a few brief points.

- 1. There's nothing to repatriate on the defence side. E/CSDP has always been an intergovernmental activity. ie Brussels's function is little more than to provide a forum, and a bit of agency/secretariat function where member states so wish. It was always v clear to me both in designing and running the EDA that both money and decision-taking power continued to rest with the member states -- who were not stake-holders but share-holders. As an institutional actor, EDA could not aspire to be more than a conscience and catalyst; its efforts, like the wider European defence enterprise, would stand or fall by the member states.
- 2. Today, it's more falling than standing. And no reason for Atlanticists to be smug -for NATO is equally being hollowed out. The failure should worry anyone concerned
  for European security, prosperity, and power and influence in the world.
- 3. Blame the majority of Europeans who are simply not serious about defence -- who think that defence is just about safeguarding against (improbable) conventional attack, and miss the point that effective armed forces are key assets for states who want, whether collectively or individually, to shape the world around them.
- 4. And blame the UK, for allowing its pathologies about Europe to prevent it from leading. Tony Blair (yes, afraid so...) grasped at St Malo that working with France on European defence was a guaranteed bet. If it worked, it would boost European capabilities which would be available to NATO as much as to the EU. It would open up European markets, to the benefit of British arms companies. And even if it didn't, it would boost British influence in Europe. (For the cost of a few embedded defence advisers we had Central and Eastern Europeans eating out of our hands ten years ago, as we helped them prepare for joining NATO and the EU. Just compare the dismissive views of the basically Anglophile Radek Sikorski today.)
- 5. We haven't just thrown this advantage away -- we've contrived to make defence the source of positive European resentment towards us, by vetoing trivial increases in the EDA budget and creation of a European OHQ, in splendid isolation. And we've even disappointed the US by trying to be more royalist than the king.
- 6. What should we do? Re-engage. Try to get Europeans to wake up to how the strategic environment is changing around them; how far we are all of us becoming marginalised in the new multi-polar world; and how important it is to get serious about defence -- including through pooling efforts and resources -- if we want to be more than spectators in the decades ahead. In short, the EU needs to develop a proper global strategy. Only heads of state/government can get this going -- the European Council discussion of European defence this December is an opportunity. Nothing to do with competences, or ceding sovereignty -- everything to do with amplifying British influence.

Some of this was set out at greater length and more elegantly in my memo 'How to Stop the Demilitarisation of Europe' -- http://ecfr.eu/content/entry/how\_to\_stop\_the\_dimilitarisation\_of\_europe

http://een.eu/content/entry/now\_to\_stop\_the\_dminitarisation\_or\_europe

Hope this is some help -- good luck with the seminar.

## Nick

Nick Witney Senior Policy Fellow European Council on Foreign Relations