The EU as a Global Conflict Manager

Edited by
**Richard G. Whitman
and Stefan Wolff**

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Conclusion

14 The EU as a global conflict manager

Reflections on the past, perspectives for the future

Richard G. Whitman and Stefan Wolff

Introduction

Over the past two decades, the European Union has significantly expanded its role as a conflict manager both in terms of the scope of activities and in terms of their geographical spread. Over 20 civilian and military crisis management operations have been conducted by the Union and its member states in Africa, Asia and Europe, in cooperation with other international and regional organisations (including the UN, OSCE, AU, NATO and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)), and deploying thousands of civilian experts and military personnel. While none of these missions can be classified as a failure, the track record of the EU in terms of achieving a lasting and positive impact on local conflicts, beyond the often narrow mandate that the Union gives itself, is somewhat patchy. This is not surprising given either the complexity of the conflict situations the EU has become involved in or the only gradual development of capabilities to deal with them. More importantly, the unqualified and qualified successes that the Union has had in managing conflict offer important lessons that can enable the EU to become a more effective conflict manager in the future. It is these reflections on the past that we now turn to in our concluding chapter in order to develop credible perspectives for the Union's future role as a global conflict manager.

The EU's performance to date

If nothing else, the preceding case studies clearly illustrate that the EU has become more globally engaged as a conflict manager over the past two decades. It has developed capabilities to act, fund, and coordinate and cooperate, albeit to varying degrees, and brought them to bear in a wide range of conflicts, and mostly successfully so. At the same time, a systematic analysis and comparison of our case studies reveals a number of areas where the EU has room for improvement. Yet, to be fair, there are also obstacles to more effective conflict management that are not of the Union's own making and often beyond its capabilities to remove.

How do capabilities matter?

The availability of relevant capabilities is an essential condition of successful conflict management. In our and our contributors' analysis, the EU does not suffer from a capability gap when it comes to *funding* specific missions and operations, regardless of whether they are civilian, military or hybrid in nature. The EU has also overcome earlier problems in making

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funding quickly available. This is particularly obvious when we consider the EU's perform-ance in the Western Balkans in the first decade after the end of the Cold War. Yet, the rela-tively easy availability of funding for conflict management missions and operations is only part of the story. The EU's *capability to act*, especially in a military sense, remains curtailed because of the limited progress that has been made in achieving the Helsinki Headline Goals. This is, in part, compensated by effective cooperation with NATO and in part by the limited scope of EU military crisis management operations to date. As the five EU operations *Concordia*, *Althea*, *Artemis*, EUFOR DRC and EUFOR Chad/CAR in Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, DRC and the tri-border area between Sudan, Chad and CAR indicate, their success is in terms of achieving the goals that EU member states set these missions, while their impact on the actual conflicts has in some cases been limited because of the narrow mandates with which they were equipped.

The story that can be told of EU civilian crisis management operations is rather different. While ambition here has been significantly greater, it has also exposed capability gaps: it does not bode well for mission success if there are long delays in reaching full operability, as in the case of EULEX Kosovo and EUPOL Afghanistan. Less ambitious missions, such as EULEX Georgia or the police mission in Macedonia, Proxima, however, experienced fewer difficulties in reaching operability and delivering on their mandates.

Where weaknesses of military and civilian crisis management operations meet, however, is in the often limited, or unsustainable, impact on the conflict. This is a dual problem for the EU: limited mandates can be more easily accomplished with existing capabilities but they have, from the outset, a lower likelihood of long-term positive impact on the conflict in ques-tion; more ambitious mandates, on the other hand, face serious capability problems (espe-cially in terms of hardware and personnel, and the maintenance of an EU-internal consensus, i.e. political will) and are thus likely to have a limited impact on the conflict.

How does context matter?

The cross-section of cases that have been considered in the preceding parts of our book all point out that context is obviously important in assessing the EU's performance in conflict management. On the one hand, it shapes the mandate that the EU gives itself: the short-term, relatively limited military crisis management missions that the Union has undertaken in Africa, for example, reflect an appreciation of what the EU can do in complex situations such as in the DRC. In other words, context assessment shapes EU decisions with a view to making sure that whatever missions the organisation takes on can be completed successfully. On the other hand, and closely related, looking at the contexts in which the EU has acted to date, and with what mandates, reflects back on the capabilities it possesses and is willing to deploy. For the context of the Western Balkans, over the past decade, EU capabilities were and are sufficient to manage the actual and latent conflicts there through a combination of its own capabilities and close cooperation with its allies, especially NATO. In the Western Balkans, the EU has eventually risen to the challenge of conflict management, and framed its efforts very much in these terms. In contrast, in Moldova and the South Caucasus, it has not – or only reluctantly – done so, partly because of a lack of opportunity, partly because of its own timidity about taking on more specifically political tasks, rather than acting within its traditional comfort zone of institutional reform and economic development with the aim of creating an environment in which conflict management (and even settlement) might become possible. The Union's commitment to, and long-term engagement with, Moldova, a gradu-ally more conducive regional and international context, and the fact that the EU, at long last

in the spring of 2011, has commissioned a strategic needs and conflict assessment for Moldova indicate that this approach might eventually bear fruit in this case. The lack of most of these positive factors in the context of Georgia and Afghanistan, on the other hand, explains the Union's relatively uninspiring performance in these two cases, in the same way in which it helps us understand the limited impact on the ground that the EU has made in Africa and in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

The capabilities – context nexus

Capabilities clearly matter, and so does context. Yet to understand fully how they both do, and what lessons we can learn from this, requires us to look at the capabilities – context nexus. This is nowhere more obvious than in the case of Cyprus where the EU provided the essential conditions for what was the most promising settlement plan for decades – the Annan Plan. The initial link between conflict settlement and EU accession injected crucial momentum into the negotiation process and provided real incentives for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots to engage constructively in the settlement negotiations. Yet, at the same time, the EU failed to create the same incentives for Greece and Greek Cypriots, thus turning a very promising effort at finally settling the decades-old Cyprus conflict and overcoming the partition of the island into yet another failed settlement attempt. Crucially, this was primarily a home-made failure, attributable to a lack of strategic coordination within the EU. Looking at the way in which accession as an important policy failed in the case of Cyprus holds important lessons for the EU's use of conditionality as a whole, as well as having more immediate implications for conflict management in the Western Balkans, and potentially in Moldova, where the carrot of membership is supposed to move local conflict parties closer to burying their hatchets.

The questions that Cyprus raises about the EU's ability for a strategic approach to conflict management are profound. At one level, they are specific to this case, but in a more abstract sense, they can be asked of all the other cases in our book and more broadly of EU conflict management efforts in the past and, perhaps more importantly, the future. They relate to the compatibility of its various policies and their associated goals and how to prioritise them. They are about a realistic assessment of what the EU can achieve in which conflict (context) with the capabilities it possesses. They concern questions of whether the Union is willing to develop capabilities it currently misses, or enhance those that must be deemed insufficient at present. In other words, if we look at the larger picture of the EU as an international security actor, the most profound question that the Union has yet to answer is how its various institutions and policies for conflict management fit into the broader set of aspirations that it has articulated in its Security Strategy.

The institutional limitations of the EU

Based on the cross-examination of our case studies in the preceding section of the concluding chapter, it is clear that there are a number of institutional limitations that inhibited EU conflict management performance prior to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. In that era, there was an abundance of EU institutions that at least theoretically had a mandate in the area of conflict management, including the Presidency, the Political and Security Committee and the High Representative on the Council side, and on the Commission side the various Directorates General concerned with foreign affairs, above all DG External Relations, as well as EU Delegations on the ground. The European Parliament had a relatively limited

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impact as an institution, even though a number of MEPs tended to play a more active role in particular conflicts or specific aspects of EU conflict resolution, such as human rights. The bulk of the EU's conflict management work, however, tended to happen between Council and Commission. Commission officials generally saw their institution's role as confined to providing aid and offering financial and technical assistance, all aimed at creating conditions conducive to conflict settlement, and acknowledge that Council bodies have a greater role to play in political aspects of conflict management. Council officials accepted this more political role, but were hesitant to define clearly what it entails in relation to specific conflicts or more generally. Crucially, there was an absence of a commonly agreed strategy of conflict management across EU institutions. This left much to chance, or, to put it more positively, to the activism, skill, determination and vision of particular individuals, as exemplified in the role played by different Special Representatives, such as Kalman Mizsei in Moldova, or individual Heads of State and Government, such as French President Nicolas Sarkozy during the crisis in Georgia in 2008 or German Chancellor Angela Merkel in the context of the Meseberg Declaration and the engagement with Russia over the conflict in Transnistria that followed from it.

Another issue limiting the effectiveness of EU conflict management in the pre-Lisbon era was the lack of an integrated EU foreign policy structure and service. As a result, officials in the institutions in Brussels, delegations in countries, the representatives of different EU bodies on the ground, and member states' embassies all participated in the EU foreign policy process, including in its conflict management efforts, but all with their own priorities and capabilities. Coordination between them differed sharply from case to case, but was often less than comprehensive. In addition, local EU representatives and embassy staff of member states and desk officers in Brussels and national capitals rarely, if ever, had any specialist training in conflict analysis and management, limiting the anyway underdeveloped early warning capacity of the EU. Nor did the EU have a dedicated, well-resourced, cross-institutional conflict management body that could have taken on the role of coordination between institutions and member states and local staff, and develop and implement effective conflict management policies. This has offered a significant opportunity for the European External Action Service (EEAS) and we shall return to this issue below.

The coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty has addressed some of these limitations just noted, and there is considerable scope for further improvement, reflected, among other things, in the close collaboration of late between HR Ashton and Commissioner Füle on the EU's response to the Arab Spring. A different constraint, and one that has remained in the post-Lisbon era, is the complex relationship between EU institutions and member states: now a Union of 27 states whose institutional set-up at present still requires unanimous agreement within the Foreign Affairs Council on substantive foreign affairs decisions and makes reaching common positions very difficult in cases where national interests and domestic sensitivities are present. The very different historical and contemporary relationships of individual EU member states with Russia, for example, shaped by diverse social, political and economic links, has complicated the process of making and implementing effective decisions when it comes to conflict management in the Eastern Neighbourhood, dividing the EU at times sharply between member states with dominant pro- and anti-Russian sentiment. Similarly, divisions were obvious within the EU in relation to the response to various crises in the Middle East and North Africa throughout the first half of 2011, most notably Germany's abstention from supporting UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) that authorised the subsequent NATO military operation against Colonel Gadhafi's regime. At other times, divisions are less pronounced or less openly articulated. For example, the EU, by and large, now speaks with one voice in relation to the Western Balkans, albeit with the notable exception

of Kosovo; and other operations further afield, such as in the DRC, Chad or the EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh, Indonesia, are relatively uncontroversial once consensus has been reached on the mandate that the EU will seek to fulfil.

The policy limitations of the EU

Similarly to the abundance of institutions, and partly a result of it, the EU possesses a range of policy instruments for conflict management, including Joint Statements, Joint Actions, Common Positions, EU Special Representatives, economic sanctions, CSDP civilian, police and military operations, and support for civil society and other democratisation projects (under the framework of EIDHR).

Policies like the ENP, moreover, allow the EU to use the principle of conditionality in its conflict management efforts, albeit with a mixed track record. For example, the Action Plans, where they do make specific reference to conflict settlement, are often vague and lack the kind of specificity necessary to tie them credibly to incentives that are only conditionally available to partner countries. Moreover, Action Plans have to be based on a consensus between the EU, and thus among all of its 27 member states, and the partner country. In addition, the fact that ENP theoretically lends itself to the application of conditionality does not mean that it is in practice deployed in this way when it comes to conflict management efforts. The stronger emphasis on conditionality in the 2011 ENP Review is more than just an implicit acknowledgement of previous shortcomings in using conditionality as an effective instrument for conflict management.

The case of Georgia has shown that the EU more often than not does not engage in 'traditional' conflict management activities, such as confidence-building, mediation, etc., but rather focuses its efforts on what are basically infrastructure projects or institutional reform projects that are deemed to establish conditions conducive to conflict management but are not in themselves actual conflict management tools. Especially in projects of this kind in Abkhazia and South Ossetia the EU did not, either alone or in cooperation with the OSCE or UN, make its grants conditional on progress in settlement negotiations. Much the same can be said for the EU's engagement in Moldova and the Arab–Israeli conflict. More dramatically even, the EU completely eliminated any potential for using conditionality in the case of Cyprus where, enlargement being at stake, the opportunity to do so successfully was clearly there. Cyprus, at the same time, highlights the above-noted internal coordination problems: a single member state, in this case Greece, can effectively block vital tools for potentially successful EU conflict management. Also, and again with Greece at the centre, the EU itself is unable to force individual member states to abandon foreign policies that are counter-productive: Greece's continuing dispute with Macedonia over the latter country's constitutional name is less than conducive to EU policy *vis-à-vis* the Western Balkans.

The appointment of EU Special Representatives was a widely used tool for conflict management in the pre-Lisbon era. In the early days of the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, it seemed as if there was, at best, little room for EUSRs, and the mandate for a number of high-profile posts, including for the South Caucasus and Moldova, was not renewed. At the time of writing (July 2011), the EU has eight special representatives: for Afghanistan, the African Great Lakes Region, the African Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central Asia, Crisis in Georgia, Kosovo and Sudan. Perhaps crucially lacking are similar offices for the Middle East, Armenia/Azerbaijan and Moldova – especially at a time when the EU seeks to become more actively involved in efforts to manage these conflicts. At the same time, the very instrument of EUSRs has not always been effectively used, notably in the case

of Georgia. Prior to 2008, Georgia was covered in the vast mandate of the EUSR for the South Caucasus, covering all three countries of the region and all three conflicts there (Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, as well as the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan) and a multitude of other issues from democratisation to rule of law, organised crime, energy security, etc. At the same time, the EUSR's staff and resources were limited. What was perhaps more important for the effectiveness of the office, though, was the appointment of another EUSR to take charge of the crisis in Georgia in 2008 which seriously undermined the credibility of the EUSR across the South Caucasus, and especially in Georgia, and in the eyes of major regional players, while simultaneously creating overlaps of mandates and competences, stretching existing resources and complicating operations on the ground in terms of internal and external cooperation and coordination. Moreover, it was the EUSR for the Crisis in Georgia who represented the EU in the Geneva talks, rather than the EUSR for the South Caucasus who would have benefited in this role from his much longer engagement with the region and its major players. This indicated a lack of coherence in the EU's approach to conflict management and the loss of an opportunity to maximise the impact of existing knowledge and understanding. It was also, from this perspective, questionable whether any lessons learned from previous, if marginal, EUSR involvement in conflict management initiatives in Georgia could be properly utilised. Similarly, in the case of Moldova, not renewing the mandate of the EUSR there had a negative impact on the EU's ability to manage the conflict in Transnistria – there is a crucial difference between a Delegation, which has a multitude of simultaneous tasks on its agenda, and a high-profile, seasoned diplomat who is exclusively focused on a specific conflict.

Limiting the use of EUSRs as conflict management tools, however, not only limits the external effectiveness of EU conflict management policy but also deprives the Union of opportunities to enhance internal coordination horizontally across institutions and among member states, and vertically between them and between Brussels and the Delegations. For example, recent initiatives by HR Ashton in the Middle East peace process lacked sufficient coordination with member states. In the case of Moldova, several parallel initiatives – the German–Russian Meseberg process, the German–French–Russian Deauville process, the previously informal and now again official 5+2 talks, as well as a number of individual programmes funded by Germany and the UK – are at best loosely coordinated and clearly lack a common strategic vision for an endgame in the Transnistria settlement process.

Future prospects for the EU as a global conflict manager

In the pre-Lisbon era, two key issues, in our view, have prevented the European Union living up to its aspirations of becoming a globally significant and impactful conflict manager. The first of these was structural – the lack of a permanent External Action Service – and the second substantive and conceptual – the lack of a coherent and comprehensive conflict management strategy.

The European External Action Service

With the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, a permanent European Union External Action Service has become a reality, even though the service, two years since its inception, remains in many ways in its infancy, with turf wars between and among institutions and member states over its mandate, capacities, resources, personalities, etc. still ongoing. Ideally, what it would contribute to conflict management is a greater level of policy coherence through

joined-up thinking between delegations on the ground and EU headquarters in Brussels, offering consistency and continuity of personnel over time, enhancing the role of the High Representative as a single voice of EU foreign policy, combining more effectively the range of policy tools available for conflict management, developing as yet non-existent capabilities (such as in the area of mediation and mediation support), ensuring that there is a greater level of policy learning and establishing best practices across the range of EU conflict management operations, thereby also enhancing the reputation of the EU as an effective conflict manager on a more global scale. This requires a high-profile, skilled, experienced and well-regarded personality in the role of the High Representative, who needs to enjoy unconditional backing from at least the 'Big Three' and ample room for initiative and manoeuvre – criteria on which the current HR, Baroness Ashton, at least in part falls short.

The political leadership of the EEAS will need to continue to establish a core team of officials to support them in the range of conflict management tasks; people selected because of the experience, expertise and/or training they have, rather than on the basis of national quota allocations. Equally importantly, the Union needs to invest greater care in the appointment of its representatives on the ground in Delegations and equip them with proper resources. They need to be incorporated into developing case-specific conflict management strategies and coordinate their implementation closely with Brussels. Given the complexity of contemporary conflict management, especially the range of actors and interests involved, it will also be key to future EU success that the role of Heads of Delegation in the capitals of the Union's strategic partners is strengthened.

In Brussels, the much-criticised crisis management organisation needs rethinking. It has civilian and military elements working side by side in a structure in which reporting lines and responsibilities are not entirely clear. It remains entirely separate from the regional and thematic directorates. The newly established Directorate for Conflict Prevention and Security Policy, which could potentially serve as a focal point for conflict analysis and management, is not put on an equal footing with other directorates and not adequately resourced for policy programming. The various Council Working Groups work in isolation from each other and technical and procedural details tend to gain priority over political analysis and problem-solving.

There is a need to review the crisis management structure, to broaden the focus from crisis management to conflict management (in the broad sense of also being aimed at prevention and settlement) and to streamline reporting and coordination structures. This should also include a 'mainstreaming' of conflict impact assessments into EU policies and programmes to ensure that EU engagement with (potentially) conflict-affected states does not lead to an unintended worsening of a particular situation on the ground. The crisis management board should become a crisis response and conflict management board focusing not only on crisis response but also on EU strategy *vis-à-vis* such states. Without this, it seems likely that the short-termism that has characterised EU action on many issues will continue.

However, it is the absence of a coherent and comprehensive conflict management strategy to which all the Union's institutions and member states subscribe, that is integrated and mainstreamed into all aspects of external relations with the relevant countries, and is implemented effectively in the EU's dealings with other players involved in each conflict that remains the most fundamental conceptual obstacle on the path of the EU towards a more effective conflict management role. The fact that the Union is too often merely reacting to developments rather than developing a clear strategic vision of, and will for, proactive and effective conflict management is partly a cause and partly an indication of this lack of a conflict management strategy.

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A conflict management strategy

If the Union is serious about playing an active role in contributing to conflict management – as stated in numerous documents and statements by high-ranking officials – it needs not only to build a core human capacity in the European External Action Service but also to develop a proper conflict management strategy.[1] The formulation and subsequent implementation of such a strategy needs to rest on three pillars:

- a clear definition of EU interests and goals in the area of conflict management;
- an assessment of EU strengths and weaknesses in conflict management; and
- a feasible approach as to how these strengths can be best leveraged and weaknesses be overcome.

Within such a framework, EU officials need to develop a conflict management road map for specific conflicts. These road maps need to detail how the EU will contribute to the settlement of each conflict, including establishing what local conflict parties and other third parties need (or must not) do for the EU to become involved. This should also include contingencies for different scenarios regarding the impact of different local state, regional and global factors beyond the direct control of the Union, and define exit points for the EU in cases of both success and failure. The road maps would not as such suggest concrete solutions for each conflict but identify what the EU considers to be an appropriate process that can lead to a just and equitable, as well as attainable, settlement in an EU-led or co-led format. At the same time, the EU should set out the benefits that would accrue to the conflict parties (and where applicable third parties) as a result of their constructive engagement, or alternatively what sanctions the EU would apply in the case of non-conformity. In other words, in order to ensure the credibility and viability of these road maps, the EU, for each conflict, needs:

- to determine the relevant players and analyse in detail their interests and capabilities, and on this basis begin to build as broad a coalition as possible in support of an outcome-oriented settlement process;
- to develop a conflict-specific, that is context-sensitive, strategy for each conflict determining the incentives and sanctions the Union will bring to bear on these actors during the settlement process and the conditions that will trigger their application; and
- to define its own exit points from the settlement process if progress towards success becomes impossible or costs of succeeding outweigh the benefits.[2]

In addition, five substantive principles need to guide the EU's thinking about the process and outcome of its engagement in each individual conflict, bearing in mind that these conflicts are linked at different levels and that each individual road map has to be based on the three pillars on which the Union's overall conflict management strategy is based.

- *Primacy of negotiated solutions over imposed settlements.* The eventual outcomes of settlement negotiations must not be prejudged, but reflect what is practical and feasible given the interests of the immediate conflict parties and other relevant players. In order to attain such outcomes, the EU needs to stand ready to provide adequate resources for potentially protracted negotiations, as well as leadership and technical expertise as necessary to assist in crafting a sustainable settlement.

- *Inclusiveness of negotiations.* Comparative experience of conflict management indicates the need for negotiations to include all relevant parties if whatever settlement is obtained is to have a chance of being fully implemented and sustainably operated. Such inclusion need not be unconditional, but conditions need to be determined and enforced with care. While a commitment by all parties to non-violence is essential, the non-prejudicial approach to negotiation outcomes outlined above suggests that demanding prior acceptance of certain parameters of a settlement, such as continued territorial integrity or the permanence of demographic changes, might be counter-productive by undercutting the support that negotiators need from their constituencies.

- *Comprehensiveness of agreements.* In order to achieve comprehensive and thus sustainable agreements, a proper understanding of each relevant conflict is indispensable. This means to look beyond the often simplistic, but convenient labels that are given to contemporary conflicts. Conflict in the DRC, for example, is often equated with so-called resource conflicts, the conflict in Afghanistan is variably seen as part of the 'global war on terrorism' or as a counter-insurgency, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is characterised as one of self-determination, and conflicts in the Western Balkans, Moldova and Georgia are considered secessionist. While these labels capture significant features of each of these conflicts, they also leave other, equally important dimensions to one side. The conflicts in the Western Balkans, Moldova and Georgia, for example, are indeed primarily secessionist in nature; yet, a mere compromise about who is to control which stretch of territory will be insufficient for any settlement to be sustainable. Experience indicates that, apart from accommodating territorial claims, security, economic and cultural concerns too need to be addressed. This will require the parties to make concessions and settle for compromises. As this is an often painful and risky process for the negotiators personally and the parties they represent, mediators need to be acutely aware of 'red lines' and carefully tease out the space for compromise between them, tabling proposals at key moments. Such proposals can be specific to address a particular impasse during negotiations, but they may also be broader, considering the interests of external parties whose support will be needed for settlement implementation and operation.

- *Building broad coalitions of support for negotiated settlements.* Difficult as it may be to reach a settlement at the negotiation table, the process of securing its implementation is often even more fraught with dangers of failure. The EU will need to put significant effort into securing the support of a particular settlement from key constituencies of those represented in negotiations, external stakeholders and interested parties, as well as manage potential spoilers and limit their ability to undermine a settlement agreement once it has been negotiated. Such a broad coalition of support would need to include civil society and media, diaspora networks, regional and international organisations, neighbouring states, and relevant great powers to offer the political elites who negotiated a settlement the necessary backing and give them the room for manoeuvre to accept compromises and make concessions.

- *Need for long-term external assistance.* Achieving a negotiated settlement in any conflict is a difficult enough task on its own. Its subsequent implementation and operation, moreover, will be long-term projects of state and nation-building that would, without external assistance, lack necessary human and material resources to be completed successfully. The EU has significant experience – of success and failure – in this from its engagement in the Western Balkans over the past almost two decades, and it will increase the likelihood of its success in conflict management if it commits to long-term,

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post-settlement engagement with the former conflict zones by providing security guar-
antees, development aid and institutional capacity-building and training.

The EU has gradually expanded its conflict management efforts since the end of the Cold
War and assumed a growing responsibility as a global security provider. From the Western
Balkans to the Eastern Neighbourhood, from the Middle East to Africa, and as far as the
Aceh region of Indonesia, some of these efforts were successful while others were not (or are
not yet). Many of the EU's efforts were *ad hoc*: while often carefully conceived in individual
cases, an overarching strategy of conflict management has yet to be developed by the Union.
Building on its successes, learning from its arguable failures, and using the opportunities
offered in the Lisbon Treaty, the EU now has a real opportunity to translate these into an
institutionalised, well-resourced, global conflict management strategy. Failing to do so
would be a loss for the Union and a loss for the international community at large.

Notes

1   Such a strategy would need to go well beyond the 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention,
    which offered a useful starting point for the Union's thinking about conflict management, but has
    not seen any major revision or update over the past ten years. See Commission of the European
    Communities, 'Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention', Brussels, 11 April
    2001.
2   It might also be appropriate as part of this analysis to determine 'entry conditions', i.e. whether EU
    involvement in a particular case is likely to lead to positive outcomes.