PART 1.5 – RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation		Analysis Reference
1.5.1.	**Introduction**. The following recommendations are made in order to enhance Defence Air Safety:	
1.5.2.	**AOC 22 (Trg) Gp should:**	
	a. Conduct a risk-benefit analysis on the policy of allowing students to fly on non-BFJT course sorties. If appropriate, apply to the MAA for a waiver to conform to RA2101 and provide formalised, documented rear cockpit training.	1.4.25-26 1.4.33-34
	b. Formally introduce UTP training and currency requirements.	1.4.30-32
	c. Ensure coherent guidance is provided within TGOs (with reference to weather minima and circuit limitations) for the safe conduct of low level test flights.	1.4.44 1.4.54
1.5.3.	**UKMFTS PTL should:**	
	a. Review guidance on EEC Manual operation within the Aircraft Document Set (ADS) and amend as necessary.	1.4.13
	b. Ensure that the reliability of the TM component is tolerable and ALARP.	1.4.18-22
	c. Reassess the lifing policy for the Tucano Engine Change Unit (ECU), to ensure that critical components and ancillaries are clearly defined and tracked appropriately.	1.4.17-19
	d. Review the Tucano Flight Test Schedule (FTS) and Guidance Notes and, where necessary, include explicit height and speed criteria.	1.4.42-43
	e. Review procedures for the testing and set up of the Ground Idle Manual Mode (GIMM) valve.	1.4.52
	f. Ensure that the risk of the standby landing gear system not operating correctly is tolerable and ALARP. Also:	1.4.66-67
	(1) Ensure that the ADS fully reflects the operation of the system.	
	(2) Ensure that the Standby Selector Lever (SSL) operation in the simulator replicates that of the Tucano aircraft in order to prevent negative training value.	
	g. Implement a procedure to ensure that the hydraulic pressure release valve is correctly seated after operation.	1.4.66
	h. Ensure that a procedure is in place for the management of F765X requests so that, in addition to signing the form, PT consideration, response and action is documented.	1.4.87
	i. Implement a process to ensure the timely promulgation of all	1.4.90

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	In-Service design changes and Service Bulletins.	
	j. Consult with DE&S DAT in order to provide a single point of access for all safety data.	1.4.92
	k. Ensure that the management of the information that underpins the Tucano Safety Case is robust.	1.4.92
	l. Take ownership of the Partial Test Flight (PTF) matrix and incorporate it into the ADS.	1.4.93
1.5.3.	**MAA Cert&Reg Hd should:**	
	a. Ensure coherence in the Regulation governing Post Maintenance Test Flight Schedules.	1.4.39-41
1.5.5.	**AES PTL should:**	
	a. Issue policy for the practice of covering up helmet reflective tape for Tucano aircrew in order to reduce cockpit glare.	1.4.79
	b. Issue policy for the practice of applying coloured heat shrink to the Mk17 Personal Equipment Connector (PEC) in order to denote different sizes.	1.4.79
1.5.6.	**Tucano DDH should:**	
	a. Formalise the appointment of a Senior UTP and establish a system for supervising his/her activity.	1.4.28
	b. Ensure standardisation for the conduct of Tucano Maintenance Test Flights between 1 FTS and AWC.	1.4.32
	c. Review and amend where necessary, the RAF Linton-on-Ouse Contingency Plan 1 (CP1) PCM procedures.	1.4.82
1.5.7.	**DE&S (Combat Air) should:**	
	a. Ensure that UKMFTS PTL is resourced to provide the relevant safety assurance and air expertise for the TGSA.	1.4.89
1.5.8.	**MilAAIB Hd should:**	
	a. Amend the Manual of Post Crash Management (MPCM) to include guidance on the appropriate use of privacy screens at an accident site.	1.4.82
1.5.9.	**Hd DFRMO should:**	
	a. Ensure information provided to rescue crews detailing emergency rescue procedures from aircraft is current and standardised across Defence.	1.4.82
1.5.10.	**OC JARTS should:**	
	a. Include a dialogue box for the Unit Health, Safety and Environment Advisor (HSEA) on the Aircraft Recovery Clearance Site Certificate (Mod Form 767F).	1.4.80

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