



An inspection of border control at Manchester Airport

5 – 7 May 2010

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Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency

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Foreword from John Vine CBE QPM



Manchester Airport is the largest UK airport outside of London, handling over 20 million passenger movements each year. The UK Border Agency is responsible for checking every international passenger, dealing with passport and immigration irregularities, intercepting and seizing illegal goods and processing asylum applications as they arise.

In the last year, the UK Border Agency has merged the functions of customs and immigration at the border in order to create a more flexible workforce. During this inspection, I found evidence to suggest that the UK Border Agency needs to balance its priorities to ensure that important detection work continues side by side with meeting their target of 100% passport checks.

I would like to see evidence of objectives being clearly set out together with clearly defined performance measures.

Increasingly, the UK Border Agency relies upon technology, such as facial recognition gates, to increase security and make better use of its staff. During this inspection, I found that this new technology was not operational for a significant period of time. As a result, I recommend that the UK Border Agency gives priority to evaluating the actual benefits intended by such technology.

When stopping and searching passengers, it is important that UK Border Agency staff follow due procedure and are able to provide a clear rationale for their actions.

Finally, a high level of security is paramount at any airport so I was concerned to find that the UK Border Agency had known about a potential risk to the border for some time. At the time of inspection, no contingency plans had been put in place to deal with this risk. I would urge that this be addressed as a matter of priority.

I have set out my findings together with six recommendations which I believe will strengthen the UK Border Agency's operations at Manchester Airport.

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "John Vine". The signature is written in a cursive, flowing style.

John Vine CBE QPM
Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency

1. Executive Summary

1. The inspection involved collecting evidence to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of operations at Manchester Airport by assessing:
 - performance against Border Force performance measures;
 - use of intelligence and technology;
 - the impact of the integration between customs and immigration as separate entities to a single Border Force;
 - the processes employed by detection staff in the customs areas; and
 - compliance with discrimination laws.
2. The UK Border Agency had national performance targets set for the time passengers had to queue to be seen by UK Border Agency staff at the primary control point (PCP)¹. Alongside this, in 2007 the UK Border Agency commenced 100% passport checks of all international passengers arriving into the UK.
3. We noted, through our observations, that queuing times for passengers going through the PCP were dealt with efficiently and effectively, and that 100% checks on travel documents were being made. This supported the UK Border Agency's own assessment that their specific targets for the queuing times were met consistently across all the terminals of Manchester Airport.
4. However, we found that the queue measurement techniques used by the UK Border Agency were arbitrary and dependant on passenger co-operation.
5. Manchester Airport is located within the UK Border Agency's Border Force North region. Border Force North has targets for the detection of goods entering the country illegally. However the UK Border Agency team at Manchester Airport did not have its own specific targets for detection work. Instead they had 'indicative' targets to measure their contribution to the overall target.
6. These 'indicative' targets were not 'specific' targets, used to drive performance, and staff were not held accountable for meeting them. They were in reality nominal targets and it was unclear how they were being used by the UK Border Agency.
7. The UK Border Agency had a good working relationship with Manchester Airport Group (MAG), the airport operator. We noted the Service Level Agreement that was in place and saw some evidence of productive meetings, dialogue and actions.
8. However we observed that there were two areas in the airport where there was the potential for international passengers transferring between terminals to be able to walk out of the airport without passing through primary control points. MAG had been made aware of this risk and was given written notice by the Home Office that the entry and exit areas of the Common Departure Lounge had been designated as a control area. It is the responsibility of MAG to secure the area and at the time of the inspection this had not been done. In the meantime, it is critical that the UK Border Agency ensures that a contingency plan is in place.

¹ Initial border control point combining both customs and immigration functions, commonly known as 'passport control'.

9. When working, facial recognition gates were used by a significant number of passengers, although they were not always operational.
10. Intelligence sent to UK Border Agency staff through the Warnings Index Control Unit (WICU) was sometimes duplicated by alerts sent from the National Border Targeting Centre (NBTC). We were also concerned that ways in which information was passed in the airport from the detection staff to the immigration staff were antiquated and potentially insecure.
11. We saw that the majority of detection resource was focussed on passengers identified as possibly being involved in the illicit importation of goods. This did however mean that most other passengers were not subject to scrutiny. This was partly because detection staff were performing immigration duties in order to ensure the UK Border Agency met its queuing targets and performed 100% travel document checks.
12. Managers were unable to describe an optimum staffing model for Manchester Airport. This meant that they were unable to justify the significant outlay on overtime, nor cite the preferred staffing quota at any one time.
13. We observed some passengers being stopped for questioning or searching by detection staff, both as the result of intelligence and through 'visual selection'. The lack of rationale provided by detection staff for these stops was not acceptable.

2. Summary of Recommendations

We recommend that the UK Border Agency:

1. Reviews the rationale for 'indicative' targets, assessing how they assist in driving performance improvement.
2. Introduces performance targets to increase the use of facial recognition gates and ensures the length of time to repair faults is reduced.
3. Deploys resources effectively and investigates the current reliance on overtime.
4. Ensures detection staff are aware of the operational guidance on stop and search and are able to articulate and, if necessary, record the reasons for stopping and searching passengers.
5. Puts in place a contingency plan to deal with the risk to the border presented by the lack of border security in two areas of the Common Departure Lounge.
6. Records all risks on the local risk register and manages them through to an acceptable level.

3. The Inspection

- 3.1 The role of the Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency was established by the UK Borders Act 2007 to examine the efficiency and effectiveness of the UK Border Agency. It includes monitoring entry clearance decisions where there is a limited right of appeal against refusal. In 2009, the Independent Chief Inspector's remit was extended to include customs functions and contractors.²
- 3.2 The Chief Inspector is independent of the UK Border Agency and reports directly to the Home Secretary.

Purpose and Aim

- 3.3 This inspection of Manchester Airport formed part of a wider inspection covering some of the UK Border Agency's operations in the North West of England. The terms of reference for this inspection were:
- to undertake an inspection of Manchester Airport, collecting evidence to measure its efficiency and effectiveness.

Scope

- 3.4 The scope of the inspection was to assess:
- performance against Border Force performance measures as set out in the 2009/10 Business Plan;
 - the impact of transition from legacy customs/immigration to a single Agency approach;
 - the processes employed by detection staff in the customs areas, including any information sharing with partner agencies and the use of information and technology;
 - how UK Border Agency staff complied with the UK's laws on discrimination including the specific exemptions under section 19D of the Race Relations Act 1976 (as amended);
 - the use of the facial recognition gates at the terminals and impact on Service Level Agreements (SLAs);
 - the level of information provided to passengers regarding the use of the facial recognition system;
 - the level of awareness of the e-borders programme amongst operational staff and their responsibilities; and
 - how information from the National Border Targeting Centre and the Warnings Index Control Unit was used by front line staff.

Inspection Criteria

- 3.5 The inspection was carried out against a selection of the Chief Inspector's Core Criteria covering the following four themes:
- High level outcomes of the business;
 - Processes and procedures including quality of decision-making and consistency of approach;
 - Impact on people subject to UK Border Agency services; and
 - Management and leadership.

² http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2009/11/pdfs/ukpga_20090011_en.pdf

3.6 The criteria used for this inspection can be found at Appendix 1.

Methodology

3.7 The on-site phase of the inspection was carried out between 5 and 7 May 2010.

3.8 A range of methods were used during the inspection, including:

- analysis of documentary evidence and management information;
- interviewing eight members of UK Border Agency staff and managers across all levels;
- conducting eight focus groups with staff;
- observations at the primary control points³ and the secondary examination areas⁴;
- a walk through of the process for passengers transferring from international flights to another international flight from Terminal 3;
- analysis of statistical information and policy guidance;
- meetings and conversations with four stakeholders (Appendix 3);
- An electronic staff survey which was sent to 322 staff and achieved a response rate of 55% (Appendix 2);

3.9 On the final day of the on-site phase of the inspection, high level emerging findings were provided to UK Border Agency senior managers at Manchester Airport.

3.10 The inspection identified six recommendations for improvement to operational service delivery of the Border Force at Manchester Airport and these are set out on page five of this report.

³ Passport control

⁴ Area after passport control where officers question passengers and search baggage, freight and vehicles, with a view to identifying prohibited and restricted items and taking the appropriate legal action.

4. Background

- 4.1 At the time of the inspection, the UK Border Agency was structured into five primary segments:
- the four operational areas of Border Force, Immigration Group, International Group, and Criminality and Detention Group; and
 - the Corporate Services segment which includes the centralised management of Financial Management, Human Resources, Policy and Management Information.

The majority of UK based staff work within either Immigration Group or Border Force.

- 4.2 The UK Border Agency presence in the North West of England is made up of a part of Border Force North⁵ and Immigration Group North West⁶, which contains a number of national functions that support operations across the UK Border Agency.

Border Force

- 4.3 At the time of the inspection, the UK Border Agency's Border Force had around 9000 staff following the formal permanent transfer of over 4000 'customs' staff from Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) on 5 August 2009. The creation of a single Border Force within the UK Border Agency was designed to *'create a multi-skilled integrated workforce to improve security at the border, facilitate legitimate travel and trade and provide increased flexibility to tackle areas of greatest risk and pressures.'*⁷

Border Force North


- 4.4 Manchester Airport lies within Border Force North, the largest geographical UK Border Agency region, with a coastline of over 14,000km and numerous general aviation air strips in England, Scotland and Northern Ireland. Operations were managed across seven commands, each headed by an Assistant Director (AD). At the ports, Border Force staff had operational responsibility for immigration controls and the detection of illicit goods being transported by passengers or via freight operations.
- 4.5 Figure 1 shows the organisational structure of the senior management team within Border Force North:

⁵ Three regions – North, Central and South

⁶ Six regions – London and South East, East and West Midlands, North West, Wales and South West, Scotland and Northern Ireland

⁷ UKBA intranet


Figure 1: Organisational Chart of Border Force North



Manchester Airport

- 4.6 Manchester Airport is the largest regional UK airport outside of London. With two runways and three passenger terminals, it deals with over 20 million passenger movements each year. Approximately 85% of passenger movements are a result of international travel.
- 4.7 At the time of this inspection, Manchester Airport was under the command of an Assistant Director (AD). There were seven teams, four of which were at passport control, known as the Primary Check Point (PCP). They were led by one of Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Immigration (HMI). The other three were task based, focusing on detection work such as freight, drugs and cash. They were led by Senior Officers. Overall there were 297 members of staff based at Manchester Airport.

Figure 2: Organogram



5. Inspection findings – High level outcomes of the business

Specific criteria:

There are clear and realistic performance targets to drive improvement.

Performance Targets

- 5.1 There were regional targets for the whole of Border Force North which covered both the movement of people (immigration) and the movement of goods (detection). The targets for the financial year 2009-10 were broken down by strategic objectives within the business plan.
- 5.2 The UK Border Agency at Manchester Airport did not have specific performance targets for detection work. It contributed to the overall regional targets of Border Force North. However, each of the seven commands within Border Force North, of which Manchester Airport was one, were assigned what they called ‘indicative’ targets, to measure their contribution to the overall regional target.
- 5.3 These ‘indicative’ targets were neither ‘specific’ targets to drive performance nor were staff held accountable for meeting these targets – they were in reality nominal targets. They were estimations of what might be seized and were set by senior regional managers, based on risk and intelligence assessments. Nevertheless it was difficult to predict what type of goods could illegally enter the UK over a financial year because of changing trends in trafficking routes, production centres and new approaches to smuggling. Therefore, we did not judge Manchester Airport’s success or otherwise on indicative targets.
- 5.4 An example of a nominal target is cigarettes. The volume of seizures for cigarettes fell short of the regional target by 58%, whereas the nominal target for Manchester Airport was missed by 16%.
- 5.5 Ultimately, nominal targets for goods such as those outlined above were a way for managers to contribute to the overall Border Force North targets. However we found that staff had difficulty in explaining the rationale of nominal targets, and had little evidence to show that they were contributing to driving improvement.

We recommend that the UK Border Agency:

- reviews the rationale for ‘indicative’ targets, assessing how they assist in driving performance improvement.

Specific criteria:

Customer queuing and waiting times are as short as possible and adhere to UKBA guidelines / Service Level Agreements.

Queuing and waiting times

- 5.6 According to the UK Border Agency’s own assessment, targets for the queuing times for passengers were met consistently across all terminals. During the inspection, we observed the operation at the PCP and saw that queuing times were kept to a minimum. However we believe that the queue measurement techniques used by the UK Border Agency were arbitrary and dependant on passenger co-operation.

- 5.7 The target for queuing times was clearly set out in a Service Level Agreement (SLA) between the UK Border Agency and Manchester Airport Group⁸ (MAG), although these targets were standard across the whole of Border Force. The targets were:
- 95% of European Economic Area (EEA) Passengers to wait no longer than 25 minutes; and
 - 95% of Non-EEA passengers to wait no longer than 45 minutes.
- 5.8 In order to monitor the length of time that passengers were queuing, the UK Border Agency used two methods, sometimes simultaneously and sometimes separately:
- UK Border Agency staff handed out cards to some passengers as they arrived in the arrivals hall, with the current time recorded on the card. When the passenger arrived at the PCP, it was up to them to hand the card to UK Border Agency staff who would then record on the card the time that the passenger arrived at the control point. All of the cards which were handed in were collated by the Chief Immigration Officer (CIO) so that performance could be recorded.
 - The CIO would observe the length of the queues and draft staff onto the PCP if they felt that the queues were moving too slowly. This was known as ‘line of sight’.
- 5.9 At the time of the inspection, there was a requirement for staff to hand out at least one card per hour in each terminal to monitor the queues. Whilst this may have served to measure the queues during the arrival of one or two flights, we found that the accuracy or reliability of the process was suspect because the monitoring process depended on passengers cooperating, completing the card accurately and handing it in. We saw instances of passengers simply dropping cards on the floor or putting them into their bags or pockets uncompleted.
- 5.10 We noted that MAG and the UK Border Agency were discussing how to develop technical solutions to provide improved accuracy for monitoring queues.

Specific criteria:

Documentary and physical checks are carried out on people /goods/freight as designated.

- 5.11 During 2007, the UK Border Agency commenced checking of 100% of all international passengers arriving into Manchester Airport. Checks on goods and freight are intelligence led, meaning that they would only be checked if staff received intelligence to prompt a search.
- 5.12 We observed that all international passengers arriving at any terminal in Manchester Airport were subject to documentary checks at the PCP. All passports were checked and all passengers were asked the same series of questions with regards to their purpose for coming to the UK.

Specific criteria:

There is effective joint working with delivery partners and stakeholders.

- 5.13 We found evidence that the UK Border Agency at Manchester Airport had developed good working relationships with its stakeholders. It had a strong, mutually beneficial working relationship with the MAG, and was proactive in its cooperation with other key partners.
- 5.14 The UK Border Agency’s Assistant Director (AD) met monthly with MAG’s Customer Services Director. Evidence from the MAG showed these meetings had helped improve relationships and increased the Airport Group’s understanding of UK Border Agency priorities.

⁸ Manchester Airport Group is the airport operator

- 5.15 One positive outcome of these regular meetings was the SLA between Manchester Airport and the UK Border Agency, signed on 19 August 2008 by the then Home Secretary and the then Managing Director of MAG. The regular meetings were used to discuss the detail in the SLA and agree areas of responsibility and accountability. An example of this was ‘customer hosts’⁹ employed by MAG who helped customers with biometric passports (also known as chipped passports) join the queue for facial recognition gates. Biometric passports were introduced in 2006 and carry an electronic chip which enables the passport to be read automatically. The chip contains biometric and personal information about the passport holder, for example, fingerprints, a facial image and a digital copy of the holder’s signature.
- 5.16 We were also informed of dialogue between MAG and the UK Border Agency to improve the signage in the arrival halls in the airport.
- 5.17 In addition, sections 79 and 80 of the Policing and Crime Act 2009, which was amended on 29 January 2010, meant that there is an obligation for airports in England, Wales and Scotland to establish multi-agency groups to manage and monitor security at airports. As a result of this legislation, an Airport Security Executive Group was in the process of being set up as a joint venture between MAG, the UK Border Agency and Greater Manchester Police.

Alerts from the National Border Targeting Centre (NBTC)¹⁰

- 5.18 The NBTC is a new part of the UK Border Agency, which opened on 11 March 2010. It is the operational centre where checks on passengers entering and leaving Britain are carried out. These alerts are a result of domestic intelligence and e-Borders¹¹. They provide strategic, technical and operational analysis in order to alert UK Border Agency staff of any threat to national security. If a suspect is identified, an alert is sent to the appropriate port. We examined the alerts that were received in Manchester Airport from the NBTC. Alongside the NBTC, the UK Border Agency also uses the Warnings Index Control Unit¹² (WICU) information.
- 5.19 We found that the alerts sent by the NBTC, either by fax or e-mail to a CIO, were often already available. UK Border Agency staff at Manchester Airport also used the WICU, which identified known targets and alerted staff electronically when passports of incoming passengers were scanned on the WICU. This meant that work was sometimes duplicated.
- 5.20 Staff informed us that the majority of alerts from the NBTC were already available on the WICU and therefore, they viewed the alerts as duplication. The NBTC was in its infancy at the time of inspection and is outside the scope of this inspection.

Specific criteria:

Technology is utilised effectively to increase security and customer service.

Facial Recognition Gates¹³

- 5.21 Facial Recognition Gates were installed in Terminal 1 in 2008 and in Terminal 2 in 2009. There were ten gates overall – five in each terminal. The gates could be used by any UK or EU passengers aged 18 or over who were in possession of a biometric (or electronically chipped) passport.

⁹ Customer hosts are staff employed by Manchester Airport Group to greet passengers as they enter the arrivals hall of the airport, offering general assistance where necessary.

¹⁰ https://www5.i-grasp.com/fe/tpl_capita97.asp?news=info3

¹¹ <http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/travellingtotheuk/beforetravel/advanceinfopassengers/>

¹² The WICU is the system which controls the Warnings Index – a database of names available to the UKBA for matters of national security

¹³ Border security technology which scans each passenger’s face against the digital photo recorded in their passport. If there is a match, the automatic gates allow the clearance of EU passengers across the border.

- 5.22 The gates operate by scanning the passenger's face using a camera and matching this to the image stored on the passport. If there is a match, the gates open and the passenger is allowed through, theoretically removing the need to speak to an Immigration Officer (IO).
- 5.23 We found that when they were working, the Facial Recognition Gates delivered real benefits to passengers, reducing the time taken to transit the PCP. This was confirmed by interviews with staff. However we observed a number of occasions when one or two gates were closed and some occasions when all gates were out of service. We were informed that this was a regular occurrence.
- 5.24 Figure 3 shows that when open, the gates are used regularly by passengers¹⁴:

Figure 3

Breakdown of Transaction at Facial Recognition Gates November 2009 – April 2010							
Terminal 1				Terminal 2			
Month/Year	No of eligible Passengers	Number of Transaction at FR Gates	% uptake	No of eligible Passengers	Number of Transaction at FR Gates	% uptake	Total % uptake of both Terminals
Nov 09	53,239	12,471	23%	37,374	11,648	31%	27%
Dec 09	19,730	9,492	48%	34,564	10,402	30%	37%
Jan 10	CLOSED	CLOSED	N/A	31,723	5,644	18%	18%
Feb 10	11,092	490	4%	CLOSED	CLOSED	N/A	4%
Mar 10	44,368	13,513	30%	23,741	2,804	12%	24%
Apr 10	55,055	20,172	37%	37,959	11,712	31%	34%

Technical Faults

- 5.25 The relevant CIO maintained a log of faults and the time taken between failure and service being resumed. Staff informed us that failures were frustrating for both passengers and themselves. They felt that the reputation of the UK Border Agency was damaged, because airlines announced the use of the gates during arrival at the terminal. If the gates were not working, passengers were then met with a line of large electronic red crosses to alert them that no passage was available through the gates. Some passengers subsequently complained at the PCP.

Examples of gates failing to operate effectively

- 5.26 We noted that during one week between 18 and 24 April 2010, the gates in Terminal 1 broke down five times. Once was due to a lack of available staff and four were technical faults. Of the technical faults, one on 23 April resulted in a passenger getting trapped in a gate. Once the passenger was released, all gates were subsequently closed and the fault was not rectified until 27 April.
- 5.27 We were informed by managers that the UK Border Agency had a maintenance contract with a company based in Portugal to support facial recognition gates. The contract was not specific to Manchester Airport and covered gates in other airports. The contract was monitored by the Home Office IT unit, part of Home Office HQ. Within this contract, the timeframe to have the gates fixed was four working days. It was of particular concern to us that if a gate broke down on a Friday, it could be out of order until the following Thursday – four working days for the company, but seven working days for the UK Border Agency, the Airport Group and the passengers.

¹⁴ Detailed information for the first six months was not included in the data

- 5.28 Our opinion is that this contractual time frame is too long. If the latest technology regularly fails, staff and passengers will lose faith in its effectiveness. The effectiveness of the Facial Recognition Gates is in danger of being compromised both by the unreliability of the technology and the frustration of staff towards their use. If gates fail to operate, staff need to quickly be redeployed to the PCP. Staff are also likely to receive more complaints, and therefore slow the queuing process.
- 5.29 We could find no overall plan to evaluate the success or otherwise of the facial recognition gates at Manchester Airport and would urge the Agency to do so soon as possible.

We recommend that the UK Border Agency:

- introduces performance targets to increase the use of facial recognition gates and ensures the length of time to repair faults is reduced.

Specific criteria:

The agency is operating efficiently and effectively, securing its borders and protecting the public against risks and threats

- 5.30 We observed staff carrying out their roles and how they were deployed. We noted effective and swift deployment of staff to the PCP at busy times.
- 5.31 However, as a direct result, we saw less resources on detection when staff were deployed to the PCP alongside Immigration Officers (IOs).

Primary Check Point (PCP)

- 5.32 The PCP is the control point where international passengers present themselves to UK Border Agency staff on their arrival into the UK. Passengers must show their travel documents and any other relevant document, for example a visa, to show they are permitted entry.
- 5.33 The PCP was staffed using IOs and Assistant Immigration Officers (AIOs). During busy periods and times when there were shortages of staff, detection staff who carried out the legacy customs function were deployed to assist in the swift transit of passengers through the PCP.
- 5.34 During interviews and focus groups, staff were extremely vocal in highlighting the current demands being placed upon them. They believed the airport was under-resourced, a belief which was impossible to prove as managers did not know optimum staffing levels required using existing management information.

The role of staff deployed on detection work

- 5.35 We found that intelligence information was provided to detection staff at the start of each shift, which was used to identify passengers suspected of offences. The majority of the detection resource was focussed on passengers identified through intelligence or profiling prior to their arrival in the UK as possibly being involved in the illicit importation of goods. This did however mean that the majority of all other passengers were not subject to scrutiny.
- 5.36 We observed two teams of detection staff in the arrivals halls and also the Cash Team¹⁵ at the outbound security gates in Terminal 1. We also interviewed officers via a focus group of staff with responsibility for detection at the freight terminal.

¹⁵ The Cash Team is a team of detection staff who have responsibility for the identification and detection of large quantities of cash being imported or exported through UK ports.

- 5.37 In one instance, we observed a team of five staff who had responsibility for detection of goods across two terminals. This observation took place on a busy morning when a number of international flights were arriving. The team being observed had received specific intelligence about two incoming passengers that morning. The intelligence and the relevant passengers were completely unconnected and were arriving on two separate flights.
- 5.38 The result was that there were no other detection staff available to stop and search or watch for behavioural characteristics that could identify potential smugglers as all five staff were needed for the intelligence led operations.

Transfer of Skills

- 5.39 Following the amalgamation of the border control operations of Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs¹⁶ (HMRC), the Border and Immigration Agency and UK Visas in April 2009, there was an increased overlap in roles. Staff on the PCP would have carried out some detection duties whilst detection staff would have had a role on the PCP. However the reality was that despite some PCP staff having been trained in detection duties, the emphasis was on detection staff working on the PCP.

Whilst acknowledging the attempt to create an integrated workforce, the need to focus on the PCP had a negative impact on some staff who felt that their role had been diluted to 'queue bust' rather than protect the border.

- 5.40 There were far fewer immigration staff trained to do detection work than the other way around. When demand was required for detection work, there was little scope to ensure that both detection and immigration functions were resourced appropriately. When we raised this with managers, we were told that they had to meet the queuing and 100% document checks. Hence there was a need for staff to be on the PCP.
- 5.41 Out of 130 immigration officers, only six (4%) had been trained to work in the secondary examination area and carry out detection functions. In contrast, out of 107 detection staff, comprising 58 detection officers and 49 assistant detection officers, 53 (50%)¹⁷ had been trained to work on the PCP. It must be noted however that of the 130 immigration officers, 16 were unavailable for training, because they were working overseas working or on maternity leave.
- 5.42 This staffing approach by the UK Border Agency reflected the performance target of checking 100% of all international passengers. Our concern is therefore that formal targets for passenger queuing times were prioritised above detection staff carrying out their role, where only nominal targets existed. Whilst 100% checking of documents is very important in terms of securing the border, intelligence led checking is also a valuable deterrent.

Overtime

- 5.43 We examined the use of the overtime for staff undertaking immigration functions using data supplied by the UK Border Agency. We found that the amount paid for overtime in the financial year April 2009 – March 2010 was close to £1,000,000. Managers and staff described this use of overtime as 'an inherent way of running the airport'.
- 5.44 It was difficult to make a judgement on whether the overtime figure was justified or not due to the absence of management information available showing how staff are deployed. The Border Agency should therefore closely examine its use of overtime to support front line operations at Manchester Airport.

¹⁶ The government department formerly charged with the control of importation of goods into the UK prior to the Agency assuming responsibility

¹⁷ Includes rounding to nearest percentage point

We recommend that the UK Border Agency:

- deploys resources effectively and investigates the current reliance on overtime.

The 'Southern Front'

- 5.45 A transit point in Terminal 1 of Manchester Airport known as the 'Southern Front' handled an average of just three passengers per hour. It was staffed by two UK Border Agency officials between 06:00hrs and 20:30hrs, and dealt with passengers who were transiting between international flights.
- 5.46 This did not seem an effective use of resources, particularly when detection staff were being removed from their primary responsibility to assist on the PCP in the main arrivals halls.
- 5.47 We were informed that the 'Southern Front' was staffed in this way to assist MAG in meeting the requirements of a number of airlines who wanted to use this facility. MAG made this commercial decision due to the threat that airlines might cease their use of the airport. MAG did not reimburse the UK Border Agency for this work.
- 5.48 UK Border Agency managers acknowledged that the 'Southern Front' was not an effective use of their resources but rationalised it as good stakeholder engagement.

Staffing

- 5.49 We found that there was no formula for managers to determine their staffing requirements at Manchester Airport. We could find no evidence that the demographics of the airports, passenger numbers, number of terminal buildings, types of flights (scheduled or chartered), volume of freight and risks of importation of illicit materials were analysed to arrive at an optimum staffing level.
- 5.50 This meant that no member of staff at Manchester Airport could tell us the optimum staffing level. We found that staff were generally deployed based upon their previous legacy functions of immigration or detection.
- 5.51 Managers reported that the pool of resources used was the Border Force North regional pool of staff. However, one manager said "...*nobody knows how big the pie is or what size slice of the pie we are entitled to*". Managers also made reference to the lack of a staffing model for the airport.

Pilot to determine level of resources required at airports

- 5.52 We were informed that a pilot study was underway designed to model staffing and processes at another airport in the UK and the findings were due to be published towards the end of 2010. The modelling should provide the UK Border Agency with a template to determine the level of resources required at various airports. The pilot study was going to examine a number of factors, for example, the volume of air traffic, number of passengers, volume of freight and the level of risk at a particular airport.

6. Inspection Findings – Processes and procedures including quality of decision making, consistency of approach and impact on people subject to UK Border Agency Services

Specific criteria:

Authorisations to discriminate on grounds of nationality and ethnic origin in relation to the operation of immigration functions are personally authorised by the Minister and the list of relevant nationalities is clearly communicated to UKBA staff.

UKBA staff make lawful and reasonable decisions.

Ministerial Authorisations

- 6.1 We observed six flight arrivals and we saw evidence that all passengers were treated consistently.
- 6.2 Section 19D of the Race Relations Act 1976 (as amended) states that for public authorities:
- “it is not unlawful for a relevant person to discriminate against another person on grounds of nationality or ethnic or national origins in carrying out immigration and nationality functions”*
- 6.3 Using this legislation, Ministers can make authorisations to immigration staff to discriminate on the basis of nationality, ethnic or national origin in the exercise of their functions. This meant that when a relevant authorisation was in place, immigration staff had the powers to stop certain passengers, without the need for further intelligence, and question them in more detail about the purpose for their arrival into the UK.
- 6.4 During the inspection, we found that ministerial authorisations were updated on a monthly basis. They were sent to an HMI as a single point of contact who then distributed them to all staff via e-mail. During interviews and focus groups, all staff were aware of the current list of what they referred to as ‘high risk countries’. However staff admitted to not always reading the monthly update on ministerial authorisations. We believe that there is no excuse for this due to the critical information contained in the update.
- 6.5 Aside from ministerial authorisations, staff would also lawfully differentiate between passengers from the European Economic Area (EEA) and non-EEA passengers. The differentiation resulted in additional questions being asked to non-EEA passengers, however all non-EEA passengers were asked the same questions and treated equally.

Selection of Passengers by detection staff

- 6.6 In addition to immigration controls, passengers could also be stopped for questioning or examination by detection staff, based upon intelligence that had been gathered. We had specific concerns with regard to the selection of passengers and the reliance on visual selection over intelligence.

- 6.7 The Enforcement Handbook¹⁸ used by staff at the airport included the 'Air Passenger Selection Indicator and Selection Template' which outlined the process for selecting passengers. The process was based upon two distinct areas – Intelligence and Visual Selection.
- 6.8 Intelligence could come from a number of sources, for example specific intelligence from a current operation, shared information between the police and the UK Border Agency or information from the NBTC. Visual selection was based upon officers observing passengers to look for what are known as behavioural indicators, for example, holding back from the control points, rushing through controls and avoidance of customs dogs.
- 6.9 We observed more passengers from non-white ethnic groups were stopped by detection staff than those from white ethnic groups in both the secondary examination area, which is after the PCP where detection staff conduct searches, and by the cash teams. These observations were made over a number of days and covered a variety of flights. While we recognise that passengers may be stopped for a number of reasons such as suspicious behaviour or as the result of specific intelligence, we were concerned that staff were unable to inform us precisely why, in the cases we observed, particular individuals had been stopped for further questioning.
- 6.10 In the secondary examination area, 11 out of 14 people stopped for further questioning were from non-white ethnic backgrounds. We recognise that this is not a representative sample and we did not assess the overall number of passengers going through this area to judge whether this accurately reflected the overall proportion of non-white passengers. However, we were concerned that detection staff were unable to explain clearly to us why these individuals had been stopped and said that it was primarily based on '*gut instinct*' – this lack of rationale for the stops is not acceptable especially as the UK Border Agency's enforcement handbook contains detailed pre-selection and visual selection criteria.
- 6.11 The Cash Team also stopped a high number of passengers from a non-white ethnic background. The team were given profiles of passengers to stop based on intelligence information. The profiles were mainly based on the nationality of the passenger and their destination. However the Cash Team was not positioned in an area of the airport where it was possible to have known either. They were located by the airport security area, where all passengers have to transit. In all cases, the questioning proved negative. Despite our concerns, it is important to note that the UK Border Agency had not received any complaints relating to racism or discrimination.

Complaints

- 6.12 Complaints by passengers could be made in two ways; direct to the UK Border Agency or via a complaint to the MAG. We were provided with information from both sources. The UK Border Agency confirmed there had been no complaints since August 2009 (when the UK Border Agency and customs functions were merged into one single Border Force). MAG also confirmed that between May 2009 and May 2010, they had not received any complaints regarding racism or discrimination.

We recommend that the UK Border Agency:

- ensures detection staff are aware of the operational guidance on stop and search and are able to articulate and if necessary record the reasons for stopping and searching passengers.

Specific criteria:

UKBA staff are professional, courteous and respectful when dealing with customers, irrespective of their status and can identify and sensitively support vulnerable and distressed customers especially children.

¹⁸ UKBA intranet

- 6.13 During our observations, we saw no evidence of any discourtesy by staff toward passengers or other people in and around the airport. We did however observe that there was room for improvement in the way that some staff communicated with passengers whose first language was not English.
- 6.14 During our interviews and focus groups we noted that all staff had completed the mandatory Equality and Diversity training package. Staff informed us that managers had ensured the course had been completed. We also carried out observations on staff at the PCP and in the customs environment.
- 6.15 We did however observe that the language style of some staff did not change when dealing with English speaking passengers and non-English speakers. Grading of language and speed of speech would have reflected a more professional approach to some passengers for whom English was not their first language.
- 6.16 This was particularly noticeable when observing detection staff. We observed a number of people failing to understand why they were being taken aside and why their bags were being searched. The detection staff often had to repeat themselves a number of times to ensure the passenger understood the circumstances of the situation they were in. We were not convinced that this understanding had been achieved in all cases.
- 6.17 We were pleased to find that all staff had received mandatory training relating to safeguarding children and vulnerable adults. The training course equipped staff with skills on how to deal with children and how to identify potential child trafficking issues. We also found there to be designated officers attached to a Children's Team. All staff we interviewed were aware of their responsibilities and gave feedback that the number of passengers concerned was 'relatively low'. There was no opportunity during our observations to test how staff put this training into practice.
- 6.18 A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) existed between the UK Border Agency, Social Services and the Police to ensure that children and young people were dealt with appropriately. The MoU also provided guidance on the relevant areas of responsibility for each agency. We considered the use of this MoU to be good practice although we had no opportunity during this inspection to test its effectiveness.

7. Inspection Findings – Management and Leadership

Specific criteria:

Business risks are well managed.

- 7.1 We were concerned to discover two exits in the Common Departure Lounge in Terminal 3 where transit passengers could walk straight out without being subject to any controls. It was a further concern that the UK Border Agency could not accurately measure the risk posed to the UK as a result of this.

Common Departure Lounge

- 7.2 The Common Departure Lounge (CDL) is an area in Terminal 3 which was used for international transit passengers whose onward flights departed from Terminal 3. Passengers who arrived on an international flight into Terminals 1 or 2 were transported by bus straight from the plane to Terminal 3. They did not transit through any immigration or security controls in Terminals 1 or 2.
- 7.3 However, as Terminal 3 handled only domestic arrivals, there were no immigration controls on this terminal. We were concerned that transferring passengers could walk straight out of the airport in two separate locations without passing through any control points. We observed how this was possible and were provided with a walk through of the areas concerned.
- 7.4 We were concerned about the risk this posed, despite managers within the UK Border Agency describing it as ‘small’. Furthermore we learnt that the risk was identified during 2009 and was on the regional risk register for Border Force North to deal with. It was therefore puzzling to discover that little progress had been made since this date and the risk still existed at the time of the inspection.
- 7.5 We attempted to find out the reasons for the delay, and escalated our concerns within the UK Border Agency. After the inspection we were told that a meeting was due to be arranged between the UK Border Agency and Manchester Airport Group to address the situation. It is important that the UK Border Agency is proactive in ensuring a solution is delivered as at the time of the inspection, the UK Border Agency was unable to tell us if an international passenger had ever entered the country without passing through immigration control.

We recommend that the UK Border Agency:

- puts in place a contingency plan to deal with the risk to the border presented by the lack of border security in two areas of the Common Departure Lounge.

Risk Register

- 7.6 We found that although the UK Border Agency had an active risk register not all risks associated with the airport featured on it. One significant omission was the above mentioned Common Departure Lounge issue. This risk related to the two porous borders and the fact that individuals could potentially walk out of the airport without passing through passport control. It was considered to be serious enough to have been discussed at the level of Home Secretary yet had been removed from the airport risk register, placed on a regional risk register and not dealt with.

- 7.7 We were of the opinion that all risks, whether short, medium or long term, should be entered on the airport risk register to ensure they were managed effectively. If moved onto the regional risk register, we consider that they should also remain on the airport register until completion.

We recommend that the UK Border Agency:

- records all risks on the local risk register and manages them through to an acceptable level.

Specific criteria:

Change management is effective and leads to improvements in the quality of service.

There is evidence that the agency is flexible and responsive to changing circumstances.

Staff understand key objectives and values of the organisation.

Integration

- 7.8 We found that immigration staff and detection staff were working to different terms and conditions, including separate working arrangements relating to their shift patterns. There were also differing levels of acceptance of these terms and conditions amongst the unions who supported the staff, resulting in different unions giving different advice to their members. For example, detection staff had been trained on the PCP after their union accepted that role in an integrated service. In contrast immigration staff had been informed by their union that they were not obliged to carry out detection work and therefore, did not have to volunteer. This resulted in a low proportion of immigration staff who were trained to conduct detection work.¹⁹

Information Sharing

- 7.9 We found that the process for sharing information between detection staff and staff at the PCP had risks associated with it in that staff on the PCP might not recognise the ‘targeted’ passenger – the passenger who is subject to intelligence and liable to be stopped – as they passed through, particularly during busy periods.
- 7.10 For such passengers, it was imperative that they were identified by UK Border Agency staff as they passed through the PCP, particularly if there was no photograph to support the intelligence report. Therefore staff on the PCP had to be informed to ‘watch’ for the named person when they were scanning passports.
- 7.11 In order to do this, we observed a member of detection staff typing a name into a word processing document a number of times, printing the document then cutting the paper into strips so that all staff on the PCP could be given a strip of paper with the name of the ‘targeted’ passenger on it.
- 7.12 This paper strip was necessary, as the WICU used by immigration staff would not necessarily flag this up as an alert when a passport was scanned.

Staff Objectives and Core Values

- 7.13 We found that whilst staff were aware of their day to day responsibilities, integration had had an impact on how they perceived their roles.
- 7.14 We were provided with documentary evidence in the form of job descriptions relating to the role of some functions within the airport and this was complemented by documented procedures for those areas. For example, there was clear guidance for staff working on the PCP and within the Secondary Examination Area (SEA). The documents provided specific points about the role and differentiated between responsibilities of operational staff and managers.

¹⁹ SEA Training – Secondary Examination Area Training

- 7.15 In addition, during interviews and focus groups, staff informed us that they were clear what their day jobs were and they were also aware of their responsibilities.
- 7.16 Staff however reported that they were unsure of how they would operate in the future and were critical of a lack of information from managers which had left them feeling uncertain about the future. Managers on the other hand showed us a number of documents which informed staff as far as possible as to any changes.
- 7.17 This concern amongst staff was further evidenced by our staff survey where we asked staff whether ‘... prior to integration, they were kept informed of what was happening and what to expect from integration’. In response to this question, only 25% responded positively, with 61% responding that they disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement.
- 7.18 Furthermore, during the survey, we asked staff to provide any general comments they had about their role and impacts they had experienced over the 12 months prior to the inspection. A range of comments were received from 99 respondents to the survey, over 30% stating that ‘*uncertainty and lack of clarity has had major impact on morale*’.
- 7.19 In addition to reviewing the awareness of staff in relation to their objectives, we also examined their knowledge of core values of the Home Office and the Agency. All staff interviewed expressed knowledge of the values based around integrity, objectivity, impartiality and honesty and were aware of their responsibilities.
- 7.20 During our observations at the various points throughout the airport, we did not witness any behaviour to suggest that these values were not being employed.

Communication

- 7.21 The AD cascaded information from central management to managers within the airport. However, staff reported that they did not always receive this information directly. This was also reflected in the findings of a staff survey that we carried out prior to carrying out our on-site work at the airport.
- 7.22 A review of the airport in 2009²⁰ made reference to communication within the airport in respect of integration. It stated that “*the AD holds weekly meetings with the (Senior Officers) SOs and HMIs immediately following the weekly national AD conference call, to cascade information and directions regarding integration*”.
- 7.23 Keeping all staff informed using a variety of mediums of communication, with open and transparent information, would assist in the cultural changes that were required to ensure integration was implemented successfully. During our interviews and focus groups, we found that there remained a perception that integration had been “applied in name but not in practice” with staff commenting that very little had changed and that most members of staff continued to do their previous roles, particularly immigration staff.
- 7.24 The findings of a UK Border Agency survey in 2009 found that there were strong indicators from interview and testing across the estate to show that operational staff retained and worked to their legacy identity.
- 7.25 In our staff survey, we asked staff about change management and asked questions relating to three specific areas;
- Change being managed well;
 - Being kept informed about integration; and
 - Active involvement and opportunity to contribute views when planning for change.

²⁰ Border Transformation Review Manchester 10/12/09

- 7.26 With regards to these areas, 60% of all the staff who responded to the survey responded negatively to all three questions. We were particularly concerned to note that 85% of respondents felt change was not well managed.
- 7.27 We also asked staff about the level of service that customers were receiving, specifically whether they felt that customers were benefiting from an increased level of service from the Agency since integration. In answer to this question, we were concerned that 79% responded negatively, with 42% strongly disagreeing with the statement. It should be said that we did not find anything to support this when conducting the on-site inspection work.

General criterion:

There is clarity about an individual's role and purpose.

Specific criteria:

Staff receive appropriate good quality training, including diversity and equality, when it is needed to equip them with the necessary knowledge and skills to enable them to deliver services fairly to customers.

- 7.28 We noted that mandatory training relevant to the various functions across the airport had been provided to staff. This training included Equality & Diversity, Information Management, Keeping Children Safe and Personal Development Review Training. For specific roles, for example detection staff, Personal Safety Training (PST) had also been provided.
- 7.29 We found that after initial training, there were few opportunities for staff to receive refresher training. Custody training for staff working in detention facilities at the airport was provided every five years, along with Equality and Diversity, Information Management, Personal Safety Training, Firearms Make Safe, Airside Driver Training and Airside Awareness. However, refresher training on other issues was not routinely available.

Training for Integration

- 7.30 We found that there was a plan in place to deliver training to all staff to ensure there was sufficient cross-skilling in the teams. However, at the time of the inspection, we found that a number of actions in the training plan had not been achieved.
- 7.31 Out of ten actions on the training plan, at the time of the inspection, only one had a status of 'Green'. Green meant that the action was either on target or had been completed. Of the other actions, five were showing the status as 'Red' – meaning that the action had been halted with no contingency in place.
- 7.32 An example of one outstanding 'red' action related to the delivery of Personal Safety Training (PST) for staff who had volunteered for a Joint Operational Team. The action was to ensure that all staff on this team had received the relevant level of PST training by 2 April 2010. The 'Red' status indicated this had yet to be achieved and comments within the plan read that "we have not been given any details of the dates of PST3 course".
- 7.33 There was a need for better planning and communication between the management of Border Force at Manchester Airport and the administration staff responsible for booking and allocating training courses.

Specific criteria:

Performance of all staff is reviewed regularly and improvement plans are in place for those identified as less effective.

- 7.34 Whilst we found that the process for the management of Performance Development Reviews (PDRs) was taking place, there was a need for the UK Border Agency to review the current set of objectives that had been set for staff.
- 7.35 Prior to the on-site phase of the inspection, we were provided with six examples of PDRs for a range of UK Border Agency staff/grades at Manchester Airport.
- 7.36 The examples provided showed evidence of specific objectives being assigned to staff, with the majority of objectives being relevant to their grades and meeting SMARTER²¹ principles.
- 7.37 During interviews and focus groups, we were also informed that managers regularly conducted PDR reviews and there were also regular one to one meetings between staff and managers. Staff informed us that they had sufficient opportunity to discuss developmental issues with managers as well as training needs. However, as reported above, these training needs were not always necessarily met.
- 7.38 As part of our staff survey that was completed prior to the on-site phase of our inspection, we asked staff about the setting of objectives. We asked two questions:
- whether objectives reflected operational targets; and
 - whether new objectives following integration follow SMARTER principles.
- 7.39 The findings of the survey showed that of those surveyed, only 21% felt that objectives reflected operational targets and only 11% replied positively about the objectives following SMARTER principles. Also notable was that a quarter of staff surveyed strongly disagreed that their objectives followed the SMARTER principles. In addition, 18% strongly disagreed that their objectives reflected operational targets. We found an example of this in a PDR for a member of detection staff. One of the objectives linked to performance stated that the officer should “contribute to operational decisions and the team’s detections” under an overall heading of “achieving business targets”. However, as reported earlier in this report, the airport did not have specific targets for detection staff, only nominal ones.
- 7.40 In the time we were on-site, we were unable to fully test these objectives against the results from the staff survey. However the strength of the responses suggests that the Agency would be advised to consider these, or at the very least consult with staff as to the reasons behind their dissatisfaction.

General criterion:

Communication.

Specific criteria:

Strategies and plans are communicated throughout the organisation and to stakeholders.

- 7.41 We found mixed evidence with regards to communication by staff at the airport. We were pleased to find that there were channels of communication open between managers and staff, but that there were staff concerns about the medium of communication and volume of information that had to be read. We also found that there was no formal communications strategy in place.

21. **SMARTER** is a mnemonic used in performance management when setting goals and targets to ensure they are; **S**pecific, **M**easurable, **A**chievable, **R**ealistic, **T**ime-bound, **E**valuate, **R**e-evaluate

Assistant Director Notices

- 7.42 Prior to the on-site phase of the inspection, we examined evidence provided which showed examples of 'Assistant Director Notices' – information updates sent to all staff. For example, we were provided with copies of notices relating to:
- Bullying and Harassment;
 - Workforce Planning;
 - Integration; and
 - Automated Immigration Gates.
- 7.43 We were also provided with minutes of meetings that had taken place between various staff at the airport, in particular, between the two legacy functions in order to share information.
- 7.44 The evidence we found was positive and indicated that communication channels were open between senior managers and staff. However, whilst on-site, the majority of staff informed us that they received too much information. The volume, coupled with the workload demands of staff, were reasons given by staff to explain why they were unable to read and digest all of the information.
- 7.45 There was therefore a risk that important information could be overlooked, not understood or ignored. It was clear to us that examples of messages which went unread by many staff were ministerial authorisations and information relating to Border Force integration.

Team Briefings

- 7.46 Team briefings were held before the start of each shift. These briefings were used to articulate a range of messages to staff and we considered them to be good practice. We were also informed that when necessary, the briefings included intelligence updates ensure that staff were informed of the latest threats and techniques that could compromise the border.

Stakeholders

- 7.47 In addition to communications amongst staff, we also discussed how communications were handled with stakeholders. MAG informed us that there were regular meetings between them and the AD of the airport and any messages were communicated during these meetings. Any ad hoc messages were conveyed using formal letters where necessary. MAG had no concerns regarding the handling of communications. Managers did not however have a formal stakeholder engagement plan.

Appendix 1

Inspection Framework and Core Criteria

The criteria used in this inspection were taken from the Independent Chief Inspector's Core Inspection Criteria. They are shown below.

Section 1 – High level outcomes of the business

1.1 General Criterion: The borders are secured and immigration is controlled for the benefit of the country. The specific criteria are:

Specific criteria:

- 1.1(a) There are clear and realistic performance targets to drive improvement
- 1.1(c) There is effective joint working with delivery partners and stakeholders including enforcement and security agencies; carriers; local authorities; employers and educational establishments
- 1.1(g) Technology is utilised effectively to increase security and customer service

1.4 General Criterion: Corporate Health – UKBA is a high performing, customer-focused workforce delivering to its strategic objectives. The specific criterion is:

Specific criterion:

- 1.4(d) The agency is operating efficiently and effectively, securing its borders and protecting the public against risks and threats (tailored criteria)

Section 2 – Processes and procedures including quality of decision making and consistency of approach

2.1 General Criterion: UKBA is compliant with equalities legislation and specific duties in relation to race and diversity. The specific criterion is:

Specific criterion:

- 2.1(b) Authorisations to discriminate on grounds on nationality and ethnic origin in relation to the operation of immigration functions are personally authorised by the Minister and the list of relevant nationalities is clearly communicated to UKBA staff

2.2 General Criterion: The UK Border Agency staff make lawful and reasonable decisions. The specific criterion is:

Specific criterion:

- 2.2(c) Documentary and physical checks are carried out on people /goods/freight as designated.

Section 3 – Impact on people subject to UK Border Agency services

3.1 General Criterion: UKBA staff and staff of commercial partners are welcoming and engage positively with customers and other users. The specific criteria are:

Specific criteria:

- 3.1(a) Customer queuing and waiting times are as short as possible and adhere to UKBA guidelines / Service Level Agreements
- 3.1(b) UKBA staff are professional, courteous and respectful when dealing with customers, irrespective of their status
- 3.1(c) UKBA staff can identify and sensitively support vulnerable and distressed customers especially children

Section 4 – Management and Leadership

4.1 General Criterion: Effective and motivating leadership. The specific criteria are:

Specific criteria:

- 4.1(b) Business risks are well managed
- 4.1(c) There is evidence that the agency is flexible and responsive to changing circumstances
- 4.1(d) Change management is effective and leads to improvements in the quality of service

4.5 General Criterion: There is clarity about an individual's role and purpose. The specific criteria are:

Specific criteria:

- 4.5(a) Staff receive appropriate good quality training, including diversity and equality, when it is needed to equip them with the necessary knowledge and skills to enable them to deliver services fairly to customers
- 4.5(c) Performance of all staff is reviewed regularly and improvement plans are in place for those identified as less effective

4.7 General Criterion: Communication. The specific criteria are:

Figure 8 – Specific criteria:

- 4.7(a) Strategies and plans are communicated throughout the organisation and to stakeholders
- 4.7(c) Staff understand key objectives and values of the organisation

Appendix 2 Staff Survey Results

Methodology


As part of the evidence gathering phase, a staff survey was distributed electronically to 320 staff at Manchester Airport. Participation in the survey was anonymous and on a voluntary basis. Of these 320 staff, 177 responded to the questions, giving a response rate of 55%.

We asked staff 10 questions and also gave space for comments. The questions covered the following themes:


- Work objectives;
- Training;
- Management;
- Change management process; and
- Stakeholder engagement and benefits.

The results are shown in the charts below. Please note that the percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding.

1. Prior to the integration of immigration and customs functions in August 2009, I was kept informed about what was happening and what to expect




2. I have been offered adequate opportunities for training and development to deal with the integration of immigration and customs functions




- Strongly Agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree


3. I was actively involved and had adequate opportunity to contribute my views in the planning of integration for August 2009




4. Managers are responsive and flexible when implementing change, changing decisions where necessary and evaluating performance



5. Management are effective at implementing and publishing lessons learned from the change management process




6. Since integration in August 2009, I feel that UKBA customers are benefiting from an increased level of service from the UKBA




- Strongly Agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree


7. Objectives within my PDR reflect operational targets that have been implemented by the UKBA




8. New objectives that have been set for me since implementation of change follow SMARTER principles



9. Stakeholder engagement has improved since integration in August 2009



10. I feel that change is managed well in the UKBA



- Strongly Agree
- Agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly Disagree

Appendix 3

List of stakeholders interviewed

- Manchester Airport Group
- Greater Manchester Police
- British Air Transport Association
- A selection of airlines which operate out of Manchester Airport

Appendix 4

Glossary and Abbreviations

Term	Description
Biometrics	All customers are now routinely required to provide ten-digit finger scans and a digital photograph when applying for a United Kingdom visa. There are some minor exceptions to this rule, e.g. Heads of State and children under five.
Border Force (BF)	The directorate within the UKBA which is responsible for frontline operations.
Border and Immigration Agency (BIA)	The name of the Agency responsible for immigration functions prior to the creation of the UK Border Agency.
Customer Hosts	Staff employed by the airport to greet passengers as they enter the arrivals hall of the airport, offering general assistance where necessary.
Detection	A function carried out by Border Force staff in the customs area (to detect the illicit trade or importation of illegal goods).
e-Borders	A multi-agency programme being delivered by the UK Border Agency in partnership with the police and the security and intelligence agencies. It focuses on the capture and analysis of passenger and crew data from carriers, in advance of movements into and out of the UK by air, sea and rail.
EEA	The European Economic Area (EEA) was established on 1 January 1994 following an agreement between the member states of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Community, later the European Union (EU). Specifically, it allows Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway to participate in the EU's single market without a conventional EU membership. In exchange, they are obliged to adopt all EU legislation related to the single market, except those pieces of legislation that relate to agriculture and fisheries.
Facial Recognition System	Border security technology which scans each passenger's face against the digital photo recorded in their passport. If there is a match, the automatic gates allow the clearance of EU passengers across the border.
Her Majesty's Inspector of Immigration (HMI)	The UKBA senior manager primarily responsible for legacy immigration staff.
HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC)	UK government department responsible for customs and taxation.
Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency	The role of the Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency was established by the UK Borders Act 2007 to examine the efficiency and effectiveness of the UK Border Agency. The Chief Inspector is independent of the UK Border Agency and reports directly to the Home Secretary.
Immigration Group (IG)	The directorate within the UKBA which is responsible for asylum, enforcement and compliance and nationality.

Integration	Term used to describe the process of integrating immigration and customs functions within the UK Border Agency.
Legacy Customs functions	Term used to describe the customs detection functions undertaken by the UKBA since integration.
Legacy Immigration functions	Term used to describe the immigration functions undertaken by the UKBA since integration.
National Border Targeting Centre (NBTC)	A central hub staffed by the UK Border Agency and the Police, undertaking operational activities integral to the e-Borders programme.
Performance Development Review (PDR)	An appraisal system for monitoring staff performance.
Primary Control Point	Initial border control point combining both customs and immigration functions.
Race Relations Act 1976	An Act of Parliament established to prevent discrimination on the grounds of race.
(The) Region	North West.
Secondary Examination Area (SEA)	An area where UK Border Agency officials may be involved in the questioning of passengers and searching of baggage, freight and vehicles.
Senior Customs Officer (SO)	The UKBA senior manager primarily responsible for legacy customs staff.
Warning Index Control Unit (WICU)	A unit within the UK Border Agency responsible for updating and maintaining the Warning Index system which is a database of names available to the UK Border Agency for matters of national security.
United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA)	Formerly the Border and Immigration Agency, the UK Border Agency is an agency of the Home Office and is responsible for border control, enforcing immigration and customs regulations. It also considers applications for permission to enter and stay, including nationality and asylum.

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