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KATMANDU.

(1033/10/13)

February 11, 1963

Mr. Natar
Mr. Maharaj
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Dear Mr. Kenzie Johnston,

I referred in my secret telegram No. 9 of February 6 to a conversation which I had had with Dr. Tulsi Giri following his return from a week's visit to China, and I mentioned two points made by Dr. Giri which seemed to me of most interest from the point of view of Sino-Nepalese relations, namely, that the Chinese accepted Nepal's position of neutrality in the Sino-Indian conflict, and that, in Dr. Giri's opinion, the Chinese would not be deterred by any treaty which they had signed if they decided at any time that it was to their interest to move into, or through, Nepal.

2. In addition to making those two points, Dr. Giri said that there were two impressions which struck him forcibly during his visit. The first was that the present mood of the Chinese Government was one of confidence in its control of the whole country, arrogance in its armed strength, and resentment of its isolation from world society as represented by the United Nations. The second impression was of the determination of the Chinese to persist in their claim that Mao Tse-tung was now the foremost exponent of communist political theory, and to refuse to accept that the position of leader of the communist world should be hereditary in Moscow.

3. Dr. Giri went on to say that, in his understanding, the Chinese version of communism was communism by revolution, and the logical consequence was that it was actively subversive. According to Dr. Giri, while it supported the objectives of the anti-colonialist campaign, it did not accept the policy of non-alignment. In the Chinese view, he said, India and other non-aligned countries had come under the control of a national bourgeoisie, and the true communist state could only be achieved by a revolution of the proletariat. The implication of the threat to Nepal in what Dr. Giri was saying was obvious.

4. There had been a report in the press, which I believe Dr. Giri had denied while in Hong Kong, of a proposal for an air link between Katmandu and Lhasa. Dr. Giri repeated his denial to me, adding that there would be fuelling problems as the Indian Government would certainly not provide Nepal with aviation spirit for the maintenance of such a service.

5. Dr. Giri said that he believed that Chinese industrial development had been retarded by the withdrawal of Soviet technical aid, and he also said, though without giving any explanation of his view, that in his opinion neither China nor India sincerely desired to reach an agreed settlement of their boundary dispute.

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5. Dr. Giri said that he believed that Chinese industrial development had been retarded by the withdrawal of Soviet technical aid, and he also said, though without giving any explanation of his view, that in his opinion neither China nor India sincerely desired to reach an agreed settlement of their boundary dispute.

6. The realistic appreciation revealed by Dr. Giri in this conversation of the menace of the Chinese presence on Nepal's northern frontier was further reflected in a conversation I had recently with the Inspector General of Police in the course of which he told me something of the steps which he is taking to

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keep track of Chinese intelligence activities in Nepal. He showed me a map in his office on which were marked, among other things, motorable roads and airfields constructed by the Chinese in the Tibetan areas adjacent to the Nepalese frontiers.

Finally he said that he had personally been left in no doubt about the nature of Chinese intelligence activities in Nepal by the fact that when, on one occasion, he had accepted an invitation to dinner from the Chinese Military Attaché, he had found himself the only guest and had been obliged to spend two hours alone with his host and an interpreter, during which time the Military Attaché had made various offers of aid for the police force and for the Inspector General's personal use. The Inspector General said that he had related this experience to the King, who had instructed him to accept nothing from the Chinese.

7. These two conversations indicate to me that, whatever their public position may be, the Nepalese Government are in no danger of accepting Chinese protestations of friendship at their face value, and are well aware of the potential menace from their northern neighbour both to the political independence of Nepal as a sovereign state, and also, through internal subversive activities, to the stability of the present regime.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Garvey in Peking.

*Yours sincerely
Guy H. Clarke*

(Guy H. Clarke)

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