Future Identities: Changing identities in the UK – the next 10 years

DR 16: To what extent are on-going changes in national and supranational identities based on ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation, and what are the behavioural consequences of these different conceptions?

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1. Introduction

The aims of this paper[1] are to define national identity, describe trends in British identity and belonging or attachment to Britain, to explore which groups in society have a stronger or weaker sense of identity, and to consider the implications for what might be termed 'civic' attitudes and behaviour. Following a brief introduction, we define national identity and consider the survey evidence on trends over time in British identity (with a brief look also at different aspects of identity), British national pride, and a sense of belonging or attachment to Britain (including data for Northern Ireland) in Section 2. In Section 3 we go on to consider the main drivers of a sense of belonging, focusing in particular on age and gender groups, ethnic and religious groups, overseas birth and socio-economic deprivation. In Section 4 we then turn to the implications of a sense of belonging, or its absence, for 'civic' attitudes and behaviour. Section 5 discusses the distinction between ethnic and civic conceptions of the nation, and Section 6 concludes.

Historically, British identity is a relatively recent construct and was gradually superimposed on earlier national identities of English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish. For all of its (relatively short) history, Britain has therefore been a multi-nation state and a British identity has had to coexist with separate national identities. First Wales was formally incorporated with England by the 1536 Act of Union. Next came the 1707 Act of Union between England/Wales and Scotland, which is usually taken as the formal constitutional beginning of Great Britain, while the 1801 Act of Union created the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. In 1922 the twenty six counties of southern and western Ireland formed the Free State, leaving a United Kingdom composed of Great Britain and the six counties of the Province of Ulster that became formally known as Northern Ireland.

Many writers have suggested that national identity and more specifically British identity is now in decline. General processes of globalization and international interdependence, most strikingly through the developing institutions of the European Union, have been argued to lead to a blurring of national identities and a growth of cosmopolitanism (Dogan, 1994). In addition there are particular reasons why British national identity might be in decline. Some of the features that helped construct British identity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries - the existence of Protestant religious traditions in each of the four parts of the United Kingdom (in opposition to the Catholicism of France), distinctive traditions of British democracy (in opposition to the authoritarian rule of France), and the shared economic and political project of the British Empire that united the interests of English, Welsh, Scots and Irish - are either no longer present to the same degree or, if present, are much less distinctive (Colley, 1992).

Any decline in British identity might have important consequences for British society. While most residents of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland officially hold British citizenship and a British passport, British identity is more than an official category. It may also provide a sense of attachment to the state and may thus have a role in promoting social cohesion within the nation. In the classic formulation of national identity, Benedict Anderson conceptualised the nation as an imagined political community – imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. He went on to argue that it is imagined in the sense that "the members of even the smallest

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[1] This paper is an updated version of the previous paper published for Lord Goldsmith's Citizenship Review (Heath, A F and Roberts, J (2008) *British Identity: Its Sources and Possible Implications for Civic Attitudes and Behaviour.* Research Report for Lord Goldsmith's Citizenship Review).

nation will never know most of their members …yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion", and that it is a community because "regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep horizontal comradeship" (Anderson, 1983, pp. 6-7).

Developing this idea of a deep horizontal comradeship, David Miller has made a powerful ethical argument for nationality, arguing that this sense of belonging to an imagined community can be an important source of national cohesion:

"In acknowledging a national identity, I am also acknowledging that I owe a special obligation to fellow members of my nation which I do not owe to other human beings" (Miller, 1995, p. 49)".

Nationality can thus become a basis of mutual obligations and social solidarity: one may feel obligations to one's fellow nationals, for example to provide for them in their old age, that one does not feel towards members of other nations. In a related fashion Sidney Verba (1965) has argued that shared national sentiment can provide a basis for the legitimacy of the state and of its political institutions. Metaphorically speaking, we can see national identity as providing the social glue that holds a nation together (Smith and Jarkko, 1998).

2. Defining national identity and looking at trends in British identity, pride, and attachment

There is no clear-cut agreement among academics on the question of how the nation and national identity can best be defined. However, a broad and relatively neutral starting point for any exploration of the subject is Anderson's well-known maxim that nations are 'imagined communities', since 'the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the mind of each lives the image of their communion' (1983: 6). We might also reflect upon Billig's statement that having a 'national identity' means 'to possess ways of thinking about nationhood' and to be 'situated physically, legally, socially, as well as emotionally…within a homeland, which itself is situated within a world of nations' (1995: 8). Useful as these definitions undoubtedly are, they in turn raise further questions about how to understand national identity; such as what it is that members of any given nation believe they have in common with their fellow members, and why the image of the 'homeland' is such a powerful motivating force for vast numbers of people across the world. In defining national identity, it is imperative to recognize two components of identity: content and strength. In this paper we will analyse both these aspects; hence let us clarify the difference at an early stage. Put simply by Shulman (1999), content refers to the reasons members of a community believe they form a separate group, while strength refers to the intensity of the 'we-feeling' or solidarity among members of this group.

Theorists have distinguished two broad types of conception of national identity, often termed ethnic and civic (or cultural and political) conceptions. These can be thought of as involving different sets of criteria for defining membership in the nation. Ethnic conceptions of the nation tend to place greater emphasis on ancestry and ascribed characteristics that are more or less fixed at birth. In contrast, civic conceptions place greater importance on achieved or acquired characteristics, such as respect for political institutions, possessing national citizenship and speaking the national language. Ethnic conceptions thus tend to be more exclusive while civic conceptions are more inclusive. We will return to analysing the strength of these conceptions (ethnic and civic) in Section 5.

Unfortunately we cannot construct a long time-series for British national identity charting whether and to what extent it has declined. This is partly because a sense of British identity was largely taken for granted by early survey researchers, and it is only in recent years (particularly with the debates over devolution) that the measurement of national identity has become a matter of academic or government research. However, we can construct a time series going back to 1979 in Scotland and Wales and to 1992 in England. In Scotland for example respondents were asked:

Would you describe yourself as British, Scottish, English, Irish, British and Scottish, or European?

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Respondents were allowed to choose only one of these options in the first surveys. Later they were allowed to choose multiple identities but were then asked to select the one that fitted them best. We can think of this as a 'forced choice' question. The trends in the three territories of Great Britain are shown in Table 1.

Table 1 Trends in 'forced choice' national identity: England, Scotland and Wales 1979 – 2006

Year	1979 (%)	1992 (%)	1997 (%)	1999 (%)	2001 (%)	2003 (%)	2005 (%)	2006 (%)
England								
English identity	n/a	32	33	44	43	39	40	47
British identity	n/a	63	56	44	45	48	48	39
Other/none	n/a	5	11	12	12	13	12	14
Base		2424	2490	2684	2768	3708	3643	3666
Scotland								
Scottish identity	56	72	73	77	77	72	79	78
British identity	38	25	20	17	16	20	14	14
Other/none	6	3	7	6	7	8	7	8
Base	658	956	874	1481	1605	1508	1549	1594
Wales								
Welsh identity	58	n/a	63	57	57	60	n/a	n/a
British identity	34	n/a	26	30	31	27	n/a	n/a
Other/none	8	n/a	11	13	12	13	n/a	n/a
Base	858		686	794	1085	988		

Sources: British Election Studies 1992-1997; British Social Attitudes Surveys 1999-2006; Scottish Election Surveys 1979-1997; Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys 1999-2006; Welsh Election Survey 1979; Welsh Referendum Survey 1997; Welsh Assembly Election Survey 1999; Welsh Life and Times Surveys 2001 and 2003.

In both England and Scotland, as Table 1 shows, there was a clear decline in the late twentieth century in British identity and a rise in the separate English and Scottish national identities. Thereafter, the proportions have tended to stabilize although there was a further rise in the level of English identity in 2006.[2] It is also very clear that in Scotland and Wales the proportion who opt for a Scottish or Welsh identity when forced to choose is much higher than the proportion who opt for a British identity, while even in England a British identity has now fallen behind an English identity. (However, in England the distinction between British and English is a very 'fuzzy' one and is not as sharp a distinction as that between, say, British and Scottish (See Cohen, 1995; Hazelden and Jenkins, 2003).

This forced choice question is a relatively crude measure. There is also available a more subtle question that enables us to see more precisely the distinctions between the various identities and in particular allows us to look at 'dual' identities and to distinguish them from 'exclusive' identities (Moreno, 1988). Thus in a number of surveys respondents have been asked:

> *"Which of these statements on this card best describes how you see yourself? Scottish not British, More Scottish than British, Equally Scottish and British, More British than Scottish, British not Scottish"*

Similar questions have been asked for the contrast between British and English and between British and Welsh. Table 2 shows the patterns and trends over time.

Table 2 Exclusive and dual national identities: England, Scotland and Wales 1997-2005

Column percentages

England	1997 (%)	1999 (%)	2001 (%)	2003 (%)	2005 (%)	2010 (%)
English not British	8	17	17	17	14	19
More English	17	15	13	20	12	15
Equally	45	37	42	31	45	38

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[2] We have also checked these results using the General Household Survey, which has a much larger sample size. The GHS question on national identity is slightly different, and only goes back to 2001. However, the GHS does confirm that levels of British identity are much higher in England than in Wales or Scotland and that there has been little change since 2001. Bechhofer and McCrone (2008) also discuss and report essentially the same table, and we have taken the 2006 figures from their table. There are some slight differences in the percentages reported in their table, possibly because of weighting or rounding, but the story is essentially the same.

More British	14	11	9	13	8	8
British not English	9	14	11	10	10	12
Other/none	7	7	8	9	10	8
Base	*2488*	*2721*	*2786*	*1916*	*2367*	*2168*

Scotland	1992 (%)	1997 (%)	1999 (%)	2001 (%)	2003 (%)	2005 (%)	2010 (%)
Scottish not British	19	23	32	36	32	32	39
More Scottish	40	38	34	30	33	32	24
Equally	33	27	23	24	22	22	20
More British	3	4	3	3	4	5	5
British not Scottish	3	4	4	3	4	5	8
Other/none	1	4	4	4	5	5	4
Base	*951*	*876*	*1481*	*1605*	*1508*	*1549*	*665*

Wales	1997 (%)	1999 (%)	2001 (%)	2003 (%)	2007 (%)	2010 (%)
Welsh not British	13	18	24	21	24	22
More Welsh	29	20	23	25	20	14
Equally	26	35	28	30	32	26
More British	10	7	11	9	9	7
British not Welsh	15	14	11	9	9	23
Other/none	6	6	4	6	5	8
Base	*182*	*795*	*1085*	*988*	*883*	*235*

Sources: England - British Election Surveys 1997 and 2005 and 2010; British Social Attitudes Surveys 1999, 2001 and 2003. Scotland - Scottish Election Studies 1992 and 1997; Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005., BES 2010; Wales - British Elections Survey 1997, Welsh Assembly Election Survey 1999 and Welsh Life and Times Survey 2003, 2007, BES 2010. Note: LB = Lower bound and UB = Upper bound.

We have to be cautious because of the rather small sample sizes in some of the years, and the trends are therefore rather 'bumpy'. Nevertheless, Table 2 confirms that there were quite substantial changes during the 1990s in all three territories, with a declining sense of Britishness and a rising sense of the separate national identities although these trends have not been continued in more recent years. Table 2 also confirms that, in all three territories, the majority of respondents (well over half in all three territories) have dual not exclusive identities. Finally Table 2 shows that there were relatively few respondents who gave other answers or did not think of themselves as having one of these four national identities. The largest proportion is in England where it reaches 10%. Many of these will of course be foreign nationals, although some may also be migrants or disengaged Britons. We return to this issue later. Updating this table with data from 2010 shows that there hasn't been a major change in the way people conceive of their identities over the last few years.

In general, then, the results are rather reassuring: in all three territories a majority of residents have dual identities and there does not appear from these data to be a continuing decline in British identity or a continuing rise in exclusive national identities. There is however a small but growing number in all three territories, but especially in England, who do not subscribe to any of the four main national identities of Great Britain.

As well as measuring change in these territorial identities, we will now also briefly measure the possible conflict between them.

Table 3a Measuring conflict in territorial identities: British and English

		English		Base
		Yes (%)	No (%)	
British	**Yes (%)**	39 (58) -9.6	62 (75) 10.5	2208
	No (%)	57 (42) 10.3	43 (25) -9.8	1071
Base		1464	1815	3279

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Source: British Social Attitudes Survey 2010.

Table 3b Measuring conflict in territorial identities: British and Scottish

		Scottish		Base
		Yes (%)	No (%)	*Base*
British	**Yes (%)**	7 (50) -6.6	93 (69) 8.0	*2208*
	No (%)	14 (50) 6.9	86 (31) -6	*1071*
Base		*2978*	*301*	*3279*

Source: British Social Attitudes Survey 2010.

Table 3c Measuring conflict in territorial identities: British and Welsh

		Welsh		Base
		Yes (%)	No (%)	
British	**Yes (%)**	3 (44) -6.6	97 (69) 8.2	2208
	No (%)	9 (56) 6.7	91 (31) -5.5	1071
Base		3112	167	3279

Source: British Social Attitudes Survey 2010.

Tables 3a-c provide us with data of respondents having a British and a national (regional) identity (measured by the questions 'Does respondent think of self as British?' and 'Does respondent think of self as English/Scottish/Welsh?'), allowing us to see if there is a conflict between these identities. Firstly, a Chi-Square test[3] between these two variables in all three tables (Table 3a (British and English): chi-square with 9 degree of freedom = 6696.546, p = 0.000; Table 3b (British and Scottish): chi-square with 9 degree of freedom = 6640.421, p = 0.000; Table 3c (British and Welsh): chi-square with 9 degree of freedom = 6638.899, p = 0.000) indicates that there is a statistically significant relationship between the row and column variable, i.e. between having a British and a national (regional) identification. Secondly, we calculated the 'adjusted standardised residuals' for each cell. In all three tables, the value of the residuals clearly show a conflict between the two identities (national and regional); the residuals in the 'Yes (British)/Yes (English/Scottish/Welsh)' cells and 'No (British)/No (English/Scottish/Welsh)' cells are negative. On the other hand, there is a huge positive

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[3] A chi-square test is used when you want to see if there is a relationship between two categorical variables. This statistic is used to test the hypothesis of no association of columns and rows in tabular data. A chi-square probability of .05 or less is commonly interpreted by social scientists as justification for rejecting the null hypothesis that the row variable is unrelated (that is, only randomly related) to the column variable.

residual for the 'Don't Know/Don't Know' cells (57.4 for all three tables, not mentioned in the tables for brevity purposes) – indicating that people for whom one identity is not salient also find the other one not salient either.

Another aspect that we would have liked to explore is how the possible change in identity is influenced by other factors, but testing this empirically is an almost impossible task given the limited accessible data at our disposal. To test this, we would need comparative or longitudinal data. Furthermore, we should stress more the situational character of identity and identification. To take into account other aspects of identity like social class and gender, we have used the question about the importance of different aspects of identity from the 2003 ISSP module on national identity and we report the percentages for Great Britain.

Table 4 Different aspects of identity: Great Britain

Most important group respondent identifies with:	%
Occupation	13
Ethnic background	2
Gender	10
Age group	4
Religion	3
Preferred political party	.3
Nationality	10
Family or marital status	54
Social class	2
Part of the country you live in	2
Base	*628*

Source: ISSP 2003.

Table 4 shows family or marital status to have the most importance to respondents' identification (making up over a half of respondents), with occupation, gender, and nationality being the next most important aspect. It is interesting to note that, for our respondents, nationality only makes up 10 per cent of respondents. Respondents' age group and religion have less significance, with ethnic background, social class and geographical location having

even less importance. Political party preferences are the least likely to have importance for respondents' identification.

As well as looking at whether people adopt a British identity or not, it is also useful to explore their degree of attachment to this identity. Indeed, it could be argued that this is in many respects the more crucial issue – a sense of British identity but with a weak sense of attachment to Britain may mean that national identity is unable to perform those functions of comradeship and willingness to make sacrifices for one's fellow citizens that have been emphasized by political theorists.

From the Eurobarometer we can track two trends over time, in national pride and in strength of attachment, and we can also see how Britain compares with the rest of Europe. Respondents were asked:

*Would you say you are very proud, fairly proud, not very proud, not at all proud to be…
[Nationality]?*

The results for national pride are shown in Table 5. Here we look at the figures for Great Britain (excluding Northern Ireland) taken as a whole since the sample sizes are too small to allow us to disaggregate into the separate territories of England, Wales and Scotland with any confidence. (We combined the categories not very proud, not at all proud, and don't knows. We also include some results from the World Values Survey, European Values Survey, and the ISSP survey which used the same question).

Table 5 National pride: Great Britain (excluding NI) 1981-2009

Year	Very proud (%)	Fairly proud (%)	Not proud (%)	Base
1981	57	32	11	*1125*
1982	52	34	13	*1136*
1983	58	35	7	*1014*
1984	52	37	12	*1042*
1985	57	30	12	*1053*
1986	54	35	12	*989*
1988	40	44	16	*996*
1990	54	35	11	*1420*

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Year	Very proud (%)	Fairly proud (%)	Not proud (%)	Base
1994	40	41	17	1045
1997	42	43	15	1078
1999	60	35	5	982
2000	54	37	10	1058
2001	59	35	7	1000
2002	58	32	10	1004
2003	57	35	8	1022
2003	45	41	14	2022
2004	58	32	9	1011
2005	62	30	9	1021
2006	61	29	10	1000
2009	54	37	9	1447

Sources: Eurobarometers 17, 19, 21, 24, 26, 30, 42, 47.1, 52, 54.1, 56.2, 57.1, 60.1, 62, 64.2, 66.1; WVS 1981, 1990; ISSP 2003; EVS 2009. Weighted data.

These results show that there is overall little change in national pride in Britain. There are some odd fluctuations but these are probably due to methodological differences, as demonstrated by the numbers for the year 2003 for which data was available both in the ISSP survey and Eurobarometer. The green bordered row displays the result for the year 2003 from the ISSP survey and the row above it shows the result for the same year, but from the Eurobarometer. A comparison of results from these two data sources shows a noticeable difference suggesting that we mustn't over-interpret as the oddities may simply be due to methodological factors. Also it is worth noting that including data for Northern Ireland didn't seem to make much difference to national pride in Britain and hence we left that out from our table.

Since 1991 the Eurobarometer has also regularly asked a question on attachment to one's country, and this is perhaps a better indication of the aspects of national identity relevant to the strength of the 'imagined community' than is pride. National pride tends to reflect the country's external achievements (such as military or sporting success or failure) while attachment may

tell us more about how the members of the society relate to one another.[4] (One notable feature of national pride is the way in which both Germans and Japanese still exhibit low levels of pride decades after the Second World War).

On attachment respondents were asked:

> *"People may feel different degrees of attachment to their town or village, to their region, to their country or to Europe. Please tell me how attached you feel to your country …*

Tables 6a and 6b give the trends since 1991, for United Kingdom (including Northern Ireland) and Great Britain (excluding Northern Ireland).

Table 6a Attachment to United Kingdom (GB and NI) 1991-2010

Year	Very attached (%)	Fairly attached (%)	Not very/ Not at all attached (%)	Base
1991	57	32	11	1376
1995	53	34	12	1412
1999	55	36	8	1318
2000	52	38	10	1371
2002	49	39	12	1311
2003	48	40	11	1302
2004	51	35	13	1310
2005	44	41	13	1347
2006	50	36	15	1313
2007	49	34	17	1305
2010	47	39	13	1323

Sources: Eurobarometers 36, 43.1bis, 51, 54.1, 58.1, 60.1, 62, 63.4, 65.2, 67.1, 73.3.   Weighted data.

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[4] In practice we find that pride and attachment are highly correlated and they tend to have similar patterns of association with the other variables included in the Eurobarometer. We should not therefore exaggerate the distinction between the two concepts.

Table 6b Attachment to Great Britain (excluding NI) 1991-2010

Year	Very attached (%)	Fairly attached (%)	Not very/ Not at all attached (%)	*Base*
1991	58	30	10	*1071*
1995	52	35	13	*1096*
2000	49	41	10	*1058*
2002	47	40	12	*1014*
2004	57	35	8	*1011*
2005	49	40	10	*1044*
2006	56	34	10	*1002*
2007	55	32	13	*1007*
2010	56	36	8	*1026*

Sources: Eurobarometers 36, 43.1bis, 54.1, 58.1, 62, 63.4, 65.2, 67.1, 73.3. Weighted data.

The most striking finding from Tables 6a and 6b is that there is no change in attachment in Britain but there is a declining attachment in Northern Ireland. When we drop the Northern Ireland sample, then we see a more stable level of attachment. Britain does not rank nearly so highly on levels of attachment as it does on levels of national pride. Whereas in the case of national pride Britain was clearly above the European average, and indeed quite close to the top, it is clearly below average with respect to attachment. To be sure, around half the population do feel very attached to Britain, and it is only about 10% who feel little attachment, but it may also be worth noting that Whiteley (2008) has reported cross-national findings suggesting that Britain does not compare especially well with other West European countries on various aspects of 'good citizenship'. We turn to the wider implications of lack of attachment in Section 3 below.

With respect to the trends over time, once again we have to be cautious as the trends are rather 'bumpy', reflecting the small sample sizes. There are however hints that Britain may be slipping relative to the other members of the EU15. Up until 2000 the percentage who felt 'very attached' was consistently 50 or more, and Britain's rank among the EU 15 was tenth or higher. However, since 2002 the percentage 'very attached' has more often been below 50% and Britain's ranking has fallen as low as twelfth. However, we must emphasize that these are very modest changes in magnitude.

The overall picture from these first six tables, then, is that:

- There isn't much change in attachment in Britain but there is a declining attachment in Northern Ireland.

- Britain does not rank nearly so highly on levels of attachment as it does on levels of national pride.

- Britain was clearly above the European average in terms of national pride but ranked below the European average with respect to attachment.

- There was some shift in the late twentieth century away from a British identity towards separate Scottish or English (and perhaps Welsh) identities.

- The great majority of the population continues to subscribe to one of the four national identities of Great Britain and most have 'dual' identities.

- There does seem to be some conflict between having British and national (regional) identities.

- The great majority of the population continues to feel either very or fairly proud of Britain and to feel very or fairly attached to Britain although there has been some decline over time.

- There is a small but growing minority who do not subscribe to any of the four national identities of Great Britain.

- Nationality is not the most important aspect for individuals' identification.

In addition, we have supplemented this data with trends in levels of attachment to Village/Town, Region, and to Europe, from the same data source, the Eurobarometer.

Table 6c Attachment to Village/Town: United Kingdom (including NI) 1991-2010

Year	Very attached (%)	Fairly attached (%)	Not very/Not at all attached (%)	Base
1991	44	37	19	1376
1995	45	37	18	1412
1999	44	40	16	1318
2000	47	36	17	1371

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Year	Very attached (%)	Fairly attached (%)	Not very/Not at all attached (%)	*Base*
2002	45	42	13	*1311*
2003	51	37	11	*1302*
2004	49	35	15	*1310*
2005	45	39	15	*1347*
2006	45	39	15	*1313*
2007	49	34	18	*1306*
2010	48	36	15	*1323*

Sources: Eurobarometers 36, 43.1bis, 51, 54.1, 58.1, 60.1, 62, 63.4, 65.2, 67.1, 73.3. Weighted data.

Table 6d Attachment to Village/Town: Great Britain (excluding NI) 1991-2010

Year	Very attached (%)	Fairly attached (%)	Not very/Not at all attached (%)	*Base*
1991	42	37	20	*1071*
1995	40	41	19	*1096*
2000	44	37	18	*1058*
2002	43	43	15	*1014*
2004	48	36	16	*1011*
2005	44	40	15	*1044*
2006	45	39	16	*1002*
2007	47	35	18	*1006*
2010	46	38	16	*1026*

Sources: Eurobarometers 36, 43.1bis, 54.1, 58.1, 62, 63.4, 65.2, 67.1, 73.3. Weighted data.

Firstly, we see that the data for attachment to village/town is pretty stable over time both including and excluding Northern Ireland. The 'Not very/Not at all attached' category for village/town is slightly higher than for national attachment, but surprisingly there are small differences. Next we see trends for attachment to region.

Table 6e Attachment to Region: United Kingdom (including NI) 1991-2010

Year	Very attached (%)	Fairly attached (%)	Not very/Not at all attached (%)	Base
1991	54	32	12	1376
1995	49	37	12	1412
1999	41	42	15	1318
2000	44	41	15	1371
2002	41	45	15	1311
2003	44	41	14	1302
2004	48	39	13	1310
2005	45	41	12	1347
2006	47	40	12	1313
2007	45	39	17	1305
2010	47	39	13	1323

Sources: Eurobarometers 36, 43.1bis, 51, 54.1, 58.1, 60.1, 62, 63.4, 65.2, 67.1, 73. Weighted data.

Table 6f Attachment to Region: Great Britain (excluding NI) 1991-2010

Year	Very attached (%)	Fairly attached (%)	Not very/Not at all attached (%)	Base
1991	54	31	13	1071

Year	Very attached (%)	Fairly attached (%)	Not very/Not at all attached (%)	Base
1995	46	40	12	1096
2000	41	42	16	1058
2002	38	46	16	1014
2004	46	40	14	1011
2005	44	43	13	1044
2006	45	41	13	1002
2007	44	40	17	1005
2010	44	42	14	1026

Sources: Eurobarometers 36, 43.1bis, 54.1, 58.1, 62, 63.4, 65.2, 67.1, 73.3. Weighted data.

Here we see very similar trends to previous tables, but a slight decline in attachment to region both including and excluding Northern Ireland. Though maybe the year 1991 is an outlier, and if we exclude 1991 then there's no real change. Let us now turn to Europe.

Table 6g Attachment to Europe: United Kingdom (including NI) 1991-2010

Year	Very attached (%)	Fairly attached (%)	Not very/Not at all attached (%)	Base
1991	7	27	64	1376
1995	4	27	68	1412
1999	8	29	56	1318
2000	11	29	56	1371
2002	6	24	66	1311
2003	7	34	57	1302
2004	9	41	48	1310

Year	Very attached (%)	Fairly attached (%)	Not very/Not at all attached (%)	*Base*
2005	10	36	49	1347
2006	8	33	56	1313
2007	12	40	48	1293
2010	5	22	72	1323

Sources: Eurobarometers 36, 43.1bis, 51, 54.1, 58.1, 60.1, 62, 63.4, 65.2, 67.1, 73.3. Weighted data.

Table 6h Attachment to Europe: Great Britain (excluding NI) 1991-2010

Year	Very attached (%)	Fairly attached (%)	Not very/Not at all attached (%)	*Base*
1991	8	30	60	1071
1995	5	27	68	1096
2000	11	31	55	1058
2002	5	22	68	1014
2004	9	41	48	1011
2005	10	38	49	1044
2006	7	34	56	1002
2007	12	40	48	996
2010	5	23	70	1026

Sources: Eurobarometers 36, 43.1bis, 54.1, 58.1, 62, 63.4, 65.2, 67.1, 73.3. Weighted data.

The striking finding from these tables for Europe is that attachment to Europe is much lower than any of the other attachments. Again, the trend is rather 'bumpy' but the safest conclusion is that there has been no real change over time in attachment to Europe.

3. The sources of British identity and attachment to Britain

In this section we consider what sorts of people feel more or less attached to Britain. In particular, we ask about the small but growing minority who do not feel themselves to be British or who have weak attachment to Britain. The key issue is whether some groups of individuals, particular ethnic or religious groups for example or people who are socially excluded, feel weak attachment to Britain and might on that account be less inclined to feel a sense of civic duty, might be more vulnerable to dissident movements of various kinds or perhaps might simply be disengaged from civil society. Our interest in this section therefore is not simply whether people feel British or not but on the strength of their attachment to Britain. We are also particularly interested in identifying any groups with an unusually low degree of attachment.

The main source which we are able to use for this purpose is the government's Citizenship Survey (formerly known as the Home Office Citizenship Survey or HOCS) which has large ethnic minority sub-samples, making it ideal for investigating patterns among ethnic minorities. There are also sources such as the British Social Attitudes Survey which, although not adequate for investigating ethnic minorities, are nonetheless valuable for looking generally at individuals who are socially excluded (See Appendix 1 for technical details of these surveys).

In the 2003 and 2005 Citizenship Surveys we can use a question on 'belonging' to Britain, which is analogous to the Eurobarometer question on attachment used in Section 2. Respondents to the Citizenship Survey were asked:

> *I would like you to tell me how strongly you feel you belong to each of the following areas, using the answers on this card.*
>
> > *First, your immediate neighbourhood?*
> >
> > *And now your local area. By this I mean the area within a 15-20 minute walk from your home.*
> >
> > *Britain?*

The response codes were 'very strongly', 'fairly strongly', 'not very strongly', 'not at all strongly'. (Since there are generally small numbers in the latter two categories we merge them together, along with the few people who responded don't know). We use the data from the 2003 and 2005 Citizenship Surveys and focus on the item 'belonging to Britain'. We must remember that there is likely to be some non-response bias and that people with very low attachment might well not agree to take part in the survey.

We explored the following factors as sources of 'belonging':

Age/generation, since there are grounds for expecting younger generations to be less attached to Britain. This is because the socialisation of the younger generations has been different to the older generations. The older generations were brought up in the aftermath of the Second World War, a time in which they were exposed to Britain's heroic performance and worked together for their nation. This formative experience of growing up during the war fostered a sense of social cohesion amongst the older generations making them more attached to Britain as compared to the younger generations. This argument is made in Tilley and Heath (2007) which examines how national pride has changed in Britain since the beginning of the 1980s. The article shows that there have been large declines in pride and that this is largely generational in nature; with more recent generations having substantially lower levels of pride in 'Britishness' than previous generations. Confirming the reality of 'Thatcher's Children', the authors find that this process has been arrested to some extent, with generations coming of age in the 1980s and after having similar levels of pride to their immediate predecessors.

Overseas birth, since those born abroad may be foreign nationals, or have had less time to become attached to Britain, or lack fluency in the English language and thus be excluded from some aspects of British life.

Ethnicity, since ethnicity may be a powerful identity in its own right which might take precedence over a British identity.

Socio-economic disadvantage (the unemployed, those on low incomes or in low-paid work, those with low qualifications and poor job prospects) who may feel excluded and perhaps alienated or disengaged.

Community deprivation (which research for the DCLG by Laurence and Heath (2008) has shown to be a major driver of a sense of community cohesion). In the DCLG study, the authors suggest that the level of disadvantage in an area is a potential driver of community cohesion, and this is measured by the Indices of Deprivation 2004 (ID 2004). Deprivation is found to be one of the strongest community level predictors of cohesion. At an individual level, indicators of socio-economic disadvantage, feelings of vulnerability and powerlessness, and perceptions of crime are the strongest predictors of cohesion.

We focus here on what might be termed 'objective' characteristics of the respondents. There will also be many attitudinal measures that are correlated with attachment to Britain, but the nature of the causal relationships with this kind of variable will be much less clear.

The strongest single driver of 'belonging to Britain' proves to be age. Table 7a (data for 2003, 05, 07, 09, and 10) show belonging to Britain, and show that there is little difference between our three youngest age groups, in each of which only 40% or so feel that they belong very strongly to Britain. However, the older age groups exhibit steadily increasing levels of belonging, reaching over 70% among respondents age 85 or over.

Table 7a Belonging to Britain: variations by age and gender groups in England

2003	Belong very strongly (%)	Belong fairly strongly (%)	Do not belong strongly (%)	Base
16-24	41	42	17	363
25-34	41	40	19	1335
35-44	42	40	18	1923
45-54	44	39	17	1963
55-64	54	35	12	1427
65-74	66	24	10	985
75-84	69	24	8	739
85+	77	19	4	140
All	50	36	14	8875
Male	49	36	15	6076
Female	51	35	15	2797
All	50	36	14	8873

Source: HOCS 2003, weighted by 'core' weight, wtcinds; respondents in England only.

2005	Belong very strongly (%)	Belong fairly strongly (%)	Do not belong strongly (%)	Base
16-24	42	42	16	1313
25-34	41	41	18	1519
35-44	49	42	17	1732
45-54	59	37	15	1429

DR16 To what extent are on-going changes in national and supranational identities based on ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation, and what are the behavioural consequences of these different conceptions?

2005	Belong very strongly (%)	Belong fairly strongly (%)	Do not belong strongly (%)	Base
55-64	59	29	11	*1282*
65-74	64	26	10	*943*
75-84	73	21	6	*681*
85+	77	18	6	*180*
All	51	35	14	*9083*
Male	52	34	14	*4430*
Female	50	36	14	*4657*
All	51	35	14	*9087*

Source: HOCS 2005, weighted by 'core' weight, wtcinds; respondents in England only. Row percentages

2007	Belong very strongly (%)	Belong fairly strongly (%)	Do not belong strongly (%)	Base
16-24	32	50	18	*1221*
25-34	36	45	20	*1464*
35-44	36	47	18	*1709*
45-54	46	39	15	*1398*
55-64	52	34	15	*1282*
65-74	62	26	13	*910*
75-84	72	19	9	*600*
85+	72	23	6	*169*

DR16 To what extent are on-going changes in national and supranational identities based on ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation, and what are the behavioural consequences of these different conceptions?

2007	Belong very strongly (%)	Belong fairly strongly (%)	Do not belong strongly (%)	Base
All	45	39	16	8753
Male	44	39	16	4278
Female	46	39	15	4476
All	45	39	16	8754

Source: HOCS 2007, weighted by 'core' weight, wtcinds; respondents in England only. Row percentages

2009	Belong very strongly (%)	Belong fairly strongly (%)	Do not belong strongly (%)	Base
16-24	34	48	18	1275
25-34	33	48	18	1436
35-44	37	46	17	1664
45-54	47	36	17	1393
55-64	52	34	14	1270
65-74	62	26	13	888
75-84	69	22	9	650
85+	64	26	10	173
All	45	39	16	8749
Male	44	39	17	4291
Female	46	40	15	4458

All	45	39	16	*8749*

Source: HOCS 2009, weighted by 'core' weight, wtcinds; respondents in England only.

2010	**Belong very strongly (%)**	**Belong fairly strongly (%)**	**Do not belong strongly (%)**	*Base*
16-24	41	46	13	*1302*
25-34	39	46	16	*1409*
35-44	44	41	16	*1609*
45-54	46	40	18	*1427*
55-64	56	32	12	*1264*
65-74	65	25	10	*897*
75-84	69	22	9	*649*
85+	74	22	4	*188*
All	50	37	12	*8745*
Male	49	38	14	*4276*
Female	51	37	12	*4470*
All	50	37	12	*8746*

Source: HOCS 2010, weighted by 'core' weight, wtcinds; respondents in England only.

We then also replicated this data for trends in levels of attachment to local area/borough and neighbourhood (see tables 7b, 7c, and 7d in Appendix 2). Our findings show that strength of belonging to Britain is greater than strength of belonging to neighbourhood, which is in turn stronger than belonging to the local area/borough. Attachment to Europe is much weaker.

Women are more likely than men to feel belonging to their neighbourhood. No gender differences are apparent for belonging to Britain or to local area. There appear to be large age differences for all three measures (Britain, local area, and neighbourhood), possibly reflecting generation or perhaps (especially for neighbourhood) how long one has lived there. But age differences are reversed for Europe, possibly reflecting the rise of a younger and more cosmopolitan generation.

There isn't a systematic change over time in strength of belonging to Britain or Europe but there are moderate increases in belonging to local area and neighbourhood (around ten points).

Our earlier results showed us that younger people do not belong very strongly to Britain. Now let's see if Europe shows us an opposite trend, i.e. are younger people more attached to Europe? Generating data for this shows us that younger people do belong more strongly to Europe than the older ones (shown in Table 6d).

Given this strong relationship with age, it is important to control for age when analysing other variables. In particular this will be important when considering ethnic minorities, who tend to have a much younger age profile than the white British. In the following tables therefore, as well as giving the overall figures, we also look at respondents aged 35-49 whom we can think of as 'mature adults of prime working age'.

Table 8 Belonging to Britain: variations by place of birth, ethnicity, and religion in England

2005	Belong very strongly (%)	Belong fairly strongly (%)	Do not belong strongly (%)	Base
Born in UK	53 (47)	34 (37)	13 (15)	*11749*
Born in Commonwealth	45 (46)	46 (46)	9 (7)	*561*
Born elsewhere	38 (33)	43 (45)	20 (22)	*880*
Christian	54 (48)	33 (36)	13 (16)	*10211*
Muslim	44 (43)	43 (48)	14 (9)	*348*
Other	42 (33)	42 (51)	15 (16)	*657*
No religion	44 (43)	39 (42)	17 (14)	*1941*
White	52 (46)	34 (38)	14 (16)	*12212*
Indian	43 (48)	47 (45)	10 (7)	*280*

DR16 To what extent are on-going changes in national and supranational identities based on ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation, and what are the behavioural consequences of these different conceptions?

2005	Belong very strongly (%)	Belong fairly strongly (%)	Do not belong strongly (%)	Base
Pakistani/Bangladeshi	48 (52)	44 (43)	9 (6)	195
Black Caribbean/Black Other	43 (42)	38 (42)	20 (17)	125
Black African	44 (50)	39 (36)	17 (13)	125
Mixed or Other	39 (43)	43 (40)	19 (18)	256
All	51 (46)	35 (38)	14 (16)	13196

Source: HOCS 2005, weighted by the 'full' weight, wtfinds, which does not down-weight ethnic minorities to their population proportions; respondents in England. Note: figures in brackets give the percentages for respondents aged 35-49.

2007	Belong very strongly (%)	Belong fairly strongly (%)	Do not belong strongly (%)	Base
Born in UK	46 (39)	39 (45)	15 (16)	11580
Born in Commonwealth	46 (43)	40 (44)	13 (12)	568
Born elsewhere	34 (30)	43 (48)	23 (23)	1056
Christian	47 (39)	38 (46)	14 (15)	9959
Muslim	46 (48)	43 (42)	11 (10)	392
Other	43 (40)	35 (35)	23 (25)	709
No religion	36 (35)	44 (44)	20 (21)	2133
White	45 (38)	39 (45)	16 (17)	12151

DR16 To what extent are on-going changes in national and supranational identities based on ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation, and what are the behavioural consequences of these different conceptions?

2007	Belong very strongly (%)	Belong fairly strongly (%)	Do not belong strongly (%)	Base
Indian	45 (46)	45 (48)	10 (6)	269
Pakistani/Bangladeshi	45 (52)	43 (41)	12 (8)	234
Black Caribbean/Black Other	38 (33)	45 (49)	17 (18)	126
Black African	38 (38)	46 (47)	17 (15)	151
Mixed or Other	38 (41)	43 (44)	20 (16)	278
All	45 (39)	39 (45)	16 (17)	13213

Source: HOCS 2007, weighted by the 'full' weight, wtfinds, which does not down-weight ethnic minorities to their population proportions; respondents in England. Note: figures in brackets give the percentages for respondents aged 35-49.

2009	Belong very strongly (%)	Belong fairly strongly (%)	Do not belong strongly (%)	Base
Born in UK	46 (40)	38 (43)	16 (17)	12271
Born in Commonwealth	43 (44)	43 (44)	14 (12)	670
Born elsewhere	34 (35)	46 (45)	20 (21)	1063
Christian	48 (40)	38 (43)	15 (17)	10180
Muslim	43 (49)	44 (43)	13 (9)	475
Other	37 (36)	46 (51)	17 (13)	750
No religion	39 (38)	42 (42)	19 (19)	2579

DR16 To what extent are on-going changes in national and supranational identities based on ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation, and what are the behavioural consequences of these different conceptions?

2009	Belong very strongly (%)	Belong fairly strongly (%)	Do not belong strongly (%)	Base
White	45 (39)	39 (44)	16 (17)	12759
Indian	44 (42)	45 (49)	11 (9)	329
Pakistani/Bangladeshi	48 (58)	42 (34)	10 (8)	275
Black Caribbean/Black Other	42 (40)	42 (40)	16 (21)	128
Black African	38 (43)	43 (41)	19 (16)	188
Mixed or Other	34 (36)	45 (47)	20 (17)	329
All	45 (40)	39 (44)	16 (17)	14015

Source: HOCS 2009, weighted by the 'full' weight, wtfinds, which does not down-weight ethnic minorities to their population proportions; respondents in England. Note: figures in brackets give the percentages for respondents aged 35-49.

2010	Belong very strongly (%)	Belong fairly strongly (%)	Do not belong strongly (%)	Base
Born in UK	51 (45)	37 (41)	12 (15)	13370
Born in Commonwealth	47 (45)	41 (44)	12 (12)	561
Born elsewhere	37 (41)	44 (39)	18 (20)	1216
Christian	52 (44)	36 (42)	12 (14)	10678
Muslim	46 (50)	41 (39)	13 (12)	504
Other	42 (39)	41 (34)	18 (27)	639
No religion	43 (44)	41 (39)	16 (17)	3320
White	50 (44)	37 (41)	12 (15)	13844

2010	Belong very strongly (%)	Belong fairly strongly (%)	Do not belong strongly (%)	Base
Indian	44 (49)	43 (37)	12 (13)	286
Pakistani/Bangladeshi	50 (53)	41 (40)	10 (8)	306
Black Caribbean/Black Other	49 (48)	36 (35)	15 (17)	164
Black African	39 (43)	48 (45)	14 (13)	194
Mixed or Other	40 (44)	42 (41)	19 (15)	372
All	50 (44)	38 (41)	12 (15)	15172

Source: HOCS 2010, weighted by the 'full' weight, wtfinds, which does not down-weight ethnic minorities to their population proportions; respondents in England. Note: figures in brackets give the percentages for respondents aged 35-49.

The biggest difference shown in the tables for Table 8 is by place of birth. People born elsewhere (who will include all migrants from Europe) have much weaker sense of belonging to Britain, but note that the differences are smaller if we control for age. On the surface, Muslims appear less strongly attached to Britain. But in later years, this is reversed once we control for age. Ethnic differences are consistently small.

The differences shown in Table 8 are much smaller than those found for age group. Few of the differences reach statistical significance, particularly after controlling for age. However, there are a few notable findings.

First, it is of considerable interest that the picture for respondents born abroad is quite diverse; those born in the Commonwealth appear to have quite a strong sense of belonging to Britain, but those born elsewhere do seem to be more weakly attached to Britain. Over one fifth of this latter group do not feel strongly attached to Britain – one of the highest proportions that we encounter. This will in part be because of the recent arrival in Britain of many members of this group. Detailed analysis (not shown here) demonstrates that a sense of belonging is strongly associated with length of stay in Britain.[5]

Second, in the case of religion, we find that Christians tend to have a stronger sense of belonging, while Muslims and members of other religions are less likely to feel very strongly that they belong to Britain. At the same time, however, it is important to recognize that rather

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[5] Since we do not have a panel study, we must be careful of our interpretation of the correlation between length of stay in Britain and level of belonging. Some people may come for relatively short durations and then return to their countries of origin. The correlation could therefore be due to selective return migration rather than to strength of belonging increasing with duration of the stay. However, it is likely that in fact both processes will be at work.

few Muslims feel that they do not belong to Britain at all. It is also important to note that people who belong to no religion (who tend to be white British rather than members of minority groups) also show lower attachment to Britain.

We see a similar pattern among the main ethnic minorities: Black Caribbeans and Black Africans in particular are less likely to feel very strongly that they belong and around one fifth have a relatively weak sense of belonging. The low identification of the Black Caribbeans with Britain seems to be a robust finding as it is stable over time. We have broken down these percentages for Black Caribbeans according to gender and education (see Tables 8a and 8b in Appendix 3) and we see that males in the Black Caribbean community and the less educated Black Caribbeans belong more strongly to Britain. Mixed or Other ethnic groups often had an even lower identification than the Black Caribbeans; the Other ethnic group refers to those people who selected their ethnic group as 'Other', either because they felt their ethnic group wasn't represented in the list or they didn't want to specify their ethnic group. Other survey data confirm that ethnic minorities tend to feel a strong sense of belonging to their own ethnic groups, but this does not appear to exclude a sense of dual identity as both, say, Indian and British, analogous to the dual identity noted in Section 2 as British and Scottish or British and Welsh. Indeed Table A1 in the Appendix 4 shows that 'exclusive' ethnic minority identities are actually less common than exclusive Scottish or Welsh identities.

We next turn to socio-economic factors. Table 9 shows the results for selected categories of socio-economic disadvantage.

Table 9 Belonging to Britain: variations by level of socio-economic deprivation in England

	Belong very strongly (%)	Belong fairly strongly (%)	Do not belong strongly (%)	*Base*
Low skilled work	52 (44)	33 (39)	15 (18)	*2783*
Unemployed	48 (51)	38 (34)	15 (15)	*259*
No qualifications	51 (44)	32 (37)	17 (18)	*1600*
Lowest quintile of family income	47 (36)	36 (44)	17 (20)	*1200*
Most disadvantaged quintile of neighbourhoods	50 (45)	34 (37)	16 (18)	*1626*
Limiting long-term illness	57 (45)	29 (35)	14 (21)	*1930*

DR16 To what extent are on-going changes in national and supranational identities based on ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation, and what are the behavioural consequences of these different conceptions?

	Belong very strongly (%)	Belong fairly strongly (%)	Do not belong strongly (%)	Base
Rented accommodation	48 (43)	36 (38)	16 (19)	2355
Never married	42 (39)	41 (43)	17 (18)	2926
No access to motor transport	52 (41)	32 (39)	16 (20)	1718
All	50 (45)	35 (38)	15 (16)	9680

Source: HOCS 2005, weighted by wtcinds; respondents in England.

Note: Figures in brackets are for respondents aged 35-49.

The differences in Table 9 between the various disadvantaged categories and the overall figures for Britain as a whole are fairly small, but there are hints that socio-economic exclusion may have some minor role to play. Thus respondents in the lowest quintile of family income, those with a limiting long-term illness (if aged 35-49), those in rented accommodation or with no access to a car or motor transport tend to be over-represented among those who have a weaker sense of belonging to Britain. We should remember that these groups also tend to be non-respondents to surveys, and it is therefore possible that Table 8 underestimates the magnitude of the effect of marginality and socio-economic exclusion. Somewhat surprisingly, however, we fail to find any effect of neighbourhood deprivation.

We have checked these results for the full sample using multiple regression analysis, focussing on the drivers of a weak sense of belonging. This analysis confirms the dominance of age as the key predictor and the significant roles for overseas birth and socio-economic marginality. (See Table A2 in the Appendix 5). Overall then we find from this analysis that the major drivers of a weak sense of belonging are:

- age (younger people being less likely to feel strongly that they belong);

- birth overseas in a non-commonwealth country;

- length of stay in Britain;

- socio-economic marginality (lower social class, limiting long-term illness, non home-owners).

After controlling for these factors, we find no significant differences by ethnicity or for Muslim religion.

At this stage we cannot be sure what interpretation to give to the strong association with age. It may reflect life-cycle processes, with people developing a stronger sense of belonging as they get older. Or it may reflect generational differences: people socialized in earlier periods, for example around the time of the second world war, may feel a stronger sense of identification with Britain whereas those socialized in more recent periods, for example after Britain's accession to the European Union, may feel a weaker sense of attachment. There are technical reasons which make it virtually impossible to decide unambiguously which interpretation is correct, although work on national pride has strongly suggested that the generational interpretation is to be preferred to the life cycle one (Tilley and Heath, 2007). In Appendix 6 we explore whether a life cycle or generational interpretation is appropriate for belonging as well as for pride, and we conclude that, as with national pride, the age differences largely reflect generational change.

Given the importance of age in the analyses, it is useful to 'drill down' and to focus on young people. Young people are a relatively vulnerable group, especially given their very high unemployment rates and their greater propensities towards protest and resistance. Moreover, if the correct interpretation of the age differences found above is a generational one, then lack of attachment among young people may have lasting implications for British society. In Table 10 therefore we repeat the analysis but restrict it to young people aged 16-24.

Table 10 Belonging to Britain: young people aged 16-24 in England

	Belong very strongly (%)	Belong fairly strongly (%)	Do not belong strongly (%)	*Base*
Born in UK	44	40	16	*1067*
Born in Commonwealth	31	49	20	*153*
Born elsewhere	37	36	27	*173*
Christian	43	41	16	*684*
Muslim	38	45	17	*253*
Other	34	52	15	*158*
No religion	45	37	18	*294*
White	44 (44)	40 (40)	16 (16)	*672*

Indian	36 (38)	48 (45)	16 (17)	*156*
Pakistani or Bangladeshi	37 (38)	46 (44)	17 (18)	*153*
Black Caribbean/Black Other	35 (38)	25 (25)	40 (38)	*83*
Black African	37 (40)	48 (40)	15 (20)	*100*
Other	31 (34)	47 (45)	23 (21)	*230*
All	43 (44)	40 (40)	17 (16)	*1394*

Source: HOCS 2005, unweighted data; respondents in England aged 16-24.

Note: figures in brackets give the percentages for ethnic minorities born in Britain.

Table 10 shows some important differences among young people from the comparable table for the population as a whole. As expected we find lower levels of belonging to Britain among young people generally (43% reporting that they belong very strongly to Britain compared with the figure of 50% for the sample as a whole). And we also find lower levels of belonging among people born overseas. Less expectedly, we find that a weak feeling of belonging characterizes young people born in the Commonwealth as well as those born elsewhere.

We also find very high percentages of young Black Caribbeans with only a weak sense of belonging to Britain. Whereas among young people as a whole 17% feel a weak sense of belonging, the figure for young Caribbeans reaches around 40%. This is a much more extreme picture than the one we saw in Table 8 for the sample as a whole, where Black Caribbeans were not so seriously over-represented in this category. Moreover, further analysis shows that this is not solely a consequence of overseas birth: if we restrict the analysis to young people born in Britain, we find that the pattern still holds for the Black Caribbeans. This result also persists when we carry out a regression analysis controlling for the other demographic variables. (See Table A2 in the Appendix 5).

We must be cautious given the small sample sizes involved. However, we have replicated the analysis using the 2003 Citizenship Survey and the results are almost identical. We must also remember that non-response bias may well mean that our results underestimate the scale of the problem. In concluding this section, therefore, we feel it would be wise, as a working basis, to assume both that young people born abroad and that young black people born in Britain feel low levels of belonging to Britain.

4. The implications of belonging and attachment to Britain

In this section we explore whether a sense of attachment to Britain is associated with the kinds of attitudes or behaviours that might be thought of as representing a civic orientation and whether it acts as a source of political legitimacy. We also consider some of the possible downsides of attachment, such as xenophobia or political nationalism.

The Eurobarometer, from which we derived the trends in Tables 5 and 6 above, unfortunately does not include any measures of relevant outcomes (almost exclusively concentrating on issues connected with European integration and EU policies and institutions). However, there is some relevant evidence in the Citizenship Survey and in the British Social Attitudes surveys.

We first checked whether a sense of belonging strongly to Britain is associated with behaviours or attitudes that might be regarded as civic, or indicative of that broader sense of comradeship that scholars have suggested is a product of national identity. We explored the full range of items included in the Citizenship Survey. What we found was a modest association between a strong sense of belonging to Britain and social trust and a rather stronger association with turnout in elections. The former is often thought to be an important foundation of a cohesive society (although direct evidence on its causal role is lacking), while the latter can be thought of as one important aspect of civic duty. (A question explicitly on the duty to vote was included in the British Social Attitudes Survey and this question shows a very similar relationship with strength of attachment to Britain). Table 11 shows the results.

Table 11 Strength of belonging to Britain and social trust in England

Belong to Britain (2005)	Agree people in neighbourhood can be trusted	Base
Very strongly (%)	53 (53)	4503 (4636)
Fairly strongly (%)	47 (38)	3112 (3183)
Not strongly (%)	39 (13)	1216 (1261)
All (%)	46 (35)	8831 (9080)

Source: Citizenship Survey 2005, weighted data; England. Figures in brackets are for people born in the UK, excluding those born elsewhere.

DR16 To what extent are on-going changes in national and supranational identities based on ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation, and what are the behavioural consequences of these different conceptions?

Belong to Britain (2007)	Agree people in neighbourhood can be trusted	Base
Very strongly (%)	51 (46)	3824 (3946)
Fairly strongly (%)	38 (39)	3314 (3422)
Not strongly (%)	12 (15)	1262 (1388)
All (%)	34 (33)	8481 (8756)

Source: Citizenship Survey 2007, weighted data; England. Figures in brackets are for people born in the UK, excluding those born elsewhere.

Belong to Britain (2009)	Agree people in neighbourhood can be trusted	Base
Very strongly (%)	52 (46)	3811 (3459)
Fairly strongly (%)	37 (39)	3286 (2899)
Not strongly (%)	11 (16)	1333 (1166)
All (%)	33 (34)	8430 (7524)

Source: Citizenship Survey 2009, weighted data; England. Figures in brackets are for people born in the UK, excluding those born elsewhere.

Belong to Britain (2010)	Agree people in neighbourhood can be trusted	Base
Very strongly (%)	56 (51)	4240 (4349)
Fairly strongly (%)	35 (37)	3184 (3265)
Not strongly (%)	9 (12)	1072 (1118)
All (%)	33 (33)	8496 (8732)

Source: Citizenship Survey 2010, weighted data; England. Figures in brackets are for people born in the UK, excluding those born elsewhere.

As we can see, 76% of people who felt that they belonged very strongly to Britain reported that they had voted either at the last general or local election, with the figure falling to 57% among people who felt a weak sense of belonging. It is also interesting to see that people who felt that they did not belong strongly to Britain had relatively high levels of ineligibility. Some of this might be because they were foreign citizens (though EU citizens are eligible to vote in local elections). Or it could be because they had failed to register despite being eligible to do so. Unfortunately the Citizenship Survey does not have an actual question on citizenship, but we can exclude people who were not born in Britain. When we do so, we find that the differences are reduced in magnitude but are still present.

It is important to recognize that these differences might be explained in part by the fact that, as we saw in Section 3 above, people who reported belonging to Britain very strongly also tend to be somewhat older and less marginalized socio-economically. Since these factors are also associated with turnout (and with trust), we need to control for them statistically. When we do so, we find that these demographic differences do indeed explain some of the apparent association between a sense of belonging and turnout, but that a significant 'effect' of strength of belonging persists among people of similar demographic characteristics.

Surprisingly however, we failed to find any significant differences with respect to the other 'civic' activities covered in the Citizenship Survey, such as formal or informal volunteering or participation in voluntary associations. Detailed analysis suggested that this may be because there is a great diversity of forms of civic participation and that the decision to participate in a particular form may be due to rather specific interests and concerns. For example, participation in a parent-teacher association will be specific to parents with children of the relevant age while participation in sports clubs may attract different sets of individuals. These cross-cutting influences prove to be more important than any general sense of belonging to Britain.

We have replicated these patterns using a somewhat similar question in the British Social Attitudes survey 2005. The BSA confirms higher turnout among those who have a stronger attachment to Britain, as well as higher trust. But once again the differences are relatively modest.

The 2003 BSA survey includes a range of questions that might be thought of as tapping the extent to which people accord legitimacy to the political system or are critical of it. It also includes a question on attachment to Britain that is a functional equivalent of the HOCS question on belonging. Table 12 shows the patterns of association between attachment and attitudes to government.

Table 12 Strength of attachment to Britain and political legitimacy in Great Britain

Attachment to Britain (%)…	Always/ most of time trusts government	Thinks system of governing GB works well	Agrees very important that the monarchy continues	Believes top priority is maintaining order in the nation	Believes top priority is giving people more say	*Base*
Very closely attached	24	39	70	48	27	*369*
Fairly closely	23	39	60	40	32	*526*
Not attached closely	11	27	41	31	41	*238*
All	21	37	59	41	33	*1133*

Source: BSA 2003, weighted data.

Table 12 suggests that people who feel only weakly attached to Britain also show weaker support for the current political system; with relatively low percentages who feel that the current system of governing Britain works well. The biggest differences are in levels of support for the monarchy, which is to be sure one of the key British symbols. We also find some interesting differences on the items that make up Inglehart's index of post-materialism (1977): people who do not feel closely attached to Britain are much more likely to say that the top priority for the country ought to be 'giving people more say in government decisions' (a post-materialist response) whereas those who feel very closely attached are more likely to give 'maintaining order in the nation' (a materialist response) as their top priority. Overall this suggests that greater attachment to Britain is associated with greater support for the existing political order whereas those who are weakly attached are more critical of the political system.

Again, we need to check whether these associations are due to the differing demographic characteristics of people who feel strongly or weakly attached to Britain. When we control for age and other key demographic characteristics, we find as with the analysis of the Citizenship Survey that the magnitude of the association between strength of attachment and the outcomes of interest is reduced but remains statistically significant.

It is also important to check whether attachment to Britain has a downside. In particular xenophobia has often been associated with nationalism, although it is by no means evident that our measure of attachment should be equated with nationalism in its narrow, xenophobic

sense. Thus many theorists have made a distinction between (ethically undesirable) nationalism and (ethically desirable) patriotism. Table 13 explores these issues.

Table 13 Strength of attachment to Britain and xenophobia in Great Britain

Attachment to Britain (%) …	Would worry if GB broke up	Britain should leave EU or reduce its powers	Number of immigrants should be reduced	Self-rated prejudice	One needs to have British ancestry to be truly British	*Base*
Very closely attached	60	55	75	29	57	*369*
Fairly closely	48	46	68	31	43	*526*
Not attached closely	31	39	75	32	37	*238*
All	48	47	71	30	47	*1133*

Source: BSA 2003, weighted data.

Table 13 suggests that, on the measures available in the BSA survey, strength of attachment is largely unrelated to overt xenophobia or self-rated prejudice. On the other hand, our measure does appear to be related to a desire to maintain the union and to resist the encroachment of the EU. In that sense, the measure of attachment to Britain does appear to be associated with a particular view of the nature of Britain as a nation, and with a sense of where the boundary lies, without being overtly xenophobic or racist. We also see that people who are closely attached to Britain are more likely to have an 'exclusive' sense of British identity and are likely to feel that British ancestry is necessary for being truly British. This is a key component of an 'ethnic' conception of the nation, to which we turn in Section 5 below.

We also checked the associations between attachment to Britain and a wide range of attitudes to social and political issues in the BSA. In general we found few and relatively small differences. While attachment to Britain is associated with distinctive attitudes towards European integration, it is not strongly associated with other major political divisions, such as those constituting the left-right spectrum. (This is consistent with other research that has been carried out. See Heath *et al*. (1999) and Bechhofer and McCrone (2008)). We did find that people who were strongly attached to Britain were notably proud of the welfare state, but strength of attachment was unrelated to attitudes towards more specific policy proposals or priorities. Again, this may be because (as with forms of civic participation), these attitudes derive from other more specific (and cross-cutting) interests and concerns.

In summary then, we have found a **positive association** between attachment or belonging to Britain and

- Some aspects of civic duty and behaviour, especially turnout in elections

- Feelings of political legitimacy, trust and support for existing political arrangements and support for the monarchy

- Support for maintaining the union between England, Wales and Scotland and opposition to further EU integration

- Support for prioritising the maintenance of social order rather than giving people more say in government decisions

- An 'ethnic' conception of the nation.

But we found **no,** or very modest, relationship with

- Volunteering or other forms of political participation

- Beliefs that the government should be responsible for providing for the sick, unemployed or the retired

- Attitudes towards 'left' or 'right' wing political positions (other than European integration)

- Racial prejudice or xenophobia.

It is not immediately obvious whether or not this is a ringing endorsement for the views of the political theorists such as Miller or Verba who have argued for the positive benefits of a sense of national identity as a source of civic duty or political legitimacy. But equally it is not a ringing endorsement of the views of critics who associate national identity with racism or xenophobia. The current situation in Britain is more complex.

In particular, we may need to take account of the specific historical construction of a British identity. While table 13 indicates that a strong attachment to a British identity is associated with support for maintaining the union and opposition to closer integration in Europe, this is not an inevitable feature of national identity per se but is likely to reflect the way in which British identity has been constructed and developed over time. In Scotland, for example, a Scottish national identity tends to be associated with rather favourable attitudes towards Europe and a preference for greater devolution or outright independence from Britain. But at the same time, a strong Scottish identity may still act as a form of 'social glue' holding the nation together, providing a source of civic duty and support for fellow-Scots. In short, there may be a variety of different forms of national identity, all of which may be able to serve the functions of promoting social cohesion. The crucial question therefore may not be whether or not to promote national identity but what form of national identity to promote.

5. Ethnic and civic conceptions of the nation

Now we turn to measure the strength of these two broad conceptions of the nation, ethnic and civic. What we find in Britain is that many people believe that both ethnic and civic characteristics are important for being truly British and assign the two different sets of criteria more or less equal priority. We can term this the 'both ethnic and civic' cluster. There is then a second somewhat smaller group who prioritise civic rather than ethnic features, and a third much smaller group who believe that neither ethnic nor civic features are important. (Only a tiny minority prioritize ethnic criteria at the expense of civic ones and we therefore have to exclude them from the analysis because of the small numbers involved).

The 'both ethnic and civic' group tends to exhibit a stronger sense of national pride and sense of attachment to Britain, although their sense of national pride is a somewhat backward-looking one emphasizing pride in Britain's history and military achievements. In contrast, the 'primarily civic' group tends to have somewhat lower sense of pride and primarily feel pride in Britain's welfare state and political institutions rather than its history. Finally the 'neither ethnic nor civic' group tends to have a rather low sense of attachment and pride generally. (For more details see Tilley *et al.* 2004).

Table 14 shows how these conceptions of the nation relate to some of the attitudes that we covered in the two previous tables. (Unfortunately we cannot look at the full range of attitudes covered in tables 12 and 13 because some were asked in a different version of the BSA questionnaire).

Table 14a Ethnic and civic conceptions of the nation in Great Britain

Conception of the nation (%)	Confidence in government: A great deal/ quite a lot	EU enlargement: Has gone too far	EU fears: Loss of power	Immigrants will become a threat to society	Too many immigrants in your country	*Base*
Both ethnic and civic important	42	44	64	53	72	*2398*

DR16 To what extent are on-going changes in national and supranational identities based on ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation, and what are the behavioural consequences of these different conceptions?

Conception of the nation (%)	Confidence in government: A great deal/ quite a lot	EU enlargement: Has gone too far	EU fears: Loss of power	Immigrants will become a threat to society	Too many immigrants in your country	Base
Ethnic more important than civic	37	43	54	49	64	507
Civic more important than ethnic	38	38	36	32	47	4156
Neither very important	31	31	35	30	46	2675
All	38	38	44	38	54	10102

Source: European Values Survey 2009[6].

Table 14b Ethnic and civic conceptions of the nation in Great Britain % agreeing that

Conception of the nation (%)	System of governing GB works well	Very important that the monarchy continues	Britain should leave EU or reduce its powers	Number of immigrants should be reduced	Citizenship should be given to people born in Britain	Base
Both ethnic and civic	36	66	53	85	51	425

[6] 'Ethnic' and 'Civic' are single items derived from the following questions: "To have [country's] ancestry" (Ethnic) and "To respect [country's] political institutions and laws" (Civic).

DR16 To what extent are on-going changes in national and supranational identities based on ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation, and what are the behavioural consequences of these different conceptions?

Conception of the nation (%)	System of governing GB works well	Very important that the monarchy continues	Britain should leave EU or reduce its powers	Number of immigrants should be reduced	Citizenship should be given to people born in Britain	*Base*
Civic rather than ethnic	40	50	47	58	76	*322*
Neither ethnic nor civic	38	41	36	66	68	*76*
All	38	58	49	72	62	*848*

Source: BSA 2003 self-completion supplement, weighted data.

Table 14a (showing data for 2009) confirms the earlier results from the 2003 data (Table 14b). Citizens with a civic and not ethnic conception of the nation (row 3 in the new table) are significantly less worried about the EU and about immigration than citizens with an ethnic conception (rows 1 and 2), i.e. ethnic conceptions go with fears of the EU and of immigrants (potential UKIP or BNP supporters). But they (civic not ethnic) are equally trusting of government, i.e. not anti-establishment. In summary, people with civic, not ethnic, conceptions are more inclusive; those with ethnic conceptions are more exclusionary. The civic are probably a growing group.

Table 14b (showing data for 2003) suggests that the primarily civic conception of the nation tends to be much more inclusive than are the other conceptions, tends to be at least as supportive of the current political system, is somewhat less opposed to EU integration, but is much less traditional with respect to the monarchy.

As before we need to recognize that some of these differences may reflect demographic differences between our three types of conception of the nation. For example, members of the 'civic rather than ethnic' group tend to be younger and better educated than the 'both ethnic and civic' group, and this may account for their lower level of support for the monarchy. However, after controlling for age, we find that the pattern of findings shown in Tables 14a and 14b are quite robust.

We can think therefore of the 'both ethnic and civic' group as having a 'thicker' but more backward-looking and exclusive sense of British identity whereas the 'civic rather than ethnic' group has a 'thinner' but also perhaps a more inclusive and forward-looking sense of British identity. This suggests, therefore, that it is not simply a matter of strengthening a sense of British identity and attachment to Britain but of deciding what sort of British identity we wish to encourage. This corresponds to the empirical results and discussion in Germany (see Wagner *et al.* (2012)). In this context it may be relevant that cross-national research indicates that countries which are more 'civic' in their conceptions (countries such as the Scandinavian ones)

also tend to exhibit higher levels of participation in voluntary organizations, higher proportions of their citizens who subscribe to the duty to vote, and higher levels of interpersonal trust. To be sure, we must not infer causal relationships from these patterns of association, and there are likely to be other factors such as level of economic development and modernization that account for these associations. Nonetheless, it is notable that Britain does not rank especially highly on measures of social trust, 'good citizenship' or on measures of a civic conception of the nation. (For the detailed rankings see Delhey and Newton 2005; Whiteley 2008; Tilley, Heath and Ford, 2008).

We must also note the literature that deals with the determinants of identification and of civic and ethnic concepts of the nation like education and contextual variables. The issue of education can be relevant as special efforts to improve the educational level of all immigrant groups especially the Caribbeans would be especially effective in terms of evidence-based policy. Using the ISSP 2003, Kunovich (2009) looks at the influence of contextual variables and education on determining identification. The article examines national identification from a comparative and multilevel perspective to analyze relationships between societies' economic, political, and cultural characteristics (e.g., development, globalization, democratic governance, militarism, and religious and linguistic diversity), individual characteristics (e.g., socioeconomic status and minority status), and preferences for the content of national identities. Kunovich also examines relationships between national identity content and public policy preferences toward immigration, citizenship, assimilation, and foreign policy. Results suggest that individual and country characteristics help account for the variable and contested nature of national identification. Moreover, the content of national identity categories has implications for public policy and intergroup relations.

Raijman *et al*. (2008) test the effects of national attachments (patriotism and chauvinism) on the willingness of citizens (in France, Germany, USA, and Israel) to allow citizenship rights to immigrants. The authors find that despite notable differences in countries' migration policies and conceptions of nationhood, there are no significant differences in attitudes towards the allocation of citizenship rights to immigrants. Concerning the relation between European, national, and sub-national identification, it is important to take into account the propositions and results of Opp's (2006) paper. Opp finds a positive correlation between the three identifications. Furthermore, European identification has positive effects on sub-national and national identifications, and sub-national identification has positive effects on national and European identification.

6. Conclusions and policy implications

Our results show that the effects of national identity are complex. In many ways our results are reassuring ones. The majority of people in Britain accept a British identity, feel proud of Britain and feel strongly attached to Britain. While there appears to have been some decline in attachment to Britain (especially in Northern Ireland) over time, the rate of change is rather slow. The great majority of the population continues to subscribe to one of the four national identities of Great Britain and most have 'dual' identities, but there does seem to be some conflict between having national and regional identities.

 On the one hand, attachment or belonging to Britain also appears to fulfil some of the functions suggested by political theorists, such as acceptance of civic obligations (e.g. turnout in elections), and feelings of political legitimacy, trust and support for existing political arrangements and support for the monarchy. Nor is attachment or belonging to Britain associated with marked racism or xenophobia (although it is associated with some degree of resistance to EU integration). It is also associated with citizen support for social order and with an ethnic conception of the nation. And there doesn't seem to be much of a relationship between attachment to Britain and volunteering or other forms of political participation, beliefs of government responsibility for providing for the vulnerable in society, political attitudes, and racial prejudice or xenophobia.

On the other hand, there is a minority, perhaps a growing minority, who do not feel strongly attached to Britain. Lack of attachment is especially marked among younger people, specifically those aged 16-34, among young people born overseas, and among young people of Caribbean heritage, and among the economically marginalized. We must not exaggerate the magnitude of the differences, but it may be a cause for concern that a third or more of young people of Caribbean heritage born in Britain do not feel closely attached to the country.

It is also perhaps disturbing that the predominant conception of national identity in Britain today is one that emphasizes ethnic as well as civic criteria. While such 'ethnic and civic' conceptions are associated with stronger feelings of national pride, they also tend to be rather exclusive and backward-looking.

Policy recommendations require a firm evidence base not only establishing the descriptive patterns but also establishing the causal mechanisms involved. For example, if the causal processes involved in the association between age and strength of belonging are essentially life-cycle ones, any problem will tend to correct itself of its own accord and policy interventions may not be needed. On the other hand, if the generational interpretation is correct (which we think it is), and if young people feel a lack of belonging because they feel socially excluded, then policies to increase social inclusion may be required.

However, we can suggest some possible causal mechanisms, and their possible policy implications, which might in theory lie behind the findings that we have reported.

Lack of attachment on the part of people born overseas in non-Commonwealth countries could well be due to recent arrival, lack of citizenship and/or no desire to remain long-term in Britain,

or to lack of fluency in the English language (which might tend to exclude people from many aspects of British life). Provision of language teaching meets a number of other objectives (such as economic integration) and might be regarded as a sensible policy to implement.

It is important not to focus solely on the situation of recent migrants but to have regard for that of second-generation ethnic minorities, many of whom suffer substantial 'ethnic penalties' in the labour market (see for example Heath and Cheung 2007). French experience and research (and indeed the Northern Ireland experience) suggests that, when ethnic minorities believe that they are denied the equality of opportunity that a liberal state professes, disillusionment and resentment may follow with implications for social order. Such resentment may well be even stronger in the second (and later) generations than among the migrants themselves (who may have frames of reference oriented more to their countries of origins). Policies such as those in the recent report of the Business Commission on Race Equality in the Workplace would seem to provide a good starting point (NEP 2007). We suspect, however, that the distinctively low sense of belonging on the part of second-generation Black Caribbean youth may also be connected to their experience of policing and the criminal justice system.

While the impact of socio-economic marginalization on a sense of belonging is not especially large, we should perhaps be concerned at Britain's gradual move towards an 'hour glass' social structure with an increasing proportion of poorly-qualified people on the margins of the economy alongside growing affluence among the well-qualified in secure employment. While British research has cast serious doubt on the applicability of American concepts such as the underclass, the development of the 'hour glass' economy may also pose threats to Britain's sense of cohesion. Policies aimed at increasing the skills and opportunities of marginalized individuals surely need to be developed. These should perhaps focus on lifelong learning on the Danish model as well as on improvements in the provisions for younger people.

As well as policies geared directly towards encouraging a sense of British identity, therefore, we recommend consideration of policies which might be thought of as being indirect ones, but geared to some of the root social and economic causes of low attachment. With regards to policy implications one would need to install groups of social science specialists to develop intervention studies for the most relevant target groups like Caribbeans to develop policy measures and systematically test their effects on ethnic and civic conceptions of the nation, identification, prejudice, civic participation and protest behaviour. This would be the basis of "evidence-based policy" and could be done in connection with the Campbell Collaboration, which is performing the same function for the social sciences as the Cochrane Collaboration for evidence based medicine.

Finally, it is important to consider what conception of British identity one wishes to promote. The predominant form in Britain at present is a somewhat backward-looking conception with strong 'ethnic' and exclusive aspects. While this is undoubtedly associated with national pride, it may not be the best basis for a modern diverse society. The experience of, for example, the Scandinavian countries suggests that the development of a more civic conception of the nation can be associated with (even if it may not directly cause) many of the civic benefits (such as social trust and sense of civic duty) that normative political theorists espouse.

Future research on this topic should explore a few points, which we due to the brevity of this paper could not. Firstly, we acknowledge that for analysing true individual change and issues of

causality one would need panel data and not only repeated cross sections. An example of such an analysis is that of Reinecke *et al.* (2005), which tests the change of identification and its relation with the intention to leave the country of different ethnic minorities in Germany using the SOEP data-set and employing cross-lagged panel models and stochastic differential equations. Secondly, it would be important to discuss the behavioural consequences of national and supranational identities, as Opp (2012) has done showing how collective identity, rationality, and political action are connected. This is especially relevant because of the past riots of young immigrants in France and England. A final point is the issue of equivalence of meaning of the items over time. As only single indicators are used to measure civic and ethnic concepts of the nation and also identification, no strict test of equality of meaning over time and subgroups can be performed. This is a generally neglected problem (see Billiet *et al.* (2003) and Zick *et al.* (2008)). By using multiple indicators one could cope with this problem in the future. And thirdly, it would be necessary to have higher sample sizes for the ethnic minorities to have more reliable information. One solution for this problem could be to install a module on national identification in the Understanding Society (formerly British Household Panel) study, which should contain also sufficient sub-samples for ethnic minorities and use also a mixed method approach with a connected sample of 30 to 40 qualitative interviews to get additional information on the topic of identification.

Appendices

Appendix 1 The HOCS and BSA surveys

The 2003 **Citizenship Survey** was conducted by the Office for National Statistics on behalf of the Home Office, while the 2005 Citizenship Survey was conducted by the National Centre for Social Research on behalf of the Department for Communities and Local Government.

The Citizenship survey is designed to yield a core, nationally-representative sample of adults aged 16 or over resident in England and Wales together with an ethnic minority boost sample. The sampling frame for the survey is the Postcode Address File (PAF). The sampling method involves a multi-stage stratified random design. The ethnic minority boost sample is achieved through direct screening and focused enumeration.

The survey is conducted face to face by computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI). The overall response rate for the 2003 core sample was 64%, yielding 9486 productive interviews. The response rate for the ethnic boost sample was somewhat lower and yielded 4571 respondents. For technical details of the 2003 survey see www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/citizenshipsurvey.html. The response rate for the 2005 core sample was 65% yielding 9691 productive interviews.

The **British Social Attitudes** (BSA) survey is designed and conducted by the National Centre for Social Research. It receives core funding from the Gatsby Charitable Foundation (one of the Sainsbury Family Charitable Trusts) and a range of other funders including government departments and the ESRC.

The BSA survey is designed to yield a representative sample of adults aged 18 or over resident in Great Britain south of the Caledonian canal. The sampling frame for the survey is the Postcode Address File (PAF), a list of addresses (or postal delivery points) compiled by the Post Office. For practical reasons the sample is confined to those living in private households. People living in institutions are excluded. The sampling method involves a multi-stage, stratified random design. (Full details of the sampling methods are given in the technical reports published in the Annual Reports of the BSA. See for example Park *et al*, 2008).

The survey is conducted face to face by computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI). The overall response rate for the 2003 survey was 59%, yielding 4432 productive interviews. The survey was divided into four different (randomized) versions and some of the questions that we use were not present in all versions. There was also a self-completion supplement, in which the questions on ethnic and civic conceptions of national identity were included, and this supplement has a lower response rate.

Appendix 2 Belonging to Local Area/Borough, Neighbourhood, and Europe

Table 7b Belonging to Local Area/Borough: variations by age and gender groups in England

2003	**Belong very strongly**	**Belong fairly strongly**	**Do not belong strongly**	*Base*
%				
16-24	14	41	45	*1214*
25-34	17	37	46	*1519*
35-44	18	41	41	*1716*
45-54	20	42	38	*1434*
55-64	25	40	35	*1226*
65-74	30	41	30	*905*
75-84	32	38	30	*686*
85+	32	41	27	*133*
All	21	40	39	*8833*
Male	20	39	41	*4359*
Female	22	41	37	*4472*
All	21	40	39	*8831*

Source: HOCS 2003, weighted by 'core' weight, wtcinds; respondents in England only.

DR16 To what extent are on-going changes in national and supranational identities based on ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation, and what are the behavioural consequences of these different conceptions?

2005	Belong very strongly	Belong fairly strongly	Do not belong strongly	Base
%				
16-24	17	45	37	1276
25-34	17	42	41	1500
35-44	18	41	40	1719
45-54	19	41	41	1415
55-64	23	43	35	1284
65-74	25	39	36	933
75-84	27	41	32	675
85+	32	39	29	169
All	20	42	38	8971
Male	20	41	39	4374
Female	21	43	36	4604
All	20	42	38	8978

Source: HOCS 2005, weighted by 'core' weight, wtcinds; respondents in England only.

2007	Belong very strongly	Belong fairly strongly	Do not belong strongly	Base
%				
16-24	20	51	29	1233
25-34	19	44	37	1456
35-44	21	47	33	1706

DR16 To what extent are on-going changes in national and supranational identities based on ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation, and what are the behavioural consequences of these different conceptions?

2007	Belong very strongly	Belong fairly strongly	Do not belong strongly	Base
45-54	25	49	27	1393
55-64	31	44	25	1280
65-74	41	40	20	905
75-84	42	40	17	600
85+	38	35	27	171
All	26	45	28	8744
Male	25	46	29	4274
Female	28	45	27	4474
All	26	45	28	8748

Source: HOCS 2007, weighted by 'core' weight, wtcinds; respondents in England only.

2009	Belong very strongly	Belong fairly strongly	Do not belong strongly	Base
16-24	23	47	30	1277
25-34	19	47	33	1440
35-44	23	46	31	1667
45-54	28	45	28	1401
55-64	32	44	25	1275
65-74	38	41	21	888
75-84	43	40	18	651
85+	44	34	22	173

DR16 To what extent are on-going changes in national and supranational identities based on ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation, and what are the behavioural consequences of these different conceptions?

2009	Belong very strongly	Belong fairly strongly	Do not belong strongly	Base
Male	27	44	30	4299
Female	28	46	26	4473
All	28	45	28	8772

Source: HOCS 2009, weighted by 'core' weight, wtcinds; respondents in England only.

2010	Belong very strongly	Belong fairly strongly	Do not belong strongly	Base
%				
16-24	25	48	27	1304
25-34	26	43	31	1408
35-44	28	45	27	1601
45-54	33	43	25	1423
55-64	35	44	21	1264
65-74	46	39	15	898
75-84	48	37	15	649
85+	48	36	16	188
All	33	43	24	8735
Male	31	44	25	4278
Female	34	43	23	4461
All	33	43	24	8739

Source: HOCS 2010, weighted by 'core' weight, wtcinds; respondents in England only.

Table 7c Belonging to Neighbourhood: variations by age and gender groups in England

2003	Belong very strongly	Belong fairly strongly	Do not belong strongly	Base
%				
16-24	17	41	41	1229
25-34	16	44	40	1514
35-44	25	45	31	1719
45-54	25	48	27	1440
55-64	36	42	22	1229
65-74	42	38	20	912
75-84	45	38	17	692
85+	40	37	23	140
All	27	43	30	8875
Male	25	43	32	4372
Female	30	43	27	4504
All	27	43	30	8876

Source: HOCS 2003, weighted by 'core' weight wtcinds; respondents in England only.

2005	Belong very strongly	Belong fairly strongly	Do not belong strongly	Base

DR16 To what extent are on-going changes in national and supranational identities based on ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation, and what are the behavioural consequences of these different conceptions?

2005	Belong very strongly	Belong fairly strongly	Do not belong strongly	Base
%				
16-24	22	45	33	1309
25-34	19	45	37	1517
35-44	26	47	27	1734
45-54	31	44	24	1429
55-64	40	41	20	1290
65-74	46	38	16	946
75-84	48	35	17	680
85+	49	34	17	180
All	31	43	26	9085
Male	29	43	29	4421
Female	33	43	24	4666
All	32	43	26	9087

Source: HOCS 2005, weighted by 'core' weight wtcinds; respondents in England only.

2007	Belong very strongly	Belong fairly strongly	Do not belong strongly	Base
%				
16-24	24	41	35	1223
25-34	24	43	34	1454

DR16 To what extent are on-going changes in national and supranational identities based on ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation, and what are the behavioural consequences of these different conceptions?

2007	Belong very strongly	Belong fairly strongly	Do not belong strongly	Base
35-44	27	47	27	1704
45-54	32	45	23	1401
55-64	40	40	20	1281
65-74	52	34	14	911
75-84	56	32	11	601
85+	52	30	18	170
All	34	41	25	8745
Male	32	42	27	4272
Female	36	41	23	4473
All	34	41	25	8745

Source: HOCS 2007, weighted by 'core' weight wtcinds; respondents in England only.

2009	Belong very strongly	Belong fairly strongly	Do not belong strongly	Base
%				
16-24	25	45	30	1281
25-34	24	44	32	1440
35-44	33	41	26	1663
45-54	38	42	21	1399
55-64	45	38	17	1277
65-74	51	37	12	887

DR16 To what extent are on-going changes in national and supranational identities based on ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation, and what are the behavioural consequences of these different conceptions?

2009	Belong very strongly	Belong fairly strongly	Do not belong strongly	Base
75-84	56	31	12	654
85+	59	27	14	175
All	37	40	23	8776
Male	35	41	24	4298
Female	39	39	22	4477
All	37	40	23	8775

Source: HOCS 2009, weighted by 'core' weight, wtcinds; respondents in England only.

2010	Belong very strongly	Belong fairly strongly	Do not belong strongly	Base
%				
16-24	25	43	32	1303
25-34	27	41	33	1402
35-44	30	44	26	1604
45-54	36	42	22	1421
55-64	43	39	17	1266
65-74	48	38	13	899
75-84	54	33	13	649
85+	55	31	14	186
All	36	41	23	8730

DR16 To what extent are on-going changes in national and supranational identities based on ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation, and what are the behavioural consequences of these different conceptions?

2010	Belong very strongly	Belong fairly strongly	Do not belong strongly	Base
Male	33	43	24	4264
Female	38	38	24	4468
All	36	41	23	8732

Source: HOCS 2010, weighted by 'core' weight, wtcinds; respondents in England only.

Table 7d Attachment to Europe (of respondents in Great Britain)

2003	Very attached	Fairly attached	Not very/ not at all attached	Base
%				
15-24	9	39	51	137
25-34	8	35	58	182
35-44	8	35	57	205
45-54	7	40	53	157
55-64	4	33	62	136
65+	6	31	63	208
All	7	35	58	1025

Source: Eurobarometer 60.1.Weighted data.

DR16 To what extent are on-going changes in national and supranational identities based on ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation, and what are the behavioural consequences of these different conceptions?

2005	Very attached	Fairly attached	Not very/ not at all attached	Base
%				
15-24	10	38	52	109
25-34	7	43	51	162
35-44	9	45	46	171
45-54	17	35	48	134
55-64	12	36	52	149
65+	11	37	53	283
All	11	39	50	1008

Source: Eurobarometer 63.4.Weighted data.

2007	Very attached	Fairly attached	Not very/ not at all attached	Base
%				
15-24	7	33	60	120
25-34	7	29	63	124
35-44	5	35	60	155
45-54	6	27	66	113
55-64	6	33	61	150
65+	5	27	68	309

DR16 To what extent are on-going changes in national and supranational identities based on ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation, and what are the behavioural consequences of these different conceptions?

2007	Very attached	Fairly attached	Not very/ not at all attached	Base
All	6	30	64	971

Source: Eurobarometer 67.2.Weighted data.

Appendix 3 Belonging to Britain for Black Carribeans: variations by Gender and Education

Table 8a Belonging to Britain for Black Carribeans: variation by gender

2010	Very/Fairly attached	Not very attached	Not at all attached	Base
%				
Male	88	11	2	66
Female	84	13	3	88
All	86	12	3	154

Source: HOCS 2010, weighted by the 'full' weight, wtfinds, which does not down-weight ethnic minorities to their population proportions; respondents in Great Britain.

Table 8b Belonging to Britain for Black Carribeans: variation by education

2010	Very/Fairly attached	Not very attached	Not at all attached	Base
%				
Degree or equiv.	74	19	7	27
Higher educ below degree level	83	17	0	18
A-Level or equiv.	83	13	4	24
GCSE A-C or equiv.	84	12	4	25
GCSE D-E or equiv.	100	0	0	10

DR16 To what extent are on-going changes in national and supranational identities based on ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation, and what are the behavioural consequences of these different conceptions?

2010	Very/Fairly attached	Not very attached	Not at all attached	Base
Foreign and other quals.	100	0	0	5
No qualifications	91	9	0	22
All	85	12	3	131

Source: HOCS 2010, weighted by the 'full' weight, wtfinds, which does not down-weight ethnic minorities to their population proportions; respondents in Great Britain.

DR16 To what extent are on-going changes in national and supranational identities based on ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation, and what are the behavioural consequences of these different conceptions?

Appendix 4 Ethnic identities

Table A1 Ethnic and British identities

%	Indian	Pakistani	Black Caribbean	Black African
[Ethnic group] not British	6 (9)	8	6 (3)	22
More [ethnic group]	17 (18)	7	19 (31)	28
Equally	55 (48)	57	61 (56)	38
More British	19 (18)	16	6 (3)	2
British not [ethnic group]	1 (4)	10	1 (0)	2
Other answers, none, DK	1 (4)	2	6 (7)	9
Base	*228 (56)*	*122*	*142 (61)*	*101*

Source: British Election Study 1997, ethnic minority sample. Figures in brackets are for respondents born in Britain. There were too few Pakistanis and Black Africans born in Britain for the figures to be reliable and they are therefore not reported.

Appendix 5 Regression analysis of 'belonging to Britain'

Table A2 Binary logistic regression of 'belonging to Britain' (belong fairly or very strongly vs do not belong strongly)

	Weighted	Un-weighted	Respondents aged 16-24
constant	2.05 (.25)	2.09 (.21)	1.58 (.69)
Male (reference female)	-0.06 (.06)	-0.07 (.06)	-0.11 (.15)
Age group (ref 65-69)			
16-19	**-0.46 (.22)**	**-0.46 (.19)**	
20-24	**-0.57 (.20)**	**-0.71 (.17)**	
25-34	**-0.71 (.18)**	**-0.65 (.15)**	
35-49	**-0.57 (.16)**	**-0.51 (.14)**	
50-64	-0.31 (.16)	-0.20 (.14)	
Ethnicity (ref white)			
Indian	0.15 (.27)	**0.56 (.15)**	0.26 (.39)
Pakistani/Bangladeshi	0.53 (.37)	**0.69 (.19)**	0.17 (.41)
Black Caribbean/Black Other	-0.17 (.27)	-0.20 (.11)	**-0.98 (.28)**
Black African	-0.01 (.31)	0.02 (.13)	0.18 (.34)
Mixed and other	-0.03 (.16)	0.06 (.10)	-0.02 (.24)
Religion (ref Christian)			
Muslim	-0.24 (.25)	-0.00 (.14)	-0.09 (.32)

	Weighted	Un-weighted	Respondents aged 16-24
Other religion	-0.28 (.16)	-0.18 (.11)	-0.27 (.36)
None	**-0.22 (.08)**	**-0.20 (.08)**	-0.22 (.19)
Place of birth (ref UK)			
Commonwealth	**0.65 (.22)**	0.17 (.10)	-0.20 (.27)
Elsewhere	**-0.33 (.12)**	**-0.22 (.09)**	**-0.73 (.25)**
Occupational class (ref salariat)			
Intermediate	-0.12 (.09)	-0.06 (.08)	**-0.73 (.29)**
Routine and semi-routine	-0.14 (.10)	-0.13 (.08)	-0.44 (.30)
Never had a job	-0.28 (.16)	-0.28 (.12)	-0.36 (.39)
Employment (ref in work)			
Unemployed (ILO definition)	-0.14 (.10)	**-0.20 (.08)**	-0.17 (.29)
Inactive	0.20 (.20)	0.01 (.15)	0.40 (.35)
Highest qualification (ref degree)			
Other qualifications	0.09 (.09)	**0.15 (.07)**	**0.56 (.23)**
Foreign qualifications	-0.04 (.22)	0.04 (.15)	-0.21 (.48)
No qualifications	-0.03 (.12)	0.09 (.09)	**0.75 (.30)**
Marital status (ref married)			
Never married	0.10 (.09)	0.03 (.08)	-0.11 (.33)

	Weighted	Un-weighted	Respondents aged 16-24
Widowed, divorced, separated	-0.06 (.10)	-0.05 (.08)	-0.70 (.65)
Housing tenure (ref owner)			
Renting	0.09 (.09)	-0.05 (.07)	0.23 (.18)
Other tenure	**-0.51 (.23)**	-0.13 (.20)	-0.43 (.40)
Limiting long-term illness (ref no illness)	**-0.19 (.09)**	-0.12 (.08)	-0.14 (.32)
Without motor transport (ref with)	0.17 (.10)	**0.15 (.07)**	0.09 (.18)
Family income (quintiles)	**0.09 (.03)**	**0.07 (.03)**	0.17 (.09)
Family income missing	-0.17 (.12)	-0.15 (.10)	**-0.69 (.30)**
Model improvement (df)	118.5 (32)	219.6 (32)	58.2 (27)
Base	*7608*	*11487*	*1339*

Source: HOCS 2005, respondents in England aged less than 70.

Note: figures emboldened are significant at the .05 level.

In column 1 of table A1 we report the results of a logistic regression in which strength of belonging (coded as a binary variable distinguishing stronger from a weaker sense of belonging) is regressed on the social characteristics covered in tables 7 to 9. We exclude the neighbourhood deprivation variable because of the large amount of missing data and the fact that, when included, it is not significant. We also limit the analysis to those aged less than 70 because education data were not collected on older respondents.

In a second analysis (shown in column 2) we re-ran the model but with unweighted data. The weighting to a large extent acts to down-weight the ethnic minority respondents, who were over-sampled, and thus gives appropriate population estimates. However, when controlling for ethnicity in the regression, it could be argued that weighting is unnecessary and that we should

take advantage of the greater precision afforded by the ethnic minority oversample. As we can see, results for the unweighted analysis are broadly similar to the weighted ones, although the parameter estimate for commonwealth birth is sharply reduced while those for the Indian and Pakistani/Bangladeshi groups are increased and become significant.

The results of these first two analyses reported in Table A2 broadly confirm the picture from the cross-tabulations: the major driver of a lack of belonging is age (younger people being less likely to feel that they belong), birth overseas in a non-commonwealth country, and socio-economic marginality (lower income, limiting long-term illness, other tenure). (There are some differences of detail between the weighted and unweighted analyses, but the overall picture emphasizing the role of age-group, overseas birth and socio-economic marginality remain in both analyses).

In the third analysis we restrict the data to respondents aged 16-24. The major new findings here are the lack of belonging on the part of Black Caribbean (combined with Black Other) young people, the increased magnitude of the negative effects of overseas non-Commonwealth birth, and the negative effect of lack of qualifications.

Appendix 6 Analysing the association of age and attachment

The standard way in which scholars have attempted to decide whether associations with age represent life-cycle or generational change is to track a given generation (defined as a birth cohort) across time in order to see whether the relevant characteristic, in our case attachment or belonging to Britain, remains constant (which is what would be expected under a generational interpretation) or changes as people grow older (the life cycle interpretation). Ideally one would use a panel study in which the same individuals were re-interviewed as they grow older, but this is rarely available (and is not available for the measurement of belonging to Britain). Instead therefore we have to use the method of 'synthetic cohorts' in which we use repeated cross-section surveys to trace the experience of samples from a particular birth cohort as they age. Note that in this case we do not measure the same individuals but only samples of the same birth cohort.

One problem with this method is that there may be differential attrition as individuals die, emigrate or are not present in the samples for other reasons. A second problem is the 'identification problem'. That is to say, we cannot independently estimate the effects of age (i.e. life cycle), cohort (i.e. generation) and period. Once we know the values for two of these variables, we can logically derive the third. Thus if we know the period and age of a respondent, we can immediately calculate his or her birth year.

There have been many attempts to solve this identification problem, but ultimately they all depend on importing some additional assumptions into the analysis. What we can do, however, is to analyse the data and judge which interpretation is most plausible (while recognizing that other interpretations may be logically possible though less plausible). Table A2 shows the relevant data taken from the Eurobarometer. (These are the same surveys as used in Table 5 above.) We score strength of attachment as follows: very attached=4, fairly attached=3, not very attached=2, not at all attached / DK=1.

Table A3 'Attached to country' scores by year or survey and birth cohort

Birth cohort	1991	1995	1999	2000	2002	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	All
1910-	3.73	3.82	3.90	3.81								3.82
1920-	3.75	3.60	3.71	3.72	3.62							3.68
1930-	3.70	3.57	3.66	3.48	3.51	3.69	3.36	3.77	3.57	3.64	3.57	3.59
1940-	3.46	3.50	3.51	3.47	3.48	3.47	3.51	3.68	3.57	3.46	3.42	3.50
1950-	3.31	3.32	3.48	3.33	3.40	3.26	3.23	3.50	3.40	3.39	3.39	3.36
1960-	3.28	3.19	3.37	3.25	3.36	3.16	3.29	3.40	3.25	3.39	3.22	3.29
1970-	3.10	3.14	3.24	3.20	3.10	3.17	3.22	3.22	3.28	3.38	3.28	3.21
1980-			3.20	3.17	3.10	3.20	3.25	3.16	2.91	3.17	3.13	3.14
1990-99											3.31	3.31
All	3.45	3.37	3.46	3.36	3.33	3.30	3.30	3.42	3.31	3.39	3.32	

Source: Eurobarometer

What Table A2 clearly suggests is that levels of attachment remain constant across the life cycle for nearly all birth cohorts. While there is considerable variability (reflecting sampling variation and measurement error) from year to year, we can see that, for example, the mean scores of the1930-39 birth cohort remain around their average level of 3.59 in all periods. There is no apparent trend towards greater attachment as this birth cohort ages. The same applies to the 1940-49, 1950-59 and 1960-69 birth cohorts.

However, there are some suggestions that members of the 1970-79 birth cohort do increase their scores slightly. Their scores begin at 3.10 in 1991 – rather below their overall average – and then rise to 3.28 in 2007 – rather above their overall average. However, we do not see this rising trend in the 1980-89 birth cohort. We should not therefore completely discount a life-cycle interpretation, but the major process does appear to be a generational one with earlier birth cohorts showing greater strength of attachment than more recent cohorts, and with strength of attachment remaining fairly constant through middle and older ages.

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