Recommendation(s) Status: Collision at Plymouth Station, 03 April 2016

This report is based on information provided to the RAIB by the relevant safety authority or public body.

The status of implementation of the recommendations, as reported to us, has been divided into eight categories:

Key to Recommendation Status

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Implemented:	All actions to deliver the recommendation have been completed.
Implemented by alternative means:	The intent of the recommendation has been satisfied in a way that was not identified by the RAIB during the investigation.
Implementation ongoing:	Work to deliver the intent of the recommendation has been agreed and is in the process of being delivered.
Insufficient response:	The end implementer has failed to provide a response; or has provided a response that does not adequately satisfy ORR that sufficient action is being taken to properly consider and address a recommendation.
Progressing:	The relevant safety authority has yet to be satisfied that an appropriate plan, with timescales, is in place to implement the recommendation; and work is in progress to provide this.
Non-implementation:	Regulation 12(2)(b)(iii) = recommendation considered and no implementation action to be taken.
Other Public Body or Authority	The recommendation is also addressed to another public body or authority.
Awaiting response:	Awaiting initial report from the relevant safety authority or public body on the status of the recommendation.

RAIB concerns on actions taken by organisations in response to recommendations are reflected in this report and are indicated by one of the following:



The red triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that no actions have been taken in response to a recommendation.



The blue triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB has concerns that the actions taken, or proposed, are inappropriate or insufficient to address the risk identified during the investigation.

The white triangle shows recommendations where the RAIB notes substantive actions have been reported, but the RAIB still has concerns.

Note: The tables which follow, report the status of recommendations on 31 December 2015. In some other cases the end implementer has already sent information to the relevant safety authority about the actions it has taken, or proposes to take and the safety authority is considering whether it is satisfied that those actions and the associated timescales are accepted.

Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status		Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on ORR's report to RAIB)
1 03/04/2016 Collision at Plymouth Station	02/2017	The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk of drivers misunderstanding the concept and application of permissive working.	it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
Status: Implemented		Great Western Railway should review its driver training and assessment processes that relate to permissive working with to overall objective of ensuring that new drivers have the knowledge and skills that are needed to address the hazards they may encounter when entering an occupied platform. The review should include consideration of how best to:	
		discourage drivers from making any assumptions about the length of platform that is clear, and to avoid presuming that the line is clear to a car stop sign; and	
		provide practical experience in a variety of permissive platform working situations, for example, at through platforms, into bay platforms, in track circuit block areas and under absolute block arrangements.	
		Great Western Railway should implement any enhancements to its existing training and assessment processes that have been identified (paragraph 113c).	
		This recommendation may apply to other train operators.	
2 03/04/2016 02/2017 Collision at Plymouth Station Status: Implemented	02/2017	The intent of this recommendation is for Network Rail and train operating companies to better understand and manage the local operational risks that can affect permissive working train movements.	ORR has reported that Network Rail has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation. ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.
		Network Rail, with the assistance of the relevant train operating companies, should review and, where necessary, enhance the following aspects of operating arrangements at stations where permissive working for passenger and ECS trains is authorised:	
		the means by which signallers should establish the combinations of trains which can be safely accommodated at platforms (to include considering provision of simple look-up tables, whether particular processes should be mandated, and the safe useable length of platforms) (paragraph 113a);	
		defining any particular circumstances in which the signaller should speak to the driver in order to provide details of an intended movement into an occupied platform (paragraphs 113b and 114); and	

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Number/ Date/ Report No/ Inv Title / Current Status	Safety Recommendation	Summary of current status (based on ORR's report to RAIB)
	speed restrictions applicable to trains entering platforms during permissive working (paragraph 113c).	
3 03/04/2016 02/2017 Collision at Plymouth Station	The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk of injury when operating emergency door release handles.	ORR has reported that Great Western Railway has reported that it has completed actions taken in response to this recommendation.
Status: Implemented	Great Western Railway should modify the emergency door release arrangements on class 150 trains so that passengers are not put at risk of injury when using them. It should also review emergency door release arrangements on other trains it operates to determine whether, and when, a similar modification is required (paragraph 115c).	ORR proposes to take no further action unless they become aware that the information provided becomes inaccurate.

This recommendation may apply to other train operators.

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