HOME OFFICE - JUDICIAL COOPERATION UNIT

EVIDENCE SESSIONS

Tuesday 5th April 2011

PANEL:

Sir Scott Baker (Chair)
David Perry
Anand Doobay

IN ATTENDANCE:

Professor John Spencer

Transcribed from the Official Tape Recording
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SESSION ONE

1	CHAIR: Good morning.
2	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Good morning.
3	CHAIR: It's very good of you to come.
4	PROFESSOR SPENCER: It's good of you to ask me. [laughter].
5	CHAIR: We've tried to set up this court in the most informal manner that we can
6	with the result that the microphones are there and they're just behind us, so
7	that it will pick up everything. You can sit anywhere you like.
8	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Here somewhere?
9	CHAIR: In that row will be fine. I think you probably know all three of us, don't
10	you?
11	PROFESSOR SPENCER: David Perry.
12	CHAIR: David Perry, yes, and Anand Doobay.
13	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Yes, and yourself.
14	CHAIR: The arrangements that we've got are such that we've got a transcript being
15	prepared of everything that's said. It is a closed session, so the public don't
16	have access, but we do intend eventually to publish the evidence that we've
17	received and the submissions from people, including oral submissions, but you
18	have an opportunity to correct, alter or add anything you wish –
19	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Thank you.
20	CHAIR: - before it goes public and you are supplied with a copy in a few days' time.
21	And I say on behalf of all of us that we are really extremely grateful and we
22	really do value your time on this, and we'd like your assistance on certain
23	areas that are giving us reason for thought at the moment, but as far as the
24	EAW is concerned, I think your view is that it's generally working pretty well
25	and that there are two perceptions, as you put it: one that other countries don't
26	operate such a fair system as the UK does; and, secondly, that Poland is asking
27	for far too many people to be returned. That's your broad view, I think?
28	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Yes, that's what I said in the letter and I still adhere to
29	that, yes.
30	CHAIR: Proportionality. We've had submissions about that. I think our provisional
31	view in relation to proportionality is that there's rather less that can be done
32	from this end, that can be done from the state seeking extradition and at the
33	other end; we feel it's going to be difficult for an English/Scottish Court to
3.4	start prohing whether a particular request is proportionate or isn't

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PROFESSOR SPENCER: I agree with that and I think there's a problem too about different cultural differences and what's regarded as a serious offence in what country. We used to hang people for shop thefts at the beginning of the 19th Century, and at the end of the 19th Century you could be sure to go to prison for it, and nowadays, if you're particularly unlucky, you get a fixed penalty which nobody will enforce [laughter] and is it for us to say to the Poles, who still take these things seriously, that it's not a serious offence and it's disproportionate to try to bring somebody to justice for it? As I said in my letter and as I said when we had that session at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, the real problem is something that you can't fix but which Europe badly needs to fix, which is some mechanism for dealing with these cases across borders without having to surrender and, in fact, there's quite a lot of the mechanism there, because we already have the legal machinery for enforcing other countries' fines. If the Polish judge to whom I was talking was telling the truth, they would not be firing EAWs at us all the time if our Police were prepared to help them find the people on whom they wish to serve summonses.

CHAIR: Do any – are there any – is there any use of these provisions for enforcing fines?

PROFESSOR SPENCER: I've no idea. Before that session in London, I checked and found that the provisions had been brought into force. I've never heard of them being used, but then I'm not a practitioner, so I wouldn't. I mean, do you know, David?

DAVID PERRY: No, I don't know, John.

CHAIR: We haven't heard of any, put it that way.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: No, but I suspect the answer is nothing's happened upstream to make it possible.

CHAIR: Yes. Our thinking at the moment is that there are, as far as the EAW is concerned, there are two lines of approach really. One is that there are certain safeguards under the framework decision that haven't been implemented by the UK that UK legislation could deal with, service of sentences and so forth, but that's pretty limited. The other avenue is really what can be done persuasively on a more European-wide basis.

1	PROFESSOR SPENCER: It may be something could be done persuasively on our
2	Government without actual legislation, which is persuading the authorities to
3	be willing to help, for example, the Poles to find the addresses of Poles who
4	they want to prosecute under some lighter system of criminal procedure.
5	CHAIR: There is, I think, quite a lot going on behind the scenes and it's quite
6	difficult to get a complete grip on how much and where – and we will be
7	going to Brussels next month, when we hope to get a bit more information -
8	but I don't know how much information you have about what is or isn't going
9	on behind the scenes.
10	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Little bits and pieces. I do other things than this mainly,
11	and then I'm summoned to an expert meeting in Brussels and I rapidly catch
12	up with the topic again.
13	MR DOOBAY: I think that may be [laughter] our approach too!
14	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Are you going, because I may ask - you should be asking
15	me – but are you planning a visit to Poland?
16	CHAIR: We're not at the moment. I'm not sure how much more we would get out of
17	going than everybody else who has already been, because the Home Office
18	have been out there –
19	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Lord Justice Thomas gave me the name of the Pole who
20	talked interestingly about this at a meeting that he and I were at.
21	CHAIR: He is giving evidence tomorrow and –
22	PROFESSOR SPENCER: I which case he'll pass that on, I suspect.
23	CHAIR: - I've already seen him and he is, I think, pretty knowledgeable about what
24	goes on, on a Europe-wide basis, and I think we would take his advice as to
25	whether it was felt that we should go to Poland and if that is in the affirmative,
26	we might well do so, but at the moment I think our thinking is that we're
27	getting information from other sources.
28	MR PERRY: John, we were hearing from evidence yesterday from the DPP and
29	some question was raised as to whether defendants in Poland actually have to
30	be present in Court. I don't know whether you can shed any light on that,
31	because we were investigating the possibility of lesser measures and he
32	thought that part of the difficulty might be that people have to appear
33	personally in Court.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: I'm afraid I can't shed any light on that. I gather from the

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1	Polish Judge, whose name I can't remember but whose person I keep
2	dropping, that they have a lighter method of criminal procedure - rather like
3	our Magistrates' Court procedure - for dealing with people who don't turn up,
4	and so presumably in lower level type cases as here - though we don't say too
5	much about that when we're at International Conferences - people can be
6	dealt with in their absence, but about more serious cases, I don't know.
7.	Somebody must know.
8	CHAIR: The suggestion is that those who issue the warrants in Poland aren't
9	necessarily completely consistent and there are some who are slightly more
10	liberal, looking at it from our point of view than others.
11	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Yes.
12	CHAIR: I don't know whether that's your experience?
13	PROFESSOR SPENCER: I'm afraid I don't know. What I have heard is that a lot of
14	these cases - where Poland issues arrest warrants - get rapidly sorted out
15	when the person at this end manages to get hold of a Polish lawyer, who can
16	then deal with the Polish authorities.
17	CHAIR: That, of course, is some way down the system and it's after the Police have
18	expended quite a lot of money -
19	PROFESSOR SPENCER: And energy, yes.
20	CHAIR: - and energy in getting hold of the chap.
21	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Yes.
22	MR PERRY: The other thing John, you wrote an article, written in the Criminal
23	Review, about the German cases, where Germans or certainly some of the
24	Courts in Germany, I think not the Constitutional Court, but some of the lower
25	courts, have tried to import a proportionality requirement -
26	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Yes.
27	MR PERRY: - in their execution of requests.
28	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Yes.
29	MR PERRY: And I think, in particular, a request from Spain, and I think drug
30	trafficking cases, and I think one of the views that you'd expressed was that
31	that may be possible – a possible way forward, but not for the United
32	Kingdom, because of the opt-out arrangements in relation to the Lisbon
33	Treaty. I wonder if you could just explain that for us, John? First of all, what
34	happened in Germany and then whether you think there's a future for it.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: In Germany they have Grundgesetz, which overrules everything else, and there are bits and pieces relating to that which can be invoked. Of course we don't have an equivalent here, so we have to forget that.

Secondly, Germany hasn't made any derogation from the enhanced status of the European Charter, which contains a mention about proportionality penalties, and the Court in Stuttgart said, 'First of all, if push came to shove, we could refuse to give effect to a EAW that was disproportionate, relying on the German constitution. Secondly, we could also do it by referring to the framework decision to the broader context of European law, in which the European Charter now has status with the other foundation documents, and we could read into the framework decision a requirement for proportionality, thanks to the enhanced status of the Convention under the' – either the TEU or the TFEU, I forget which. I suppose it's the TEU. I said I didn't think that would work as an argument here, because in conjunction – in conspiracy with the Poles, we've agreed a derogation from the enhanced effect of the Charter, so that it didn't give any rights beyond rights which were already recognised.

I subsequently discussed that with Cambridge College, notably my colleague Catherine Barnard, who said, 'Actually, if you read the Protocol, it doesn't necessarily mean that; maybe our Courts could rely on the Charter to that effect.' So maybe I got that bit wrong. Unfortunately, I haven't got the arguments in the front of my mind to give them to you now, but I could certainly send you the article that Catherine Barnard wrote about it, if you'd find that interesting.

MR PERRY: I think it would be, yes. We would appreciate that.

MR DOOBAY: Yes, it would be. We would be extremely interested.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: It was ironic, of course, that we, together with the Poles, put out of gear the argument we would have liked to use [laughter].

MR PERRY: One of the other things that we've been told and, I mean, this is just anecdotally, is that the Dutch seem to apply some form of proportionality over tests. I'm not quite sure (a) whether they do and if so on what basis, but I'm not sure whether you have any knowledge of that?

PROFESSOR SPENCER: I don't. I know, unlike with Poland, I know a lot of Dutch lawyers who would tell us and I could find out easily enough. Somebody I

1	know well, who's actually Italian, has written about this. He's just migrated to
2	the University of Maastricht to teach all this and it would be easy to find out
3	from him. I have made a lot of Dutch contacts over the years.
4	MR PERRY: That would be useful.
5	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Let me make a note. [laughter]. The President of the
6	Dutch Supreme Court, Geert Corstens, actually wrote a book about European
7	criminal law and also wrote the first big book on Dutch criminal procedure
8	and he'd know, but he's rather a busy man to ask. [laughter]
9	CHAIR: Do you have any experience of Albania and Norway, which I think are two
10	European countries that are outside the EAW system?
11	PROFESSOR SPENCER: No relevant experience. I talked informally with Timothy
12	Workman about cases he had from Albania, but that's all.
13	CHAIR: We've got Tim coming in here later in the week.
14	PROFESSOR SPENCER: I can't help you with those.
15	MR DOOBAY: One of the things that you mention in your letter, John, was about
16	extradition between the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe was a running
17	sore before the 2003 Act and, of course, Lord Bingham talked about a system
18	disfigured by delay. Some of the representations that we received are
19	suggesting that there should be a return to the Secretary of State's discretion.
20	PROFESSOR SPENCER: God preserve us! [laughter]
21	MR DOOBAY: And obviously that wouldn't work in Part 1 cases, because the
22	framework decision simply doesn't permit it, but any views generally in
23	relation to the suitability of the Secretary of State being involved in
24	extradition?
25	PROFESSOR SPENCER: I suppose it's a useful safeguard when you're dealing with
26	countries outside the European Union. The trouble is when you then have the
27	possibility of a whole series of judicial review applications directing the Home
28	Secretary to think again, which spins it out and out and out, that is what we
29	used to have under the previous arrangement.
30	CHAIR: We've been thinking along the lines of the Secretary of State has, of course,
31	a residual discretion at the moment and he deals with capital punishment
32	specialty, which, it seems to us, eminently suitable to remain with him.
33	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Yes.

 CHAIR: But the area that's giving us some trouble is the residual human rights discretion, witness the McKinnon case, which goes back to him at the end of the road, and what we're looking at, at the moment, is the possibility of some kind of residual power in the Court to refer a case back to the Court if there's some most unusual supervening event after the Court has heard the case, rather like the Taylor and Lawrence jurisdiction, or the statutory jurisdiction that enables the Court to reopen a case if something fresh has happened that might have affected their decision.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: Well I hadn't thought about that, but it sounds a sensible idea to me. One of the problems – this is in relation to the rest of the world, or in relation to Part 1?

CHAIR: No, Part 2.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: Part 2, yes. Well I'm more worried about the rest of the world than I am of the Part One territory's. I didn't like the McKinnon case and my instinctive reaction, not having thought about it, is that it's a wise idea.

CHAIR: Prison conditions is one of the real running sores in Part 1 cases and there is an argument put forward that the Courts here don't pay proper regard to prison conditions and therefore only lip service is being paid to Article 3 complaints. I think the situation has slightly been remedied by two decisions of the Court relatively recently, that is in February or January of this year, which have rowed back from John Mitting's rather more extreme position in an earlier case, but there's still the problem of prison conditions and it's quite difficult for an English Court to get round to looking at what conditions are like in Greece or Poland, because it really, in the end, depends on whether the individual is going to go to the prison that has rats in it or if he is going to go to one of the others, and unless you've got really strong, systemic evidence that they're all over the Article 3 limit, there's not a lot that we can do about it. Have you any thoughts on the way ahead on this sort of territory?

PROFESSOR SPENCER: Well as I said in my letter, I think we're in trouble if we start giving our Courts general powers to start listening to complaints about other countries within Europe not living up to the Convention standards, and I thought that, under our legislation, most unusually the Secretary of State can actually delete people – delete countries from the range of states that are within what we call Part 1 territories. Of course, that wasn't the idea behind

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the framework decision at all – but if we had endless complaints about absolutely terrible justice conditions of any sort, particularly prison conditions, maybe the remedy is for the Secretary of State to intervene.

CHAIR: But it will be difficult for him to intervene unless there was something pretty strong from Strasbourg.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: Yes.

CHAIR: In which case it would probably have been remedied by that route, wouldn't it?

PROFESSOR SPENCER: Well one would hope it had been, but it might not have been.

CHAIR: Another idea that we've just been floating is this is probably territory that is best dealt with by recommendations for things that could be done behind the scenes on a Europe-wide basis, and we wonder if there's anything in the pipeline anywhere for having, for example, the equivalent of an inspector of prisons, but on a Europe basis, who can go to any country he wants and have a look at the conditions?

PROFESSOR SPENCER: Yes, a pretty sensible idea and if the result of concerns about the EAW are a levelling up in the quality of prison conditions, well and good.

CHAIR: I mean I think we want to try and level up not only in prison conditions but in general the standards of the administration of justice.

FESSOR SPENCER: Yes. On prison conditions, a related matter, which was a point that Judge Daphne Wickham made at a session that I was present at, is the problem that we shift people off who have been living here for years to be tried in countries where they then sit in prison for ages and ages pending trial, and we really ought to have some mechanism for suspending the execution of the European Arrest Warrant until somewhere near the date when they're actually going to try them. I only remembered that when I was coming down on the train and hence I hadn't looked at the various other framework decisions to see whether there was already some European legislation.

CHAIR: It was going through my mind. I was wondering whether that could be done under –

MR PERRY: The European Supervision Order, which enables you to remain on bail in the executing state and then you're obliged to return to the requesting

1	territory, rather like you would be on bail in domestic proceedings with an
2	obligation to attend Court on a specific date, so we think that greater use of the
3	European Supervision Order could alleviate some of that particular problem.
4	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Yes.
5	MR PERRY: It wouldn't work in custody cases.
6	PROFESSOR SPENCER: No. In custody cases, it would be a kindness to the
7	wanted person and his family, probably, to hold him in custody here rather
8	than the other end of Europe if he'd been living here for a substantial time, I
9	suppose. I don't know whether that could be done under the present law? No.
10	I suppose. Whether it could be done under the law as amended compliantly
11	with the – in compliance with the framework decision I'm not so sure.
12	CHAIR: There would be cost implications, wouldn't there?
13	PROFESSOR SPENCER: I don't imagine the Government would be too keen, given
14	our own prison crowding problem, but we wouldn't be talking huge numbers
15	here, would we?
16	MR PERRY: No. There'd be problems under the framework decision because of the
17	time limits by which you are required to comply with the request.
18	CHAIR: Yes. It would need change to the framework decision, which is probably
19	some way down the line.
20	PROFESSOR SPENCER: On the other hand a little closer if the UK, pushed forward
21	by your review, says it would be a good idea.
22	CHAIR: Yes.
23	MR PERRY: And then, sorry, I was going to say, then at the other end, there's a
24	possibility of the enactment of the part of the framework decision that permits
25	surrender to be conditional on the return of the wanted person in the event of
26	conviction to serve any sentence in this jurisdiction, so that deals with that side
27	of the problem.
28	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Yes.
29	MR PERRY: And that there's also the optional ground for surrender if, in a
30	conviction case, you say we will actually execute the sentence that has been
31	imposed in this jurisdiction, so that leaves that particular problem.
32	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Yes.
33	MR PERRY. So that we do feel that there are some mechanisms that can deal with

some of these problems.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: Some of it, yes. Yes.

MR DOOBAY: I just wanted to touch upon – we discussed Article 3 and prison conditions and also Article 5 in terms of the length of pre-trial retention, but Article 6, which I think you mentioned in the letter, how do you think we should deal with, in the UK, allegations that the trial process in the country which has issued the EAW isn't sufficient to meet the Article 6 there?

PROFESSOR SPENCER: I don't think we can do much, except in the most flagrant case related to the particular individual. My feeling is that the administrative Court has probably got hold of the right end of the stick in taking a firm view about it. That is not what Fair Trials International say in their excellent report, but I think we have to be realistic and I think we have to remember that it's what everybody says all the time about the courts in another country.

CHAIR: You made the point, I think, about Italians being told, yes.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: So I think that is a difficult point and I think if we listen to generalised allegations about 'in their procedure, you don't have this, that or the other,' then we would have large delays and probably a lot of them in not very strong cases.

CHAIR: We're getting the same arguments in the American cases, in particular about plea bargaining being very unsatisfactory, but I don't think that complaints about how other systems operate is really within our remit.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: No. Often, when you look at another system, it's got something in it that looks bad, but when you look more closely, it's got something else that cancels it out which isn't so bad, so I am sceptical as to whether we can do any more than our judges have already done about that one.

MR DOOBAY: In terms of the notion – I just need to come back to something you mentioned – around [inaudible], obviously we have the power to remove the designation for some of the category 1 territories, but that would cause a difficulty, because obviously under the framework decision, we should be allowing them to use the European Arrest Warrant, so presumably if the UK had a real concern about one member state, if something which the Government was going to have to deal with, as well as the European level –

PROFESSOR SPENCER: Yes.

1	MR DOOBAY: - as well as being designated, because whilst that does exist at the
2	domestic level, it would cause us presumably some greater difficulties at the
3	European level to explain why we've done that, despite remaining within the
4	framework decision.
5	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Yes, I see that. I see it more as a lever to cause pressure to
6	be put on the member state, rather than something that we would actually, at
7	the end of the road, probably do. As I think I said, or somebody said, at that
8	meeting at the ILAS, the truth is we, for political reasons, admitted to the
9	European Community countries whose criminal justice systems weren't really
10	up to it. We are now living with the consequences.
11	CHAIR: But of course it is a two-way, [inaudible] extradition and we didn't
12	[inaudible] entirely from the system, we're not going to get our criminals back
13	from them.
14	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Yes exactly. I can - we're still on anecdotes, but -
15	MR DOOBAY: There's no [inaudible]. Part of the pleasure. [laughter]
16	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Years back when the Corpus Juris project was published,
17	we had a meeting in Cambridge to present it, because I was part of it, and
18	somebody got up who was a lawyer with Customs & Excise and said, 'This all
19	misses the point! You can't do anything about this at all, Secretary. The real
20	problem is extradition. That's why we can never do anything.' And we
21	pointed out that, under the Corpus Juris proposals, for offences of budgetary
22	fraud you wouldn't have it. You'd have a European Arrest Warrant. 'What!
23	You can't get rid of extradition! Inconceivable[?]' [laughter]. I thought of
24	these doctors who spend their lives working out cures for some terrible disease
25	and their life's built round it, and then when it's cured they've nothing to do
26	and [laughter].
27	CHAIR: Have you had any thoughts about the relationship between extradition and
28	asylum?
29	PROFESSOR SPENCER: None at all, no.
30	CHAIR: Because we've been pointed out there were certain inconsistencies in the
31	way a situation is operated, but it's not territory that you've been into?
32	PROFESSOR SPENCER: No, I haven't.
33	CHAIR: Sorry, I was interrupting you.

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MR DOOBAY: No, that's fine. One other issue, I don't know whether you've considered in evidence of one of the issues we're looking at, is whether there should be prima facie evidence test reintroduced in some countries. Is that something which you have considered?

PROFESSOR SPENCER: Not much, except to notice that we'd already suppressed that requirement before the European Arrest Warrant came on the scene.

Would it actually make any difference really to the problems that we're dealing with? I was impressed with what Fair Trials International said about the need for some kind of quick process to deal with the problem of somebody who might have been the victim of an identity fraud and some possibility of asking for some further evidence from – or asking them to check maybe some case which is going down a wrong route.

CHAIR: Well we heard quite a lot about that from ACPO and SOCA and the CPS yesterday. I think that there are two aspects to this. The first aspect is, is this the man for whom the warrant has been issued, which is – the Police are pretty confident that they have biometric testing and fingerprint testing that they can be pretty confident that they are getting the person who is wanted.

The other aspect of it is the person who says, 'Well this is all very well, but I mean, I'm nothing to do with this crime. It's not me that you really want, it's somebody else, because I was in Britain at the time I was supposed to be murdering him in Greece,' to which the Police's answer is, 'Well that's really a matter for the Court of the trial, and we can't get involved in that, but if we have evidence, or material is put before us to suggest that there is a real possibility of a mistake, we would of course notify not only defence lawyers but the foreign Court as well.'

PROFESSOR SPENCER: Yes.

CHAIR: So I think myself, I was feeling that the identity point probably wasn't as big as Fair Trials was suggesting and you may have a different view about that.

MR DOOBAY: No. I think that it was quite reassuring. The CPS basically said,
'Look, if the defendant put forward the type of evidence to say either, "I
wasn't there," or "Somebody has stolen my identity," then we, the CPS, would
transmit this back to the requesting state, and we might give them our view
and it might be that they would then decide they want to withdraw the request,

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so that is as much as we, the CPS, could do and we would try and do that and try and facilitate it,' and so I don't know whether you think there is more that could be done. I mean the view of the CPS and the Police is that we would help to relay this information evidence back, but if the requesting state said. 'Thank you very much, but actually we still want them to come to face trial, in order to test this evidence at trial,' then there's not much more we can do.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: I rather agree with that, tough as it might seem, and though I wouldn't like to find myself in the position one day, maybe when I'm walking out of here, being nicked under a European Arrest Warrant for something I didn't do, the trouble is, again, it's what so many people would say, unfortunately. There was a time when I used to get very excited about alleged miscarriages of justice, and I still do sometimes, but two things. I had a conversation with Sir Fred Crawford, the first Chairman of the Criminal Cases Review Commission.

MR DOOBAY: Whom I know well.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: Yes, and he said, 'If only we could find some mechanism, in advance of spending a lot of time and money investigating, to know whether the person is genuine or not, because we get people who come to us and tell us apparently very genuine stories, and their families likewise, and probably their defence lawyers, and we look into it and it is terrible and yes. we refer it back, and we look at other people who come to us with an equally straight face and equally plausible relatives and equally honest defence lawyers, and the more we look into it, the more guilty we find they are.' And then I think about the Hanratty case, do you remember?

MR DOOBAY: Very well, yes.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: The current of opinion was that he was a victim of miscarriage of justice and then the DNA testing showed that he had absolutely done it, and I think in the end we have to trust the other states to investigate the case honestly according to the evidence, so I don't think there's anything we can do about that. As we were talking, I was wondering whether there was something we could try to build into the system on the lines of an application for summary judgment; you know, when something is so clear you can bring it before the Court and say, 'Look, it's so obvious it's not me; strike this one out,' but I can't see how you could build that in.

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MR PERRY:	: It would be quite	difficult to do th	at, because i	it would p	probably	require
facts	to be investigated.					

PROFESSOR SPENCER: In the end, the facts are best investigated in a country where it's supposed to have happened.

MR DOOBAY: Yes. I think in practical terms – I was certainly reassured by the CPS' view, because I'm sure that if you had a passport which showed that you were in the UK on the date when the Italian warrant says you were in Italy, the CPS would probably make quite vocal submissions to the Italians that we think this is very strong evidence, it appeared to us, to show that what you're saying isn't correct, whereas if you had very, sort of, evidence that could go either way, then they probably would relay it, but perhaps not quite as strongly.

CHAIR: I mean I think the – it's not as if there are a number of mistaken identity cases that are stacked up causing concern. I think there's probably one, isn't there? Is that right David?

DAVID PERRY: Yeah one, there was one, but he wasn't actually extradited, because once he produced his passport –

PROFESSOR SPENCER: Judge Joachim Vogel, otherwise Professor Joachim Vogel, who I think wrote the judgment in that German case, sits as a judge in extradition cases, and I heard him tell the story how he was once presented with an EAW from Italy, and it was the case of somebody who self-evidently couldn't have been there at the time, and he just rang the prosecutor in Catania and sorted it out with him, and he dropped it, and I suspect a lot of these cases are sorted out that way, sometimes with the judge intervening. I put that to Timothy Workman once when I was talking to him and he said, 'Well yes, of course, that's all right if it's somewhere where you know somebody or you can speak the language, but we don't have too many Albanian speakers here.'

CHAIR: Yes, and I don't think you can very well write that into the Act either.

MR PERRY: Although the framework decision does encourage communication between judicial authorities, which I think is something that could be used [inaudible] egregious cases.

 CHAIR: Well there's certainly quite a lot of communication when there are defective warrants. SOCA has done a lot of that to make sure that the Court [inaudible] to a defective warrant.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: Probably, there are moves towards trying to train and bring together the judges in the different member states who actually deal with these cases. There was a conference in Amsterdam back in December, and probably networks of people who could talk to each other are a way of alleviating this problem.

CHAIR: On an entirely different topic, as you are aware, there is in legislation as yet unimplemented a forum bar both under Part 1 and Part 2, and we've had quite a lot of evidence from people who say this is very important, it ought to be introduced immediately and why hasn't it been, and on the other side of the coin there are those who say that if it is introduced, it will completely clog up the system and it's, in any event, totally contrary to the concept of the Part 1 cases, where there's procedure for dealing with them.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: Well I agree with the first people over that. The Article 47 of the framework decision appropriates a ground for optional non-execution, 'Where the European Arrest Warrant relates to offences which are regarded by the law of the executing member state as having been committed in whole or in part in the territory of the executing member state, or a place treated as such, or have been committed outside the territory of the issuing member state and the law of the executing member state does not allow prosecution for the same offence.' Anyway, it's the first part of that, 'are regarded by the law of the executing member state as having been committed in whole or part in the territory of the executing member state, or a place treated as such.' And I looked at the French implementing legislation on this, which just says the Court may refuse to execute it where, under French law, it's regarded as the facts having occurred in France and under French law our Courts have jurisdiction over it. They seem to have lived with that without their system breaking down under it. Would there be that many cases where somebody's wanted in Poland for something and our Court would actually have jurisdiction over it?

CHAIR: I think it's possibly more a Part 2 problem than a Part 1 problem, but that's just an impression.

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MR PERRY: I think the problem is that – this problem you never used to get under the old legislation, because it reflects two modern trends: first of all the nature of trans-national offending; and secondly, the greater use of extra-territorial offences. So you combine those two trends and you get the possibility of offences being trialled – triable in an overseas jurisdiction, even though the mastermind has been sitting in London at the computer, but may have directed harm at the overseas jurisdiction, or even he may have been masterminding the people trafficking, which was the facts of the Cando Armas case, in Belgium while he's in London.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: In London, yes.

MR DOOBAY: Or alternatively he may have sent one email to another state, which has given them the jurisdiction to prosecute, even though most of it was in the UK.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: In practical terms, it would mean what? It would mean that the Westminster Magistrates Court were presented with an argument that it ought to be dealt with here, please.

CHAIR: The answer given to us via the Crown Prosecution Service and the Director on this is that there is very close co-operation between prosecuting authorities of different states. There is a system for dealing with this in the –

MR PERRY: Eurojust Guidelines.

CHAIR: Eurojust, and as far as, for example, America is concerned, a Part 2 country where this is particularly topical, they have meetings between the prosecuting authorities, they work to guidelines and then they come up with a decision, and it would be very difficult, it is argued, for the Courts to go into territory which would really be usurping the prosecuting authority's decision whether or not to prosecute, which in domestic terms the courts are very, very reluctant to do. How do you deal with a situation, for example, where the Crown Prosecution Service have already decided not to prosecute in this country? Are they then going to be told by the Court, well the forum bar is going to operate in this case, no extradition, so do you end up then with a chap not being prosecuted at all, for what might be quite a serious offence, or do you force the Crown Prosecution Service to do something that you wouldn't force them to do in ordinary domestic legislation? I mean that's a bit of a summary, but –

T	PROFESSOR SPENCER: 1 es, 1 see.
2	CHAIR: – but where the argument has run.
3	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Has this been a practical issue very much in Part 1
4	European Arrest Warrant cases? I must say it's not one I've heard of.
5	CHAIR: I don't think it has.
6	MR PERRY: No, only in Part 2.
7	MR DOOBAY: There have been a couple, but it's certainly not as widespread. I
8	mean there was a VAT carousel fraud case; there was a cigarette smuggling
9	case. There are some, but it's certainly not been as controversial as in Part 2.
10	CHAIR: I mean there's certainly quite a strong public perception, in that if the
11	prospective defendant is living here, has been here for a significant period of
12	time and his roots are all here, that that ought to be a pretty dominant factor in
13	deciding in which country he should be prosecuted. I'm not convinced that
14	that plays enormous weight in the CPS's argument. That's just an impression.
15	MR DOOBAY: It certainly seems that in the Part 2 cases the public believe that if
16	it's possible to prosecute something in two different jurisdictions, then the fact
17	that you are a British National or British resident should weigh quite heavily
18	in favour of you being prosecuted here, even if it costs more or it would be
19	more difficult in terms of bringing evidence to the UK.
20	PROFESSOR SPENCER: There are conveniences of others than the defendant at
21	issue in these cases.
22	CHAIR: And certainly the CPS say, 'Well we look at things like: where is the
23	evidence, where are the victims, where was the offence committed?' They ran
24	through quite a large series of matters, which their point was it would be much
25	more difficult for the Court to evaluate these than it is for prosecutors who are
26	meeting with opposite numbers and weighing up the problems and working
27	out where the investigations have got to in each of the two countries.
28	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Well subject to any further reflections on the train back, it
29	sounds to me the CPS have got hold of the right end of that particular stick.
30	CHAIR: So you're moving from one end of the thing to the other? [laughter]
31	PROFESSOR SPENCER: I am, yes. Particularly if it's not perceived to be a severe
32	problem in the European cases.
33	CHAIR: But I don't think we'll find it easy to resolve this at all.

 MR PERRY: No, certainly one of the difficulties with the forum bar that hasn't been enacted, consistent with the point you made in your article – you've just mentioned the French legislative instrument; our forum bar is about four times longer – and you first of all have to – the court first of all has to consider whether a significant part of the conduct alleged to constitute the offence took place in the United Kingdom, and then it would have to consider, in view of that and all the other circumstances, it would not be in the interests of justice for the person to be tried for the offence in the requesting territory. And then the Court is directed that, when it's looking at the interests of justice, the judge must take into account whether the relevant prosecuting authority in the United Kingdom have decided not to take proceedings. It doesn't say that's determinative; it just says you've got to, so it's possible that you could have no prosecution.

Now it appears that that would involve the Court first of all deciding whether a significant part of the conduct had taken place in the United Kingdom. I'm not quite sure how you'd resolve that, because that could be a very, very tactical question, then – and the interests of justice, where presumably you'd have to take in account where the witnesses were, who got the evidence. It's quite a complicated provision.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: I suppose particularly, given the way the issue would have to be resolved with us, which would be oral evidence presumably, I guess part of the reason the French managed to make their system work in this respect is it is probably all done on written submissions anyway, and —

MR PERRY: I was going to ask you about that. One of the things that I think I've never really been able to understand is why is extradition such a problem in the United Kingdom, because the French don't seem to have any problem with delays, or so far as I'm aware.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: They invented them. [laughter]

MR PERRY: But is there a problem with extradition in France, or Germany, or Holland, Italy? I mean the Hussain Osman case, to which you made reference, where he's returned within four weeks for a very serious offence.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: I don't really know. I had a discussion with Jean Pradel, who's an eminent French colleague, about the time the European Arrest Warrant came into force in France, and he was shocked about a Frenchman

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32 33 being shipped off to Poland to face a causing death by dangerous driving charge, which he plainly thought no honest Frenchman should have to face in any country other than France. But my cursory reading of the French Press doesn't indicate there's been the agitation about it there's been in this country. Why would that be?

MR PERRY: Well I know before the EAW, of course, that there were – France had started a worldwide jurisdiction so it would prosecute its own citizens within – PROFESSOR SPENCER: People – it does, yes.

MR PERRY: - France and Germany I think the same, and I think the Scandinavian countries also, but in terms of extradition, because we, of course, extradite a lot of foreign nationals also. There are people in jail in this jurisdiction awaiting extradition to the United States who are United States citizens, who still resist it and spend quite a long time in the process, but are there similar cases in the civilian system?

PROFESSOR SPENCER: I don't know. Again, I could ask my friend Jean Pradel and others, who doubtless know and would tell me and I could tell you. I think part of the reason is, it's rather a common lawyers' perception that we have the only just system in the world, and I think probably that if you read the Daily Mail and things, and you read the things the Conservatives said when the Extradition Act, Part 1 was before Parliament, you know, 'We mustn't co-operate with these other countries, because you're all presumed guilty there.' There was even somebody saying that in the last but one edition of Counsel, to the annoyance of one of my friends who actually worked in France for a bit. And I think that is something which is more strongly felt by us than by the people in continental Europe. Just like we wouldn't have policemen for years and then fell in love with them when we had them, and conversely the French have always had them and now are cynical about them and think they're an unnecessary evil and maybe they're not culturally waving the flag for the superiority of French criminal justice quite so much [laughter]. Would you like me to ask my contacts in whatever European countries to see whether it's been a matter of public concern, as it has here? MR PERRY: Do you think, just developing that point, John, do you think that - I

mean, if you're being returned from France to Poland, I imagine that the

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system operating in Poland is more familiar to you than it would be to an English lawyer, for example.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: Well pretty much, yes, because the criminal justice systems in most parts of continental Europe are based on the French model, though a lot changed. They all had Napoleon's Code d'Instruction criminelle, basically kept it and adapted it afterwards, so they all work in approximately the same way, though with significant changes. Italy remodelled theirs on what they thought were Anglo-Saxon lines, but aren't really. The Scandinavians always had something different, but yes, I think that is true: essentially you have powerful public prosecutors who in theory tells the police what to do. You have, in some countries still, a juge d'instruction or the equivalent, so it's all more familiar to them anyway I think, yes.

MR PERRY: And then one of the things that we've been invited to consider is that the charter on continental [inaudible], and it's been suggested that as a more contemporary and expensive human rights instrument, with protection of the right to human dignity, that that could also be an additional protection in addition to the European Convention on Human Rights. Any views on that one? First of all, are there difficulties because of the way the United Kingdom's approached the Treaty of Lisbon in relation to the Charter, because as I understand it, we're not supposed to be adding more rights than the ones that we already have, and secondly, do you think it would provide more expensive protection?

PROFESSOR SPENCER: I think as to the first question, the protocol (Protocol 30), as you say, only says we can't use it in order to create new areas of rights that we don't already have, and would we really be doing that if we amended the Extradition Act to refer to something in the – I don't know. It depends.

Nobody quite knows what that protocol means actually. I would have thought we probably wouldn't be in trouble over that, but I'd need to –

MR DOOBAY: Would or wouldn't, sorry?

PROFESSOR SPENCER: We wouldn't, I think. Would it give us anything the European Convention doesn't? Not much I think, because it's mirrored it closely. There is the issue about proportionality of penalties, which is in the Charter, which isn't in the European Convention, so I think it might add a little; it probably wouldn't put us – we probably could do it without getting

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into running across protocol 30, but I'd need to think about that question. I don't think I've given a very coherent answer. I'll think about it on the train home.

CHAIR: Would proportionality of penalties come in at all with life with no possibility of a review?

PROFESSOR SPENCER: Yes it might. That's already a possible ground under the framework decision anyway, which we didn't implement.

CHAIR: Should it be implemented?

PROFESSOR SPENCER: It probably should, but again, pots and kettles you know.

We are heavy hitters as regards heavy penalties, and think about Schedule 21 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and all these other things, so it probably wouldn't make an awful lot of difference.

MR DOOBAY: Can I just go back to something we were talking about a minute ago? You mentioned that the French implemented the bar on forum and in that form it's in the [inaudible] decision, and David was mentioning that the French have a long tradition of trying French citizens in France, even if the offence was committed outside of France, and I wonder whether that might be a reason why it's not controversial in France, because the French, I think, may be less concerned about trying an offence which has a peripheral connection with France but is under French jurisdiction for a French citizen, because that's their tradition, in the same way that's the German tradition, so they don't have any real qualms about saying, 'We have the technical ability to prosecute. This is a French citizen. We will prosecute and therefore we will exercise the bar to stop extradition, because that's what a French citizen would expect us to do.'

PROFESSOR SPENCER: Yes. I can see that. It may well be that that was why they were so happy to accept that part of the framework decision.

MR DOOBAY: Because it strikes me that in the UK we just don't have that tradition; many continental countries have had constitutional bars on extraditing their own nationals, and the quid pro quo has been that they [cross-talk] reassure that they're not sort of immune from prosecution.

MR PERRY: I wonder what happens though if the French say, 'We're not going to extradite; we will prosecute. Please hand over the evidence'? So you say to the issuing state, 'We, the French, don't have any evidence. Please hand it

over,' and the issuing State says, 'Well we're not very happy about this. We think this is a case that should be prosecuted in our jurisdiction. We're not going to give you the evidence.'

PROFESSOR SPENCER: I was talking, as it happens, to a French avocat, whom I met at a conference only the other day, who was dealing with trying to defend a client where something like that was happening actually. He'd been suspected of a murder committed in Ireland and they had dropped the case. He hadn't been formally acquitted. The Irish DPP just thought there wasn't enough evidence. Then he went back to France, whose citizen he was, and the French said, 'Right, we're having you,' and they were trying to get the evidence out of France – out of Ireland and it wasn't proving easy, so I think they do have these problems. But again, you'd need to talk to a French lawyer, who would answer your questions about this I'm sure.

MR DOOBAY: I mean I certainly know there's a German issue where this arose, and they used Eurojust as the justification to say, 'Look you have two options: one is you give us the evidence and allow us to prosecute,' or –

MR PERRY: I mean it may be that's why in the Lisbon Treaty, I think, there is now an express provision that enables conflicts of jurisdiction to be resolved at an EU level. I can't remember which provision of the Treaty it is, but it's around 88 or something like that. The other thing I wanted to ask, because there's another point that we've been asked to consider, both in relation to Part 1 and Part 2 of the Act – the prima facie evidence point that we were discussing a moment ago – but may I just ask, in relation to Part 1, if you were to go to a jurisdiction such as France and say you've got to make out a prima facie case, would they know what we were talking about?

PROFESSOR SPENCER: I suspect they would. They don't call it that, but they have a phrase, it's preuves graves et concordantes, or something like that. I think they have the notion of it as needed before certain measures can be taken against people in the French criminal justice system. Cases can get thrown out in France by a juge d'instruction who finds there's a non-lieu; a non-lieu would be on the basis there's insufficient evidence on which to proceed. So I think they have the notion. They might be puzzled by the phrase, but I think they have the notion.

1	MR DOOBAY: But the trial there would not involve the prosecution adducing all its
2	evidence in the way that we understand it, and then getting to the end of its
3	case and then saying, 'Right, over to you.'
4	PROFESSOR SPENCER: You don't have submissions of no case to answer, as far as
5	I know.
6	MR DOOBAY: No.
7	PROFESSOR SPENCER: And in France the judge examines the witnesses to begin
8	with and then the prosecution and defence have a go. It's altogether rather
9	different.
10	CHAIR: Just looking at the evidence of Dr Franey, who is a legal team manager,
11	international jurisdiction, to sit with Westminster Magistrates' Court, you
12	probably know her anyway, do you?
13	PROFESSOR SPENCER: I may have met her, but I don't recognise the name.
14	CHAIR: In her evidence she was saying that 'provision of a prima facie case causes
15	problems for civil law jurisdictions. This was recognised by the European
16	Convention on Extradition, which specifically required information, rather
17	than evidence, for extradition within Europe. Civil law jurisdictions in other
18	parts of the world, particularly in South America, struggled with the concept
19	of a prima facie case. Common law jurisdictions, such as United States,
20	Canada and Australia, understand the concept.'
21	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Well I think -
22	CHAIR: She appears to take a possibly different view about that.
23	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Well as I said, they might be puzzled at the phraseology,
24	but I think if it were explained to them, they understand what we're actually
25	looking for.
26	CHAIR: Okay.
27	PROFESSOR SPENCER: As I said, we suppressed the requirement years back in
28	European cases – definitely well before the framework decision.
29	MR PERRY: I just wanted to - the other thing I wanted to ask you about, John, was
30	the future on improvements in procedural safeguards in Europe, because one
31	of the points that I think is perhaps valid in these areas is, if you're going to
32	have a European Arrest Warrant perhaps you should first of all have
33	concerned yourself with making sure that you could be satisfied with the
34	systems that exist in other states, and we've received some information about

 the road map on procedural safeguards, and it looks as though interpretation and translation are going to be the first significant measures, and some work is being done on this by the Commission and others, and I just wondered what your view is as to the improvements, the progress on improvements in procedural safeguards and how you might see that developing in the future?

PROFESSOR SPENCER: I wrote an article about that in an obscure journal, just published the other day, which I will send you if you like.

MR PERRY: That would be very helpful.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: That at least says what's happening. I know quite well the European civil servant who was very active in pushing this along, one Caroline Morgan. I don't know whether you know Caroline Morgan or not?

MR DOOBAY: You'll be meeting Caroline in Glasgow[?] soon.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: Caroline Morgan started off as a defence solicitor in this country and then joined the European Civil Service, so she's somebody in the machine who has, surprisingly, a defence lawyer's perspective on some of these problems. She's probably responsible, more than anybody, for pushing this along every year, and you'd be well to talk to her about where it's actually going. She said it was almost impossible to get anything sensible done when you had to have unanimity to get a framework decision, and the bigger the EU got, the more some country could be a prima donna and awkwardly insist on their particular thing going in. And then, to its great shame, the UK decided to block the whole thing, as it did in 2006, I think it was – shockingly, so a lot of us think.

She then said how the UK reversed its position on that and was now cooperative, and then we have the Lisbon Treaty and it's possible for these things to be agreed by quality – a qualified majority voting, and she said she thought there was a good chance of getting a sensible outcome on a lot of these, because in the end member states insisting on throwing their dummy out of the pram will just be told somebody else wouldn't pick it up for them and we'd just vote it through. So I think there probably is a chance of this getting somewhere.

My impression is things will get difficult when a directive is put forward that is going to cost significant amounts of money, and they are thinking about one to do with legal advice and legal aid at the moment. The sequence of

events is there's been a directive agreed already on translation and interpretation, there are negotiations going ahead about one on minimum rights to information – and the UK's opted in to the negotiations on this – and they have, further down the stream, the one on legal advice and assistance, with which they foresee problems because that's costly and we're in economic recession.

My feeling, and some other people's feeling, about this is that it's one thing to enact a directive, and it's another thing to have the thing actually applied in all member states. At a meeting in Brussels, I said, and some other people said, 'When these directives are produced, it actually needs to be written in as an obligation on the member state to make it part of their law that the defendant who didn't get what this directive requires could raise this as an objection to the case going forward, because without that, unfortunately, the directive won't have the teeth that it ought to have.' So I think I am a bit optimistic, much more optimistic than I was, and certainly much more optimistic than I was when the UK suddenly said it was going to block all this in 2006.

CHAIR: On the legal aid topic, we haven't troubled you with that because it's probably not particularly your province, but we've got evidence from quite a number of different sources that the legal aid arrangements in the Magistrates' Court are very unsatisfactory, in that they are causing unnecessary delays, as well as potential injustice to defendants, and we have talked to some Home Office officials with a view to getting them to at least start looking at possibilities for modifying the system and doing a cost benefit exercise to see what costs would be saved in making a more efficient system, but obviously money is pretty relevant in all this at the moment.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: I can't say anything much of use about that. I think it's a good thing that we centralise dealing with these things in three Courts, and I think at least that creates the possibility of a cadre of experienced lawyers who know the law on these matters, as well as judges who know the law on these matters, but if they're not going to be paid enough to deal with it, or there aren't enough of them, then there's going to be a problem. And I can't but sympathise with those who say it's essential to make sure they have properly

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informed people who are able to defend these cases. It's going to save time and trouble to the legal system in the end.

CHAIR: Not least you get a knowledgeable lawyer, who may be able to get back in touch with the prosecuting authorities in Poland or wherever and find that there are good reasons for withdrawing the warrant.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: Yes, if you're knowledgeable, you know how to sort it out whether that's what the law actually says, yes. I was very shocked where the Garry Mann case – to see that Garry Mann not only got let down by his Polish lawyers, but then he got let down by his English ones. As Lord Justice Laws, I think it was, said at the end, well whoever could have imagined that that had happened twice over, but it did. You can make a system foolproof, but not bloody foolproof! [laughter]

MR DOOBAY: I must remember that!

CHAIR: Have you got anything you'd like to ask us, or topics you'd like to raise with us, if you think it would be beneficial, while you're here?

PROFESSOR SPENCER: I think we've covered everything that I had in mind. I read the Fair Trials International document, which I think is excellently done.

I don't agree with all of it. One of the other things I shall do, if I may, is write a brief response to the points they make —

CHAIR: Please do.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: - and send that to you.

CHAIR: We too have been very impressed by that document, and I think we too don't, at least initially, agree with all the points they are making.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: No, but it's a good starting point I think.

CHAIR: Yes, yes, absolutely.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: So I'll add that to my list of jobs that I said I would do.

MR PERRY: Just one matter that's just occurred to me: we were discussing this morning the operation of human rights in the extradition context, and we were discussing the decision of the House of Lords in *Wellington*, the case in which Lord Hoffman and the majority of three to two, took a relativist approach to human rights protection and extradition, given the public interest that there is in giving effect to extradition arrangements. So in the Wellington case it was 'If you send me to the United States, I'm going to be serving a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.' In fact it was found to be a reducible sentence,

1	but certainly the Strasbourg Court, in relation to Article 6, has taken the
2	flagrant breach approach, and the Supreme Court in Norris, in relation to
3	Article 8 took an exceptional - it's got to be an exceptional case approach. Do
4	you see a merit in that type of approach in extradition?
5	PROFESSOR SPENCER: I haven't thought about that and I'm not sure I can give
6	you a coherent answer, but shooting from the hip, I think so. If it's very
7	shocking, then we shouldn't, but otherwise we have to give them some margin
8	of appreciation to sort out their justice systems as seems fit to public opinion
9	in their countries, I think.
10	MR PERRY: If you do have any thoughts –
11	PROFESSOR SPENCER: If I have any thoughts - I'll think about that one as well
12	and write to you if I have further thoughts about it.
13	CHAIR: There just seem to me certain questions I had about Lord Hoffman's
14	approach, which is he seems to be saying that because it's extradition,
15	therefore there's a higher threshold for Article 3 breaches than might be the
16	case in other circumstances. It could get pretty close to that.
17	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Yes, that is worrying, yes.
18	MR DOOBAY: Certainly I find it less troubling to have a qualified test[?] where
19	there are qualified rights. So for Article 6 there's a balancing exercise, and of
20	course you could say one side has more weight than the other, but for Article 3
21	there isn't a balance involved. It's a straightforward prohibition.
22	CHAIR: You certainly can't have much margin of appreciation of the right to life.
23	PROFESSOR SPENCER: I'll think about that. It merits a more considered answer I
24	think.
25	CHAIR: Thank you so much for coming. It's really been terrific from our point of
26	view, and as we were saying beforehand, we don't often get the opportunity of
27	running a seminar with a professor. It's usually [laughter].
28	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Well I'm very honoured to be asked, so thank you, and I
29	find it quite fascinating as well and I'll follow up those points and -
30	CHAIR: If you have any other thoughts that you think might benefit us, do by all
31	means let us know.
32	PROFESSOR SPENCER: Well I may have. My mind's now going around all this
33	again, having prepared it to come down.
34	CHAIR: It's not an easy task to tot our way through all this stuff.

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PROFESSOR SPENCER: No, unless you're actually into extradition law as your main theme, like I suppose Anand obviously is, there's a lot to catch up, a lot of very technical law and a lot of particular knowledge to get around.

CHAIR: Particularly to myself, the EAW situation, there's so much going on in Europe that seems to be sort of inter-linked and crossing over, and I'm not quite sure how it all fits in.

PROFESSOR SPENCER: I don't think anybody else is either, so - [laughter]. CHAIR: Good, thanks very much. Thank you. Bye bye.

(End of session)