

Researching livelihoods and  
services affected by conflict

# The Effectiveness of Local Peace Committees in Nepal:

A study from  
Bardiya district

Working Paper 40

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# About us

Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC) aims to generate a stronger evidence base on how people make a living, educate their children, deal with illness and access other basic services in conflict-affected situations (CAS). Providing better access to basic services, social protection and support to livelihoods matters for the human welfare of people affected by conflict, the achievement of development targets such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and international efforts at peace- and state-building.

At the centre of SLRC's research are three core themes, developed over the course of an intensive one-year inception phase:

- State legitimacy: experiences, perceptions and expectations of the state and local governance in conflict-affected situations
- State capacity: building effective states that deliver services and social protection in conflict-affected situations
- Livelihood trajectories and economic activity under conflict

The Overseas Development Institute (ODI) is the lead organisation. SLRC partners include the Centre for Poverty Analysis (CEPA) in Sri Lanka, Feinstein International Center (FIC, Tufts University), the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), the Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI) in Pakistan, Disaster Studies of Wageningen University (WUR) in the Netherlands, the Nepal Centre for Contemporary Research (NCCR), and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

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# List of acronyms

CAP	Conflict-affected person
CDO	Chief District Officer
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
DAO	District Administration Office
DLPC	District Local Peace Committee
FGD	Focus group discussion
IDP	Internally displaced person
LPC	Local Peace Committee
MoPR	Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction
NCCR	Nepal Centre for Contemporary Research
NPTF	Nepal Peace Trust Fund
SLRC	Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium
VDC	Village Development Committee
VLPC	Village Local Peace Committee

# 1 Background and context

Between 1996 and 2006, armed conflict between the Maoist Party of Nepal and state security forces ravaged many parts of Nepal. The conflict led to almost 13,000 deaths, with 25,000 displaced and many more disappeared (Babcock, 2013), and caused a significant increase in the numbers of orphans, widows and physically handicapped people. Women were deeply affected by the conflict and, as with many other conflicts, its origin and course had notable gender dimensions, such as the use of gender violence, the large number of women combatants in the Maoist ranks, and the fact that the negotiations led to a peace agreement that largely excluded women (Arino, 2008). Further, the conflict affected the allocation of resources and there was massive increase in the administrative and programme costs in each district. Investment in basic services like health, education and drinking water decreased (Upreti, 2006). This had a lasting negative effect on service delivery, especially for people in the more remote, rural areas (SODARC-CPRP, 2010). In addition, the economy suffered as foreign investment declined, tourist numbers fell, industries closed, workers were displaced, and business suffered losses due to strikes, sanctions and regulation by rebels (SODARC-CPRP, 2010).

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed between the Maoists and the main political parties in 2006, was a major breakthrough (MoPR, 2011). The CPA promised the end of violence and set out priority areas for social, economic, and political transformation. It also established the Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction (MoPR) (Odendaal, 2010) with a mandate to manage the peace process, including peace negotiations and agreements, peace mechanisms (e.g. national commissions and local committees), support to conflict-affected people (including the internally displaced), reconciliation, and social and physical reconstruction. To support the MoPR, the Government of Nepal and seven donors established the Nepal Peace Trust Fund (NPTF) in January 2008.<sup>1</sup> The Peace Fund Secretariat of the MoPR is responsible for the overall activities of the NPTF (MoPR 2011).

In order to support local government functions, rehabilitate infrastructure destroyed during the conflict, and help conflict-affected people, the NPTF created four clusters:

- Cluster 1 focused on cantonment management and rehabilitation of Maoists ex-combatants.
- Cluster 2 focused on providing support to internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other conflict-affected persons (CAPs) for their social integration and rehabilitation.
- Cluster 3 focused on strengthening the security apparatus and the provision of transitional justice.
- Cluster 4 focused on forming the constituent assembly and establishing peacebuilding initiatives through the formation of LPCs.

In 2010, the MoPR formulated the Local Peace Committee (LPC) Directive to support peacebuilding activities at the local level. LPCs have now been formed at the district, municipality, and Village Development Committee (VDC) levels. There are 75 districts in Nepal containing 191 municipalities and 3,276 VDCs. So far, 75 LPCs have been created at the district level (one in each district), 46 at the municipality level, and more than 2,700 at the VDC level (MoPR, 2014).

This study is intended to explore the effectiveness, usefulness and relevance of LPCs in Nepal through information gathered from Bardiya district's LPC.

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<sup>1</sup>The NPTF is a state-owned multi-donor basket fund intended to support post-conflict peacebuilding in Nepal through the provision of resources necessary to fulfil the aspiration of the CPA (MoPR, 2011). The programme is funded by several donors including Nepal, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the European Commission. Each donor has committed to provide certain funds for carrying out peacebuilding activities in Nepal.

## 2 Analytical framework, methods and outline of the study

### 2.1 Analytical framework

This study has used the analytical framework developed for studying the capacity of states in fragile and conflict-affected situations developed by the Secure Livelihoods Research Consortium (SLRC). This study is based on state capacity, which is one of the SLRC's three core themes (2014), pertaining to building effective states that deliver services and social protection in conflict-affected situations. The analytical framework of the study breaks down the concept of state capacity into a set of five capacities and five targets developed as part of the broader SLRC objectives. The capabilities are:

- 1 The capability to self-organise and act
- 2 The capability to generate development results
- 3 The capability to establish supportive relationships
- 4 The capability to adapt and self-renew
- 5 The capability to achieve coherence.

This study uses these to assess the effectiveness of the LPC and the inclusiveness, relevance and helpfulness of the services that it provides. The framework is helpful in assessing the ability of community members to participate in LPCs and influence decision-making. It can also indicate the ability of LPCs to deliver relevant and effective services and assess transparency, nepotism and favouritism in the services provided. It can help to identify the ability of LPCs to establish relationships with other actors and to manage political relationships and deliver services on an inclusive and transparent basis.

This framework has been developed to help analyse factors related to LPC performance and specifically those that significantly affect LPC service provision. The detailed analytical framework is presented in Table 1.

**Table 1: Analytical framework**

5Cs	LPC	Indicators
<p><i>The capability to self-organise and act</i></p> <p>Actors are able to: mobilise resources (financial, human, organisational); create space and autonomy for independent action; motivate unwilling or unresponsive partners; plan, decide, and engage collectively to exercise their other capabilities</p>	<p>Inclusiveness of LPC committees</p>	<p>The ability of community members to participate in LPCs and influence decision-making</p>
<p><i>The capability to generate development results</i></p> <p>Actors are able to: produce substantive outputs and outcomes (e.g., health or education services, employment opportunities, justice and rule of law); sustain production over time; and add value for their clients, beneficiaries and citizens</p>	<p>Relevance and effectiveness of LPC service delivery</p> <p>Inclusiveness of LPC beneficiary identification and LPC services</p>	<p>The ability of LPCs to deliver relevant and effective services</p> <p>The ability to deliver services on an inclusive and transparent basis, without favouritism and preferential treatment</p>
<p><i>The capability to establish supportive relationships.</i></p> <p>Actors can: establish and manage linkages, alliances, and/or partnerships with others to leverage resources and actions; build legitimacy in the eyes of key stakeholders; deal effectively with competition, politics, and power differentials</p>	<p>Relevance and effectiveness of LPC service delivery</p> <p>Inclusiveness of LPC beneficiary identification and LPC services</p>	<p>The ability of LPC to establish relationships with other actors to deliver services</p> <p>The ability of LPC to manage political relationships and deliver services on an inclusive and transparent basis</p>
<p><i>The capability to adapt and self-renew</i></p> <p>Actors are able to: adapt and modify plans and operations based on monitoring of progress and outcomes; proactively anticipate change and new challenges; cope with shocks and develop resilience</p>	<p>Relevance and effectiveness of LPC service delivery</p>	<p>The ability to deliver services in the situation of severe resource constraints</p>
<p><i>The capability to achieve coherence</i></p> <p>Actors can: develop shared short and long-term strategies and visions; balance control, flexibility, and consistency; integrate and harmonise plans and actions in complex, multi-actor settings; and cope with cycles of stability and change</p>	<p>Relevance and effectiveness of LPC service delivery</p>	<p>The ability to plan, prioritise and develop a short-term and long-term vision</p> <p>The ability to accommodate conflicting interests and priorities</p>

## 2.2 Methodology

Fieldwork was carried out in November 2014 using the following methods.

**In-depth interviews** were conducted with conflict-affected people who had received LPC services and those who were not able to receive services at both the VDC and district levels. Conflict-affected people are defined as those who have been affected directly by the conflict in the form of killing, kidnapping and disappearances, disability, sexual violation, displacement, or loss of property. A total of 25 conflict-affected people, 9 female and 16 male, were interviewed for the study. They were selected using a snowball approach and through purposive sampling. Key informants and other respondents were asked about people they knew of who had been affected by the conflict, and who had or had not received reparations from the government.

**Key informant interviews** were held with Bardiya District officials including the Chief District Officer, the Conflict Victims' Association, political party officials, LPC members and LPC officials. Altogether, 14 key informants were interviewed, 13 of them male.

Two **focus group discussions** (FGDs) were conducted with community members, including those who had been affected by conflict and those who had not. One FGD was conducted in Neulapur VDC with one female and four male participants. The other FGD was conducted in Rajapur VDC with two female and three male participants.

### Quality standards

The study has followed Lincoln and Guba (1985), as cited in Shenton (2004), on the four primary criteria for establishing research 'trustworthiness'.

**Credibility:** Credibility is achieved through the adoption of appropriate, well-recognised research methods. The use of different methods, especially key informant interviews, focused groups and individual in-depth interviews in the study helps view the LPC from different angles. Each person approached was given the opportunity to refuse to participate in the research so as to involve only those who were genuinely willing to take part.

**Transferability:** This study contains thick descriptions of the LPC in terms of its composition and functioning from multiple stakeholders' views. Respondents included not only LPC officials and members but also different district-level government officials. This helps to make the study transferable to other contexts. Transferability was also achieved through triangulation: using different methods to view the LPC phenomena from different angles.

**Dependability:** Transparency is achieved through detailed discussion of research methodology. As part of auditing the study, an expert from the Overseas Development Institute team, an expert on the conflict in Nepal, and the Nepal Centre for Contemporary Research (NCCR) team were involved in each step of the research process. NCCR staff spent time independently checking a selection of the interview transcripts to see if there was agreement on the themes emerging.

**Confirmability:** Researchers used field notes and tape recordings, which were useful in analysing the recorded information. This helped to ensure that the findings are the result of the experiences and ideas of the informants, rather than the characteristics and preferences of the researchers.

### Data analysis techniques and methods

The data were collected on the basis of a set of themes generated for the study. Separate themes were developed for interviewing the key informants and relief fund recipients and for focus group discussions. The data was collected in the form of recordings with the consent of the interviewee, and later transcribed and coded in different themes for preparing the report. The study is limited to one



district so the findings cannot be generalised to all the LPCs across the country, although some inferences could be made.

### **Selection and description of study area**

Bardiya district was selected as the location for this study. The district was among the most affected by the conflict. For example, Human Rights Commission Nepal and INSEC reports that Bardiya district had the highest number of conflict-related disappearances (220) of any district in Nepal (Basnet, 2011; HimRights, 2011). The severity of the impacts was confirmed in quantitative work (SLRC, 2014) undertaken previously as a part of this research programme across three districts: Bardiya, Ilam and Rolpa district. The District LPC (DLPC) has been operating in Bardiya district from 2008 with Village LPCs (VLPCs) operational from 2009.

Bardiya district lies in Bheri zone of the mid-western region of Nepal. Tharus (an indigenous group) account for 52.6% of the total population of 426,576 (CBS, 2011), with a notable presence of Chhetris (10.6%), Brahmin (9.5%) and Muslims (3%). There were 31 VDCs and one municipality (CBS, 2006) until 2013, when a second municipality was formed by merging some of the VDCs. The DLPC and two VLPCs were identified as study units. Two VLPCs in the Bardiya district were selected on the recommendation of the DLPC Secretary as examples of one VLPC that is working well and one that is adequate.

### **2.3 Outline of the study**

The first section provides a short background and context for the process of peacebuilding in Nepal. Section 2 describes the analytical framework and the methods used during the study. Section 3 provides a detailed description of the mandates and functions of the LPC. Section 4 presents the findings from the study, including those regarding the composition, functions, areas of work and effectiveness of the LPCs. Section 5 links these findings to a broader analysis of the LPC and its effectiveness. This is followed by the conclusion and recommendations.

### 3 Local Peace Committees

The LPC is one of the mechanisms that seek to promote inclusivity, peace and recovery in the country through grassroots leadership, dialogue processes and the mediation of local conflicts (Babcock, 2013).

The LPC is formed at the level of a district, municipality, town or village with the aim of encouraging and facilitating inclusive peacemaking and peacebuilding processes (Odendaal and Oliver, 2008). The LPC strategy is characterised by its emphasis on dialogue, mutual understanding, trust-building, constructive and inclusive solutions to conflict, and joint action that includes all sides of the conflict and is aimed at reconciliation.

#### Composition of LPCs

The LPC terms of reference (ToR) stipulate that LPCs should be formed in a participatory and inclusive way. ADLPC should have up to 23 members comprising representatives of political parties, civil society organisations and conflict victims, and it should ensure proper representation of different groups in the community. There should be at least one-third representation of women and the chair should be rotated every six months. A maximum of 12 members should be comprised of one person from each of the political parties represented in the Constituent Assembly; four members should come from civil society, local organisations or human rights activists promoting peace; four members should represent various conflict-affected parties; one member should come from the Chamber of Commerce and Industries; and two members should come from communities of indigenous groups, Madhesis, Dalits, Muslims and other marginalised communities who are not represented under other categories.

The ToR also stipulate the composition of the VLPC. It should include 9 to 11 members, including representatives of different groups such as political parties, civil society, indigenous groups and ethnic minorities, and conflict-affected people. At least one-third of the members should be female. The VDC secretary functions as the secretary of the VLPC and the VDC offices are used for its operations.

The major objectives of the LPC are to:

- Assist in the implementation of the CPA and promote the peace process
- Monitor the implementation of the MoPR's Relief and Reconstruction Programme
- Support the Task Force for Data Collection on Conflict-Affected Individuals, Families, and Structures
- Facilitate constructive conflict transformation processes in situations of political and social conflict
- Work on reconciliation, healing and trust-building
- Monitor political and social developments at the local level and disseminate information on issues that affect local peace processes.

The LPC has a mandate to:

- Advise or liaise with the Consultative Committee of the MoPR on any local developments or conditions that are relevant to or have the potential to threaten the national peace process
- Collaborate closely with all national or international monitoring agencies, including relevant UN agencies, during elections for the Constituent Assembly
- Cooperate with all relevant governmental and non-governmental agencies in the management of conflict at the local level.

## 4 Findings and discussion

This section presents study findings regarding two key characteristics of LPC operations: inclusiveness and effectiveness. For both characteristics, findings are presented disaggregated by level of administration (DLPC and VLPC), as there were important differences between the two levels.

### 4.1 LPC Inclusiveness

The findings from the study on the DLPC and selected VLPCs are discussed below in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 respectively. At each level, we present findings regarding processes (including the composition and operation of the committees) and outcomes (including the inclusiveness of the services provided by the committees).

#### 4.1.1 Inclusiveness of the Bardiya DLPC

##### Inclusiveness in DLPC composition

The Bardiya DLPC has not followed the ToR strictly in terms of the composition, but the secretary claimed the committee was nevertheless inclusive:

*There is 33% representation of females, representatives from different political parties, conflict-affected people, the bar association, civil society. Including all these people there are 23 members in total. (Secretary, DLPC).*

Yet in some areas there appear to be deviations from ToR specifications. There were 14 representatives from political parties<sup>2</sup> even though only 12 are allowed. As a result, social activists and conflict-affected people were under-represented, with three members each instead of the specified four. The Chamber of Commerce and indigenous or backward groups each had one representative, as specified. There was no explanation of why the ToR was not followed strictly, and no evidence of the underrepresented groups attempting to make the LPC do so. This tendency to political party dominance is also supported by the findings from the monitoring of Peace Structure Coordination Division and MoPR in Bardiya (PSCD and MoPR, 2013).

There was also less female representation than specified in the ToR. Although the DLPC secretary claimed one-third female representation, an interview with a female committee member and a review of the list of committee members provided by LPC suggested this was not the case.

*There are just 4 to 5 females in the committee and we are not 33%. The issue of 33% representation was raised by the political parties but in Bardiya they have never tried to fulfil that as females are not given higher priority. (LPC committee member, female)*

The over-representation of political parties and the under-representation of women, social activists and conflict-affected people raises important questions regarding the inclusiveness of the committee, which in turn may have implications for the ability of under-represented groups to raise issues relevant to them.

The DLPC has been conducting meetings on a monthly basis with additional ad hoc meetings as required. Decisions are made by 'majority rule'. This raises some concerns regarding the role of minority groups and women. Since female committee members comprise substantially less than 33% of the

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<sup>2</sup>The representatives of the political parties were from *Nekapa yemale, Nekapa Maobadi, Nepali Congress, Madhesi Janadhikar Forum Nepal, Terai Madhesh Loktantrik party, Sadbhawana party, Nekapa Male, Rastriya Prajatantra party, Rastriya Prajatantra party Nepal, Rastriya Janashakti Party, Rastriya Janamorcha, Nekapa Sanyukta, Sadbhawana Anandadevi.*

committee, they depend on support from a significant number of males for any given issue to receive committee approval. In some cases minority groups have been able to secure decisions in their favour during meetings: for example, in cases in which some conflict-affected women were not been able to access reparations, female committee members raised their issues and investigated why they were being deprived of funds. This suggests that limits around adherence to inclusiveness guidelines are not necessarily prohibitive of achieving positive outcomes for marginalised groups.

### **Inclusiveness of DLPC service provision**

One of the sources consulted for the study suggested that there had not been clear identification and selection of conflict-affected people. The government official of District Administration Office (DAO) said that because of the lack of proper investigation, the real victims could have been missed and non-affected people could have received funds instead. However, no other evidence of bias or discrimination or provision of services to unaffected people was found.

There was also no clear evidence of decisions being taken by the DLPC on the basis of political affiliation or of funds being provided without proper documentation. The provision of the relief fund seems inclusive according to key informants and the people receiving funds. The victims had to provide their citizenship papers, a passport-sized photograph, and a letter from the municipality/VDC confirming their status as conflict victims. Only with the submission of all these documents were they eligible to receive relief funds.

Most participants from conflict-affected groups perceived that they were able to get the relief funds from the government. However there were specific cases from victims' groups where they had been denied relief funds even after submitting all the documents, which raises a question over inclusivity. One such case in Gulariya concerned the wife of a man who disappeared after being kidnapped who had not been able to receive relief funds. She had been registered in the list of individuals getting relief funds and her recommendation letter had been forwarded, but the DLPC had not contacted her and she had not gone to ask for the funds. This raises questions over the DLPC's will or capacity to follow up problem cases.

Another respondent reported a case where a person who had been severely beaten up by the Maoists had been able to receive the funds while a person who had been kidnapped by the army had not. The DLPC Secretary reported that the committee had lobbied the MoPR for relief funds for those who qualified for relief but who had not yet received the funds.

#### **4.1.2 Inclusiveness of selected VLPCs**

##### **Inclusiveness in VLPC composition**

The Neulapur and Bhimapur VLPCs each comprise 11 members. Most representatives are drawn from political parties, and the rest from conflict-affected groups, marginalised groups and social activists. There are two members more than the required nine because people are motivated to join the committee. Both VLPCs have more than one-third representation of female members (4 out of 11 members). Conflict-affected people, local people from the backward groups and disadvantaged groups like Dalits and Madhesis were also included in the committees in each case.

Both the VLPCs conducted regular monthly meetings during their initial phases. The meetings included discussion of the activities of the VLPC and updates on the status and number of conflict-affected people in the VDC. The VLPCs were not able to sustain this, however, and the frequency and regularity of the meetings has reduced. Part of this appears to relate to a lack of responsiveness on the part of committee members, despite the coordinator being in regular contact with them. The Neulapur VLPC coordinator suggested this might be due to a lack of genuine motivation on the part of committee members to make the most of the meetings:

*I called for a meeting in the 24th at 11am sharp but none of the members came until 12pm so I had to shift the meeting. They have to consider the time. They should not just come for the sake of receiving the allowance. (Coordinator, VLPC Neulapur)*

The incentives that play a significant role in the participation of committee members do not appear to be sufficient to sustain their involvement.

### **Inclusiveness of VLPC service delivery**

Interviews with members of VLPCs found some cases of discrimination and exclusion in provision of services to conflict-affected people in both VDCs. Importantly, these cases date back prior to the formation of VLPC in both VDCs when the listing of conflict-affected people was initiated by political party representatives. Interviewees report errors of both exclusion and inclusion, based on a variety of factors, including individuals' knowledge of administrative procedures, affiliation with government officials, age, gender and disability.

Respondents perceived that during the initial registration period, numerous conflict-affected people were not registered because the political representatives charged with drawing up the list provided very little information regarding either the relief funds themselves or the process for obtaining them. Reports suggest a politicisation of service provision in which a number of individuals who had connections to political officials were able to get listed even when they were not conflict-affected:

*We did not get the funds allocated for the conflict affected people and displaced people. Everybody in [and] around the village knows that we were affected, but [the] government did not provide us [with] the funds. [Instead] the ones who were not affected got the funds through various channels. (Conflict Victim, Bhimapur)*

*We were displaced, there are people who were not displaced but got the fund, but we did not. I am not telling you because we did not receive, I am expressing my dissatisfaction. I am just saying that the real victim should get the help from the state. (Conflict Victim, Bhimapur)*

Exclusion on the basis of not having a connection to officials or political party representatives was not the only reason reported for conflict-affected people being left off the list. The other problem was the timing of the listing process: this was done at a time when most conflict-affected people, including the eventual VLPC coordinators, the entire family of a respondent from Bhimapur and several other respondents in the study area, were not present in their village, having been displaced to other parts of the country or to India. Once the list was forwarded to the Ministry without their names, there was no chance they would receive relief funds, a problem that has been noted elsewhere in the literature (HimRights, 2011). Multiple returnees subsequently applied for relief funds, with a recommendation and verification letter of their conflict-affected status from the VDC: they were assured they would receive the funds, but never did so.

While the origins of these errors of omission and inclusion took place prior to the formation of the VLPCs, they continue to be relevant. For example, VLPC coordinators who missed the initial enrolment due to displacement have not yet been able to access relief funds despite their current positions. This suggests a bleak outlook for ordinary people who missed out for similar reasons. While this does not appear to be an example of deliberate discrimination, it would appear to have the effect of excluding an important group of potential beneficiaries.

Respondents also highlighted two other cases that exemplify important issues regarding excluded populations. In the first case, a person in Neulapur had been kidnapped by state forces and jailed for eighteen months. During that time he was badly beaten, leading to mental and physical complications that should have qualified him for assistance as a conflict-affected person (see Box 1). In the second case, from Bhimapur, a respondent's younger brother was killed and the fund provided to his wife (see

Box 2). She continued to receive this after remarrying despite arguments raised by the deceased man's aged father that he should have access to the fund instead as wives are not supposed to get the relief funds after remarrying (Nepal Monitor, 2011). In this case, the respondent indicated the wife had connections with the administration.<sup>3</sup>

#### **Box 1: An account of exclusion in Neulapur**

My son was arrested by the army in 2002 and he was jailed for one and a half years. He was accused of being involved with Maoists but he was not involved with any party. I tried to get him free and could not, but finally they released him. During his sentence he was beaten very badly and he was like an unconscious person when they released him. Now he is with us: sometimes he is ok and sometimes he loses consciousness. I tried to apply for funds with the help of the coordinator but the people from the administration told me to bring my son as well. He is scared to go near the police and runs away when he sees them for fear that they will beat him again. We have not had justice yet.

#### **Box 2: An account of exclusion in Bhimapur**

My brother was killed during the conflict. He had a child and a wife. The government provided relief funds in his name to his wife, who then married another man. I have old parents and they are now very much alone and do not have source of income except my earnings. My parents expected that they would get the funds but the administration said that the wife has right to the funds, not the parents. When she got the first instalment then she eloped with another guy and she is still getting the money, even though she is not conflict-affected anymore. The money needs to be provided either to the child or the parents. The VLPC also raised this issue but nothing has been done yet. The state must provide justice for all.

These cases suggest changes that need to be made in order to make access to relief funds more reflective of the needs of conflict-affected people. In neither case has the LPC been able to secure funds on behalf of the affected people, and although the coordinators have been lobbying at the district level, these issues have not reached the national level bodies that disburse the funds.

## **4.2 Assessing the functions, effectiveness and mandates of LPCs**

### **4.2.1 DLPC-level findings**

#### **Roles, responsibilities and functions of the DLPC**

The major roles of the DLPC are to investigate, identify and recommend the provision of relief funds to all conflict-affected people in the district. DLPCs are also responsible for coordinating with the DAO and other stakeholders in the provision of relief funds, and for conducting peace-related activities, including resolving conflicts through the use of a mediator. The findings of this study suggest that respondents perceive that the DLPC has broadly been performing its roles and responsibilities fairly and satisfactorily.

Regarding the functions of DLPC, the Secretary says, 'The major function of the DLPC is to work for the welfare of the conflict-affected people'. For the DAO official, 'The major work of the LPC is to make recommendations for relief and benefits for conflict-affected people, people handicapped during the conflict, and the dead ones who are now declared as a martyrs by the state.' The DLPC is indeed

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<sup>3</sup> This was not the only reported case of contention regarding the provision of funds to a wife rather than to parents, with multiple other respondents raising similar stories regarding the allocation of funds to widows who subsequently remarried.

helping conflict-affected people take forward their applications and making the necessary recommendations to the DAO. There are cases where the DLPC has been lobbying the government to provide relief funds when people are not able to get the funds they are eligible for.

The DLPC secretary also points to awareness programmes conducted with conflict-affected people and their families in Gulariya and in the villages. Any conflict mediation and arbitration is handled by the local administration, with the DLPC referring those cases to the existing formal institutions. Even though the ToR clearly specify that the LPC has to facilitate in the mediation and arbitration process, this is not done in practice. The Chief District Officer (CDO) of the district reports:

*There are some extra works done by LPC in distributing and sharing information but they have not arbitrated or mediated any quarrels and conflicts at the district level.*

A female committee member concurred:

*We just conduct programmes for conflict-affected people. If there are conflict cases related to the affected people then we get involved, but if it is with people generally then we do not.*

The DLPC has also been working to help provide educational opportunities to those orphaned by the conflict. It has been coordinating with the District Education Office to provide financial support. Around 20 orphans were reportedly being provided education through the help of DLPC, and at the time of the fieldwork efforts were being made to identify more who would be eligible.

However, the study did not find that Bardiya DLPC had a clear plan for other programmes in the district. Neither the secretary nor the committee members were able to expand on future activities. In contrast, Babcock (2014) found that Dhading DLPC had clear work plans for the future, including a number of activities not part of the DLPCs' core duties and responsibilities such as reconciling victims, providing employment and income-generation activities, providing educational support, running joint programmes among conflict parties, and resolving conflict at the local level. Likewise, Dahal and Bhatta (2008) found that DLPCs aimed to ensure the return of property taken by the Maoists, to look into resettlement and rehabilitation issues, and to promote the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure. The DLPC in our study was exploring none of these types of activities, which detracts from its ability to generate development results.

## **Resourcing**

The DLPC is provided with three staff members for its daily operations, including a secretary, technical staff and an office assistant. The secretary is responsible for managing the activities of the DLPC, while the committee as a whole is responsible for identifying, verifying and recommending conflict victims.

All three staff members of the DLPC are financially supported by the MoPR. In addition to the salaries, the Ministry provides an annual budget of 500,000 rupees to conduct programmes for conflict-affected people and for administrative use. The budget provided to the LPC for conducting its programmes is generally considered insufficient to meet the objectives and targets of the LPC:

*The total budget provided to the LPC is around Rs. 500,000 but this is used up just in the interaction programmes. The budget is not enough to do any other programmes in the district.*  
(Secretary, DLPC)

In addition to the budgetary resources, the government provides equipment including tables, desks, a sofa for visitors, cupboards, a telephone and fax machine, a set of computers with printers, and monthly stationery. However, the condition of these resources suggests that DLPC's ability to use the resources efficiently is limited:

*We have provided computers in the LPC but because of the negligence of the LPC members the computers have not been maintained and kept properly and now they are at a situation where there are no computers. (CDO, DAO)*

The telephones and fax machines were not operational at the time of our visit and the computers were packed and stored in the cupboard. The DLPC explained that previous secretaries had not bothered to maintain the computers and had preferred to use computers outside the office where there are internet facilities for sending reports to relevant ministries and checking their email. The current DLPC secretary had not bothered to repair the computers, citing a lack of equipment.

It is clear that the resources provided to the LPC are insufficient but also that the LPC has not been able to use them in the best manner.

### **Effectiveness of the DLPC**

Bardiya DLPC faces some challenges which limit its effectiveness. In relation to its core function of providing assistance to the conflict affected population, one government official was critical of its functioning and processes:

*When it came to recommending the victims and conflict-affected people there were no measures of proper investigation or clear decisions, which meant that persons who are not victims have been getting the relief funds while real victims were missing out ...The recommendations and the request letters from Village level are directly forwarded [to the central level] through a letter from DLPC. Until now the request letters and recommendations are coming [to us] for the relief of the victims like the dead ones, kidnapped etc. which have not been identified and listed at the central level...[so we cannot pay them]. In my experience the LPC has not made a leap forward in process and has not been effective in terms of LPC at the district level. (Government Official, DAO)*

Although there are several roles and responsibilities listed in the ToR, the DLPC has only been assisting distribution of relief funds and conducting a limited number of awareness initiatives. It has been unable to fully accomplish its responsibilities. A key limiting factor is reportedly the short stays of DLPC secretaries. They are not hired for a fixed term and always feel at risk of losing their jobs. The DLPC coordinator is expected to change every six months in order for the position to rotate among the different political parties, and a change in coordinators tends to involve a change in secretaries. In Bardiya the coordinator has not changed but there have been changes in the secretary. The current secretary expressed concern that the temporary nature of the position has made secretaries less efficient and the programmes less effective.

Historically, performance was also compromised by nepotism and favouritism in the selection of the LPC secretary. Previous secretaries were appointed by the political party in power, without regard for capabilities and qualifications. However, this practice appears to have stopped as the current secretary was appointed through a free and formal competitive process. The influence of the political parties in appointing the secretary have been reduced, at least for now.

Some respondents argued that the DLPC must internalise their roles and responsibilities more clearly and develop a vision of how to move ahead in the future. The CDO suggested that for this to happen, the staff of the LPC should be made permanent, which would change their attitude towards their work, making them feel more secure.

*The LPC has to be made very strong in order to work for conflict-affected people. The temporary nature of hiring of LPC staff must be made permanent. There have been no programmes devised for the monitoring of the activities of the LPC as well as other activities related to conflict-affected people. (CDO, DAO)*



There are examples from DLPCs in other districts that show they have been providing services effectively and contributing towards peacebuilding. For example, the DLPC in Kavre district has been conducting radio programmes, providing training to conflict victims' families, running community mediation training for the LPC members, offering help for the education of victims' children, and running reconciliation programmes (Badal, 2013). But this was not the case in Bardiya district, where there is not much evidence to support the claim that it has been effective in fulfilling its responsibilities and providing services to conflict-affected people.

#### 4.2.2 VLPC-level findings

##### Roles, responsibilities and functions of VLPC

The major role of the VLPC is to assist the DLPC in fulfilling the responsibilities of the LPC as a whole. The VLPC coordinator of Neulapur noted that the VLPC is responsible for collecting the names of people in a village who are affected by the conflict, and for investigating, verifying and recommending those people for relief funds to support their rehabilitation. It is also responsible for coordinating with all the stakeholders in the VDC who are involved in providing relief funds and other support to conflict-affected people. More broadly, it is responsible for maintaining peace in the village and is involved in several mediation and conflict resolution activities. In many cases, the roles and responsibilities of the VLPC are similar to the DLPC, but the extent and coverage area are different.

In both VLPCs, these roles and responsibilities have been largely fulfilled and the affected people are getting satisfactory services. Both VLPCs were involved in conflict mediation and in solving a variety of conflict-related problems, bringing conflict-affected parties together and convincing them to move on from past incidents. Both male and female respondents saw the performance of the VLPCs in this regard as better than that of the DLPC.

The VLPC coordinator of Neulapur described the process of recommendation for relief:

*When some people come and ask me to write a recommendation letter, I investigate all the details about them to verify whether they are the real conflict victims or not, and if they are real then I write recommendation letters for them and if they are telling me the false things then I do not give them recommendations. (Coordinator, VLPC Neulapur)*

The VLPC acts as a focal point for relief and reparation programmes for conflict-affected people – the first place that conflict-affected people come to for reparations and relief funds. Since most residents of the VDC are familiar with each other, the VLPC is well placed to verify an individual's status when a request is made. The VLPCs conduct interaction programmes which help to share information about the provision of relief funds with the affected people. These programmes also provide a forum in which conflict-affected people are able to express their concerns, share their feelings, and share their difficulties with VLPC members and political party representatives. This is said to help raise these issues in the political parties, but there was no immediate evidence of specific actions resulting from this.

The VLPCs conduct several activities beyond the relief distribution programmes. In Neulapur VDC, small roads had been built under the leadership of VLPC coordinator with labour contributions from the villagers. It is open to question whether these should be considered relevant achievements as such programmes are beyond their mandates, but the VLPCs deserve credit for working for community development.

Both VLPCs performed conflict resolution and mediation in cases of conflict between husbands and wives, extramarital affairs, disagreements between neighbours, and disputes related to cultivation and irrigation. In Bhimapur VDC, there was a traditional conflict resolution institution called *Badh Ghar*, which has been doing mediation in coordination with the VLPC. These procedures did not require users to go through formal legal processes. Such informal conflict resolution techniques are seen as more

efficient and capable of building of a coherent relationship among the conflicting parties. One of the VLPC coordinator described the process as follows:

*I have a different technique of solving problems and managing cases. I do not do in a legal manner but in my own way. I solve the case in half an hour. If the conflicting parties do not try to listen to me or avoid me then I ...tell them to go to the police station and solve their matters over there legally. ... But if they do not want to go to the police station, saying 'no, we will solve the matters over here', then I make them confess to each other the ways in which they feel unsatisfied, and if necessary someone is punished, like holding the ears and make them stand up and sit down several times and saying sorry in front of people and coming to a common consensus. (Coordinator, VLPC Neulapur)*

These activities appear to show the VLPC contributing positively to society more broadly, despite the resource constraints that limit its formal programming with conflict-affected people. Despite the presence of police authorities as legal bodies at the village level, people prefer to go to the VLPC to resolve conflicts. Additional resources (financial, training or otherwise) could be channelled to VLPCs to further strengthen their contribution in these VDCs and in the rest of the country.

### **Resourcing**

VLPCs are meant to be answerable to the DLPC, which is the authority where the right to form VLPCs resides. However, the VLPC gets resources from the District Development Committee and operates at the office of the VDC. The VDC Secretary is responsible for the operation, taking minutes, paperwork, and writing the relief fund recommendation letters of VLPC. VLPCs have no staff, unlike DLPCs; instead, the VDC secretary acts as secretary of the VLPC, performing the duties of the both roles simultaneously. The duration of the term of the VLPC coordinator is not limited by mandate nor is it required to rotate among different political parties. In Bardiya, the coordinator has not changed since the formation of VLPC even though the coordinator is quite ready to vacate the position for another capable candidate.

The VDC's office equipment and other resources are used, although the budget provided to VLPC may also be spent on office equipment for the smooth operation of VLPC. The VLPCs have been given an annual budget of 22,000 rupees for their operations. Of this, half goes to administrative expenses, including office equipment and other resources necessary for the operation of the VLPC, and half for conducting programmes, including the payment of allowances to committee members for their participation in the meetings. As a result, VLPC programming is extremely limited. In one example from Bhimapur, the VLPC coordinator spent all the money on an interaction programme in which a single goat was killed and all the participants were fed with goat meat and rice. Spending the entire budget on a single programme shows a lack of planning capability as well as the need for budget increases if VLPCs are to perform properly.

Occasionally additional support can be identified at the local level. Bhimapur VDC, for example, facilitates the production of radio programmes for mass awareness-raising. It has been successful in collaborating with the local radio station to conduct awareness programmes without any additional finance. However, it is generally the case that the VLPCs are financially constrained in terms of the formal programming they can support. If VLPCs are to be expected to carry out additional programming of this sort, there is a need for more budget to be allocated at the VDC level.

Even though there are budget constraints for the VLPCs in our study, they have been able to conduct activities beyond their mandates. The activities performed indicate that they have been doing this voluntarily and in collaboration with other stakeholders. The conflict mediation activities did not require any expenditure, while the radio broadcasts have been made with the help of the radio stations as a service to the community. The only programmes that required financial resources were the interaction

and awareness programmes among conflict-affected people. Additional financial resources could strengthen the functioning of the VLPCs and help achieve better outputs.

### **Effectiveness of the VLPC**

Lots of changes are reported to have taken place in the villages after the establishment of both VLPCs. The VLPC coordinator reported that in the past there were tensions among people that were linked to the conflict, including feelings of lingering resentment and a desire for revenge. After the formation of VLPCs, these issues were resolved as the VLPC convinced the conflicting parties to abandon these feelings and live with each other in peace. At the initiative of the VLPCs and sometimes in collaboration with the local administration, political parties held meetings with people to mediate the conflicts and culprits were made to apologise to the victims. This indicates the VLPC's capabilities in helping to establish supportive relationships among the people.

This did not mean that respondents felt everything that should be done was being done. A teacher from Bhimapur said:

*In my opinion the local level peace committee is successful in achieving their objectives. The state should have 100 percent responsibility for the conflict victims to get jobs and economic opportunities for the sustenance of their lives. The state must provide funds without collateral and provide them training. It must not be taken as an alternative to the relief funds but it should be brought forward side by side to make it efficient. (Local teacher, Bhimapur)*

The view of the teacher suggests that there is still huge room for improvement in the role VLPCs can play as catalysts for improving the economic conditions of affected people, which in turn could help build sustainable peace in society. Broadly speaking, VLPCs have functioned well at the local level, but the state as a whole has to do more to support the VLPCs in the provision of services to the conflict-affected population.

## 5 Discussion and reflection at national level

This section reflects on the performance and relevance of the LPCs, drawing on the findings above and other studies conducted at the national level. Attention is given to issues of gender and other forms of social difference as well as insights from the analytical framework of the study.

### 5.1 Relevance of LPCs to peacebuilding and state-building in Nepal

LPCs were established to work inclusively to provide relief to displaced people, ensure the return of property taken by the Maoists, assist in resettlement and rehabilitation, promote the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure, provide an institutional focal point for peaceful recovery, and build a more peaceful democratic environment (Dahal and Bhatta, 2008). The LPC is meant to communicate the peace agreements signed between political parties and central government at the local level, as many of the causes of conflicts were rooted in rural areas (Dahal and Bhatta, 2008).

This study suggests that the DLPC has not been able to perform to its fullest potential. It has only been providing relief funds to affected people, which represents less than half of its responsibilities. This is also supported by the findings from Carter Center (2011), which found the majority of LPCs saw their main role as reviewing and verifying conflict-affected persons' applications for interim relief, with only a small number of them making conflict resolution a major focus.

Previous studies have suggested that although LPCs have been put in place across the country, they are often dysfunctional and it appears that unless there is a 'strong political commitment to activate them' LPCs can fail to produce meaningful results or meet their objectives (Dahal and Bhatta, 2008). LPCs operate under the Peace Secretariat that falls under the MoPR, which itself is perceived as monopoly of the political parties (Dahal and Bhatta, 2008). The Carter Center (2011) reported that LPCs were even referred to as party committees in several districts. Upreti (2014) argues that the LPC is weak because of its politically dominated composition and lack of resources, which is also supported by the findings from Malik (2013). Bhattarai (2013) also criticised the current peacebuilding initiatives in Nepal for not benefiting the affected people and for over-politicisation. This study also found that political party members exceed their allocation according to ToR, threatening the LPC's inclusiveness. The success of LPCs depends on whether they can be accepted by the excluded and marginalised groups as this is a major way in which they can contribute towards inclusive peacebuilding and peacemaking.

In Nepal, then, the biggest problem for conflict transformation lies in the political process. The CPA has been implemented selectively due to the power struggles among the major political parties (Upreti, 2012). The LPCs fell victim to this reality as their mandates got changed several times with changes in power (Carter Center, 2009).

More recently, LPC capacity-building training has been criticised for being mostly conducted in capital, regional and district headquarters, with none at local level. The study found some training had been provided to the DLPC but very little, if any, has been provided to VLPCs. The people who need it most do not get to go. Likewise the money that has been spent on peacebuilding has gone on training, advocacy and capacity building, meaning that the money has not gone to those most in need in conflict-affected areas and communities. Similarly the lack of medium- and long-term peacebuilding initiatives that can contribute to the socioeconomic uplift of victims of violence is also a major concern. Further there has been duplication and overlap in projects and too few measurable outputs (Bhattarai, 2013).

However, there are also some positive aspects at the local level where VLPCs have been working as a catalyst for the people of the VDCs. A report by Odendaal (2010) cited an LPC Chairperson from Chitwan who said, 'We're living in a virtual stateless situation here. The administration and police cannot deal with many cases. Therefore, people call us whenever there is some major problem.' This shows the

relevance of the LPC at the district and village levels. The report further described the lack of support from the government as the stumbling block. However LPCs were still able to deal with several problems of the conflict.

There are some examples where LPCs have been highly successful in winning people's hearts. The Carter Center (2011) reports Bhaktapur and Surkhet LPC were highly effective, mediating conflicts, holding regular meetings, having positive relations with the CDO and other stakeholders. These LPCs helped solve several conflict mediation activities and helped in peacemaking and peacebuilding and even published a book on conflict victims. Similarly, Gross and Rajbhandari (2009) also found that some LPCs had been effective. For example, the committee in the highly conflict-affected district of Rolpa had members from all major political parties, civil society and marginalised groups who were working together on peacebuilding.

## **5.2 Relevance of LPCs in study area, and linkage with analytical framework**

Drawing on the evidence presented above, this subsection reviews the capacities of LPCs. The findings suggest that LPCs' capability to self-organise and act was limited. The composition of the DLPC was not inclusive, while the VLPC could not sustain active participation in meetings. The implications were more severe at the DLPC, where politicisation dominated appointments and decision-making. This finding corresponds with other studies, such as Bhattarai (2013), who found politicisation negatively affecting the functioning of LPCs. Further, PSCD and MoPR (2013) in Bardiya found that representatives of different political parties dominate meetings and have a higher chance of influencing decisions.

In terms of gender and social differences, female committee members were less capable of influencing LPC decisions, even when they put forward their views and raised issues during committee discussions. The failure to fulfil the requirements of the ToR regarding female representation is part of this, but majority decision-making practices suggest that even one-third representation would not put women on an equal footing. Though there were some DLPC decisions in support of gender-specific activities, it cannot be assumed that the LPC has strongly supported socially marginalised and disadvantaged groups. Since the formation of the committee there has not been a female coordinator even though many promises had been made about having a woman lead it. This was the case in Bardiya in 2012, where committee members said that they would be prepared to give up their position for a woman, but to date this has not occurred (NFDIN, 2012).

At the VLPC level, the evidence regarding formal compliance with diversity quotas (gender and otherwise) is more encouraging. However, the findings of this study suggest a limited role for those committees and that the actual locus of authority and decision-making lies with the VLPC coordinator. While the committee was limited to relatively few meetings (with variable attendance) and extremely limited programming, the coordinators were able to conduct programmes on regular basis. This does not mean that gender and other social difference were not addressed in the work of the LPC through the coordinator, but does suggest that the LPC mechanism is unlikely to have significantly changed the capacity of marginalised groups to organise and act.

There was no real coordination and relationship between the DLPC and VLPC. Even though DLPCs are directly responsible for the formation of VLPCs, they rarely work together: the VLPC only assists the DLPC in collecting data about affected people from the VDCs and providing their details. The VLPC members were provided training by the DLPC at the time of its formation, but beyond that no other capacity building programmes have been conducted.

VLPCs were effective in several activities such as assisting in conflict resolution through the involvement of the committee members without the use of formal legal procedures. No discrimination between conflicting parties was reported, and these practices were perceived as effective by conflict-affected people. The credit goes to the VLPC coordinator and their influence at the village level, as was

also the case in the Carter Center's research (2011), which pointed to the importance of effective leadership by coordinators.

The performance of the VLPCs and the diversity of activities pursued by other LPCs across the country suggest that there is significant room for the Bardiya DLPC to be more active in complementary programming (e.g. training on income generation as suggested by MoPR, 2013), which might contribute to improved development results. This study found little evidence of LPC leadership capacity (or capacity development). One possible explanation is the lack of merit-based appointments. In the case of Bardiya DLPC, the secretary was appointed because of his links with one of the political parties, rather than on free competition. Another might be that the short duration of a DLPC secretary's tenure (3-6 months) has an impact on productivity, including the capacity of LPC leadership to establish supportive relationships.

LPCs all over Nepal have been severely affected by the resource constraints. Bardiya did not receive any funds in 2013 (PSCD and MoPR, 2013) as the budget was frozen due to a lack of cooperation with the CDO. In some districts, LPC members have complained about not having the power or autonomy to do even small transactions; instead, they have to get permission from the CDO. In the case of Bardiya, a poor relationship between the CDO and the LPC could be the reason for the freezing of the funds. This has a serious implications for the functioning and effectiveness of the LPC as a whole. It is clear that LPCs in Nepal do not have adequate resources and have not been able to properly use and maintain the equipment they have. VLPCs use the resources of the VDC and receive just 22,000 rupees annually. Limited funds are hindering performance as people do not find any motivation to help the affected people.

The studied LPCs lacked any vision for the future. The DLPC has to make plans and budgets and forward these to the DA, which releases the money. Beyond that, there are no provisions for broader planning. VLPCs do not have any planning mechanisms at all, instead conducting programmes as they go.

The study has used the analytical framework developed by SLRC to assess the capacity and effectiveness of LPCs in Bardiya district. More broadly, this can be defined as simply with the ability to serve the affected people and help solve their problems at the local level, which can be determined by their levels of satisfaction with their services. Another way to assess their effectiveness is to compare their outcomes with those of other LPCs across the country. In this light, Bardiya's LPCs are at least operational: the DLPC provides some services and the VLPCs carry out conflict resolution and mediation initiatives, which is better than many VLPCs. Additional financial resources and capacity building could further improve the effectiveness of LPC as a whole.

## 6 Conclusion

The ability of LPCs to function effectively has been limited. In Bardiya, the DLPC helps conflict-affected people to access relief funds but is not active in planning or implementing further programming. There were no records of it facilitating any kinds of mediation or conflict resolution activities, which the LPC officials said was the task of the local administration, apparently unaware of their own terms of reference. These weakness and loopholes need to be addressed through resources, training and capacity building.

The two VLPCs studied for this report conduct several programmes, including interaction and awareness programmes with conflict-affected people and their families. The VLPCs also provide people with a platform to put their concerns across to the political parties and engage in mediation and conflict resolution activities. Major cases that they had successfully dealt with related to marriage, elopement, rape, fights between neighbours, and disputes over land or irrigation. In Bhimapur, an independent unit called *Badh Ghar* was working in collaboration with the LPC. Further, in Neulapur VDC, the LPC had initiated road construction activities with labour contributions from the locals. The credit for these activities goes to the respective coordinators who have taken these initiatives.

The findings, then, suggest that the LPCs at the village level have been much more active and arguably more relevant than those at the district level, despite the fewer resources they receive.

This study reveals weak relations and a lack of cooperation between the DLPC and VLPC. The government needs to promote better coordination between these entities if peacebuilding objectives are to be met.

Despite some good work being done with limited resources, there is significant room for improvement in the cases reviewed here. However, this study suggests that many of the constraints on the effectiveness of the LPC mechanism relate not to capacity or a lack of awareness of how to do things better, but to the incentives of those involved and the nature of the political institutions of Nepal that create those incentives. Achieving the hoped-for peacebuilding outcomes from LPCs will require considerable work on these fronts.

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# Annex: Methodological description

Methods	Key persons to be Interviewed	Type of data to be explored	Remarks
<p><b>Key informant interview</b>  <i>The reason for using this method in the study was to get detailed information about the mechanisms, process, service provisions, institutional factors, mandates, functions and every details of the LPC. This was generally useful in getting a detailed idea about the LPC and its working modalities, plans, vision.</i></p>	<p>Chief District Officer (CDO), District Development Committee chief, CAP/IDP activists, LPC committee members, NGO/INGO officials</p>	<p>Some of the data explored through this method are presented below, For detailed information refer to the study guide:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Details about the LPC committee (participation/accountability/transparency)</li> <li>• Functions, mandates and effectiveness of the LPC</li> <li>• Services that have been and are being provided by the LPC</li> <li>• Impacts to the society as a result of the LPC activities</li> <li>• Resource utilisation/constraints</li> <li>• Contribution to peacebuilding/state-building</li> <li>• Issues that are not part of mandate but have been done</li> <li>• Fulfilment of the mandatory activities</li> <li>• Relevance of activities that are being conducted by the LPC</li> <li>• How have they been dealing with the resources, skills capacity, other structural problems</li> </ul>	<p>Use of this technique helps to get detailed information on the services that have been provided by the LPC, and detailed information about the LPC</p>
<p><b>Detailed interview of the beneficiaries (in-depth interview)</b>  <i>This method is generally used to get the views, perceptions from the service receiver's point of view. It further helps to triangulate the information gathered from the service providers and check whether the LPC was participatory, accountable, responsive and effective.</i></p>	<p>Service receivers and people recommended to get (CAP/IDP) services</p> <p>People whose disputes are settled</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Challenges that people have faced in receiving the services through the LPC</li> <li>• Hassles/difficulties that people have faced in receiving the services</li> <li>• Participation/transparency of the LPC</li> <li>• Inclusiveness of LPC</li> <li>• Why the LPC is effective or not</li> </ul>	
<p><b>Focus group discussion</b>  <i>This helps to triangulate the information, generate additional information, reconfirm the data generated or gathered, examine fairness, participation, extent of accountability and situation in the community, and check the bias/perspectives of people at the institutional level.</i></p>	<p>Local people, service receivers, CAPs/IDPs with someone who is related with the LPC</p>	<p>Same information as IDI with the service receivers</p>	





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SLRC Working Papers present information, analysis and key policy recommendations on issues relating to livelihoods, basic services and social protection in conflict affected situations.

This and other SLRC papers are available from [www.securelivelihoods.org](http://www.securelivelihoods.org).  
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