensive ground surveys. Nonetheless, the trials did prove the practicability of operating with a barrier in place and resulted in permanent vehicle restraint measures being installed at St Pancras International and Ebbsfleet International stations.

Current security arrangements

4.5   We recognise that it would play into the terrorists' hands to put in place measures that effectively shut down the rail network or that make it prohibitively expensive or time-consuming to travel.

4.6   Instead, working in co-operation with train and station operators, and through the National Railway Security Programme (NRSP), we rely on a range of security measures, including, but not limited to:

- over 3,300 BTP officers (including Police Community Support officers) deployed on the rail and tube network to maintain security and provide reassurance to the travelling public;

- BTP baggage screening equipment and explosives detection dogs;

- physical security measures such as vehicle restraint measures;

- regular searches of stations;

- the vigilance of staff and the public; and

- regular monitoring by DfT inspectors which ensures maximum compliance with the mandated requirements.

This year

Passenger screening

4.7   In 2006, the DfT (with support from London Underground, Network Rail, British Transport Police and others) carried out trials to test the ability of different types of equipment and dogs to detect explosives or traces of explosives on people and bags.

4.8   On 26 June 2008, the DfT published the results of those trials. They showed that screening equipment can be effective in the railway environment, but, given the very large passenger flows and thousands of entry points on the UK rail and underground networks, 100 per cent airport-style screening is not feasible using today's technology.

4.9   A number of public attitude surveys carried out following the trials concluded that the public recognises the threat to the rail network, and is broadly supportive of the need for security measures, provided they are proportionate to the threat. However, the public would be unlikely to accept major delays to journeys and wants to ensure that personal privacy is protected.

4.10   Also on 26 June 2008, the BTP announced enhancements to their existing stop-and-search capability. These enhancements took the form of new baggage X-ray machines and additional explosives search dogs.

4.11   The increased screening capability is part of a proportionate risk management response to terrorism and is one of a number of measures in place. The aim is to reduce the risks as much as possible, whilst still allowing people to go about their day-to-day business.

Vehicle restraints

4.12   Work on protecting stations from hostile vehicle attack continues, following the installation of permanent vehicle restraint measures at St Pancras International and Ebbsfleet International stations. Agreement is in place with transport operators for similar measures at other key railway stations, including those that will be undergoing major redevelopments.

Light rail security programmes

4.13   Updated instructions and associated security programmes were issued in respect of the Docklands Light Railway and the Glasgow subway.

5. Cross-sector security

5.1 Many of the security programmes in development in TRANSEC have applications for all areas of the transport industry. Detail on the latest work is given here.

Research

5.2 TRANSEC has a comprehensive programme of research, analysis and development in transport security which provides the basis of many of our security regimes. The programme has the following key objectives:

- to understand the consequences of possible terrorist attacks and the technical vulnerabilities of transport systems;

- to assess new equipment or technology-based security processes and develop technical standards with international partners;

- to work with security equipment manufacturers to enhance the capabilities of their equipment and improve their ease of use;

- to analyse the impact of different security measures on transport users and on the industry; and

- to encourage innovation in the security solution sector by funding high risk research into novel techniques and technologies.

5.3 Key areas of work during the year have included research into the use of dogs to detect novel explosives, developing a common testing methodology for detection of liquid explosives, evaluating and assessing novel vehicle screening technologies, and development of improved techniques to protect ships.

Olympics

5.4 The Government is developing detailed security plans for the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games. To take this work forward, the Olympic Security Directorate (OSD), a multi-agency body based in the Home Office, was created. The OSD is responsible for the strategic and operational planning of the security of the Games and for overseeing its delivery.

5.5 The transport security project is a key part of the overall Olympic security programme and aims to deliver secure and resilient transport networks for the 2012 Games. In order to achieve this it will:

- risk assess all transport modes, hubs and networks, whether regulated or non-regulated, to identify any specific additional security risks presented by the Olympic Games i.e. those risks over and above those managed as business as usual; and

- implement all proportionate measures to mitigate the specific additional risks identified.

5.6   TRANSEC is working closely with colleagues from a number of key agencies, including OSD, the British Transport Police, the Olympic Delivery Authority and key transport operators to develop and deliver this project, as well as taking forward work to ensure that it is effectively co-ordinated with existing transport security regimes.

Dangerous goods

5.7   Following Lord West's review in 2008 of the protective security of hazardous substances, TRANSEC has been working with the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) and other Government departments and agencies to reduce the risk of terrorists obtaining and misusing hazardous substances.

Personnel security

5.8   In July 2008, the Secretary of State published the results of an independent review of personnel security across the transport sector. Ministers accepted the main recommendations of the report, namely that:

- the time is right for there to be an increased focus on personnel security;

- industry needs to take a systematic risk-based approach to the task; and

- personnel security should become as important as safety already is to employees and managers.

5.9   Ministers hosted a cross-sector conference with the transport industry on 3 October 2008 to build commitment to the principle of personnel security and to address the practicalities of raising its profile. Since then, the DfT has circulated best practice advice and is planning to enhance its existing training programmes to strengthen their personnel security content. A series of internal workshops were held this spring to pave the way for working with industry on risk assessment. This will enable industry partners to carry out personnel security assessments for themselves and to develop their own action plans.

5.10   A number of transport operators already carry out overseas criminal record checks, and more are now considering doing so. In November 2008, TRANSEC issued guidance to all regulated sectors on how to carry out such checks.

5.11   This spring, the DfT consulted the transport industry about how best to introduce mandatory overseas criminal record checks for new applicants to the most sensitive posts, namely those which are already subject to counter-terrorism checks. It included a regulatory assessment covering the impact on business and on ethnic groups. Depending on the results of the consultation, we expect to issue amended regulations over the summer to bring into effect these new measures.

Secure communications

5.12 Much work has gone into the procurement and development of an extranet that will allow TRANSEC to communicate securely and quickly with security contacts in the industry. Testing of the system is planned with a group of volunteer stakeholders with the result that it will be rolled out during the autumn.

6. Contingencies

6.1 The main response to disruptive events in the UK continues to rest at the local level and with transport operators. However, if the scale of the crisis demands it, national and even international arrangements may come into play.

6.2 During 2008, the DfT crisis response arrangements were called upon to deal with a range of issues including flooding, the effects of industrial action in the energy sector, and the heaviest snowfall across England for eighteen years.

6.3 These arrangements were also tested during the participation in a number of government-wide contingency planning exercises in 2008–09. These exercises allowed us to explore, in conjunction with transport operators and other stakeholders, our incident handling and recovery from potential terrorist incidents, chemical contamination of the transport network, and interruption to fuel supplies. The lessons learned from these exercises have been used to update the crisis response mechanism as well as to develop DfT policy for a range of scenarios.

7. Compliance and training

General

7.1 TRANSEC inspectors carry out compliance and enforcement activity across all regulated sectors of the transport industry. As well as formal inspections which may be announced or, more often, unannounced, they:

- carry out covert tests of security measures;

- provide advice and guidance on improving the effectiveness of security measures;

- provide a presence on the ground at transport hubs to ensure that security requirements are maintained during periods of disruption or special events of particular security sensitivity;

- attend industry security committee meetings and other meetings on an *ad hoc* basis; and

- where applicable, facilitate and support EC inspections in the UK and take part in EC inspections in other member states.

7.2 Where deficiencies are identified, TRANSEC normally aims to resolve them in discussion with the operator concerned. However, it will use its powers under legislation where required.

Aviation: compliance

7.3 TRANSEC inspects airports, airlines, air cargo handlers and aviation catering providers. During the year, we undertook a full programme of inspections at airports and other aviation locations, such as cargo facilities, both on and off-airport. Our audit programme continues with comprehensive audits of several airports and assessment of airline compliance.

7.4 The covert testing programme has been proving effective, as it spreads to cover more UK airports and other areas of the industry.

Aviation: training

7.5 Key achievements for the training team include:

- the revision of the initial training syllabuses for security operatives, cargo security staff and aircrew;

- the accreditation of a second provider of training in the recognition of firearms and explosives; and

- delivery of an award winning training DVD for cargo security staff.

7.6 In the coming year, the team will be developing a training DVD on the nature of the threat, which will be suitable for all modes of transport. It will be introducing mandatory refresher training for managers, training for handlers of screening dogs and developing further a competence assessment framework for trainers.

Maritime: compliance

7.7 TRANSEC carried out its regular programme of inspections across the whole range of UK ports, and vessels operating from them, and of UK flagged passenger ships, both in UK and overseas ports. Within the programme, we continue to develop our covert test regime focusing on passenger ports in the UK.

7.8 The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA), an Executive Agency of the DfT, undertakes inspections of cargo ships on TRANSEC's behalf, governed by a service level agreement between the two organisations.

7.9 In addition to working on EC inspections, TRANSEC has also welcomed a second visit by the United States Coast Guard under its International Port Security Programme (IPSP) and participated in a reciprocal visit as part of an EU delegation to the USA.

Maritime: training

7.10 TRANSEC continued its programme of regular maritime security awareness roadshows at port facilities throughout the United Kingdom. These are delivered in conjunction with the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) and are aimed at all those working in the maritime industry.

7.11 Following on from the very successful *Safe Harbours* DVD promoting port security awareness, we produced a similar DVD, *Security: Everybody's Business*, focusing on ship security. It has received a number of accolades, including a gold award from Omni Intermedia.

7.12 TRANSEC is a regular contributor, participant and attendee at maritime security exercises held throughout the UK. We attend local, regional and national exercises that can be industry, police or HM Government led.

Rail: compliance

7.13 Throughout the year the compliance team has continued to deliver a balanced programme of inspection activity on the domestic rail network.

7.14 On the national rail network this included both announced and unannounced inspections, thematic audits and an increased number of covert tests.

Light rail and metro: compliance

7.15 A similar balance of compliance activity was delivered for the regulated light rail and metro sectors – London Underground, Docklands Light Railway and the Glasgow Subway. During the year, with the help and co-operation of London Underground Limited, covert tests were trialled for the first time.

7.16 The compliance team also produced a DVD aimed at helping stakeholders to train those staff with a responsibility for the security of passenger trains.

Channel Tunnel: compliance

7.17 TRANSEC inspectors have monitored compliance amongst the regulated operators serving the Channel Tunnel system covering Eurostar, Eurotunnel shuttle services, and international rail freight operations. Inspection activity has included an enhanced and varied programme of covert tests for these operators.

Dangerous goods: compliance

7.18 During the year VOSA (the Vehicle & Operator Services Agency) traffic examiners and TRANSEC rail inspectors have monitored compliance with the regulations on the security of the movement of dangerous goods by road and rail. These inspections have been undertaken both at the roadside and on sites served by road and rail. Inspectors from DfT's Dangerous Goods Division have monitored compliance at those sites handling radioactive materials.

Annex A
Corporate resources

Business planning and resources

A.1   TRANSEC is a Directorate within the DfT's International Networks & Environment Group (INE), so its annual business plan is prepared and scrutinised as part of the Department's planning arrangements. The business plan supports TRANSEC's request for resources to the INE Director General.

A.2   Our agreed headcount target for 2008–09 of 200 full-time equivalent staff was not exceeded. The breakdown of staff in TRANSEC's main divisions at the end of the financial year is indicated in Figure A.1.

Table A.1 TRANSEC staff by division at 31 March 2009

- Aviation Security Division — 40%
- Maritime & Land Transport Security Division — 35%
- Threats, Contingencies & Operations Division — 17%
- Corporate Planning & Performance Team & the Director's Office — 8%

A.3   We reported regularly to both the INE and DfT Boards during the year on progress towards achieving the objectives, milestones and key performance indicators set out in the business plan.

Finance

A.4   We spent £20.9m during the year. Expenditure in 2008–09 and during the previous year is summarised in Table A1.

Table A1 Expenditure for 2008–09 and 2007–08		
	2008–09 £000	2008–09 £000
Staff costs	11,417	11,019
Delivery programmes	9,145	8,558
Capital programmes	247	175
Non-cash	184	171
Total expenditure	**20,993**	**19,923**

A.5   Most of our costs were staff-related – 54 per cent in 2008-09 (55 per cent in the previous year). A further 44 per cent (43 per cent in 2007–08) was spent on delivery programmes, including £6m on research and development. The remaining 2 per cent was spent on capital programmes and non-cash costs (depreciation and cost of capital).

A.6   Expenditure against budgets was monitored regularly at monthly meetings of TRANSEC's Resource, Planning & Performance Group (RPPG). Totals were also reported each month to the INE Board.

Programme and project management (PPM)

A.7   We made good progress during 2008–09 to develop TRANSEC's capabilities and deliver improved management of programmes and projects. Notable developments included the publication of the Directorate's PPM charter and the introduction of a PPM training programme.

Forward look

A.8   We have received additional funds for 2009-10 to cover new cross-cutting areas of work, such as the Olympics transport security and personnel security programmes. Consequently, the Directorate's agreed budget for the year will be sufficient to fund a total of 216 full time equivalent staff.

A.9   Work was under way at the end of 2008–09 to develop a TRANSEC resource management strategy. The aim of the strategy will be to improve the Directorate's processes and arrangements for business and workforce planning, recruitment and flexible deployment, succession planning, and the delivery of learning and development.

A.10   Work also continues as part of the implementation of the PPM charter to refine the Directorate's governance arrangements. This includes the introduction of a TRANSEC Programme Delivery Board to oversee the delivery of the Directorate's strategic projects and to manage business critical risks.

Annex B
Highlights of the year:
April 2008 – March 2009

April

- Air cargo security training DVD *Airtight* wins gold for practical training film of the year at International Visual Communications Association awards.
- Start of public consultation on Port Security Directive (closes July 2008).

May

- National Maritime Security Committee – biannual meeting of strategic group.

June

- Results of rail passenger screening trials and associated public attitude surveys published.
- BTP enhances its existing rail passenger screening activities with the announcement of new mobile X-ray baggage screening equipment and additional explosives detection dogs, jointly funded by TRANSEC and BTP.

July

- Publication of Stephen Boys Smith's review of personnel security.
- Launch of public consultation on airport policing, funding and security planning.
- Close of public consultation on Port Security Directive.

August

- TRANSEC gives evidence to Calman Commission on Scottish Devolution.

September

- TRANSEC participates in Joint Contact Group, Washington DC.

October

- TRANSEC conference on personnel security in the transport industry.

- DfT's Dangerous Goods Division takes responsibility for monitoring compliance with the Dangerous Goods Regulations at sites handling the movement of radioactive materials.

November

- First meeting of the newly constituted National Aviation Security Committee.

- New regime involving screening of perishable goods trucked to the UK for onward flight by British Airways introduced.

- TRANSEC/Home Office conference on airport policing.

- Guidance issued to transport sector on carrying out overseas and domestic criminal record checks.

December

- Start of Parliamentary process of Policing and Crime Bill.

- National Maritime Security Committee – biannual meeting of strategic group.

- NATO-Eurocontrol conference delivered by TRANSEC.

January

- Annual senior rail security forum comprising strategic leaders from the rail industry, police and government.

- Relaunch of maritime security awareness roadshows.

- Oral evidence to Defence Select Committee.

- Revised instructions issued to Docklands Light Railway and the Glasgow subway.

February

- Response to consequences of heavy snowfall on transport networks, including active management of consequential grit shortage.

- Signing of memorandum of understanding with Singapore on aviation security training.

- Maritime security training DVD, *Security: Everybody's Business* wins gold award at the Omni Intermedia Awards.

- End of trial at Heathrow and Glasgow airports for screening of laptops in cabin baggage.

March

- Start of consultation on overseas criminal records checks (closes end of May 2009).

- Confidential briefing for Transport Select Committee.

Annex C
Abbreviations used in this report

AMSA	Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990
BTP	British Transport Police
CONTEST	(Government's) Counter-Terrorism Strategy
CPNI	Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure
CWIC	Critical Workers' Identity Card
DfT	Department for Transport
EU	European Union
ExCo	Executive Committee of National Aviation Security Committee
IMO	International Maritime Organization
INE	(DfT's) International Networks and Environment Group
IPS	Identity & Passport Service
IPSP	(US) International Port Security Programme
ISPS	International Ship and Port Facility Security
JTAC	Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre
MATRA	Multi-Agency Threat and Risk Assessment
MCA	Maritime & Coastguard Agency
NASC	National Aviation Security Committee
NASP	National Aviation Security Programme
NRSP	National Railway Security Programme
OSD	Olympic Security Directorate
OSCT	Office of Security and Counter Terrorism
PPM	Programme and project management
SDOC	Single direction on cargo
TRANSEC	Transport Security and Civil Contingencies (Directorate)
TSC	Transport Select Committee

UKMTO   UK Maritime Trade Operations

VOSA   Vehicle & Operators' Service Agency

Annex D
Useful websites

Department for Transport www.dft.gov.uk

Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure www.cpni.gov.uk

Home Office www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism

Identity & Passport Service www.ips.gov.uk/identity