

DFID WASH Results Programme

Learning Event

The 2016 Learning Event was held on 7th March, 2016 at National Council for Voluntary Organisations, London, UK.

Participants were largely drawn from the three internal stakeholders of the WASH Results programme: the *Donor* (DFID), *Suppliers* (SNV, and the SAWRP and SWIFT consortia) and the *Monitoring, Verification and Evaluation (MVE) service provider* (e-Pact consortium). Also present was a representative of the Girls' Education Challenge (another DFID programme, funded partly through the Payment by Results modality). See Annex A, for the full list of participants.

As explained in 'What is WASH Results?' on page 3, in WASH Results, Suppliers work in different settings, have separate contracts with DFID and thus have been able to agree with DFID the targets, definitions and milestones that apply to their contract. For these reasons, Suppliers may experience aspects of the Payment By Results funding modality differently from each other.

This report summarises the sessions' discussions, highlights the main areas of consensus and disagreement, and presents ideas to consider for future Payment by Results programmes. The intention is for the report to provide an objective summary of the discussions and contributions made by participants; DFID, the Suppliers and the MVE service provider use their own channels to share their particular perspectives on the WASH Results Programme¹.

¹ See for example, <https://washresultsmve.wordpress.com/> and <http://swiftconsortium.org/>

Executive Summary

Coming at the end of the Output phase of the WASH Results Programme, this was the programme's third learning event and aimed to support participants to collaboratively identify insights from the programme, particularly around the Payment by Results (PBR) modality. The event succeeded in consolidating and building on participants' previous impressions and knowledge while bringing into sharper focus some of the unresolved tensions and challenges presented by PBR. Several participants observed a greater level of openness than at earlier learning events, based on the trust that has built up over time.

Discussions revealed broad consensus around the following areas:

- Suppliers appreciate the flexibility within PBR to change their approach, as compared to a typical grant, but there was disagreement between Suppliers about whether PBR has driven innovation at a programmatic level or not.
- PBR has seen Monitoring & Evaluation replace Finance as the central role in programme management and has been an effective means of incentivising delivery and focusing minds on risks, costs and results.
- Aligning with local government is something Suppliers are committed to doing, regardless of PBR, and while there are challenges to this, Suppliers reported several examples of having been able to align to local systems, approaches and priorities.
- Whatever model of PBR is used (100% or some hybrid version), an adequate Inception Phase with early payment for Suppliers should be a feature of any future programmes funded through PBR.
- Suppliers were strongly opposed to an entirely independent verification system but the current systems-based approach to verification could be improved.
- Participants saw no need for an independent Management Agent for future programmes (as is the case for some other DFID programmes), instead preferring to work directly with DFID.

The event also highlighted issues that need further consideration:

- Defining targets: While more sophisticated targets that focus on outcomes from the start are desirable, these may be harder for external stakeholders (such as politicians or the general public in donor countries) to understand or appreciate, compared to simpler targets with large numbers attached.
- How to describe, and make a requirement, the intangible benefits offered by Suppliers (such as commitment to alignment, existing relationships with local governments, etc.) during the tendering process so that value for money comparison is fairer.
- The detail of alternative models to a 100% PBR model: what would need to be decided at contracting or inception phase? How exactly would a hybrid PBR model work?
- Getting the right balance between clearly outlining expectations of results and their measurement, with the flexibility to respond to operating contexts. At what point in tendering, contracting or design phase should Suppliers give firm details?

What is WASH Results?

The DFID Water, Sanitation & Hygiene (WASH) Results Programme aims to support poor people in 12 countries to access improved water and sanitation, and to introduce improved hygiene practices. WASH Results uses a funding relationship known as Results Based Financing (RBF) where the funding goes from DFID (the commissioning agent) to a Supplier or Service Provider. RBF is a type of Payment By Results (PBR), a relatively new form of financing used by DFID that makes payments contingent on verification of the Supplier/Service Provider's monitoring and reporting systems by an Independent Verifier.

The diagram below illustrates the roles and relationships between the commissioning agent, Supplier and monitoring and verification agent in the WASH Results Programme.




Figure 1: Relationships between commissioning agent, supplier, and monitoring and verification agent

Three Suppliers were contracted by DFID to deliver results in WASH by December 2015 and strengthen local systems and build local capacity to help sustain these results up to March 2018:

- The **SWIFT Consortium** – led by Oxfam, with Tearfund, Overseas Development Institute (ODI), and Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor (WSUP), together with

local partners, working in DRC and Kenya and contributing to all three areas of WASH.

- The **South Asia WASH Results Programme (SAWRP)**, a consortium led by Plan UK with WaterAid, Unilever, Water and Sanitation for the Urban Poor (WSUP), the Water Engineering and Development Centre (WEDC) and IPSOS working in Bangladesh and Pakistan and also across all three areas of WASH.
- The **Sustainable Sanitation and Hygiene for All (SSH4A) Results Programme** implemented by the SNV Netherlands Development Organisation; working in Ghana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mozambique, Nepal, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and focusing on sanitation and hygiene only.

Although each Supplier has a separate contract with DFID and the results and measurement approaches vary, across all three contracts the main payments are for gains in access to water and sanitation services.

The e-Pact consortium is the Monitoring, Verification & Evaluation (MVE) service provider for WASH Results with Itad as the lead agency, joined by OPM, IWEL and Ecorys. The Monitoring & Verification (MV) team supports DFID by monitoring progress and verifying that the Suppliers' reporting on results is accurate and realistic. The Evaluation team is assessing if and why the programme delivers sustainable outcomes, how efficiently and effectively it is operating and how to effectively design and implement RBF programmes in the WASH sector. Cutting across the work of the MV and Evaluation teams is a Learning & Dissemination function, that supports knowledge-sharing and learning between the Suppliers, DFID and the MV team and helps lessons learned about RBF in WASH reach a wide audience.

Workshop Agenda

Opening Session: why are we here and what is expected from the workshop? *See p.6 for summary, and p.3 for an overview of the WASH Results Programme.*

Session 1: Emerging implications of the Payment by Results (PBR) design on programme delivery

Have participants experienced and observed the same effects of the PBR design (and to the same extent)? *See p.7.*

Session 2: Designing an intelligent PBR modality to achieve sustainable and inclusive programming

Groups each explored one idea for improved design:

- More intelligent target setting with greater focus on outcomes from the start
 - Hybrid PBR model
 - Greater differentiation in price per beneficiary / weighting depending on the context
 - Aligning programme design with local priorities, context and reporting mechanisms
- See p.11.*

Session 3: Designing an effective verification approach

Participants explored the pros and cons of independent verification (led by a Monitoring and Verification team) as compared to verification based on Supplier-provided evidence. *See p.14 for a summary of the discussion.*

Session 4: Roles and Responsibilities

Do we agree who should do what in the design and management of a PBR programme?
See p.16.

Session 5: Reflecting and wrapping up

An informal panel/chat show featuring representatives from Suppliers, DFID, the MV team and Evaluation team prompted reflection on the day's discussions and what they added up to. *See p.18.*

Opening Session: why are we here and what is expected from the workshop?

Welcome from Leonard Tedd, DFID

From his experience as Senior Responsible Owner for the WASH Results Programme, Leonard reminded participants that when the programme was designed in the summer of 2012 it was on the basis of a set of assumptions including:

- organisations would have the capacity to operate at scale
- people/organisations would be interested in engaging with DFID on a commercial basis, rather than the grant funding approach with which they may be more familiar.

Leonard commented that although he and Laura Westcott, the WASH Deputy Team Leader and Statistics Adviser engage frequently with Suppliers, this learning event provided them the chance to step back from day-to-day queries and understand any major issues missed along the way, how the experience of delivering the programme challenges the assumptions made, and how any risks could be reduced.

The learning event was particularly timely for DFID as they are considering a new tender for WASH in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and DFID's commitments to achievements in WASH by 2020. The SDG aim is no longer reducing by half the number of people who lack access to water or sanitation, but is for universal access including those who are "hard to reach", which brings in new technical and economic challenges.

Connecting with the evaluation

Members of the WASH Results Evaluation Team were present as observers to aid their understanding of the Programme and to update participants on progress with the evaluation. Richard Carter from the Evaluation Team explained that the evaluation is formed of two components: a set of three country case studies (with fieldwork in 2016 and then at the end of the outcome phase in 2018) and a randomised controlled trial (RCT) in Pakistan. The team had previously shared a summary of the high level evaluation questions with participants and explained that in the absence of a counter-factual, they would be taking a contribution analysis approach to seeing the effect of PBR on delivery as well as looking at what Suppliers would normally do under a grants model. Findings from the evaluation will be communicated as they emerge.

Session 1: Emerging implications of the Payment by Results (PBR) design on programme delivery

This session sought to explore participants' perspectives on the effect of the PBR design of WASH Results on the way in which the programme has been delivered. A set of statements were presented to participants that reflected opinions or questions raised by Suppliers, DFID and MV team in previous reflection processes.

Participants were asked to organise themselves in a “human Likert scale” based on the extent to which they agreed with these statements. The differences between perspectives were explored through subsequent discussions.



Participants discussing their positions on a human Likert scale

1. PBR under the WASH Results Programme has been a highly effective means of incentivising delivery at scale.

Most participants broadly agreed, a few people were in-between, a few disagreed

Why people agreed: Participants compared what has been delivered through WASH Results with some other large-scale programmes where staff and logistics are put in place but are not necessarily being accountable for delivery.

“to me that’s been quite a stark standout in this programme” (Don Brown, e-Pact).

Why people disagreed: They challenged “highly effective” and “at scale”; Suppliers are used to working at scale, so questioned how PBR is different from a grant scenario.

Why people were in-between: They didn’t feel they had a clear point of comparison against a grant programme. While they acknowledged that the hardness of deadlines has been effective, they questioned whether the right things were being incentivised.

“Are we focusing mainly on things that can be counted?” (Francesco Rigamonti, SWIFT)

2. PBR is not well suited for demand side behaviour change programmes (e.g. Community Led Total Sanitation).

Participants were evenly split between Agree and Disagree

Why people agreed: Because behaviour change is a “higher order” outcome and the time-frame of WASH Results is too short. *“It takes a generation to change behaviour”*

“We’re looking at very low-level outcomes in a 4 or 5-year programme; we’re somewhere between outputs and outcomes,” (Louise Medland, SAWRP).

Why people disagreed: It could only be well suited if the conditions are right; what is being measured and how needs to be made clearer, Suppliers would need to be given sufficient

time and activities would need to be costed properly. The uncertainty around achieving behaviour change would require a high risk premium and the costs of verification would be extremely high.

“One challenge for us is there’s no standard methodology to measure behaviour change; how you define behaviour change and how you measure it is where the risks lie” (Ian Gavin, SAWRP).

3. PBR contributes to professionalising the sector by promoting focus on costing, risks and focusing minds on results

Most people agreed, with a few scattered in the middle or strongly disagreeing

Why people agreed: There was some agreement among Suppliers that PBR “focuses minds on results”. One Supplier commented that PBR had improved the quality of their internal monitoring, while another Supplier highlighted a shift in culture among their local partners who now had a stronger sense of accountability about whether they delivered or not.

“Grants have never made it so clear that you ought to deliver... Country directors have to deliver in ways that they have not necessarily had to deliver before and this transpires through to partners, local governments and sub-contractors...Quite a number of these actors have started to applaud us for it.” (Jan Ubels, SNV)

Why people disagreed (strongly): They challenged the word “professionalising” arguing that the sector was already professional. They argued that PBR made the sector more *commercial*, not more professional and they suggested a need to discuss whether having a commercial focus is good or bad.

Why people were in-between: Although PBR does cause organisations to focus on risks, costing and results, they consider professionalising to mean bringing in other issues like sustainability and inclusivity.

4. The PBR modality disincentives alignment with government and local communities

Generally, a broad spread with a skew towards Strongly Agree, however there was no consensus by stakeholder with different members of DFID, Suppliers and MV Team at different ends of the spectrum.

Why people agreed: Because non-governmental organisations (NGOs) already work in a way that aligns with government (not just because they are funded by PBR).

The extent to which alignment is incentivised through PBR depends on the design both of the tender and of results frameworks. One Supplier noted that SNV had been smart to build in alignment with government by including district plans as a deliverable, and indeed SNV has found that the approach influences how districts think about their plans.

The MV team noted that alignment is not currently verified, but that one might want to. However, one Supplier suggested care would be needed when verifying alignment with government and asked if it would be too difficult politically to include alignment in PBR.

Why people disagreed: Individuals from DFID, Suppliers and MV team felt that more definition was needed about the sort of alignment, what one is trying to measure and what goals have been set. They observed that due to the time frame and the 100% PBR nature of WASH Results, alignment may not have happened where it normally would have.

Although there are sensitivities about working with PBR with government bodies the response is mixed. SAWRP has experienced such a positive response to PBR among one government with whom they work, that SAWRP has been asked by the government to help them implement it themselves.

5. Focus on results and attention to good metrics has accelerated innovation.

Initially, most people strongly disagreed, with one participant (MV team) strongly agreeing. During the subsequent discussion it became evident that agreement or disagreement depended in some cases on the location of innovation (programme management, verification, implementation, etc.).

Why people agreed: Innovation has been found within management rather than at a programmatic level. A member of the MV team observed a transformation in the role of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) within at least one Supplier, compared to typical grant programmes. M&E has become central to programme management while finance has become peripheral. There was some agreement with this comment from other participants.

Why people disagreed: Suppliers reported that they had not had the time and space to innovate (the focus was on delivery in order to get paid) so any innovation was either at a process level, or had been tested and piloted prior to application in WASH Results. One Supplier queried whether there had been a clear steer *not* to innovate, with DFID requesting Suppliers to avoid piloting and testing, and focus on scaling up instead.

Why people were in-between: The MV team noted that innovations in mobile technology and documenting had been brought in for monitoring and verification that probably wouldn't have been used otherwise. SNV also observed that there had been quite a lot of learning and exchange at country level, about how one reached numbers and costs.

Exploring alignment under PBR

The Suppliers each reflected briefly how the design of the WASH Results Programme had affected their ability to align with local and national government sector planning and reporting.

Flexibility supports alignment: Suppliers value being allowed to change their approach without going through a contract amendment process. In one case a Supplier was able to change definitions of results to better align with national government definitions. However, there are potential risks in this approach: *“Alignment to what? If the government has a much lower CLTS standard than the SDGs – is that still the alignment we are trying to encourage?”* (Louise Medland, SAWRP)

“Flexibility of the contract has allowed the space for alignment: in DRC we were able to modify the programme to help align with the government’s Healthy Villages and Schools approach” (Francesco Rigamonti, SWIFT)

“Something I really like about this programme is that you have the flexibility to define the results” (Jason Calvert, PWC)

Building alignment into results packages: There was some sense that the focus on outputs in the first phase of WASH Results had taken attention away from areas such as alignment that are not so easily linked to milestones and so opportunities for alignment had been missed. However, SNV took a different approach to other suppliers by building concrete items into their results packages to reflect their work with local partners, e.g. district plans in each of 60 districts in which they work. While this was felt to be a “smart” approach – SNV warned that there are also disadvantages:

“We think we have found some meaningful ways to address elements of alignment, but let’s not be too optimistic about these instruments; they focus attention on direct deliverables” (Jan Ubels, SNV).

Challenge of timelines: WASH Results has tight deadlines and an emphasis on deliverables while partners, e.g. water authorities, are working to a different longer timeline and may not deliver at the pace required. Suppliers noted there was a limit to how much risk could be transferred.

PBR risks limiting Suppliers to existing relationships: participants agreed that PBR can only be introduced where there is existing relationships and social capital and it would be risky to try to implement PBR in places where there was no established relationship.

Value alignment at tendering and contracting stage: Alignment should be considered when costing at the tendering and contracting stage so that prospective Suppliers are competing on an equal basis, given the additional cost (and value) alignment brings. All suppliers were concerned that the private sector would not bring the same level of relationships and social capital as INGOs so may appear more competitive in a tender

Additional demands of monitoring for PBR: One Supplier felt that the kind of monitoring carried out for WASH Results could never be the same as that carried out at a local level; it would always be additional to, rather than aligned with, that of the government, although it might stimulate M&E at a local level.

Session 2: Designing an intelligent PBR modality to achieve sustainable and inclusive programming

The Learning Event built on individual reflection by WASH Results stakeholders who each submitted learning notes to DFID in Jan 2016. Many suggestions in the learning notes concerned how to create a PBR modality that will better incentivise sustainable and inclusive programming. Four ideas were identified from these notes, participants split into groups to explore each idea in more depth and their implications for the design of a stronger PBR modality.

1. More intelligent target setting with greater focus on outcomes from the start

WASH Results is divided into output and outcome phases. Stakeholders in the programme agree that this divide is artificial and a focus on outcomes from the start is desirable. This discussion explored the practicalities of that approach.

Key points:

- If this happened, then the focus of M&E would be more on outcomes than outputs but working through PBR has made it clear that the WASH sector needs to agree on the evidence and data it needs to predict results and standardise ways of measuring behaviour change.
- If the focus is on outcomes, the option to include process inputs intended to contribute to outcomes (e.g. baseline surveys) in payment milestones is important and needs to be communicated to Suppliers, however this does pose challenges for verification
- The use of a commercial tender for contracting Suppliers has hampered sharing of plans and models between organisations compared to the norm with grant-funded programmes.
- Front-line people involved in delivery need to be able to understand the result otherwise they cannot be incentivised to do it.
- There is a political challenge of providing low numbers from sophisticated indicators vs. big numbers from simple indicators that can be easily communicated to the general public.



2. Using an alternative PBR model to the 100% model in the current programme

Unlike other large PBR programmes, WASH Results uses a 100% PBR model². This has posed challenges, including how costs that are not directly related to delivery of outputs are reflected in tender documents and in price per beneficiary. The idea of a hybrid model has been proposed a number of times, this group explored the practicalities of that idea.

² However, an important distinction between WASH Results and “pure” 100% PBR is that some of the results that Suppliers agreed with DFID are at the input/process level rather than at just output and outcome levels.

“something we found as a challenge in our programme was the learning bit...and the cost of learning in competitiveness of the bid...if we include learning from the start, how would we then justify additional costs that allow us to contribute to the sector, and learn as an organisation?” Marc Faux SAWRP

Key points:

- Participants explored isolating some elements of the programme (learning; internal monitoring, verification and evaluation; and core costs) through a hybrid model where these were excluded from PBR or smarter payment packages.
- There was a particular focus on learning. One idea explored was an operational research component that ran alongside delivery of a programme across multiple Suppliers. This has the advantage of economies of scale but raises issues about intellectual property and would lead Suppliers to ask “why are they learning on our programme?”
- Any model would need to strike a balance between achieving sustainability while meeting the reality of managing a programme e.g. not paying Suppliers at the end of 10 years, timing of payments is important.
- Reporting requirements of a hybrid model need to be reasonable, not requiring both results reporting and finance reporting:
“Fear of going down hybrid route is that we would have to do both; finance reporting and results reporting and getting the worst of both worlds” (Rachel Stevens, SWIFT)
- The group suggested two possible models:
 - Option 1) keeping the model as 100% PBR - adapt SNV’s approach: use different payment milestones, some more and some less within the Supplier’s control and add advance payment options.
- Option 2) adopt a hybrid model through which some activities would be funded under a grant basis, separate from those funded under PBR. This model would need to retain the flexibility and lower burden on financial reporting that Suppliers value from the existing model. Participants suggested including a funded inception phase (submission of an inception phase report triggers payment to Suppliers) or a set of products such as a baseline survey and inception report for which Suppliers get paid.

3. Greater differentiation in price per beneficiary / weighting depending on the context

This topic explored the challenges of working within a PBR framework that uses a standard price per beneficiary as a means of linking results to payment. The concern is that this approach risks incentivising focussing on easier to reach beneficiaries.

Key points:

- Value for Money for DFID is not just about being the cheapest, it is also about quality of delivery and needs to encompass ambitions about wanting to reach the most vulnerable, alignment, capacity building etc., but it is difficult to assess this in a meaningful way.
- There is uncertainty within DFID and the sector on what a reasonable price is; the product in this case is ill-defined (not just a toilet, for example, but includes the process that led to it being built too).
- Meaningful comparison of tenders may imply greater requirement for suppliers to explain why the price is what it is: what additionalities it includes, not just what is done

but how. However, such requirements may force organisations to reveal commercial information, donors requesting information on both cost and price is “having your cake and eating it”.

- Suppliers face differential costs in different contexts, how can this be communicated in a tender?
 - Should they be packaged together into a standardised price and if so, do organisations risk pricing themselves out if they try to work with the hardest to reach?
 - An alternative approach is to submit different prices that reflect costs of operating in different contexts and risk profiles, however this raises questions about levels of specificity in the tender (e.g. detail of geographical areas) which potentially limits flexibility and increases complexity of reporting.
- Bilateral donors have low tolerance to risk compared to foundations who are more comfortable with innovation and potential failure as long as there is learning. This is important when thinking about risk and the limits of what bilateral donors can do.

4. Aligning programme design with local priorities, context and reporting mechanisms

Building on the discussion earlier in the morning, participants broadened the topic beyond alignment with local reporting, to alignment as acting in support of locally-defined priorities. There were still some unanswered questions such as who owns the assets created through the programme? Might the alignment requirement stop Suppliers from working in places they don't know?

Key points:

- Alignment might be more difficult in certain contexts, such as urban areas.
- If alignment is incentivised, then it brings in a risk of over-promising by prospective Suppliers.
- Programme-level evidence should be used to feed back into and strengthen country systems.
- The Suppliers observed that there have been examples of their work having a greater influence on government than expected (going beyond alignment) but this was not an objective of WASH Results. This could be supported through a separate fund to which Suppliers could apply to support additional activities during a PBR programme if opportunities for influencing were identified.
- To support alignment within a PBR mechanism, the group recommended:
 - defining specific hard deliverables, perhaps during a pre-inception phase, that were somewhere between output and outcome phase e.g. district plans.
 - including specific rewards or incentives aimed at government to encourage their buy-in to the programme.

During the short plenary discussion that followed, the following themes emerged:

- There might be some things within WASH for which PBR is not the answer.
- Challenge of bringing in improvements to the model, while still allowing for flexibility and partial payment for underachievement, and keeping the model easy enough to understand so that people apply for it.
- Managing external expectations about the price per beneficiary given the additional costs involved in working in certain contexts; getting more beneficiaries for less money is not the same as VFM.

Session 3: Designing an effective verification approach

Participants explored the pros and cons of entirely independent verification - led by a Monitoring and Verification (MV) team - compared to the current approach within which evidence is generated by Suppliers then verified by the MV team, and in which Suppliers' systems are appraised by the MV team (see p.3 for more details).



Key points:

Suppliers were strongly opposed to an entirely independent verification system

Several reasons were given by participants (not just Suppliers) for Supplier-led evidence generation including:

- Data are an essential part of Suppliers' relationships with a whole range of partners. They can be used (with and between individual partners) to develop trust, unearth difficult issues, create clarity and build accountability;
- Suppliers collect more data than that which is required for verification, to inform programming, learning and strategy adjustments;
- Having a separate collection of data by independent verifiers would create significant additional costs;
- Collecting reliable and meaningful data requires a strong understanding of the realities and dynamics of the field.
- Where Suppliers are investing in developing, applying and refining modern data tools to increase their capacity to deliver results at larger scale, taking away data collection for verification weakens Suppliers' ability to develop and deliver improved approaches to scale.
- Strengthens relationships with local implementers who are key to providing information needed for verification. This requires a lot of goodwill and coordination, which would be unlikely if an independent third party monitor was used.
- Keeping data collection in-house avoids the huge risk inherent in delinking the Supplier (responsible for achieving the results, and getting paid for them) from the monitoring of the results;
- Enables the close involvement in survey design and implementation necessary for Suppliers to feel confident about the data generated.

Systems-based verification has advantages but could be improved

Participants recognised that there were benefits to a systems-based verification, although they pointed out it was far more extensive than indicated in initial tender documentation. They felt the approach could be improved by:

- Establishing survey quality standards in advance so that Suppliers can budget sufficient resources to meet those standards;
- Including payment milestones relating to any baseline survey/s in an Inception Phase e.g. “the supplier’s approach to minimising gaming” as a milestone which would be verified to check the robustness of the system;
- Being clearer about consequences from the outset (e.g. what happens if Verifiers report that a survey is not good enough?) so Suppliers are certain that their systems are good enough to generate the data for payment.

“constantly changing the standards of systems-based verification completely undermines the benefits of that certainty” (Francesco Rigamonti, SWIFT)

Surveys are not the only option for measuring outcomes

Surveys tend to be the default approach but they are very expensive and unimaginative.

Participants suggested some alternative approaches, although these have disadvantages that would need addressing before use within a PBR programme:


- **Beneficiary-led monitoring** (e.g. sticker diaries used among schoolchildren by Unilever); some doubts over their appropriateness for PBR given their subjectivity
- **Investing in and using government systems**, such as national capacity for MICS/DHS surveys, particularly relevant for sustained outcomes.
- **Sensors in hand pumps**; would need to be triangulated with other information at a community level to confirm what the water was used for.
- **Qualitative community assessment** (Participatory Rural Appraisal maps, etc.); would this work at scale? How could it be made more rigorous?

“Do we want to be creative, or do we want to get paid?” (Marc Faux, SAWRP)



Session 4: Roles and Responsibilities

In this session, participants explored the division of roles and responsibilities between Suppliers, the MV team, the Donor and other stakeholders within a programme like WASH Results. The diagram on p.3 is reproduced below to illustrate the current relationship and roles between Suppliers, MV team and DFID.



Participants explored various tasks required within a programme like WASH Results (see Box, right) and considered what role each stakeholder should play in delivering them. Two roles that generated most discussion were Management Agent and Technical Advisor.

No need for an external Managing Agent

Participants agreed that there was no need for an external managing agent. Within WASH Results, programme management is the Donor's responsibility and DFID noted that this brought more control and direct lines of communication with Suppliers and the MV team without presenting too great a demand on time.

Technical advice on implementation should be separate from verification

There was much discussion about what the role of Technical Advisor means and what the experience had been within WASH Results, particularly as compared to other sectors.

- One group suggested that advisors are needed, but at different levels: within the Donor, within each Supplier and within the MV team and that each is responsible for contracting their own advice.
- The MV team noted that a disadvantage of this, is that should Country Verifiers (who may be experts in WASH) observe an issue of quality, not directly affecting the requirements of the verification process, they would be unable to pass this observation on to the implementing partners, or indeed the donor.

Responsibilities within a PBR programme include:

Target setting/negotiation
 Programme management
 Programme implementation
 Data collection for monitoring
 Data analysis
 Quality assurance
 Programme design (setting Terms of Reference)
 Bid writing
 Inter-consortia learning facilitation
 Systems appraisal
 Results reporting
 Evaluation
 Verification
 Communications about the programme

- For the future, DFID may need to bring in a formal Terms of Reference if requiring technical advice from the MV team.

Learning, verification and evaluation benefit from some separation

- Evaluation and verification needs to be carried out by separate teams as the work is very different and the evaluators need to evaluate the verification. This does not require separate contracts; a consortium approach can also work and facilitates sharing of information between verifiers and evaluators.
- There were some concerns about the cross-programme learning function being housed within the MV team. One group suggested the Learning team could be an independent entity or housed within the Evaluation team, but should be kept separate from the MV team in future (avoids conflict of interest).
 - “what we have done [on inter-consortia learning] in a rather haphazard way is get together alone – **we don't really want our MV supplier getting involved** (no offence)” Supplier
- Some Suppliers argued that the first priority for learning is *within* programmes with their local partners rather than cross-programme learning with other Suppliers, which it was suggested was of most value to DFID. If cross-programme learning (between Suppliers, MV and DFID) is important, it requires greater resources and dedicated learning counterparts within the Donor and each Supplier. This would increase ownership over the learning and uptake within organisations.



The Inception Phase is a critical period

One group explored roles and responsibilities through the process of design and set up. There was consensus that the Inception Phase was important, although opinions differed on optimum length: one group in the workshop proposed 6-9 months whereas one Supplier argued that, when delivery is time-bound with a fixed end date, 3-5 months is enough). During the inception period, systems appraisals would take place and many of the stakeholders would be involved including local government and partners, Technical Advisors, the Donor, Suppliers, Evaluators, Verifiers, etc. For the Learning team, the Inception Phase could be a key moment for bringing together lessons that inform the rollout of the programme.

Session 5: Reflecting and wrapping up

In plenary, participants reflected on and shared their observations on the learning event and the nature of the discussions. Broadly, these were:

- A high level of consensus among Suppliers within many of the discussions (to the surprise of the MV team).
- Greater openness between Suppliers than at previous learning events, based on the trust that has been built up over time.
- A sense of having consolidated and built on previous impressions and knowledge rather than brand new learning emerging.
- A renewed appreciation of the benefit to alignment and sustainability in cases where NGOs have existing social capital with national and local governments.
- Capacity of local (rather than just national) government is more central to success than first expected and needs to be built into future Terms of Reference.
- A greater awareness of the challenges presented by trying to reach the poorest beneficiaries

There were several issues that participants felt needed to be addressed:

- More time needs to be spent thinking through the detail of some of the suggestions and ideas that were presented today; what would need to be decided at contracting or inception phase, for example, and how exactly would a hybrid PBR model work?
- Getting a better idea of the likelihood of health impacts from the WASH Results programme.
- How to support more learning, communication and exchanges of experience between partners, particularly where Suppliers are working in similar areas.

ANNEX A: Participants in WASH Results Programme Learning Workshop March 2016

Name	Representing	Organisation
Leonard Tedd	DFID	DFID
Shirley Cameron	DFID	DFID
Laura Westcott	DFID	DFID
Marc Faux	SAWRP	Plan UK
John Dean	SAWRP	Plan UK
David Hughes	SAWRP	Plan UK
Ian Gavin	SAWRP	WaterAid
Louise Medland	SAWRP	WEDC
Kevin Sansom	SAWRP	WEDC
Kelly Beaver	SAWRP	Ipsos
Anita Leydon	SAWRP	WSUP
Tim Hayward	SWIFT	WSUP
Francesco Rigamonti	SWIFT	Oxfam
Emma Feeny	SWIFT	Oxfam
Rachel Stevens	SWIFT	Tearfund
Nat Mason	SWIFT	ODI
Jan Ubels	SNV	SNV
Lucrezia Tincani	MVE service provider	OPM
Richard Carter	MVE service provider	OPM
Zach White	MVE service provider	OPM
Cheryl Brown	MVE service provider	Itad
Katharina Welle	MVE service provider	Itad
Rachel Norman	MVE service provider	Itad
Catherine Fisher	MVE service provider	Itad
Kelsy Nelson	MVE service provider	Itad
Grace Elliott	MVE service provider	Itad
Alison Barrett	MVE service provider	lwel
Don Brown	MVE service provider	lwel
Joseph Gomme	MVE service provider	lwel
Jason Calvert	PWC	PWC