



Operational Plan 2011-2015

DFID Afghanistan

Updated June 2013

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Introduction

The UK Government is determined to help end extreme poverty around the world. We believe that international development is not just the right thing to do, but the smart thing to do. Britain has never stood on the sidelines, and it is in all our interests for countries around the world to be stable and secure, to have educated and healthy populations and to have growing economies. DFID aims to end aid dependency through jobs – building the economies of developing countries so that they can stand on their own feet.

No country can develop with only half of the population involved, that is why DFID is scaling up its support for women and girls across all of our country programmes, including an increased emphasis on girls education and preventing violence against women and girls.

We are also focussing on what works, investing in research and taking advantage of new technology to ensure that UK development support has the greatest impact.

DFID is committed to being a global leader on transparency, and in 2012 was ranked the top aid organisation in the world for transparency. Transparency is fundamental to improving accountability both to UK citizens and to citizens in the countries where we work. Transparency also helps us achieve greater value for money and improves the effectiveness of aid. As part of our commitment to transparency we publish Operational Plans for each area of our work setting out what we will achieve and how we will achieve it. In June 2013 DFID launched a new online tool, Development Tracker, to provide an easy way to access information and data about DFID programmes.

With less than 1000 days to go, we will continue to focus our efforts on delivering the Millennium Development Goals, creating wealth in poor countries, strengthening their governance and security and tackling climate change. The prize, in doing so, is huge: a better life for millions of people, and a safer, more prosperous world.



1) Context

Over thirty years of conflict have left Afghanistan one of the poorest countries in the world. A third of Afghans live below the poverty line; one in ten children die before their fifth birthday; and average life expectancy is just 49. Only one in four Afghans are able to read and write. Afghanistan remains off-track on all the Millennium Development Goals and has agreed a five year extension until 2020. Corruption is a problem felt personally by many Afghans, fuelled by patronage politics and a war economy. Women and girls still face enormous challenges and huge disadvantages in the areas of political participation and decision-making.

- **From this low base, progress has been made over the last ten years.** 5.9 million children now attend school, over a third of whom are girls, up from virtually none under the Taliban. 57% of the population now lives within one hour's walking distance of a public health facility. In 2002 only 9% of the population was covered by any form of basic health care. The economy has grown by an average of 9% over the past decade, and tax revenue has risen from \$250m in 2004/05 to more than \$2bn in 2011/12. Progress is being made on strengthening public financial management, and local government is improving in some areas. The government of Afghanistan approved a National Action Plan for Women in 2008. However, considerable challenges still lie ahead.
- **A weak and politically unstable state fosters insecurity and holds back social and economic development.** Afghanistan's diverse cultural and ethnic mix, and resistance to change from external influences, are contributing factors. Poor governance and corruption undermine people's trust in the government, while weak public sector capacity hinders service delivery. The transition process – handing over responsibility for security from international forces to Afghan security forces by the end of 2014 – is now well underway. It will be another decade before the Afghan government is able to pay for its own security costs without external support.
- **The Afghan government is increasingly taking the lead** in working for better security, governance and social and economic opportunities for Afghan people. At the NATO Chicago Summit on security and the Tokyo Conference on development the government of Afghanistan reaffirmed its commitment to take forward vital reforms. In return, the international community, including the UK, agreed to provide \$4 billion per annum for security and \$4 billion per annum for development through to 2014 to help the government meet its obligations.
- **Long term stability in Afghanistan will also be dependent on increased regional cooperation and integration**, particularly on issues such as security, trade and economic infrastructure.
- **Afghanistan is one of the UK's top foreign policy priorities.** DFID plays a key role in the UK National Security Council's Strategy for Afghanistan by leading on UK efforts to ensure a viable state. This work reflects the UK's commitment to tackle poverty globally and also has important benefits for the UK's national security by helping Afghanistan achieve a lasting end to the insurgency and conflict.
- **UK Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) is helping to tackle the root causes of instability** and the effects of insecurity, and rebuild the legitimacy of the state in Afghanistan. As part of the UK's effort, DFID is helping Afghanistan build a more capable and accountable government at all levels, able to function more effectively and meet local people's expectations. The 2012 Enduring Strategic Partnership sets out the UK's commitment to helping Afghanistan for many years to come. At the Tokyo Development Conference, DFID confirmed that its funding to Afghanistan would remain at current levels of £178m until 2017. DFID will provide a further £47m in education funding to Afghanistan between 2013-2016, alongside its bilateral programme, as part of the Girls Education Challenge. DFID also shares responsibility with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Ministry of Defence (MOD) for the Conflict Pool, the majority of which qualifies as ODA (total budget £45m in 2013/14).



2) Vision

- **Our vision is a more peaceful, stable, viable and prosperous Afghanistan.** This is a long-term agenda that will require DFID's ongoing presence well beyond 2015 when UK combat troops will have withdrawn. Our vision up to 2015 is to see progress towards a viable Afghan state, for example a more stable and growing economy, a sustainable political settlement leading to greater political stability and government delivering key basic services at all levels. This will help tackle poverty and will also support the UK's National Security Council strategy, helping Afghanistan resist extremism and achieve a lasting end to the insurgency.
- **Over the next three years**, to help the Afghan government make a clear and irreversible progress towards a more peaceful, stable, viable and prosperous Afghanistan, we will focus on three critical areas:
 - Supporting peace, security and political stability: We will support more inclusive politics by strengthening support for civil society, including women's, youth and disabled groups, and by increasing political participation and people's trust in the state in insecure areas, including in Helmand. We will help the Ministry of Interior manage the police better so they can provide safety and security for the Afghan people. We will strengthen our humanitarian work to help address the direct impacts of conflict, exclusion and natural disasters on the most vulnerable groups.
 - Promoting economic stability, growth and jobs: Priority areas include large-scale infrastructure, agriculture, business development, community infrastructure, improving the conditions for private investment (including in the key extractives sector) and creating jobs. We will continue to help the Afghan government raise and manage its own funds, including tax revenue, to help Afghanistan reduce dependence on aid over time. Improved livelihoods and a growing economy will help weaken the appeal of the insurgency.
 - Helping the state to deliver improved services: We will help the government to deliver key functions better and improve how it responds to the demands of citizens, including reducing corruption and providing basic services such as education and vocational skills including for girls and women. Afghanistan also needs better public financial management, local government and to rely less on international expertise.
- **Our work will support Afghan women's empowerment.** Our work will help build a peaceful state and society that will tackle poverty and create wealth for both Afghan men and women. Increased political and economic participation of women will improve their lives and help reduce the risk of Afghanistan remaining in conflict. The UK National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 – Women, Peace & Security was launched by the Foreign secretary in 2010 and is a guiding strategy for DFID and the UK work on gender. Tackling violence against women and girls will be a key strategic priority within DFID's programme in the years ahead.
- **Our programme supports the Afghan government's National Development Strategy.** We are committed to channelling at least half our annual programme through Afghan government systems primarily via the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, based on sound economic management and strong fiduciary safeguards. This approach will help to deliver value for money and build Afghanistan's capacity to manage its own affairs.
- **We will strive not to undermine Afghan leadership** and civil service capacity, or duplicate the efforts of other donors. We can not do everything, our programme will focus on the above three priorities based on our experience to date and where we can add value. We will not tolerate under-performing programmes and will take immediate action on any allegations of misuse of UK aid funds.



3) Results

Pillar/ Strategic Priority	Indicator	Baseline (including year)	Expected Results (including year)
Governance and Security <i>Supporting peace, security and political stability</i>	Percentage of people who perceive their Provincial Government positively ¹ .	78% (43.4% male and 34.5% female) of people surveyed said their Provincial Government was doing a good or very good job (2010).	DFID Afghanistan (DFIDA) will <u>contribute</u> to an increase in the number of people who say their Provincial Government was doing a good or very good job by 2015.
	Number of men and women who vote in elections supported by DFID.	4.3 million voters in 2010 Parliamentary elections (including 1.7m women); 6.8m in 2005 and 8.5m in 2004.	DFIDA will <u>contribute</u> to halting a worsening trend in voter participation: at least 4.3m voters (including 1.7m women) in 2014 Provincial and Presidential elections ² .
Governance and Security <i>Helping the state to deliver</i>	In the ten Afghan government ministries with the biggest budgets in the Afghan financial year 1389 (2010/11) we will measure: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proportion (percentage) of projected budget actually spent³ • Proportion (percentage) of funds made available to the ministries which are actually spent • Absolute spend. 	In Afghan financial year, 1388 (2009/10): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 44% of projected budget actually spent. • 85% of funds made available actually spent. • \$849.2m total spend in the ten ministries with the biggest budgets. 	Up to 2015, DFIDA will <u>contribute</u> to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4 percentage point annual increase in the projected budget actually spent. • 1 percentage point annual increase in the funds made available actually spent. • 10% annual increase in actual spend.
Wealth Creation <i>Promoting economic stability, growth and jobs</i>	Number of jobs created for Afghan men and women (Full-Time Equivalent jobs).	Zero jobs created for Afghan men and women at March 2011.	Approximately 71,500 jobs created for Afghan men and women by 2014/15 ⁴ .
Humanitarian <i>Reducing impact of conflict and natural disasters on people's lives, well-being and dignity</i>	Number of people assisted by humanitarian agencies.	According to assessed need – variable by year.	Target to be determined annually.

Notes: Our expected results are 100% attributable to DFID support unless otherwise indicated as a contribution, in which case our financial contribution will be reported annually by sector in DFID's Statistics for International Development and in most cases by project on the DFID projects database - <http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/Default.aspx>

1. This indicator can be found in the Asia Foundation's Survey of the Afghan People 2012. It provides an indication of the impact of the government of Afghanistan and donor efforts on Afghan people by asking for their opinion on the performance of the government. Support for the Provincial Government relates to security and political stability. The current baseline (78%) provides an overly positive picture, real support is likely to be less than this as the interviewers were unable to go to some insecure areas and studies have shown that people refrain from criticising government and authority when questioned for opinion polls in Afghanistan. Despite this the survey is a useful indicator of the trend of progress. 2. The number of voters in Afghanistan has declined from 8.5m in 2004 to 6.8m in 2005 and 4.3m in 2010. DFID aims to help reverse this trend by providing support to maintain the current level. The target has been changed to reflect that the Provincial elections will now take place in 2014, not 2013.

3. The rate at which projected and actual budgets are spent is a good measure of public financial management in a country where government capacity is low. It should be noted that the Afghan financial year changed in 1391 so that from 1392 financial reporting will be more in line with calendar year.

4. The target for this indicator has been changed from 20,000 new jobs created..



3) Results: Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)

Pillar/ Strategic Priority	Indicator	Baseline (including year)	Expected Results (including year)
Governance <i>Peace, security and political stability</i>	Number of Ministries who have completed pay and grading reform.	8 Ministries had completed pay and grading reform in 2011.	DFIDA will <u>contribute</u> to 22 Ministries completing pay and grading reform by 2013/14 ¹ .
Governance <i>Helping the state to deliver</i>	Both the ARTF and DFIDA's bilateral support will contribute to the Public Financial Management results given on the previous slide ² .		
Education <i>Getting the state to deliver</i>	Number of children attending primary school.	3,943,337 children attending primary school in 2009/10 (of which 1,534,725 were girls).	DFIDA will <u>contribute</u> to 5,422,671 children attending primary school in 2013/14 (of which 2,169,068 are girls).
Wealth Creation <i>Economic stability, growth and jobs</i>	Kilometres (km) of rural roads rehabilitated.	774km of secondary rural roads and 887km of tertiary roads rehabilitated between 2008 and 2011.	DFIDA will <u>contribute</u> to the rehabilitation of i) 1,105km of secondary rural roads and ii) 1,243km of tertiary rural roads by 2013/14 ⁴ .
	Agricultural production under irrigated land.	2.5 tonnes per hectare in 2011.	DFIDA will <u>contribute</u> to 2.75 tonnes per hectare yield of wheat produced under irrigated land by 2013/14.
Gender	% of sampled women representatives in Community Development Councils (CDCs) that take active part in decision-making related to community development.	35% in September 2011	DFIDA will <u>contribute</u> to at least 70% of sampled women representatives in CDCs taking active part in decision-making related to community development in 2013 ⁵ .

Note: The ARTF is a multi-donor trust fund. The principle is therefore that funds are co-mingled and results and financing for particular projects cannot, even with preferencing, be assigned to individual donors. As such DFIDA is contributing to the total results achieved by the ARTF. Our financial contribution will be reported annually by sector in DFID's Statistics for International Development and in most cases by project on the DFID projects database – <http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/Default.aspx>

¹ The target has been changed from 13 to 22 Ministries.

² The ARTF contributes to the improved Public Financial Management results given on the previous page.

³ 2012/13 data will be available by the end of July 2013.

⁴ The target has been changed from i) 1,100km of secondary rural roads and ii) 1,195km of tertiary rural roads.

⁵ There has been no progress to date as the project for which this results relates has not yet started.

⁶ The target has been changed from 65% to 70%.



3) Results: Strength of Evidence Base and Value for Money

	Governance and Security	Wealth Creation	Education	Humanitarian
Evidence	Medium	Medium/High	High	Medium
VFM	Moderate	Good	Good	Moderate

Data and evidence in Afghanistan is scarce due to decades of conflict and continuing lack of access to certain areas due to insecurity. For example, population estimates are based on a partial census last conducted in 1979. However data and evidence are improving, in part due to DFIDA’s support for improving national statistics (see part 7). The strength of the evidence base for our headline results is rated as High, Medium or Low. Value for Money is ranked as Good, Moderate or Low. DFIDA commissioned a data quality assessment (DQA) of eight major data sets used in Afghanistan, conclusions noted below.

- Governance:** This sector lacks quantifiable data. However we have drawn on evidence from South Asia and other fragile states where Afghan-specific evidence is lacking. Two key qualitative data sources are the annual national perception survey conducted by the Asia Foundation (TAF) and the quarterly perception survey carried out by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The quality of surveys is hampered by some social biases and lack of access to insecure areas. The DQA of the TAF and ISAF surveys concluded that the data can be used to measure trends. Governance results are notoriously difficult to quantify in VFM terms, especially in fragile contexts. However, VFM in some programmes is very high (public financial management) and there is some evidence that reducing corruption through public administration reform can lead to increased investment in development.
- Wealth creation:** Quality evidence and data is provided annually by the IMF and World Bank in-country. The number, quality and independence of reports on growth, trade, agriculture and private sector issues is reasonable and gives us confidence that our objectives are the right ones. However, the evidence is weakened by lack of access to some insecure areas. For example, the DQA of GDP data showed it lacks in empirical basis and is likely to be an underestimate, but still can be used for broad purposes. On VFM, our performance has been generally good, with good rates of return shown on our high performing tax and budget programmes. Our support to the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund has helped ensure that the Government remained solvent and able to pay civil servant salaries, including teachers. Evidence for the return on investment in post-conflict environments is available (e.g. work by Paul Collier and others).
- Education:** Evidence from the National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment shows that there has been a significant positive impact on the literacy of children and young people from the investment in education since 2001. The National Education Strategy Plan II is based on evidence from the Ministry of Education’s Management Information System (EMIS) which is one of the most comprehensive and credible data sets available in Afghanistan (according to the DQA). There is a positive relation between education level and annual income in Afghanistan. Wage and salary workers earn between 24% and 174% times more at each level of schooling as those categorised as self-employed (World Bank Afghan Skills Development Project Report, 2008).
- Humanitarian:** The UN’s Common Humanitarian Action Plan for Afghanistan provides a credible analysis of humanitarian needs, which we triangulate with other sources, including appeal documents from the ICRC and WFP. Previous phases of DFID support to WFP and ICRC have proven effective. However, deteriorating security is shrinking humanitarian space which makes it difficult to gather quantitative evidence on impact and value for money. ICRC data is sensitive and can not always be shared with donors. On VFM, quantitative evidence is lacking but qualitative evidence shows that humanitarian assistance can prevent millions falling into a cycle of impoverishment due to illness, loss of productivity and income.



4) Delivery and Resources

Overview of the unit's structure, design and means to deliver its programme

DFID Afghanistan is located in the British Embassy in Kabul and works closely with the FCO, MOD and the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) under the umbrella of an integrated UK Government Country Business Plan (CBP). The structure of the CBP mirrors the National Security Council strategy for Afghanistan. It includes sections on political settlement, creating a viable state and security transition. DFID leads the viable state pillar. Our work on governance and civil society also supports the political settlement pillar. The key governance structure for the CBP is the Afghan Delivery Group (ADG). The ADG is chaired by the Ambassador. The DFID Head of Office is a permanent member.

DFID Afghanistan is structured around five thematic teams: Resources, Results, Governance Reform, Growth and Livelihoods, and Helmand. The multi-donor funded Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) is the key mechanism to support government delivery and will help us meet our commitment to channel at least 50% of our funding through government systems while helping safeguard UK public funds. In late 2011 we resumed our payments to the ARTF following agreement to a new IMF programme in Afghanistan. Our approach of working primarily with and through government helps us leverage other donors to get behind Afghan priorities. Historically up to 20% of our programme resources has been spent directly in Helmand province in support of key infrastructure, economic growth and business development projects. However this will decrease as projects in Helmand either end ahead of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) closing or shift to a national level. DFID's programme complements the tri-departmental Conflict Pool (£45m for 13/14) and FCO Strategic Programme Fund (£8m for 13/14). DFID has an important role in the governance of these programmes through the ADG.

DFID's work in Afghanistan was reviewed in November 2011 by the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) who published their report 'Programme Controls and Assurance in Afghanistan' in March 2012. The report did not identify any leakage within the DFID programme and made a series of recommendations which mainly centred around strengthening systems to further reduce this risk across the programme portfolio. A range of initiatives to strengthen programme delivery have been implemented to address the recommendations of the review. For the original report, DFID's response to it and on-going progress updates, please visit <http://icai.independent.gov.uk/publications/>

The UK has a 10-year Development Partnership Arrangement with the Government of Afghanistan (signed in 2005) which sets out our shared commitments for deliverables around poverty reduction and aid effectiveness. The majority of our programmes are co-funded with other donors to leverage maximum support as well as to harmonise and align efforts. The main multilateral agencies we work with are the United Nations, the European Union, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank. We also work with a variety of international and national civil society organisations as well as private sector organisations. Decisions on our funding partners, and the interventions we use to deliver programmes, are strategically based on burden-sharing and ability to deliver.



4) Delivery and Resources (continued)

Planned Programme Spend¹

Pillar/Strategic priority	2010/11		2011/12		2012/13		2013/14		2014/15		TOTAL 2011-15	
	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000	Resource £'000	Capital £'000
Wealth Creation	29,747	21,140	86,668	10,695	80,299	20,473	100,800	19,000	84,300	19,000	352,067	69,168
Climate Change												
Governance and Security	34,168		14,120		16,116		20,000		15,000		65,236	
Education ²	140		39,378		39,100		49,700		49,700		177,878	
Reproductive, Maternal and Newborn Health												
Malaria												
HIV/Aids												
Other Health												
Water and Sanitation												
Poverty, Hunger and Vulnerability												
Humanitarian	17,000		3,006		24,498		10,000		10,000		47,504	
Other MDG's												
Global Partnerships												
TOTAL	81,055	21,140	143,172	10,695	160,013	20,473	180,500	19,000	159,000	19,000	642,685	69,168

1. Figures for 2010-11 and 2011-12 are actual outturn; 2012-13 are provisional outturn; 2013-14 and 2014-15 are planned budgets

2 DFIDA support to the education sector is made indirectly through our annual contribution the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. Our allocation for education is therefore an estimate based two key assumptions: 1. Current levels of support to the ARTF required by the GoA remaining constant (baseline 2011/12); 2. the proportion allocated to each sector by the GoA also remain constant (baseline 2010/11).



4) Delivery and Resources (continued)

Planned Operating Costs ¹

	2011/12	2012/13	2013/14	2014/15	Total 2011-15
	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
Frontline staff costs - Pay	2,208	1,736	2,847	4,272	11,063
Frontline staff costs - Non Pay	2,528	6,917	8,359	6,794	24,598
Administrative Costs - Pay	993	629	522	549	2,693
Administrative Costs - Non Pay	2,605	1,280	750	533	5,168
Total	8,334	10,562	12,478	12,148	43,522

¹ Figures for 2011-12 are actual outturn; 2012-13 are provisional outturn; 2013-14 and 2014-15 are planned budgets.

Administrative Cost Savings

Despite reductions in HCS staff allowances (e.g. travel and cost of living) and the implementation of a range of cost saving initiatives, DFIDA is unable to demonstrate cash savings in the short term due to: increasing staff numbers; yearly increases in the cost of services provided by the FCO (notably on security); increasing residential accommodation rent charges and a rising SAIC wage bill due to inflation and the competitive nature of the local salary market. We will continue to explore with the FCO the scope for efficiency savings through more shared services (e.g. generator and fire alarm servicing, drivers, cleaners, etc). We will continue to seek savings in other areas but expect these to be modest.



4) Delivery and Resources (continued)

Planned Efficiency Savings

Category	Details	Residual cost in the SR period £'000
Strategic Reprioritisation	Several of our discrete, directly managed technical assistance projects (totalling £104m) have not delivered as well as we had hoped. We will look to rationalise our use of TA. Over the longer term we will look at expanding our support to new Afghan-led mechanisms as a means of providing more sustainable and better value TA.	104,000
Further examples of Programme efficiency	Support to the Microfinance Investment Facility after 2010/11 will finish as the Facility has now become self sustaining.	700

Administrative Cost Savings Initiative	2011/12			2012/13			2013/14			2014/15		
	PAY £'000	Non Pay £'000	Total £'000	PAY £'000	Non Pay £'000	Total £'000	PAY £'000	Non Pay £'000	Total £'000	PAY £'000	Non Pay £'000	Total £'000
Reduction in Consultancy Payments			0			0			0			0
Reduction in Travel			0			0			0			0
Reduction in Training			0			0			0			0
Reduction in Estates & Property Costs			0			0			0			0
Reduction in costs as a result of Office Restructuring			0			0			0			0
Other Reductions			0			0			0			0
Total	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Note: Please see the previous slide for more detail on admin cost savings.



5) Delivering Value for Money (VfM)

Achieving value for money is challenging in the Afghanistan context due to: high security premiums; a low national skill and expertise base available; corruption; a limited pool of contractors and project implementers which limits competition; the limited scope for DFID staff and auditors to travel to parts of the country due to insecurity; and the scarcity of data and evidence to assess value for money (VFM).

All our significant investments have an economic appraisal of their options. Following central DFID guidance, depending on the nature of the project, this is either a formal Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) or a Rating & Weighting approach of the 3Es (economy, efficiency, effectiveness), where a CBA is not technically meaningful (which is often the case for governance projects).

The economics capacity of the office was further boosted through the recruitment of a SAIC assistant economist. Economic appraisals were undertaken for all existing and new projects, the first-ever appraisal of the ARTF was undertaken and a Portfolio Assessment Tool was developed to analyse the value for money of our portfolio as a whole and is discussed at the quarterly Programme Board.

VFM Strategy Objectives 2012/13:

The VFM Strategy has been refreshed and sets out the following objectives for DFID Afghanistan:

1. Funding decisions on bilateral projects are based on appropriate value for money appraisals and robust logframes.
2. Value for money is maximised through well-designed procurement processes and supplier and market engagement encourages competitive tendering.
3. We receive effective value for money from our funding to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund appropriately supporting and engaging with the World Bank to ensure this.
4. The DFIDA programme portfolio as a whole offers value for money in its balance of risk and return.
5. All DFIDA staff have the necessary skills, for their grade and role, to challenge and maximise value for money in their project.

A plan of work to meet these objectives is being developed which will be jointly taken forward by DFIDA's Economic Advisor and new Commercial Manager.



6) Monitoring and Evaluation

Monitoring

- **How:** We will monitor the Operational Plan using a Portfolio Assessment Tool for monitoring risk and a Results Tracker, which includes baselines and target results at portfolio and programme level. The Results Tracker will be used as an internal planning tool to plan, monitor and assess delivery. Progress will be informed by annual project reviews, project completion reports, as well as more frequent reporting as available. The DFIDA Programme Board will be the primary mechanism through which progress will be monitored. Targets will be assessed as on or off track using a standard red, amber and green rating.
- **When:** The Programme Board meets quarterly. The Results Tracker data will remain a tool for guiding programme board discussions.
- **Who:** The Programme Board will be chaired by the Head of Office and permanent members will include group heads, programme managers, advisers and key colleagues in the British Embassy and DFID London Teams. Each pillar of the Results Tracker will have a nominated senior responsible officer (SRO) who will be accountable for delivery and performance.
- **What:** The Programme Board will scrutinise, challenge or endorse the SRO's assessment of progress and outlook. An internal quarterly progress report will be produced, including decisions taken on corrective action for off-track targets. Decisions on poor performing projects will be taken at board meetings. Major annual review reports will be assessed and key lessons shared. The Head of Office and Group Heads also discuss results and portfolio management with the Director at least twice a year.
- Beneficiary monitoring will be incorporated into programmes, where appropriate, to better understand who accesses DFID support. Higher-risk programmes will be identified and enhanced monitoring strategies applied to these programmes, including the use of independent third parties.

Evaluation: The DFIDA Evaluation Strategy will continue to form the basis for how we improve the quality and impact of our programmes through the use of evidence. The strategy:

- sets the criteria for determining which programmes should be evaluated so that resources are targeted at the priority programmes;
- embeds evaluation by requiring DFIDA business cases to make an assessment of whether to undertake an evaluation;
- has supported the establishment of systems and processes to grow internal evaluation expertise within DFIDA and makes proposals for improving capacity in Afghanistan;
- supports improvements to the quality of impact evaluations so we can be more confident in attributing the improvements we observe in Afghanistan to the programmes we fund. These evaluations should improve our ability to report against programmes' results and outcomes.

Three evaluations were implemented in 2012/13, including one completed evaluation of DFID's humanitarian assistance to northern Afghanistan. Three new programme evaluations will start in 2013/14. Furthermore, the DFID Programme Board, the Embassy's Afghan Delivery Group and the DFID/FCO Joint Programme and Results Group (JPRG) will also be mandated with reviewing the effectiveness, value for money and impact of all ODA in Afghanistan. In Helmand, DFIDA and the PRT will develop a plan to monitor our remaining programmes post the security transition in 2014.

Building Capacity of Partners: DFIDA will continue to provide technical assistance to the Afghan Central Statistics Organisation (CSO) and the wider national statistical system, to enhance the quality and increase the quantity of official statistics in a sustainable manner. Globally, DFID has provided funds for the World Bank's Statistics for Results Facility which will be delivered by the CSO in Afghanistan. We will continue to work closely with line ministries to build their capacity, including the Ministry of Finance who convene an annual Donor Cooperation Dialogue to review alignment of bilateral aid with government priorities and the national budget to improve aid effectiveness.



7) Transparency

Transparency is one of the top priorities for the UK government. We will ensure that we continue to meet our commitments under the UK Aid Transparency Guarantee including publishing detailed information about DFID projects including programme documents and all spend above £500. We will continue to ensure that information is accessible, comparable, accurate, timely and in common standard with other donors and that we provide opportunities for those directly affected by our projects to provide feedback.

The UK Aid Transparency Guarantee

DFID has committed to publishing all the information that it can on its programme support to Afghanistan and completes regular Transparency reporting to do so. However, for security reasons DFIDA will make anonymous, on request, the names of our implementing partners, as well as withhold information that would reveal the locations in which they work. Where appropriate, the criteria for exclusion from publication may be applied, since security is a major ongoing concern for our implementing partners working in Afghanistan and many manage security by maintaining a low profile.

Implementing the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI)

DFIDA will seek to lead by example in order to have credible conversations on transparency with all partners. We will encourage other donors to do more on aid transparency, and support high level messages encouraging them to sign up to, and implement, internationally agreed transparency standards through the IATI. This will include the UK's active participation in the annual Donor Cooperation Dialogue led by the Ministry of Finance to seek information on donor assistance and encouragement to others donors to do the same.

The Ministry of Finance is currently redesigning its Donor Assistance Database and once re-launched we will continue to lead by example and ensure that all UK funding data is entered onto it as required.



8) Human Rights Assessment

The UK recognises that the realisation of all human rights underpins sustainable development. Through its development programmes, the UK aims to support civil society and governments to build open economies and open societies in which citizens have freedom, dignity, choice and control over their lives, and institutions are accountable, inclusive and responsive.

Human rights context

- **Social and Economic rights:** Afghanistan remains low on the UN's Human Development Index (2012) ranked 175th out of 187 countries but has improved from its position of second to last in 2009. Over a third of Afghanistan's people live in poverty (NRVA 2007/08) but real GDP has grown at 9% on average between 2003/04 and 2010/11 (World Bank) and is predicted to increase by 12% in 2012/13 (IMF). The proportion of Afghans who say they are more prosperous now than under the Taliban has significantly increased over the last two years but remains at the same level as 2006 (The Asia Foundation). There has been some progress in rights to health and education. Child mortality remains high at 74 deaths per 1000 live births which is nearly double the global average of 40 (MICS 2010/11), but almost one in two pregnant women receive antenatal care in Afghanistan compared to 16% in 2003 (MICS 2010/11 and 2003). 55% of primary age children were enrolled in school (NRVA 2007/08), up from 37% in 2005 (NRVA 2005) but still a long way behind the South Asia average of 85% (WB Global Monitoring 2008).
- **Non-discrimination:** Afghanistan is ranked 147th out of 148 on the Gender Inequality Index (UN 2012). Maternal mortality remains high at 460 per 100,000 live births (MICS 2010/11). Violence against women and girls is particularly concerning; according to the UN, 87% of Afghan women will experience some form of violence during their lifetime. More broadly, ethnic divisions lead to religious discrimination of Hazara and other minority groups. Not every ethnic group or province has the same access to Government services, while support for disabled individuals is limited. Sharia Law criminalises same-sex relationships and family law prevents gay marriage. There are some successes: nearly a third of seats in Parliament are held by women; and almost 40% of children attending school are girls - up from virtually none under the Taliban (EMIS 2011/12).
- **Civil and political rights:** According to the Worldwide Governance Indicators (2011), civil liberties, political rights and political stability have recently deteriorated. The UK welcomed the Afghan Government's public commitments to electoral reform in support of holding credible inclusive and transparent elections in 2014 and 2015 in line with the constitution. Freedom House rated Afghanistan as 'not free' in 2012.
- The Universal Periodic Review reported in July 2009. The Government accepted 118 of the recommendations put forward, declined 10 and had no clear position on the remainder. Implementation of recommendations will be reviewed at the next UPR process in 2013.

Direction of travel

- Improving respect for human rights is a long term project. From low levels, **social and economic rights are on a gradual, improving trajectory**.
- **Inequalities persist** and although there is some progress, improvements in **women and girls' human rights** continue to lag.
- **Civil and political rights** have improved over time but recently deteriorated according to the Worldwide Governance Indicators 2011.

UK approach and focus

- The UK will continue to support the Afghan Government in implementing its **commitments under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework** which cover many aspects of human rights, including civil and political, rule of law and access to justice and women's rights.
- The UK will **step up work to reduce inequalities and push for progress on women's civil, social and economic rights** through development and diplomatic activities. This will include political lobbying, projects to empower women to play a role in politics and public life, practical support to women in their communities to help them improve their livelihoods and access basic services, and financial support to Afghan civil society organisations promoting women's rights.
- The UK will **help build accountability institutions** and continue our support to the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and encourage all Afghans to let it function without undue interference. We will continue to press the Afghan Independent Election Commission to help deliver on their commitment to an electoral process where all Afghans including women and minorities are able to participate fully. We are the largest bilateral donor to a UNDP programme supporting the delivery of credible and inclusive elections. This assistance supports the work of the Independent Election Commission gender unit.



9) Gender

The context for women and girls in Afghanistan

- Under the Taliban, the position of women in Afghanistan was one of the worst in the world. There has been good progress since 2001, but significant challenges remain such as: deeply-embedded traditional conservative values and culture; isolated rural communities; high illiteracy rates; domestic violence; forced marriages; poor access to healthcare; and lack of livelihood opportunities.
- Bringing about change is a long-term task, in which girls' education, economic opportunities and women's representation and rights are key instruments. By focusing on these areas the UK works towards enabling women and girls to escape marginalisation, and to seize opportunities to lift themselves out of poverty.
- The Afghan government's commitments on women's rights are set out in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF). The UK, along with our International Partners, will monitor implementation of the TMAF and support the Afghan government as they seek to ensure women's participation in the 2014 Presidential election process as well as implementation of the law on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.

UK Support for women and girls

- The UK National Action Plan for the implementation of UN Security Resolution 1325 sets out how the UK Government will work to support women and girls in Afghanistan. The UK takes a cross-cutting approach and gender considerations are integrated into the majority of our Afghan engagements. We support the Government of Afghanistan in meeting its international commitments, working with those who advocate change and making targeted interventions where appropriate.

Additionally, between now and 2015 DFID Afghanistan will

- Strengthen the gender impact of the ARTF and champion better tracking of results for women and girls.
- Work closely with the FCO and MoD to ensure the effective delivery of the UK National Action Plan (NAP) for UNSCR 1325.
- Ensure that all DFID staff and the wider UK mission in Afghanistan are fully aware of our gender commitments. We will regularly engage with the Afghan government and civil society on progress and input into the annual updating of the UK NAP.
- Identify opportunities to do more to tackle violence against women, based on the evidence of what works on the ground and where we can deliver the most impact.
- Use sex disaggregated data across our programmes to identify opportunities to do more to support women's empowerment, and work with Afghan and international partners to ensure that our combined development efforts deliver a better future for women and girls.



10) Eliminating Violence Against Women and Girls

Context

Violence against women and girls remains a widespread issue in Afghanistan. Although there have been some quantifiable improvements in the lives of women and girls since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, there remains far to go and personal safety remains one of the most significant challenges in relation to securing women's and girls' rights. Data is limited but one survey indicates that up to 87% of Afghan women experience violence on a regular basis, and that the majority of violence acts are perpetrated by the victim's husband (accounting for 70% of reported instances):

Making the Elimination of Violence against Women and Girls a strategic priority for DFID Afghanistan:

In 2013/14, DFID will consider initiatives that make a tangible and lasting difference in the lives of girls and women experiencing violence in Afghanistan:

- Continue to work to **understand the underlying causes of violence against women and girls**, what others are doing, and what really works on the ground, investing in evidence and evaluation as part of future programming;
- Where relevant and feasible, **explore how existing investments could maximise their impact on reducing violence against women and girls**, including ensuring grants to civil society organisations through the Tawanmandi programme support more organisations working to tackle violence against women and girls;
- Explore the possibility of a **new targeted programme** to better prevent and respond to violence against women and girls, including a package of interventions at community level, working sensitively with experienced local partners and in areas that complement the investments of others; and
- Explore the possibility of **smaller initiatives that could be linked to existing and future programmes** as they develop to increase and to monitor their impact on violence against women and girls specifically, and results for girls and women more generally.

These initiatives will link to, and form an important part of, DFID's and the UK's wider investments in gender equality and the social, economic and political empowerment of women and girls in Afghanistan.



Annex A: Revisions to Operational Plan 2012/13

Context

Updated to reflect events over the past year.

Results

Revised to reflect progress against results achievements and latest available data.

Delivery and Resources

Revised to provide most up-to-date picture of staffing and spend.

VFM

Revised to reflect the newly refreshed VFM Strategy.

Monitoring & Evaluation

Revised to reference public commitments on beneficiary monitoring.

Gender

Revised to reflect new developments over the year.

Eliminating Violence against Women & Girls

New inclusion this year to reflect DFID's commitment for this to be key strategic priority for DFID's programme in Afghanistan.

Human Rights assessment:

All Operational Plans are required to publish an assessment of human rights. Since the last operational plan, the human rights indicators have been updated with more recent statistics and a subsequent review of the direction of travel has been undertaken.



Annex B: Results Progress

Pillar/ Strat. Priority	Indicator	Baseline (including year)	Progress in FY 2012/13	Expected Results (including year)
Governance and Security	Percentage of people who perceive their Provincial Government positively ¹ .	78% (43.4% male and 34.5% female) of people surveyed said their Provincial Government was doing a good or very good job (2010).	80% (44.6% male and 35.7% female) of people surveyed said their Provincial Government was doing a good or very good job in 2012 .	DFIDA will <u>contribute</u> to an increase in the number of people who say their Provincial Government was doing a good or very good job by 2015.
	Number of men and women who vote in elections supported by DFID.	4.3 million voters in 2010 Parliamentary elections (including 1.7m women); 6.8m in 2005 and 8.5m in 2004.	We will only be able to report on this indicator when the elections are conducted in Afghanistan. The elections are planned for 2014.	DFIDA will <u>contribute</u> to halting a worsening trend in voter participation: at least 4.3m voters (including 1.7m women) in 2014 Provincial and Presidential elections ² .
Governance and Security	In the ten Afghan government ministries with the biggest budgets, in the Afghan financial year 1389 (2010/11) we will measure: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proportion (percentage) of projected budget actually spent³ • Proportion (percentage) of funds made available to the ministries which are actually spent • Absolute spend. 	In Afghan financial year, 1388 (2009/10): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 44% of projected budget actually spent. • 85% of funds made available actually spent. • \$849.2m total spend in the ten ministries with the biggest budgets. 	In Afghan financial year, 1391 (21 March 12 to 20 December 2012): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 53% of projected budget actually spent. • 84% of funds made available actually spent. • \$906.4m total spend in the ten ministries with the biggest budgets. 	Up to 2015, DFIDA will <u>contribute</u> to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 4 percentage point annual increase in the projected budget actually spent. • 1 percentage point annual increase in the funds made available actually spent. • 10% annual increase in actual spend.
Wealth Creation	Number of jobs created for Afghan men and women (Full-Time Equivalent jobs).	Zero jobs created for Afghan men and women at March 2011	20,000 jobs with an additional 653 expected by the end of March 2013.	Approximately 71,500 jobs created for Afghan men and women by 2014/15 ⁴ .
Humanitarian	Number of people assisted by humanitarian agencies	According to assessed need – variable by year.	90,000 people reached through humanitarian agencies in 2012/13.	Target to be determined annually.

Notes:

1. This indicator can be found in the Asia Foundation's Survey of the Afghan People 2012. It provides an indication of the impact of GoA and donor efforts on Afghan people by asking for their opinion on the performance of the government. Support for the Provincial Government relates to security and political stability. The current baseline (78%) provides an overly positive picture, real support is likely to be less than this as the interviewers were unable to go to some insecure areas and studies have shown that people refrain from criticising government and authority when questioned for opinion polls in Afghanistan. Despite this the survey is a useful indicator of the trend of progress.

2. The number of voters in Afghanistan has declined from 8.5m in 2004 to 6.8m in 2005 and 4.3m in 2010. DFID aims to help reverse this trend by providing support to maintain the current level. The target has been changed to reflect that the Provincial elections will now take place in 2014, not 2013.

3. The rate at which projected and actual budgets are spent is a good measure of public financial management in a country where government capacity is low. It should be noted that the Afghan financial year changed in 1391 so that from 1392 financial reporting will be more in line with calendar year.

4. The target for this indicator has been changed from 20,000 new jobs created..



Annex B: Results Progress (ARTF)

Pillar/ Strategic Priority	Indicator	Baseline (including year)	Progress	Expected Results (including year)
Governance	Number of Ministries who have completed pay and grading reform.	8 Ministries had completed pay and grading reform in 2011.	21 ministries completed pay and grading reform in 2012/13.	DFIDA will <u>contribute</u> to 22 Ministries completing pay and grading reform by 2013/14 ¹ .
Education	Number of children attending primary school.	3,943,337 children attending primary school in 2009/10 (of which 1,534,725 were girls).	4.14m children attending primary school in 2011/12 (of which 1.67m were girls). ³	DFIDA will <u>contribute</u> to 5,422,671 children attending primary school in 2013/14 (of which 2,169,068 are girls).
Wealth Creation	Kilometres (km) of rural roads rehabilitated.	774km of secondary rural roads and 887km of tertiary roads rehabilitated between 2008 and 2011.	i) 904km of secondary rural roads and ii) 1058km of tertiary rural roads in October 2012.	DFIDA will <u>contribute</u> to the rehabilitation of i) 1,105km of secondary rural roads and ii) 1,243km of tertiary rural roads by 2013/14 ⁴ .
	Agricultural production under irrigated land.	2.5 tonnes per hectare in 2011.	2.5 tonnes per hectare in 2012/13 ⁵ .	DFIDA will <u>contribute</u> to 2.75 tonnes per hectare yield of wheat produced under irrigated land by 2013/14.
Gender	% of sampled women representatives in Community Development Councils (CDCs) that take active part in decision-making related to community development.	35% in September 2011	77% of women representatives in Community Development Councils (CDCs) reported as at January 2013	DFIDA will <u>contribute</u> to at least 70% of sampled women representatives in CDCs taking active part in decision-making related to community development in 2013 ⁵ .

Note: The ARTF is a multi-donor trust fund. The principle is therefore that funds are co-mingled and results and financing for particular projects cannot, even with preferencing, be assigned to individual donors. As such DFIDA is contributing to the total results achieved by the ARTF. Our financial contribution will be reported annually by sector in DFID's Statistics for International Development and in most cases by project on the DFID projects database – <http://projects.dfid.gov.uk/Default.aspx>

¹ The target has been changed from 13 to 22 Ministries.

² The ARTF contributes to the improved Public Financial Management results given on the previous slide.

³ 2012/13 data will be available by the end of July 2013.

⁴ The target has been changed from i) 1,100 KMs of secondary rural roads and ii) 1,195 KMs of tertiary rural roads.

⁵ There has been no progress to date as the project for which this results relates has not yet started.

⁶ The target has been changed from 65% to 70%.