

Report on the investigation of the collision between

the general cargo ship


Daroja

and the oil bunker barge

Erin Wood

4 nautical miles south-east of Peterhead, Scotland

on 29 August 2015



Extract from
The United Kingdom Merchant Shipping
(Accident Reporting and Investigation)
Regulations 2012 – Regulation 5:

“The sole objective of the investigation of an accident under the Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2012 shall be the prevention of future accidents through the ascertainment of its causes and circumstances. It shall not be the purpose of an investigation to determine liability nor, except so far as is necessary to achieve its objective, to apportion blame.”

NOTE

This report is not written with litigation in mind and, pursuant to Regulation 14(14) of the Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2012, shall be inadmissible in any judicial proceedings whose purpose, or one of whose purposes is to attribute or apportion liability or blame.

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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AIS	-	Automatic Identification System
ARPA	-	Automatic Radar Plotting Aid
BNWAS	-	Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System
cm	-	centimetre
COG	-	Course over ground
COLREGs	-	International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea, 1972, as amended
CPA	-	Closest Point of Approach
DNV-GL	-	Det Norske Veritas-Germanischer Lloyd
DSC	-	Digital Selective Calling
ECS	-	Electronic Chart System
EPIRB	-	Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon
FRB	-	Fast Rescue Boat
GL	-	Germanischer Lloyd
GPS	-	Global Positioning System
gt	-	gross tonnage
ICS	-	International Chamber of Shipping
ILO	-	International Labour Organization
IMO	-	International Maritime Organization
IS	-	International Register of Shipping
ISM Code	-	International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention
kt	-	knot
m	-	metre
m ³	-	cubic metres
MCA	-	Maritime and Coastguard Agency
MGO	-	Marine Gas Oil

MoU	-	Memorandum of Understanding
MSMC	-	Minimum Safe Manning Certificate
NCV	-	Non-Convention Sized Vessel
nm	-	nautical mile
OOW	-	Officer of the Watch
PEC	-	Pilotage Exemption Certificate
PSC	-	Port State Control
RNLI	-	Royal National Lifeboat Institution
RO	-	Recognised Organisation
RYA	-	Royal Yachting Association
SKN Registry	-	St Kitts and Nevis International Ship Registry
SMS	-	Safety Management System
SOG	-	Speed over ground
SOLAS	-	International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended
STCW	-	International Convention on the Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978, as amended
t	-	tonne
UK	-	United Kingdom
USC	-	United Shipping Companies Barnkrug GmbH & Co.KG
UTC	-	Universal Co-ordinated Time
VDR	-	Voyage Data Recorder
VHF	-	Very High Frequency
VTS	-	Vessel Traffic Service
WBT	-	Water Ballast Tank

TIMES: all times used in this report are UTC+1 unless otherwise stated

SYNOPSIS

At 1658 on 29 August 2015, the Cyprus registered cargo ship *Daroja* and the St Kitts and Nevis registered oil bunker barge *Erin Wood* collided 4 nautical miles south-east of Peterhead, Scotland. Minor damage was caused to *Daroja* but damage to *Erin Wood* included breaches of the hull, resulting in flooding of the vessel and pollution from leaking fuel cargo.

At the time of the accident, both vessels were manned by watchkeepers not keeping a lookout and therefore unaware of the risk of collision. On board *Daroja*, the chief officer, who was the officer of the watch, missed opportunities to detect *Erin Wood* by visual, radar and automatic identification system means. This happened because he had become complacent through distraction, inattentiveness, the repetitive nature of the vessel's schedule and insufficient supervision. On board *Erin Wood*, the bridge was not continuously manned and, although the skipper was aware of the presence of another vessel, the situation was not effectively assessed and an assumption was made that a larger ship would keep clear.

Lone watchkeeping was a causal factor on board both vessels and, similar to previous MAIB investigations, this report highlights the importance of identifying and managing risks when a sole watchkeeper is the only lookout.

This investigation has also identified significant safety shortcomings in the management and operation of *Erin Wood*. The vessel's crew did not have the competence necessary to operate a small tanker and there was not an effective safety management system. This unsafe situation arose because *Erin Wood*'s managing company lacked experience in the industry sector and prioritised commercial gain ahead of safety at sea. Risks associated with *Erin Wood*'s operations also went undetected by the flag and coastal states. This happened because the Flag State's process of initial registration was not sufficiently thorough and because *Erin Wood* was not inspected under the Port State Control regime.

United Shipping Companies Barnkrug GmbH & Co.KG, *Daroja*'s managing company, has reviewed its safety management system and made a series of changes to improve bridge watchkeeping standards. Northern Oils Limited, *Erin Wood*'s managing company, has temporarily ceased transportation of fuel products by sea. Nevertheless, safety recommendations have been made to both managing companies intended to improve standards of navigation and watchkeeping. A safety recommendation has also been made to the St Kitts and Nevis International Ship Registry intended to improve its assessment of potential risks during the process of initial registration of vessels being taken onto its flag.



Daroja



Erin Wood

SECTION 1 – FACTUAL INFORMATION

1.1 PARTICULARS OF *DAROJA*, *ERIN WOOD* AND THE ACCIDENT

SHIP PARTICULARS		
Vessel's name	<i>Daroja</i>	<i>Erin Wood</i>
Flag	Republic of Cyprus	St Kitts and Nevis
Flag State's Recognised Organisation	Det Norske Veritas-Germanischer Lloyd	International Register of Shipping
IMO number	9148221	Not IMO registered
Type	Cargo ship	Oil bunker barge
Registered owner	Marjesco Schiffsbeteiligungs GmbH	Northern Oils Limited
Manager(s)	United Shipping Companies Barnkrug GmbH & Co.KG	Northern Oils Limited
Construction	Steel	Steel
Year of build	1997	1964
Registered Length	85.0m	25.3m
Gross tonnage	3266	70
Minimum safe manning	7	2
Authorised cargo	Containers	Marine gas oil
VOYAGE PARTICULARS		
Port of departure	Aberdeen, Scotland	North Shields, England
Intended port of arrival	Lerwick, Scotland	Scrabster, Scotland
Type of voyage	Short domestic	Short domestic
Cargo information	181 containers of general cargo	130m ³ of marine gas oil
Manning	9	2
MARINE CASUALTY INFORMATION		
Date and time	1658 on 29 August 2015	
Type of marine casualty	Very Serious Marine Casualty	
Location of incident	57°26.36'N – 001°41.58'W	
Place on board	Hull Bulbous bow	Hull, engine room, accommodation and superstructure
Injuries/fatalities	None	None
Damage/environmental impact	Indentation and scraping to bulbous bow	Shell plating fractures, flooding, superstructure damage, fuel cargo pollution
Ship operation	On passage	On passage
Voyage segment	Mid water	Mid water
External & internal environment	Wind: South-westerly, 4 to 6 knots, sea state 2, 0.5m swell, visibility good	
Persons on board	9	2

1.2 NARRATIVE

1.2.1 Events prior to the collision

At 2130 on 28 August 2015, the oil bunker barge *Erin Wood* sailed from North Shields, England and commenced passage to Scrabster, Scotland (**Figure 1**). The vessel was loaded with 130m³ of marine gas oil and was manned by its skipper and a deckhand. At 0100 (29 August 2015), with the vessel proceeding on autopilot at a passage speed of 9.5kt, the skipper handed the bridge watch over to the deckhand and went to his cabin to rest. The skipper returned to the bridge at about 0830 and took back control of the watch; the deckhand then left the bridge and went to rest.

At 1510 on 29 August 2015, the general cargo vessel *Daroja* sailed from Aberdeen, Scotland and commenced passage to Lerwick in the Shetland Islands (**Figure 1**). Once clear of Aberdeen Harbour, with the passage speed set at 14.5kt, *Daroja's* master handed the watch over to the second officer, then left the bridge. At 1538, the second officer altered *Daroja's* autopilot controlled heading to 034° (**Figure 2**). At 1600, *Daroja's* chief officer arrived on the bridge and, following a short handover brief from the second officer, took over the watch. Once alone on the bridge, the chief officer checked the bridge equipment settings and looked out of the windows to scan the horizon. At about 1620, the chief officer went to the chart table on the starboard side of the bridge and began working on paperwork relating to the cargo loaded in Aberdeen.

At about 1620, *Erin Wood's* skipper observed several automatic identification system (AIS) shipping tracks on the vessel's electronic chart system (ECS) display. The skipper interrogated the tracks to establish the closest point of approach (CPA) for each of them, and noted that the nearest CPA was predicted to be 1 nautical mile (nm). At 1625, *Erin Wood's* skipper adjusted his autopilot controlled heading to 350° (**Figure 2**); he then left the bridge and went to the stern deck to urinate into the sea. While on deck, the skipper noticed a larger vessel approaching from astern. He assumed the vessel would keep clear and made no attempt to assess it further. The skipper then collected his tablet computer from his cabin and returned to the bridge. About 10 minutes later, he went to the mess room and briefed the deckhand on the intended passage plan.

At 1646, the chief officer on board *Daroja* answered a call on the bridge internal telephone. Following a 4-minute discussion, the chief officer went to the starboard side of the bridge and sat in the bridge chair (**Figure 3**). At about the same time, *Erin Wood's* skipper returned to the bridge and sat down in the chair on the port side (**Figure 4**).

1.2.2 The collision

At 1658, *Daroja's* bulbous bow struck *Erin Wood's* port side (**Figure 5**). The bunker barge became lodged under *Daroja's* bow and started being driven sideways; in an attempt to break his vessel free, *Erin Wood's* skipper immediately deselected the autopilot, applied maximum port rudder and put the engine to full ahead. Within seconds, *Erin Wood* heeled over 90° to starboard and seawater rushed into its bridge, accommodation areas and engine room through the vessel's open weathertight doors. The skipper escaped from the flooded bridge through an open window; meanwhile, the deckhand, who was in the mess room, was fully submerged in seawater.




Figure 1: Intended passages of Daroja and Erin Wood and collision location



Figure 3: Reconstruction of the chief officer of *Daroja* sitting in the chair on the starboard side of the bridge prior to collision




Figure 4: Reconstruction of the skipper of *Erin Wood* sitting in the chair on the port side of the bridge prior to collision




Figure 5: Schematic diagram of the collision sequence

After about 15 seconds, *Erin Wood* broke free, rolled back upright and passed down *Daroja*'s port side on an opposing heading (**Figure 5**). As *Erin Wood* came upright, the skipper found himself clinging to the bridge roof. The deckhand was washed out of the mess room and over the ship's side as the floodwater rushed back out through the open door. The deckhand grabbed hold of the top edge of the bulwark to prevent himself being swept completely overboard. When the rush subsided, the deckhand was able to climb back over the bulwark onto the vessel's upper deck.

1.2.3 Actions following the collision

When the collision happened, *Daroja*'s chief officer heard an unusual noise and stood up from the bridge chair and looked out ahead and to starboard. With nothing in sight, he then went to the port bridge wing, where he saw *Erin Wood* passing close down the port side. The master, who was in his cabin, had also heard the noise and phoned the bridge to find out what it was. The chief officer answered the phone and asked the master to come to the bridge immediately. The master arrived on the bridge at 1701 and called *Erin Wood* on very high frequency (VHF) radio channel 16, but there was no response. *Daroja*'s master also reduced the vessel's speed, turned back towards *Erin Wood* and ordered the fast rescue boat (FRB) to be prepared for launch.

Once clear of *Daroja*, *Erin Wood* settled low in the water and started listing to port as seawater flooded into No.4 port water ballast tank (WBT). The skipper, concerned that the vessel might sink or capsize, released the liferaft from the bridge roof and threw it over the side. He then climbed down to the deck and, with the assistance of the deckhand, inflated the liferaft and secured its painter to a cleat on the starboard quarter ready for immediate use. The deckhand then fetched two lifejackets from the accommodation space and both he and the skipper donned them.

It was apparent to *Erin Wood*'s skipper that the vessel was taking on water so, at 1704, he called Peterhead Harbour vessel traffic service (VTS) using VHF radio and stated that his vessel was sinking and help was urgently required. Peterhead VTS immediately relayed this information to Aberdeen Coastguard, who ordered the launch of the Peterhead RNLi¹ lifeboat and also tasked the oil rig support vessel *Grampian Talisman*, which was nearby, to proceed to the scene.

Daroja's FRB was launched at 1710 and proceeded directly to *Erin Wood*. The skipper of *Erin Wood* told the FRB coxswain that there were two crew on his vessel, both were safe and that no assistance was required. Shortly thereafter, *Erin Wood*'s skipper informed the coastguard that he assessed the vessel was no longer in immediate danger but that its engine room was partially flooded. *Erin Wood*'s crew then used an emergency salvage pump to start pumping floodwater out of the engine room; this was initially successful but the suction soon became blocked by rags.

The Peterhead RNLi lifeboat arrived at 1732 (**Figure 6**) and transferred two crewmen and a salvage pump onto *Erin Wood*. The RNLi salvage pump was used to assist the crew of *Erin Wood* in their efforts to pump out the floodwater from the

Image courtesy of the RNLi



Figure 6: *Erin Wood* after the collision as seen from the Peterhead lifeboat, including evidence of fuel cargo pollution

¹ Royal National Lifeboat Institution

engine room and accommodation space. Once the majority of the floodwater had been pumped out of the engine room, *Erin Wood's* skipper turned his attention to addressing the vessel's list to port. This was corrected by pumping 11t of seawater into No.4 starboard WBT: 8t from the after peak tank and 3t from the sea (**Figure 7**).




Figure 7: *Erin Wood* – general arrangements of tanks illustrating contents before and after collision

At 1830, Aberdeen Coastguard released *Daroja* from the scene but directed it to proceed alongside in Peterhead, where it arrived at 1945. The fishing vessel *Ocean Endeavour* arrived on scene at 1842 and started preparing to take *Erin Wood* in tow. *Grampian Talisman* was stood down by the lifeboat coxswain at 1941. Escorted by the lifeboat and under tow by *Ocean Endeavour* (**Figure 8**), *Erin Wood* berthed in Peterhead at about 2230.

Image courtesy of the RNLI



Figure 8: Fishing vessel *Ocean Endeavour* with *Erin Wood* in tow, taken from the Peterhead lifeboat

After arriving in Peterhead, both *Daroja* and *Erin Wood* were attended by local Police. The master and chief officer of *Daroja* and both crewmen from *Erin Wood* were breathalysed, all with negative results. An environmental containment boom was rigged around *Erin Wood* to prevent the spread of fuel leaking from the vessel.

1.3 ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS

The environmental conditions in the vicinity of the accident were:

- Wind: south-westerly, 4 to 6kt
- Weather: overcast
- Sea state: smooth with approximate swell height of 0.5m
- Visibility: good

1.4 POST-ACCIDENT INSPECTIONS AND DAMAGE ASSESSMENT

On 30 August 2015, *Daroja* was inspected by surveyors from the UK's Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) and the vessel's classification society, Det Norske Veritas-Germanischer Lloyd (DNV-GL). *Daroja's* bulbous bow was dented and scraped (**Figure 9**) but no other damage to the vessel was observed and both the MCA and DNV-GL approved the vessel's return to sea.



Figure 9: *Daroja* - bulbous bow damage with detail inset

The following day an MCA surveyor inspected *Erin Wood* out of the water in Peterhead. The damage identified during the inspection included:

- A large indentation in the shell plating and distortion of hull frames and stiffeners where *Daroja's* bulbous bow made contact (**Figures 10 and 11**). The shell plating was breached in 2 places (**Figure 12**).
- Distortion of the accommodation space weathertight door (**Figure 13**).
- Bent and distorted mast structure and port side aerials on the bridge roof.
- A section of the keel had broken away and a propeller blade tip was dented.
- Seized main engine and water damaged electrical equipment.

The larger of the two breaches in *Erin Wood's* single-skinned shell plating (**Figure 12**) straddled No.3 port cargo tank and No.4 port WBT (**Figure 7**). Prior to the collision, No.3 port cargo tank was full of marine gas oil and No.4 port WBT was empty. The impact damage caused No.4 port WBT to flood and marine gas oil to leak into the sea from No.3 port cargo tank. The amount of pollution was not determined but was visible on the water surface (**Figure 6**).

The damage rendered *Erin Wood* non-compliant with the UK's merchant shipping load line regulations, resulting in the MCA surveyor issuing a detention notice to its skipper following the inspection.

Image courtesy of Mr Graham Innes, www.marinetraffic.com



Figure 10: *Erin Wood* – hull indentation below the waterline




Figure 11: *Erin Wood* – structural damage viewed from inside No.3 port cargo fuel tank (looking aft)




Figure 12: *Erin Wood* – external detail of shell plating breaches



Figure 13: *Erin Wood* – distortion of accommodation space weathertight door

1.5 DAROJA

1.5.1 General

Daroja was registered as a general cargo ship in Limassol, Cyprus; it was 85m in length and its gross tonnage (gt) was 3266. It was one of 15 vessels managed by United Shipping Companies Barnkrug GmbH & Co.KG (USC) from offices in Drochtersen, Germany. *Daroja* was on a time charter to Streamline Shipping Limited, based in Aberdeen. The vessel moved palletised and containerised cargo between the Scottish mainland and the Shetland and Orkney Islands. It operated a routine schedule visiting the ports of Aberdeen, Lerwick and Kirkwall twice per week.

1.5.2 Crew

Daroja's crew of nine complied with the Flag State's minimum safe manning requirement and consisted of German, Lithuanian and Latvian nationals.

The master was a 62-year-old German national who held a Flag State endorsed STCW² II/2 master's certificate of competency. He also held pilotage exemption certificates (PEC) for the ports of Aberdeen, Kirkwall and Lerwick. He was a career mariner with over 30 years' industry experience including sea command and shore-based marine safety management. He was a part-owner of *Daroja* and had been involved in the management and command of the vessel since 2005.

The chief officer was a 34-year-old Lithuanian national who held a Flag State endorsed STCW II/2 certificate of competency as chief officer for cargo vessels exceeding 3000gt. He had been on board *Daroja* for just under 4 months and had less than 2 weeks to go until completion of his contract.

1.5.3 Bridge equipment

Daroja was equipped with two automatic radar plotting aid (ARPA) enabled radars (one S-band and one X-band), an ECS and a key-controlled, bridge navigational watch alarm system (BNWAS). The ECS used global positioning system (GPS) data and also displayed AIS tracks. The primary method of navigation on board *Daroja* was paper charts.

Daroja's S-band radar display was on the port side of the bridge and the X-band display was on the starboard side, ahead of the bridge chair next to the ECS display (**Figure 14**). *Erin Wood* was detected and displayed by *Daroja's* X-band radar for 52 minutes prior to the accident; the initial detection at 8.4nm is at **Figure 15** and 10 minutes prior to collision, when the vessels were 1.8nm apart, is at **Figure 16**. *Erin Wood's* AIS transmissions were detected by




Figure 14: *Daroja's* bridge (starboard side) showing the bridge chair, X-band radar and ECS displays

² International Convention on the Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978, as amended




Figure 15: *Daroja's* radar display showing the initial detection of *Erin Wood* at 8.4nm, 52 minutes prior to collision




Figure 16: *Daroja's* radar display showing contact on *Erin Wood* at 1.8nm, 10 minutes prior to collision

Daroja for 1 hour prior to collision, and this data would have been available on the ECS display. Voyage Data Recorder (VDR) evidence indicated that the chief officer did not interact with the radar prior to the collision.

Daroja's bridge chair pedestal was damaged and had been repaired in a manner that prevented the adjustment of its height and reclining angle. When seated in the chair (**Figure 17**), the chief officer could only see the sky ahead of him through the bridge windows.



Figure 17: Reconstruction of the chief officer of *Daroja* sitting in the bridge chair illustrating the restricted line of visibility

1.5.4 Watchkeeping routine

When at sea, *Daroja's* master, chief officer and second officer shared the watchkeeping responsibilities, working four on, eight off rosters; an additional lookout was only required on the bridge during the hours of darkness. This was in accordance with *Daroja's* safety management system (SMS), which required only one STCW qualified watchkeeper on the bridge in *open sea day conditions*.

USC's guidance on bridge watchkeeping, contained in Chapter 7 of *Daroja's* SMS, stated that vigilance of the officer of the watch (OOV) was necessary to avoid danger. The SMS also required *Daroja's* crew to be familiar with the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) Bridge Procedures Guide. *Daroja's* SMS was supplemented by the master's standing orders that included direction to the OOV to keep a sharp lookout at all times; instructions on briefing watch personnel were also included.

There was no risk assessment for lone watchkeeping and no additional guidance on the subject in the master's standing orders. There was also no onboard training programme for bridge watchkeepers and the master did not actively monitor or mentor OOW standards. USC's SMS stated that: *the BNWAS has to be operational whenever the vessel is at sea*. The BNWAS was switched off.

1.6 ERIN WOOD

1.6.1 General

Erin Wood was built in Sweden in 1965 and was registered as an oil bunker barge by the St Kitts and Nevis International Ship Registry (SKN Registry); it was 70gt and had a registered length of 25.3m. *Erin Wood* was one of three seagoing vessels owned and operated as small coastal tankers by Northern Oils Limited³ (Northern Oils).

Originally designed to operate around sea ice, *Erin Wood's* internal frames were closely spaced for structural strength. On the starboard side of the superstructure were two weathertight doors; the forward door accessed the engine room and the after door led to the accommodation spaces (Figure 18). Both weathertight doors were open at the time of collision. Two single cabin berths were available for the crew.

Image courtesy of Mr Graham Innes, www.marinetraffic.com



Figure 18: *Erin Wood* – starboard side showing weathertight doors

³ Northern Oils was a fuel and lubricant division of its parent company, Impact Trading. *Erin Wood's* certificate of registry stated that the vessel owner was 'Northern Oils' - this term is used throughout this report in relation to the ownership and management of the vessel. Several months after the accident, Impact Trading was placed in administration and Northern Oils was bought out by Aztec Oils, and renamed Northern Oils (Scotland) Limited.

Erin Wood was fitted with a *Sea-Safe* 6-person liferaft, four emergency use lifejackets and four immersion suits.

1.6.2 Crew

Erin Wood had two crewmen, a skipper and deckhand; both had joined the vessel 5 weeks before the accident and neither of them had any previous experience on board bunker barges or fuel tankers. Neither crewman had received training in the management of hazardous cargoes.

The skipper was a 65-year-old British national who had been at sea all his working life on tugs, workboats and fishing vessels. He held a commercially endorsed Royal Yachting Association (RYA) Yachtmaster (Offshore) qualification for power-driven craft and a Merchant Navy Certificate of Competency as an Able Seaman⁴. The skipper had also undertaken safety awareness and engineering watchkeeping training for fishing vessels.

The deckhand was a 36-year-old Latvian national who had previously worked as a fisherman in Scotland for 10 years. He had completed training courses for fishermen in first-aid, fire-fighting, safety awareness and sea survival.

1.6.3 Bridge equipment

The primary means of navigation on board *Erin Wood* was paper charts, and an outfit of charts was carried. *Erin Wood* was fitted with a Furuno navigational radar, an ECS with integrated GPS / AIS inputs and an autopilot (**Figure 19**). A fixed digital selective calling (DSC) enabled VHF radio and two hand-held VHF radios were also carried. The vessel did not have an echo sounder.

At the time of the accident, the radar and ECS systems were switched on. None of the paper charts found on board had any passage planning information plotted. In practice, *Erin Wood* was navigated using the ECS. In the ECS system, the skipper plotted waypoints for the intended passage and then he and the deckhand adjusted the vessel's heading to follow the plotted track. Three months of AIS track history for *Erin Wood* prior to the accident is at **Figure 20**.

1.6.4 Watchkeeping routine

Erin Wood's skipper and deckhand did not keep watches to a pre-determined schedule and records of work and rest were not kept. For entering and leaving harbour, the skipper was always on the bridge and the deckhand outside. On a typical sea passage, the skipper would remain awake most of the day, keeping watch. When on watch, the skipper did not remain continuously in the bridge; instead, he would visit other compartments on board and undertake routine planning and maintenance tasks. On longer passages, the skipper would hand over the watch to the deckhand during the night and only when the vessel was not close inshore.

⁴ *Erin Wood's* skipper's Merchant Navy Able Seaman Certificate of Competency was issued under the Merchant Shipping (Certificate of Competency as AB) Regulations, 1973. This certificate predated the STCW scheme but was supplemented by a letter, dated 12 September 2011, issued by the MCA Seafarer Training and Certification Department. This stated that, due to the skipper's previous experience, he was exempt from STCW courses in personal survival, fire-fighting, elementary first-aid and personal safety/social responsibility.

1.6.5 Safety management documentation

Erin Wood's operational and maintenance management routines (**Annex A**) were contained in the vessel's operations manual⁵. The manual contained emergency contact details, hours of work and rest record forms and fuel and oil management forms. It also contained checklists for crew handovers, emergency procedures, defect reporting and weekly maintenance.

The operations manual contained no guidance on weathertight integrity, watchkeeping routines or stability management. The stability data found on board *Erin Wood* after the accident was dated 1965; it had not been updated when the vessel was lengthened in 1986.

1.7 NORTHERN OILS

Northern Oils was established in 1967 as a local distributor of industrial lubricants in the north-east of Scotland. Its head office was in Cullen, Scotland. After change of ownership in 2005, the company was expanded and diversified.

In 2013, Northern Oils identified a commercial opportunity to make substantial savings by restocking its coastal fuel depots using ships instead of road vehicles. This led to the purchase of the small tanker *Sauria*, in February 2014. *Sauria* was



Figure 19: *Erin Wood* – starboard side of bridge showing navigation equipment

⁵ *Erin Wood*'s operations manual was titled *Caley Oils Operations Manual*; Caley Oils was another fuel and lubricant division of Impact Trading.




Figure 20: *Erin Wood* – 3 months of AIS track history

a 362gt tanker originally built for the Royal Maritime Auxiliary Service in the 1960s. When ownership transferred to Northern Oils, the vessel remained on the Sierra Leone Register but its name was changed to *John Wood*.

Moving fuel in bulk using *John Wood* delivered the anticipated commercial benefit and led Northern Oils to expand its maritime operation through the purchase of two further vessels: *Westa* in September 2014, which became *Erin Wood*, and *Musca* in July 2015, which was renamed *Wood Spirit*. In April 2015, *John Wood* suffered an engine seizure and was taken out of operation.

Northern Oils' marine operations were managed by its managing director, logistics director, international projects manager and marine manager. The management team's maritime credentials were:

- Owner/managing director. A career businessman, entrepreneur and the driving force of the company; he had some family based knowledge of the fishing industry but no marine management qualifications or experience.
- Logistics director. Prior to joining Northern Oils, the logistics director had worked at sea in the oil industry. He was responsible for scheduling resupply of the company's fuel depots using both road and sea transportation methods.
- International projects manager. Employed on a part-time consultancy basis, the international projects manager had served as a junior engineer officer in the Royal Fleet Auxiliary Service in the 1970s. Thereafter, he had worked in the heavy engineering industry as an infrastructure, risk and safety consultant. He was responsible for negotiating the purchase and managing the arrangements for the survey and certification of Northern Oils' vessels.
- Marine manager. Northern Oils employed a marine manager from April to October 2015 who had experience of management in the fishing industry.

1.8 THE ST KITTS AND NEVIS REGISTRY AND ITS RECOGNISED ORGANISATION

1.8.1 Background

The SKN Registry was an open register operated under the jurisdiction of the St Kitts and Nevis Government's Department of Maritime Affairs. The Registry was administered from its head office in Romford, England.

The SKN Registry had an agreement with the International Register of Shipping (IS⁶) for provision of statutory surveys and issue of certificates as a Recognised Organisation⁷ (RO). IS was also an RO for the Sierra Leone Maritime Administration and had surveyed *John Wood* on the Flag State's behalf. Additionally, IS was the classification society for *Erin Wood*, *John Wood* and *Wood Spirit*. The IS head office was in Panama and its technical office was in Miami, USA. It also had European regional offices in Greece and Cyprus, and a non-exclusive surveyor based in the UK.

⁶ The abbreviation IS is used for the International Register of Shipping to avoid confusion with the Indian Register of Shipping (IRS).

⁷ Flag States routinely employ and authorise ROs to conduct surveys and issue certificates on their behalf. Guidance for the responsibilities and conduct of ROs is set out in the International Maritime Organization's Resolution MSC.349(92) *Code for Recognized Organizations*.

1.8.2 Registration and certification of *Erin Wood*

When Northern Oils purchased *Erin Wood* in September 2014, it was deleted from the Norwegian Ordinary Ship register. Northern Oils considered UK registration of *Erin Wood* but did not make a formal application to the MCA. Dialogue with the SKN Registry indicated that registration of the vessel would be possible subject to survey by one of its RO surveyors. Northern Oils then contacted IS's UK-based non-exclusive surveyor and arranged for *Erin Wood* to be surveyed.

In preparation for the survey, the IS technical office in Miami provided the surveyor with checklists for the conduct of international tonnage, load line, hull, machinery and propeller surveys. No checklist was provided for navigation or safety equipment.

Between 3 and 5 November 2014, and during a dry docking in Whitby, *Erin Wood* was surveyed by the IS surveyor. After a period of further work in Buckie, Scotland, which included the removal of a deck crane, a second survey was carried out on 10 February 2015. This resulted in the surveyor issuing interim certification permitting *Erin Wood* to operate commercially as an oil bunker barge. The survey results were then sent to the IS office in Miami for technical scrutiny. Following this review, the RO issued the following full term certification for *Erin Wood* on behalf of the Flag State:

- Non-Convention Sized Ships Safety Certificate (**Annex B**).
- International Load Line Certificate.
- International Tonnage Certificate.

IS also issued a Certificate of Class that included an operating restriction limiting the vessel to no more than 20nm from shore. Neither *Erin Wood's* managers nor crew were aware of this restriction.

The SKN Non-Convention Sized Ships Safety Certificate stated that *Erin Wood* had been surveyed in accordance with the Flag State's Safety Regulations for non-convention sized ships. A footnote to the certificate stated that the applicable regulations were:

Annex B of IMO Final Report on the Seminars on Safety and Load Line Regulations (Realized Under Project RAS/93/034).

This was the report of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) conferences held in India and Iran in September 1995 and July 1996 respectively. Annex B of the report was an 'agreed text' of safety regulations, primarily intended for new construction, non-convention sized vessels operating in the Asia region.

1.8.3 Manning level negotiations for *Erin Wood*

Between June 2014 and February 2015, Northern Oils and the SKN Registry were in dialogue regarding *Erin Wood's* manning arrangements. The vessel's previous Minimum Safe Manning Certificate (MSMC) when operated under the Norwegian Ordinary Ship register was for a minimum of two crew and included an operating restriction of a maximum of 14 hours of service in any 24-hour period. Based on its

previous manning levels and the number of bunks on board, Northern Oils proposed that *Erin Wood* could be safely operated with a crew of two. The SKN Registry responded to Northern Oils' proposal by e-mail, stating:

...we could man the vessel with two crew as per the Norwegian MSMC but we would ask for restriction along the lines of say 25nm from shore and sailing in daylight hours...

On 10 October 2014, Northern Oils sent an email to the SKN Registry proposing that *Erin Wood* be operated with:

...two competent crew during all hours of the day within no more than 25 miles of the coast.

The crew to share watches on a 6 hours on / 6 hours off basis.

Both crew members to be ticketed with appropriate watchkeeping certificates.

The Erin Wood, because of its age and size, is exempt from the MCA Workboat Code so the crew would not normally be required to carry formal merchant certificates.

It is suggested that it would be safe to operate the ship with 2 crew who carried a yacht master's or skipper's fishing class I or class II certification.

After further discussion, Northern Oils submitted, on 10 February 2015, a formal application for issue of an MSMC for *Erin Wood* to be crewed by a master with an STCW II/3 qualification and a chief engineer with an STCW III/1 qualification. This resulted in the SKN Registry issuing *Erin Wood* an MSMC (**Annex C**) on 12 February 2015, requiring two crew with the qualifications described in the company's proposal. This MSMC did not include an operational condition regarding crew hours of work and rest or a requirement for the crew to have endorsements for operations on board a tanker.

1.9 MANNING OF NORTHERN OILS' VESSELS

The crews for Northern Oils' vessels were initially employed through the marine manning agency, Clyde Marine Recruitment. These crewmen were mainly Polish and Latvian officers with the required STCW qualification and previous experience of tanker operations.

In June 2015, Clyde Marine Recruitment received several complaints from crew on board Northern Oils' vessels; issues raised included poor working conditions, low pay and lack of company direction. This situation resulted in Northern Oils recruiting some crew locally, rather than via the manning agency, and led to the employment of the crewmen that were on board *Erin Wood* at the time of the accident.

1.10 PORT STATE CONTROL INSPECTIONS

1.10.1 Vessels in UK waters

The MCA conducts Port State Control (PSC) inspections of foreign-flagged vessels in UK waters under the authority of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding (Paris MoU). MCA PSC inspections are prioritised based on the potential risks

associated with a vessel's operation. Such risk criteria include: a previous history of deficiencies, a poor performing Flag State or reports of vessel shortcomings from third parties. Vessels identified by the MCA as high risk were normally subject to 6-monthly PSC inspections.

The MCA used the IMO's database of seagoing vessels as the source document for identifying foreign vessels for inspection. *Erin Wood* was not IMO registered⁸ and had not been subject to any MCA PSC inspection. *Erin Wood* routinely berthed in Peterhead, and harbour staff there had expressed concerns to staff at the MCA office in Aberdeen about the vessel's manning and operations. On one occasion, the harbour authority had prevented the vessel sailing to allow its crew to get some rest.

John Wood and *Wood Spirit* were both IMO registered and had been identified as high risk by the MCA due to the performance status of the Sierra Leone Maritime Administration. Between May and September 2014 *John Wood* and *Wood Spirit* were each subject to three PSC inspections during which a total of 51 safety deficiencies were identified.

1.10.2 Paris Memorandum of Understanding performance tables

Data collected from PSC inspections was used by the Paris MoU committee to evaluate the performance of Flag States and their ROs. The purpose of this evaluation was to determine the risk for ship owners associated with their choice of Flag State. For Flag States, the performance table was divided into white, grey and black lists, representing low, medium and high risk respectively.

Appearance on the grey or black lists was intended as an incentive to Flag States to improve the standard of vessels on their register in order to progress up the list. The Paris MoU committee also published performance tables for ROs using the same data from vessel inspections and detentions. The 2014 Flag State and RO performance tables are at **Annex D**. At the time of the accident, the SKN Registry was in the bottom half of the grey listed Flag States and IS was listed as the second worst performing RO globally. The Sierra Leone Maritime administration was on the black list.

1.11 REGULATIONS

1.11.1 Regulations applicable to *Erin Wood*

As a foreign registered, 70gt tanker operating in UK waters, elements of the following regulations were applicable to *Erin Wood*:

- International regulations required by the Flag State:
 - International Convention on Load Lines, 1966, as amended.
 - International Convention on Tonnage, 1969, as amended.
 - International Labour Convention, 2006, as amended.
 - STCW, 1978, as amended.

⁸ IMO registration is not required for cargo vessels under 300gt

- National regulations⁹ applicable to foreign-flagged vessels in UK waters:
 - UK Merchant Shipping (Life saving for vessels other than Class III – VI(A)), 1999, as amended.
 - UK Merchant Shipping Fire Protection Regulations (small ships), 1998, as amended.
 - UK Merchant Shipping (Safety of Navigation) Regulations, 2002, as amended.
 - UK Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Oil Pollution) Regulations, 1996, as amended.

1.11.2 Watchkeeping standards

Part 4 of the STCW regulations states that the OOW is the master's representative with the primary responsibility of the safe navigation of the ship, including keeping a good lookout in compliance with the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collisions at Sea (COLREGs). Rule 5 of the COLREGs required every vessel, at all times and by all means available, to keep a proper and effective lookout in order to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision. Other COLREGs relevant to this accident are at **Annex E**.

STCW regulations and the ICS Bridge Procedures Guide both state that the OOW may be the sole lookout in daylight provided that, on every occasion, the situation has been properly assessed. Such an assessment should take into account factors including: the OOW's workload, availability of back up assistance and whether all bridge equipment and alarms are functioning normally.

For oil and chemical tankers, STCW Chapter V stated that all crew of tankers are required to demonstrate competence in the handling and management of their hazardous cargoes including loading, discharge, hazard prevention and emergency preparedness.

1.11.3 Safety management

Section 1.4 of the IMO International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (ISM Code), required every company to maintain an SMS to ensure the safe operation of its ships. An SMS should include procedures, plans and checklists for the safety of personnel and environmental protection.

Daroja held a Safety Management Certificate issued by Germanischer Lloyd¹⁰, which stated that the vessel's SMS complied with the requirements of the ISM Code. *Erin Wood* was not required to comply with the ISM Code as it was less than 500gt.

⁹ The St Kitts and Nevis Government had issued Small Commercial Vessel Regulations and a Code of Safety for Small Commercial Vessels but neither were applicable to *Erin Wood*. The Small Commercial Vessel Regulations applied to vessels less than 24m in length and the Code of Safety for Small Commercial Vessels was only applicable in the Caribbean trading area.

¹⁰ The classification societies Det Norske Veritas and Germanischer Lloyd merged on 12 September 2013 and were rebranded as Det Norske Veritas-Germanischer Lloyd (DNV-GL)

1.11.4 Principles of safe manning

Regulation 14 of the IMO International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974, as amended (SOLAS) required governments to ensure that all ships were *sufficiently and efficiently manned*. Further guidance on this regulation was available in IMO Resolution A.1047(27) *Principles of Safe Manning*. Issues to be considered when manning ships included the capability to maintain a safe navigational watch and manage all other functions on board including: maintenance, cargo management, security, weathertight integrity and emergencies.

Annex 3 of the guidance stated that vessel managers should submit manning proposals to flag administrations taking into account all the factors necessary for safe operation of the vessel. Flag administrations were then required to consider managers' requests taking into account all the relevant legislation that deal with, inter alia: watchkeeping, hours of work and rest and safety management.

1.11.5 Maritime Labour Convention

The International Labour Organization (ILO) Maritime Labour Convention¹¹ (MLC), 2006, as amended, was intended to ensure that all seafarers are trained and certified as competent and have a right to a safe and secure workplace. For seafarers, the MLC required a minimum of 10 hours rest in any 24-hour period and a minimum of 77 hours rest in any 7-day period; records of work and rest were also required to be kept.

1.12 PREVIOUS OR SIMILAR ACCIDENTS

1.12.1 *Erin Wood*

On the morning of 11 June 2015, *Erin Wood*¹² was on passage west through the Pentland Firth (**Figure 21**) with a following tidal stream. At about 0920, the crew started to experience extreme sea conditions as the vessel approached the notorious Merry Men of Mey tidal race. Seeing the very significant danger ahead, the crew turned the vessel around and then spent over 3 hours making little headway against the strong westerly tidal stream. This was a harrowing experience for the crew and the vessel was in significant danger until clear of the Firth. There was no evidence that the skipper reported the matter to the company or that the incident was investigated.

1.12.2 *Harvest Caroline* grounding – MAIB Report 13/2007

On 31 October 2006, the 712gt, St Vincent and Grenadines registered cargo ship, *Harvest Caroline*, grounded in the Summer Isles off the west coast of Scotland. In addition to low standards of watchkeeping on board, the MAIB investigation established that the company's SMS did not meet the standards mandated by the ISM Code and the vessel's managers lacked experience in marine safety

¹¹ The Maritime Labour Convention applied to all seafarers and had been adopted by both Cyprus and St Kitts and Nevis, the Flag States of both vessels involved in the collision.

¹² The crew on board *Erin Wood* on 11 June 2015 were not the same personnel manning the vessel when the accident described in this report occurred.




Figure 21: Erin Wood – track history in the Pentland Firth on 11 June 2015

management. In addition, it was established that the MCA had rejected an application for UK registration by *Harvest Caroline*'s owners. The MAIB report included a safety recommendation to the MCA to:

review its procedures for flagging in ships to the UK Register to assist in the promotion of the quality of ships operating predominantly in UK waters.

1.12.3 Shoreway and Orca – MAIB Report 10/2015

On 8 June 2014, the dredger *Shoreway* and the yacht *Orca* collided 7 miles off the coast of Felixstowe. The skipper of the yacht was unaware of the risk of collision before it happened and *Shoreway*'s OOW saw *Orca* only seconds before the collision. The accident resulted in catastrophic damage and rapid sinking of *Orca*; the yacht's skipper escaped but his wife did not survive. The MAIB investigation concluded that neither vessel was keeping a proper lookout in accordance with the COLREGs. It was also established that the bridge manning on *Shoreway* was insufficient and the vessel's SMS was of little benefit to the crew. A safety recommendation was made to *Shoreway*'s managers to take action to improve the effectiveness of its SMS.

SECTION 2 – ANALYSIS

2.1 AIM

The purpose of the analysis is to determine the causes and circumstances of the accident as a basis for making recommendations to prevent similar accidents occurring in the future.

2.2 THE COLLISION

Both *Daroja*'s chief officer and the skipper of *Erin Wood* had obligations under the COLREGs to take action to avoid collision. *Daroja* was the give-way vessel in a crossing situation (**Figure 22**) and the most appropriate action would have been for its course to have been altered to starboard to pass safely around *Erin Wood*'s stern.

Erin Wood's skipper, as the OOW on the stand-on vessel, had an initial obligation to hold course and speed. Had *Erin Wood*'s skipper been monitoring the situation, it would have become apparent that *Daroja*, as the give-way vessel, was not taking appropriate avoiding action. In this situation, *Erin Wood*'s skipper was obliged to act to avoid collision. However, because neither vessel was keeping a lookout, the risk of collision went undetected, no avoiding action was taken and the accident resulted.

2.3 THE FLOODING OF ERIN WOOD

When the collision happened, *Erin Wood*'s hull plating was damaged and the vessel heeled heavily to starboard. The collision damage caused the previously empty No.4 port WBT to free-flood and marine gas oil to leak from No.3 port cargo tank. *Erin Wood*'s upper deck weathertight doors had been left open and therefore, when the vessel heeled over, water rushed into the accommodation, bridge and engine room spaces.

The extent of the flooding placed the vessel and the lives of both crewmen in grave danger. It is likely that the instinctive reactions of the skipper to escape through a bridge window and the crewman to grab the top edge of the bulwark as he was washed out of the mess room prevented loss of life.

Erin Wood's external doors were routinely left open at sea and there was no procedure or guidance on board for the maintenance of weathertight integrity. However, the importance of ensuring the weathertight integrity of a low freeboard vessel such as *Erin Wood* should have been readily apparent to the crew. Had these doors been shut at the time of collision, the downflooding of the bridge, accommodation and engine room spaces would have been avoided.

2.4 BRIDGE ROUTINES AND LOOKOUT PROCEDURES ON BOARD DAROJA

Daroja's chief officer had been on the bridge as the OOW for almost an hour prior to the collision and was sitting in the bridge chair when the vessels collided (**Figure 3**). Other than scanning the horizon when he first came on watch, at no point thereafter did he keep a visual lookout. In addition, VDR evidence indicated that he did not interact with the radar display during that time.




Figure 22: Diagram of rule of the road situation between *Daroja* and *Erin Wood*

Erin Wood could have been detected visually from *Daroja* at a maximum range of about 13nm¹³, its AIS transmissions were being received by *Daroja* for 1 hour prior to collision and its radar target appeared on the display screen shortly after the chief officer took over the watch. However, all of these detection opportunities were missed.

Fatigue or tiredness on board *Daroja* were not considered to be contributory factors in this accident. The chief officer failed to maintain a proper lookout because he allowed himself to become distracted, primarily by cargo paperwork but also by a phone call and, potentially, the use of his tablet computer. If completion of the cargo paperwork was critical, then the chief officer should have arranged for another officer to take over the watch or called for the support of a dedicated lookout.

Having completed his paperwork and his discussions on the bridge telephone, the chief officer returned to the bridge chair. When he sat down, *Erin Wood* was about 1.5nm ahead of *Daroja*. It is clearly apparent that he did not look out of his bridge windows or check his radar at this point. Once seated in the bridge chair, visibility was restricted due to the poor height and angle of the chair itself. However, the radar and ECS displays were just in front of him (**Figure 14**) but he did not interact with either and sat doing nothing for about 8 minutes.

¹³ Data from Norie's Nautical Tables (Extreme Range Table) using 16.0m as the OOW of *Daroja*'s height of eye and 5.3m as the height of observable superstructure of *Erin Wood*.

It was clear that the chief officer and *Daroja's* bridge team as a whole had become complacent about their watchkeeping duties. No alarms had been set to alert the chief officer to the risk of collision. Had *Erin Wood* been selected as an ARPA target on the radar, safety settings were available that could have sounded an alarm when the risk of collision developed. The BNWAS was also switched off; although this would not have alerted the chief officer to the risk of collision, it is indicative of the low watchkeeping standards and further demonstrated that bridge equipment was not being utilised effectively.

The repetitive nature of *Daroja's* weekly schedule and the chief officer's familiarity with the trading route almost certainly contributed to the levels of complacency described above. This could have been combatted on board through positive command supervision. It was apparent that *Daroja's* master trusted his bridge watchkeeping officers; however, he should have taken a more proactive approach to mentoring them and enforced a higher standard of watchkeeping.

2.5 BRIDGE ROUTINES AND LOOKOUT PROCEDURES ON BOARD *ERIN WOOD*

About 40 minutes prior to collision, *Erin Wood's* skipper checked the CPAs of AIS contacts on his ECS display; shortly after that, when on the stern deck, he saw a larger vessel approaching. However, he took no effective action to assess the risk of collision.

When the skipper made the sighting, two vessels, *Daroja* and *Grampian Talisman*, were closing *Erin Wood* (**Figure 2**). It is unknown which vessel the skipper saw, but he assumed that the sighted vessel would pass clear by at least 1nm as that had been the nearest AIS CPA he noted earlier. However, this information was no longer valid because of the subsequent course alteration of about 10°, at 1625, that had actually steadied the bearing of *Daroja* and created the risk of collision. Altering course invalidated the previous CPA calculations and the skipper should have reassessed the situation thereafter.

The skipper also made an assumption that the larger vessel he had seen would keep clear. Such an assumption is likely to have been influenced by the skipper's extensive experience in the fishing industry where he was used to merchant vessels giving way to vessels engaged in fishing.

A fundamental principle of maintaining a proper lookout is that it is kept at all times. In the build-up to the collision, *Erin Wood's* skipper left the bridge unattended on several occasions. Additionally, when the skipper returned to the bridge about 10 minutes before the collision, he sat down in the chair on the port side and looked forward out of the windows (**Figure 4**). During this period, he did not move from his seat to interrogate the electronic navigation aids.

In common with the chief officer on board *Daroja*, *Erin Wood's* skipper had become complacent about his watchkeeping responsibilities. Despite being aware of the presence of other vessels, the skipper not only failed to maintain a proper lookout or assess the risk of collision, he also failed to maintain a continuous bridge watch. This extremely unsafe situation, which was normal practice on board *Erin Wood*, demonstrated insufficiencies in crew competence, manning levels and company safety management.

2.6 LONE WATCHKEEPING

Lone watchkeeping in both ships was a significant contributory factor in the build-up to this collision. The STCW Code and ICS Bridge Procedures Guide both describe the conditions to be considered on every occasion prior to lone watchkeeping commencing; these included: the workload being within the OOW's capacity, back-up assistance being readily available and equipment and alarms all fully functional. Had a dedicated lookout been present on *Daroja's* bridge, *Erin Wood* would almost certainly have been spotted and therefore avoided. On board *Erin Wood*, there was insufficient manpower for provision of a dedicated lookout.

Daroja's SMS permitted lone watchkeeping in *open day sea* conditions; however, there was no associated risk assessment and the master's standing orders provided no specific guidance on this issue. This lack of procedure and direction meant that *Daroja's* OOWs, including the master, had settled into a routine where daytime lone watchkeeping was normalised and the associated risks, such as being distracted by paperwork, were not routinely assessed. Had procedures been in place on board *Daroja* to assess the risk of lone watchkeeping prior to taking over each watch, and the critical importance of keeping a lookout been emphasised, it is likely that the chief officer would have either waited until the end of his watch to do his cargo paperwork or called for assistance.

Previous MAIB investigation reports have repeatedly highlighted the significant risks associated with lone watchkeeping. This accident again highlights the potential consequences when these risks are not effectively assessed, managed or understood.

2.7 EMERGENCY RESPONSE

2.7.1 *Daroja*

Once the chief officer realised the vessel had been in collision, he summonsed the master to the bridge and the vessel's FRB was launched to assist *Erin Wood*. However, having been in collision, it would have been appropriate for *Daroja's* crew to have been mustered, a "Mayday" to be transmitted on behalf of *Erin Wood*, and for the vessel to have been immediately checked internally for damage.

2.7.2 *Erin Wood*

Immediately after the collision, the crew raised the alarm, launched the liferaft, donned lifejackets and rigged a portable salvage pump. When the RNLI lifeboat arrived its salvage pump was used to help evacuate the water from the engine room and accommodation spaces.

Once the floodwater was pumped from the vessel, the skipper's effort switched to addressing *Erin Wood's* port list (**Figure 7**). In order to correct this, 11t of seawater was pumped into the previously empty No.4 starboard WBT; this included 3t from the sea. There was no guidance on board regarding damaged stability or stability management, therefore the potential consequences of pumping 3t of seawater into an already flooded and listing vessel were not understood.

Without doubt, the actions of the crew following the collision helped prevent *Erin Wood* from sinking; however, a “Mayday” broadcast would have been appropriate given the circumstances, and, given the lack of stability information or knowledge, it was not appropriate to pump seawater into an evidently damaged ship in an attempt to correct the list.

2.8 THE MANAGEMENT AND OPERATION OF *ERIN WOOD*

2.8.1 Safety management system

The safe operation of a vessel at sea is largely dependent on the development of a SMS that comprehensively covers all aspects of the vessel’s operations. The guidance and procedures contained in a vessel’s SMS should be thoroughly understood and applied by the crew.

A copy of Northern Oils’ *Caley Oils Operations Manual (Annex A)* was carried on board *Erin Wood*, but this did not provide the levels of information and guidance required of an SMS. In particular, there was no guidance on the conduct of watchkeeping, the maintenance of weathertight integrity, stability management or damage control. This resulted in a situation where there was insufficient guidance for the crew in the safe management of their vessel.

2.8.2 Conduct of sea passages

It was apparent that the crew of *Erin Wood* were not developing and following detailed passage plans. Historic AIS evidence (**Figure 20**) showed that *Erin Wood* routinely operated outside the 20nm coastal restriction placed on the vessel by its classification society. Again, there was no company process in place to ensure that this restriction was understood and applied, and the crew were unaware of it.

It was also notable that *Erin Wood* was routinely transiting the Pentland Firth which, although inside 20nm from shore, is an area notorious for treacherous sea conditions, often very dangerous for small vessels. On 11 June 2015 (**Figure 21**), the crew of *Erin Wood* spent over 3 hours trying to extricate the vessel from the Pentland Firth tidal race; this was a potentially perilous situation for such a small vessel.

The fact that *Erin Wood* routinely operated outside 20nm from shore (**Figure 20**) further illustrates that Northern Oils did not have a management system to ensure that the vessel was operated in compliance with stated safety requirements.

2.8.3 Crewing arrangements

Erin Wood was certified as an oil bunker barge, but was operating continuously as a small coastal tanker transporting fuel between Northern Oils’ shore depots. The requirement for safe manning of vessels is embedded in international regulations including SOLAS, STCW and the MLC, all of which require competent crew to operate their ship safely.

The manning proposals for *Erin Wood*, submitted by Northern Oils to the Flag State in October 2014 and then February 2015, were not compliant with relevant regulations. It was not tenable to suggest that a small tanker could be operated continuously with two crew and the comparison with the Norwegian Flag’s

requirement was misleading because that arrangement had placed an operating hours restriction on the vessel. In response, the Flag State proposed adopting a *daylight hours* restriction; however, this did not result in a special condition on the MSMC (**Annex C**). This omission meant that the Flag State was, in effect, approving unsafe manning.

Uncertainty also arose in the manning negotiations regarding appropriate qualifications for *Erin Wood's* crew. Northern Oils initially proposed that the crew should be *competent and ticketed* but that *formal merchant certificates* would not be required, and suggested that RYA or fishing vessel qualifications would suffice. This was ambiguous, and further dialogue led to the company's request for a minimum manning level of two crew with STCW qualifications, which was later reflected on the issued MSMC (**Annex C**). However, neither of the crew on board at the time of the accident possessed the necessary STCW qualifications.

The responsibility for safe manning of the vessel rested with Northern Oils. Agency supplied crew had been suitably qualified; however, when the company decided to recruit its own crew locally, no attempt was made to employ appropriately qualified or experienced personnel. The fact that *Erin Wood's* crew were not suitably qualified or experienced was because Northern Oils' staff lacked the marine management experience to identify and apply the relevant regulations for the type of vessel being operated. Equally, the crew themselves were unaware of the fact that they were not qualified to operate the vessel.

Competence is the ability to undertake responsibilities and to perform activities to a recognised standard on a regular basis. It is a combination of practical and thinking skills, qualifications, knowledge and experience. Although *Erin Wood's* crew, in particular the skipper, were very experienced mariners, they lacked the qualifications, skills or experience necessary to safely and competently operate an oil bunker barge or small coastal tanker.

Erin Wood was not manned in accordance with its MSMC and its crew did not have the levels of competency required to operate and maintain the vessel at sea or handle its hazardous cargoes. Furthermore, given the nature of its operations, the requirements of the MSMC were wholly inadequate; a two-person crew, with only one requiring a bridge watchkeeping qualification was insufficient to maintain a continuous bridge watch at sea.

2.9 NORTHERN OILS

2.9.1 Company management and commercial pressure

Procuring and then operating a fleet of small coastal tankers requires a competent shore management team with the skills necessary to create and then implement a safety management system. The rapid development of Northern Oils' maritime division through the purchase of three small tankers was not matched with the creation of a suitable shore management team to run the fleet.

Although Northern Oils' logistics director had previously worked at sea and the company had recruited a marine manager, neither had experience of tanker operations or hazardous cargoes. The company's international projects manager, who had been responsible for the purchase and commissioning of the fleet, also had no recent or relevant experience of tanker safety management. Because Northern

Oils' vessels all fell below the 500gt limit, the ISM Code did not apply and, therefore, there was no internationally mandated requirement for the company to demonstrate that its SMS met an acceptable standard.

The driving force in the management of Northern Oils' fleet was the commercial pressure to meet customers' demand for fuel from the company's coastal depots. This resulted in an ambitious schedule for Northern Oils' vessels, which were expected to work continuously and flexibly to restock coastal depots; a situation exacerbated by *John Wood's* engine seizure, which placed further schedule loading on *Erin Wood*.

Thus, the combination of a shore team that lacked the necessary skills and the absence of a requirement to demonstrate compliance with a safety management standard meant that Northern Oils was able to create its marine operations division without sufficient management competence. Without an underpinning SMS, the commercial pressure to restock coastal depots dominated Northern Oils' marine management and was prioritised ahead of marine safety.

2.9.2 Choice of Flag State and Recognised Organisation for *Erin Wood*

When Northern Oils' purchased *Erin Wood*, the vessel was deleted from the Norwegian registry. Although Northern Oils considered UK registration of *Erin Wood*, no formal application was made; instead, the company focused on achieving SKN registration through survey by the IS classification society.

Flag States and their ROs are required to ensure compliance with relevant regulations but, more widely, set the standards for safe conduct of vessels including environmental protection. Risks associated with choice of Flag State and RO should be taken into account by vessel owners and managers. According to the IMO's Paris MoU performance tables covering the period 2012 - 2014 (**Annex D**), the SKN Registry was on the 'grey' list of Flag States and the IS classification society was, globally, the second worst performing RO.

As Northern Oils' vessels were being operated solely between UK ports and within UK coastal waters, it would have been preferable for them to have been flagged in the UK. However, given that the MCA and other white list registries might not have been prepared to accept the risks associated with registering a single-hulled tanker as old as *Erin Wood*, then Northern Oils' options were limited.

2.10 FLAG AND COASTAL STATE OVERSIGHT

2.10.1 Flag State

As a foreign-flagged vessel operating in UK waters, *Erin Wood* was subject to international regulations, Flag State national regulations and, where applicable, elements of the coastal state's regulations. The safe and legal operation of the vessel relied on ensuring compliance with such regulations. The SKN Registry did not conduct a Flag State inspection of the vessel on entry to its register; instead, it delegated the task to its RO, the IS classification society.

Based on advice received from the IS technical office in Miami, the RO's non-exclusive surveyor in the UK used a series of checklists to examine and certify *Erin Wood*. These checklists did not include navigational or safety equipment. Additionally, despite the anticipated operation of the vessel in UK waters, no reference was made to any applicable UK regulations.

On completion of the surveys and after technical scrutiny in Miami, the IS headquarters in Panama issued a safety certificate (**Annex B**) stating that *Erin Wood* was compliant with *Annex B of IMO Final Report on the Seminars on Safety and Load Line Regulations (Realized Under Project RAS/93/034)*. This was an unratified set of regulations aimed at new build vessels in the Asian region. The IS surveyor in the UK had no knowledge of these regulations and was unaware that they were to be applied.

The absence of a dedicated Flag State inspection for a new applicant vessel, allied to inconsistencies in the RO's survey and certification, resulted in *Erin Wood* and its intended operations not being sufficiently scrutinised by its Flag State. It was clear that the risks associated with the vessel were not properly assessed and that the SKN Registry and IS classification society need to review their vessel survey and certification processes.

2.10.2 Coastal state

The primary mechanism for the UK as a coastal state to identify risks associated with foreign-flagged vessels in its waters was the Paris MoU PSC inspection regime, implemented by the MCA. The IMO database was the internationally recognised register used by the MCA to identify foreign vessels for inspection; high risk vessels were also identified and targeted for more frequent inspection based on the performance status of their Flag State or the receipt of reported incidents and concerns.

Erin Wood was not inspected by the MCA under the PSC regime. This was because the vessel was not IMO registered and therefore was not listed in the IMO database. However Northern Oils' other vessels, *John Wood* and *Wood Spirit*, were IMO registered, had been identified as high risk by the MCA and were subject to frequent PSC inspections. The MCA had also received reports about *Erin Wood's* manning and operational shortcomings from the Peterhead harbourmaster.

Given the number of deficiencies found on board *John Wood* and *Wood Spirit* and the reported concerns of the Peterhead harbourmaster, it is reasonable to conclude that the MCA had the necessary information to target *Erin Wood* for inspection. Had *Erin Wood* been subject to an MCA inspection, it is highly likely that the manning and operational shortfalls discussed in this report would have been identified.

SECTION 3 – CONCLUSIONS

3.1 SAFETY ISSUES DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT THAT HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED OR RESULTED IN RECOMMENDATIONS

1. *Daroja* and *Erin Wood* collided because a proper lookout was not being kept on either vessel. [2.2]
2. On board *Daroja*, the chief officer, who was the OOW, missed multiple opportunities to detect *Erin Wood*; this happened because he had become complacent about his watchkeeping duties and allowed himself to become distracted. [2.4]
3. Complacency and poor watchkeeping practices were systemic on board *Daroja*. This was largely due to the repetitive nature of its trading route and a lack of mentorship and direction from the vessel's master. [2.4]
4. Although *Erin Wood*'s skipper was aware of the presence of another vessel, he did not effectively assess the situation and assumed a larger vessel would keep clear. [2.5]
5. Lone watchkeeping was a normal practice in both vessels and the risks associated with this had not been properly assessed. [2.6]
6. The lives of *Erin Wood*'s crew were placed in significant danger. The skipper's presence of mind to escape from the flooded bridge, and the deckhand managing to hold on to the bulwark to prevent being washed completely overboard, are actions that probably saved their lives. [2.3]
7. The flooding of *Erin Wood*'s bridge, accommodation spaces and engine room would have been prevented if the upper deck weathertight doors had been shut. [2.3]
8. *Erin Wood*'s crew did not have the competence necessary to operate a small coastal tanker; the vessel was also not provided with an effective safety management system. [2.8]

3.2 SAFETY ISSUES NOT DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTING TO THE ACCIDENT THAT HAVE BEEN ADDRESSED OR RESULTED IN RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Northern Oils, the managers of *Erin Wood*, did not have the management experience necessary to run a fleet of small tankers. Additionally, the company prioritised commercial gain ahead of marine safety. [2.9.1]
2. Northern Oils did not recognise or take into account the risks associated with a grey listed Flag State and a low performing recognised organisation. [2.9.2]
3. Surveys of *Erin Wood*, conducted by the International Register of Shipping on behalf of the Flag State, did not ensure that the vessel complied with appropriate international, or applicable national, regulations. [2.10.1]

4. The St Kitts and Nevis International Ship Registry did not identify risks associated with *Erin Wood*'s operations due to inconsistencies in the initial survey regime and the absence of a dedicated Flag State inspection. [2.10.1]
5. The Maritime and Coastguard Agency did not identify the risks associated with *Erin Wood*'s operations primarily because the vessel was not IMO registered and, therefore, not inspected under the Port State Control regime. [2.10.2]

SECTION 4 – ACTION TAKEN

United Shipping Companies Barnkrug GmbH & Co.KG has:

- Conducted an internal investigation to identify the casual factors of the accident.
- Updated *Daroja's* Safety Management System to include:
 - further guidance on the use of mobile phones and other electronic devices
 - updated advice on bridge watchkeeping standards.
- Brought to the attention of all navigation officers, the requirement for the BNWAS to remain on at all times when the vessel is at sea and steering by autopilot.
- Improved the OOW's visibility from the bridge chair on *Daroja* by raising it approximately 30cm.

The St Kitts and Nevis International Ship Registry has:

- Implemented procedures that ensure relevant Flag State operating restrictions are included on vessels' minimum safe manning certificates.

SECTION 5 – RECOMMENDATIONS

The St Kitts and Nevis International Ship Registry is recommended to:

2016/155 Ensure that, for vessels applying to join the Registry:

- A Flag State inspection of the vessel takes place to review compliance with relevant regulations.
- Manning negotiations with owners/managers take into account all relevant factors set out in the IMO Principles of Safe Manning.

Northern Oils (Scotland) Limited is recommended to:

2016/156 Develop a company safety management system to ensure that:

- All company vessels are safely manned to meet the requirements of international and national regulations.
- Vessel crews are suitably trained, qualified and experienced to operate the company's vessels.
- Shore-based staff are suitably trained and experienced to manage a fleet of small tankers.

United Shipping Companies Barnkrug GmbH & Co.KG is recommended to:

2016/157 Improve standards of bridge watchkeeping by introducing measures to ensure that:

- On each occasion prior to lone watchkeeping, all relevant factors are considered in accordance with the ICS Bridge Procedures Guide.
- Standards of onboard bridge team monitoring are reviewed in order to ensure that watchkeepers are effectively supervised and watchkeeping standards maintained, in particular: the effective use of all bridge navigational aids and alarms.

Safety recommendations shall in no case create a presumption of blame or liability

