CabinetOffice

The National Security Strategy of the
United Kingdom: Update 2009

Security for the
Next Generation

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Foreword by the Prime Minister

The National Security Strategy provides a comprehensive basis for planning and delivering the most important responsibility of Government – protecting our country and our people.

The United Kingdom no longer faces the sort of fundamental threat to our way of life posed by both the Soviet Union and fascism at different times in the last century. As an outward facing nation, we are well placed to take advantage of the opportunities of the new global age.

But recent events have brought home to us how, in this global age, instability anywhere in the world can affect our interests and ultimately our security more quickly and in more fundamental ways than ever before. So we need global responses to global problems – whether we are facing up to the challenge of a global banking crisis, international terrorism, or pandemics. The United Kingdom has been at the forefront of developing these global responses, including at the London Summit in April where decisive British leadership helped stabilise the world economy and frame a new set of global rules for the new age.

We also need a strong national basis for our security and prosperity, linking our action in the international sphere to our action at home. Last March, we set out, for the first time, a National Security Strategy for the United Kingdom, bringing together the many important strands of work which Government, its agencies, our world class Armed Forces and many others carry out to keep us safe and protect our vital interests. I believe this was an important improvement, but I recognised then that it was a first step in the process rather than the last word. Therefore we committed to updating the strategy this year.

This update sets out:

- what we have achieved in the past year;

- how we have continued to strengthen our approach;

- our assessment of the challenges ahead; and

- our response to those challenges – from terrorism and instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan, to nuclear security, to energy security and climate change, to pandemics, to failing states and the challenges of strengthening global security through development.

This report describes what the United Kingdom is doing across the full range of national security risks. It contains a series of detailed proposals for international reform, together with realistic plans to deliver them. It shows how our approach to national security is internationalist, not isolationist; active, not passive; and agile and flexible.

Our approach means we are responsive to new challenges like cyber security. Seizing the benefits of new technology is vital for our national prosperity. But hostile states, terrorists, and criminals can all potentially use cyber space to undermine our interests. This could be at the national level – for example through attacks on our essential infrastructure. But

security threats in cyber space also threaten the interests of businesses and individuals. In the past, Governments thought about national security as being about protecting the state and its interests. This remains important, but the nature of the risks we face in today's world means our approach to national security must be focused just as much on protecting individual citizens and businesses. So today, alongside this strategy update, we are publishing the United Kingdom's first national strategy for cyber security, to help people make the most of the benefits of Digital Britain in a safe and secure way.

Our National Security Strategy – and the hard, often dangerous work our dedicated Armed Forces and others do in putting it into practice – is grounded in core British values of fair play, human rights, openness, individual liberty, accountable Government and the rule of law, because we cannot protect our country and our way of life unless we do so in a way that clearly exemplifies and protects those values.

The Right Honourable Gordon Brown MP

Executive Summary

The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom

1. Providing security for the nation, safeguarding our citizens and our way of life, remains the most important responsibility of government.

2. Fulfilling this responsibility requires a strategic and comprehensive approach. That is the purpose of the National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom, published for the first time last year, under the title *Security in an Interdependent World*. At that time, the Government recognised that the fast changing nature of the security challenges we faced required an ongoing evolution and adaptation of our approach, as well as a dynamic and hard-headed assessment of the strategic threats faced by the UK. For these reasons, as well as to provide a progress report on the national security commitments already made, the Government committed to presenting regular updates of the Strategy to Parliament and the public. This paper, *Security for the Next Generation*, is the first such update.

The strategic context

3. In the modern era, governments must adapt their approach to national security to reflect the way in which our understanding of it has changed. There have been rapid and profound changes to the international landscape, including the security landscape, since the end of the Cold War. Much of this has been positive. The UK no longer faces an existential threat from a hostile, state-backed ideology with the capacity to destroy our way of life.

4. No state directly threatens the UK at present. Nor is there any sustained global challenge to the liberal, market-oriented vision of a free society championed by the UK and our key allies. Over the past two decades, the opening up of world markets and the technological advances in communications have delivered significant benefits to the UK with wider choices of goods and services, considerable increases in capital flows and trade opportunities, and internationally, increased productivity and millions lifted out of poverty.

5. But this increasingly complex and unpredictable international landscape has also provoked new security challenges. These challenges have transformed our way of understanding national security, away from the traditional focus of threats to the state and its interests from other states. These are still important. But over the past twenty years, the focus has shifted to a diverse but interconnected set of threats and risks to the UK and our citizens, both directly and through wider international instability. These include international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, conflicts and failed states, pandemics and trans-national crime. The scope of the National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom therefore reflects the broader demands of the global age.

6. Over the past year, the banking crisis and the ensuing synchronised global economic downturn has shaken confidence in the rapid process of globalisation and increasing interdependence seen over the past twenty years. Economic downturns inevitably lead to a cyclical slowdown in cross-border economic activities such as trade and foreign direct investment. But the magnitude of the current crisis and its rapid transmission across borders raises the risk that there will be a change in attitudes towards globalisation, and a less permissive environment may result going forwards. Regrettably, protectionist measures have already been taken in some countries. The Government firmly believes

that open international markets for products and services will maximise welfare for all countries. We are working with our partners to mitigate the risks to globalisation in forums such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the European Union (EU), and the Group of Twenty (G20) Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors.

7. The truly global nature of the crisis has emphasised the integration and interdependence of all countries into the world economy. This has demonstrated the need for policy responses coordinated across a wide range of countries. The prominent role the G20, made up of both advanced and emerging economies, has played is a direct consequence of this.

8. Prosperity and financial stability are critical for security and so we have undertaken in-depth analysis to better understand the potential implications of the economic downturn for our national security. Our conclusion is that the crisis has not fundamentally altered our assessment of key security threats. That is not to say that it has had no impact. The downturn has increased the risk that fragile states and regions become more fragile, and the risk that poverty acts as a driver of insecurity at a global level. And whilst there has been welcome progress, including at the London Summit, it is important that we continue to commit to addressing global risks arising from climate change and other drivers. We must also take decisive action to make sure that the multilateral commitment necessary to tackle these security challenges does not falter as countries seek to recover from the downturn. Most importantly, the economic downturn has provided new impetus for vital reform of the international rules-based system, and the Government is committed to leading this crucial process.

9. The threat from international terrorism to the UK and our interests overseas remains severe, and although significant progress has been made in weakening the capability of international terrorist networks, continuing serious terrorist attacks across the globe show the ongoing potency of this threat. There also remains a threat to the UK from small, dissident Irish republican groups opposed to the political settlement endorsed by the people of Northern Ireland.

10. South Asia continues to be a region of crucial security concern to the UK. Of the six major sources of threat identified in this strategy, Afghanistan and Pakistan are relevant to at least four: terrorism, conflict, trans-national crime and, because Pakistan is a nuclear state, weapons of mass destruction. The stability of Pakistan and Afghanistan are interlinked. The past year has seen a significant shift in the patterns of instability in the region. The Taliban insurgency in Pakistan has reached new levels of intensity and violence, with a sharp increase in attacks beyond the border region. Equally significant has been the response of the Government of Pakistan, which has engaged in major military operations against the Taliban. Although these have weakened the Taliban, the consequential internal displacement of millions of ordinary Pakistanis is a multifaceted security concern in itself. The UK has committed £22 million to the provision of humanitarian aid in response.

11. It has become increasingly clear that a regional approach is necessary if the international community is to find enduring solutions to the difficulties of both Afghanistan and Pakistan; this is reflected in both the UK's joint policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan (published in April)[1] and the approach being adopted by the United States.

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1   HM Government (April 2009) *UK Policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan: The way forward*
     http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/reports/afghanistan_pakistan.aspx

12. The international community has also needed to work together to tackle threats as diverse as the attempts by North Korea and Iran to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities, and to combat a potentially very serious outbreak of pandemic 'flu.

13. Across many of these challenges there has been a welcome impetus from the new United States Administration. The United States continues to provide the largest share of the NATO led presence to stabilise Afghanistan, and committed additional troops to the country in February 2009. The new Administration has worked hard to build strong alliances with partners across the globe and use its position as the sole world superpower constructively. This 'smart power' concept has seen a fresh commitment to the global international framework, human rights, in taking a strong stand against torture, and the importance of international development for both global prosperity and stability. The United States has made a fresh attempt to make vital progress in the Middle East, and has provided new leadership on climate change, working with the UK and other partners.

14. The UK will continue to take a leading approach in multilateral responses to key issues, building on the success of the G20 Presidency and our ongoing central role in driving international progress on climate change.

National Security – The Government's approach

15. The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom is designed to meet the challenges posed by this strategic context. It includes:

- **Our vision** of national security: our vision is to protect the UK and its interests in order to enable its people to go about their lives freely and with confidence.

- **Our guiding principles:** the UK's approach to national security is rooted in our core values. These include human rights, the rule of law, legitimate and accountable government, justice, freedom, tolerance and opportunity for all. We will be hard-headed about the risks, our aims and capabilities, and will work with partners at home and abroad wherever possible.

- **Our strategic framework:** our comprehensive, strategic approach means:

  – we will tackle national security challenges at source by identifying **why** there are challenges to national security – the *drivers* – and what we can do to mitigate these;

  – we will also tackle **who** or **what** is threatening UK interests and citizens – the *threat actors* – and frame the policy response appropriately;

  – we will ensure we have the capabilities to tackle security threats no matter **how** they arise – the various *means* or *domains* in which threats can manifest themselves. These go beyond the traditional military domains of land, sea and air, to include weapons of mass destruction, and the increasing importance of cyberspace; and

  – our response will draw on a wide range of better integrated **capabilities** – including our Armed Forces, law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies, diplomatic capabilities, and international development activity.

- **Our position in the world and our interests:** the UK is an open, pluralist democracy based on the rule of law. It is historically internationalist in outlook and is a hub for global activities. We are

a key part of critical alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the EU, as well as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. International security cannot therefore be separated from domestic security and the UK has genuinely worldwide interests. All of these have implications for our national security outlook.

- **Our planning assumptions for national security activity:** to plan our national security responses effectively we must make robust, hard-headed assumptions about the threats we face. *Security for the Next Generation* brings together, for the first time, these assumptions in one place. They include assumptions around all of the drivers, threat actors, and domains outlined in our strategic framework.

- **How we are organised:** the disparate nature of the threats we face requires an integrated and flexible response. *Security for the Next Generation* also outlines where in Government the lead responsibility for tackling each national security threat or driver is held. We have strengthened the role of expert external advice through the National Security Forum and are enhancing Parliamentary accountability through a new Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy.

Tackling the drivers of insecurity

16. The Strategy outlines how we are tackling those factors which provoke challenges to our national security, what we have done to address these, and our future plans.

Global trends – the economy, technology, demography and migration

17. Global trends impact upon and define the strategic context within which we work to protect our citizens and interests. Key global developments impact more quickly and more profoundly on the UK than ever before. As we have seen over the past year, trends in the global economy can rapidly and dramatically affect the whole world. Technology, and particularly the growth of the Internet, has changed the nature of interaction between and within countries and regions: the barriers to communication and commerce globally have been dramatically reduced. Migration trends will continue to be affected by global economic inequality and other factors, such as climate change. While we have benefited from globalisation, it has also created a series of challenges to which the Government's response is hard-headed in its commitment; thorough in its analysis; and internationalist in its approach.

Climate change

18. Climate change will increasingly be a wide-ranging driver of global insecurity. It acts as a threat-multiplier, exacerbating weakness and tensions around the world. It can be expected to worsen poverty, have a significant impact on global migration patterns, and risk tipping fragile states into instability, conflict and state failure. From a security perspective, it is important to act now to reduce the scale of climate change by mitigation, such as emissions reduction, and by being able to adapt to climate change that is now already unavoidable. The Government is determined to play a leading role and, over the past year, the Climate Change Act has come into force, setting a legally binding target to reduce the UK's emissions by at least 80 per cent by 2050, from 1990 levels, and introducing the world's first carbon budgets.

19. The coming six months are a critical window of opportunity. The UK has already led the way multilaterally in securing EU agreement to reduce emissions by 20 per cent by 2020. It is vital that the world reaches an ambitious global deal on climate change in the multilateral Copenhagen negotiations in December 2009. The Government places the highest priority on these talks and will publish its priorities for negotiations shortly. The forthcoming National Strategy for Climate and Energy will set out a comprehensive set of policies to meet the UK's carbon budgets and to cut emissions by more than a third by 2020. The Government will also shortly publish a paper on International Development, *Building Our Common Future,* which will include plans to support developing countries to prepare for the impacts of climate change by building their resilience and adaptive capabilities.

Competition for energy

20. Global energy demand, on the basis of governments' existing policies, is forecast to increase by around 45 per cent between 2006 and 2030[2]. Internationally, competition for energy and other resources can act as a driver of insecurity in a number of ways: through fostering increased state-led competition for resources; through increasing the economic and political leverage of producer states; and through tension arising from exploitation of resources as a source of internal instability. The Government recognises the importance of tackling these issues. For example, over the past year we have worked with countries like Nigeria to help tackle the role that tensions linked to energy exploitation play in instability and conflict in the Delta, and, at the London Energy Meeting in

December 2008, the UK secured wide international agreement for measures to enhance oil market transparency and reduce price volatility. We will look to develop this work further over the coming months, including calling for greater, more rapid progress on work coming out of the London Energy Meeting.

21. The Government's National Strategy for Climate and Energy will be published shortly and will set out more clearly the Government's strategic role in ensuring energy supply in a dynamic market in the context of tackling climate change.

Poverty, inequality and poor governance

22. Over one billion people live on less than $1.25 a day[3]. Poverty, inequality and poor governance can exacerbate the impact of violent conflict, organised crime, and terrorism, among other factors, and can inhibit an effective response to these threats. This means that vulnerable, fragile states and systemic global poverty have implications for UK national security, whether manifested in the form of illegal weapons smuggling by organised criminals, or the threat from terrorism.

23. The UK is a world leader in international development. The level of Overseas Development Aid as a proportion of national income has risen steadily from 0.36 per cent in 2007 to 0.43 per cent in 2008, rising towards the 0.7 per cent target by 2013[4]. Tackling poverty is essential for global security, as well as being a worthwhile investment in its own terms. In line with our commitment to tackling security challenges early, the Department for International Development (DFID) is looking at ways to increase development

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2   International Energy Agency World Energy Outlook 2008: this is according to the IEA's reference scenario, taking account of all policy measures introduced by Governments at the time of publication.

3   World Bank (2007) *Global Economic Prospects*

4   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Development Assistance Committee (March 2009) *Overseas Development Aid Report*.

assistance to fragile states and regions where links between insecurity, poverty and conflict are strongest.

Ideologies and beliefs

24. Ideology has long been recognised as a factor that can influence security threats. For much of the twentieth century the UK faced serious threats from potent, state backed ideologies, first Nazism, and later communism.

25. In the modern age, ideology can still provoke unrest within and across borders, and our strategy recognises ideology as a driver of instability. It is a particularly important driver of both international and domestic terrorism. That is why the Government is committed to promoting our values of justice, tolerance and the rule of law at home and abroad, and challenging those who, for ideological reasons, promote extremist views which can incite criminal and violent activity, whether they are for religious, ethnic, nationalistic or other reasons.

Addressing the threat actors

26. As well as addressing these drivers of instability, in the National Security Strategy the Government has developed a comprehensive view of potential national security threats and who or what can pose such threats. These comprise a mixture of human and natural factors, as well as activity by state and non-state actors. It is important to tackle all relevant threats.

State-led threats to the UK

27. While it remains our assessment that no state has both the intent and capability to threaten the UK militarily, history has shown how difficult it can be to predict the nature of conflict and so we cannot rule out the re-emergence of such a threat in the future. Given the continuing risk posed by proliferation and the certainty that a number of other countries will retain substantial nuclear arsenals, it would be

premature to judge that a nuclear threat to our national security will not arise over the longer term. As a result, a minimum strategic deterrent capability is likely to remain a necessary element of our national security for the foreseeable future.

28. Instead of taking offensive military action, a hostile state may be more likely to seek to threaten our way of life by non-military means, for example, by disrupting or denying access to critical services, such as energy supply, causing sudden or malicious damage to our economic infrastructure, or sponsoring terrorism in the UK or against UK interests overseas. The threats we face are diversifying.

29. The Government will maintain a broad range of military, intelligence, diplomatic and other capabilities to ensure that we are well placed to counter any future state led threats, wherever and however they manifest themselves. As a result of the strategic approach taken in this strategy we will strengthen, in particular, the mechanisms for collective analysis and decision taking across government to integrate further our response to the changing nature of non-military state-led threats.

Global instability and conflict, and failed and fragile states

30. It is not just competent states with malign intent that can threaten the UK and our allies. Threats can emerge from failing and fragile states, which provide uncontrolled spaces in which terrorism and organised crime may flourish, such as occurred in the past when Al Qa'ida grew under the Taliban regime. They can also allow the transition of terrorist groups into larger and more ambitious insurgent organisations and cause significant internal population displacement and migration.

31. Our response has to be rooted in helping states and the societies within

them become more secure, with sound infrastructure, capable and responsive government, and the rule of law. For example, the UK-led joint military-civilian Provincial Reconstruction team in Helmand, which has doubled the number of deployed civilian experts in the past year, is focused on building Afghan capacity across roads, power, local governance, policing and informal justice systems. The Government's enhanced Stabilisation Unit[5] is facilitating the planning and delivery of this in a range of key target countries, through both bilateral and multilateral cooperation. By the end of 2009 we will have established a one thousand strong UK civilian standby capability from which to deploy in support of stabilisation and conflict prevention in priority areas. Afghanistan and Pakistan remain critical. The Government's strategy for this region, published in April, set out clearly how we are supporting the development of sound government and a strong society.

Terrorism

32. Terrorism remains a constant and direct threat to the UK and our people. Since the publication of *Security in an Interdependent World*, there have been three deaths within the UK directly caused by terrorist activity. These were the actions of small groups of dissident Irish republicans, rather than international terrorism inspired by Al Qa'ida and its affiliates. However, international terrorism continued to be a threat. There were major attacks in a number of countries, notably in India and Pakistan, and Al Qa'ida inspired terrorism is believed to have been responsible for the murder of a British citizen in Mali.

33. There is no single source of terrorism and we must be alert and ready to respond to terrorism in whatever form it takes. Within Northern Ireland the Government continues to work with local political leaders to strengthen the political and democratic processes, and empower the Executive further through the planned devolution of policing and justice.

34. Currently, Al Qa'ida and its affiliates remain the pre-eminent threat to the UK and our allies. But Al Qa'ida is not winning and may not survive in its current form. The Government's response to the threat from international terrorism, the CONTEST strategy[6], was revised in March this year and is regarded as one of the most comprehensive and effective responses to terrorism anywhere in the world. It has greatly improved our ability to address the underlying causes of violent extremism, detect and disrupt terrorist networks, protect our people and the structures which underpin their daily lives, and to manage the consequences of attacks should they happen in the future.

Trans-national Organised Crime

35. The estimated global cost of organised crime stands at approximately one trillion pounds.[7] Within the UK, the Government estimates that over £20 billion of social and economic harm occurs as a result of serious organised crime. Our response has delivered a number of important successes. In the past year, for example, we have seen a record increase in the number of assets recovered from serious organised crime networks, over 85 tonnes of cocaine has been intercepted and new evidence suggests there has been a drop in street level purity of cocaine.[8]

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5   The tri-departmental (FCO, DFID, MoD) organisation established in 2004 to help improve the UK's ability to support countries emerging from conflict.

6   HM Government (March 2009) *The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism*. http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/HO_Contest_strategy.pdf

7   World Federation of UN Associations (2007) *State of the Future Report*

8   Serious Organised Crime Agency 2008/2009 performance figures.

36. But we must strengthen our approach further and recognise more strongly the key international dimension to serious organised crime. The Home Office will shortly publish the results of a review of serious organised crime. This review will overhaul our international organised crime strategy, through strengthened governance and greater interlinking of responsibility between the activities of the Serious Organised Crime Agency and the Government's overseas network.

Civil Emergencies, including pandemics

37. The UK continues to increase preparedness for all kinds of civil emergencies. The UK is rated by the World Health Organization (WHO) as one of the best prepared countries for pandemic 'flu, building on the nationwide emergency response organisation and capabilities developed in the past few years.

38. Fulfilling a commitment made in *Security in an Interdependent World*, the Government published, for the first time, a National Risk Register[9] last year, the first step in providing advice on how people and businesses can better prepare for civil emergencies. Building on this, over the coming months the Government will announce plans to strengthen further corporate and community resilience.

Action in the threat domains

39. As well as setting out what drives instability, who or what poses a threat, and how we tackle these challenges, a key development in this revised strategic framework for national security is a greater focus on how threats can arise. The Government is committed to tackling national security in a comprehensive way, and this is why plans are in place to tackle the causes of instability, and respond to those groups who may pose threats. But we also need to be able to act in all of the domains in which threats can become apparent. In the modern age, these domains are evolving rapidly and so our response, as elsewhere, needs to be effective, fast, coordinated and adaptable. *Security for the Next Generation* therefore contains new analysis and new responses in respect of a number of important domains of security threat and response activity.

Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction

40. The Government remains extremely concerned by the threat posed by the proliferation of technologies related to nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons. We strongly condemn the continuation by Iran of its nuclear activities in breach of numerous UN Security Council Resolutions, and the recent detonation of a nuclear device by North Korea. We will continue to work with international partners to achieve universal application of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and secure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

41. The Government also remains concerned that nuclear capability or material could fall into the hands of terrorist groups. We are at the forefront of international efforts to ensure the safety of nuclear material and will ratify the Amendment to the Convention on the Prevention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and press others to do so. As a nuclear weapons state we are also committed to engaging fully with international partners on global disarmament.

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9   Cabinet Office (August 2008) National Risk Register.
     http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/reports/national_risk_register.aspx

42. But we must recognise the role nuclear energy has to play in the global supply of energy, if we are to mitigate the risk of competition for scarce energy resources and tackle climate change. That is why the Government is bringing forward detailed proposals later this year on how more countries can gain access to civil nuclear power in a way which avoids proliferation, within a strong, rules based, multilateral enforcement system.

43. We will also continue to take a leading role in international efforts to combat the spread of chemical, biological and radiological weapons, as well as conventional weapons, which remain a significant concern. The UK led multi-lateral negotiations to secure, in December 2008, a new international agreement to ban the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions.

Maritime Security

44. The UK has long been a maritime nation and this domain remains vital for the UK's commercial and security interests. Over the last few months the terrorist attacks in Mumbai and the increase in piracy related incidents, particularly off the Horn of Africa, have increased international focus on the challenges for the maritime sector, their impact on global trade and the rule of international law.

45. To address the range of challenges in the maritime domain, the Government is launching, under Cabinet Office leadership, a cross-cutting programme of work to bring together key elements of Government and industry in partnership to tackle the full range of maritime security challenges. This will build on, for example, the considerable work the UK is already leading with EU and international partners to tackle piracy off the coast of Somalia.

Cyber security

46. Cyber space is the most important new domain in national security of recent years. Cyber space is increasingly vital for our prosperity and our way of life. There are tremendous commercial and other opportunities for the UK's business and people. But cyber space is also a domain in which hostile states, terrorists, and criminals can operate putting the interests of businesses and citizens at risk.

47. That is why, alongside *Security for the Next Generation*, the Government is publishing the first Cyber Security Strategy for the UK. This Strategy announces the establishment of an Office of Cyber Security to provide strategic leadership for, and coherence across, Government departments and agencies, a Cyber Security Operations Centre to coordinate incident response and monitor the health of cyber space, and a cross-Government programme working in partnership with business, international partners and the public on cyber security.

48. The new organisations will help citizens and businesses by providing assessments of risk, plugging skills gaps, and providing advice so that the UK can avail itself of the many opportunities in cyber space set out in the Government's *Digital Britain* strategy.[10]

Space

49. Just as cyber space underpins many elements of our daily life, space also plays an increasingly key role in modern society, and space related technologies are now critical for many services. Building on what we have learned from the strategic approach to the cyber domain, over the next year we will take forward a strategic cross-cutting programme between Government, industry and international

10 Joint report by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (16 June 2009) *The Digital Britain Report*.
http://www.culture.gov.uk/what_we_do/broadcasting/6216.aspx

partners to develop recommendations on how we can secure the UK's interests with respect to space now and in the future. In doing this, we will seek the views of National Security Forum (NSF) members.

Public opinion, culture and information

50. Almost every aspect of national security has an important information dimension. In the information age, the world is increasingly interconnected and information is instantaneous. The sphere of public opinion, of culture and cultures, and of information and information operations is therefore an important domain in its own right. This has long been recognised in both the military and diplomatic arenas.

51. The Government is adapting and extending this approach. We know that international terrorist groups see the information domain as an integral part of their broader campaign, and our response must counter this. Under the CONTEST framework, we have established a tri-partite Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU). Staffed and directed by the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Home Office, this new team ensures that the UK Government communicates effectively to reduce the risk of terrorism, providing communications advice to CONTEST partners, exposing the weaknesses of violent extremist ideologies and supporting credible alternatives. Internationally, we continue to promote our values of freedom, tolerance, justice and human rights. Active international outreach, for example through the work of the British Council, is an important strand of this approach.

Internationalism – global responses to global problems

52. Cutting across all of these domains, is our work to ensure fair, clearly understood, commonly accepted, and robustly enforced international rules which govern global activity. Our approach to the global era is an internationalist one, and we are committed to working with partners to develop and adapt the rules based international system to meet the demands of the twenty first century.

53. Over the past year, the UK has played a crucial and valued role in helping lead the global response to the financial crisis and economic downturn, most importantly through the London Summit in April, where countries representing 85 per cent of global output agreed vital steps to promote the recovery. A key priority for the UK's security and international strategies over the next decade is to build on this success and work with partners to ensure that the framework for international rules for the full range of global activities are fair, relevant and enforceable. This will involve significant reforms to key international institutions.

Conclusion

54. Government exists to serve the people and its first function is the protection of their way of life. The UK is, in many ways, safer than ever before and the new, global age provides many opportunities. But it also gives rise to newer and more disparate threats to citizens. These modern challenges require a broader understanding of national security and a broader range of responses.

55. And in our response to them, we must be proportionate in and uphold our core values, including liberty and the rule of law. We need to be hard-headed about the UK's interests but also recognise that the varied, interconnected threats we face

cannot be tackled in isolation. Global problems demand global responses.

56. Delivering the Strategy requires a cross-Governmental approach. The National Security, International Relations and Development Committee (NSID),[11] which includes a wide range of Ministers and the heads of key security agencies, will oversee implementation of this Strategy. NSID takes advice from external experts, including the National Security Forum.

57. *Security for the Next Generation* develops further the UK's ground-breaking, comprehensive approach to tackling security threats, and to understanding why they exist, who poses them, and how and where they can arise. It is a strategic framework for prioritising the Government's national security activity in the years ahead, and how we organise that activity, in partnership at home and abroad, to deliver our response.

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11 http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/secretariats/committees/nsid.aspx

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Providing security for the nation – safeguarding our citizens and our way of life – remains the most important responsibility of government.

1.2 Fulfilling this responsibility requires a strategic and comprehensive approach. That is why last year, for the first time, the Government published a National Security Strategy: *Security in an Interdependent World.* This groundbreaking approach to tackling security challenges reflected a profound and developing shift in our understanding of national security: broadening the concept beyond the traditional focus of the protection of the state and its interests from attacks by other states, to include threats to individual citizens and our way of life. That is why the Government's strategic framework for national security covers not just traditional areas of national security like hostile military activity, or even new and developing forms of terrorism, but also challenges such as climate change, energy security and competition for resources, serious organised crime, and major civil emergencies like pandemic 'flu and flooding.

1.3 *Security in an Interdependent World* contained our first comprehensive assessment of the international and domestic security landscape, which has changed radically since the end of the Cold War. In the two decades since then, profound technological and communications advances have transformed the global landscape. These have undoubtedly created many opportunities, but also new challenges. The impact of events in one country or region is now felt more directly, across

greater distances. Perhaps even more importantly, the speed at which challenges in one country or region are transmitted to other parts of the world has increased dramatically. Previously confineable threats to security now have the capacity to quickly affect citizens in the United Kingdom and our interests overseas.

1.4 This means that our strategic and comprehensive approach must also be a dynamic approach. As our understanding of national security has broadened, so too has the range and nature of our response to security challenges. Our response to the challenges of the world today is grounded in our core values and a hard-headed assessment of our interests. But our strategic response must also be capable of adapting and reacting nimbly to the challenges of a fast changing world.

That is why the Government committed to publishing an annual update of the National Security Strategy. This first annual update comprises:

- our assessment of how the strategic context for our approach to securing the UK has evolved since the National Security Strategy was first introduced last year;

- our vision for the security of UK citizens in a safer world;

- a set of guiding principles for all our work on security; and

- a Strategic Framework for addressing challenges to our security, based on:

  – understanding and tackling the drivers of threats;

– addressing the challenge of states, non-state actors and hazards which could threaten our security;

– acting in all the domains through which threats may manifest themselves;

– an understanding of the UK's position, interests and responsibilities;

– a set of planning assumptions to guide our security priorities; and

– detailed capabilities and actions to tackle the drivers, address the threats, and be effective in all important domains of activity.

1.5 Chapter 2 sets out the strategic context for a secure UK. Chapter 3 sets out the vision; the guiding principles; and the framework for our national strategy. Chapter 4 discusses the UK's position and interests, and our planning assumptions for guiding our security priorities. Chapters 5 to 7 set out the details of the capabilities we have and the actions we are taking to address the drivers, threats and domains. Chapter 8 summarises how our national strategy will be taken forward.

Chapter 2

Context: The Global Security Outlook Since March 2008

2.1 This chapter sets out the strategic context for the United Kingdom's national security and the Government's assessment of how that strategic context is changing.

Security in an interdependent world

2.2 The UK's National Security Strategy is designed to address the challenges of the global age. The two decades since the end of the Cold War have seen a profound and rapid shift in the international landscape. UK national security in the twentieth century was dominated by direct threats to the integrity of the UK as a sovereign nation of free citizens. This threat – ideologically driven and existential in nature – came directly from other states with competing, totalitarian ideologies: first, from fascism in the 1930s, and then from the communist Soviet Union in the four decades of the Cold War.

2.3 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union there has been no direct, state sponsored, ideologically driven, existential threat to the UK's sovereignty and our way of life. At present no state directly threatens the United Kingdom.

2.4 This absence of a competing, state sponsored challenge to the democratic, liberal, free market based societies of the UK and our allies has been accompanied by a drive towards the opening up of trade and travel routes. At times this paradigm, sometimes called the 'Washington Consensus', has seemed to be moving inexorably towards an ever more globalised society, underpinned by a rules based international system. Rapid technological and communications changes have augmented this shift, with almost instantaneous communication rendering physical distance far less important, and the faster movement of people, goods and capital worldwide rendering attempts to manage strategic challenges at a purely national level obsolete. The UK, with its long tradition of facing outwards and engaging strongly at a multilateral level, is well placed to lead this more integrated global response to manage the challenges of the twenty first century.

2.5 Many of the features of the new global landscape are positive and the UK remains in many ways more secure than many countries, and more secure than at most times in our history. But this new global picture also presents complex, diverse and unpredictable challenges. As a nation, we cannot rule out the return of a direct state threat to the UK, and our highly trained and skilled Armed Forces are the ultimate guarantee of the nation's security. We also continue to face long-established but rapidly evolving threats from non-state actors, notably terrorists, and the potential threats from terrorists or rogue states attempting to acquire chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons for use against the UK and its interests.

2.6 But, as *Security in an Interdependent World* set out, the strategic, twenty-first century context for national security is much broader than these well-known risks. Global poverty and weak or fragile governance creates instability, and sometimes conflict, which can impact on

the overall stability of individual regions which are strategically important to the UK and our interests. Competition for energy, which will be exacerbated over the coming decades by the impact of climate change, is a further driver of instability. Climate change increases the risk of disruptive, high impact events in other countries and even within the UK itself. Moreover, those who threaten global stability – be they other states, ideologically motivated terrorists or serious trans-national organised crime syndicates – can use more sophisticated means to pursue their objectives, for example through the use of cyber space.

The security context: the Government's updated assessment

2.7 Just as these are global problems that cannot be dealt with by the UK alone, nor can the UK's response rely solely on the role of Government. And no one part of Government can unilaterally address individual threats. The purpose of the National Security Strategy is to bring together our multilateral and integrated approach to tackling security threats, the forces that drive those threats, and the means through which they can arise.

2.8 This national security framework depends on a timely, transparent and hard-headed assessment of the strategic context for national security. That is why, in *Security in an Interdependent World,* the Government committed to updating regularly this assessment of the challenges we face. This is so that Parliament and the UK public can see how the Government assesses the implications of ongoing events for our strategic response.

The global economic downturn and its implications for national security

2.9 By far the most fundamental change in the global economic landscape since the publication of *Security in an Interdependent World* is the global financial crisis, and the ensuing synchronised global economic downturn. The severity of the slowdown is not disputed, nor is its reach. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) now forecasts that the world economy will contract by 1.3 per cent in 2009.[12] This is the first full year fall in global output since the end of the Second World War. Whilst North American and European countries were the first to experience the downturn, its effects have spread across the globe. Some emerging economies have contracted sharply, while some of the larger economies that make up an increased share of global output, notably China and India, have seen significant falls in the rate of economic growth.

2.10 This shock to the global economic system requires Governments to assess what impact the slowdown might have on individual national security risks. However, at the strategic level, we must also analyse whether the slowdown has altered the overall strategic international security context.

2.11 The economic crisis and slowdown in the world economy has led to sharp falls in trade volumes and flows of capital across borders and of investment in key sectors, such as energy. Much of this can be considered cyclical, though it is no less serious for that. We can expect some or all of these declines to reverse as the world economy recovers, but this cannot be taken for granted. There is already some evidence of heightened protectionist

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12 International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook (April 2009) *Crisis and Recovery*

sentiment in some parts of the world. This is not without historical precedent, as previous slowdowns have also led countries to try and protect their own industries to the detriment of all.

2.12 The Government firmly believes that open international markets for products and services will maximise welfare for all countries, and the UK is a strong advocate of international policy initiatives that contribute to this goal. We believe an early and successful conclusion of the Doha round of World Trade Organisation (WTO) trade negotiations will demonstrate countries' collective commitment to the principle of free trade. Opposing protectionism has also been an important part of the G20 agenda during the UK's chairmanship this year.

2.13 The truly world-wide nature of the crisis has emphasised the integration and interdependence of countries within a global economy. This has demonstrated the need for policy responses coordinated across a wide range of countries. The prominent role the G20, made up of both advanced and emerging economies, has played is a direct consequence of this, and illustrates that emerging markets will be increasingly integral to global policy decisions.

2.14 For the purposes of assessing the strategic context for national security, the Government needs to assess what implications this global economic slowdown has on the drivers of insecurity and threats to national security. At this point, any assessment can only be preliminary, but some conclusions can be drawn.

2.15 The Government judges that the economic downturn has not, at this point,

altered the fundamentals of the global security landscape and our overall assessment of the security challenges faced by the UK. It has not altered the Government's view that addressing national security challenges in the modern world are driven by a range of factors that arise as a result of a more globalised and inter-dependent world.

It is therefore important not to overstate the impact of the slowdown on the strategic global security picture. But some important and subtle shifts are emerging as a result of the events of the past year, and the economic slowdown requires some reassessment of individual drivers of insecurity. There are three main areas within the strategic security framework which reflects the Government's preliminary assessment of the implications of the economic slowdown.

2.16 The first, and most important, is the impetus the downturn has given to more effective cooperation in global governance. The post-recovery global order cannot and will not be a resumption of the international rules-based system before the financial crisis and economic slowdown. The global response has illustrated the widespread acceptance of the need for concerted action in international crises. The broadened scope of the global response, through the G20 in addition to the post-war Group of Seven (G7)[13] or Group of Eight (G8)[14], is a welcome development. It reflects the Government's key strategic objective, as expressed in *Security in an Interdependent World*, to see enlarged multilateral mechanisms for tackling such challenges. The UK is committed to the further reform of key international institutions and seeks to

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13 The G7 is the meeting of the finance ministers from seven industrialised nations: France, German, Italy, Japan, USA, UK and Canada.

14 The G8 is a forum for the governments of eight nations in the northern hemisphere: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, UK and the USA.

make them more reflective of the twenty-first century context and thus more effective in their response to its challenges. It is vital that these efforts succeed, and gain wide international support.

2.17 Second, the National Security Strategy recognises poverty and instability as a key driver of national security challenges, and the most serious risk arising from the global economic downturn is an exacerbation of those risks. The Government assesses that economic difficulties may increase the fragility of already vulnerable states and regions. Any resulting poverty or instability could act as a driver of insecurity.

2.18 Third, the Government assesses that there is a potential risk over the willingness and ability, at an international level, to tackle long-term security threats collectively. This is particularly true of challenges like climate change. Whilst some countries have emphasised the importance of ensuring a low-carbon based recovery, it remains possible that other countries may de-prioritise programmes aimed at mitigating climate change as they focus on economic recovery. The same may be true in respect of development, and conflict prevention and mitigation. There is also the risk of heightened resource competition between states. In terms of our long term energy security, it is possible that a failure to invest now both in new and existing sources of energy as a result of lower incomes could increase problems in the future, elevating prices and increasing their volatility.

2.19 All of these issues underline the interdependence of both the global economy and of the security context, and strengthen the argument for a strong commitment to multilateralism, strengthened international institutions and effective coordinated responses to global challenges. The Government's programme

for delivering our response to these challenges is set out in Chapter 7.

The wider strategic security context

2.20 In addition to the economic downturn, other events since the publication of *Security in an Interdependent World* have illustrated the unpredictability of the security landscape that provided the impetus for a strategic framework for national security. There remain a series of disparate threats to UK citizens and UK interests. The remainder of this chapter analyses some of these key developments.

Terrorism

2.21 International terrorism, principally motivated by a violent extremist ideology remained a threat across the world over this period. Al Qa'ida and other groups continue to find sanctuary in ungoverned areas of South Asia and Africa. And in November 2008, at least 160 people, including three British citizens, were killed in Mumbai, India, by terrorists the Government believes were linked to Lashkar e Taiba, a Pakistani based militant group.

2.22 International terrorism continues to pose a direct threat to the UK. The Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) has assessed the level of threat to the UK to be SEVERE, which means that there is a high likelihood of future terrorist attacks. In March 2009 the Government published its updated counter-terrorism strategy, setting out a comprehensive approach to tackling this threat and how it is to be delivered.

2.23 International terrorism is not the only threat. There remains a threat from a number of small, dissident Irish republican groups opposed to the political settlement endorsed by the people of Northern Ireland. In March 2009, these groups were

responsible for the murder of two Army personnel and one officer from the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), the first terrorist murder of a police officer in Northern Ireland since 1997. These acts of terrorism are aimed at destabilising Northern Ireland and its people, and the new power-sharing institutions they have endorsed. The Government will continue to work with the Northern Ireland political parties to strengthen the political agreement in Northern Ireland, and over the past year together we have made considerable progress towards the devolution of policing and justice to the Executive.

2.24 The UK's approach to tackling terrorism, in whatever form it takes, continues to be grounded in our values, including the rule of law. We oppose torture and mistreatment in all its forms, and as we adapt our legal and operational framework to deal with changing threats, so too are we strengthening the protection of civil liberties and the role of Parliamentary and judicial oversight in the protection of individual liberty.

Instability and conflict, failing and fragile states

2.25 The UK continues to play a leading and active role in tackling conflict and its causes. This is vitally important not just for those countries and regions but for our own interests and security.

2.26 Progress in Iraq remains vital for the UK's security interests, and much has been achieved. Violence is at its lowest level since 2003; provincial elections were held peacefully in January and, despite the economic downturn, economic growth in Iraq is predicted to be nearly 7 per cent this year. Substantial challenges remain, but Iraq's future is now in the hands of its people and politicians. British forces conducted their last combat patrol in Basra on 30th April this year. At the request of

the Iraqi Government we shall continue to support the training of the Iraqi armed forces and Royal Navy ships will continue to protect the oil platforms that make a significant contribution to Iraq's economy and thus the country's long term stability. Economic progress will help embed security gains.

2.27 Over the past year in Afghanistan, the UK and our NATO-led allies have contributed more forces, more resources and more long term aid to help the Afghan people bring stability and security to their country. The Taliban continue to threaten the local population, undermine good governance and the rule of law, and collude with drugs traders. They seek once again to rule Afghanistan, a shift which would see an increase in the freedom enjoyed by Al Qa'ida and other terrorist organisations in the region to operate training camps and to plan worldwide terrorist events. But through the remarkable efforts, and sacrifices, of our Armed Forces, and as part of an international community effort, we are tackling the insurgency and the drugs trade directly, developing Afghan capacity and reducing the threat to our national security.

2.28 Another illustration of where the failure of the rule of law in one country can have profound implications for the UK and beyond is Somalia. State failure and lawlessness in that country means that currently 3.1 million are dependent on humanitarian relief and approximately 200,000 children are malnourished. It also threatens global trade, on which the UK critically depends, through the increase in piracy witnessed over the past year. Somalia is also a concern because of the growing number of terrorist suspects who travel to the country for training.

2.29 Conflict continues to have the potential to destabilise individual regions.

The conflict in Gaza in December and January emphasised the need for urgent progress in securing a lasting peace agreement in the Middle East. The Government strongly supports the leadership of the new United States Administration in their efforts in this regard.

2.30 In common with Afghanistan, Pakistan is relevant to at least four of the major sources of threat set out in the National Security Strategy.

- Terrorism – the senior leadership of Al Qa'ida remains located in the border areas of Pakistan and a majority of the most serious terrorist plots investigated in the UK have links to Pakistan.

- Conflict – insecurity in Pakistan has an impact on regional stability which affects the UK's interests.

- Trans-national crime – an estimated 45 per cent of the heroin in the UK is smuggled via Pakistan.

- Weapons of mass destruction – Pakistan is a nuclear armed state. Its proper control of its weapons and nuclear material, and the prevention of proliferation to other countries and non-state actors is vital to our interests.

Pakistan currently faces grave security challenges including a major insurgency along its border with Afghanistan and a growing threat from violent extremism across the country. The economic situation remains fragile and potentially vulnerable to further external shocks. Pakistan has made significant efforts, at a considerable cost in lives lost, to address many of these challenges. The UK remains committed to a long term strategic partnership with Pakistan grounded in a common desire to tackle Pakistan's problems.

2.31 Since the end of the Second World War and the inception of the EU and NATO, old rivalries in Europe have been transformed into peaceful and constructive partnership. However, the conflict between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 was a reminder that unresolved conflicts on the EU's doorstep have the potential to spiral into military confrontation. These conflicts can threaten our national and regional security and have potentially negative wider implications. With several other unresolved conflicts in the EU's neighbourhood, including Nagorno Karabakh and Transnistria, the Russia – Georgia conflict demonstrated the need for countries to make every effort, through political dialogue and within international law, to find a solution to ongoing disputes. As we have seen with the Western Balkans, the UK is convinced that closer Euro-Atlantic integration for countries in the region, if they so choose, will contribute to a safer, more prosperous world.

Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction

2.32 Over the past year, we have witnessed the continued risk of proliferation of nuclear weapons, most notably from Iran and North Korea. The Government believes that the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction must be addressed through firm, coordinated international action. But we must also ensure that nuclear weapons states keep their side of the bargain, and that we address the energy needs, including nuclear power, of those countries that need it if we are successfully to tackle the challenge of climate change. That is why the Government has committed to setting out a comprehensive roadmap to nuclear supply and security issues. The Government's paper, *Road to 2010*, will be published later this year.

Climate change and energy

2.33 Over the past year, compelling evidence presented at the International Scientific Congress on Climate Change suggests that the impact of climate change is being realised more rapidly than previously estimated. There is no evidence, as yet, to suggest that the economic downturn has slowed the pace of emissions growth. But such a slowdown, should it occur, is likely to have little effect on the overall rate of climate change. To meet our ambitious climate change reduction goals, the Government is playing a leading role in advance of the 15th Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen in December 2009.

2.34 With regard to energy, the EU's vulnerability to supply disruptions was demonstrated in January 2009 when a dispute led to a disruption of Russian gas flowing through the Ukraine and widespread gas supply shortages. This demonstrated the need for action at EU level to improve resilience and increase the diversity of types of energy, their sources and routes of supply.

Civil emergencies, including pandemics

2.35 The outbreak of H1N1 influenza in Mexico in April 2009 caused, within weeks, a global health emergency with cases diagnosed in 41 countries within 28 days of the first outbreak. This required a strong response by governments, working collaboratively and multilaterally with the World Health Organization and, within the UK, the activation of the successful civil contingencies capability, which is working with delivery partners throughout the country to mitigate the impact of the outbreak.

Conclusion

2.36 All of these events, the continuing threat from international terrorism; the wider ramifications of regional conflicts; continuing attempts by individual states and non-state actors to acquire weapons of mass destruction; our better understanding of the imminence and impact of climate change; and the very real threat from the rapid spread of infectious diseases, demonstrate the interconnectedness of global security challenges in the twenty first century, as set out in *Security in an Interdependent World* last year.

2.37 These events also illustrate the importance of concerted global action to tackle these challenges. Over the past year this has been particularly crucial in stabilising and reviving the global economy following the most severe global downturn since the end of the Second World War. Whilst that downturn has neither reversed the trend towards increasing global interdependence, nor fundamentally altered the global balance of power, it has emphasised the need for broadening the range of international partners needed to deliver decisive action. Much still depends on the leadership of the UK's closest ally, the United States, and the Government warmly welcomes the determination of the Administration not just to show leadership on driving economic recovery, but in working with international partners on key strategic challenges like climate change and regional conflict. The Government also welcomes the Administration's determination to make progress in securing a just and lasting settlement in the Middle East.

2.38 This updated assessment of the context for the UK's national security also demonstrates why governments in the twenty first century need to broaden the traditional strategic framework for national security. Chapter 3 sets out that framework and the vision behind it.

Chapter 3

The UK Government's Approach to National Security: guiding principles and the Strategic Framework

3.1 This chapter sets out the Government's vision for national security; the principles guiding our approach; and the framework behind the United Kingdom's National Security Strategy, to address the challenges of the strategic context outlined in Chapter 2.

The vision for national security

3.2 In *Security in an Interdependent World,* the Government stated that its single overarching national security objective was:

"Protecting the United Kingdom and its interests, enabling its people to go about their daily lives freely and with confidence, in a more secure, stable, just and prosperous world."

3.3 This remains our objective. National security may often require action to protect the functions of government, but this is to enable government to meet this fundamental objective. Protecting our people's freedoms includes protecting our capacity to govern ourselves, and protecting our democracy and the rule of law as vital elements of our way of life.

3.4 Nor is protecting our people all that government can do to achieve a better future. The Government has a wider vision to create a strong, fair, prosperous and secure society, in which everyone has the opportunity to live their lives and make the most of their abilities, with fair chances for all, and governed by fair rules. This wider

vision embraces a world based on cooperation between peoples and nations, with collective responsibility taken for collective problems, and every nation state, including the UK, playing its part in working for this better world.

3.5 To achieve this future involves all the actions of government, domestically and internationally. Not all these actions form part of this strategy. This update to the National Security Strategy covers the protection of our people and our country from disruptive threats.

National security as protection against disruptive threats

3.6 It is not straightforward to define national security. Traditional approaches to national security have focused on military threats, on espionage, and on other threats to the state and its interests. However, the disruptive threats which could endanger our freedom come from a wide range of sources. In *Security in an Interdependent World* we committed to adopting a broader approach to national security, considering all those threats to citizens and to our way of life, including to the state and its vital functions. Therefore, in this strategy we include not just the threat from hostile states, but also non-state threats such as terrorism or serious organised crime, and serious hazards to the UK, such as flooding; not just traditional areas through which we may be threatened, such as military action, but

new ones such as cyber space; not just traditional drivers of threats such as nationalism or inter-state rivalry, but wider drivers such as climate change, competition for resources, or international poverty.

3.7 This does not mean that climate change or poverty are themselves national security threats in the way in which threats, such as terrorism, are defined in this strategy. Rather they drive, exacerbate or change the way in which threats are manifested. Nor does it mean that in responding to these issues, the Government seeks to address them solely through a security prism. They are major global issues and security may not be the only reason for tackling them.

3.8 The threats with which we are concerned in this strategy are those which have the potential to provide severe and sudden damage to our people, our institutions or our way of life. This Strategy looks ahead and aims to address such potential threats over the next twenty years. It does not define longer term trends as threats. But we recognise the need to act now to address the impact of wider drivers of national security, such as climate change, even though its most serious impacts may not occur within the next twenty years. And, in time, any long-term global trends, such as the gradual exhaustion of hydrocarbon fuel sources could become acute enough to constitute a security threat. We will continue to assess, through horizon scanning and ongoing analysis, whether further refinement might be necessary.

3.9 What counts as serious enough to be a national security threat? A partial answer might be whether the response required needs to be at a national, rather than a local or regional level. But a national security threat is not simply a matter of

scale. For example, while ordinary criminal violence is not a matter of national security, a threat to the life of people in the UK from terrorists, or from an overseas state, is a sufficient attack on our way of life to amount to a national security threat.

Guiding principles for national security

3.10 Our work to defend national security is driven above all by some abiding principles, as well as by the UK's interests. In *Security in an Interdependent World* we set out eight principles to guide all our national security work. They remain vital, and are repeated here.

- Our approach to national security is clearly grounded in a set of core values. These include human rights, the rule of law, legitimate and accountable government, justice, freedom, tolerance and opportunity for all.

- We will be hard-headed about the risks, our aims and our capabilities. We adopt a rigorous approach to assessing the risks and threats to our security, and the options for tackling them.

- Wherever possible, we will tackle security challenges early. We scan the horizon for future challenges, and we aim where we can to tackle not just threats as and when they become real, but also the drivers or causes of threats before they lead to potential damage to our security.

- Overseas, we will favour a multilateral approach. This is based on our need to work collectively with partners to tackle threats that are almost always threats to many of us, not just to the UK and its people, and most of which we would be unable fully to tackle on our own.

- At home, we will favour a partnership approach. The range of threat actors,

drivers and domains set out in this Strategy means that Government cannot work alone to protect our people. Our people themselves, through voluntary organisations, civic society, private industrial sector and all levels of government need to work together to tackle domestic threats and develop our resilience.

The Government's Partnership with Industry

The Government maintains a strong relationship with the defence industrial base. This is now being extended by expertise in other key areas of national security through its strategic partnership and dialogue with the UK security industry including through the Security and Resilience Industry Suppliers Community (RISC).

Technology plays a vital role in countering many of the threats we face. The UK is a world leader in the field of security, and has a long experience of dealing with a variety of significant security threats. Our security industry is one of the most diverse and technically advanced in the world, with UK companies – many of whom are Small Medium Enterprises – producing innovative solutions and cutting edge technologies across the full spectrum of security, covering the protection of people, assets and critical national infrastructure.

We benefit from strong partnerships between the public and private sectors in the security environment, involving academia, industry and our security services. This enables us to respond quickly to new and emerging threats in order to protect the UK and our friends and allies around the world.

- Inside government, we will develop a more integrated approach. This involves integrating both our domestic and foreign policy, and integrating different departments, agencies and areas of policy in support of joined-up responses to threats.

- We will retain strong, balanced and flexible capabilities. Some of the capabilities needed for our protection have to be the responsibility of central Government: for example intelligence gathering and analysis, military capabilities, and our diplomatic network. These have to be maintained as effective and flexible, to cope with the threats we have identified now, those we are preparing for through our horizon scanning, and those that might emerge in the future.

- We will continue to invest, learn and improve to strengthen our security. This Strategy develops and learns from lessons identified since *Security in an Interdependent World*. We apply lessons identified from areas of national security where our thinking is more mature to deal with the new or evolving challenges as they emerge.

3.11 In this Strategy we develop the theme of **protecting and involving our citizens** in national security. There are many examples of this set out in the Strategy, including:

- The priority given to countering international terrorism, as the most significant security threat currently facing the people of the UK, and our approach, which seeks to engage the public as fully as possible on national security issues.

- The strengthening of our work to combat serious organised crime, recognising the harm and direct consequences that such crime can have on our people, communities and

Ensuring security while protecting liberty

The first principle of this Strategy is to ground all our work in our core values. These include human rights, the rule of law, legitimate and accountable government, justice, freedom, tolerance and opportunity for all.

This is fundamental to our approach. We cannot protect our country, our people and our way of life unless the ways in which we do so are themselves compatible with that way of life. We are a free people with a proud history of defending and advocating freedom, building up the rule of law, and extending justice and human rights. We have worked towards greater tolerance and opportunity for all, and continue to do so.

All our actions are designed to be compatible with these values. We hold ourselves to the highest standards, but it is a fundamental challenge facing any government, to balance the measures intended to protect security and the right to life with the impact they may have on the other core values. We ensure that the use of any measure is necessary and proportionate to the risk an individual poses, and that safeguards are in place to ensure the individual's rights are respected. Thus all our actions to protect our people's security have to be compatible with applicable domestic and international law, including the European Convention on Human Rights. This includes the actions of our armed forces, our police services, and our security and intelligence agencies.

Similarly, in considering measures to protect the public, we take into account rights such as privacy, freedom of speech, and the right to a fair trial. The compatibility of all our actions with these rights is challengeable in our courts.

These values also guide our counter-terrorism work, where between 11 September 2001 and 31 March 2008, a total of 196 people have been convicted of a terrorist or terrorist-related offence, many under the new offences which have been brought in since 2001. In terrorist trials in 2007/8, over half of suspects pleaded guilty.

Our values govern our engagement with partners abroad, including in the difficult area of detention. In undertaking this work, we have been absolutely clear that the UK stands firmly against torture. This is a fundamental principle guiding our approach and that of those who work to protect us, not just in terms of law, but also in terms of our values as a nation. In March, the Prime Minister announced that the Government will publish, for the first time, its guidance to intelligence officers and service personnel about the standards that we apply during detention and interviewing of detainees overseas. The Intelligence Services Commissioner, Sir Peter Gibson, will monitor compliance with this guidance.

Alongside this fundamental UK position, we work around the world to eradicate torture, including through efforts to strengthen UN and other international mechanisms, diplomatic activity such as lobbying, and funding concrete project work.

economy, through drugs, violence, people-trafficking and fraud.

- The new Cyber Security Strategy being published alongside this Strategy, gives priority to ensuring that our people's ability to do business, communicate, learn, and interact socially through the internet and other networked activities are secure, and that the risks inherent in our dependence on networks for the critical infrastructure that underpins all our lives are managed.

3.12 Everyone has a role to play in building the UK's resilience. Our continuing work on community resilience builds on the established resilience structures Government already has in place by helping community groups who want to do more to prepare for the risks we face.

The National Security Strategic Framework

3.13 Responding to the full range of modern security challenges requires a strategic approach. The Government's Strategic Framework is summarised in Figure 1.

Figure 1: The United Kingdom's National Security Framework

Drivers
- global trends
- climate change
- competition for energy
- poverty, inequality and poor governance
- ideologies and beliefs

Threat actors
- states
- failing/fragile states
- terrorists
- criminals
- nature/hazards

Domains
- nuclear weapons
- maritime
- cyber space
- space
- public opinion, culture and information
- internationalism

Objective: Protecting UK citizens, prosperity and way of life

Why? Who / what? How?

Threat Drivers → Threat Actors → Threat Domains

UK actions — *Multiple departments and agencies*

UK characteristics / interests

3.14 This strategic framework builds on and develops the approach set out in *Security in an Interdependent World,* where the Government distinguished clearly for the first time between threats to our national security, and drivers of insecurity. In this framework that distinction is developed further.

3.15 First, global **drivers** of insecurity are the causes, reasons or motivations which might drive state or non-state actors to behave in a way which could potentially damage our national security. The framework assesses the most important of these drivers, and prioritises action to deal with the effects of these drivers, and thus reduce the likelihood that they will cause threats. Drivers concern answers to the question "**Why** might our national security be threatened?"

3.16 Secondly, the **threats** to our national security are the people, states or institutions which could act in a hostile way to threaten our people and way of life. They could be established states with a wide range of capabilities; failing or fragile states; non-state actors motivated by ideology such as terrorists; or non-state actors with mercenary motivations, such as organised criminals. In addition, there is a category of threats known as 'civil emergencies' which are disruptive actions caused by accidents or by the hazards of nature, such as floods, storms or pandemics. The category of threat actors (including Nature and accidents) concern answers to the question "**Who or what** might threaten our national security?"

3.17 The strategic framework also adds a third category, of **domains** of threat: those environments in which threats may become manifest. The category of threat domains concern answers to the question "**How or by what means or where** might a threat to our national security be manifested?"

3.18 Our National Security Strategy concerns drivers, threats and domains. It includes a comprehensive set of **actions** by government: to address the drivers; to tackle the threats; and to protect ourselves in each of the domains.

3.19 This is a wide remit of potential action. We need to act where we can have the most beneficial effect, unilaterally or in partnership. We use our guiding principles, and our assessment of our interests and position in the world, to help choose from the many actions we could undertake. And our actions must be integrated across departments and agencies. The framework provides a structure for organising and aligning all the many levers of government.

3.20 The different components of the framework are frequently inter-connected: one driver can impact on another driver; the boundaries between different types of threat actors can be blurred; and particular threats can be manifested in multiple domains, and require multiple tools to combat them. Moreover, our interests in advancing our national security are increasingly inter-connected with the interests of others.

3.21 The application of this strategic framework is discussed in more detail in later chapters, which set out the actions the Government is taking to address each of the important drivers, threat actors, and domains of national security.

National Security in law

3.22 In setting out this Strategic Framework for analysis and consideration of national security issues, the Government is not seeking to amend the legal understanding of the term "national security" as it has been established in statute and common law.

National Security Capabilities

3.23 Our actions may consist of the strategic development of capabilities, such as military, diplomatic or intelligence capabilities, scientific or technical capabilities; or they may consist of the application of those capabilities to particular situations or issues.

3.24 Capabilities can be applied to tackle many threats, and to deal with many aspects of the framework. For example, our Armed Forces can operate to address threats from states, contribute to tackling civil emergencies; and they can also, as part of a comprehensive civil and military approach, contribute to addressing instability. We aim to develop flexible capabilities which can be applied to deal with a wide variety of potential future threats and in a variety of threat domains. The Government's range of capabilities for delivering our national security include:

- The Armed Forces;

- The Security and Intelligence Agencies;

- Diplomacy; and

- International Development Activity.

National Security Capabilities: The Armed Forces

3.25 The capabilities of the UK's armed forces are a core element of our ability to ensure our national security. They provide the ultimate defence against direct threats to the UK and its overseas territories, and they contribute to tackling threats to our national security overseas by helping to address conflict, instability and crises across the globe.

3.26 Internationally, the deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan have involved personnel from all three Services, including

vital support from the Territorial Army and the Reserves. The current UK contribution to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan is playing a key role in the South, the Taliban heartland and centre of the drugs trade. By tackling the insurgency and the drugs trade directly and developing Afghan capacity we are, as part of an international community effort, reducing the threat to our national security.

3.27 At home, the Armed Forces contribute to security by supporting the civilian authorities in a wide range of tasks, including through quick-reaction fighter aircraft and Royal Naval patrolling of our territorial waters, disaster relief, search and rescue operations and support for counter-terrorism operations.

3.28 To enable the armed forces successfully to deliver these effects, the Government continues to make a major investment in our service personnel, their equipment and the infrastructure that supports them. This investment includes the decision in 2006 to maintain the UK's nuclear deterrent and major new equipment programmes, including improved armoured vehicles for the Army and Royal Marines, continued commitment to renewing the Royal Navy, through Type 45 Destroyers, ASTUTE submarines and the Future Aircraft Carriers, and investment in new aircraft and weapons for the Royal Air Force, including Typhoon Tranche 3 and REAPER unmanned air vehicles.

3.29 And the Government has continued to invest to improve the infrastructure, accommodation and terms and conditions for our service personnel. Since the publication of the Government's Service Personnel Command Paper (Cm 7424)[15] in July last year, we have doubled the Armed Forces Compensation Scheme maximum

15 HM Government (July 2008) *The Nation's Commitment: Cross-Government Support to Our Armed Forces, Their Families and Veterans* (Cm 7424 July 2008).
   http://www.mod.uk/Defenceinternet/aboutDefence/Corporatepublications/Personnel/Publications/Welfare/TheNationsCommitmentCrossGovernmentSupporttoourArmedForcesandTheirFamiliesandVeterans.htm

lump sum compensation; provided partners of Service personnel with access to the New Deal;[16] and have allocated £20 million for affordable housing. These initiatives form part of an ongoing programme of reform.

National Security Capabilities: The Security and Intelligence Agencies

3.30 The United Kingdom has three Security and Intelligence Agencies (the Security Service ('MI5'), Government Communications Head Quarters (GCHQ), and the Secret Intelligence Service ('MI6')). They (or their predecessor organisations) have been at the heart of the national security effort for 100 years, and are as relevant today in dealing with threats from both state and non-state actors as they have ever been.

3.31 Although their core tasks differ, the three Agencies work together comprehensively, bringing global intelligence-gathering to bear on problems affecting the security of UK interests abroad and at home. They, together with the wider intelligence community including the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), have a great depth of knowledge on a range of countries and topics which provides insights that shape Government policy, diplomacy, and operational engagement at every level. Their technical expertise allows them to develop, and help others to deploy, robust defenses against physical and cyber threats to our national infrastructure and Government services. Their high-end intelligence gathering helps the law enforcement authorities deal with the most serious terrorist and criminal threats we face as a society.

3.32 The capabilities of our intelligence and security agencies are reliant on

continual improvement, as technology develops. In seeking to ensure that these capabilities are maintained, the Government will continue to act proportionately and to ensure that proper and effective oversight mechanisms and safeguards are in place to protect information and individual liberties.

The communications advances that are transforming the global landscape are impacting on our capability to undertake interception of communications for intelligence purposes and to obtain information about communications data for intelligence and law enforcement purposes. Maintaining this capability is vital to achieving our vision for national security and is the objective of the cross-government Interception Modernisation Programme, led by the Home Office. In April 2009 the Home Secretary ruled out a central database of all communications data and published a consultation inviting views on other options for tackling the technological challenge which balance respect for individuals' human rights and protection of the public.

3.33 It is inherent in the business of intelligence and security that the human rights of individuals who are understood to pose a serious threat to the UK's interest are balanced against the rights of society as a whole to security and freedom. Those decisions are taken very seriously by Ministers, and are closely regulated and reviewed by the Intelligence Services Commissioner, the Interception of Communications Commissioner and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal.

The Role of Diplomacy

3.34 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) runs a global network of posts in more than 170 countries, and 21

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16 New Deal – Jobcentre Plus offers a number of New Deal programmes to help unemployed people, particularly those who have been unemployed for a long time, people with disabilities and anyone in need of extra help to find work.

delegations and representatives at international organisations including the United Nations, the European Union and NATO. By strengthening the relationships on which our alliances and partnerships rest, the UK's diplomatic network is crucial to enabling one of the guiding principles behind this strategy – favouring a multilateral approach to national security. The UK is able to draw on these relationships to tackle the drivers and causes of insecurity as they originate overseas, and to respond to security threats once they arise.

3.35 In addition, our diplomatic network can contribute to national security directly:

- In the UK's Overseas Territories – in the Turks and Caicos Islands, FCO staff helped lead recovery efforts after the devastation of Hurricane Ike.

- On counter-terrorism – launching a range of capacity-building programmes overseas as well as driving forward an outreach programme at home and abroad. For example, stepping up efforts to support Pakistan in tackling the shared threat of terrorism, with a £10 million package designed to build capacity to disrupt terrorists and their networks, as well as to address the root causes of terrorism.

- On counter-proliferation – using the FCO's global network to ensure that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2010 succeeds in re-energising the commitment of the international community to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

- On conflict – reducing the impact of conflict through the contribution FCO staff make to the Government's broader stabilisation effort in many areas of conflict. These include Kabul, Lashkar Gas, Baghdad and Basra.

- Supporting UK citizens overseas – following the earthquake in China, the FCO's London-based emergency response team handled calls from families regarding over 500 British nationals who might have been involved. Rapid deployment teams (RDTs) from Hong Kong and London travelled to the area to locate and assist British nationals. RDTs were also deployed during the Russia-Georgia conflict and to Mumbai within hours of terrorist attacks in November 2008.

The Role of International Development

3.36 The Department for International Development (DFID) is currently working with other departments to help address the manifold challenges facing Afghanistan and Pakistan, illustrating the complementary nature of development goals with security interests.

3.37 The UK aid budget is managed by DFID. DFID works in 150 countries and half its staff are based overseas. The primary purpose of UK development assistance is poverty reduction overseas and achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. DFID works with other Departments, the governments of developing countries, charities, businesses and international bodies, including the World Bank, the UN agencies and the European Commission. In collaboration with partners, DFID helps developing countries to deliver basic services and foster sustainable growth to participate fully in the international economy and, increasingly, to address the underlying social and economic causes of state fragility and instability which threaten the prospects of the poorest countries. Tackling these helps to reduce poverty, improve the lives of poor people and can also contribute to our own security.

The National Security Strategic Framework

Drivers

- global trends
- climate change
- competition for energy
- poverty, inequality and poor governance
- ideologies and beliefs

Threat actors

- states
- failing/fragile states
- terrorists
- criminals
- nature/hazards

Domains

- nuclear weapons
- maritime
- cyber space
- space
- public opinion, culture and information
- internationalism

Objective: Protecting UK **citizens**, **prosperity** and **way of life**

Why? Who / what? How?

Threat Drivers → Threat Actors → Threat Domains

UK actions *Multiple departments and agencies*

UK characteristics / interests

Chapter 4

The UK Government's Approach to National Security: interests, planning assumptions and organisation

4.1 This chapter sets out how we apply the principles and Strategic Framework discussed in Chapter 3 to the particular interests and concerns of the United Kingdom and its people. Drawing on an assessment of these interests, and our work on horizon scanning about the future development of threats and drivers, it outlines some planning assumptions which underpin this Strategy and future strategic work on national security issues and priorities. Finally, it sets out how the Government is organised to deliver all the actions necessary for national security, and how these actions are integrated into a coherent strategic approach.

The position and interests of the United Kingdom

4.2 To understand how to protect our people and our way of life, we need a clear understanding of our position in the world, our assets and advantages, and the challenges and vulnerabilities we face. This section sets out a baseline assessment of some of the key characteristics of the UK, and some key implications of how we therefore need to protect our national security. The challenges – in terms of the drivers, threats and domains of threat – are set out in subsequent chapters. In a public document we will not discuss all of our vulnerabilities, lest we help potential adversaries. But within these parameters we will be as transparent as possible.

4.3 It is impossible to capture all the diverse characteristics of our country. But this section highlights certain features of particular importance for national security.

4.4 The UK is a multi-national state covering the island of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Overall, the UK is relatively densely populated, and we have limited domestic food and energy resources. Our economy, the sixth largest in the world, is based on the import of primary and manufactured products and the export of services and high value-added manufactured products. It is a free market economy, with a tradition of openness. We have a pattern of trade that reaches many parts of the world, not just Europe, and very large overseas investments matched by substantial foreign investment in our infrastructure and economy.

4.5 We are a long-established democratic constitutional monarchy, with a strong central government and devolved administrations in three countries of our United Kingdom. We are part of the European Union (EU) and therefore share competence for many aspects of government action with other member states and the institutions of the EU. We have other strong overseas ties and responsibilities, economic, familial and cultural, including with our overseas territories, the Commonwealth, with the United States and with other countries. Over 5 million British citizens live overseas.

4.6 We are one of the few major European states with a growing population. An increasing proportion of our population (8.9 per cent in 2005)[17] is made up of ethnic minorities, from very many different backgrounds. Over 4.1 million residents of the UK are foreign citizens[18]. In an increasingly globalised world, diaspora communities can contribute to the UK's economic and cultural success.

4.7 We have a markedly pluralistic society, with a tradition of open debate supported by a lively free press, and a very long-standing tradition of the rule of law. We have a strong belief in values which should guide our Government's actions. But we also have a tradition of individualism which means that our values and identity are not easily captured in a single narrative.

4.8 The UK, and London in particular, is a hub for a number of global activities: communications, media (partly because of the position of English as a world language), services including business and finance, education and international transport.

4.9 We have strong and well established alliances and security interests, notably as a leading member of the EU and NATO, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and as a nuclear weapons state. We have a strong and enduring partnership with the United States, and other countries including Canada, Australia and New Zealand, in security and other areas. Our membership of the Commonwealth, which is headed by Her Majesty The Queen, provides a forum within which the UK can engage with a wide range of partners in different continents. Given our history in past centuries, our people have often been more supportive of action, including overseas intervention and/or the use of

military force, and over the last century, this has particularly been in defence of our values and freedoms.

4.10 What does all this imply for our national security? As we consider how to tackle the threats to our national security, through the Strategic Framework, we need to bear in mind the following factors:

- Because our economic interests, our citizens, and our cultural and familial connections with other countries are spread throughout many parts of the world, we have **interests that are genuinely worldwide** rather than local or regional, and we need to be able to influence events in many parts of the world, working with partners in many regions.

- Given the openness of our economy, and our dependence on trade from around the world, and flows of energy, information, resources and capital, we need to be able to **ensure that these flows are open and secure**.

- But as we cannot secure world trade and resource flows on our own, necessarily we **must work in partnership** with other countries, and with international institutions, to ensure that security.

- The UK's position as a hub of international communications, travel and migration means that it can **act as a stage where international events can be played out** domestically, with events in other countries having an impact on populations resident here. The growth of diaspora communities in the UK means that some overseas conflicts or instability can be felt acutely at home. **Domestic security cannot be separated from overseas security issues**.

17 UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs (March 2006) *UN World Population Policies.*
18 Office for National Statistics (ONS), March 2009.

- Our role in established international alliances such as NATO means that, while there is no discernible state threat to the independence, integrity or capacity for self-government of the UK, we have obligations to other states which might be more likely to face such threats, and we have to take into account **possible state threats to allies** who may be distant from our borders.

- The tradition of open debate, combined with a robust independent legal system, means that policies and actions to protect our national security have to **command consent, and be defensible** to the public as consistent with our values, and justifiable legally. In addition, both the UK's international connections and our past can lead to a public expectation of action on overseas issues greater than in many other developed nations. Our inherited links to other parts of the world, and our past and recent actions overseas, heavily influence the perception of UK security actions now. Positively, this can help us exercise leadership and influence beyond our objective power; negatively, it can limit our influence on some important issues and regions.

4.11 All of this means we have a **particularly large stake in the success of the international rules-based system**. We need international institutions to be effective, and we need overseas actors, states and non-states, to abide by international rules.

4.12 These factors are taken into account in assessing what priority we should give to particular actions to defend our national security. Given the very wide range of issues which directly or indirectly affect national security, there is an equally large range of actions we could take to protect it. This hard-headed assessment of our position, our influence and our interests helps us prioritise which of those actions are most important for us.

Key planning assumptions for national security

4.13 Our work to protect national security rests on the following key planning assumptions, which are based on our horizon scanning of possible futures and our assessment of current and future threats. We have organised these planning assumptions by the categories used in the Strategic Framework described in Chapter 3. Unless otherwise stated they relate to the next five years. Our horizon scanning extends to 20 years. On occasions, we need to plan programmes over even longer timescales, but that inevitably requires a degree of caution, given the challenges of predicting events over those timescales and the risks of unforeseen strategic shocks in the intervening period.

4.14 These planning assumptions are not intended to be exhaustive. Nor are they a substitute for more detailed operational planning assumptions for individual parts of Government. However, they provide, within the Strategic Framework for national security, a basis for informing strategic planning across the broader range of the Government's national security responsibilities. The planning assumptions must be, and are, flexible enough to allow different parts of Government to tackle different challenges as they arise.

Planning assumptions about the drivers of insecurity

4.15 The National Security Strategy is based on a set of assumptions around our more integrated world, where UK citizens and interests are affected by a more diverse range of risks. There are therefore key planning assumptions about global drivers:

4.16 Global trends: the drivers of insecurity, security threats to the UK and how they can arise, and the required response, will continue to be driven by a more interdependent global security landscape:

● **the global economy:** the present global economic recession will increase fragility in the security situation in some key regions, but will also provide an opportunity for increased global cooperation during the recovery and beyond;

● **technology:** worldwide advances in technology will, alongside all their positive aspects, inevitably bring with them emerging national security challenges, for example in cyber technology and nuclear power; particularly if they are exploited by terrorists and organised criminal groups, or others with malicious intent; and

● **demography:** the world's population will continue its rapid increase, which, combined with rising living standards worldwide will increase demand for food and energy by up to 50 per cent and water by up to 30 per cent over a 20 year period. This will bring new challenges for regional stability in key areas affected.

4.17 Other drivers of instability: Three of the other key drivers of instability – climate change, poverty, and competition for energy – have potential individual implications for national security and may exacerbate the risks of regional instability and conflict:

● **Climate change**: the world's climate will continue to change with increasing global temperatures and changing rainfall patterns. Such changes will increase the risks to human society and the natural environment with increasing pressure on health, water resources, agriculture and human settlements. Over the next twenty years these effects will be manageable but beyond that, the risk of dangerous impacts will increase strongly. We need to act now to mitigate the most dangerous consequences and adapt to those we cannot prevent, because in the longer term, climate change will act as a global threat multiplier, exacerbating existing weaknesses and tensions around the world.

● **Poverty**: Most developing countries' economies will, once the global recession has ended, continue to grow over the medium to long term. Development in countries like China and India will help to lift millions out of poverty. However, there may be a group of fragile and conflict-affected states that will benefit much less from the economic recovery and future growth.

● **Competition for energy**: Global energy demand will continue to increase over the next 20 years and competition for energy and other resources will intensify. The scope for disputes within, and between, states could therefore increase. Continued instability in energy markets will put increased pressure on existing resources. If oil demand increases faster than supply over the coming months, this could lead to a tightening of oil markets and potentially higher oil prices, which could jeopardise a sustainable economic recovery.

4.18 Ideologies: the National Security Strategy recognises the potential for ideologically driven threats to UK citizens and interests and specifically:

● **Al Qa'ida inspired ideology**: the ideology associated with Al Qa'ida will outlive any changes to its structure. It will continue to attract support. A small but significant number of people will remain committed to violent extremism.

The terrorist narrative will continue to exploit political events and individual grievances; and

- **Other ideologies**: apart from this, there is at present no other competing world ideology of sufficient force to drive national security threats to us, unlike during the Cold War. However, some regionally based ideologies may affect the UK through our role as a hub, through our diaspora populations or through driving conflict which impacts on our interests. However, none yet amount to a major national security threat.

Planning assumptions about threat actors

4.19 Terrorism: the key planning assumptions are:

- **international terrorism:** assuming continued international pressure, the Al Qa'ida 'core' organisation may not survive in its current form. The core group will not be able to achieve its strategic goal of establishing a Caliphate, but it will still have the capability to conduct significant terrorist attacks. Al Qa'ida affiliates will develop more autonomy. Associated networks and 'self-starting' groups will become more prominent and develop significant capabilities. They will continue to gravitate towards fragile and failing states, and to challenge them (notably Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, and Somalia). They will also have the capability to conduct significant terrorist attacks, including against western states. A fragmentation of the core group of Al Qa'ida may cause a diversification of the threat in the UK. 'Self-starting' organisations, old Al Qa'ida affiliates and other terrorist groups may all become more important. Full planning assumptions for international terrorism are set out in the CONTEST strategy; and

- **domestic terrorism:** The principal threat remains from Irish related terrorism, and in particular from Dissident Republican groups. Frequent attacks on the scale of Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) activity during the 'Troubles' are highly unlikely, but the risk of further attacks remains high. Loyalist paramilitary groups remain active, though the risk of them mounting attacks will decrease if they fully decommission weapons. The planned devolution of policing and justice may help to undermine Dissident Republicans, though their activity will remain unpredictable.

4.20 State threats: the key planning assumptions are:

- we cannot rule out the re-emergence of a major state-led threat but, in the foreseeable future, there will remain no state with the intent and capability to threaten the independence, integrity and self-government of the UK mainland. State threats are more likely to be manifested in less traditional, non-military threat domains than through military action;

- however, some of our Overseas Territories will continue to be subject to territorial claims by other states, which will seek to exert pressure on them through some or all of diplomatic, economic or military means;

- some Allies of the UK, to which we have an obligation under Article V of the NATO Charter, could be threatened from other states, through military or other means; and

- a number of states will continue to pursue programmes to develop offensive nuclear capabilities. Some states may look to develop cyber attack capabilities.

4.21 The other key planning assumptions for threat actors are:

- **Failing and fragile states**: there will be continuing conflict, insurgency and instability in failing or fragile states. Some of these conflicts may have a direct or indirect bearing on our national security or that of our allies;

- **Conflict**: Violent conflict and serious instability between states will also persist. Such conflicts may erupt quickly and may engage states in which the UK has a direct interest;

- **Trans-national organised crime**: the spread of globalisation and advances in technology will continue to act as the main facilitator of transnationally linked serious organised crime- increasing the pace of 'old' crimes such as drugs and enabling 'new' crimes such as e-crime. This will increase the ability of serious organised criminals to operate from a safe distance to minimise risk, enabling criminals to locate in weak and/or fragile states to evade detection; and

- **Hazards:** there is a likelihood of severe weather events and other hazards, particularly widespread flooding, sufficient to cause disruption in the UK. The risk of pandemic influenza remains high (as demonstrated by the current outbreak).

Planning assumptions about actions in the domains of threat and the United Kingdom's capabilities

4.22 The National Security Strategy recognises both how threats can arise and the importance of maintaining, adapting and, where necessary strengthening, the capabilities of the UK to respond to them.

4.23 The key planning assumptions for the **domains of threat** are:

- **Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction:** as well as some states seeking to acquire nuclear capabilities, terrorists will continue to seek access to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capabilities. There is an imperative to secure fissile and other dangerous material;

- **Cyber space:** this will become increasingly important as a national security domain, as it continues to play an ever greater role in almost all forms of human activity; and

- **Public opinion, culture, and information:** in turn, the connectedness across the globe provided by cyber space means that the domain of culture and public opinion will be increasingly important.

4.24 The UK has a range of capabilities, spanning military and non-military activities, underpinning our response to the range of threats within the national security strategy.

4.25 The key planning assumptions are:

- Operationally, activity in Afghanistan to deny Al Qa'ida a haven and to increase the stability of the nation of Afghanistan is likely to dominate the activities of UK Armed Forces;

- Capacity-building will become an increasingly important task for the UK's Armed Forces and will include tasks such as security sector reform, training of local security and military forces and building local counter-insurgency skills.

- The UK's Armed Forces are likely to be deployed to confront terrorists, manage peacekeeping or assist with stabilisation and development. In those cases, they

are likely to be confronted by a mixture of high-tech and low-tech military capabilities; and the success of their operations will depend less on battlefield success and more on shaping behaviours and gaining support for political change;

- Adversaries are unlikely to challenge the UK (and its NATO allies) in traditional military domains, given the Alliance's conventional superiority. However, there are feasible scenarios which could draw NATO allies into traditional military conflict or which would have many of the characteristics of traditional military conflict; and

- The range of potential threats which require non-military capabilities will continue to develop, as state and non-state actors increasingly pose threats in non-military domains. Continued law enforcement, security and intelligence work will be needed to monitor the threat, to disrupt those activities where necessary and to prosecute through the criminal justice system where possible;

- To address the risk from terrorists, hazards, and other threat actors, the UK's capabilities for responding to non-military threats will continue to need to become more integrated and flexible, with a greater capability to involve the citizen, local groups and the private sector in maintaining and enhancing the capabilities required; and

- Over a 20 year horizon, significant progress in modernising the international rules based system is essential if the global capability to tackle increasingly global problems is to be sufficiently robust in the long term. This will require active diplomatic and other effort from the UK.

4.26 We do not include in this list any overt planning assumptions about our vulnerabilities, nor about gaps in our capabilities, so as to avoid giving assistance to actual or potential adversaries.

4.27 We use this approach (principles, strategic framework, interests, and planning assumptions) to set priorities across the whole of the national security strategy, and within sub-strategies for particular areas, to build up flexible capabilities, and to use those capabilities. The detailed priorities for particular areas of action are set out in subsequent chapters.

How Government is organised to protect national security

4.28 The Government manages national security issues, including all the issues covered in this Strategy, through a cross-Government approach involving many departments and agencies, as well as partners in civil society, other levels of government, and international partners. The integration of government action to tackle national security is vital.

4.29 Within Government, national security matters are handled at strategic level by the Cabinet committee for National Security, International Relations and Development (known as NSID), chaired by the Prime Minister. There are also sub-committees of NSID, some chaired by the Prime Minister and some by other senior Ministers, which deal with particular aspects of national security. These committees are supported by the Cabinet Secretariat, which works to ensure coordination across Government of all policy and action on national security issues. Programme management of actions set out in the National Security Strategy is coordinated by the National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Office.

The National Security Forum

The National Security Forum is a body of experts who provide independent advice to the Government on matters relating to National Security. It was established in interim form in March 2009, with members appointed by the Prime Minister. It is chaired by Lord West of Spithead. The other members are: Professor Michael Clarke, Professor Julia King, Sir David Manning, General Sir Rupert Smith, former Deputy Assistant Commissioner Peter Clarke, Professor Amartya Sen, Professor Ziauddin Sardar, Sir Ronnie Flanagan, Sir Michael Rake, Dame Juliet Wheldon and Sir David Pepper. The Forum is tasked and directed through the Cabinet Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development. It has met twice since its establishment and its advice has contributed directly to the development of this update to the National Security Strategy. The Forum's work this year has also included a consideration of the impact of the global economic and financial downturn on national security, the implications for national security of competition for energy and the Government's draft Cyber Security Strategy.

4.30 This work is supported by horizon scanning on national security issues. Horizon scanning is the systematic examination of potential future threats and opportunities, including those at the margins of current and future thinking or planning. In *Security in an Interdependent World*, we committed to strengthening our capacity for horizon scanning and, in July 2008, established a Strategic Horizons Unit in the Cabinet Office. This Unit coordinates horizon scanning on national security issues across government to ensure that the assessment of threat drivers, threat actors, and domains of threat activity are kept up to date, and looking to the future. The Joint Intelligence Committee also provides a strategic look at future trends. This enables the national security strategy process to anticipate and plan for some of the problems of tomorrow.

4.31 Parliamentary oversight of the Strategy will be provided by a new Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, comprising members of both Houses of Parliament, and including the chairs of some key House of Commons select committees with an interest in national security. The remit of this new committee is to review the Strategy.

4.32 Each component of the Strategy requires cross-Government leadership and coordination, as each requires more than one department, and often many departments, to work together to deliver the actions needed for each component.

4.33 Some aspects of national security involve responsibilities and responses which are devolved to the administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. For example, law enforcement and justice are devolved in Scotland; and aspects of resilience and the response to civil emergencies are devolved in all three countries. Responsibility for national security as a whole is reserved to the UK Government. The Government works closely with the devolved administrations to ensure that the aspects of national security work falling to them contribute effectively to the security of the whole of the UK.

4.34 Within central government, there are lead Ministers and departments responsible for each component as follows:

- State-led threats to the UK – the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

2012 London Olympics

Providing security for the 2012 London Olympic and Paralympic Games is an example of where activity across Government is integrated in support of a single operational objective. The Games will be a celebration of sport and culture for London and the UK. But the Games will pose security challenges, the starkest of which is the threat of a terrorist attack on or associated with the Olympics. To mitigate these risks, the Government has developed a comprehensive strategy with the aim of delivering a safe and secure Games, in keeping with the Olympic culture and spirit. Working with the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA), the London Organising Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games (LOCOG), the Police and other key partners, the Government (through its Olympic Security and Safety Programme) will:

- protect Olympic venues, events and supporting transport infrastructure, and those attending and using them;

- prepare for events that may disrupt the safety and security of the Games and ensure capabilities are in place to mitigate their impact;

- identify and disrupt threats to the security of the Games;

- command, control, plan and resource for the safety and security operation; and

- engage with international and domestic partners and communities, to enhance our security and ensure the success of our Strategy.

Olympic security measures will be integrated with, and draw on, resources allocated under the United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism (CONTEST) and other pre-existing security regimes, such as those governing the transport networks. Additionally, we aim to secure some legacy benefits from the investment made in Olympic security which will support the security arrangements for future sporting events, such as the Commonwealth Games in Glasgow in 2014.

- Global instability and conflict and failed and fragile states – the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

- Terrorism (with the exception of Irish-related terrorism in Northern Ireland) – the Home Office.

- Irish-related terrorism in Northern Ireland – the Northern Ireland Office.

- Serious organised crime – the Home Office (and within Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Office).

- Civil Emergencies – the Civil Contingencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, coordinating the work of lead government departments for each type of emergency (for example, the Department of Health for human health issues, and the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs for animal diseases).

4.35 In addition, the lead responsibility for coordinating action relevant for national security on key threat drivers is as follows:

- Global economic trends – Her Majesty's Treasury

- Climate change – Department of Energy and Climate Change

- Competition for energy – Department of Energy and Climate Change

- Poverty, inequality and poor governance – Department for International Development

- Ideologies – work on the ideology underpinning the main strand of international terrorism is led by the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism based in the Home Office

4.36 The National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Office supports the Prime Minister and NSID, and leads work to address the interconnectedness of the various threat drivers. This includes leading a number of cross-cutting studies on key areas of national security, and supporting the work of the National Security Forum.

4.37 Supporting these functions, there are also lead responsibilities for coordinating the development and application of our national capabilities for acting in particular domains:

- military – Ministry of Defence

- diplomatic – Foreign and Commonwealth Office

- intelligence – the Cabinet Office is responsible for co-ordinating the Single Intelligence Account and supports the Prime Minister in overseeing the intelligence community. The individual heads of Agencies have responsibility in statute for each Agency

- cyber security – Office for Cyber Security in the Cabinet Office

4.38 It is important that the strands of work on the various drivers, threat actors and threat domains do not become separate from each other, and create silos of activity. It is the role of the Cabinet Secretariat, supporting the National Security, International Relations and Development committee of the Cabinet, to ensure that these strands of work are considered strategically, balanced, and prioritised to best effect in pursuit of our overall national security objective.

The National Security Strategic Framework

Drivers

- global trends
- climate change
- competition for energy
- poverty, inequality and poor governance
- ideologies and beliefs

Threat actors

- states
- failing/fragile states
- terrorists
- criminals
- nature/hazards

Domains

- nuclear weapons
- maritime
- cyber space
- space
- public opinion, culture and information
- internationalism

Objective: Protecting UK **citizens**, **prosperity** and **way of life**

Why?   Who / what?   How?

Threat Drivers → Threat Actors → Threat Domains

UK actions   *Multiple departments and agencies*

UK characteristics / interests

Chapter 5

UK National Security Framework – Tackling the drivers of insecurity

5.1 Challenges to national security spring from a variety of drivers and motivations. This chapter looks at **why there are challenges to the United Kingdom's interests and our way of life, and at how we address them.**

5.2 *Security in an Interdependent World* identified some of the main drivers of threats to national security. No such list of drivers can be exhaustive or remain constant over time. What matters is to identify the most important drivers likely to influence threat actors in ways which may affect the UK, now and for the future. In this Strategy we identify the following priority drivers, which are most relevant for the Government in tackling national security challenges at source:

- global economic trends and other global trends, including demography and migration;

- climate change;

- competition for energy;

- poverty, inequality and poor governance; and

- ideologies.

Global trends – the world economy, technology, and demography

5.3 Understanding and responding to fast-changing global trends is at the heart of our strategic approach to national security. As this strategy explains, globalisation has created both opportunities and challenges. Alongside a robust rules based system, the continued development of globalisation and the more equal distribution of benefits remains the best way to achieve future security and stability.

The United Kingdom as a globalised nation

5.4 The UK is a highly 'globalised' nation. This reflects our long history as an open, outward facing, trading nation and a hub of global activity. As Chapter 3 explained, the distinctive characteristics of the UK as a nation mean that it is impossible, when thinking about our own national security interests, to separate the 'domestic' and the 'international'.

5.5 The UK has and will continue to benefit from globalisation. We have a strong interest in monitoring and managing its development and in maximising the opportunities and addressing the challenges that it creates. In *Security in an Interdependent World*, we identified three sets of challenges which continue to be important: the increasing interconnectedness of and interdependence within the global economy; the impact of technology in reducing barriers between international activity; and the growth and mobility of the global population.

A more global economy

5.6 The pace of global integration has increased profoundly over the twenty years since the Cold War ended. A range of factors have driven this. Within the world economy, the collapse of communism opened up previously closed markets to

global trade, and the emergence of high growth regions, particularly though not exclusively in Asia, has greatly increased the capacity of world output. The accompanying leap in productivity, as well as lower transport costs, has had a significant impact. In the current recession, global trade flows have fallen, but in the last two decades, the trend has been towards cheaper goods and high levels of global trade.

5.7 As the past year has demonstrated, economic shocks can be quickly transmitted across national borders. There is, therefore, a compelling need for concerted global responses to global problems to aid economic recovery, including the promotion of trade.

Technology

5.8 Economies and societies around the world are increasingly dependent on electronic information and communication systems which remain vulnerable to terrorist, criminal or state-led cyber attack. The fast changing nature of communications requires active and concerted international action to ensure that communications assets are secure.

5.9 In a globalised world, scientific research is increasingly undertaken by globally dispersed teams. Developments spread widely and quickly, and information and capability lies with small groups and individuals. Further, the continued proliferation of new technologies and the rapid pace of change can be exploited for illicit as well as legitimate means. Virtual actors can operate in cyber space, across boundaries and beyond the control of state hosts. They are able to join together and dissolve both at will and at speed, and almost instantaneously reach larger

audiences than ever before. This means their impact may far exceed any required effort or outlay.

5.10 As well as computer technology, developments in fields such as bioengineering, nanotechnology, medicine and the exploitation of space are transforming the way we live. The acceleration of technical evolution is one of the major opportunities, but also one of the challenges for national security into the future as criminals and terrorist groups change their tactics to exploit the new technology. The government is committed to regular horizon scanning for technological and scientific developments, in order to maximise benefits and minimise the risks to our national security.

Demography

5.11 The world's population is growing and is expected to exceed 9.1 billion by 2050[19]. The global population is also ageing, especially in developed countries, where the size of the elderly population is already greater than the number of children[20]. However, in many of the world's poorest and most fragile regions, there is a demographic 'youth bulge', where as much as two thirds of the population is under 25. Finally, there continues to be a trend towards urbanisation and the world's urban population is expected to grow year on year, reaching a total of 6.4 billion in 2050[21]. These combined trends will impact on many of the drivers of insecurity.

5.12 There will be increased pressure on resources. The Government's Chief Scientific Advisor estimates that, by 2030, the demand for food will rise by 50 per cent, water by 30 per cent, and energy by close to 50 per cent. As the population suffering from a shortage of supplies

19 UN Population Division – UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2009) *World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision*.

20 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2007). *World Population Ageing*.

21 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2008) *UN World Urbanization Prospects: 2007 Revision*.

increases, so does the possibility of disputes. Urbanisation, when coupled with problems such as poor infrastructure and political exclusion, present increased risk of social and political instability, conflict and disorder. In poorer countries, with large working-age and youthful populations, unemployment will have been exacerbated by the economic slowdown. This could have a destabilising effect and increase the risk of social unrest, criminal activity and disorder.

5.13 Trends such as population growth, urbanisation and climate change not only present security challenges but also tend to increase migration in the longer term. There are over 190 million international migrants around the world. This number is expected to increase to 230 million by 2050.[22] Immigrants form an increasingly large part of the workforce in many industrialised economies, and are especially important for countries with ageing populations. Human mobility makes economies more dynamic and more efficient. Remittances from migrant workers far exceed international aid as a source of income to the developing world.

5.14 The economic slowdown is likely to have some impact on global migration, though the effects will be complex and hard to predict. Global levels of migration from less developed to more developed countries are likely to slow temporarily and some migrant workers may return to their country of origin.

Despite these immediate effects, in the longer term, migration will continue to be an important trend. Increased pressure on water and food supplies, severe weather events and continued global economic inequality are all likely to stimulate global migration on a large scale in future.

5.15 In Chapter 2, we explained that the continued openness of global economies was the best route to long-term stability and security. So too is the openness of societies an important factor in achieving a secure, prosperous world. Moves towards closed societies, or economies, would decrease overall stability and increase risk. However, the global movement of people must be properly managed so that its effects do not create or compound security challenges.

The longer term response

5.16 Our response will be the same as that outlined throughout this strategy: a commitment to acting early, assessing future risks, and working in partnership in support of a progressive, multilateral and rules based approach.

5.17 We will drive forward the programme collectively agreed at the London Summit. We are also committed to pushing for a resumption and successful completion of world trade negotiations, as well as the liberalisation of agricultural trade and better measures to manage water demand and promote efficiency.

5.18 We are working actively with partners internationally to monitor and protect the safety and security of new technology. We continue to support international efforts to manage global migration patterns and will continue to manage migration in a way that is fair and in the interests of our economy.

Climate change

5.19 There are two interrelated ways in which climate change acts as a driver of insecurity, both internationally and domestically.

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22 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2002) *Population Division: International Migration Report 2002.*

International risk multiplier

● Globally, climate change will increasingly be a wide-ranging driver of insecurity because it acts as a 'threat multiplier', exacerbating existing weakness and tensions around the world. It presents a challenge that goes far beyond direct physical disruption to the environment. Climate change could lead to a wide-range of social, economic and political problems such as large-scale migration, water stress, crop failure and food shortages, faster and wider spread of diseases, increased scarcity of resources, economic instability and the possibility of new geopolitical disputes.

● Everyone is affected by climate change, but the most vulnerable will be those least able to cope, especially developing countries and states with weak governance. Climate changes will increase poverty in the developing world and, though the links are complex, could tip fragile states into instability, conflict and state failure. Climate change might also lead to social unrest and power vacuums, making it easier for extremists and organised criminals to move in. Climate change therefore has the potential to impact on many of the UK's current and future security concerns. This emphasises the need for an ambitious global deal in Copenhagen later this year. Progress by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to reach a global agreement on emissions reduction, to help limit temperature increases, will be essential.

Direct impacts within the UK

● Domestically, we are already seeing the environmental impacts of climate change in the more frequent extreme weather events of recent years. These are likely to increase in frequency and severity in the future. In the coming years, national security impacts will mainly be linked to an increase in weather driven civil emergencies. But in the long term, climate change impacts are likely to increase our vulnerability more widely: affecting our transport, energy and water infrastructure, public and private property, citizen health and agriculture and food production. This is underlined by the new UK Climate Projections 2009[24] which illustrate that climate change presents a long-term security challenge to the UK without effective mitigation and adaptation action.

5.20 While the most serious impacts of climate change domestically and globally may not be seen for many years, we need to act now to address the security implications. The UK is at the forefront of tackling climate change, both domestically and internationally, in order to mitigate the impacts of climate change that are projected to affect our national security and adapt to the climate change which is already unavoidable.

Climate Change – the past year

5.21 Events during the past year have further strengthened the Government's resolve to tackle the risk of dangerous climate change. The latest research, presented at the Climate Change Congress in Copenhagen in March 2009, suggests that human-induced climate change is more severe and happening at a faster rate than previously thought. The economic downturn poses new challenges, including risks to global investment in low carbon technologies and mitigation measures. But it also presents opportunities. By moving to a low-carbon, climate-resilient economy, the UK can secure economic recovery and

23 UK Climate Projections 2009 (UKCP09), published 18th June 2009.

Climate Change: Government progress on commitments in the past year

In the past year, the Government has led multilateral efforts to tackle climate change through a reduction in carbon emissions and work to ensure that systems are in place domestically and internationally to deliver mitigation and adaptation policies. This includes:

Progress towards Copenhagen
- The European Union (EU) has achieved agreement on a 20 per cent reduction in green house gas emissions by 2020 (or 30 per cent in the event of a global deal), a 20 per cent renewable energy target by 2020 and a 20 per cent reduction in EU energy consumption by 2020. This represents a significant step towards a global agreement on climate change commitments after 2012.

Making the transition to a low-carbon economy
- The UK Climate Change Act 2008 set a legally binding target to reduce the UK's greenhouse gas emissions by at least 80 per cent by 2050, and introduced the world's first legally binding carbon budgets, alongside a statutory framework to adapt to climate change.

Increased funding on climate change research
- The Government has provided £10.4 billion funding for low carbon and energy investment over the next three years.
- A new funding mechanism for coal carbon capture and storage has been established to support up to four demonstration projects and a proposal to step up efforts to develop the Center for Climate Strategies.

Developing a global carbon market
- With EU Emissions Trading Scheme partners, and through other multilateral groups, UK effort contributed to a doubling from 2007 to 2008 in the value of the global market and an increase of 61 per cent in the volume of allowances.

Building capacity in developing countries
- The UK has helped to deliver progress towards international adaptation to help developing countries build their resilience to climate change, including the Pilot Programme for Climate Resilience under the Climate Investment Funds (the UK has pledged £800 million to these Funds).

Building capacity at home
- We have also achieved progress on domestic adaptation including a cross-government *Adapting to Climate Change Programme.*

growth at home and also provide the necessary international leadership for action.

Future Challenges and the Longer Term Response

5.22 This year is a critical window of opportunity. The increased emphasis on climate change by the US administration is very welcome and the G20 took an important step forward when it reaffirmed at the London Summit its commitment to 'address the threat of irreversible climate change'.

5.23 We have the opportunity, through an ambitious global agreement, to prevent dangerous climate change. Global emissions will need to peak and start a

significant decline within the next ten years if we are to prevent temperature rises of over two degrees Celsius. However, some impacts are already inevitable, both in the UK and globally. Our work to mitigate the impact of climate change, and to adapt to what is already unavoidable, will include:

● The UK will play a full part in preparations for UN negotiations on a **new international climate change agreement** in Copenhagen in December 2009. The Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) will shortly publish our key priorities for the negotiations including for emissions reductions, financing and technology development and international adaptation.

● The Government will shortly publish its **Strategy for Climate and Energy**, setting out policies to deliver our first three carbon budgets (to 2022) and continue progress towards our 2050 emission targets as required by the Climate Change Act. The Strategy will set out measures to cut UK emissions by 34 per cent by 2020 and 80 per cent by 2050 through investment in energy efficiency and clean energy technologies such as renewables, nuclear and carbon capture and storage.

● The Government will shortly publish its fourth paper on International Development: *Building our Common Future* which will include plans to strengthen support for developing countries by building their resilience and adaptive capacities.

● We will continue preparation for the long-term domestic impacts of climate change through our **cross-Government Adapting to Climate Change Programme**. The new UK Climate Projections, together with the actions set out in the summary

document published alongside, are an important part of this. The first **UK Climate Change Risk Assessment** process will start in the autumn and will build on the Projections and further develop our approach to domestic adaptation. Potential national security risks will be considered as an integral part of this work and will feed into the established medium term risk assessment process which underpins the National Risk Register.

● Through our **leading role in climate research**, both domestically and internationally, we will continue to improve our understanding of climate change and the actions we need to take to address it.

Competition for energy

5.24 Energy is a fundamental building block of the global economy. Secure supply is crucial to ensuring stability and growth. Energy presents security challenges in a number of ways. Most obviously, as demand increases across the globe, supplies may not be able to keep up, intensifying competition for energy and leading to instability and conflict. Increased competition may drive prices higher, positively impacting on the economic power of producer states. However, higher prices should also incentivise investment in energy production and help to drive energy efficiency.

5.25 There are other potential risks. The stability and security of our domestic energy supply is fundamental to our day-to-day lives and this supply is increasingly coming from energy imports. This can make us vulnerable to a number of disruptive challenges. For example, energy could be used as a geopolitical lever by a state threatening to restrict the energy supplies of the UK or our allies. The motivation of the state might not itself be

linked to energy, but rather reflect wider political considerations. We also know that some terrorists aspire to attack critical national energy infrastructure. Other scenarios need not involve malicious intent. We have already seen that extreme weather events, such as the 2007 summer floods, can threaten our energy infrastructure. Accidents, such as the Buncefield Oil Depot explosions and fire of December 2005, remain a risk too.

Competition for energy as a driver of insecurity

5.26 Global energy demand, on the basis of governments' existing policies, is forecast to continue to increase by around 45 per cent between 2006 and 2030.[25] Although the world is far from running out of oil and gas, output from mature oil fields is currently in decline. Remaining resources are harder to find, reach or access and are concentrated in areas of environmental sensitivity and/or potential political instability.

5.27 The scope for disputes and conflict within, and between, states could increase as a wider range of actors, with increased projected demands for energy, compete for limited resources. There have been recent examples of civil wars where energy has been used as a lever. Additionally, a state that has concerns about its access to energy resources could be motivated to threaten the UK or our allies. The impact of climate change increases potential security threats as states compete for access to energy and other resources in previously ungoverned spaces such as the Arctic. In a more competitive energy environment, price security will also be more difficult to achieve.

Wider competition for resources

5.28 Competition for other natural resources such as food, water and minerals may be a significant driver of conflict, especially in countries with poor governance. In Africa, some of the most enduring conflicts have taken place in countries with significant natural resources, such as Angola. Competition for water resources can be particularly destabilising and is set to increase in the future as the climate warms. For example, by 2035 the melting of Himalayan glaciers could affect the water supplies of three quarters of a billion people in Asia. In addition, natural resources that can be easily smuggled out of a country (diamonds most obviously) have the potential to act as both a cause and a means of financing violent conflict.

Competition for energy – the past year

5.29 Developments over the past year have reinforced the need to understand and address competition for energy as a driver of insecurity. The economic downturn has led to a contraction of energy demand. Lower oil and gas prices, coupled with higher spare capacity levels, has increased our security of supply in the short term. However, the fall in commodity prices has meant reduced or delayed investment in global energy infrastructure, particularly in oil and gas. This could have security implications for the UK in the longer term, particularly when demand rises as the global economy recovers. An energy supply crunch would cause significant price-rise risks and could exacerbate the potential for global instability and conflict.

5.30 The cut off in supply of Russian gas through the Ukraine to Europe in January 2009 demonstrated the potential for energy to be used as a political lever. It also

24 International Energy Agency: World Energy Outlook 2009.

Energy: Government progress on commitments in the past year

To mitigate competition for energy as a driver of instability and conflict, we have:

- Continual **bilateral co-operation with producer countries**, such as Nigeria, to help tackle the role energy competition plays in instability and conflict.

To address energy competition challenges and threats, we have:

- Worked internationally and within the EU to develop **competitive oil and gas markets**, increase physical security of supply and reduce price volatility. This includes:
  - measures agreed at the London Energy Meeting to enhance oil market transparency and reduce price volatility;
  - the European Commission's second Strategic Energy Review; and
  - agreement of the Third Market Liberalisation Package to improve the functioning of the EU's gas and electricity markets.

- Focussed on energy **diversification**. This includes:
  - working bilaterally with a range of countries, and through multi-lateral organisations, to increase sources and routes of supply and to facilitate investment in gas supply infrastructure to manage new imports;
  - championing new routes of supply in the UK and Europe; and
  - diversifying use of different energy types including facilitating new build nuclear power stations, improving take-up of renewables to meet the new EU 2020 renewable energy target of 20% and world leading action on coal carbon capture and storage.

To tackle other energy security related challenges, we have:

- Pursued **bilateral and multilateral dialogue** on a range of energy security issues, including work to strengthen EU-Russia dialogue.

- Undertaken an extensive programme of **security enhancements at critical energy sites** as part of our wider work to counter the threat of terrorism.

- Worked to **reduce the vulnerability of our energy infrastructure** to natural hazards, as well as to disruption by terrorist acts, following on from Sir Michael Pitt's Review of the flooding emergency that took place in June and July 2007.

demonstrated the importance of EU energy security for our domestic energy security. Due to the diversity of our gas supplies, the significant increase in our import infrastructure in recent years and our limited reliance on Russian gas, the UK experienced little direct effect. However, in certain circumstances, a longer cut off could have led to the UK balance of supply and demand becoming tight, highlighting the need to monitor and review the mechanisms for ensuring continued supply.

Future Challenges and the Longer Term Response

5.31 It is clear that the current reduction in global energy demand is a temporary departure from the long-term trend of increased consumption. UK import reliance is expected to continue to increase. By 2020 we expect to import a much greater proportion of the oil and gas we use: DECC projections suggest more than 50 per cent compared to less than 20 per cent in 2008. We will therefore become more

like other major consuming countries in facing increasing competition for supplies, exposure to developments in the global energy markets and the associated geopolitical risks.

5.32 The Government is adopting energy efficiency measures to reduce the energy intensity of our economy and moving to more diverse sources of low-carbon energy. In the long term, this will reduce our dependence on fossil fuels. Nevertheless, the UK will be reliant on imported fossil fuels for the foreseeable future. We will therefore need to continue to ensure secure and reliable supplies of oil and gas in order to maintain the stability required to enable the UK to make the transition to a low carbon economy. We will also need to address new security challenges linked to this transition, most obviously the risk of proliferation due to an increase in the use of civil nuclear power.

5.33 Decisions we make in relation to energy will also have far-reaching implications for other drivers of insecurity, most obviously climate change. The Government will therefore continue to work internationally, within the EU and domestically to mitigate the energy risks identified, while undertaking an urgent transition to a low-carbon economy. This will build on the work taken forward in the past year and includes:

- The UK Government's forthcoming **National Strategy for Climate and Energy** setting out the Government's strategic role within a dynamic market.

- We will set out a **Renewable Energy Strategy,** detailing the Government's action plan for ensuring that 15 per cent (our share of the overall EU target of 20 per cent) of our energy consumption comes from renewable sources by 2020. Work to decarbonise the economy will bring security benefits by reducing our

reliance on foreign supplies of gas and oil.

- The Government's forthcoming '**Road to 2010'** document, which will set out our approach to the proliferation challenges linked to increased use of civil nuclear power.

Within the EU
- The Government will work to support and drive **further action at an EU level**. This must aim to strengthen UK energy security, while increasing EU energy security as a whole. We will continue to press for the opening up of EU energy markets, in particular through the implementation of the Third Market Liberalisation Package. We will also work to improve Europe's ability to respond to potential future supply disruption, including through revisions to the Gas Security of Supply Directive. Finally, we will continue to encourage the EU to increase the diversity of the sources of its energy supply, in particular through the development of a 'Southern Corridor' bringing Caspian Sea gas to the EU via Turkey. These measures will complement action to move Europe towards a low-carbon economy, which will also have long-term energy security benefits.

Internationally
- The Malcolm Wicks Review is an independent review of international energy security issues, commissioned by the Government in 2008. The report, due to be published in July will contain recommendations on what further measures the UK might take, domestically and internationally, to reduce and address the risks posed by our increasing dependence on imported oil and gas. We will also consider whether the Review identifies wider national security implications.

5.34 The Government will press for improvements in **international energy governance** through a process involving the International Energy Forum, the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and others. We have been at the forefront of the IEA's work to reach out to key energy states like India, China and Russia, but will push for further progress in the coming period. We also work bilaterally with a range of countries to build strategic energy partnerships that will enhance our security of oil and gas supply over the longer term.

5.35 The Government's effort to tackle the many and disparate issues arising from both climate change and energy supply are now led by a single department, the Department of Energy and Climate Change. This is one of the most significant changes in the machinery of Government in recent years and emphasises the Government's determination to tackle long term and interrelated challenges.

Poverty, inequality and poor governance

5.36 Poverty can be a driver of insecurity through its contribution to conflict and fragility in developing countries. Such instability can have implications for the United Kingdom, for example by driving migration patterns which can spread threats such as people trafficking closer to home. Recognising this, *Security in an Interdependent World* reiterated the Government's commitment to meeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),[25] with a particular focus on fragile states.

5.37 Over one billion people live on less than $1.25 a day. Poverty, inequality and poor governance can both drive and worsen the impact of violent conflict, terrorism, organised crime, climate change and health pandemics, as well as make it more difficult to mount an effective operational response.

5.38 The vulnerability of developing countries has implications for global security and the UK, whether manifested through flows of illegal drugs and firearms into our cities, or the current terrorist threat. It is in our shared interests to support the efforts of all developing countries to increase their resilience by addressing poverty and inequality. The UK's commitment to poverty reduction and achievement of the MDGs is not only morally right in itself; it can also contribute to our shared interests, and to our own security. More effective and accountable states in poor countries will be better able to meet the aspirations of their citizens and deliver basic state functions, as well as making it more difficult for terrorist organisations to recruit and operate in these areas. The UK is committed not only to ensuring that our own development assistance is used effectively to reduce poverty but also that the international system provides the right support for developing countries. The UK has a particular interest in contributing to shared responses to shared problems because our way of life is dependent, to a greater extent than in many other countries, on the free movement of goods, money, people and ideas.

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25 The MDGs are eight specific goals to be met by 2015 that aim to combat extreme poverty across the world. These goals were created at the UN Millennium Summit in New York in 2000.

Tackling poverty: Government progress on commitments in the past year

Continued action towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs):

- During 2008, the Government, alongside the UN, continued to drive forward the MDG Call to Action campaign, galvanising international support for efforts to accelerate progress on the MDGs.

An increased development budget

- We are on track to achieve the UN target of 0.7 per cent of gross national income (GNI) by 2013, as reflected by the year on year increase in the UK's Overseas Development Aid expenditure from 0.36 per cent of GNI in 2007 to 0.43 per cent in 2008 and the budgeted spend of £7.5 billion, estimated as approximately 0.50 per cent of GNI for 2009.

- Within this, Department for International Development is also currently committed to ensure spending on education in developing countries is increased to £1 billion by 2010/11 and to spend £8.5 billion on education by 2015/16. In June 2008, the government announced a commitment to spend £6 billion on health systems and services over 7 years to 2015, and is also committed to providing £1 billion to the Global Health Fund.

More assistance to fragile states and regions where links between insecurity, poverty and conflict strongest

- DFID has significantly increased development assistance to fragile states over recent years. In the five years to March 2009 the UK has doubled its aid to conflict-affected and fragile countries to £1.2 billion per year, and is now the third largest bilateral donor.

Working to ensure that mineral revenues contribute to economic development, political stability and security

- The Government strongly supported the launch in 2002 of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). We continue to support the EITI in its aim to increase the transparency of revenues paid by extractives companies to host governments.

Poverty – the past year

5.39 The impact of the economic downturn on developing countries is serious. Growth for emerging and developing countries is expected to grow at 1.6 per cent in 2009 and 4 per cent in 2010[26] compared to growth rates of 8.3 per cent and 6.1 per cent in 2007 and 2008 respectively. The World Bank expects remittances to fall significantly during 2009, by up to 8 per cent.[27]

26 IMF's World Economic Outlook (April 2009).
27 World Bank Migration and Development Brief: March 23 2009.

5.40 The lack of social insurance systems across the developing world will force many poor and vulnerable households to sell their few remaining assets, often small amounts of livestock or land. This might mean that they may not be able to take advantage of the recovery when it arrives and will remain in poverty.

5.41 Prior to the economic crisis, developing countries were already contending with a massive increase in food commodity prices. While international food prices have come down significantly over the past year, food insecurity in developing countries continues to rise in the face of the global economic crisis, causing increased hunger and poverty.

5.42 These developments, combined with population growth, suggest the impact on poverty will be significant. DFID has estimated that 90 million more people will be in poverty (living on less than $1.25 per day) after 2010 than had been previously anticipated. In these circumstances, the risk of conflict is heightened.

Future Challenges and the Longer Term Response

5.43 Investment by the UK development programme to achieve the MDGs and improve governance reduces the risks of instability and conflict by helping developing countries to address many of its underlying causes. However, the current economic context requires additional support for developing countries, ensuring that we are using development assistance for the right things and in the right way to maximise our impact on poverty reduction.

5.44 During the economic downturn, we will work to protect the poorest by increasing support for social protection. The UK is working with the World Bank to design and finance a Rapid Social Response Fund to channel funds quickly to country-level social protection systems, where people have been badly affected by the crisis. This will help reduce the impact of the downturn on individuals but also reduce the risk of social unrest. We will also give new priority to ensuring the poorest countries build back resilient and sustained economic growth.

5.45 DFID is also exploring new approaches in fragile and conflict-affected countries, focused on peace-building and state-building. This includes doing more to provide justice, security and economic opportunities for the poor and new, joint Government strategies in fragile countries.

5.46 The economic downturn is already impacting on international aid commitments and progress against the MDGs more broadly. The UK has reiterated its development commitments, including increasing aid to achieve the UN's 0.7 per cent target and encourages others to do the same. At the London Summit, world leaders reaffirmed their commitments to development, including the provision of aid. Continued action is needed to ensure the downturn does not irrevocably damage the development prospects of the poorest.

Ideologies and beliefs

5.47 Previous sections discussed various objective or external drivers which can motivate threats. But threats can also be motivated by human and social concerns. A particularly important category of threat driver in the last century has been ideology.

5.48 Ideologies comprise a broad grouping of many types of belief. For a variety of reasons – political, economic, historical, ethnic or religious – different groups of individuals, some organised in states, and some non-states, have propagated ideologies which can be hostile to the UK and its people, and or to our allies and partners. In the twentieth century, the UK and its allies faced existential challenges from the ideologies of Nazism and world communism.

5.49 We do not currently face such a severe challenge from any ideology. Nor do we form part of a culture or civilisation that is threatened by other discrete cultures or civilisations. But ideologies can still be motivating forces for threats which are real, even if on a smaller scale than those of the last century.

5.50 The current threat from international terrorism is driven by a violent extremist ideology associated with Al Qa'ida. This ideology regards most governments in Muslim countries to be 'un-Islamic' or apostate; claims that these governments are sustained by western states who are engaged in an attack on Islam; and considers violent action to be a religious duty. So in responding to the threat of international terrorism, we have to consider how to address this ideology, just as we addressed the ideological appeal of world communism, in the UK and overseas, during the Cold War. The Government's action against this ideology is described further in Chapter 6, which outlines our counter-terrorism strategy.

5.51 We assess that apart from this example, at present, there is no other competing world ideology of sufficient force to drive national security threats to the UK or its people. However, regionally based ideologies – particularly forms of nationalism, religious sectarianism, or separatism – can still affect the UK. Given our role as a hub for international activity, and for the movement and settlement of peoples from many countries, regional conflicts driven by ideology can potentially reach into the UK. Examples include disputes in Sri Lanka, in Kashmir and in the Caucasus. To date, the impact of these regional ideologies has not been enough to constitute a driver of threat in the UK. But we must continue to monitor the impact of such disputes, and to scan the horizon for other disputes which could in time – like the early precursors of Al Qa'ida

in the 1990s – ultimately turn into a threat to us.

5.52 Ideologies can be, and often are, pursued by legitimate and peaceful means. The peaceful political pursuit of beliefs amounting to an ideology is not an issue for national security. Indeed, the pursuit of a belief in freedom can be a positive force for good, as in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s.

5.53 It is not always easy to determine whether the actions of states to expand their influence and advance their interests are explicitly ideological; or whether they arise from other reasons, such as fear of other states, or differences in perception about the actions or aims of other states, or from rivalries between states. Throughout history, there have been examples of states seeking to expand their power and influence at the expense of other states, not necessarily for identifiable ideological reasons.

5.54 But whether actions are driven ideologically or not, there are always driving beliefs which are important. This premise has three important consequences:

- First, that in order to address any resulting threat, we have to tackle the underlying beliefs: either by tackling the ideology, if there is one; or by working to change the beliefs of the state concerned which are motivating its hostile actions. This is a classic role for diplomacy;

- Secondly, that it may also require appealing directly to the people of the state concerned, to try and build a shared set of beliefs which will reduce the tendency to hostility. This requires action in the domain of public opinion;

- Thirdly, such rivalries can be made less potentially harmful if they are constrained within multilateral systems

of rules, at the global level through the United Nations, though international law, through security and defence alliances such as NATO, and through regional organisations, particularly in Europe through the European Union. A rules-based international system is vital to help turn any rivalry into peaceful competition and in turn into constructive cooperation. This is another compelling argument for strong multilateral governance.

The National Security Strategic Framework

Drivers

- global trends
- climate change
- competition for energy
- poverty, inequality and poor governance
- ideologies and beliefs

Threat actors

- states
- failing/fragile states
- terrorists
- criminals
- nature/hazards

Domains

- nuclear weapons
- maritime
- cyber space
- space
- public opinion, culture and information
- internationalism

Objective: Protecting UK **citizens**, **prosperity** and **way of life**

Why?   Who / what?   How?

Threat Drivers   →   Threat Actors   →   Threat Domains

UK actions   *Multiple departments and agencies*

UK characteristics / interests

Chapter 6

UK National Security Framework – Addressing the Threat Actors

6.1 The Government has developed a comprehensive view of potential national security threats. It includes all those threats which could cause a major disruptive challenge to our country, and which could prevent UK citizens from going about their daily business and maintaining their way of life.

6.2 In analysing national security threats, the Government analyses the source of the threats systematically. Threats may come from:

- intentional, hostile human action,

- from unintentional human action, i.e. from accidents;

- or from the effect of natural phenomena, i.e. from hazards

6.3 The bulk of national security threats of course relate to intentional, hostile human action. These 'threat actors' include:

- state actors –

  - established, capable states (state-led threats); and

  - failing and fragile states, and groups or individuals operating within conflicts in or between such states

- non-state actors –

  - terrorists, insurgents and other non-state actors motivated by ideology

  - transnational organised criminals – people motivated by pecuniary rather than ideological motives.

6.4 Taken together, this provides a comprehensive view of threat actors (those who may pose a threat), including state and non-state actors, and accidents and natural hazards. The National Security Framework is accordingly structured to reflect these five categories of threat, the four listed above, and civil emergencies.

State-led threats to the UK

6.5 *Security in an Interdependent World* recognised that the bi-polar world of The Cold War has been replaced by a more complex set of relationships. The global balance of power has changed, and is still changing. Whilst we no longer face a major state-led existential threat to our national security, the threats we do face come from a wider and less predictable range of sources. The nature of threats is also diversifying.

6.6 Instead of taking offensive military action there is a realistic possibility, within the 20 year horizon, that a state may seek to threaten the stability or freedom of action of the UK, its overseas territories or its allies through non-military means by, for example: disrupting or denying access to critical services such as energy supply; exerting malign influence on citizens or the Government; causing sudden malicious damage to economic infrastructure, or sponsoring terrorist activities against the UK or its interests. To achieve these effects, a state may chose to employ a number of different levers such as cyber attack or espionage (both human and technical), or bring to bear significant economic or trade pressure.

State-led threats: Government progress on commitments in the last year

Much of the Government's responses to current and future state-led threats are not made public for essential national security reasons. Therefore, it is not possible to include them all in a public document. However, since March 2008:

● The Government has strengthened further the full range of both its military and intelligence capabilities, as described earlier in Chapter 3.

● Through the establishment of the new Strategic Horizons Unit in the Cabinet Office, we have enhanced our ability to scan the horizon for future threats, including those that are state-led, and plan accordingly.

● In order to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities which might be exploited by hostile foreign states, the Government continues to invest in collaborative working with critical national infrastructure providers and to provide advice on physical, electronic and personnel security. This effort is led by the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) and CESG, the UK's National Technical Authority for Information Assurance. Up to date advice is also available for individuals, academic and research institutes and businesses to mitigate the risks presented by hostile foreign states.

● Finally, the Cabinet Office has led a programme of work over the past year to develop the UK's first Cyber Security Strategy which addresses the full range of threats, including those from hostile states. This is explained in full in Chapter 7.

Future challenges

Military threats

6.7 We continue to assess that for the foreseeable future it is unlikely that any state or alliance will have both the intent and capability to threaten the independence, integrity and self-government of the UK militarily. However, history has shown that it can be notoriously difficult to predict the circumstances and character of future conflict, and it is not possible to rule out the re-emergence of a major state-led threat to the UK over the longer term. We will need, therefore, to continue to review the nature of military state-led threats, including in relation to our Overseas Territories, some of which remain subject to territorial claims by other states. It is also possible that allies of the UK, to which we have an obligation under Article V of the NATO Charter, could be threatened by other states, through military or other means. Finally, certain states' intention to acquire nuclear weapons, and the proliferation of ballistic missile technology and other systems, could transform regional security dynamics and generate conflicts which, either directly or indirectly, could pose a considerable threat to UK interests.

Non-military threats

6.8 As highlighted in *Security in an Interdependent World,* the UK already faces a sophisticated and pervasive threat from hostile foreign intelligence activity, much of which is conducted in the cyber domain. There is no reason to expect this to diminish in the short or medium term. The techniques used by some state actors also have the potential to go beyond traditional intelligence gathering and may

also be used for spreading disinformation or attempting to disrupt critical services.

6.9 As Chapter 5 noted, the potential for one state to use its control over resources to apply political pressure on another was highlighted earlier this year. The gas dispute that led to a disruption of Russian gas flowing through the Ukraine resulted in widespread gas supply shortages in the EU. Although not an imminent concern for the UK, we need to recognise the role that access to critical resources, such as energy supply, may play in defining the global security landscape in the future. We must work to ensure that we have in place adequate protection and mitigation measures. Given the interconnectedness of global financial markets, we also need to be alive to the possibility that hostile states may turn to economic or trade levers more widely to exert malign pressure on the UK.

6.10 The UK continues to benefit from significant inward foreign investment, including in elements of its critical national infrastructure (CNI) and we are reliant on international products and technology across all sectors. Foreign ownership does not of course imply malign intent, nor does it generally mean foreign state control. Nevertheless, in some cases, there is the theoretical possibility of state influence being exercised through such means in times of tension. The Government will keep such issues under review to mitigate against this possibility becoming an actual vulnerability.

Longer term response

6.11 Building partnerships and improving relations with other states, multilaterally and bilaterally, is at the heart of our approach to foreign policy. The overall strategic lead on state-led threats therefore rests with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. However, the UK's significant military and intelligence capabilities represent key elements of our response.

6.12 The UK's response to the full range of state-led threats needs to be informed by a sound understanding of the changing nature of the threat; be forward thinking and able to adapt to the future; and draw on all the capabilities available, including:

- **Effective diplomacy and strong multilateral relationships**
We place a high premium on diplomacy and multilateral engagement to reduce the motivation of potentially hostile states. For example, the capability of our Armed Forces, both as a deterrent and operationally, is magnified greatly by our leading role in NATO and the EU, and through our other international military and security cooperation and development programmes.

More widely, we are committed to working multilaterally to develop a strong rules-based international system, not just to promote economic growth and development, but also to mitigate the risk of another state acting to damage our economic well-being in a way that poses a threat to our national security.

- **Robust trading partnerships**
Strong international trade links and industrial interdependencies, supported by Government where appropriate, also mitigate the risk in this area.

In a trade-driven world, economic interaction can contribute to reducing the motivation of potentially hostile states, by allowing open international markets for products and services to benefit all countries. These trading relationships also have the effect of enhancing the position of the UK and its economy.

- **Our Armed Forces**
The UK's military capability is fundamental to our ability to counter state-led threats and we remain committed to retaining robust, expeditionary and flexible armed forces for the foreseeable future. Our

conventional military capabilities also act as a significant deterrent to potential non-nuclear state-led threats.

As noted in Chapter 4, we assess that no country currently has the capability and intent to threaten the UK with nuclear weapons. We believe that the best way to ensure that this position endures is to work towards a safer world in which there are no such weapons. But given the continuing risk posed by proliferation, and the certainty that a number of other countries will retain substantial nuclear arsenals, we believe it is premature to judge that a nuclear threat to our national security will not arise in future. As a result, a minimum strategic deterrent capability is likely to remain a necessary element of our national security for the foreseeable future.

- **Our Security and Intelligence Agencies**

Some hostile state actions, particularly in times of conflict or heightened tension, could be carried out overtly but many will be covert. Our security and intelligence agencies, together with those of our allies, play a critical role both in providing insight and early warning on states' capabilities and intent and in enabling us to best mitigate or defend ourselves against specific threats.

- **Our underpinning domestic legislative and regulatory framework**

The Government works collaboratively with the organisations which maintain our critical infrastructure and provide key services within the United Kingdom to ensure that the interests of consumers are protected. This approach is underpinned by a robust regulatory framework.

And ultimately, through the Enterprise Act (2002), the Civil Contingencies Act (2004) and the Energy Act (2005), the UK Government has the legislative powers required to intervene should it have significant concerns on national security grounds about the acquisition of elements of its critical national infrastructure, or to take control of that infrastructure in the event of an actual or threatened emergency.

Priorities for the future

6.13 As the nature of possible future state-led threats to the UK evolves in both the military and non-military domains, our capability to respond to any such threats needs also to develop. Our priorities, therefore, include:

- continued commitment to multilateral relationships and international trading partnerships;

- taking forward the recommendations of the Cyber Security Strategy to ensure the safety and security of citizens, business and Government in cyber space;

- strengthening further the mechanisms for collective decision making across Government on all aspects of non-military state-led threats;

- in partnership with industry, working to strengthen the UK's industrial capability in technologies critical to our infrastructure and defence assets, and hence our national security;

- maintaining the global reach of our security and intelligence agencies through continued investment in existing and new capabilities;

- maintaining the capability of our Armed Forces by ensuring they remain agile, deployable, highly trained and are held at high readiness against a range of contingencies;

- maintaining the credibility and utility of our alliances, especially a reformed

NATO, including our contribution to strong multilateral forces;

- continuing to invest in maintaining a qualitative military advantage over potential state adversaries in technological, doctrinal and structural terms; and

- maintaining a minimum strategic deterrent capability, currently represented by Trident.

Global instability and conflict, and failed and fragile states

6.14 Instability and violence overseas can pose a threat to the UK, its citizens and way of life, both directly and indirectly. Our well-being is derived from trade, security of our energy supplies and commercial interests – all of which can be severely interrupted by conflict within or between states. What happens in a state where law and order has broken down or is under pressure can have a direct impact on security at home, through the spread of organised crime, drugs, the growth of extremism, or the effects of migration. And our citizens rightly expect us to take action to uphold security and justice, to promote legitimate and accountable government and support for human rights.

6.15 No two conflicts are the same. The factors that cause tension in one country or region to boil over into violent conflict will not mirror those in another. Nor will any two conflicts require the same interventions to prevent violence, bring it to an end, or to stop it recurring. Our understanding of the drivers and implications of instability and violent conflict and how to reduce conflict continues to develop. For example, the likely consequences of climate change, such as migration, crop failure, damage to energy infrastructure, decreasing fresh water supplies and increasing poverty, could displace populations and exacerbate

existing conflict in already vulnerable regions.

6.16 Instability and violent conflict overseas provide an opportunity for other threats such as terrorism and organised crime to flourish. Much of the current wave of international terrorism is connected to disputes and conflicts where the international community has found it difficult to broker resolution. Palestine, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Lebanon, Kashmir, and Iraq have become focal points for terrorism over the past 20 years. Terrorist groups can thrive in fragile and failed states where the infrastructure of terrorism may flourish, where terrorist organisations not only run training facilities but also provide material support, protection and sometimes quasi-governmental services to the local population. Al Qa'ida grew under the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and it's senior leadership now operates out of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Al Qa'ida affiliates exploit areas in Yemen, the Sahel, and Somalia where the writ of the state is undermined. Failed states are also prone to insurgencies where non-state organisations, such as the Taliban, pose a specific threat to the integrity of a state or portions of its territory.

6.17 Our approach to conflict is to work across government bringing together the full range of development, diplomatic and military tools aligned to wider Government (and multinational) priorities, working together towards common goals. The FCO, MoD and DFID jointly deliver the Government's key public service agreement (PSA): our commitment to reduce the impact of conflict through enhanced UK and international efforts. Our efforts must be prioritised on those conflicts which most affect UK interests and citizens and where the UK is most able to make a difference. Our priorities under the PSA include Afghanistan and Pakistan, Africa,

including Sudan and the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans as priorities for UK engagement.

Global instability and conflict – the past year

6.18 Violent conflict and serious instability between and especially within states persists. Both state and non-state actors engage in conflict, and because the implications of intra-state conflict can reach beyond the borders of a particular state, internationalised intra-state conflicts are also prevalent. The conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008 has shown how conflicts can suddenly erupt and become an international priority for action. Israel's invasion of Gaza in response to Hamas rocket fire into Israel highlighted the importance of sustaining international efforts to achieve political solutions to entrenched conflicts.

6.19 It is not yet clear what effect the global economic downturn will have on conflict affected and fragile states or on the international community's ability and willingness to address it. Economic factors alone are unlikely to cause new conflicts. But the crisis has increased the vulnerability of countries highly dependent on external financing, commodity exports or remittances. And it is likely that it will further reduce the ability of weak or fragile states to deal with or absorb external and internal shocks.

Future Challenges and the Longer Term Response

6.20 We will improve and integrate our early warning mechanisms for conflict, trends analysis and planning processes

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Global instability and conflict, and failing and fragile states: Government progress on commitments in the past year

Delivering the Government's PSA on conflict and building the capacity of weak states and regional organisations to prevent and resolve conflicts

● Through a broad programme set out in our public service agreement (PSA), we have provided support to conflict affected regions including Sudan, the Horn of Africa, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, the Balkans, the Middle East, Afghanistan and Iraq.

Strengthening UN capacity for conflict prevention, mediation, stabilisation, recovery and peace-building

● We strongly support the UN's role in international peacekeeping and peacebuilding. We are working with others to ensure the UN Security Council develops a more strategic approach and strengthens linkages between the two. On peacekeeping, we have three main objectives: to ensure that the UN Security Council's peacekeeping mandates are rigorous, incorporating robust military advice, and early consultation with troop contributing nations; working to ensure that current and future peacekeeping operations are properly resourced. With our encouragement, the UN's Peacekeeping Department has started work on a major report on the future of UN peacekeeping called *A New Horizon for Peacekeeping*. On peacebuilding we have built international consensus to address three critical challenges in support to countries emerging from conflict: strategic leadership, rapid flexible funding and civilian resources.

Global instability and conflict, and failing and fragile states: Government progress on commitments in the past year (continued)

Strengthening EU capacity for conflict prevention, mediation, stabilisation, recovery and peace-building

- Many of the security challenges the UK faces are common to those of Europe as a whole. This is reflected clearly through the shared approach to security in the National Security Strategy and the European Security Strategy, first endorsed by the European Council in 2003 and reaffirmed in December 2008. Both recognise the key threats posed by proliferation, terrorism and regional and global conflict. Both also acknowledge the increasing complexity and interdependence of the threats and challenges we face, the importance of multilateral solutions to them and the particular importance of climate change and competition for energy as drivers of future insecurity.

- Working with European partners we have secured agreement at the December European Council on the creation of a single civilian and military strategic level planning structure for European security and defence policy (ESDP) missions and operations.

Enhancing ability to deploy civilians and increased civilian-military integration

- The UK has also provided police and civilian UK secondments to key international institutions including the UN, the EU and Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2008/9. To underpin further our ability to contribute more widely to international civilian missions and to operate nationally alongside British or NATO forces, for example in Afghanistan, the UK is also developing a more robust standby capability of civilians with different areas of expertise, including 800 stabilisation experts, a cadre of around 200 conflict and stabilisation experts within the civil service, and a wider network of professionals willing to assist in conflict affected environments. This capacity will be fully established by the end of 2009.

across government departments. As well as engaging early, we will engage substantively by strengthening governance in fragile states, supporting reform of security and justice systems, and addressing the underlying causes of conflict. We will also aim for solutions that are locally-led, and implemented, and inclusive of local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society to help build effective states, accountable to their citizens.

6.21 The United Kingdom will rarely be the only external actor in a given conflict. When violence or instability erupts collective action is most effective and

carries greater legitimacy. The Government expects responses to fragile and conflict affected states to be primarily through multinational institutions (particularly the UN, NATO, the EU and the African Union) or with like-minded partner nations. In a time of increasing pressure and strained resources, the United Kingdom and France are leading work, launched in the UN in January 2009 during the French UN Security Council Presidency, to develop a more strategic approach to peacekeeping. This includes a more coherent approach to when and how we mandate UN operations, building the capacity of the UN and troop contributors, and ensuring that

a peacekeeping operation is part of a wider and coherent strategy to build peace. We will be taking this forward during the UK Presidency of the UN Security Council in August 2009.

6.22 Different situations of conflict and fragility require different tools and capabilities. The Government will continue to develop its ability to tackle the underlying causes of conflict and fragility through its development and poverty reduction programmes, through mediation and other diplomatic approaches as well as developing more flexible military capabilities to support stabilisation. The Government's enhanced Stabilisation Unit is supporting delivery of our programmes in a range of key target countries, through both bilateral and multilateral cooperation. By the end of the year, we will have established a one thousand strong civilian standby capability to deploy in support of stabilisation and conflict prevention in priority areas.

6.23 Government departments are already working together to deliver the Public Service Agreement to reduce the impact of conflict through UK and international efforts. We will be developing that work further to ensure we have a coherent conflict strategy which sets out a strategic approach to preventing and responding to conflict.

6.24 Encouraging international partners and organisations to take a strategic approach to conflict will be essential in ensuring that the international system can develop its capacity to tackle conflict early and use scarce resources more effectively and efficiently.

Afghanistan and Pakistan

The challenges facing Afghanistan and Pakistan are substantial and complex: ranging from strengthening security, to improving governance and basic services, reducing poverty and promoting growth, and protecting human rights, including women's rights. But it is vital to the region, to global security and to our own security, that these challenges are met. The situation in both countries has changed significantly in the past year, and we have adapted our activities across development, diplomacy and defence, as part of an integrated approach – set out in the new joint strategy *Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Way Forward* in April this year. This strategy sets out a multi-strand approach, covering improving security in the face of a complex insurgency with links between the two countries, building more effective and accountable governance, strengthening the rule of law, and an innovative approach to development in an often insecure environment. The strategy also recognises that in all these areas, efforts must be led by the Afghan and Pakistani governments themselves, with the international community's support.

Afghanistan and Pakistan (continued)

In **Afghanistan,** we are playing a leading role: there are currently 8,300 UK troops in Afghanistan. This number will temporarily rise to 9,000, to provide extra security during the Presidential election, and will return to an enduring maximum of 8,300 in 2010. In Helmand, where the majority of our troops are based, the UK is in the lead in the joint military-civilian Provincial Reconstruction team. At both national level and in Helmand we are focused increasingly on building Afghan capacity, so that Afghans can take control of their own security, governance and development. Over time, the UK will shift the balance of its military effort away from front line combat and towards training the Afghan police and army. This will be integrated with civilian efforts to help build effective and accountable Afghan governance, tackle the drugs trade, improve the rule of law, and basic services. We are committed to strengthening Afghan democracy at all levels, including by providing support for credible and inclusive elections this year, and backing the Afghan government as it takes forward efforts to tackle corruption and reconciliation. We will increase our support for sub-national governance and rule of law, including helping governors reach out to the traditional tribal system through local shuras.

In Helmand, coordination between government departments is significantly improved, showing how we have adapted to the challenge of delivering development and governance support in difficult security conditions. We now have 80 deployed civilians experts, double the number a year ago, working in a joint civilian-military headquarters to a joint plan for the key population centres. DFID support to Helmand will help 400,000 people with clean water, better roads, improved electricity, and support for legal agriculture and other opportunities to earn a decent wage.

In **Pakistan**, UK policy is based on principles shared with the Government of Pakistan, which include the need for long-term good governance and economic development, as well as providing security and tackling terrorism. To help meet these needs, the UK and Pakistan recently established a Strategic Dialogue, which provides a framework for working together at a senior level on high priority issues of security, economic prosperity and poverty reduction. Increased cooperation on security and diplomatic issues is complemented by the UK's development assistance to Pakistan, which focuses greater attention on the basic human challenges Pakistan faces. That is why the UK has increased development assistance to Pakistan to £665 million over the next four years, providing more support for education and health, making government more effective and making growth work for everyone. This will contribute to 5 million more children in primary school and train 15,000 health facility staff. Increasing our work in the areas of Pakistan that border Afghanistan (especially on education, governance and economic opportunities) will also help the Government of Pakistan to tackle grievances that can fuel violent extremism. Maintaining long-term vision and commitment will be essential. The success of UK and international efforts to help the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan bring stability, democratic governance and prosperity to the region depends on it.

Terrorists & Terrorism

6.25 This section of the Strategy concerns terrorists and other non-state actors, such as insurgents, who may threaten our security. Currently the threat from international terrorism is the most significant immediate security threat to the United Kingdom.

Terrorism – the past year

6.26 Since the publication of the National Security Strategy, terrorist attacks have been carried out in the UK by dissident Irish republican terrorists, with the murder of two soldiers and a policeman in Northern Ireland this year. Nonetheless, the threat by individuals and groups linked to or inspired by Al Qa'ida continues to represent the pre-eminent terrorist threat to the UK and our interests. We know that conducting a successful attack against the UK remains a priority for the Al Qa'ida leadership and that, despite significant disruption by the police and the security and intelligence agencies, planning and attempts to carry out attacks against us continue.

6.27 The international terrorist threat originates primarily from four sources: the Al Qa'ida leadership and their immediate associates, located mainly on the Pakistan/Afghanistan border; terrorist groups affiliated to Al Qa'ida in North and East Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Iraq and Yemen; 'self starting' networks and lone individuals motivated by an ideology similar to that of Al Qa'ida, but with no connection to that organisation; and terrorist groups that follow a broadly similar ideology as Al Qa'ida but which have their own identity and regional agenda. Al Qa'ida and associated terrorists aspire to attack without warning and they aim to cause mass casualties. They are actively seeking to recruit new members. We believe that they are prepared to use unconventional techniques where they can develop a capability to do so (including chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons).

6.28 Overseas, the past year has seen a deteriorating security situation in Pakistan, with over 60 suicide attacks in 2008. We have an immediate counter-terrorism interest in Pakistan because the Senior Leadership of Al Qa'ida continues to operate from havens in the border areas near Afghanistan. More widely the UK has important national interests in Pakistan that are founded in our historical association with the Indian sub-continent, the close familial links between many UK and Pakistani citizens and the importance of a stable Pakistan to Afghanistan and the wider region. These interests are threatened by the presence of Al Qa'ida and the continuing Taliban insurgency in Pakistan.

6.29 Elsewhere, Al Qa'ida and Al Qa'ida associated groups have been active in Yemen, East Africa and the Mahgreb. In November 2008, India suffered a serious terrorist attack in Mumbai by 10 terrorists whom the Government believes were trained and directed by Lashkar e Taiba, based in Pakistan. The attack, which killed at least 160 people and injured over 300, demonstrated key hallmarks of modern terrorism: it was an attack on soft targets; it was designed to cause large numbers of civilian casualties; it required careful planning and command and control; and it exploited the media for propaganda.

Counter-Terrorism: Government progress on commitments in the past year

Increasing capability to detect and disrupt terrorists

- The Government published its updated CONTEST Strategy for countering international terrorism. This set out for the first time in a public document our view of the history and development of the current threat for the UK, our detailed approach to countering the threat from international terrorism, and our key successes to date.

- The Government has continued with its programme of significant investment in the intelligence and security services. Since 2001, the Security Service has doubled in size, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) Terrorism Team has grown significantly and additionally Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) resources have enhanced front-line counter-terrorism operations overseas. In the past year, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) has also grown by 10 per cent.

- On 1 April 2009 a fourth Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) in the Thames Valley became operational. This was established by expanding the size and capability of the previous South East Counter Terrorism Intelligence Unit.

Enhancing protection against terrorism provided by the new UK border agency

- The United Kingdom Borders Agency (UKBA) now has more than 25,000 staff with a presence in 135 countries. Within UKBA, a new unified UK Border Force presents the primary face of Government at the border and comprises almost 9,000 staff.

- The £1.2 billion e-Borders system has screened over 90 million passengers travelling to the UK, using data received from approximately 105 carriers on over 185 routes. This has led to over 40,000 alerts and over 3,200 arrests for all crimes, not specifically terrorist charges, and has allowed the resources of the border agencies to be targeted better on those intending harm to the public in the UK or to deceive UK authorities.

Increasing capacity to deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack

- Counter-terrorism security advisors have run over 900 scenario-based training events for city and town centre businesses to help them identify measures they can take to protect themselves, and their customers, and to recover from a terrorist attack should one occur.

Tackling violent extremism and challenging the violent extremist narrative

- The revised Prevent Strategy and an associated Guide for Local Partners in England were published in May 2008.

- A toolkit for schools on preventing violent extremism was published in October 2008 by the Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF). This is complemented by two sets of guidance published in February 2009 to enable higher and further educational institutions to reduce the risks of radicalisation on campus.

Future Challenges and the Longer Term Response

6.30 For the foreseeable future, Al Qa'ida and its associates are likely to remain the pre-eminent threat to the UK, although the Al Qa'ida 'core' organisation may not survive in its current form. If the very top leadership (Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri) were killed or captured it would cause significant disruption in the short term and lead to changes in Al Qa'ida's structure and command and control but would not necessarily make the broader movement less lethal. A fragmentation in the core group of Al Qa'ida may cause a diversification of the threat in the UK: self-starting organisations, old Al Qa'ida affiliates and other terrorist groups may all become more important. Over time, Al Qa'ida affiliates are likely to develop greater autonomy and continue to gravitate towards and to challenge fragile and failing states, where it will be difficult, and at times impossible, to conduct conventional law enforcement counter-terrorist operations.

6.31 We cannot predict what causes or ideologies will give rise to terrorism in the future. Some of the factors that sustain the current pattern of international terrorism are likely to persist. Many of the conflicts and disputes exploited by contemporary terrorist organisations show no signs of early resolution, and failing states (or areas with failing governance) are likely to remain a factor for the foreseeable future. Grievances will continue to make some people in the Islamic world vulnerable to the political agenda associated with Al Qa'ida, and small numbers may be prepared to support Al Qa'ida's operational activities.

6.32 Globalisation, the Internet and the increasing ease of travel will increase the extent to which territorially driven or constrained grievances are played out on a worldwide stage. The UK may be particularly exposed to this risk because we are a very open and diverse society with numerous diaspora communities. Political events in countries thousands of miles away are closely reflected in communities in the UK. Because of the worldwide spread of our interests, and our dependence on the stability that enables international trade, we have a particular vulnerability where terrorist attacks threaten or damage stability and the peaceful and ordered conduct of affairs overseas.

6.33 It is probable that terrorist organisations will develop greater access to increasingly lethal technology. Scientific training and expertise will have significance for terrorist organisations as technology enables an asymmetric approach to methods of attack. While interdependent, open and networked societies benefit greatly from the strengths and resilience that arise from information sharing, co-operation and efficiency, it is also the case that such societies present unique opportunities for people to cause harm. Furthermore, technology will allow terrorists to compensate for some of their vulnerabilities, although it will also generate new opportunities for intelligence gathering and disruption. These changes have implications for the shape, size and capability of our security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

6.34 As well as potentially easing access to more lethal effects, technology enables the use by terrorist groups to communicate in ways that have long been key to their delivering mass effect, but which are now easier than ever to achieve; for example by the posting of propaganda on video-sharing websites. We know how much importance Al Qa'ida places on communications and the exploitation and manipulation of information.

6.35 A major component of our current counter-terrorism strategy seeks to challenge the ideology that drives Al Qa'ida inspired violent extremism. Whilst terrorism will always be a method by which groups may seek to influence the political process through violence, we can challenge Al Qa'ida's distorted interpretation of Islam, exposing its inaccuracies and shortcomings in order to reduce the support and motivation which Al Qa'ida and associated groups rely on for their survival.

6.36 The lines between terrorism, subversion and legitimate dissent and protest may become increasingly blurred. This presents a particular and complex challenge to liberal democracies. We may face challenges from non-state actors – whether motivated by ideology or not – who employ the methods and tactics of terrorists but do not conform to historical models of terrorist groups. It is arguable that we are already experiencing this in Al Qa'ida and associated groups that lack an obviously realisable political objective. It is important that we challenge material and arguments which create a climate of intolerance and distrust in which violence as a tool of political discourse becomes acceptable, as well as disrupting and prosecuting those who directly incite violence. We will not undermine our commitment to freedom of speech, which allows individuals and organisations with extreme and even intolerant views to express them, but we will work to ensure that the hollowness of these views is revealed.

6.37 Terrorists can harness new technology and develop new techniques for communication and recruitment which makes them increasingly hard to identify and disrupt. In such circumstances, various forms of covert and intrusive surveillance become increasingly important. Yet while we must develop and deliver a strategy,

structures and capabilities that both address the immediate threat and that are resilient and flexible enough to cope with and adapt to the threats we are likely to face in the coming decade, this must not be at the expense of the principles of the UK as a liberal democracy. These include a commitment to individual privacy. As the debates around changes to our laws, measures to enable surveillance and their relationship to civil liberties underline, this is an ongoing challenge. To ensure that all measures we adopt are proportionate to the threat and necessary to the management of it, we have, and will maintain, strict rules governing the use of surveillance and independent oversight of the application of these rules.

6.38 The Government's response to both the immediate and the future threat is the Strategy for countering international terrorism – CONTEST. In existence since 2003, the Strategy's aim is "to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence." Details of this strategy were made public in July 2006.

6.39 The Government believes that the strategy continues to achieve its intended aim. Over the past six years we have greatly improved our ability to prevent, detect and disrupt terrorism, protect our people and the structures which underpin their daily lives, and to manage the consequences of attacks when they do happen. However since 2003 both the threat and our understanding of it have evolved, we have learned lessons about our response and committed significantly greater resources to counter-terrorism. To reflect this changing context the Government has revised CONTEST and in March published the updated version of the strategy (Cm 7547)[28].

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28 HM Government (2009) The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism available at http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/general/HO_Contest_strategy.pdf

CONTEST

Delivery of the UK's strategy for countering the threat from international terrorism – CONTEST – depends upon a unique and ground-breaking range of local, national and international partners.

Arrangements in the West Midlands are representative of the steps we have taken at the regional level across the UK to deliver an integrated response. Under a regional CONTEST Board, the Government Office for the West Midlands (GOWM), brings together Home Office representatives, West Midlands Police, Regional Offender Managers, UK Border Agency (UKBA), Youth Justice Board, Public Health, representatives for Children & Young People and the Regional Resilience Forum.

A key strand of CONTEST, known as PREVENT, aims to stop people from becoming radicalised. At a local level, we are working with communities to develop Prevent projects which, under the framework of the national Prevent Strategy[31], provide effective support to vulnerable people at risk of radicalisation. Channel is one such programme. Run in a partnership between the regional Counter Terrorism Units (CTUs), local authorities, statutory and community partners, it aims to provide a focus for public sector professionals and members of the community to refer individuals of concern to a multi-agency risk assessment and case management system, bringing to bear a variety of resources and expertise to counter radicalisation.

The Civil Contingencies Secretariat, in the Cabinet Office, is leading work to develop partnerships at local, regional and national level in preparation for all kinds of civil emergencies. The increased focus of this work on community and corporate resilience will aid local groups and organisations to respond to terrorist attacks as well as other common hazards; local groups and networks are best placed to identify people who may be vulnerable, local places of safety, and local resources of skills and material than can be used in any kind of civil emergency.

We also recognise that the expertise and knowledge held by citizens, industry and the third sector is vital to delivery. The Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure works with a range of Government Departments, the Devolved Administrations and public and private sector organisations to provide integrated advice on physical, personnel and electronic security to partners who own or operate infrastructure in order to protect the UK from terrorist attack.

But we also need to work overseas, just as much as at home, in order to understand the process of radicalisation, to reduce the vulnerability of our diaspora communities and the countries and regions from which they come. Our response has increased significantly in scale over the last two years; Foreign and Commonwealth Office spending alone on Prevent overseas has more than doubled. It has also widened in scope, with support from the Department for International Development and the British Council, and more international work by the Home Office and the Department for Communities and Local Government. The work of the Armed Forces and engagement with and through international partners and multilateral organisations are clearly also critical.

29 HM Government, Preventing Violent Extremism: A Strategy for Delivery (2008); available at
http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/news-publications/publication-search/prevent-strategy

6.40 CONTEST governs the UK's domestic and international response to the international terrorist threat. It is organised around four pillars:

- Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks

- Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists, or supporting violent extremism

- Protect: to strengthen our protection against terrorist attack

- Prepare: where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact.

6.41 CONTEST is overseen at Ministerial level by the Cabinet Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development (NSID), chaired by the Prime Minister (this is the same Cabinet Committee which oversees the National Security Strategy); the Home Secretary (or, as appropriate, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland) is the lead minister for counter terrorism. Some specific aspects of CONTEST are also dealt with by subcommittees of NSID.

6.42 Delivery of the strategy requires close co-operation between a wide range of organisations and stakeholders: local authorities, Government departments, Devolved Administrations, the police, the security and intelligence agencies, emergency services and the Armed Forces and international partners and multilateral organisations. Delivery is overseen by a CONTEST Board, chaired by the Director General of the Office of Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) in the Home Office. Representatives from key Departments and agencies attend the Board. Each workstream of CONTEST has a detailed delivery plan, identifying responsibility for each programme, projected timescales, benefits and costs. Within the Home Office OSCT is responsible for co-ordinating action on

CONTEST by stakeholders across the whole of Government, and reports on its delivery against the Counter-Terrorism Public Service Agreement (26). The 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review announced increased resources for counter-terrorism and intelligence. Counter-terrorism and intelligence spending is planned to reach £3.5 billion pa by 2011.

6.43 The Government believes that in CONTEST the UK has one of the most sophisticated and comprehensive strategies for addressing terrorism in the world.

6.44 We now have a robust combination of intellectual framework, capability, and governance and delivery arrangements that will allow us to adapt and respond to threats as they arise and provide the structures that will enable this strategy to operate coherently alongside our strategies for related challenges (such as Serious Organised Crime, Civil Emergencies, Stability and Counter Insurgency in key countries) within the overall approach set out in the National Security Strategy.

6.45 The attacks in Northern Ireland this year show the continued intent of dissident republicans in the face of the political progress that has been made in recent years and which is supported by the overwhelming majority of the people of Northern Ireland. The Government's response to the continuing threat from Irish related terrorism is to continue to support the political process as the means by which all sides can pursue their political ambitions by exclusively peaceful means and to provide the strategic leadership and the resources in which the law enforcement and intelligence agencies can work to reduce the threat from terrorism. The Government's response includes close cooperation with the Irish Government.

6.46 The key principles for tackling the threat from Irish related terrorism are drawn from those which underpin both the National Security Strategy and the CONTEST approach to international terrorism but are applied to the specific circumstances of Northern Ireland. The additional investment, increased capabilities, and improved structures we have put in place since 2001 to counter terrorism are available to respond to threats as they arise.

Counter-Terrorism and Counter Insurgency

6.47 The UK is currently involved in combat operations in Afghanistan that continue to expose the complexities of the modern security environment in which insurgency and terrorism are woven together. Similarly, what began in Iraq as an insurgency became a theatre in which Al Qa'ida sought to attack not only the Coalition but Iraqi forces and civilians too, as part of an ideologically driven campaign to undermine the progress of democracy there.

6.48 In Afghanistan and Pakistan there is a complex nexus of terrorist and insurgent groups with similar, though not always mutually consistent and shared aims. The continuing radicalisation of Afghan fighters in Pakistan and the growing network of extremism orchestrated from the borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan are all good reasons to consider a holistic counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism approach.

6.49 Insurgencies in the last century were largely fought within the boundaries of single states (though not devoid of outside influence), and were rarely, if ever, linked to wider acts of terrorism. Today, globalisation and the increasing dependence of societies on international financial information and communication networks ensure that grievances and agendas can pay little heed to geographical boundaries. This networked migration of ideas is exploited to fuel both terrorist and insurgent action. The transfer we now see of ideas, money, tactics and personnel between 'insurgent' and 'terrorist' groups is unprecedented.

6.50 Al Qa'ida uses local insurgencies and instability to fuel its narrative of perceived injustices. We can expect this approach to continue. Local insurgents turn to Al Qa'ida for philosophical guidance, finance, tactical expertise, and practical assistance (for example in creating sophisticated explosive devices), and Al Qa'ida relies on indigenous insurgents for support and shelter in ungoverned spaces. Personnel recruited from local populations feed both local insurgencies and wider international terrorist campaigns.

6.51 The current terrorist threat to the UK comes predominantly from the global vision of Al Qa'ida and its associates, which in turn feeds and is fed by local insurgencies. The symbiotic nature of insurgency campaigns and the most prevalent terrorist threats today require us to design mutually supporting counter insurgency and counter terrorism strategies. The core of our approach to countering international terrorism must be to resolve local issues and negate the grievances that feed terrorism: key to this will be our work to counter insurgency. Addressing these problems requires a co-ordinated response from, and is the responsibility of, the whole of government, and the wider international community. Countering terrorism and insurgency requires an approach that closely ties together traditional diplomatic, security and military capabilities and development resources which are best placed to help address the underlying grievances. A strategy that is any less comprehensive will fail to match the vision, energy and reach of the adversary.

Trans-national organised crime

The past year

6.52 Trans-national organised crime is often seen to operate in an isolated world, with little consequence for communities and their citizens. The reality however is different: it is present in almost every facet of society and affects the daily lives of UK citizens. The Home Office estimates that over £20 billion a year of social and economic harms to the UK are attributable to serious organised crime, which affects local communities through drug-related crime, gun crime, people-trafficking and illegal immigration. Globally, the UN estimates the cost of international organised crime to business to be £1 trillion.

6.53 In *Security in an Interdependent World* the Government highlighted the complex nature of trans-national organised crime. There is no single model for how an organised crime group is structured. Serious organised criminals are operating across international borders and in a variety of criminal markets. They mirror ordinary businesses, adopting a portfolio approach and switching between different crime types to maximise profitability and minimise risk.

6.54 Globalisation, along with its many benefits, has also provided opportunities for serious organised criminals. In fact, globalisation has acted as the main facilitator of organised crime, increasing the pace of 'old' crimes, such as drugs trafficking, and enabling 'new' crimes such as fraud via the Internet.

6.55 The revolution in global communications and increased movement of people, goods and ideas has also enabled criminals to operate from a safe distance to minimise risk, often in countries where state authority is weak or susceptible to corruption. Organised criminals are increasingly locating in these areas to evade detection, and once established, can stimulate vicious circles of crime, instability and corruption, which undermine already fragile states. Piracy is one of the many ways criminals can seek to gain large sums of money. Although piracy is a problem in several areas of the world, the current incidence off the Horn of Africa is exacerbated by the existence in Somalia of large expanses of ungoverned space in which land-based havens for pirate groups can be established with relative impunity.

6.56 Technology is another factor. Online payments have increased by 400 per cent in the last five years[30], creating new opportunities for legitimate businesses and organised criminals alike. Online banking fraud grew to over £52 million in 2008, up from £22.6 million in 2007[31], and the cost to the UK's small businesses of online crime and fraud is approximately £800 to each such business per year[32]. Card fraud has also increased by 13 per cent since 2007[33]. This type of fraud is particularly popular with organised criminals because it can be committed from a safe distance.

6.57 Unrestricted by regulation and scrutiny, the nature of trans-national organised crime enables it to take advantage of changing economic

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30 The UK Payments Association (APACS) 2007.

31 APACS 2009.

32 Inhibiting Small Enterprise – Report by Federation of Small Businesses 2009 (includes England, Wales and Scotland).

33 Figures from APACS show that card not present fraud (includes phone and mail order frauds as well as internet transactions) amounted to £328.4 million in 2008, a 13% increase from 2007, and account for 54 per cent of all card fraud losses.

conditions in ways that legitimate businesses can not. Crime groups operating across borders can exploit vulnerabilities in international financial systems to defraud and to launder their illegal profits.

6.58 Internationally, organised crime is enabled by weak governance and corruption, conditions that may increase as a result of the global economic downturn. Domestically, there is early evidence to suggest that crime types are evolving as criminals take advantage of new markets and new opportunities. For example, demand for loan sharking has increased, and there is already evidence of a proliferation of counterfeit goods in the shadow economy.

Future Challenges and the Government's Longer Term Response

6.59 Over the 20 year horizon, advances in technology, and in particular the internet, will continue to be important in defining both crime types and the *modus operandi* of trans-national organised criminals.

6.60 As we look to the future, serious organised criminals will continue to adapt to take advantage of new technology and exploit new markets:

● Unless we act coherently and collectively, there is a risk, for example, that the growth in online social networking may present opportunities to plan and commit crime or that the growing interconnectedness of global markets may provide greater opportunities for financial fraud;

● The predicted 'youth-bulge' in many developing countries may provide

stimulus for migration, with resultant impact on the UK through organised immigration crime and people trafficking;

● Increased competition for resources, potentially rising commodity prices and rise of environmental regulations over the coming decades may create new markets for organised crime; and

● There is some evidence to suggest an overlap of methods between terrorism and organised criminal groups, in particular around how they fund their operations, for example through drug trafficking and counterfeiting[34].

6.61 Organised criminals are uniquely agile in seizing new opportunities for illegal gain. The Government's approach to the challenges of serious organised crime, both domestically and internationally, therefore, needs to be ahead of the threat.

6.62 As well as creating new crime types, the advances in technology provide opportunities for Government in its response. In recognition of this changing context, and in line with our commitment to continue to learn and invest, the Home Office and Cabinet Office have recently concluded a joint review of organised crime. The review identifies opportunities to build on the successes we have already had and improve further our response to the new threats and challenges.

6.63 The Home Office will shortly publish a new strategy on serious organised crime, reviewing the Government's response to the threat, doing more to tackle it overseas and creating a more hostile environment for serious organised criminals within the UK.

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34 The Institute for Public Policy Research (2008) The Interim Report of the IPPR Commission on National Security in the 21st Century – *Shared Destinies: Security in a globalised world*; and RAND (2009) http://www.rand.org

Trans-national organised crime: Government progress on commitments in the past year

Increasing recovery of organised criminal assets

- Over £500 million of criminal assets have been recovered since the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 came into force in 2003. There has been a five fold increase in the value of assets recovered between 2003 and 2007, and a total of £136 million was recovered in 2007-08. Provisional figures for 2008/09 show a further record increase in assets recovered, but are still below trajectory in relation to the target to recover £250 million in 2009/10.

- £175 million worth of assets have been denied to UK criminals by the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) through a combination of cash seizure, restraint orders and property freezing orders, and £88 million worth of assets denied to criminals overseas.

Strengthening the European response

- Internationally we have worked to strengthen EUROPOL and EUROJUST[35], through the introduction of two new legal instruments (the EU Council Framework on Europol, which replaces the Europol Convention and the amended EU Council Decision on Eurojust).

Enhancing targeting of criminals at our borders

- Since the UK Border Agency commenced the implementation of checks against the Interpol Stolen and Lost Transport Documents database in October 2008, there have been 4932 hits and 2127 documents seized. Checks against the database are undertaken pre-entry (visa applications), on-entry (at the border) and in-country (applications for extensions of stay and residency).

Tackling the illicit trafficking of drugs

- Working with international and domestic partners, SOCA was involved in the interdiction of over 85 tonnes of cocaine last year, and there is new forensic evidence to suggest a drop in street level purity of the drug.[36]

- The Armed Forces continue to support SOCA and international partners and agencies to combat the trafficking of drugs. Royal Navy vessels in the Atlantic and Caribbean, and RAF Nimrod MR2 and E3D aircraft play an important role in joint operations. From April 2008 to March 2009, the Royal Navy and RAF have assisted in the seizure and destruction of about 13 tonnes of cocaine[37]. Not all of this cocaine was destined for the UK, but, if it had reached our streets, it would be worth in the region of £520 million.

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35 EUROJUST is an agency of the European Union (EU) charged with improving judicial co-operation.
36 SOCA 2008/09 performance figures.
37 This figure is included in the SOCA overall cocaine intercept figure.

6.64 Domestically this will mean:

- **A more hostile environment for organised criminals**: we will engage all the levers at the Government's disposal to attack the spaces in which organised criminals operate, such as closing down outwardly legitimate businesses used for criminal purposes, using tax investigation powers to pin down elusive criminals, or blocking the use of mobile phones by organised criminals within prisons. This will require a combined effort by Her Majesty's Revenue & Customs (HMRC), local authorities, regulatory bodies, the National Offender Management Service and law enforcement agencies to identify ways to disrupt the interests of organised criminals at all possible opportunities.

- **A more ambitious approach to asset recovery**: we will take the attack on criminal finances one step further by mainstreaming its application in organised crime cases, shifting the burden of proof on civil recovery cases, and increasing the flexibility of law enforcement to use whatever tool works, criminal or civil, to recover illegal assets.

- **A more strategic policy response to serious organised crime**: we will learn from the lessons of CONTEST, the Home Office will sharpen and strengthen the response to serious organised crime. It will work with key delivery partners to increase coordination across Government, identify and respond to new and emergent threats, and support law enforcement in targeting the organised criminals harming this country.

6.65 Internationally:

- **A more targeted approach to international strategy**. This will be achieved through closer working between the Home Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and by strengthening the cross-Government forum on international crime that identifies where best to intervene overseas to reduce harms to the UK. This means our international strategies against organised crime will be better aligned, better tied to domestic efforts and make better use of the range of capabilities available to embassies, missions and law enforcement overseas.

- **Better coordinated spending overseas**. The Government agencies that have a role to play against organised crime overseas – SOCA, UKBA, the FCO and the Crown Prosecution Service – will work in concert to combat the threat by coordinating their activities and identifying collaborative opportunities. The FCO and DFID will coordinate their objectives against organised crime in weak and failing states and continue to work together to aid these fragile countries. The Home Office and SOCA will explore the extent to which SOCA can allocate more resources overseas to ensure we are doing all we can to attack organised crime at source.

- **A stronger international response to the finances of organised crime:** we will work with partner countries to develop the role and reach of the international Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in reducing global money laundering. The Government will step

up efforts to coordinate international asset recovery partnerships and take an aggressive approach to attacking the illegal finances of overseas criminals that pass through the UK. This will make the UK an unwelcome home for those wishing to do business in organised crime.

- **Closer working with international partners.** The UK will work with European partners to deliver a strengthened role for Europol, acting as an information hub for all EU-level enforcement agencies, which will lead to a step change in Europe's ability to respond to organised crime. In addition, and as detailed in the new Cyber Security Strategy published alongside this document, the Home Office and the new Office for Cyber Security will review the Government's response to e-crime, a significant element of which is both organised and international. This will consider how the Government will respond to online crime in partnership with the private sector.

Civil Emergencies

6.66 In addition to 'malicious' threat actors outlined earlier, natural disasters and accidents, collectively known as hazards, can pose a significant disruptive challenge to our way of life. Work to address these challenges (including malicious threats) has been underway for many years but the National Risk Register (NRR) published last summer, outlined in more detail the potentially wide ranging impacts that events such as an influenza pandemic or widespread coastal flooding could have on the UK's citizens.

Civil emergencies – the past year

6.67 The types of civil emergencies outlined in the Government's National Security Strategy and NRR are based on the more detailed five year projection of risks facing the UK. These are contained in the classified National Risk Assessment. As a result of these projections, the risk profile for the UK has not significantly shifted during the past year. Overall the risk profile continues to be diverse, with no single risk dominating. It also remains complex and unpredictable, with links randomly and suddenly emerging between previously unconnected events, such as the links between the flooding in summer 2007 and the subsequent foot and mouth outbreak.

6.68 Over the past year the economic situation has also presented challenges to our ability to deliver improved resilience; with many businesses and organisations facing difficult questions about prioritisation of their resources. However, in terms of civil emergencies, the picture in the UK still compares favourably with many other parts of the world which are prone to much more frequent natural disasters on a catastrophic scale (such as flooding and earthquakes) or which are less well prepared to deal with the consequences.

6.69 Sir Michael Pitt's Review into the 2007 flooding was published in June 2008 and the Government issued its response in December of that year. The response outlined an action plan covering all six themes of the review: identifying when and where flooding will occur; improved planning to reduce the risk and impact of flooding; changes to rescue and care arrangements; protection and maintenance of critical services; better advice to the public on protection of their families and homes; and improving the recovery

process. The Government has also announced some £2.15 billion funding for improved flood risk management and resilience to 2011.

6.70 On pandemic 'flu the UK has continued to increase preparedness to ensure we remain one of the best prepared countries in the world – a position which has been validated by the World Health Organization (WHO). This has included stockpiling antivirals ensuring that every National Health Service Trust and Local Resilience Forum has specific plans in place

for a pandemic and publishing a suite of guidance to assist planners covering management of excess deaths, school closures, infection control, the judicial system, local and health responses, as well as guidance to businesses.

6.71 The Government also launched its pandemic preparedness international strategy in October 2008 which is the first of its kind and sets the priorities for the Government's work with international organisations over the next three years.

'Swine flu' and other new or emerging infectious diseases

The response to the current swine 'flu outbreak is a clear demonstration of the benefits of working together at all levels to prepare for the risks we face. Over the last few years the Government has worked with the wider resilience community including the health sector, emergency services, local and regional resilience planners, the devolved administrations, businesses and the international community, to ensure that we have robust but flexible plans in place to deal with an influenza pandemic in whatever form it may take. This has meant that the nation-wide response to the current outbreak has been rapid and co-ordinated. Work continues through the established relationships at national and international levels to ensure that we are in the best place to handle the further challenges this outbreak may present as it evolves.

In 2008, the National Risk Register identified an influenza-type pandemic as posing a very high risk to the UK population. The Register also assessed other kinds of infectious diseases, either new or emerging, that could pose a risk to the health of the UK population and are therefore monitored, and included in the National Risk Assessment. Over the past 25 years, more than 30 new or newly-recognised infections have been identified around the world. Recent scientific studies suggest it is relatively unlikely that a new infectious disease would originate in the UK, but possible 'hot-spots' for novel infections elsewhere in the world could lead one to emerge in another country and spread rapidly before it is detected and be transmitted to the UK. SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) is an example. The Department of Health has developed contingency plans for dealing with SARS, which builds on our generic response to outbreaks of infectious disease. Early recognition of a new infection is crucial as is international collaboration and the deployment of surveillance and monitoring systems.

The remit of the Health Protection Agency's (HPA) Centre for Infections includes infectious disease surveillance, detection and diagnosis, as well as the public health risks and necessary preventive and control measures; the HPA collaborates with other international surveillance bodies, undertaking horizon-scanning to enable a rapid response to any international health alerts.

Civil Emergencies: Government progress on commitments in the past year

Increasing expenditure on flood management in England

- In December 2008 the Government published an action plan outlining its response to the six themes covered in the Pitt Review into the 2007 flooding and dedicated £2.15 billion funding to improve flood risk management and resilience before 2011.

Increasing domestic capacity to respond to an influenza pandemic

- We continued to build the UK's preparedness for a 'flu pandemic by stockpiling antivirals, ensuring every NHS Trust and Local Resilience Forum had plans in place and publishing a suite of additional guidance for responders, businesses and other organisations.

Extending networks of organisations engaged in preparing for and responding to domestic emergencies

- The Government undertook and extensive consultation on community resilience which will inform a programme of work to be launched later this year.

- Publication of the first ever National Risk Register.

Future Challenges and the Longer Term Response

6.72 Whilst it is unlikely that the UK's risk profile will change dramatically in the next 20 years, there are obviously factors which may affect the likelihood of risks occurring, our vulnerability to them and the potential impact they may have. Consideration of the range of possible eventualities can help us identify and build in the necessary flexibility in our policy responses. Some of the potential challenges are outlined below.

6.73 As described in Chapter 5, climate change and the international response, as well as the UK's response to it will undoubtedly have a significant impact on our resilience over the coming years. In addition to the primary consequences of severe weather events, there will also be secondary impacts such as the potential for migration and movement of people both within affected states and to the UK, and for greater global instability to impact on critical supplies and supply chains. There is a large

body of work underway to address the causes of climate change and to adapt to its consequences. Whilst Government and emergency responders will remain the first line of response to events, climate change will test the resilience of our infrastructure and communities. All sectors of society – Government, public bodies, businesses and individuals – will have a part to play in preparing ourselves to adapt to those impacts which are unavoidable.

6.74 The increasingly networked, interdependent and complex nature of modern society, and the critical systems which underpin daily life will, over the coming years, increase both the UK's vulnerability and the potential impact of civil emergencies. The interconnectedness means that a relatively small event, such as an electricity outage or loss of key information and communications networks, irrespective of the cause, can potentially lead to a cascade failure, with impacts on a wide range of critical services, such as water, transport and gas, which

are dependent on that supply. The lack of inherent resilience in many of our critical services, for example our reliance on just in time supply chains, will make us less able to bounce back from what might otherwise be minor incidents. Dealing with these widespread, complex and unpredictable events will require greater societal resilience than we have today.

6.75 The generic way in which the UK currently prepares for civil emergencies, by building capabilities to deal with the consequences of a wide range of events, provides a flexible and sound basis for dealing with the changing requirements. The multi-level, multi sector, bottom-up approach to resilience planning means that, wherever and whenever an emergency occurs, capabilities should be in place to help respond to and recover from it. This broad approach is followed throughout the UK although some aspects are the responsibility of the Devolved Administrations. Continued and new programmes of work to deal specifically with the highest, potentially catastrophic, risks (such as pandemic 'flu), working with international bodies where necessary, are obviously also key to improving the UK's resilience in the longer term. However, there are additional measures which might help us respond to and recover from the challenges we face.

6.76 The range of longer-term challenges outlined here all point to the need to develop a greater understanding of our inherent and increasing vulnerabilities and to build social and economic infrastructure which is resilient to a wider range of risks.

6.77 The NRR, which will be reviewed and reissued later this year, was the first step in providing advice on how people can better prepare for civil emergencies should they wish to do so and incorporated more established business continuity advice. Programmes of work to improve corporate

and community resilience, which are already underway, will build on this and should, when developed, help build the sort of socio-economic flexibility and resilience the UK will need. The new work by the Government to promote corporate resilience stemmed originally from the obligation placed on public sector organisations both to ensure their own business continuity in a civil emergency and, in some cases, to promote business continuity in the community. There is evidence that resilience in the private sector has also improved, but large gaps remain. It will be in all of our interests, and it is our collective responsibility, to ensure that these gaps close as the risk of civil emergencies grows. A particular focus of work, which will be developed from the Pitt Review and the climate change adaptation programme, will be critical infrastructure. The Government will publish a framework and policy statement for an initial programme to reduce the vulnerability of critical infrastructure during the summer of 2009.

6.78 Similarly, a programme of work will be announced later this year on community resilience flowing from the scoping work undertaken over the last few months. The scoping work confirms that the model of community resilience that is most likely to work is that of self-selecting communities working together to help themselves in an emergency, reducing the burden on the emergency services and other responder organisations, and enabling them to focus their efforts on the most vulnerable groups. But in both cases the programmes will need to develop and become embedded in society and with citizens before they can really have effect. The Government will announce later this year how it will contribute to community resilience schemes, through resources, guidance, information, and communication.

6.79 The delivery mechanisms for civil emergencies are well established and are based on the Civil Contingencies Act 2004. It is founded on the principle of multi-agency collaboration at all levels of Government (local, regional and national) with Ministerial oversight both of wider resilience work and specific policy areas.

6.80 Over the past year, Ministerial committees have overseen work led by the Cabinet Office Civil Contingencies Secretariat to ensure that all Local Resilience Forums have multi-agency plans to deal with some of the highest risks such as flooding and pandemic 'flu. These plans knit together the roles and responsibilities of all agencies and organisations, as well as the different tiers of Government, which would be involved in responding to an incident. The very development of these plans helps to build trust and familiarity between organisations, and in the longer term these plans form the basis for exercises to ensure each area is as ready as it can be to face our highest risks. But, there is always a need to review structures and consider whether and where changes might add value. One proposal, emerging from the Pitt Review, is the concept of a National Resilience Forum, similar to and contributing, to the National Security Forum but focused entirely and therefore in more depth on resilience related issues. The Government will establish this Forum in the second half of 2009.

6.81 On a more practical level, the types of challenges we face now and in the future are likely to require timely and resilient communications which can target potentially large sections of the population at short notice. New communications technologies need to be explored to consider whether they can meet this need. One option which some of our international partners are pursuing is cell broadcasting – a system by which people can be notified of events and provided with advice in a text message style format to their mobile phones. The Government will undertake a review of possible technologies and work with international partners to consider whether there is a system which could support the UK's resilience in this way.

The National Security Strategic Framework

Drivers

- global trends
- climate change
- competition for energy
- poverty, inequality and poor governance
- ideologies and beliefs

Threat actors

- states
- failing/fragile states
- terrorists
- criminals
- nature/hazards

Domains

- nuclear weapons
- maritime
- cyber space
- space
- public opinion, culture and information
- internationalism

Objective: Protecting UK **citizens**, **prosperity** and **way of life**

Why?   Who / what?   How?

Threat Drivers → **Threat Actors** → **Threat Domains**

UK actions   *Multiple departments and agencies*

UK characteristics / interests

Chapter 7

UK National Security Framework – Action in the Threat Domains

7.1 Having analysed why there are challenges to the United Kingdom's national security interests, and who and what threatens us as a result, it is important to look at **how** and **where** those threats manifest themselves in order to reduce our vulnerability to their impact. As well as addressing what drives challenges to national security and what threats arise as a result, we also look at the **threat domains**.

7.2 There are different types of threat domains:

- **hostile and destructive capabilities:** this is a critically important example of **how** threats can arise. A range of threat actors, both state and non-state, can pose national security challenges. In some areas, the capabilities those with hostile intent could acquire would, if used, have consequences of such severity that the capability itself is an area of specific risk that requires a strategic and co-ordinated response. Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is the most obvious example;

- **physical and technological domains:** there are a number of physical and technological environments, which can be characterised as domains **where** national security threats can arise. These include long established and familiar domains, such as the land and maritime environments, the air, and emergent, technology driven domains like space and cyber space; and

- **domains of influence:** in a globalised, information age, there are important arenas which affect our ability to act against the drivers of insecurity. A strengthened international rules-based system is essential in providing the robust and effective frameworks required for an interdependent world. Without it, risks can arise in various areas, for example, the use of economic resources, such as energy supplies, or unjustified trade restrictions being used as a hostile policy tool. We also recognise that almost every element of national security activity has an important information dimension, be it public support for military campaigns, or persuading those at risk of falling under the influence of terrorists.

7.3 There is no simple 'map' of how and where threats can arise. Various groups that can pose threats to national security can act in a number of ways and operate in a number of physical and technological environments and other domains.

7.4 This chapter provides a framework for our strategic response to the questions of how and where threats can arise, and how we protect ourselves, in technological environments such as cyber space or physical environments such our seas and borders.

Our Borders

The UK already has one of the toughest borders in the world and the UK Border Agency (UKBA), part of the Home Office, is currently delivering the biggest shake up of border security and the immigration system in a generation. The new measures that have been put in place or are in progress will for example, enhance our ability to prevent entry to those whom we know may pose a threat to our national security, monitor those who cross our borders, and refer to relevant authorities individuals who are identified as they are pass through our asylum and migration systems as potentially posing a national security risk.

In the UKBA we now have a single, strengthened border force that works very closely with the police. The roll out of the UK's biometric visa programme was completed in December 2007 ahead of schedule and under budget. From November 2008, the UKBA began issuing compulsory identity cards to foreign nationals. By requiring a person to register their unique biometric identifiers we can reduce immigration abuses, illegal working, the misuse of public funds and identity fraud.

The new electronic eBorders system will enable us to count people in and out of the country and to conduct checks in real time against crime and terrorism watchlists. eBorders has already screened over 90 million passengers travelling to the UK, using data received from approximately 105 carriers on over 185 routes, leading to over 40,000 alerts and more than 3,200 arrests. By the end of 2010 in excess of 95 per cent of all passenger and crew movements (including UK citizens) into and out of the UK will be checked.

Between July 2005 and the end of 2008, over 150 people were excluded from the UK on national security grounds and a further 87 on the basis of unacceptable behaviour. In addition recent changes to exclusion policy allow for the presumption in favour of exclusion where an individual comes within the terms of unacceptable behaviours. Further changes that took effect on 1 June 2009 will enable the Home Secretary to exclude European Economic Area (EEA) nationals before they travel to the UK.

Hostile and destructive capabilities

7.5 *Security in an Interdependent World*, explicitly recognised how a set of hostile and destructive capabilities, such as nuclear weapons and others weapons of mass destruction, could have significant consequences for our national security. In *Security for the Next Generation* we provide an updated assessment of that risk.

Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction

7.6 The Government remains extremely concerned by the threat posed by the proliferation of technologies related to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) weapons.

Nuclear weapons and other WMD – the past year

7.7 The Government continues to judge that no country currently has the capability and intent to pose a direct threat to the UK with nuclear, chemical or biological

weapons. However, it would be premature to conclude that such threats might not develop in future, either from states or from terrorist groups, some of whom we know are trying to develop such capabilities. As explained in Chapter 6, the continuing risks from such proliferation means that the UK's minimum strategic deterrent capability, currently represented by Trident, remains a necessary element of our security. However, we remain committed to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and therefore strongly support the international structures that are in place to constrain such proliferation to states or terrorist groups. Although these have generally been successful in limiting the global development of such capabilities, our concerns have been heightened because:

- Iran has continued its proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities in breach of numerous UN Security Council Resolutions and has failed to respond to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) questions about possible military dimensions to its programme. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has attempted to detonate two nuclear devices and has launched a number of ballistic missiles, all in direct contravention of UN Security Council Resolutions. Despite repeated attempts by the international community to engage, the regime in Pyongyang seems intent on a policy of isolation and confrontation. In addition, Syria is not cooperating fully with IAEA efforts to investigate suspicious nuclear-related activity. These states are of particular concern because of their attitude to international institutions and treaties, and for the impact that their activities have had on regional stability.

- To enable a shift towards low-carbon energy generation, while meeting energy needs, there is likely to be a

global expansion of nuclear power. Whilst this is welcome, if it is not managed carefully there is a risk this will lead to increased availability of dual-use nuclear technology, knowledge and nuclear materials relevant to the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

- Long term global trends point to an increase in inter-state tensions, driven by climate change, competition for resources, population growth and movements and increasing public pressure in less well-developed countries for improved living conditions.

- The internet has made information widely available on the technology of CBRN devices and the materials which might be used to develop them. The advance and spread of dual-use biotechnology provides easier and cheaper access to highly destructive and disruptive technology. This is increasingly attractive to terrorists.

7.8 Nationally, therefore, the Government continues to invest significant resources into counter-proliferation and CBRN counter-terrorism efforts. The former is delivered through a comprehensive counter-proliferation strategy based around four inter-linked strands:

- **Dissuade** states from seeking to acquire, develop, or spread WMD-related weapons, materials, technology and expertise;

- **Detect** attempts by states, and terrorists, to develop or acquire these capabilities;

- **Deny** access to WMD and the necessary materials, equipment, technology, and expertise to develop them, while promoting commerce and technological development for peaceful purposes; and

- **Defend** our country, our citizens, our Armed Forces and our strategic interests from the threats posed by proliferation.

Government progress on commitments in the past year

Addressing international concerns

- As part of the E3+3[38] in the case of Iran and, in the case of Democratic People's Republic Korea (DPRK), as part of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the UK continues to put considerable pressure on these two nations to comply with the will of the international community.

Strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime

- The UK has set a new agenda for non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control, playing a key role at the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee meeting in May. We also played an important role in building consensus at the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) on US-India civil nuclear cooperation and in securing agreement at the Conference on Disarmament to a programme of work that will include negotiations for a Fissile Materials Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT).

Reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism

- The Government has increased the resources dedicated to tackling CBRN terrorism threats, and continues to work across government and with partners internationally to reduce the risk of a successful attack.

An effective Chemical Weapons Convention

- The UK is strongly committed to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Since the Second Review Conference in April 2008, two States Parties (SPs) have completely destroyed their declared chemical weapons stockpiles. Good progress has been made on expanding membership, with Iraq, the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas acceding to the CWC this year, bringing the number of States Parties to 188. Only seven countries now remain outside of the Convention.

7.9 The revised CONTEST strategy recognises the specific threat of CBRN terrorism. A recent, classified, strategic review assessed the current threat facing the UK and identified specific areas for further action with regard to countering it.

Future Challenges and the Longer Term Response

Nuclear

7.10 In his speech on 17 March 2009 on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, the Prime Minister underlined that nuclear energy has a vital role to play in overcoming the global challenges of climate change, of ensuring sustainable development and of defeating poverty. But there is also the risk of a new and dangerous nuclear era of new states, and perhaps even non-state nuclear weapon holders. We will address this risk by renewing and refreshing the grand global bargain at the heart of the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

7.11 The Government is determined that NPT Review Conference will review and refresh this grand bargain and re-energise the commitment of the entire international community to stopping proliferation, to realising the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy, and to delivering the NPT's ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Because there is a strong inter-linkage between the global expansion of nuclear

38 The 'E3+3' is the group of countries which leads the international community's engagement with Iran on nuclear issues. The UK, France and Germany (the E3) initially took forward this engagement. The first meeting of this group with the US, China and Russia took place in January 2006.

power, the threat posed by nuclear proliferation and moves towards global nuclear disarmament, we need a coherent global strategy to progress on all three issues.

7.12 That is why the Prime Minister has committed to publishing a *Road to 2010* plan later this year, setting out proposals in a range of areas, including:

- the development of the UK's civil nuclear industry;

- the management of the global expansion of nuclear power;

- enhancing the security of fissile materials;

- nuclear counter-proliferation;

- multilateral nuclear disarmament; and

- reform of the international verification and control regimes and the strengthening of the IAEA.

7.13 Nationally, we have undertaken a thorough review of our Counter-Proliferation strategy and its delivery. We will retain the existing four strands of that strategy, which are based around detecting, defending, dissuading and denying proliferation activities of concern. Each strand will have a more rigorous programmatic approach, with clearer objectives and better assessment of the effectiveness of delivery. Government departments will be required to give a higher priority to counter-proliferation issues, with stronger inter-Departmental coordination of bids for additional resources. The overall strategy will be governed by a strengthened Cabinet Office-led Counter Proliferation Committee, which will, in turn, have a stronger reporting chain to Ministers. Closer coherence between the Counter-Proliferation and Counter-Terrorism communities will be established, along

with enhanced coordination on intelligence assessment and operations.

7.14 We will continue to work hard with our international partners to achieve universal application of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the instruments of the IAEA Safeguards regime, to secure the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, including completion of its verification regime, and to ensure successful negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

7.15 We will continue to take a lead in designing international mechanisms to ensure the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while mitigating the associated proliferation risks. We have helped lay the foundations for such mechanisms through the conference we co-hosted with the Netherlands and Germany in 2008, and the London International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Conference in March 2009. We will work to encourage further debate both regionally and globally.

7.16 International terrorists have stated their desire to acquire a CBRN capability. Such groups have exploited open source information and have actively recruited scientists to their cause. There are a number of facilities in countries across the world where poor security could provide a route for terrorists to procure nuclear materials. As part of our response, the UK will ratify the Amendment to the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and press key countries that have not yet ratified this amendment to do so as soon as possible.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

7.17 Although less than a dozen states have offensive chemical or biological (CB) programmes, the number of countries that have the potential capability to produce CB weapons is large. Regional security issues

including competition for natural resources and energy, may provide the political drivers for some countries to consider acquiring them. Access to knowledge about former state CB programmes, as well as the growth and global spread of the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries may provide technology drivers.

7.18 We believe that international co-operation in the framework of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) is key to defeating the threat from chemical and biological weapons, and we are committed to strengthening these agreements.

7.19 The BTWC Review Conference in 2010 is advancing work to strengthen the Convention and promote its universality. In between review conferences the UK actively participates in inter-sessional meetings held to discuss agreed topics such as national implementation, biosafety and biosecurity, awareness-raising and codes of conduct, capacity building and assistance in cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons.

7.20 The CWC Review Conference in 2008 reaffirmed the comprehensive nature of the prohibition of chemical weapons, the need to take into account scientific and technological change to keep the verification regime effective and the importance of full and effective national implementation of all obligations under the Convention. The conference also noted the threat from non-state actors including terrorists and encourages states who are party to the convention to consult and cooperate on ways to prevent terrorists from acquiring and/or using chemical weapons. The UK is supporting efforts to encourage states not party to the CWC to accede as soon as possible. Iraq recently acceded to the CWC and the UK is

considering possible post-accession assistance.

Conventional Weapons

7.21 The proliferation of conventional weapons remains a significant concern because of links to regional stability and global economic factors, as well as humanitarian issues. The UK is strongly supporting the UN process towards an Arms Trade Treaty to regulate the international trade in arms. The UK led international efforts to secure a new international agreement to ban the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions, and signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2008. The UK remains committed to the global humanitarian effort to rid the world of these munitions. In the same way, we are willing to extend export laws to control extra-territorial brokering and trafficking of small arms, and potentially other weapons.

7.22 We will ensure that our work under CONTEST on reducing the threat from international terrorism and our work under the Government's counter-proliferation strategy on improving the security of all WMD materials are brought together in a way that ensures a comprehensive approach to reducing the CBRN security threat to the UK and its overseas interests.

Physical and technological domains

7.23 We recognise the importance of particular physical and technological environments as domains of threat where national security risks can arise. These include long-established and familiar domains, such as the land and maritime environments in which the UK has operated for hundreds of years. They also include the air, which has become increasingly prominent since the advent of powered flight in the early twentieth century, and emergent domains that are being rapidly

shaped and re-shaped by changes in technology and patterns of utilisation, such as space and cyber space.

7.24 In some cases, the national security challenges in a given domain are already being tackled under the remit of a particular threat. For example, the CONTEST strategy addresses the terrorist threat in the air and land environments. In other cases, such as cyber, maritime and space, a combination of the diversity of the challenges and the existing configuration of the delivery architecture argues for co-ordination, on the basis of the domain, as the best means of providing coherence.

7.25 Whilst all of these domains are inherently trans-national in character, the emergent domains are less dependent on physical location and, as such, distance is a less effective buffer against potential threats.

7.26 Addressing threats in these domains has substantial common requirements: for coherent strategic direction, for effective information-sharing and situational awareness, for co-ordinated incident response, and for effective use of resources.

7.27 The UK's national security framework looks across the full range of physical and technological domains. Within the physical environment, considerable attention is now being paid to the maritime domain, reflecting the UK's long-established key strategic interests, our history as a maritime nation, and recent emerging challenges. In the technological domain, the need for security in cyber space is now a pressing concern. And assets in space are also increasingly important to the modern way of life. These are therefore three of the current areas of focus for specific consideration within the national security framework.

Maritime Security

7.28 The maritime domain stretches beyond the UK's territorial waters, and comprises all of our interests overseas. Global shipping, for example, is a cornerstone of international trade.

7.29 It follows that maritime security comprises a very wide range of issues, interests and activities, many of which relate to the operation of threats and drivers across the marine and in the littoral environments. The maritime domain remains a conduit for threats but also offers a range of opportunities for the UK's national security. The diagram overleaf provides an illustration of the ways in which interconnected threats and drivers can manifest in the maritime domain.

7.30 The UK is, and has ever been, a distinctively maritime nation. The UK has over 10,500 miles of coastline and 600 ports. There are 14 Overseas Territories, and some 5.5 million UK citizens living overseas. Over 90 per cent of UK trade by volume (686 million tonnes) transits by sea. Maritime transport remains critical for energy supplies to the UK. Historically, we have relied upon the ability to protect the integrity of our maritime borders, be it against invasion during time of conflict, against criminality in the form of smuggling, or as a source of natural resource. Maritime capability has also historically been central to ensuring security of trade routes and access to markets.

7.31 Over the last few months, the terrorist attacks in Mumbai and the increase in piracy related incidents particularly in the Horn of Africa, have increased international focus on the challenges this poses both for the maritime sector and more broadly for international security.

Piracy off the Horn of Africa

The past year has seen a surge in piracy in the seas off the Horn of Africa. Ships ranging from small privately owned yachts to very large oil tankers have been targeted by small groups of pirates equipped with guns and rocket-propelled grenades. Around 22000 ships passed through the Gulf of Aden in 2008, so piracy threatens one of the world's trade arteries. Piracy not only poses a direct threat to UK economic interests, but also to UK tourists and merchant crew.

Piracy stems from serious instability within Somalia, exacerbated by the lack of capacity for regional response. Any long term solution must take account of the many complex issues involved, including the need to support improvements in governance and the rule of law.

The international response to piracy has been effective in reducing risks to shipping, and includes contributions from China, Russia, Japan and India, as well as many NATO and EU nations. Over 30 pirate vessels have been destroyed or confiscated and over 130 pirate suspects transferred for prosecution over the past year.


Under UK leadership, the EU launched a major operation, called ATALANTA. This operation aims to: protect World Food Programme ships delivering food aid to Somalia; protect vulnerable shipping transiting the region; and deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy off the Somali coast.

Since this operation was launched last year, supplies into Somalia have continued unchecked and far fewer attempted acts of piracy have been successful. NATO and the US-led Combined Maritime Forces have also made a significant contribution to international efforts to tackle piracy and are working closely with ATALANTA.

The UK is also playing a leading role in the International Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. This has included working with maritime industry to ensure that best practice for ships transiting the region is effectively disseminated, working with the military operations to ensure co-ordination, and starting work on capability building in the region.

A long term sustainable solution will require concerted activity on many fronts. In the meantime the effort to deter and disrupt pirate activity will need to be increased. We will continue to work closely with the shipping industry to make it harder for pirates to attack or gain control of ships, and we encourage and support more countries to prosecute and jail pirates detained by international forces.

Objective: Protecting UK citizens, prosperity and way of life

Global Trends

Climate Change

Competition for Energy

Poverty, Inequality & Poor Governance

States

Criminals

Nature

Failing & Fragile States

Terrorists

Interference with Trade
Deterrence

Trafficking
Interdiction

Pollution, Flooding
Resilience

Piracy
Stabilisation Ops

Direct/Enabling Attacks
Protective measures

Cyber

Internationalism

MARITIME

Space

Public Opinion

Threats

Opportunities

UK actions

Multiple departments and agencies

UK characteristic/interests: densely populated island nation; worldwide pattern of seaborne trade. These flows of energy and resources need to remain open and secure.

7.32 The UK has many assets it can bring to bear to both address threats and exploit opportunities in the maritime domain. But some areas of policy have developed independently over the years as threats and related technology have evolved. Given the ongoing importance of this domain to the UK, and the increasing interdependence of the threats and drivers, it is vital that we take a more comprehensive overview of maritime security.

7.33 To address the range of challenges in the maritime domain, the Cabinet Office is leading a cross-government study that will bring together key elements of government and industry in a partnership approach and across the full range of

maritime security challenges. This work will clarify which elements pose the greatest challenges and which present the most opportunities for our national security. It will prioritise our aims, assess our current capabilities and identify ways to fill any key gaps and remove duplication. We will work with international partners where appropriate. A report with recommendations for further action will be completed over the next twelve months, following consultation with the National Security Forum and others experts.

7.34 More specifically, in addressing the threat from piracy off the Horn of Africa, we will step up efforts to train and equip coast guard, fishery protection and naval forces in the area so that progressively they can

complement and in due course replace the international maritime effort. And in the longer term, we will need to develop sustainable Somali-based solutions to this problem, including supporting alternate livelihoods for littoral populations, enhancing the ability of the Somali authorities to impose the rule of the law, and more generally working with the political authorities in that country to ensure that the ungoverned space cannot be used by those who might post a threat to our national security.

Cyber Security

7.35 Millions of people across the UK now rely on the services and information that make up cyber space. It is often an essential component of many people's jobs, and many people rely on cyber space for commerce, research, and social activities. Modern business, Government, and critical national infrastructure are similarly dependent on this new domain of human activity. Cyber space presents major opportunities for citizens, business and Government alike and its effective functioning is of vital importance.

> Cyber space encompasses all forms of networked, digital activities; this includes the content and actions conducted through digital networks.

7.36 The increasingly digital nature of our society is recognised in the Government's Digital Britain strategy, which aims to make the United Kingdom the leading major economy for innovation, investment and quality in the digital and communications industries. Digital Britain will bring forward a unified framework to help maximise the UK's competitive advantage and the benefits to society. The Government's ultimate goal is to reduce the risks from the UK's use of cyber space to ensure we can reap its full benefits for the UK,

including using it to assist in the pursuit of our broader security policy goals. The Government recognises that we need to secure the broader benefits of this engagement with the digital world: for the individual citizen, for business, and for the public sector.

7.37 With the increasing importance of cyber space, however, comes greater exposure and vulnerability to some of the national security threats that interact with, and through, it. The asymmetric, low cost, and largely anonymous, nature of cyber space makes it an attractive domain for use by organised criminals, terrorists and in conventional state-led espionage and warfare. Those with hostile intent can, for whatever reason, use a variety of methods of attack through networks, radio communications, supply chains and potentially high power radio frequency transmissions, to gather intelligence, spread false information, interfere with data or disrupt the availability of a vital system.

7.38 These same attributes also potentially make cyber space a useful domain for the UK to exploit in fighting crime and terrorism, as well as in the military sphere.

7.39 As with all national security threats, we must be realistic about the risks, and proportionate in our response. We all have an important contribution to make to ensuring that we reduce those risks to the greatest extent possible, maximise the benefits, and do so in a way that safeguards the respect for privacy and civil liberties that is enshrined in the values of the UK. Government and business must work together to provide more secure products and services, to operate their information systems safely and to protect individuals' privacy. And citizens have a responsibility to take simple security measures to protect themselves, their families, and others in society.

7.40 That is why, alongside *Security for the Next Generation*, the Government is launching the first **Cyber Security Strategy of the UK.** The Strategy recognises the challenges of cyber security and the need to address them. It sets out the UK's strategic objectives of reducing risk and exploiting opportunities by improving knowledge, capabilities and decision-making in order to secure the UK's overall advantage in cyber space.

7.41 The Cyber Security Strategy aims to build on existing work across government and industry by developing a more cohesive and coherent framework. As a result of the Strategy, the Government is therefore announcing a cross-governmental programme of key cyber security work, and establishing an Office of Cyber Security to lead it.

7.42 In addition to bringing together existing work across Government to make best use of the substantial resources that have already been committed to cyber security, the Government will be providing an initial injection of new funding to support and expand the collaborative work already being undertaken by the Government and industry to help protect UK networks. This additional funding will target those areas that the Strategy has

identified as gaps in national capability that warrant early prioritisation.

7.43 The Government is also establishing an operational centre for monitoring the health of cyber space, and for response to cyber security incidents. This centre will not only improve the information already provided to industry, organisations and the public – it will also work with the Office of Cyber Security to systematically identify and prioritise new areas of work for targeted investment as the cross-government cyber security programme evolves.

7.44 In summary, the Government will:

- establish a cross-government programme to address priority areas in pursuit of the UK's strategic cyber security objectives, including:

  – providing additional funding for the development of innovative future technologies to protect UK networks;

  – developing and promoting the growth of critical skills;

- work closely with the wider public sector, industry, civil liberties groups, the public and with international partners;

- set up an Office of Cyber Security (OCS) to provide strategic leadership for and coherence across Government;

- create a Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) to:

  – actively monitor the health of cyber space and co-ordinate incident response;

  – enable better understanding of attacks against UK networks and users;

  – provide better advice and information about the risks to business and the public.

Further detail, on these steps and others, is included in the accompanying Cyber Security Strategy (Cm 7642).

Space

7.45 Just as cyber space underpins many elements of our daily life, space also plays an increasingly key role in modern society, although the dependence of many or our networks on resources such as satellites in space is less generally recognised. For instance, while navigation is the most recognisable product of the Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) array, (road haulage companies, shipping and aircraft rely heavily on GPS), it also facilitates a highly accurate and stable timing signal to many systems globally, including resource networks. The transmitted 'pulse' also controls the regularity of the frequency within the UK's 50 Hertz electricity supply, the universally-accepted time-stamp required in our global financial transactions, mobile phone coverage and the synchronisation of radios used by security services such as the police.

7.46 This considerable and increasing dependence on space makes us vulnerable to any disruption but also presents opportunities which the UK can use to its advantage. The UK need to understand where and how it may be vulnerable and what the impacts of this might be – then ensure we protect against them and prepare for them. We also needs to think strategically about how space can be used to support security and other aims and work to shape our approach and the infrastructure and technology we need to achieve it.

7.47 Given the UK's current reliance on foreign-owned space assets this may require some fundamental and difficult decisions both for Government and industry. It will also require close working with international partners who are facing similar questions.

Galileo

For some time, the UK has been working with our European partners in the development of Galileo, a Global Navigational Satellite System (GNSS), which has been developed with civil applications in mind. On completion in 2013 it will give Europe an independent GNSS capability and not only provide a boost to the European space industrial sector and build up expertise and know-how in a developing area but also help deliver a wide range of UK and Community policies.

7.48 In many ways, the challenges and opportunities the UK faces in space are similar to those we are addressing in cyber security, and there is much we can learn from that process.

7.49 The Government will now undertake a review of the strategic security of the UK's interests in space, working with key stakeholders across Government, in industry and internationally. It will consider the UK's strategic approach to space, how it underpins our security objectives and provide recommendations on how this should be developed to secure our interests now and in the future. The review will be led by the Cabinet Office and will seek the advice of the National Security Forum.

Domains of influence

7.50 In addition to the long-established and clearly understood physical domains, and newer technological ones, the National Security Strategy also focuses on areas of human activity which are of fundamental importance to global stability. The first is around public opinion, culture and information – in short, the debates

around the globe that affect the attitudes of people and what drives the behaviour of individuals, groups, and nations. The second is around the vital area of international organisation and how multilateral structures are configured to facilitate shared solutions to shared problems in the global age.

Public Opinion, culture and information

7.51 This domain of activity is increasingly important for national security. We live in an information age. The world is increasingly connected and transparent. More than ever before the actions of government are subject to scrutiny and comment, at home and overseas.

7.52 Almost every domain of national security activity has an important information dimension. Military campaigns must command the support of public opinion, and secure the support of the people amongst whom they are carried out. Indeed some have argued that for much military activity, the very purpose is to win the support of the people concerned rather than some more traditional physical objective. Diplomatic activity is as much about engagement with non-governmental organisations as about traditional inter-state diplomacy. Intelligence and other covert activity will necessarily remain secret in detail, but must command legitimacy and support through a degree of openness and understanding in the aggregate.

7.53 In countering terrorism, we have put increased effort into preventing people from becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism, as the strategic solution to the problem of terrorism. This seeks to challenge Al Qa'ida's ideology, which is based on a distorted interpretation of Islam, exposing its inaccuracies and shortcomings through better information,

challenge and debate, as well as addressing perceived grievances that can colour individuals views of western society. This is essential: Al Qaida are very conscious of the importance of propaganda for radicalisation, and have made good use of the internet for this purpose. In our own communications we recognise the need to engage with the public on the counter-terrorism agenda; publishing the full CONTEST strategy this year was a key step in this direction.

7.54 So the domain of public opinion, of culture, and of information and influence, is a vital area to be considered in its own right. The exponential growth of the Internet and cyber space has expanded the range and influence of this domain so that it is both global (because the internet can connect almost all nations, communities and individuals across the globe) and very localised (because people can choose through cyber space who they wish to connect to). These 'local' communities are not necessarily geographical, because people can choose to align to communities across the world.

7.55 Gaining the support of people around the world for our values, for our vision of a secure, stable, just and prosperous world based on cooperation between peoples and nations, and for the actions we take in support of that vision, is a vital part of securing our future. These are powerful, universal values, irrespective of race or religion. We must continue to develop our capacity to express and communicate the values that inform our policy. If we believe in these values, as we do, we should be confident in our ability to express and communicate them, and thereby to win support for them. We must therefore aspire to be effective in this domain, organising all our resources to the best effect.

7.56 The Government has already recognised the importance of this sphere for national security activity, and, just as importantly, for wider community cohesion. For example, the FCO works to address some commonly held misperceptions about our foreign policy and about life in the UK for British Muslims: misperceptions which are exploited by violent extremists to discredit our values and win support for their cause. We have recognised the importance of supplementing traditional government communications with more proactive face-to-face and online contacts to ensure that people develop an accurate picture of our work. Since some communities and individuals can be suspicious of governments as a source of information, we are finding credible voices within communities and building larger contact bases to enable us to quickly and effectively distribute the facts about our policies and rebut distortions.

7.57 To help tackle the threat from international terrorism, the Home Office, the Department for Communities and Local Government, and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, established in 2007 a joint Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) which advises on, coordinates, and helps deliver the Government's counter terrorism communications.

Internationalism: Global responses to global problems

7.58 In an increasingly globalised world, the UK's security and prosperity are dependent on international stability. The best way to achieve this is through a robust **rules-based international system**. Cutting across all aspects of the Government's Strategic Framework for National Security is the firm commitment to working in partnership with other countries and multilateral institutions.

7.59 Just as our approach to activity in the UK is governed by our commitment to the rule of law and accountable government, so our activity in the international environment is governed by our commitment to internationalism and working with others to develop global responses to global problems, with effective global capability to implement them. This means pushing for clearly articulated principles and a robust framework of rules for international activity – whether it is military, commercial, or other examples – upheld and enforced by effective, responsible and accountable institutions.

7.60 This is a vital principle. The response to global challenges must be internationalist not isolationist: one country may be tempted to take damaging action in its own interests. This action in itself may only have limited impact but it might then

London Summit

Against the backdrop of the worst international banking crisis in generations, the London Summit in April 2009 brought together leaders of the world's major and emerging economies, as well as key international institutions. As Chair, the UK took a leading role in forging agreement on the appropriate response to these challenges and to ensure multilateral commitment to taking the necessary action to stabilise financial markets and enable families and businesses to get through the recession; to reform and strengthen the global financial and economic system to restore confidence; and to put the global economy on track for sustainable growth. We will continue to lead this agenda through our G20 Presidency in 2009.

provoke a similar response by other states. Collectively, this damages global stability. In the economic context, this risk can be seen in the current economic slowdown with the temptation to impose restrictive trade measures for the benefit of a particular country. More generally, it can be seen in the potential for states to use energy supplies or other economic levers as hostile policy tools. Strong international frameworks are needed to combat these risks. This is why multilateralism is at the heart of the National Security Strategy.

The past year

7.61 Global economic cooperation has been at the forefront of the multilateral agenda over the past year. *Security in an interdependent world* outlined the very significant priority the Government gives to promoting strong international financial institutions (IFIs) and the need for further, wide-ranging reform to reflect better the composition of the twenty first century economy.

7.62 The financial crisis and subsequent synchronised global economic downturn has generated much greater impetus and global support for this agenda. The London Summit, under UK Chairmanship, in April brought together leaders of the world's major and emerging economies covering 85 per cent of the world's output, as well as key international institutions.

7.63 The London Summit outcomes included:

- A commitment to a package of measures to help the world economy through the crisis;

- Agreement to take steps to prevent future crises building by creating the Financial Stability Board to develop greater cross-border regulation and crisis management;

- Agreement to reform the mandates, scope and governance of the IFIs to reflect changes in the world economy and the new challenges of globalisation, including giving greater representation to emerging and developing countries, including the poorest;

- Extended commitment not to raise trade barriers or impose any new export trade restrictions until the end of 2010;

- Tasking the WTO and other international organisations such as the OECD to monitor and report publicly on adherence to anti-protectionism;

- Taking steps to eliminate tax havens and non-cooperative tax jurisdictions;

- Agreement to make an additional $850 billion available through international institutions (including £750 billion for the IMF), promoting global liquidity and supporting countries most in need during the crisis;

- Tasking the International Labour Organisation with monitoring the actions countries are taking and should take to support employment and provide social protection during the crisis;

- Commitment of $50 billion to support social protection, boost trade and safeguard development in the poorest countries, and reaffirmed commitment to aid targets and to the MDGs; and

- Commitment to make the best possible use of investment funded by fiscal stimulus programmes based on understanding the importance of transition towards clean, innovative, resource efficient, low carbon technologies and infrastructure.

7.64 In **international security**, building stability, democratic governance and prosperity in Afghanistan and Pakistan,

as well as countering terrorism and violent extremism remain challenges for us and our partners in the UN, NATO and elsewhere. With international partners, we are working to tackle the continuing humanitarian crisis in Somalia as well as the piracy, crime and extremism which are fuelled by it. Following the Georgia-Russia conflict in August 2008, we are working with both parties and with international partners to ensure greater stability in that region – through the presence of the EU, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN – the resettlement of civilians and a long-term political process. With international partners we are also working with the Georgian government to support democratic reform and closer Euro-Atlantic integration.

7.65 The UK is active across a broad range of multilateral organisations aimed at strengthening global security.

Within NATO:

- The UK takes a leading role in **NATO**, especially in the areas of transformation and capability development. The NATO Defence Ministers' meeting in London last September gave impetus to the transformation agenda and led to an increase in deployability targets for Allies' land forces from 40 per cent to 50 per cent. The NATO Summit agreed a Declaration on Alliance Security, which sets the rationale for NATO's future direction and underlines the need to make capabilities more flexible and deployable to respond quickly to new crises.

- NATO has benefited from expansion and in the past year has welcomed Albania and Croatia as members. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be invited to join soon and Georgia and Ukraine are in the process of agreeing Annual National Programmes

with the Alliance to help them implement the reforms necessary for eventual membership. France's reintegration into NATO's military structure has given further impetus to NATO transformation and a key priority of our engagement with both NATO and the EU is to increase the European contribution to global security activity.

Within the United Nations:

- The **United Nations** (UN) remains a vital part of the UK's multilateral effort. We have directly supported, through the Conflict Prevention Pool, the building of UN Headquarters capacity in projects which cover the spectrum of the conflict cycle. The UK has also provided police and civilian secondments to key international institutions including the UN, EU and OSCE in 2008/9 and has shaped ongoing debate on the development of EU mediation capacity. There has been continued UK political support for the UN Mediation Support Unit.

- In January 2009, the UK and France launched an initiative in the Security Council to address the need for more effective UN peacekeeping. This will help to ensure that peacekeeping operations have clearer, tighter and more realistic mandates and that progress can be measured.

- The UK is already working to incorporate best practice into the every day work of the Security Council, such as introducing benchmarks into peacekeeping mandates, in order to enable more effective progress monitoring; ensuring that mandates better incorporate conflict analysis and military advice; and provide for better consultation of troop and police contributors to peacekeeping operations. We are also working to

ensure closer linkages between peacekeeping and peacebuilding to strengthen the international response when countries emerge from conflict.

- In June 2009, the UN Secretary-General will issue his report on peace building. We will ensure rapid progress to implement its recommendations including through our support to strengthen UN leadership, to clarify the division of labour for post-conflict recovery within the UN, and between the UN and the World Bank, and to make the Peacebuilding Commission and Fund more effective. We are working with others to improve international civilian capacity and strengthen links with bilateral capacity. We are supporting strengthened UN leadership on the ground.

Within the European Union:

- The reaffirmation of the **EU** European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2008 was an important step in achieving more robust, accountable and integrated EU security policy. We remain committed to the EU's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and to an integrated approach to addressing crises, including close coordination between military and civilian activity. During the French Presidency of the EU in the latter half of 2008, a Crisis Management Planning Directorate was introduced with the UK's full support. This set up permanent comprehensive political and strategic planning capability with civilian and military strategic planners working together.

Working with the African Union:

- In April 2008 the Prime Minister underlined the need for more sustainable funding for **African Union** (AU) peacekeeping at the UN Security Council. We will continue to pursue this agenda with international partners.

- The AU continues to develop its African Peace and Security Architecture, as well as maintaining peacekeeping missions in the field in Darfur and Somalia, to which the UK has made significant contributions.

- The UK, with the EU and other international partners, has contributed to supporting the growing network of Political Offices in Africa which provide information and advice to policy makers in Addis Ababa. The EU has also continued to support the development of the AU Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). The next twelve months will be important for the development of the Africa Stand-by Force (ASF), and the UK and EU are supporting the process of creating its operational capability.

7.66 The stability and governance of the international rules based system is critical for our ongoing security and prosperity. However, we also maintain important **bilateral relationships** within the global context which remain critical. Over the past year we have worked to develop strong ties with the new Administration in the **United States**, our most important bilateral partner. We have continued to build an effective and close bilateral relationship with China, and recently launched our first ever public strategy, *The UK and China: A Framework for Engagement*, which makes clear that building a progressive partnership with China is a long-term UK priority. The UK's relations with **Russia**, culturally and economically, are strong and Russia continues to play a constructive role internationally, though we stand firm where we consider actions to be unacceptable, such as over Georgia. The UK developed and deepened co-operation

with **India** across a broad range of bilateral issues including political, development, culture and education. The UK is also committed to its long-term strategic relationship with **Pakistan** and will continue to strengthen it through high-level dialogue and close co-ordination to help the country build stronger security capability, better governance and sustained economic development.

Future priorities

7.67 Building on these successes, our future priorities for strengthening multilateral capability to tackle global challenges include:

- **the global economy:** we will work to ensure that the consensus achieved by the G20 to overcome the economic crisis continues and that the London Summit commitments are upheld and built upon. We will also seek to make progress on long-term issues such as climate change and international development. The sustainable enlargement and reform of international financial institutions to reflect better the modern world is a priority, and we will continue efforts to develop a suitable new model for multilateralism;

- **NATO:** we are committed to developing the new NATO strategic concept and will continue to support an open door policy on enlargement, working with countries aspiring to join the Alliance to implement necessary reforms. We will continue to contribute to NATO's ISAF force in creating a stable and sustainable future in Afghanistan;

- **the United Nations:** we will champion reform of the UNSC throughout negotiations in Autumn 2009 and will encourage more of the dialogue between member states that has helped to generate a more proactive and constructive approach to the debate.

- **non-proliferation:** as part of the Government's approach to countering nuclear proliferation, we are committed to strengthening the IAEA so that it can successfully fulfil its crucial role in safeguarding against the spread of nuclear weapons and will set out proposals for doing so in the run up to the 2010 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;

- **conflict and instability:** we will chair a meeting of the UNSC in August 2009 to set out progress on UN peacekeeping operations and to set the context for further work. We will continue to work towards a resolution to the three critical challenges facing the UN peacebuilding: ensuring stronger leadership around a single strategy; deploying civilian experts to support national efforts; and disbursing fast flexible financing to get recovery going. Building further capacity in regional security institutions remains a priority, in particular, we are ready to offer support for the restructuring and strengthening the AU Commission's Peace and Security Department.

7.68 The UK has played a major role in a series of significant achievements which have reformed and strengthened the international institutions that sustain the rules-based system.

7.69 The Government is committed to pushing further still to ensure that international governance across all domains of activity is robust and able to respond effectively to the challenges of the global era and that the commitments made this year are upheld.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

8.1 This update of the National Security Strategy – *Security for the next generation* – sets out the Government's assessment of the range of national security challenges we face across a broad range of drivers, threats and domains of activity.

8.2 National security challenges arise in different ways, and within different timeframes. Some, like international terrorism or poverty, are already evident and require a continuing response. The most significant implications of other challenges, such as climate change, are unlikely to be seen within the next twenty years but require action now to mitigate the consequences. In the case of other potential threats, like pandemic 'flu, there is no credible scientific way of predicting exactly when threats may arise and we therefore require a constant state of readiness to respond.

8.3 The Government will continue to look objectively at the evidence to assess how challenges to national security develop, and over what timescale. This strategy, and future updates, therefore set the framework for targeting the resources allocated specifically to national security activity in the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review and in future spending reviews.

8.4 The National Security, International Relations and Development Committee (NSID), chaired by the Prime Minister, is the Cabinet Committee charged with oversight of the National Security Strategy. NSID brings together the large group of Ministers, heads of Agencies and other key parts of the national security apparatus within Government within one forum for consideration of strategic national security issues. Over the next year NSID will review progress against delivering the commitments set out in the National Security Strategy, and assess ongoing developments and the Government's response. NSID is supported by a dedicated National Security Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, which brings together a wide range of national security related work across Government. The Secretariat will also lead the development of further important work on maritime security, security of strategic interests in space, and other key studies, working closely with other departments, partners and the private sector. The Government will continue to develop its horizon scanning capabilities, building on the successful establishment of the Strategic Horizons Unit last year.

8.5 We will continue to seek the fullest possible range of external advice. The National Security Forum will continue to advise NSID on national security issues and will be specifically consulted on key forthcoming work on maritime security. The Government looks forward to working with the new Joint Parliamentary Committee on the National Security Strategy. We will continue to develop links with academia and research organisations with an interest in national security.

8.6 The aim of the National Security Strategy Strategic Framework is to ensure that Government thinking on national security keeps pace with a rapidly evolving global context. As such we will publish further regular assessments on the challenges we face, and on progress in implementing this strategy. This will allow Parliament and the wider public to scrutinise the Government's national security activity and our assessment of security risks.

8.7 By bringing together the full range of national security challenges and activities in a single strategic framework that looks ahead to the long term, the Government aims to provide the UK with a coherant set of objectives and plans for national security activity. The Framework is designed to address the specific challenges arising from our analysis of the position of the UK in the modern world. Delivering our plans requires a concerted and co-ordinated effort within Government. It also requires strong and enduring partnerships with business, local communities, and international partners. And our approach to national security must be proportionate and consistent with the cherished values of liberty in a free society governed by the rule of law. All of this is essential if we are to deliver the progress we need in moving towards a more secure, stable, just and prosperous world.

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