Action for Empowerment and Accountability Research Programme: Understanding Social and Political Action

Pakistan: Country and Intervention Scoping Report

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1: Introduction

This paper provides an approach to political and social action for empowerment and accountability in Pakistan. It is based on a review of the landscape of social and political action undertaken by the author in the third quarter of 2016. The aim of the Scoping Paper is to identify some of the key themes and topics for research on social and political action. The paper opens with the country context which pays special attention to the formal institutional setting within which social and political action takes place (Section 2). It then moves on to interpreting and defining key concepts as they might apply to the country (Section 3). Section 4 provides a brief landscape of social and political action, and the role of external players is summarised in Section 5. Section 6 outlines a number of promising areas of research, research questions, methods, outputs and likely approaches to research uptake.

2: Country context

The constitution plays an important role in Pakistan's governance and politics. There are differing views about whether there are basic and immutable architectural features of the constitution which define the relationship between state and citizen, and between citizens.[1] But there are historical patterns which suggest the durability of some key features of the constitution. The present constitution was negotiated and approved in 1973 by the National Assembly which replaced an outgoing military-led government. There have been two further rounds of military government since the 1973 constitution – from 1977 to 1988, and then again from 1999 to 2007. The resilience of the 1973 constitution can be seen from the fact that each round of military rule was followed by a restoration of (an amended version of) that constitution.

In order to properly contextualise social and political action for empowerment and accountability in Pakistan, it is useful to start with four key enduring elements of the 1973 constitution.

First, the state is fashioned, formally speaking, on the model of parliamentary democracies, notably the United Kingdom. It consists of a permanent establishment made of a civil administration, a judiciary and a military. These three pillars of the permanent establishment are not entirely distinct from one another in the constitutional scheme. The military, for example, is perhaps the most powerful arm of the state, but it formally comes under the Defence Ministry, which in turn is subservient in the constitutional scheme to the elected government and parliament. The judiciary is formally autonomous from the administration, but there has been a history of administrative officials enjoying judicial powers in particular domains.[2] There have also been concerns that activism on the part of the superior judiciary

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[1] The issue of basic structure has been subject of various constitutional debates, including those in courts: http://www.dawn.com/news/1180240; https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/55541-basic-structure-of-pakistan-constitution-exhaustively-discussed

[2] District administrative officials had judicial powers over criminal matters until 1996. They continue to hold judicial powers with respect to some land revenue matters. http://www.civilservice.org.pk/history-of-pas.html

has led to it taking on administrative and political powers.[3] An elected federal parliament consisting of the National Assembly (lower house) and the Senate (upper house) is the representative pillar of the state. The parliamentary system has endured repeated disruptions by military and at times judicial action. There have been three long periods of military rule – or government headed by the military leadership.

Second, principles of modern republicanism underpin the basis of the constitution. This means that the constitution posits itself, primarily, as a contract between individual citizens and the state. It is based on the notion that all individual citizens enjoy equal rights. This is significant because the primacy and equality of individuals are asserted in a context where there are substantive formal and informal normative distinctions between individuals and groups. Social norms around gender and patriarchy, for example, constrain women's social, political and economic participation in conspicuous ways. Families and kinship groups are powerful factors that mediate an individual man or woman's formal as well as informal relations with other individuals and the state. Since many of the dimensions of marginality and disempowerment are connected to group-based social relations, the constitution's formal assertion of the primacy and equality of the individual citizen can and does act as one centre of gravity for empowerment and accountability.

Third, the modern republican architecture of the constitution comes into potential conflict with its other abiding claim – one based on the origin narrative of state-formation. The historical claim for the Pakistani state was based on the narrative of a distinct identity of the Muslim community in India.[4] Religion occupies an important place in the constitution and Muslims are marked out as a privileged community in a document that otherwise professes individual primacy and equality (Rahman 1973). Religion is also, understandably, an important dimension of disempowerment and marginality. It is not only the distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims, or Muslims of various sects that matters. The interpretation of religious texts can and has been utilised to argue for deviations from the principles of individual primacy and equality in other matters (Iqtidar 2012). A preamble to the constitution states, for example, that sovereignty belongs to God but that it is exercised in His name by 'the people'. But, perhaps more significantly, the invocation of religion allows for arguments of different rights of men and women, in opposition to basic liberal norms of equality.

Fourth, the system of representation envisaged in the original 1973 constitution which resembles the Westminster model has survived various military-led disruptions. Adult citizens directly elect representatives from territorial constituencies to legislative assemblies. Attempts at changing the nature of franchise, moving from a parliamentary to a presidential system, and to emasculate political parties have not succeeded. The two military regimes since 1973 attempted to legalise their rule by forcing constitutional amendments. Most of these amendments were reversed with the passage of the 18th constitutional amendment during the current transition from military to civil government (Adeney 2012; Gazdar 2010). There have been serious misapprehensions about electoral practices, but no significant challenge to the legitimacy of the mechanism through which political representation is ensured. Voter participation remains relatively low compared with other South Asian countries. The general elections in 2013 had a record turnout of 55 per cent of the registered voters. This was still some 20 per cent points below what is regularly achieved in neighbouring countries. Women's electoral participation rates remain significantly lower than that of men, and there is an anti-poor bias in turnout rates.

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[3] http://iglp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Siddique-Jidication-of-Politics.pdf
[4] Jalal (1985) provides an important account of the political trends leading up to the demand for a Muslim state in British-ruled India and the realisation of that demand.

Fifth, the state is a federation of four provinces, and provinces have strong associations with ethnicity (Adeney 2007). While the federal level of government is powerful, many aspects of the state's direct interaction with citizens are within the mandate of provincial governments. Provinces are not arbitrary administrative units. They are seen as basic units that make up the federation. Provinces also play a role in the state's origin myth that provinces and regions with Muslim majorities came together voluntarily to form the state of Pakistan (Jalal 1985). Centralisation and devolution have been persistent themes in the political and constitutional history of Pakistan. There are direct elections to provincial assemblies from which provincial governments are formed. Provincial assemblies also form the electoral college for the federal Senate with all provinces sending equal numbers of Senators regardless of their varying population sizes. The most populous province, Punjab, which has over half the population of the federation, elects as many Senators as Balochistan, which accounts for around 5 per cent of Pakistan's population.

Ethnicity has been a significant element of identity politics in Pakistan, and there has been a consolidation of ethnic identity over time. There are, of course, numerous and significant ethnic minorities within each province. So provinces are associated with ethnic identity and are also sites of inter-ethnic difference. The provincial level of government is also a claim-maker on the behalf of its residents to a range of rents and resources (Mushtaq 2009). State ownership of land and the regulation of property rights in land is vested with the provincial level. Provinces are contracting parties in the allocation of river flows, and are also major or exclusive stakeholders in the ownership of subsoil resources. Inter-provincial and federal-provincial issues in resource and rent allocation often get articulated in ethnic terms, even though ethnicity has little formal recognition in the constitution.

The strategy adopted here - basing our approach to empowerment and accountability in Pakistan primarily on its constitutional setting – is not the only way to set the country context. It privileges some forms of social and political action over others. There is wide agreement but certainly no consensus in the country that the existing constitutional framework exhausts the scope of empowerment and accountability. We will certainly counsel caution in adopting such an approach in other countries, and would not have advocated it even for Pakistan at other moments in time. The main advantage of this approach is that at the present political moment – and there is nothing to suggest that this moment will pass in the near future – the constitutional framework provides a robust way for classifying contention in economic, social and political spheres in Pakistan. It highlights the following dimensions of contention:

- Representative government versus military-led rule
- Individual agency versus family/kinship/group affiliation
- Individual rights versus patriarchy
- Liberal values versus religious interpretation
- Centralisation versus devolution
- Inter-ethnic tensions

3: Definition of concepts used

3.1: Empowerment and accountability

The Action for Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA) programme technical proposal sets out the following definitions that the consortium intends to use as starting points.

We use empowerment to mean a state of both subjective and objective being, where people have greater voice over decision making that affects their lives, an expanded range of choices and the possibilities of making them in the social, political and economic spheres and increased control over their own lives…..'Empowerment happens when individuals and organised groups are able to imagine their world differently and to realise that vision by **changing the relations of power that have been keeping them in poverty** [emphasis added].' Technical Proposal.

Empowerment is, therefore, both a process and an outcome, and for the purposes of the A4EA programme it is about improvement in the situation of those who have been relatively deprived. Since the processes and dimensions of disempowerment and deprivation can vary over time and space, it is useful to set out how we intend to interpret these terms in the present-day in Pakistan. Some dimensions of power and contestation have been identified above in the description of the broad institutional context of social and political action in Pakistan. It is important to also set out aspects of poverty and marginality which circumscribe the voice, agency and wellbeing of individuals.

Income poverty in Pakistan is closely associated, like it is in many countries, with the (lack of) asset ownership, education and formal sector employment, region, ethnicity and caste/kinship group at the local level. Some of the proximate drivers of income and wealth such as land ownership and housing security are themselves driven at the local level by social structures such as caste and kinship group identity. Labour markets tend to be segmented by gender and also by social grouping, and other markets such as those for land, housing and credit also rely on enforcement mechanisms which work to the advantage of incumbent groups. Income poverty is known to be an inadequate signifier of material deprivation let alone other aspects of poverty such as health, education and access to public goods and services. A large segment of the population (between a third and a half) is vulnerable to hunger, and rates of undernutrition are among the highest in the world. Education outcomes also lag behind the region particularly in rural areas and for females. There is persistent female disadvantage not only in education but in survival, work participation, ownership of assets and wages. Many aspects of female disadvantage are underpinned by a gendered division of space, with the public sphere seen largely as a male domain.

Empowerment in Pakistan, therefore, could encompass a wide range of processes and outcomes, including equal rights for women, the right to food, abolition of coercive and discriminatory labour arrangements, removal of incumbent advantage in land ownership, reversal of caste-based marginality and religious discrimination. Some of these processes and outcomes are envisaged in the existing formal social contract (the constitution and public policy) while others are not. Some aspects of unequal power and deprivation have given rise to mobilisation and demand whereas other, perhaps more severe and chronic ones have not.

In contrast to empowerment, accountability has a more specific meaning. It is about holding actors and institutions to account for what they have promised to deliver. While accountability is mostly associated with systems of delivery, it may apply to claims and entitlements that have been accepted as legitimate within a political process but for which there are, as yet, no delivery mechanisms in place.

At the most general level, accountability refers to the process of holding actors responsible for their actions. This involves 'answerability'— usually **formal processes in which actions are held up to specific standards of behaviour or performance**. For some this is sufficient to 'count' as accountability, while others prefer a more rigorous minimum standard, including sanctions and/or remedies for transgressions [emphasis added]. Technical Proposal.

A corollary of this understanding of accountability is that it only exists for things that are promised. For those aspirations and demands that are yet to be acknowledged as promises, there can be no accountability. This is easy to see in the context of the constitution. Because the constitution promises equality between the sexes, there is an opening for citizens to hold the state's various elements to account. In countries where the constitution makes no such promise campaigners would need to get equality accepted as a legitimate demand before holding any institutions or individuals to account. Taking this example further, if a state does not recognise equality between the sexes, activists make use of international standards and covenants to argue for such recognition. Some states purposively avoid accession to international covenants to preempt the legitimisation of such demand-making.

There is often thought to be a benign relationship between empowerment and accountability. Empowerment will expand the areas where the political process legitimises the claims and entitlements of those who were previously disempowered, and moves these claims and entitlements into the realm of accountability. Action for accountability can then further the process of empowerment. It is possible, nevertheless, to envisage situations when empowerment and accountability might work independently, or indeed, in opposite directions. An otherwise vibrant civil society where actors are held accountable for some promises can also shut out other potential needs from becoming claims, entitlements and promises. The very vibrancy of the civil society on some issues can become a factor in 'crowding out' others. Such situations occur in most countries. An illustrative example from Pakistan is the high level of political articulation for the demand of a predictable supply of electricity in the more developed regions while many marginalised regions remain unconnected to the national grid.

3.2: Social and political action

> We use social action to mean **action taken collectively** in the social sphere (of how social groups relate to each other) taken in order to shift social norms, values, incentives and power that underpin social behaviour…By political action we mean **collective action undertaken by groups** (or network of groups) to change in public policies and governance arrangements. Thus, attempts to expand the provision of welfare policies by governments would be included as would movements for increased citizen participation in policy making. Technical Proposal.

Collective action is a key element of social and political action for empowerment and accountability. In the rational choice framework, the ability of individuals to act together for a shared purpose is known to be constrained by free-rider problems. Many accounts of collective action (implicitly) assume the prior existence of a group (workers, women, the landless, an ethnic or religious minority, a geographical community of school or health service users). But group formation itself is a form of collective action because it requires, at the very least, the recognition by some individuals that their interests are conjoined (Olson 1965). 'Actions', as in actual mobilisation, protest, organised demand-making and leadership, are subsequent to the existence of the group. In reality group formation and 'actions' are less easy to disentangle from one another.

In the Pakistani context, it can be argued that various forms of collective action are ubiquitous, while others are virtually non-existent. The strength of (mostly patriarchal) social groups around family, kinship, tribe, ethnicity, and religious sect is often seen as an obstacle to the development of alignments around individual rights, class, gender, and public service delivery (Lieven 2011). But while parochial forms of collective action are often associated with exclusion, their role in engendering some forms of empowerment and accountability cannot be ruled out. Informal collective action is commonly observed

in urban and rural Pakistan around contests over residential land and housing (Gazdar and Mallah 2010, 2011). There are many instances across the country of historically marginalised castes and races having acquired social status and political power through kinship group-based collective action. Some tightly-knit religious sects have been successful in ensuring high levels of social development by organising within-group public services such as schooling, housing, health and even social insurance. More generally, extended families and kinship groups act as sources of support for their individual members in the face of risk, uncertainty and threats of insecurity. Basic voting blocs which go on to form broader factions are often based on close kinship ties (Wilder 1999).

By their very nature, parochial forms of collective action are empowering and exclusionary at the same time. They empower the group in question in relation to other groups. If that group is from a historically marginalised segment of society its social and political action is empowering in the sense that it redresses at least some balance of power which held that group in poverty. The very act of group formation (on parochial lines) can be exclusionary because it is based on marking out a clearer boundary between insiders and outsiders to the collective action. It is also often exclusionary because it relies on creating patriarchal forms of leadership among social segments which did not have strong patriarchal organisations to begin with. The construction of kinship group identity, or the tribalisation of a community, usually involves the adoption of patriarchal norms with respect to the gender relations. Upwardly mobile kinship groups which acquire 'honour' often do so by emulating more powerful patriarchal groups in their localities (Shah 2010).

There are and have been various forms of collective action in Pakistan which are not primarily based on kinship or religious sect. The trade union movement was strong in the late 1960s and the early 1970s and although it has lost much of its membership and political power, there are functioning unions in some public sector concerns (Shaheed 2007; Ali 2005). The informalisation of work and hostile government policies have made it difficult to sustain unions or to form new ones. There have been attempts, nevertheless, at organising workers on labour issues in some of these challenging contexts. There have also been movements around rights to land and other natural resources such as rights of fishing communities to water bodies. Caste and kinship are not overt bases for mobilisation in these cases. The role of these parochial identities cannot be ruled out, however, in the way in which these movements have actually evolved on the ground.

Another important factor in social and political action in Pakistan and in other conflict and fragile contexts is the role of violence on the part of the state as well as non-state actors. Fragility implies that the state might have lost its monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. Admitting the possibility that non-state sources of violence might not only exist but might also enjoy some legitimacy raises three sets of questions. One, what role, if any, does violence play in the internal organisation of any instance of collective action? The standard treatment of collective action assumes that it is voluntary and non-coercive, yet internal disciplining is a feature of many forms of collective action. Two, how do we deal with social or political action, particularly the latter, which deploys violence for tactical or strategic purposes and claims it to be for empowerment? Three, in a setting where state and non-state violence is prevalent, is the active promotion of non-violence and peace-building an empowerment objective in itself?

The definition of social and political actions which might be considered for the purposes of this research in Pakistan (and in other conflict and fragility contexts) therefore needs to consider the following:

- To what extent does any instance of social or political action address the situation of individuals or groups who are disempowered or deprived?
- To what extent does it directly involve disempowered segments of the population?
- How significant is the area of social and political action with respect to the size and severity of the overall poverty profile of the country?
- In what ways does group-formation in one dimension of disempowerment interact with other dimensions of disempowerment?
- In what ways does the social and political action interact with violence?

4: Nature of internal social and political action in relation to accountability and empowerment

The landscape of social and political action extends from macro-level political mobilisation for constitutional, governmental or policy change, to community-based mobilisation for local demand-making around public goods and services. In practice there are multiple strands – thematic and organisational - which might connect different levels in this hierarchy. For example, there might be community-based mobilisation around a public service (such as schooling) for which there is also lobbying at the national and provincial levels. Another example of vertical threads might be in the mode of mobilisation. A kinship group might be the main support base for a local community-based organisation and may also be a vote bloc that combines with others to form factions in national and provincial elections. Six broad types of social and political action can be identified in Pakistan in the light of the description above of the institutional context (Section 2) and dimensions of empowerment (Section 3).

4.1: Democratic transition

Democratic transition has been a persistent feature of political action in Pakistan. There have been several rounds of military government and all of them have been resisted (successfully) over time. The 1973 constitution defines the formal institutional framework for empowerment and accountability, but its own preservation could not be taken for granted. Movements for the restoration of constitutional government have been led by political parties as well as other organised segments of the civil society. The legal community is one such segment, which has acted alongside political parties, for the restoration and maintenance of democratic constitutional government. In the post-1973 period there are two important moments of political action associated with the democratic transition. The military regime of General Ziaul Haq was opposed in the 1980s by a coalition of constitutional parties under the umbrella of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (Ahmad 2015). This precipitated large-scale violent reprisals on the part of the military authorities but ultimately led to the revival of an elected constitutional government. The second important moment was a movement launched against the military government of General Musharraf in 2007 in which lawyers' organisations campaigned alongside political parties (Malik 2008). The democratic transition initiated in that movement defines the current political-constitutional scenario in the country (Gregory 2016).

4.2: Human rights

Human rights activism of various types led by dedicated organisations, often supported by networks of political activists, lawyers and media persons, has been a persistent feature of social and political action. Such activism is typically carried out by small groups but gains wider support at different moments. Human rights activism can be seen as revolving around three broad themes: civil and political rights;

peace and non-violence; and specific social structural issues such as bonded labour and violence against women.

Human rights activism has had strong overlaps (in terms of leadership and platforms) with movements for constitutional democracy in the country. Its defence of civil and political rights includes opposition to the persecution of political activists (usually at the hands of military governments) but also stretches to include human rights violations of non-mainstream activists including those accused of rejecting the constitutional framework of the country. In this way human rights activism goes well beyond the comfort zones occupied by mainstream political parties. Human rights activism in Pakistan has also been vocal in its defence of those who are accused of religious violations such as blasphemy.[5] Human rights activism in Pakistan has taken positions against political violence carried out by state as well as non-state actors. The 'fact-finding missions' of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (the leading human rights organisation in the country) and other organisations that have adopted similar models, have provided valuable forums for victims of violence to speak somewhat safely about their experiences.

The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) was established in the 1980s and set the tone for other organisations and activists in this area. Its leadership has often work closely with leaders of lawyers' organisations as well as other segments of organised civil society. The main distinguishing feature of reputable human rights organisations is their capacity to engage with, document and report impartially on rights' violations and violence. Politically, they operate within a constitutional framework and also speak out about violations of the constitution. They endorse the liberal dimension of the constitution which gives primacy to individual equality, rights, freedoms and agency.

4.3: Women's empowerment

The 1980s were an important turning point in the women's movement in Pakistan when women from relatively well-off backgrounds began to form organisations on a feminist basis (Mumtaz and Shaheed 1987; Shaheed 2010; Saigol 2016). The Women's Action Forum (WAF) emerged as a relatively open but coherent group which spearheaded this movement. While WAF retains its identity as an autonomous organisation of women, many of the activists also became associated with NGOs which worked on various aspects of women's empowerment, often in alliance with human rights activists and likeminded political activists (Khan forthcoming). While there are common elements between the women's movement and human rights activism in Pakistan there are also distinctive features of the women's movement in terms of organisation, tactics, action and success. At one level the agenda is more radical than that of human rights activism which remains anchored, at least nominally, within the constitutional framework. The women's movement has developed deeper critiques of patriarchal social structures and the need for fundamental social and normative changes. At another level the movement is better embedded within mainstream power structures with access to high level state organisations such as the National Commission on the Status of Women, and women legislators.[6] While many of the tactics have

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[5] Individuals accused of infractions of laws against blasphemy have not elicited support from mainstream politicians. Lawyers often refuse to take up the defence of such individuals. This is due to a pervasive atmosphere of fear perpetuated by acts of non-state violence around such cases. There have been high-profile assassinations, such as those in 2011 of exceptional politicians such as the Governor of the Punjab province Salman Taseer, and Federal Minister Shahbaz Bhatti who took up the case of a young woman accused of blasphemy. Another chilling case was that of a defence counsel, Rashid Rehman, who defended a young academic facing a blasphemy charge, was threatened in open court and then murdered in 2015. Rehman was associated with the HRCP.

[6] The National Commission on the Status of Women (NCSW) is a statutory body and has counted among its heads a number of prominent activists of the women's movement.

overlapped with human rights activism (for example, the documentation and pursuit of individual cases of violence against women) there have been broader successes too in the form of legislative changes. There have been questions within the movement about its leadership (whether this continues to draw from women from the socio-economic and political elites), outreach and tactics.

4.4: Religious ideology

Social and political action around religious ideology has taken three main forms. First, movements have developed critiques of the modern constitutional framework, made changes in it, and alternately withdrawn and participated in its institutions (Nasr 1994; Iqtidar 2011). Second, there has been a fusion of some elements of ideological religious politics with armed action including the imposition of control over territory and community and attempts at establishing parallel state structures (Gazdar, Kureshi and Sayeed 2014). Third, there has been mobilisation around religious sectarian identity (Nasr 2002). There are often organisational and tactical overlaps between these forms of political action. It is sometimes claimed that some strands of political action around religious ideology can be empowering for their participants. Religious political activism, it has been argued, has historically challenged older propertied elites, but there is no convincing account that its leaders have not themselves occupied the position of the old elites (Haroon 2011). Exclusionary aspects of these movements are easier to observe as they explicitly prescribe inferior positions to women and to any individual or group that does not subscribe to their ideology (Iqtidar and Sarkar 2013).

4.5 Ethnic identity

There have been prominent movements in Pakistan throughout its history for the articulation of ethnic identity and nationalism based on it. Movements for ethnic identity are often framed around claims of cultural distinctiveness, but almost invariably implicate political rights for particular regions and communities. Complaints about economic discrimination and claims over economic resources have generally played an important role in these movements (Waseem and Hyat 1997). The creation of Bangladesh out of the former province of East Pakistan was an important watershed. Since then there have been movements for the rights of various ethnic communities, some of them demanding outright secession from the state. There are contested narratives, of course, around ethnic movements. Their supporters almost invariably claim that a big part of their struggle is for economic empowerment, even while detractors point to other motives such as secession.[7]

Political action around ethnic identity straddles the constitutional framework – at times articulating demands within the constitution and at times outside. It can be exclusionary towards individuals who belong to other ethnic groups. Violence has played a role in political action. Ethnic movements are generally more inclusive of women than mainstream politics, and certainly more than religious

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[7] Currently, there is a movement for ethnic rights in the Baloch regions of the province of Balochistan, and elements of this movement have turned to armed action (Samad 2014). Given that the Baloch regions of Balochistan are among the most deprived in terms of infrastructure, public services and government employment, there is a near-consensus that a political resolution will involve expanding economic opportunities. Another recent example of an ethnic movement is that of Mohajirs – or Urdu-speaking Partition-migrants and their descendants in the Sindh province. This movement too rested its claim partly on the grounds of economic deprivation, even though its constituents are among the relatively privileged in terms of economic and social development. The empowerment claim of this movement found resonance among its constituents on grounds of loss of privilege over time to other communities (Kennedy 1991). The Seraiki-speaking region of southern Punjab has seen a movement for cultural recognition turn gradually into a voice for the redressal of regional economic backwardness.

movements. They tend to be invested in the modern republican framework of the constitution even if they often end up opposing its territorial claims. They couch their message in developmental terms – and their complaint with other ethnic groups and with the nation-state as it is presently constituted is mostly one about the blockage of development.

4.6 Rents and resources

These is a wide range of contests over rents and resources – some of them articulated as ethnic and provincial politics. An example of the latter is the distribution of river water resources between provinces.[8] Other examples include constitutional as well as extra-constitutional demand-making with respect to mineral resources and provincial/ethnic claims on these.

There are also numerous local instances of collective action for rents and resources which involve informal networks. Three types of such mobilisation represent significant potential for empowerment. The regularisation of urban slums, particularly in the city of Karachi, has led, over time to increased housing security for a large segment of the urban poor. The cumulative effect of local community-based actions, some led by informal land developers, but all involving some level of collective action on the part of residents has left a strong imprint on the politics of the city. While these actions were not coordinated on a city-wide basis, they made the city more inclusive of the poor (Gazdar and Mallah 2011). Another example is the mobilisation of tenant farmers organised by the Anjuman-e-Muzaraeen Punjab (AMP) in the district of Okara in 2001 to resist the takeover of their land by military authorities (Akhtar 2006). This case received wide attention from outside activists. While it led to the empowerment of some of the marginalised tenants and blocked evictions, the issue of property rights remains unresolved. A third example is that of the successful movement led by the Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum (PFF) in 2007 to restore traditional communal fishing rights over water bodies taken over by state agencies.

Some common features of these three types of social and political actions are worth noting. One, they have all been based on collective action on the part of historically marginalised groups. Two, group formation and leadership around collective goals (housing security, land security and fishing rights) was a combination of parochial community organisation and modern social and political structures. Three, there were strong elements of empowerment as well as exclusion. Four, all three types of action did involve women as political agents if not leaders. Five, there were complex negotiations with the mainstream political process in each case. Some of the local social and political actions around specific rent and resources get magnified into broader political movements (such as those for ethnic rights), while others lead to new combinations locally in voter blocs and transactional electoral politics.

5: Role of external actors

External actors have historically played an important role in Pakistan's politics. The country has been part of US-led military alliances since the 1950s and this involvement was premised on close military-to-military ties, often at the expense of democratic consolidation (Jalal 1990). The Cold War provided the broader context for this geopolitical engagement on the side of external actors. From the Pakistani side, concern about national security with respect to India was an important factor in seeking alliances. Another set of external actors gained prominence in the 1980s when oil-rich Gulf States became an

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[8] There was a largely peaceful and successful movement in the Sindh province in the 1980s and 1990s against the federal government's plans to construct a water reservoir on the Indus which, it was alleged, would have reduced water flows to downstream regions.

important factor in the country's economy and politics. Western governments and the Gulf States supported the military regime of General Ziaul Haq in that decade, though the former did encourage some movement towards constitutional government. Geopolitical interest revived after 9/11 when Pakistan became an important member of the US-led coalition. This too coincided with a period of military rule. From around 2006 onwards, however, various Western governments, particularly the US and the UK, backed efforts for the restoration of an elected civilian government. There was a visible change in US perceptions about the Pakistani military, and an expressed priority to develop ties with the civilian side of the state, culminating in aid legislation to this effect.

Much of the political engagement of the US and UK with Pakistan in the post-2007 period has been framed as supporting the democratic transition. This support has involved assisting negotiations between the military and political leaderships for the return to an elected civilian government in 2008, and programmes for electoral reform and legislative strengthening.

External actors – both Western as well as those from the Gulf region - will continue to play an important role in the landscape of social and political action in Pakistan. They are likely to be joined by China which has been an important strategic partner of Pakistan and has begun to play a more active role in the economy. The shift in Western, particularly US, strategic engagement with Pakistan around 2006 in relations with the Pakistan military was probably responsible for the pro-active role played by the US and UK in facilitating delicate negotiations between the military and civilian leaderships which paved the way for a return to constitutional government.[9] This role is likely to continue regardless of political changes in these Western countries. A key factor in this shift is the perception that the military in Pakistan cannot be relied upon on its own, to deliver on key security-related concerns of Western countries. The idea that the Pakistani military has supported or tolerates Islamic military abroad is firmly rooted now in how Western powers deal with Pakistan. Pakistan has sought to utilise its relations with the Gulf States and China to counter Western pressure. These external actors are not particularly invested in Pakistan's democratic transition.

Western governments' support for greater voice and accountability inside Pakistan is often couched within a broader theory of change that sees the democratic transition as a route to political and security stabilisation (Ali 2009). Some externally supported empowerment and accountability programmes are explicit about the democratic transition in their theories of change.[10] Election support programmes have argued that a more transparent electoral process will lead to greater popular participation in electoral politics, and this, in turn will lead to political stability (Balagamwala and Gazdar 2014). The change in question sets the context for other social and political action which can lead to empowerment and accountability.

We conducted a brief review of recently concluded or ongoing externally supported empowerment and accountability programmes in Pakistan. A long list of programmes was generated using two approaches. One, we reached out to important donor organisations for details of programmes or projects addressing

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[9] This shift was articulated formally in US politics through the enactment of the Kerry-Lugar Act which committed the US government to maintaining relations with the civilian segment of the state, in addition to its existing close relationship with the military. The act formed the basis for the flow of US assistance which was specifically ear-marked for civilian purposes.

[10] The Theory of Change document for the DFID-supported AAWAZ programme states, for example, 'Pakistan is a transitional democracy and given the deepening divisions of class, caste, and gender and inequitable distribution of resources, enabling conditions need to be created to nurture active citizenship', p 5, http://www.aawaz.org.pk/AAWAZ%20TOC%202014-02-17.pdf.

empowerment and accountability. Two, we searched online for externally supported projects. We focused on the following donor organisations: USAID, AUSAID, the European Union, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, JICA and DFID. The long list included 32 projects/programmes which had something to do with empowerment and accountability in their titles and/or their objectives. Programme documents were reviewed to ascertain their objectives, outcomes and activities. We screened out those programmes whose activities did not correspond with the broad definitions of empowerment and accountability, or which did not include any form of social and political action as defined by A4EA. The final list consists of 15 projects/programmes (Annex 1).

Five of DFID-Pakistan's programmes are directly related to empowerment and accountability. Of these the largest is AAWAZ (GBP 35 million) which is a cross-sectoral voice and accountability programme with a particular focus on conflict and violence. This is followed by EVA-BHN (GBP 15 million) which is related to demand-making in the health and nutrition sectors. Both these programmes operate in two out of the seven regions/provinces that make up Pakistan (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab provinces). A third programme formerly STAEP and currently CDIP (around GBP 15 million) is related to the electoral process, while a fourth Alif Ailan (GBP 11 million), is a campaign for demand-making in the education sector. There is a smaller (GBP 4 million) fifth programme for developing a database on violence against women.

There are other programmes that have elements of empowerment and accountability but not necessarily as primary components. DFID support to the national cash transfer programme is an example of a social protection programme that has an empowerment and accountability component through the creation of community-based beneficiary groups. Two of the largest DFID programmes – AAWAZ and EVA-BHN are primarily focused on promoting local level accountability of and access to public goods and services through the creation or strengthening of community-based organisations and networks. Alif Ailaan activities are mainly for lobbying and demand-making for education at the national and provincial levels, while election support programmes combine elements of the supply side as well as demand-making for credible elections. They have aimed to provide independent election monitoring services, but have also attempted to create community level groups for local lobbying.

Analyses of the two completed DFID-Pakistan supported programmes – Supporting Transparency and Accountability in Electoral Processes in Pakistan (STAEP) and Improved Community Engagement through Devolution (ICED) – highlighted a number of features of interventions involving community-based demand-making in Pakistan.[11] First, community-based organisations are generally led by the more empowered segments of the community. Shifting the locus of organisation downwards is no guarantee that it will be more inclusive of women, the landless and the socially marginalised. Second, demand-making on the part of community-based organisations often follows existing informal patterns of patronage and can underpin rather than undermine clientelism. Third, interventions find it difficult to incorporate and implement methods for addressing social exclusion. Trainings tend to be procedural whereas issues in empowerment need more rigorous political engagement. Fourth, these programmes discourage the articulation of existing local contests over resources in the interests of presenting a cohesive image of the community.

The activities of AAWAZ and EVA-BHN both have significant elements of community mobilisation and demand-making around existing or promised public goods and services. To this extent these interventions face challenges that are comparable to the ones found in completed programmes like STAEP and ICED. The programmes have different approaches to the problem of community mobilisation

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[11] On the former see Balagamwala and Gazdar (2014), on the latter see Gazdar, Masood and Naqvi (2013).

and it will be interesting to see how and to what extent these approaches succeed in overcoming some of the challenges faced by past programmes with respect to inclusion.

Broadly speaking externally supported programmes are most active in the accountability of existing or promised public goods and services. AAWAZ does have one stream of work around conflict prevention and the advocacy of non-violence, but it too mostly leverages community-level mobilisation around existing or promised public goods and services. The political process from the ground-level up, however, is complex and consists of multiple contests and negotiations. Group formation can be both empowering and exclusionary at the same time and there are ongoing horizontal and vertical transactions at play. As we have seen from studies of social and political action around rents and resources, much of the collective action and group formation takes place around contests within and across communities. Externally-supported programmes generally steer clear of such domains of contestation which find representation in political processes.

6: Emerging research questions/themes, justification for their importance, assumptions

6.1 Democratic transition

The democratic transition lays the basis for social and political action for empowerment and accountability in Pakistan, yet its consolidation remains an objective in its own right. Challenges to the democratic transition arise not only from non-representative segments of the state such as the military and judiciary. There are challenges from non-state actors too who do not subscribe to the constitutional institutional arrangements of governance. In the face of these challenges the weak public investment in the democratic system – signalled by the relatively low voter turnout rates by regional comparison – is something which can be addressed in the medium term. Increasing voter turnout rates is, in principle, in the interest of many political stakeholders who seek to expand their support bases. Given the particularly low turnout rates among women and the poor, increases in turnout rates are likely to be pro-poor. External actors also see increasing voter turnouts as signs of progress towards the institutionalisation of democratic government.

Research question: What are the impediments to higher voter turnout rates and how might they be overcome?

Methods: A mixed methods approach is proposed here with a review of existing evidence, hypotheses based on theoretical assumptions regarding voter behaviour, and quantitative as well as qualitative research on causal factors.

Outputs and stakeholders: Research findings will be shared among relevant stakeholders including government, the election commission, political parties and those working on electoral processes, who will all be engaged with the research from the outset.

6.2 Women's empowerment

The women's movement in Pakistan has registered many successes under challenging conditions. Female disadvantage in virtually all aspects of economic and social development and well-being, however, remains one of the most important dimensions of poverty and disempowerment in the country. The campaigning and legislative successes of the women's movement are generally not matched by actual change on the ground in terms of social norms or public action. One of the possible factors hindering the growth of the women's movement is the fact that it has remained limited to urban elites and has failed to grow in terms of its leadership and participation into middle and working class women. Expanding the space for the women's movement will be empowering in itself, and will also enhance the capacity of women to act in their interests and according to their priorities.

As seen from our review of externally-supported projects and programmes, donor organisations have taken great interest in gender and women's empowerment. Some of the largest donor supported programmes are in this area, and all programmes have a significant focus on gender. DFID-supported programmes, for example, work on a range of issues including violence against women, women's political participation, and women's access to public services, and they work with a range of partners including women's organisations and state bodies. These programmes taken together, therefore, have an interface with virtually all elements that would make up the women's movement in Pakistan. They rely on these segments for their own programmatic activities, and thus also shape activities of many of the constituents of the movement. There are few resources, however, which take a holistic view of the women's movement, how its different components come together or digress, what might be the change dynamics, and what are the strategic issues going forward.

Research question: How can the women's movement increase its outreach, participation and representation?

Methods: The study will be based on a historical case study and landscaping of possible areas of expansion and qualitative shifts in the women's movement. Qualitative research will be carried out with women activists and with potential leaders at various levels and from diverse socio-economic backgrounds to assess their priorities and organisational ideas.

Outputs and stakeholders: This research will be conducted from an 'insider's perspective' with the view to informing and strategising with women's organisations. Research uptake will be embedded with the research and forums will be used to both generate evidence and debate.

6.3 Expanding entitlements

The high prevalence of hunger and undernutrition is one of the most basic aspects of poverty and disempowerment. There is an implied social contract around food security and this revolves around protection of consumers from price volatility and market shortages of designated essential 'kitchen items'. This social contract is observed to hold and breaches in it are seen to impose a political price on the government. There are several paradoxes. Administrative and political processes that are otherwise seen as dysfunctional and failing have, by and large, managed to honour this significant implicit social contract. At the same time this social contract has not extended to the right to food and freedom from hunger. There is little public expectation of the state in this regard even though there is a large potential constituency for this change. This case study of mostly passive but effective social and political action

around one implied social contract and the absence of demand-making around a closely associated potential entitlement will raise the profile of the public debate on the issue.

Research question: How can hunger and nutrition become higher priority issues in politics and policy?

Methods: Historical case study of existing implied social contract; analysis of secondary data on correlates of hunger and nutrition; qualitative study on politics of hunger.

Outputs and stakeholders: Research report; opinion makers, political and human rights activists.

6.4 Community-based mobilisation

External actors have supported community-based mobilisation as a prominent route to empowerment. The Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP) is a flagship social protection programme of the federal government which provides an unconditional cash transfer to women in poor households. As part of its support to the programme DFID-Pakistan has invested in the creation of BISP Beneficiary Committees (BBCs) at the community level across the country. The BBCs are seen as forums for discussion as well as possible channels of women's empowerment.

Research question: What is the empowerment impact of the BISP Beneficiary Committees and how might it be strengthened?

Methods: Rigorous quantitative impact assessment

Output/stakeholders: Research study aimed at government, donors, academic community.

6.4 Peace and non-violence

Although a wide range of social and political action takes the non-violent route, there is a weak understanding of social and cultural resources which can be used to expand the domain of non-violent strategies and restrict the domain of violence. External programmes such as AAWAZ have components on conflict prevention and non-violence at the local level. There are also indigenous resources for non-violence which appear to be in place when individuals and organisations choose to act non-violently in conditions where violence is a prevalent form of action. There is relatively little systematic understanding, however, of the social, political, and indeed cultural constituencies, for non-violent social and political action in Pakistan. This study will address a major gap in our understanding of the empowerment and accountability landscape in a fragile setting. It will identify cases of positive deviance – i.e. instances where the path of non-violence was taken – to better understand indigenous social and cultural resources for non-violence and how they might be leveraged.

Research question: What are the constituencies for non-violent social and political action and how might they be strengthened? What are effective strategies for non-violent collective action in conditions where state and non-state violence is prevalent?

Methods: Case studies of social and political action, organisations and movements with a special focus on non-violence; positive deviance

Outputs and stakeholders: Analytical framework for understanding non-violent social and political action in conflict and fragile contexts; academics, activists, external actors.

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Annex 1 Recently Concluded or Ongoing Externally Supported Empowerment and Accountability Programmes in Pakistan

S.No	Programme Name	Donor	Objectives	Dates/ Duration	Approx. Budget(British Pounds)	Documents	Reason for being Action for Accountability	Methodology/Output	Activities
1	Resilience	USAID	USAID has supported the return and recovery of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the Malakand and South Waziristan regions in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province and in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). This will be done by 1) Increasing Engagement 2)Addressing Gender-Based Violence3) Connecting to Markets 4)Supporting the Voluntary Return of Displaced Families	Phase wise	N/A	https://www.usaid.gov/pakistan/stabilization	Plans to increase engagement of people in the political process.	Supported the livelihoods of farming families by restoring irrigation for thousands of acres of arable land across FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province; Upgraded power grids and transmission and rehabilitated a damaged power supply system in 85 villages of South Waziristan Agency (FATA); Rebuilt or renovated over 300 public facilities, such as health units and utility systems, to resume and improve the provision of essential services. **Increasing Engagement** USAID-supported organizations have educated over 63,000 people from marginalized groups about their rights, and have helped them engage with political parties to advocate for better representation. USAID also has provided assistance to 332 civil society organizations that engage in community advocacy. In addition, USAID has helped develop management systems, provided equipment, and trained staff of the FATA Secretariat and the Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to improve delivery of essential services.	Engaging with local NGOs and partners to improve shelter for addressing gender based violence. Advocacy activities and training of government employees to improve delivery of services for increasing engagement.

| 2 | Political Parties Development Project | USAID | Using a bottom-up approach, the Political Parties Development Project works with grassroots party members and leaders on policy and platform development that reflect local input. Broader participation will lead to policies that are more responsive to constituents' priorities and higher voter turnout. | Phase wise | N/A | https://www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/political-parties-development-project | Engaging marginalized groups in policy development process. | Work with political parties, including marginalized groups, particularly women and young adults, to strengthen their ability to participate effectively in the policy development process.
Support public opinion research.
Help working groups conduct research and draft policies that respond to issues identified by members at the grassroots level.
Help parties organize conferences through which they can present policies under consideration to members.
Train party leaders and activists to effectively communicate democratically-developed policies.
Assist in the establishment of an independent opinion research facility that meets international standards.
Engage party leaders and grassroots members in a policy development process that will ultimately lead to more informed policies that have broader public buy-in
Train polling agents. | • Work with political parties, including marginalized groups, particularly women and young adults, to strengthen their ability to participate effectively in the policy development process.
• Support public opinion research.
• Help working groups conduct research and draft policies that respond to issues identified by members at the grassroots level.
• Help parties organize conferences through which they can present policies under consideration to members.
• Train party leaders and activists to effectively communicate democratically-developed policies.
• Assist in the establishment of an independent opinion research facility that meets international standards.
• Engage party leaders and grassroots members in a policy development process that will ultimately lead to more informed policies that have broader public buy-in
• Train polling agents. |
| 3 | Gender Equity Programs | USAID | The Gender Equity Program educates women about their rights at home, at work, and in society. The program is working to expand women's access to justice and human rights, while combating gender-based violence. | Phase wise | 32,000,000 | http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnaea125.pdf | Targets a marginalized group i.e. women to have access to a justice system in different spheres in life. | The Gender Equity Program is designed to reduce the gender gap in Pakistan by taking proactive actions in support of women in four key areas: access to justice, empowerment at home, in the workplace and in the public domain, and combating gender based violence | The project is implemented by Aurat Foundation and has sub programs in different cycles. It is a five year program in collaboration with The Asia Foundation. AF works primarily with the collaboration of civil society organizations, networks and groups and has an outreach extending to all of Pakistan's districts. It is catalysing critical groups in society to influence policy, legislation and programs for women's greater economic and political power in society. The Gender Equity Program seeks to facilitate behavioural change in society by enabling women to access information, resources and institutions, and improve societal attitudes towards women's rights issues. During multiple periodic cycles, numerous grants will be given by Aurat Foundation to achieve the objectives of this program. |

| 4 | Citizens Voice Project | USAID | The Citizens' Voice Project aims to increase positive engagement between citizens and federal, provincial, and local government institutions on public policy, service delivery, and good governance. | 2011-Present | 36,000,000 | https://grants.cvpa-tdea.org/grants/index.php?-&-action=partner | The programs in this project focuses on increased citizen participation in policy making | 1)Strengthened voice (policy advocacy and government oversight) 2) Improved Accountability (public-private partnerships) 3)Enhanced capacity (organizational development & targeted trainings) | The Citizens Voice Project is an umbrella program and works in cycles. There are multiple programs under this project and all the sub programs are conducted by local NGOs. These programs focus on advocacy, citizen engagement and participation at community level. There are programs which focus on surveys and data collection, and training of citizens in different areas of Pakistan. |
| 5 | Strengthening Electoral and Legislative Processes | UNDP | Strengthen democratic governance to improve the core functions of electoral and legislative institutions and promote inclusive, responsive, credible and transparent processes. | 2013-2017 | 4,480,000 | http://www.pk.undp.org/content/pakistan/en/home/operations/projects/democratic_governance/elections-2013.html | Helps in increasing citizen participation. | Women's parliamentary caucuses were established in the assemblies; Strategic plans were developed to guide MDG task forces in Provincial Assemblies; A Parliamentary Reporters Association was set up; The Youth Parliamentary School and Children's Parliament have improved parliamentary outreach; Over 500 legislators were trained on rules of procedure, budget analysis, etc.; A voter education campaign before the 2013 General Election reached 40 million people; The ECP used tamper-evident bags and collected gender-disaggregated voter data for the first time; A results management system helped the UNDP and the ECP improve accuracy and transparency in compiling election results; The ECP has developed a Strategic Plan which includes a goal to increase the role of women in electoral processes. | Training of legislatures, collecting gender disaggregated data, establishing women's caucuses in the assemblies, educational campaigns for voters, and developing strategic plans. |

| 6 | Strengthening Rule of Law in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province | UNDP | The project is supporting sustainable peace through improved access to justice for women and men in the Malakand division through effective and accountable justice and security service delivery. | 2011-2017 | 5,000,000 | http://www.pk.undp.org/content/pakistan/en/home/operations/projects/democratic_governance/strengthening-rule-of-law-in-Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa-Province.html | Aims to strengthen civil society | More than 100 judges were trained in judgment writing skills during 2012
184 Legal Aid Clinics were conducted in the project's target Union Councils
A total of 8,345 persons, including 45 per cent females, attended these clinics.
On the spot legal advice was provided to 376 persons, including 45 per cent females, attending these clinics.
188 cases, with 70 per cent females, requiring further follow-up were referred to Legal Aid Desks.
A total of 1,200 lawyers were sensitized on law and jurisprudence through expert lectures.
The project trained 412 MJ members; out of which 108 were female
The project identified a total of 650 Paralegals, fifty per cent women, and trained them in facilitating legal population in taking the best legal or informal courses for resolution of their problems.
Needs based training toolkits (manuals) developed for police and prosecutors;
Pool of master trainers formed including police and prosecutors;
Training needs assessment completed of Executive Magistrates of Malakand division;
Prosecution libraries of seven districts equipped;
Assessment of seven prosecutorial offices completed;
Prison management system installed at Timergara;
Support provided to police training college, Hangu;
Female trainees residential facilities upgraded;
Mini forensic science laboratory established for training on investigation;
Expert sessions (forensic, criminology, investigation, using information technology to detect crime, human rights, juvenile and women rights etc.);
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Judicial Academy operationalized and capacitated;
First ever research wing in justice sector established in Peshawar;
Planning cell of Peshawar High Court strengthened;
District judiciary process serving branch strengthened; | Training judges, establishing legal aid clinics, expert lectures for lawyers, training women lawyers and paralegals, increasing participation of women in legal aid clinics |

									Dialogue initiated on gaps in Nizam-e-Adal regulation; Refurbishment needs of courts in Malakand division identified; Justice coordination forum established; Policy level discussions with the Pakistan BAR Council to make legal aid sustainable; Initiated discussions to create synergies between District Level Empowerment Committee and the Bar; council; Legal Aid Desk established at district level (Buner, Swat, Dir Lower); Encouraged female legal practitioners to enter mainstream legal practice; Need based training toolkit for lawyers developed and master trainers trained.	

| 7 | Support social protection and decent work of brick kiln workers and bonded labourers in Pakistan | Action aid Lbg | The overall objective arising from Action Aid's ground work with local civil society Partner organisations is to 'contribute to poverty reduction and social inclusion of informal workers and bonded labourers in Pakistan'. The specific objective is to ensure that 'brick kiln workers have better access to social protection services and more productive employment'. | 04/2011 to 09/2014 | 1,162,667 | http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/pakistan/projects/list_of_projects/236497_en.htm | Improving lives of bonded labour which is a form of modern day slavery so overall achieving the empowerment objective. | The proposed action has been designed to ensure that project activities will contribute to the overall goal through following four results; 1. Increased awareness and access of Brick Kiln Workers (Right Holders) to Social Security Services/benefits and minimum wages to ensure respect of existing legislation 2. Local community organizations representing brick kiln workers are strengthened and have capacity to lead advocacy on rights to minimum wage, social protection and decent employment 3. Basic Social Services are functional, Coordination with government institutions is ensured to provide and protect basic rights of brick kiln workers 4. Enhanced productive potential and technical skills through vocational training | Increasing awareness among brick kiln workers regarding their economic rights and minimum wages, providing vocational training to brick kiln workers, strengthening local organizations for advocacy regarding brick kiln workers, coordinating with government organisations for protecting the basic rights of brick kiln workers. |
| 8 | Strengthening civil society | Trust For Democratic Education And accountability | The overall objective of the project is to contribute to strengthened democratic institutions and practices in Pakistan through greater public trust in transparent and accountable electoral processes. The specific purpose is to contribute to strengthened enforcement of election laws leading to greater trust of political parties and people. | 12/2012 to 06/2014 | 2,129,198 | http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/pakistan/projects/list_of_projects/284456_en.htm | Increasing participation of the citizens in policy making | TDEA-FAFEN raised the standards of citizens' election observation in Pakistan during the General Elections process in 2013 through its project Long Term Election Observation and Oversight (LETOOP). TDEA's nationwide methodology was based on national election laws and procedures of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), Pakistan's ratification in 2010 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 2012 Declaration of Global Principles and Code of Conduct for Non-Partisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations. | Assisted citizens to obtain their CNICs, used statistically driven methodology for election observation, trained observers to monitor the polling stations, registered citizens for voting, published reports and collected data on election results and established a governance monitoring methodology in different institutions, and currently handling complaints of public institutions to gauge their effectiveness and getting monthly information on crime, performance of lower courts and incidence of disease. |

| 9 | Working women use legislation to combat harassment | Interactive Resource Centre Trust | To effectively implement the laws against sexual harassment as a part of the on-going legal reforms in Pakistan | 03/2010 to 02/2012 | 183,640 | http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/pakistan/projects/list_of_projects/223081_en.htm | Women empowerment by working on policy level to implement laws against sexual harassment in the workplace. | The 18-month project is funded by European Union. The project aimed to influence policy for making amendment in laws to include sexual harassment at workplace as offence. It also aims at making the private sector realize their responsibility to curb sexual harassment at workplace. The project is implemented in collaboration with an alliance called Alliance Against Sexual Harassment at Workplace. | The project is implemented in collaboration with an alliance called Alliance Against Sexual Harassment at Workplace (AASHA). AASHA works in influencing policy making by working with senior officials of the Government and ILO and engaged labour unions, private sector, civil society organizations, academia and working women |
| 10 | Pakistan Elimination of Violence Against Women Program | AUSAID | The program will deliver services for women affected by violence, including shelters, counselling, legal aid and medical services, as well as income generation support to help survivors reintegrate back into their communities. Support will be provided to strengthen the capacity of police, medical institutions and the judiciary to respond to cases of violence and to support and implement policy and legislation to protect women from violence. The program will engage with men, women, youth, religious and community leaders to educate to challenge attitudes and behaviours that tolerate violence against women. | 2014-2018 | 5,968,000 | http://dfat.gov.au/geo/pakistan/development-assistance/Pages/multi-sectorial-policy-priorities-and-investments.aspx | The program will engage with men, women, youth, religious and community leaders to educate to challenge attitudes and behaviours that tolerate violence against women. | The EVAW program aims to strengthen the capacity of Pakistan's police, medical institutions and the judiciary to respond to violence against women and to build the capacity of parliamentarians to enable them to strengthen legislation to eliminate violence against women. The EVAW program will provide more than 17,200 Pakistani women and children with direct assistance and benefit about 238,000 Pakistani women and children indirectly. | Activities include public and focused dialogues, sensitization workshops and discussion forums to ensure civil society representation against cases of women violence. |

| 11 | Empowerment, Voice and Accountability for Better Health and Nutrition (EVA-BHN) | DFID | Under the UKaid funded Provincial Health and Nutrition Programme (PHNP) this four year project (EVA–BHN) has been launched to focus on Reproductive, Maternal, New-born and Child Heath (RMNCH) and Nutrition services. It aims at empowering citizens to play an active role in demanding better access to RMNCH services and to hold service providers to account. Will focus on demand making to supplement the supply side aspect of the PHNP program. It also has a grant fund known as HANIF 'that aims to foster and promote simple innovations that benefit poor women and children by funding ideas that will result in long term impact.' Programmes will only be implemented in KPK and Punjab. The Implementing agency is The Palladium (former GRM International Futures Group). | Nov 2013-Nov 2017 | 15,000,000 | https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-202488/documents | Aligned with E&A because it focuses on empowering citizens to play an active role in demanding better access to RMNCH services; and accountability by trying to empower citizens to hold service providers to account | EVA-BHN is primarily focused on the 'demand side' of RMNCH services and will complement the 'supply side' activities under the broader PHNP framework by: enhancing communities' understanding of their health rights, entitlements and engagement in monitoring the planning and delivery of services organising communities at all levels to catalyse the precipitation of desired policy charges at the local, provincial and national level. These results will be achieved through evidence based approaches using communicative ecology, two way communication methodologies, knowledge management, and extensive action research and fostering of innovations. | The EVA project works with citizen forums at community, district and province levels where voices and demands are raised, supported and amplified by a wide range of allies and partners at every level. Tools like community based monitoring and engagement with grievance redress mechanisms support citizens in a structured way to engage and raise their voices sustainably. Engagement with news and entertainment media as well as citizen journalists, religious leaders and advocacy through civil society, supports the enabling environment for citizen voices to be heard. |

| 12 | Gender, Youth and Accountability Programme (previously GCOT) | DFID | This programme will work to strengthen voice and accountability for women's rights and young people. It aims to address the root causes of disadvantage, discrimination and exclusion working with communities, civil society, government institutions and the UN. Its objectives are to shift damaging social norms, attitudes and behaviours at the individual, institutional and societal levels to improve gender equality and youth participation. Implementing organization: UN population fund | Aug 2015-July 2021 | 4,000,000 | Annual report, business case and logical framework available at: https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-204605/documents | Aims to reduce the gender gap by taking a survey and then planning out a strategic course to implement other programs in combating gender inequality and violence against women. | This is a gender project that seeks to develop the evidence base to tackle the high levels of violence in Pakistan against girls and women. In 2014, Pakistan was ranked 141 out of 142 countries on the World Gender Gap Index above Yemen and below Chad. This project indirectly contributes to reduction of inequality between men and women, as the survey results can be used for evidenced based programming to address the impact of violence on women and girls. This project, through developing the evidence base on VAWG, it will directly contribute to the national baseline line of gender in the new strategic development goals, it will contribute to the development of DFID's GCOT programme and it will create government owned data. The benefit for the individual woman and girl cannot be quantified here, but they should benefit from better targeted evidence based programming that could now be able to tackle root causes of violence including domestic, physical, sexual and psychological violence and move us away from response programming solely. | Developing evidence base for violence against women. This will be done through surveys and will be part of government data. It will help in future by providing support to evidence based policy making. |

| 13 | Aawaz in partnership with *Aurat Foundation (AF), South-Asia Partnership Pakistan (SAP-PK), Strengthening Participatory Organisation (SPO) and Sungi Development Foundation (SF)* | DFID | Consortium of International donor (DFID), civil society organisations, community groups. The programme seeks to increase public and social accountability leading to government reforms; reducing violence against women, and increasing the safe participation of women and other excluded groups in politics and governance structures. It also has capacity building and research components Managed by DAI | Mar 2009-May 2017 | 35,500,000 | Tender, contract, annual reviews available at: https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-114433/documents | Focuses on both empowerment and accountability and linkages with civil society organisations ensure citizen involvement at grassroots level. Aligned with E&A because of its objectives for a) increasing women's voice in decision making and political processes, which can be defined as empowerment b) accountability (public and social) | Women better able to participate safely in politics and in public spaces at federal, provincial and local levels in KP and Punjab. Citizen and communities better able to pre-empt violence and work together peacefully for common solutions in KP and Punjab. Women and other excluded groups better able to demand improved delivery of services in KP and Punjab. Evidence generation is improved, synthesized and timely communicated/advocated with political leaders/decision makers in KP and Punjab. | AAWAZ will work with civil society and governments at local, provincial and national levels to increase public and social accountability leading to government reforms. The first three outputs are being implemented by consortium partners, which comprises of Aurat Foundation, South Asia Partnership-PK, Strengthening Participatory Organization and Sungi Foundation. The areas of activity under the first three outputs are closely linked to each other to ensure that women and other marginalized groups are enabled and encouraged to participate in community processes and decision making, gain political voice, and are able to articulate their priorities. AAWAZ achieves this by reducing violence against women, and increasing the safe participation of women and other excluded groups in politics and governance structures. |

| 14 | Alif Ailaan | DFID | Raising education on the public discourse (social and political action on education); also provide grant support to CSOs and fund research on issues relating to education | Sep 2012-Oct 2016 | 10,800,000 | Business case, contract and annual reviews available at: https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-202491/documents | Alignment with accountability objectives (soft form of accountability; social accountability; somewhat linked to empowerment objectives (campaign to give voice to public school teachers/educators; support people doing advocacy, reporting or volunteering to demand better education | Activities include: Political advocacy at the highest levels of government as well as locally; Outreach to parents and communities through grassroots activists and civil society partners; Engagement with school heads, teachers and education managers; Targeted campaigns in print, on radio and television, and on social media; Research and data compilation to assist decision makers and to inform the education discourse. | Advocacy at government levels, outreach to communities through activists and civil society partners, engagement with educational institutions, targeted campaigns in media, and research and data compilation to influence decision makers. |

| 15 | Supporting Transparency, Accountability and Electoral Processes in Pakistan (STAEP) | DFID | The project aimed at improving efficiency and efficacy of public institutions through active citizen engagement and participation in governance; promoting greater citizen participation in governance and democratic processes in Pakistan. | Oct 2010-Aug 2014 | 11,700,000 | Annual review and logical framework at: https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-202289/documents | Alignment with E&A: seeks to hold government accountable through empowering citizens for more active demand making to improve governance | The "Supporting Transparency, Accountability and Electoral Processes in Pakistan" (STAEP) programme (2011-2014) provides support through the Asia Foundation (TAF) to the Free and Fair Elections Network (FAFEN), a coalition of 35 NGOs across Pakistan. STAEP focuses on the demand side of elections (citizens) and thus complements supply-side assistance (state/ institutions) to the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) under the Support to Electoral Reforms in Pakistan (SERP) programme, as well as additional support to civil society for voice and accountability under. The £11.6 million STAEP programme to strengthen citizens' engagement, demands and participation in elections made a significant contribution to successful elections in Pakistan. Overall the programme has been effective in making democratic processes more open, inclusive, efficient and accountable to the citizens of Pakistan. The peaceful transfer of power in 2013 for the first time in Pakistan's history, from one elected government to another, was of great significance given its turbulent democratic history. | Provides support to Free and Fair Elections Network (FAFEN), a coalition of 35 NGOs across Pakistan through their partnership with the Asia Foundation (TAF). Activities include governance monitoring to ensure quality of services provided to the public, formation of Constituency Relation Groups to foster local level accountabilities, Increase public awareness about political and electoral violence and get support for its prevention and reduction, election observation, CNIC and voter registration, and parliamentary watch. |

| 16 | Supporting Democratic and Electoral Processes in Pakistan (SDEPP). In partnership with DRI, UNDP, TDEA-FAFEN, IRI, ABKT and CWS | DFID & FCO | The programme, Supporting Democratic and Electoral Processes in Pakistan (SDEPP), provides UK government's cross-departmental support to Pakistan in preparation for the next general elections in 2018. The programme aims to strengthen the role of civil society to hold parliamentarians to account, improve capacity of parliamentarians and in doing so improve public confidence in democracy and support electoral reform. The programme complements and reinforces the UK government's on-going political engagement and will help to provide incentives to shift Pakistan from patronage and identity-based politics towards more issue-based politics. | May 2015-Dec 2017 | 6,293,996 | https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-204604/documents | The programme aims to strengthen the role of civil society to hold parliamentarians to account, improve capacity of parliamentarians and in doing so improve public confidence in democracy and support electoral reform. | • The programme was designed initially for a 12-month period with a view that the new multi-year programme would replace it in year 2016. Expected outcomes of the program are:
1. Increased capacity and dialogue between members of Provincial Assemblies, civil society organisations, and other stakeholders on civil and political rights in Pakistan, with a focus on the rights of women, minorities, and youth
2. Citizens groups more effectively engage with national, provincial and local elected representatives and officials to demand and support improved electoral, legislative and local governance
3. Citizens, including women and those belonging to socially-excluded groups, exercise their rights and entitlements both as voters and as candidates
4. Local government elections in KP, Sindh and Punjab assessed and increased knowledge among parliament, political parties, provincial assemblies, and civil society about how to improve the political participation of women, youth, and minorities in local government in all provinces
5. Civil society organisations use innovation and technology to raise their voices for enhanced accountability of government | Dialogue between members of Provincial Assemblies, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders on civil and political rights in Pakistan, with a focus on the rights of women, minorities, and youth ;
Training minority MP's;
Debate, policy advocacy, and conflict resolution skills of parliament and political parties. |

| 17 | Consolidating Democracy in Pakistan (CDIP) | DFID & FCO | The programme is a bigger and better version of SDEPP. This is the same program as SDEPP with the same objectives by incorporating improvements and amendments from lessons learnt from SDEPP | 2016-2019 | Upon development of new business case | https://devtracker.dfid.gov.uk/projects/GB-1-204604/documents | The programme aims to strengthen the role of civil society to hold parliamentarians to account, improve capacity of parliamentarians and in doing so improve public confidence in democracy and support electoral reform. | Lessons learnt from SDEPP and through previously supported programmes have been incorporated in the new business case. These include the need for joint political and technical engagement, increased coordination and cooperation with stakeholders and a multi-year approach to electoral and democracy support. | Same as SDEPP but with addition actions including impact evaluation and synergies with other DFID programs. |