Toward Local Development and
Mitigating Impoverishment in Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement

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Introduction

The numbers of people displaced by programs and projects intended to promote national, regional, and local development are substantial. The number most commonly cited is approximately 10 million people per year displaced throughout the world; over the last 20 years this would mean 200 million displaced (Cernea 2000:11). In India alone, an estimated 25 million were displaced from 1947 to 1997 (Mahapatra 1999b:191). Numbers are also significant in other large countries like China. However, impact can also be great when fewer persons are resettled; in many African countries with relatively small populations, the numbers of displaced may be lower, but the proportion of the population affected by development-induced activities is nevertheless significant, sometimes even higher than in the Asian cases (Rew, Fisher, and Pandey 2000:14, citing Cernea 1997).

The kinds of development projects that lead to involuntary displacement are diverse. They include urban relocation, from slum clearance and renovation to the installation of infrastructure for water projects, roads, and rail. In rural areas, forestry projects, mining, and the creation of biosphere reserves and national parks often displace people. Road projects and other kinds of environmental infrastructure may require urban, suburban, peri-urban, or rural relocation. Perhaps the best studied examples of development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR) are dam projects, which displace people from the reservoir area and disrupt social systems and ecosystems both upstream and downstream. While dam projects have accounted for significant numbers of displaced people, they are by no means the only reason for DIDR. Among World Bank projects that involved displacement, 63% of the people displaced were done so by dams (World Bank 1994:14). In contrast, dam-related displacement in China is estimated to have accounted for only 34% of DIDR between 1950 and 1990 (WCD 2000:104). Recently large dams have been increasingly called into question by environmentalists as well as other development practitioners. At the same time, cities have continued to grow substantially. In the future, it is likely that the numbers of people required to relocate by dams will constitute a diminishing proportion of the displaced, while the proportion required to resettle by other kinds of initiatives, especially urban ones, will increase. It is an open question whether our understanding of DIDR, drawn disproportionately from the dam experience, is relevant for other types of resettlement, especially urban resettlement.

For a long time, it has been clear that those displaced by development initiatives have usually not benefited from them. Instead, they are more often impoverished, as they lose economic, social, and cultural resources while the new benefits go to others. National governments typically have justified these projects by invoking larger goals of national growth and development. They appear to have believed that the greater good could justify losses among a small segment of the population. For example, Chinese policy prior to 1980 was based on the assumption that the economic development of the state was more important than individual well-being; individuals were in fact expected to sacrifice for the
state (Meikle and Walker 1998). This approach to development has been called into question by many: development practitioners, human rights advocates, and even funders, who have extensively documented the losses sustained by those involuntarily displaced and resettled. While some critiques have questioned whether large-scale development projects could ever offer equitable or just development, others have argued that impoverishment can be mitigated or avoided by careful planning that includes development initiatives that specifically target the displaced and others affected by these larger projects.

This desk study is situated directly in this problematic, drawing on the extensive work that has already been done on the subject. It recognizes that we already know a great deal about the processes that cause impoverishment in DIDR. The effects of resettlement have been documented and studied systematically for at least 30 years (e.g., Chambers 1969; Hansen and Oliver-Smith 1982; Scudder 1981) and anecdotally for even longer. In light of this knowledge and drawing on what is now an extensive literature, analysts have attempted to look for regularities in the resettlement experience in order to improve future resettlement initiatives. The most recent and most formalized of the approaches to improving resettlement has appeared in Cernea’s (2000) risks and reconstruction model that delineates eight major risks that lead to impoverishment in involuntary resettlement and pinpoints actions to avoid or mitigate these risks, turning them into development opportunities.

Knowledge about avoiding impoverishment has been codified in guidelines for international organizations and national governments. Here the World Bank was a leader. Its initial policy was promulgated in 1980; this policy was reformulated in 1986 and again in 1990. The first published version of the World Bank policy was an operational paper on resettlement by Cernea (1988). Versions of these guidelines were later adopted by the OECD and other international organizations. They have also been adopted by some countries. Although these guidelines have been instrumental in improving some outcomes, displacement and resettlement continue to be problematic.

Why, indeed, have these guidelines failed to transform the resettlement experiences of so many? To answer this question, this paper turns to the literature written about resettlement, both the accounts of individual settlement experiences and the attempts to find regularities in the process. This desk study has used the abundant literature: published sources, grey literature, and draws as well on my own first-hand experience of resettlement at Manantali (Mali). The literature available reflects the perspectives of many different stakeholders in the resettlement process: donors, national governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), other interested individuals, and academically-inclined analysts.

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1 An overview of the guidelines can be found in Rew, Fisher, and Pandey (2000).

2 I was a member of the design team for this project (USAID 1984), served as senior social-science advisor during implementation, participated in an end-of-project evaluation that looked at effects of resettlement on the population (Diarra et al. 1994), and carried out research on the mid-term effects of this resettlement (e.g., Diarra et al. 1995, Koenig and Diarra 1998a, 1998b).
This literature suggests many different answers to the question of why DIDR continues to be plagued by problems. This desk study delineates those that seem to be most important and offers suggestions about the ways in which resettlement efforts can be further improved.

The structure of this paper reflects this approach. The first section looks at some of the early experiences of resettlement and the approaches generated to analyze them. It then presents an overview of the most significant recent formulations of theory (Cernea’s risks and reconstruction model) and policy (the World Bank guidelines).

The second section addresses the gaps in existing policy and theory. Of most import, existing theory and policy tends to concentrate on the economic aspects of resettlement, while not discussing explicitly the political aspects, but resettled people are typically not simply poor in terms of resources, but also in terms of political power in their own societies. The paper argues that approaches to resettlement that overlook the distribution of societal power ignore crucial conflicts of interest among different stakeholders in the resettlement process. The first step in “doing resettlement as development” is to define development in a way that takes distribution of both power and resources into account. A second problem with existing policy and theory is that much of it appears to contain a dam-and-reservoir bias; generated in the context of high-profile large-dam projects, it has paid much less attention to the effects of non-hydropower resettlement. In particular, the problems of urban resettlement, also quite extensive, are in many ways distinct from those of rural resettlement. The third major gap flows from an emphasis on public-sector projects; resettlement theory and policy have not addressed to any significant degree the specific problems posed by private-sector activities that involve involuntary resettlement. As governments have fewer resources available, many of the activities that involve DIDR use private companies in a variety of ways, minimally as contractors, but also as joint venture partners and as the primary funder.

The third section then looks at the gaps in practice, in terms of the ability of resettlement programs to address economic and power issues, using the risks and reconstruction model as a framework for discussion. The first part of the section identifies places where improvements have occurred; this includes attempts to avoid unnecessary resettlement, the social welfare components of projects, growing recognition of the importance of secure land access for resettled rural agriculturalists (including, but not limited to land-for-land replacement), growing recognition of the importance of social capital (e.g., the emphasis on settling communities as units), and attempts to make compensation more equitable and useful. The second part of the section identifies those areas where risks are known but resettlement practice remains highly problematic. First, economic issues other than land continue to be insufficiently addressed; this includes access to jobs in both urban and rural areas and access to resources held as common property. It also includes the question of how to deal with the multiple economic resources used by most resettled groups. Second, the particularities of urban resettlement and the ways in which it is distinctive from rural resettlement are addressed. Third, the role of conflicting interests among the resettled population has not been given sufficient attention. At minimum, this includes differences arising from gender, age, and class positions; it may also include differences arising from ethnic identification, educational level, occupation, etc. Finally, although the role of other project-affected persons, i.e., those not physically
displaced but still affected by resettlement, has been recognized, it is still rarely taken into account in projects.

The fourth section looks at how to improve existing theory, policy, and practice so that resettlement leads to greater equity and growth. First it looks at some of the improvements that can be made to broaden access to economic resources after DIDR; the rest of the section then turns to look at some of the implications of including power issues in the understanding of DIDR. It discusses the larger political-economic environment that frames DIDR initiatives. At the theoretical level, this may mean understanding the society’s distribution of power and resources, but there are practical implications as well: the importance of giving resettled communities some kind of ‘official’ status and the insertion of resettled people into ongoing development and social welfare initiatives. It then discusses practical ways of dealing with socio-cultural diversity and the associated potential conflicts of interest among the resettlers. Finally, it suggests that participation needs to be expanded to a more democratic approach to planning and resettlement, offers both practical and theoretical rationales for doing so, and suggests some practical strategies of building the capacities of interested parties to undertake this approach.

A final concluding section offers some discussion of the potential problems involved in moving from an economic approach to a more explicitly political-economic one. These include the move to a less top-down and more participatory, incremental style of planning and project implementation, the need to create options for resettled people, the kinds of personnel needed to carry out resettlement projects, ways to meet the increased costs of enhanced resettlement programs, and further research needs.
1. Understanding the Impacts of Involuntary Resettlement

This section looks at the growth of social science understandings about the impacts of involuntary resettlement. It begins with early projects and the attempts made to improve their results. It discusses how piecemeal attempts were followed by more systematic analyses of the resettlement process. It ends with a discussion of the most significant attempts to codify these understandings: in a theory of practice through Cernea’s risks and reconstruction model and in policy through the World Bank’s guidelines.

1.1 The negative consequences of DIDR

It seems to have become apparent relatively early to planners that simply moving people out of areas of large infrastructure projects would be relatively problematic unless something was done for those relocated. Many early projects included social scientists who looked after the welfare of the resettled and various plans to make economic resources available to them. Various countries introduced legal requirements to deal with the problems caused by displacement and relocation.

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA, United States) approached relocation with the explicit goal of creating as little injury to the economic status and social environment of communities as possible (Satterfield 1937). The relocation service worked with other services, for example, the Farm Credit Administration and the Works Progress Administration, to create viable post-resettlement lives. Agricultural extension agents played a key role in helping families locate farms for sale, appraising their value, and advising on appropriate farm strategies in the new sites. Supplemental services were available to families whose relocation was difficult due to health, mental, or physical disability. This approach to resettlement was not confined only to developed countries. When the Papaloapan dam was built in Mexico (1949-52), the Papaloapan Commission Resettlement was headed by an anthropologist (Villa Rojas), whose goal was to resettle communities as units to retain social and political cohesion. Although cash compensation was the norm, the resettlement agency also worked with communities to find land nearby (Partridge, Brown, and Nugent 1982:249). In India, one of the first major dams after independence in Orissa state was Hirakud, completed in 1956. A specific department (the Hirakud Land Organisation) was set up to implement resettlement and rehabilitation of the displaced. The goal was to replace land with land and housing with housing well ahead of the date of actual submergence; supplementary compensation was also intended to be generous and included community infrastructure (e.g., temples, schools). In hindsight, the amount of compensation appears to have been grossly underestimated, but by 1962, the government had in fact paid out more than it had planned. The belief was that resettlement colonies should improve existing conditions of rural residents (Baboo 1996:210-212). When Panama began construction of the Bayano hydroelectric complex, resettlement carried out in 1973-75 was based on recommendations of anthropologists who had earlier (in 1971) studied the Kuna and Embera Indians that would be displaced. The resettlement team included an anthropologist and social worker as well as an administrator (Wali
In some cases, individual resettlement plans were complemented by laws and policies. In 1970, a time of many urban renewal projects, the United States Congress passed the Uniform Relocation Act, which required that every family displaced be housed in a comparable dwelling as well as in a comparable, if not more desirable, location (Rubinstein 1988:185). Orissa state (India) created a policy in 1973 to benefit those who had been displaced by the Rengali dam; this was later extended to other projects within the state. In 1977, this policy was improved (Pandey 1998:15).

Yet it also became clear that these isolated attempts at improving resettlement were not all that successful. First, despite planning and the participation of social scientists, results remained problematic. For example at Papaloapan, the failure of the commission to provide infrastructure, housing, health, and educational resources undermined the efforts of the social scientists to reconstitute livelihoods (Partridge, Brown, and Nugent 1982:250). At Hirakud, only 11% of the displaced chose to live in the resettlement colonies set up to improve conditions; no colony benefited from canal irrigation. Despite good intentions, planners seemed to have little knowledge of rural life and did not pay sufficient attention to social aspects of communities (Baboo 1996:223). At Bayano, while resettlement planning paid attention to Indian residents, there were no plans for the Panamanian colonists who had come earlier and at resettlement formed about half the resettler populations; since Indians and non-Indians were treated differently from the very beginning, ethnicity became a powerful political force (Wali 1989:150).

Moreover, unanticipated problems became apparent. The Relocation Authority at Kariba (Zambia) made assumptions about conditions in new sites, which were rarely met (Colson 1971:32). People had to give up various economic resources; for example, some people had to give up remunerative wage work because they were required to work on new housing; many lost much stock because the move was done hastily (Colson 1971:46). Many household heads spent for their personal use compensation they had received for wives and children (Colson 1971:106-11). The people of Chemawawin, relocated to Easterville, Manitoba (Canada) in conjunction with Grand Rapids dam, were only one example of groups facing multiple predicaments: economic suffering, loss of resources, social stress, and disintegration (Waldram 1988).

It was becoming clear that those already poor were most vulnerable to becoming even more impoverished by relocation and resettlement, despite attempts at improving their lives. A study in Orissa (India) showed that those displaced were disproportionately from the ‘weaker’ sections of society: scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, and other “backward classes.” Pandey (1998:65) found multiple problems brought about by their poverty; these included exploitation by land owners, money lenders, bank officials, and lawyers; questionable practices by government officials, petty businessmen, middlemen; and undervaluation of their assets by projects. In addition cash compensation often led to ‘wastage’ by the displaced, who spent this money on living expenses, to clear their debts, and to carry out marriage and religious ceremonies. The end result was often near destitution.

Relatively early work pointed to the particular issues of urban resettlement. In
addition to work done on urban renewal in the United States, Perlman’s (1982:233) classic work on *favela* removal in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) noted that urban relocation often meant economic deterioration for relocatees. Relocation far from the center of town meant that resettlers had to spend more time and expense to get to work; it lessened the availability of informal work as they were far from prospective clientele; and jobs available for women, often in the informal sector, decreased. People also needed more money as they now had mortgages. This work also noted that even the threat of removal provided a strong disincentive to upgrade current housing (Perlman 1982:230), an observation echoed by Bartolomé (1984:189), who noted that the very announcement of the potential move created stress among potential displacees at the Yacyretá dam (Argentina, Paraguay). Causes included storeowners who stopped offering credit to customers because they feared default and landlords who evicted tenants in the hope that they could get their relocation rights. There were a variety of ways in which both potential and actual relocation affected negatively access to resources. Bartolomé (1984:187) also noted the importance of ‘non-urban’ activities in urban areas, e.g. orchards and poultry, which provided important complements to other work. Perlman (1982:231) discussed the importance of settler organization and state response; relocation at her study site in Rio did not actually occur until the leaders of its resistance had been arrested.

Finally, some of this early material pointed out the effects on those affected by projects but not actually displaced. One example was the Montagnais Indians of Quebec (Canada), who, since the early 1940s, were affected by 13 plants and 5 hydroelectric reservoirs (Charest 1982:416). Although not directly resettled, they lost many of their hunting territories as animal habitats were flooded by reservoirs or rendered useless due to changes in river flow. Industrialization made territories near factories partly or totally useless for significant periods of time. It also led to the growth of urban centers and pressure to develop forests as recreation areas for non-Native Québécois (Charest 1982:423). The end result was the sedentarisation and proletarianisation of Montagnais and the loss of the viability of their traditional livelihood.

Those working in the resettlement field have attempted to understand the processes leading to these continuing problems so as to avoid and mitigate impoverishment of the displaced and help them reestablish productive new livelihoods and communities. This meant moving from individual case studies to a synthesis of understandings about both development in general and resettlement in particular.

One of the first syntheses was done by Chambers (1969), who proposed a three-stage model of resettlement processes (cited in Cernea 2000:14). This drew on both involuntary (e.g., in Ghana, Chambers 1970a) and voluntary resettlement, (e.g., in Kenya, Chambers and Moris 1973). Scudder and Colson (1982) built upon this to create a four-stage model, which drew upon their earlier work at Kariba in Zambia (e.g., Colson 1971) and was developed after comparative analysis of other settlement situations. Scudder (1981) also elaborated this model in regard to voluntary settlement experiences throughout the world. This model emphasized the processional phases of resettlement initiatives: 1) recruitment, the process by which resettlers are selected; 2) transition, the initial few years of adaptation to the new site; 3) potential development, in which settlers begin to invest particularly in economic activities; and 4) handing over and incorporation, which concerned the integration of relocated settlers into more effective political units, including
an ability to get along with hosts (Scudder and Colson 1982). While the first two phases were virtually always part of the resettlement experience, the latter two were more problematic. It was not inevitable that resettlers would find conditions that would permit either economic (stage 3) or political (stage 4) development. Phases 3 and 4 could occur in any order, but it appears that Scudder found stage 4 more problematic than phase 3, especially in resettlement situations that were closely supervised by government authorities. This model drew not only on resettlement experiences per se, but also upon general development theory. For example, it noted the importance of forward and backward linkages (e.g., sources of inputs and markets) to make farm production successful, stressed the importance of regional growth beyond the resettlement area, and drew on contemporary models of integrated rural development.

Scudder’s knowledge was used extensively in his own later work on various resettlement initiatives. It was also drawn upon by others to improve resettlement projects. When the Manantali Resettlement Project (USAID 1984) was designed, the team used his work on voluntary resettlement (Scudder 1981) to help design the project. It also drew on his expertise informally. Once the Manantali Resettlement Project was funded, Scudder was formally involved as a senior-level consultant to the project through a contract to the Institute for Development Anthropology. He did not participate in day-to-day activities, but his timely advice was crucial to improving various aspects of the resettlement.

Other approaches to improving resettlement by learning from past experiences drew less on resettlement per se and more heavily on contemporary thinking about development. This was particularly evident in the attempts to improve outcomes for the James Bay Cree (Canada) when it became clear that dam construction would seriously affect their way of life. In this case social scientists were working in Cree villages in the summer of 1971 when rumors about the James Bay Project arose (Salisbury 1986:152,3). They helped individual Cree to get information and funds for a general meeting that year; they also persuaded Salisbury to protest to the Quebec government about the absence of environmental and social impact studies. Later on, the McGill University department of anthropology was asked to do the social impact work. Drawing on their knowledge of economic and social systems and their concerns for indigenous autonomy, the anthropologists insisted on a partnership between themselves and the Cree, which provided a framework in which the Cree could organize and reconstitute their livelihoods (Salisbury 1986).

Salisbury (1986) considered the James Bay resettlement a success, but there were dissenters, and unanticipated problems did appear later. One of the Cree chiefs claimed that they had wanted the best of both worlds, but got the worst instead (McCutcheon 1991:122). This study will discuss aspects of the Cree case throughout; it shows that the choices involved in resettlement often require trade-offs and may bring unanticipated consequences. One small example will suffice. One of the complaints post-DIDR was about the activities of adolescents in the major Cree town, who were perceived as running wild. In fact, many if not most of these young people were in school, but they had to go to

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3Although the initial World Bank guidelines (to be discussed below) had been drawn up by 1980, the design team was not aware of them.
boarding school because the low population density could not support multiple high schools. They were indeed far away from families, but the ‘problem’ was a reflection of the improved access to education. This suggests that even the most ‘successful’ resettlement initiatives may remain problematic in some ways.

The 1980s saw other attempts as well to delineate the particularities of involuntary displacement and resettlement. One of the first volumes on resettlement experiences appeared (Hansen and Oliver-Smith 1982). This brought together in one volume information on those suffering from displacement due to natural disasters, development-induced displacement, and refugees.

The attempts to create a deeper understanding of resettlement processes continued. Although Scudder and Colson’s model was important and continues to be used to frame discussion of resettlement processes (e.g. Meikle and Walker 1998, Hayes 1999), it was criticized for being insufficiently comprehensive. It was also criticized for confounding problems rising from voluntary and involuntary resettlement. There was a need for a model focused uniquely on involuntary resettlement, which would not only outline processes of impoverishment, but also predict the cumulative impacts of displacement and provide a practical guide to address them (Cernea 2000). It was within this context that Cernea proposed the risks and reconstruction model that would simultaneously predict and diagnose the major problems of involuntary resettlement, and offer suggestions for problem resolution and further research. Cernea (2000) provides the latest iteration of ideas that he has discussed since the early 1990s.

Cernea was simultaneously influential in crafting the World Bank guidelines to involuntary resettlement. As noted above, the first policy was created in 1980; it was reformulated in 1986 and again in 1990. Versions of these guidelines were later adopted by the OECD and other international organizations. They have also been adopted by some countries. By codifying existing knowledge about how to mitigate impoverishment in involuntary resettlement, these guidelines have had an important effect in making the problems inherent in DIDR more visible and showing ways in which they can be decreased. The World Bank’s visible response to the problems of DIDR together with Cernea’s more theoretical work also galvanized further academic research on resettlement. More volumes appeared (e.g., Cernea and Guggenheim 1993; McDowell 1996a; Mathur and Marsden 1998; Cernea and McDowell 2000).

The next part of this section looks at Cernea’s risks and reconstruction model, which has now become a major framework for understanding the social impacts of DIDR; it then turns to the World Bank guidelines. Because of Cernea’s (1991) involvement in creating and implementing these guidelines, the two are necessarily linked. Although the guidelines came before the formal risks and reconstruction model, this study treats the model first (continuing the discussion of analytic models) and then turns to the guidelines.
1.2 The risks and reconstruction model

Cernea has worked to develop a theoretical model that explains both the causes of impoverishment (the risks that come with displacement) and the ways in which these factors can be addressed to reconstitute livelihoods (reconstruction after resettlement). He has delineated eight primary factors that are linked in three separate ways. First, as causes of impoverishment, they influence one another. For example, the health problems caused by resettlement can exacerbate economic problems of landlessness or joblessness. Second, the risks and the actions to avoid or address them are linked as well; if landlessness is a problem, then this can most easily be addressed by providing land to the displaced. Third, mitigating the different risks can work synergistically to reconstitute more sustainable future livelihoods (Cernea 2000). Although these different risks are typically presented each in its own terms, they group into three sets: economic, socio-cultural, and social-welfare risks.

1.2.1 Economic issues

The economic aspects of impoverishment and reconstitution of livelihoods concern the loss of economic resources and the reconstitution of access to those resources in such a way as to earn a viable living and reproduce the next generation. They include resources that produce income, such as land or common property, as well as jobs. Cernea has broken these down into three separate risks. Landlessness can be seen as both land for housing and for production, although land for production is particularly important. Landlessness is more crucial when people have land-based production systems. Farmers are the primary category here although land can be used for other purposes as well, e.g., ranching or tree production. Loss of common property is important where people gain a significant part of their production from a commons or an open-access resource, e.g., forests, rivers, inundatable river banks, etc. These may provide the primary productive resources or may serve as complementary resources for individuals or households. The poor are especially likely to depend on common property resources. Finally, joblessness will be confronted by those who lose employment because of displacement. This includes those who lose jobs with larger firms because the commute becomes too long or because the firm itself folds as a consequence of the resettlement. It also affects those who are self-employed, who may lose either a source of raw materials or their clientele.

The ways to reconstitute these livelihoods most successfully is not obvious, but rather entails various complexities. Three are particularly important. First is the issue of tenure regimes. While a significant number of land users have title, many do not. In rural areas, some of those without title are considered to have types of customary tenure, while others are considered “squatters” or “encroachers.” In urban areas as well, rapid urban growth often implies neighborhoods where many are considered squatters. While it is now generally recognized that long-term “squatters” ought to receive compensation, there remains the practical issue of weeding out individuals who come into a displacement area simply so they can get rights to new land. Common property is often of ambiguous tenure status as well; moreover, governments are often reluctant to allot land to groups rather than individuals.
Second is the fact that people rarely live by one kind of resource. The poor especially are often required to make use of multiple productive resources to make ends meet. Therefore, many displaced do not need to face the risk of only landlessness or joblessness or loss of common property, but two or all three simultaneously. Resettlement initiatives need to consider complex combinations of resource replacement in an environment that is itself changing because of the resettlement.

Third, replacement of economic resources is not only about replacing incomes, but also assets. For example, a displaced peasant farmer loses not only the yearly income from his or her crop at the time of displacement, but the asset (land) that will allow production of a crop (subsistence and/or income) after resettlement. Compensation for the loss of assets needs to be at replacement cost, not market value (Cernea 1996a:26).

The loss of productive capacity is one of the major causes of impoverishment. In this light, the reconstitution of productive resources has come to be at the heart of livelihood reconstitution strategies because without a way to make a reasonable living, people are bound to become impoverished. However, reconstituting productive resources is usually insufficient in and of itself to reconstitute meaningful lives. In Cernea’s model, five of the eight impoverishment risks are oriented around other sources of impoverishment.

1.2.2 Socio-cultural issues

Human beings are not simply individual economic beings, but are part of social and cultural systems that give meaning to their lives. When displacement weakens or dismantles vital social networks and life-support mechanisms, local authority systems collapse and groups lose their capacity to manage themselves (Downing 1996:34). This causes social disarticulation, the dispersion and fragmentation of existing communities. The loss of reciprocity networks and resulting social cohesion can also increase powerlessness, dependence, and vulnerability (Cernea 2000:30). Social disarticulation is especially common when existing social groups cannot resettle together, but may also occur even when groups stay together, but lose their ability to act effectively in the context of new social and political forces.

Marginalization is seen by Cernea as a more individualized process and occurs when families or individuals lose economic power and experience downward mobility. This may be because they cannot use their old skills at a new location, finding their existing human capital obsolete. Resettlement may bring a loss of control over physical space (Oliver-Smith 1996:78), as well as a new environment in which existing knowledge and skills, either individual or social, are less useful (Downing 1996:36). Economic marginality can lead in turn to social or psychological marginality, such as a drop in social status or psychological problems (Cernea 2000:26). It is also possible for entire ethnic groups to lose status as they become incorporated into states at the bottom of national stratification systems.

The major way to mitigate both social disarticulation and marginalization is
through resettlement strategies that emphasize the reconstruction of communities and social networks and deliberately pursue strategies of social cohesion (Cernea 2000:40). Some have seen educational loss as a distinctive and additional risk (Mahapatra 1999a). Building education and skills that allow people to make use of new resources in the new environment is a necessary part of strategies to combat marginalization.

Even though the concept of resettling groups as communities has been important, other aspects of resettlement introduce complexities into reconstituting social and cultural resources. These relate in part to the power distributions of both local and larger society. Resettlement situations introduce the possibility for some groups to increase power and access to resources; these are often those with much power already who want more. At the national level, powerful national groups may pursue strategies that allow them to increase control. Scudder (1996:65,66) noted for example the power struggles between immigrants and local residents that may arise when a resettlement scheme can provide an elite the opportunity to realize its political goals at the expense of the local population. He cited the struggles between Mauritanian black and white Moors downstream of the Manantali dam and land grabs on the Juba River in Somalia, as well as attempts to use the Mahaweli irrigation project as a means to split Sri-Lankan Tamil speakers. Divide-and-conquer strategies have also been found in Canada (Waldram 1988:175). The ability of local groups to use resettlement to increase their control has been much more problematic, as they are usually fighting maintain to maintain what they have. Lacking the ability to maintain this control, existing local leaders can often lose credibility (Scudder and Colson 1982).

However, it is not only the distribution of power between the displaced and the larger society that offers possibilities for change, but also the distribution within the displaced community. Diverse interests often appear among those replaced, as some of them will not want to reconstruct communities that did not work in their interest. In terms of reconstruction as social units, this means that certain groups will not want to reconstruct the units and types of social cohesion that disfavored them. This was seen in some cases of Indian resettlement where lower castes chose to resettle apart from upper caste villagers with whom they had previously lived (Mahapatra 1999a:96) and at Manantali (Mali), where hamlets (politically inferior to officially recognized villages) chose to regroup in larger units so they could compete effectively with villages for status and power. Divergent interests between men and women and youth and elders are also common (see Section 3.2.3 below). Downing (1996:44) suggested that because children have not yet completed developing their cultural spatial-temporal orders, the simple act of displacement seems to affect them less than adults. Youth, especially young men, may also see opportunities for new jobs and be more in favor of the resettlement than older adults.

These internal divisions among relocatees facilitate any implicit or explicit divide-and-conquer strategies of the powerful and affect the ability of the displaced to determine and act in their interest as a group. Participatory strategies of development that assume homogeneity of interests are not likely to work in such a situation. Rather, the strategies to reconstitute cohesive social units and to avoid marginalization need to take into account the diverse interests among resettlers. How this might be done will be discussed below (Section 4.4.2).
The focus of this study will be the ways in which the loss of social cohesion and individual and group marginalization affect the ability of resettlers to make use of economic resources and to control their lives. In particular, it is interested in the impoverishment caused when individual knowledge (human capital) and social knowledge (social capital) lose value because of changes in the post-DIDR physical and political-administrative environment. It is also interested in the impoverishment caused by the loss of capacity to organize effectively to achieve local goals.

The loss of social and cultural resources, however, is not only a problem with economic impact, but also a significant loss in and of itself. An integral part of human culture is attachment to existing conceptions of time and space and the ways in which they are prioritized; societies often order themselves internally through their relationship to space (Downing 1996); resettlement disturbs this order. The destruction of the local economic order may not be the primary reason for social disarticulation, since signs of social disorder often appear before loss of productive activities, as people begin to act in light of what they believe the future will bring (Downing (1996:35). Individuals create and make meaningful a common identity through their relationships to place and the artifacts they use to define space (Earle 1997). These artifacts include not only productive resources, but also social resources, tangible evidence of a group identity. These may include such things as burial grounds, community and religious shrines and centers, etc. These also may include economic infrastructure that creates a local identity, e.g., a periodic marketplace, bus station, crossroads, etc. Oliver-Smith’s companion study on resistance deals with the importance of cultural identity in greater detail.

1.2.3 Social welfare issues

The final three risks identified in the risks and reconstructions can be categorized as social welfare risks. They include homelessness and lack of shelter, food insecurity when people do not have enough to eat, and increased morbidity and mortality caused by the stress and environmental changes of moving. These can be risks over either the long or short term. Over the short term, these are humanitarian social welfare issues that can be dealt with along the lines of other projects that deal with these problems, for example, the aftermath of natural disasters. They require the mobilization of significant resources but over relatively short time periods.

Homelessness can be dealt with by plans for housing construction or provision of construction materials in a great number of different formats. Food insecurity over the short term can be dealt with by a range of food-aid programs. Physical morbidity can be addressed by vaccination and disease prevention programs before displacement, and by assigning appropriate medical and mental health personnel during the resettlement phase. Time is of the essence, but these programs can follow procedures laid out for other humanitarian assistance programs. It appears that issues of short-term homelessness, food insecurity, and increased morbidity and mortality are among the easiest to address successfully. They have been relatively well addressed by many resettlement programs. The problem is rather that because these risks are both highly visible and relatively easy to mitigate in the short term, many resettlement projects stop after addressing these social welfare risks and do not go on to development initiatives that deal with the other risks.
identified in the model.

Food insecurity, homelessness, and increased morbidity and mortality may also continue to be risks over the long term. For example, in Rengali (India), people still had insufficient food twelve years after resettlement. Yet Mahapatra (1999b:207) attributed the long-term social welfare problems at Rengali to the scarcity of wage work, the poverty of the land, and the lack of access to forest produce, that is, to landlessness, joblessness, and lack of access to common property resources. In this sense, social welfare risks need to be addressed immediately, but if they persist over the long term, it is usually because the other two major categories of risk have not been effectively addressed.4

1.3 The World Bank guidelines

The World Bank guidelines were an attempt to put into practice what analysts understood about resettlement and the means to avoid the impoverishment of the resettled so commonly found. Since their inception some 20 years ago, the World Bank guidelines have become the standard used to judge the adequacy of resettlement initiatives. As such they are consistently cited in discussions (Rew, Fisher, and Pandey 2000; Gray 1996; Feeney 1998, among many). They are important not only because of their content but because they have been formalized as the policy of a major international organization and hence gain a status and force beyond the suggestions that might be offered by individuals. They became important not only because social scientists working in the World Bank theoretically understood how resettlement ought to work, but also because they understood the internal organization of the bank sufficiently well to have the bureaucratic means to put these understandings into practice (Cernea 1991).

The World Bank policy includes the following main points (World Bank 1990). First, avoid or minimize involuntary resettlement through appropriate technical choices. Second, if displacement cannot be avoided, resettlement ought to be conceived and executed as a development program, for which a plan ought to be prepared (see also Van Wicklin 1999). Community participation in planning and implementation ought to be encouraged (see also Feeney 1998:90; Gray 1996:110). Hosts, as well as resettled, ought to be consulted to encourage integration. Compensation (including land, housing, and infrastructure) ought to be provided to the adversely affected and customary rights should be taken into account (see also Mejía 1999). Valuation of assets should be at replacement cost. There should be a timely transfer of responsibilities from agencies to settlers to avoid dependency relationships.

Even though the World Bank policy has been adopted and adapted by other international organizations and national governments, debate over the guidelines and their

4This is particularly true of food insecurity and homelessness. Some resettlement projects do introduce new health concerns, e.g., increases in malaria and schistosomiasis in river-basin and irrigation projects, health risks related to pollution from mines or factories. See Ault (1989).
utility has continued. When the World Bank reformatted the policy in the late 1990s, there was much criticism by the NGO community and other interested parties that this would remove important safeguards. At the time this study was written, Operational Policy/Bank Procedure 4.12 had been posted on the World Bank’s external web site, was redrafted, and had been forwarded to the Executive Directors for approval (World Bank web site July 2000).  

1.4 Conclusion

The simultaneous work by analysts to understand resettlement and by organizations to formulate policies has led to a more constructive framework for avoiding impoverishment in the resettlement process. Yet this study will show that there are still serious problems in many DIDR projects.

One of the reasons that involuntary resettlement is so impoverishing is because it takes away economic, social, and cultural resources at one and the same time. People find it very difficult to plan on their own for this eventuality, especially those for whom involuntary resettlement is a unique experience. They often cannot believe it will happen, even when information is available. Moreover, information is often not available, since implementing organizations fear resistance if people know about the impending move. This is in contrast to voluntary resettlement projects, where people typically have information in advance and can plan for the resources they will need.

But involuntary resettlement is also impoverishing because it takes away political power, most dramatically the power to make a decision about where and how to live. It tends to render more powerless those parts of society that are already less powerful and economically marginal, i.e., those with the fewest economic and political resources. The resettled are often those who already receive few services from the state or get them only with difficulty. These are often groups already integrated into national structures on very unequal terms and involuntary resettlement only exhibits dramatically this inequality (e.g., Fernandes 1996). Those with more resources, especially political resources, are often more able to resist displacement effectively. So the new road or other urban infrastructure gets built in a poorer neighborhood rather than a wealthier one. Moreover, when wealthier people do get displaced, they are more likely to have formal title to lost resources; hence they are more likely to be adequately compensated than the poor, who often have legally problematic ownership rights over the resources they use to make their livings.

The main argument of this study is that recent efforts to understand why

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5 The Operational Directive on involuntary resettlement has not been the only one under debate. Gray (1996:112) suggested that World Bank policy in the 1990s on indigenous peoples lacked the strength of its initial version (1982), which supported the rights of indigenous peoples to veto projects and respected their right to self-determination. The later policy supported protecting indigenous peoples from the harmful effects of projects and advocated their participation in development processes.
resettlement programs have not improved outcomes as much as they could is because they have focused on the economic aspects of resettlement while neglecting the political. The focus has been mostly on the resettled communities themselves rather than on the relationship of the resettled communities to their national and regional systems.

To be sure, political aspects are not ignored entirely. As noted above Cernea (2000:30) has specifically noted that social disarticulation can worsen powerlessness, dependency, and vulnerability. The issue of power relationships is more explicit in Scudder and Colson’s (1982; see also Scudder 1981) ideas; in particular the last stage of resettlement, handing over and incorporation, addresses the question of the relationship of the new community to the larger political-economic structures of which it is a part. Yet the analysis of this stage appears less developed both by Scudder and Colson as well as less used by others who have adopted the model (e.g., Meikle and Walker 1998). In the work of the McGill University anthropologists, issues of local autonomy and aboriginal rights were indeed key. Although their work was important in setting the framework for other discussions of Indian and Native resettlement in Canada, it has been much less used by those looking at resettlement in other parts of the world. It would appear, however, that an understanding of the larger political processes underlining societal change and an explicit integration of them into planning might improve DIDR.

Another split in the earlier resettlement literature is also important. On the one hand, there has been an effort to delineate the unique characteristics of involuntary resettlement and the unique kinds of activities that need to be done to establish livelihoods for the displaced. This track is especially evident in the guidelines, which directly target involuntary resettlement. It is also evident in Cernea’s risks and reconstruction model, which targets the specific impoverishment processes found in DIDR and discusses how to change them. On the other hand, there have also been continued efforts to inform DIDR by general understandings of development and social change. These appear for example in the discussions that link the World Bank’s involuntary resettlement policy with its policy on indigenous peoples (since a substantial proportion of those resettled can be considered indigenous). It appears as well in Ericksen’s (1999) systematic comparison of involuntary and voluntary resettlement.

Questions about the distribution of power, its impact on societal direction and resource allocation, and the implications for the poor have been central to development debates for a long time. Therefore it would appear to be useful to place resettlement theory and practice within general propositions about human, economic, and social development. While DIDR creates a particular set of problems and issues, some of these may be addressed in reference to more general propositions based on more varied experiences with economic and social development. DIDR does have unique characteristics, and approaches to mitigating the impoverishment associated with it must keep these in mind, but it also has aspects in common with other development problematics. In this context, strategies to reestablish livelihoods and viable socio-cultural systems can draw upon much that we know from general development theory and practice. Work that stresses the unique characteristics of DIDR has indeed served to make issues related to resettlement much more visible. Nevertheless this study contends that this emphasis has limited the ability of DIDR mitigation efforts to draw upon other development knowledge. Most particularly it has neglected issues of the distribution of power by focusing primarily on
the local economic and socio-cultural aspects of reconstituting livelihoods. One of the major indicators of this is the lack of explicit discussion of what constitutes development.

2. Complementary Perspectives

DIDR means development-induced displacement and resettlement. Yet what is the development that brings about displacement in the first place? Are all the displacement-inducing activities necessarily ‘development’? Perhaps even more importantly, the World Bank guidelines say explicitly that programs for the displaced ought to be carried out as ‘development projects.’ What does this mean? By what criteria might a project for the displaced be construed as development? Does development simply equal reconstituting livelihoods and mitigating impoverishment or is it more than that? The most important gap in the literature would seem to be explicit consideration of what is involved in the development aspect of DIDR. This section looks at this issue, with particular attention to what development might mean for the people resettled.

Although an explicit understanding of development is the major area where complementary perspectives are needed, there are two other major gaps, which also stem directly from biases in the existing work. One is a bias toward river-basin development and dam resettlement. The lists of causes of DIDR virtually always include a variety of resettlement situations. Cernea (1996a:17), for example noted that displacement can be caused by forestry projects, mining, thermal energy plants, biosphere reserves and parks, conversions in land use, transport corridors, and urban and environmental infrastructure projects, as well as dams. He even noted that conservation, road projects, and urban renewal projects, despite their age and breadth, have not been much addressed in the literature. However, a review of the literature makes the bias toward dams apparent. For example the stress on fragile ecological systems (deWet 2000:8) is one that is particularly linked to river-basin development. In the emphasis on reaching those impacted but not necessarily displaced by DIDR, the foremost case mentioned is “downstreamers,” i.e., those who live downstream from a dam and find their water regimes disrupted. Scudder (1996:49) even defines other project-affected persons as “all other river-basin residents” because he has confined his discussion to river-basin development.

Another bias is toward publicly planned and implemented development initiatives. To be sure, many of the major resettlement initiatives were and still are due to state-funded and executed infrastructure projects; again, dams are the major case that comes to mind. However, non-dam projects may more often be private-sector projects, sometimes in partnership with government in significant ways, but sometimes not. For example, in urban renewal projects, the state may move people out and provide basic infrastructure like roads, water, and power transmission lines, but actual economic development will depend on private firms who choose to build or go into business there. In recent years, both the left and right have become more critical of the failures of centralized planning, and there has been a move toward less centrally planned, private sector driven development initiatives. Yet much of the DIDR literature does not explicitly recognize the implications
of this. This section looks further at these two issues. 

2.1 Understanding ‘development’

One of the important contributions of the World Bank guidelines has been to state explicitly that all involuntary resettlement be conceived and executed as development programs (OD 4.30, 3b) so that the quality of life of those affected will improve rather than deteriorate. Yet, in much of the literature on the consequences of involuntary resettlement, the meaning of the term development is not well specified. For example, the World Commission on Dams (WCD 2000:2) simply defined development as “sustainable improvement of human welfare ... on a basis that is economically viable, socially equitable, and environmentally sustainable.” This definition would probably be accepted by most development practitioners today, but it is vague and does not render explicit some of the background issues and controversies. If the goal of resettlement is to be the development of displaced and affected persons, we need some discussion of the concept of development, the ways that improvement in human welfare might be discerned, and the controversies and the debates involving surrounding these issues. To be sure, these are enormous topics, each with an extensive literature of its own. The purpose of this section is to raise issues and put the approach of this paper in context.

One of the earliest debates in the development literature concerned the question of who would benefit from particular development initiatives. The first generation of development projects was planned in the belief that benefits would ‘trickle down’ from those specifically targeted to the rest of the population. This approach was roundly criticized as it became clear that wealthier segments of the population tended to benefit more than others (Rapley 1996). The goal of equity of benefits across society came to be important in development thinking and led to approaches that targeted those with greater needs. The concern of many donors today in eradicating poverty and targeting development projects to the least well-off is one of the latest iterations of the concern for equity in development.

Another bias is the lack of comparative analysis of displacement and resettlement in developed and developing countries, except in the case of North American Indians, where there is a relatively abundant literature (e.g., Salisbury 1986; Waldram 1988). This is so despite the fact that there is a relatively important literature on urban renewal in the United States (e.g., Gans 1968 (cited in Cernea 1996a), Squires et al. 1987) and the resettlement of refugees (e.g., Nann 1982). Since developing countries are the focus of the work of the funding agencies involved here, this paper will not address this bias directly. However, it does integrate the experiences of developed countries where appropriate.

When the concept of equity began to be stressed by development agencies, it was often suggested that equity was important because it increased efficiency (i.e., greater productivity that could lead to higher economic growth and ease in convincing people of the value of development projects). The emphasis on the eradication of poverty and the importance of human development, basic-needs thresholds, and human rights all suggest that equity has widely come to be seen as an end in itself.
The concern for equity is clearly evident in the discussion within the DIDR literature of the differential benefits of the projects, most particularly in the split between increasing ‘national’ welfare and the impoverishment of the displaced that occurs when their welfare is ‘sacrificed’ to this end. In the past, some saw this as justified; for example Chinese resettlement several decades ago offered no compensation to displaced people as national level concerns were primary (Meikle and Walker 1998). However, this is no longer considered an acceptable approach.

A second debate is about the relationship between economic growth and other goals of development. These other goals are quite varied: environmental sustainability, human and social development, the distribution of political power, and protection of basic human rights. Economic growth considerations have been primary in the dominant models of resettlement as well as in the concept of development implicit in guidelines such as those of the World Bank. Economic growth is indeed necessary. To talk about development without talking about economic growth is futile because simply redistributing existing resources is politically as well as economically problematic. However, to talk only of economic growth is insufficient.

Among the other goals of development, the concept of human and social development has been integrated into the models. This is especially clear in Cernea’s emphasis on reversing social disintegration, marginalization, and increased morbidity and mortality. It is also clear in the emphasis on the importance of education and training. Issues around environmental sustainability have also been important. The definition of the WCD directly included environmental sustainability; World Bank guidelines mandate an environmental assessment that covers its potential environmental impacts (OD 4.30, 20). Concerns about host-resettler relations discussed explicitly the resource competition among them that may have negative environmental consequences. Moreover, environmentalists have allied with potential resettlers to protest against some kinds of projects that displace people, most notably large dams.

Human rights issues have been raised mostly by NGOs and analysts. Human rights considerations also became an explicit part of international approaches, e.g., Fourth Lomé Convention, which provides a framework for European Community aid to developing countries (Barutciski 2000:18). Specific rights include rights to physical and mental health and adequate living standards (food, water, and housing). European countries have also signed a 1998 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, which encourages a participatory approach to environmental issues often related to DIDR (Barutciski 2000). Oxfam (1996a; 1996b) has been particularly active in arguing that EC projects need to respect human

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8The companion paper by Oliver-Smith offers further information on these alliances. Note however, that environmentalists and potential resettlers often perceive divergent interests when the question is relocation out of national parks and other environmental conservation areas. Moreover, there is little literature on the relationship of environmentalists and displaced when urban infrastructure to improve environmental quality displaces people, e.g. sewage or water systems.
rights conventions to which it has subscribed. A variety of human rights declarations are relevant to the practice of involuntary resettlement (see Barutciski 2000). A human rights approach is complementary to an equity approach in that it suggests that there is a dignity to human life that needs to be respected in all projects. All residents (or at least citizens) of a country have basic rights that should not be compromised.

Discussion of political perspectives on development are present only at the margins of the involuntary resettlement literature (e.g. Gibson 1993), although they clearly inform some of those who have been most vocal against DIDR projects (e.g., Patkar 2000). As discussed above, an understanding of the importance of political context is there in Scudder and Colson’s fourth stage, handing over and incorporation. It is also basic to the work done with the Cree, where one important goal was to preserve indigenous rights. This emphasis has been there in work on other groups as well. Asch (1982:354) proposed that for the Dene, an aboriginal Canadian group, true development meant not only an adequate resource base, but also continuity with their past and political control. A key aspect of the latter was the ability of the Dene to control the reproduction of their own institutions. Asch (1982:365) argued that the society could accommodate much technical change unproblematically if it retained institutional autonomy. Yet involuntary resettlement by its very nature disrupts the control a society has of its own institutions.

Moreover, political issues exist not only between the displaced and others, but also among different groups within the displaced populations. Within their societies, Jacobs (1989:161) suggested that women could be considered better off after resettlement if they were better off materially (i.e., greater access to resources), if they were less subordinate to men (i.e., had greater control over their own lives), and were more able to act autonomously. Recognition of the political dimensions means paying attention to the divergent interests of the different groups involved in resettlement. Not only does the displaced population as a whole have a set of interests often at variance from the groups implementing the larger development initiative, but within the displaced population different segments of the population may have conflicting interests. Resettlement programs need to take into account these different interests and the conflicts they may generate.

From this perspective, it is unrealistic to think that by following any list of criteria, an approach to post-resettlement development could be elaborated that pleases everyone involved (Gibson 1993). Divergent interests render this impossible. Rather, the different groups need to develop the capacity to negotiate with one another to find ways to resolve conflicts and create development strategies that respect basic human rights and lead to broad improvements in human welfare. This necessarily involves the empowerment of relatively powerless groups to enable them to participate effectively. Although the meaning of the term is not always precise, many now see empowerment as an explicit goal of development. Just as equity was seen as a complement to efficiency, empowerment was also considered a means to increase both equity and efficiency. Whether seen as a means to other goals or as an end in itself, its inclusion as a major goal by the World Bank signals that concern for empowerment has entered the mainstream.

The World Bank (2001:33) considers that there are three major tasks to combat poverty: promoting opportunity, enhancing security, and facilitating empowerment. The
latter includes “making state institutions more accountable and responsive to poor people, strengthening the participation of poor people in political processes and local decision-making, and removing the social barriers that result from distinctions of gender, ethnicity, race, and social status.” Empowerment thus includes the ability of individuals and local groups to make choices about their own lives and to participate in directing their larger societies. The growth of interest in the role of civil society in affecting state activities and decentralization are aspects of the concern for empowerment. Development for displaced peoples would need to include not only increasing access to economic and social resources, but also increasing local autonomy and control and improving people’s ability to affect their own national institutions.

Understanding the ways and means by which vulnerable groups may become empowered has become one of the major themes of recent development literature. Three contemporary critiques of development have been important: a critique of big development, a critique of the state and national integration, and a critique of planning. Some of these are alluded to in aspects of the resettlement literature, but rarely do the debates become explicit.

At the heart of the controversy over big dams is the question of whether large infrastructure projects can be equitable, especially when approached from the perspective of the powerless. While some have answered this question negatively (e.g. Patkar 2000), the WCD (2000) has argued that a change in the decision-making process can indeed justify the construction of some large dams and distribute their benefits more equitably. The issue of the appropriate scale of development is very important in the development literature, and there are convincing arguments on both sides. Having worked with those displaced from the Manantali (Mali), yet having also lived through one of the worst power outages in Mali’s capital (spring 1999) because Manantali was not yet on line, I have experienced firsthand some of the contradictions. Being involuntarily moved was certainly problematic as were the downstream environmental and social effects, but lack of electrical power had clear negative impacts on working-class urban residents (e.g., welders, mechanics, and other artisans; various services dependent on computers), who faced substantial economic losses. The approach taken in this paper is that neither big nor small is intrinsically good, but that any option needs to be scrutinized in terms of a clear analysis of the kinds and distribution of benefits and costs, both economic and non-economic. In terms of involuntary resettlement, it is clear that the World Bank guidelines to avoid or minimize involuntary resettlement and explore all alternative project designs are important (OD 4.30, 3a).

Moreover, many projects that displace people are not ‘big’ projects in a conventional sense. Here, the dam-and-reservoir bias of the resettlement literature and the subsequent debate over the role of large dams has led to the neglect of the many smaller projects that still displace people. In urban areas, even small projects may displace significant numbers because of the density of urban populations. Rarely is there debate about the conceptual value of projects that offer clean water or sewage disposal, but these do displace people and there is usually plenty of controversy about the placement of a particular plant.

A second critique, which has come from both the political left and the right, is a
critique of the role of the state. While the left focused on the ways in which the state has acted inequitably in the interests of the powerful, the right focused on its inefficiency and inferiority to the market for regulating economic processes (Rapley 1996). In the case of involuntary resettlement, the state serves often as both implementer and referee and hence is invariably compromised. Some have considered the state a sinister machine that does much damage in the name of the common good (Waldram 1988:172). But if the state cannot act in the interest of the common good, the literature does not suggest that there is any other organization that can do so. Elements of the private sector are usually expected to act in their own interest; only the firmest believers in the invisible hand of the market believe that the self-interest of the different parties works through market forces for the common good. Political scientists have instead suggested that states, however compromised they may be, can work in the interests of a wide array of constituencies if those constituencies pressure them to do so. In this sense, the empowerment of local groups becomes part of the development process; by organizing and increasing their capacity to act as pressure groups upon the state, they should constrain the state to carry out policies in their interest. Within involuntary resettlement, a necessary part of avoiding long-term impoverishment is building the capacity of local groups to serve as pressure groups. In involuntary resettlement, some have underlined the role of international organizations (both multilateral and bilateral donors and international NGOs) as a way to pressure states to act in the interests of the displaced (Feeney 1998). This is useful over the short term, but long-term development means increasing the ability of local groups to influence their governments as well.

There are two other aspects of the debate about the state. One concerns the advisability of national integration. This is seen as especially problematic when isolated groups (e.g. indigenous communities) are integrated, but at the bottom of a national class system. States do appear to have tendencies toward cultural homogenization and difficulties in accepting the right of groups to be culturally distinct (Gibson 1993). Paine (1994) for example, discusses the reticence of the Norwegian government to accord Saami herders special rights. Oliver-Smith also discusses this issue in more detail in his paper on resistance. However, this is another area where the dam-and-reservoir bias of the existing literature has served to foreground one problem, while obscuring another. Many of those resettled are already integrated or trying to become so; this is especially, although not uniquely, true in urban resettlement. For urban residents, resettlement disrupts forms of integration into urban markets and access to national social service systems that had served them adequately, if not always optimally (Mahapatra 1999b; Perlman 1982). Impoverishment in this case implies being cut off from those systems. The question is not whether national integration is good or not, but the kinds of national integration that work to the benefit of the poor and powerless and the kinds that do not.

The other aspect of the critique of the state that deserves comment is that some of these critiques tend to treat the state as a monolithic entity, where the interests of all government personnel are the same. Various pieces of the resettlement literature suggest that different pieces of the government apparatus have different interests, capabilities, and roles to play (e.g., Rew, Fisher, and Pandey 2000; Koenig 1997). Local groups may have common interests with parts of the government and can forge alliances with them to bring about action in their interest. The approach here is that states are neither disinterested organizations nor monolithic. They respond to pressure as well as to the creation of
informal alliances. Intrinsic to development, in involuntary resettlement or elsewhere, is increasing the ability of local people to affect the actions of their government.

A third critique of development is of the concept of plans and planning (e.g., Escobar 1995). Since the state typically carries out planning activities, this critique is linked to the critique of the state. If the state cannot be expected to act in the interests of the public, it cannot be expected to plan in the general public interest either. A second criticism of planning is that it is too “top-down.” By definition, it relies on experts, planners assumed to have more knowledge than other groups of people involved. Yet this is an extraordinarily problematic assumption; the knowledge of experts is always limited in a variety of ways (Escobar 1995; Lohman 1998). Some have noted resettlement plans that pay no attention to the actual lives of the target populations. Boiler-plate resettlement plans may undergo *ad hoc* modification in practice to meet local conditions, but this leads to an overall inconsistency in implementation (Meikle and Walker 1998). However, the alternative, laissez-faire resettlement without planning, led to the disasters that encouraged planning guidelines in the first place. In the field of involuntary resettlement, the critique of planning has been nearly absent. One of the important aspects of the World Bank guidelines, for example, is the formulation of a Resettlement Action Plan (OD 4.30, 4, 5). The discussion of economic planning has shown that both liberal market economies and centrally planned economies have their own deficiencies. In this context, Rapley (1996) has suggested that states have a new role to play and planning still needs to be done, but in a different way. In the context of DIDR, planning needs to be done in a more democratic, more inclusive way that takes into account the aspects of power distribution underlined here. The goal should be to give people greater control over their own lives as well as more influence over their interactions with national governments.

For the purposes of this paper, development for those affected by DIDR can be operationalized as follows:

1) increasing the availability and utility of economic resources;
2) environmental sustainability (implying equitable access across generations);
3) respect for basic human rights;
4) increasing equity between affected groups and other national groups as well as increasing equity among the different groups within affected populations;
5) increasing local autonomy and control;
6) improving people’s ability to improve their interactions with national institutions

This definition of development includes considerations about the distribution of power as well as the distribution of economic resources. Groups who have been “sacrificed for” or suffer from the impact of other people’s development projects enter the process as relatively powerless. While the more powerful may sometimes find themselves the subject of involuntary resettlement (e.g., residents of shoreline or wetland communities and earthquake zones in the United States), those who are resettled are more often the poor and relatively powerless. They lose resources (become impoverished) because they do not have the economic, social, cultural, or political capital in the first place to make their claims to resources and rights heard as effectively as do those of the more favored parts of the population. In the process of DIDR, they often have ended up losing even further. The development projects to address DIDR need to consider the existing distribution of power in their analyses and integrate empowerment as an explicit goal.
This aspect of development, i.e., local development of those affected by DIDR, is the focus of this study. However, this is not the only meaning of development in the DIDR literature. DIDR means development-induced involuntary displacement and resettlement. In this sense, the idea is that there is some larger development project that aims to improve social welfare, usually at a national or regional level. An equally important question is whether the projects that induce involuntary displacement are really about ‘development,’ even in the sense of improving national welfare. Certain of the activities cited in many of the lists of factors leading to DIDR are very problematic. This includes activities such as politically mandated mass relocation, particularly that to facilitate government control, for example, vilification in Ethiopia or Tanzania (Brain 1976; Cohen and Isaksson 1987) or relocation to or within homelands in South Africa under apartheid (deWet 1993; Hofmeyr 1994). It also includes attempts to sedentarize pastoralists (e.g., Merryman 1982), another questionable activity, even from most conventional development perspectives. Insofar as these activities improve resource access and autonomy for only a small favored part of the population, it is problematic whether they can be conceived of as development in any sense of the term. In some projects, authors have suggested that so-called development projects have covert anti-development purposes. For example, Scudder (1996:62) came to believe that the main purpose of the Okavango delta project was to provide water for diamond mines rather than its explicit goal of serving a local urban area. Oliver-Smith (1996:91) believed that control of minority ethnic groups was an important secondary goal of many South American initiatives. Except in a few cases, data on these covert purposes is not available.

Insofar as possible, the literature will try to focus on the experiences of those larger projects that do offer some potential for the development of a broad mass of people, even if the displaced risk impoverishment. Many urban projects, such as light rail or sewage systems, offer the promise of real benefits to a large percentage of the population; electricity and clean water are often available to many as well. Yet many other projects that appear in the literature are quite problematic. Can an urban renewal project that moves out poor neighborhoods to create an upper-class housing development be considered a development project, e.g. relocation in metropolitan Manila (Meikle and Walker 1998)? Should the privatization of state-owned mines to increase their efficiency and productivity be considered development or not? Some NGOs and analysts believe that many of the projects undertaken in the name of development benefit only a small percentage of those already favored and base their opposition on that. On the other hand, the growth of these, often privately funded, projects are playing an increasingly important role in displacement. Whether they fulfill the criteria for being development or not, people are being resettled and impoverished because of them. A discussion of whether these projects are ‘development’ or not is beyond the scope of this paper. This study will include them because of their growing importance.

2.2 Non-hydropower displacement and resettlement

The next section will make the argument that some aspects of DIDR projects have improved in light of greater understanding about the impoverishment processes of DIDR.
and strategies to mitigate them. However, due to the dam bias and the boundaries between people who work in different sectors, using the lessons learned from existing knowledge seems to have been most effective in the river-basin development and hydropower sectors. The lessons learned in this context have not been readily transferred to other contexts of DIDR. Following are just a few examples of more recent development initiatives that involve resettlement.

Forest conservation projects appear to have been slow in building on knowledge about involuntary displacement or using policy guidelines. Among the most graphic examples was the displacement of some 35,000 people in 1992 from the Kibale Forest Reserve and Game Corridor; these were only some of the 130,000 people evicted between 1990 and 1993 in the context of Uganda’s Natural Forest Management and Conservation Project (Feeney 1998; Oxfam 1996a). Those living in the forests were evicted because they were defined as “squatters” even though most had been residents twenty or more years (Feeney 1998). Some were evicted forcibly and a Government of Uganda report documented human rights violations. When valuation of resources was carried out and people compensated, it was typically done in an arbitrary fashion (Feeney 1998:95). Thousands of displaced people ended up squatting elsewhere.

Although the evictions were carried out by an arm of the Ugandan government, the project was funded by the EC as part of a larger conservation initiative with World Bank participation. By the time the evictions were carried out, the EC had adopted the OECD guidelines on involuntary resettlement and was therefore bound by them (Feeney 1998:98; Oxfam 1996a:10). The World Bank failed to follow its own operational directives (Oxfam 1996a:9). The resettlement issue appears not to have been raised at donor coordination meetings (Feeney 1998:97). After the event, other parts of the Ugandan government carried out an inquiry which publicized these issues, and some activities were undertaken to mitigate the effects of those evicted and help them reconstitute livelihoods in their new homes. However, these were criticized for being insufficient to counteract impoverishment (Oxfam 1996a).

There has been a growing recognition in the conservation community that people need to be involved in forest and wildlife conservation projects (e.g., Bonner 1993; Kottak and Rakotoarisoa 1990). Yet the major goal of these projects remains forests or animals, not people. In many cases, it may be impossible to maintain the forest with the number of users presently there. People living in forests may suggest cutting them down so they can cultivate (e.g., Cissé et al. 1989), which brings them into conflict with environmentalists. In contrast to dam reservoirs and downstream areas, where those concerned about the environment and those concerned with people often find common cause, conservation projects offer less obvious areas of common interest. Although environmentalists have become more aware of the human impacts of conservation projects, there still is a way to go.

But conservation is not the only sector in which DIDR projects ignore policy and lessons learned. Other kinds of infrastructure development can also involve displacements, sometimes of small numbers, other times of many people. Donors can be involved in a variety of ways: not at all, as a direct funder, or indirectly, as in the case of Zambia where pressure was put on the government by the World Bank to privatize copper mines.
The belief was that new private owners would use more technologically advanced, productive forms of mining. In turn this would require fewer workers, which would displace people. The government of Zambia evidently believed that its mines would be more attractive to outside investors if they included substantial amounts of ‘vacant’ land available for new exploration, so the problem of “squatters” living on this land became important (Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer 1998:41).

There were no adequate resettlement programs and almost no assistance to evicted families (Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer 1998:29). This was despite the fact that World Bank policy recognized mining as a sector in which displacement can occur and also stated that resources should be provided to people with usufruct or customary rights to land, the case of these long-term “squatters.” It was as if these two sections of the World Bank, those working on privatization and those working on involuntary resettlement, were not aware of one another.

These examples are both cases where the World Bank and other lenders were involved in some way, so that recourse could have been made to their policy guidelines. Yet people are also affected by locally or nationally-funded infrastructure development that displaces them directly or puts their resources at risk. For example, the construction of the North Gujarat University campus (India) in 1988 displaced people from fertile land even though use of an alternative site not far away would have avoided or substantially decreased displacement. Industrial plants can also cause other problems. The Gujarat Mineral Development Corporation (India) needed water for its copper plant, built in 1992; they drew water from horizontal wells that locals believed would lower their water table (Appa and Patel 1996:141). Various kinds of industrial plants also cause air and water pollution (Pandey 1998).

These are only a few of the many examples of non-dam related resettlement and its impacts. The study has referred above and will refer again below to the implications of the dam-and-reservoir bias of existing resettlement theory and practice. While resettlement theory and practice have improved dramatically on the basis of lessons learned from river basin development initiatives, it is time to broaden the perspective to include more systematically other types of DIDR as well.

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8Simple mine or plant closures can also result in the physical dislocation of communities and workers. This is a situation where there is a question of whether the larger project is about development or not, but where the displacement of people who lost jobs and housing may demand a DIDR-type development project. The experiences of developed countries, particularly in areas where small towns have relied heavily on a single large plant that closes, may offer useful insights.
2.3 Privatization of DIDR

As needs for irrigation, electricity and other infrastructure grow, there is enormous pressure for infrastructure development. Even as governments find some infrastructure investments of questionable economic benefit, the private sector is moving into this area (McDowell 1996b:3). Other kinds of DIDR, particularly that not linked to dams, has had at least some private-sector participation for a long time. In this context, both government policies and national legal systems are important. Together they place constraints on activities (through zoning and environmental regulations, compensation laws, taxing regimes, etc.) and offer opportunities to citizens to respond (through public comment periods, court access, incentives for or constraints against local organizing). The planning bias of the literature on involuntary resettlement tends to see government agencies in their role as planners who direct national action (state-ordained action) and has paid much less attention to national legal frameworks as a means to constrain and facilitate certain actions (state-sanctioned actions).

Although the state will almost always have a role in involuntary resettlement, its role may be substantially different in cases where funding is from the government or funneled through governmental agencies and those in which funding is private. In the former, government agencies can ordain, plan, and carry out action, while in the latter they sanction actions, serving in a watchdog role. If one of the problems of the former type of involuntary resettlement is that government agencies serve both as player and referee (deWet, 2000), this may be less true in the latter, where the government should serve primarily as referee. However, here too the government may offer incentives to some private initiatives and not others, retaining a role as a certain kind of player. A systematic empirical study of the effects of privatized development initiatives and their impacts on affected populations has not yet been done. Nor can it be done here, since there simply is not enough data. This section offers a few indicative examples of some of the issues involved, and examples will be used where appropriate in later sections of this study as well.

In contrast to government organizations, which may be constrained to follow a particular policy and an administrative hierarchy, many private sector organizations are more entrepreneurial, following a number of strategies to achieve their goals. Depending on the situation and the laws of the country, they may follow strategies of getting land before or after making their development plans public. Private-sector companies may turn to alternative actors who have claims over the land. When Cyprus Amax made an offer for a publicly-owned mine on the Zambian Copperbelt, it wanted more land. It began

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10Some of the issues here reflect the debates among political scientists over the appropriate role for the post-structural adjustment state. If the state pulls back from its role in directing the economy, it may nevertheless need to enhance its regulatory, taxing, and licensing role, hence the argument for a ‘leaner but meaner’ state (see Rapley 1996). The approach taken here is not to debate whether this is an appropriate strategy but rather to recognize that the trend among contemporary governments is to decrease their direct involvement in economic affairs.
negotiations with and obtained approval from chiefs and local authorities to extend the mining area to neighboring land under the authority of traditional chiefs. In its negotiations with the local Council for land to house 2000 temporary workers, it also negotiated a plan with the Council to hand over surplus houses in a later phase when it anticipated needing only 400 workers. This seems to have been in part an effort to gain support of the local politicians (Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer 1998:63-67). Private negotiations were evident in India as well where the Ambuja Cement Company (India) made private agreements to purchase a part of the land they needed from individuals who needed cash (Appa and Patel 1996:143). This was also the case in the Philippines, where Amari, a private developer, negotiated directly with resisting residents when a cut-off date for action by the government agency involved had passed (Meikle and Walker 1998). In many cases, there are a variety of legal ways in which private companies can get the land they need for their business; there is no single formula they must follow.

Private organizations can also make use of the fact that government organizations are not monolithic and have different levels and departments, each with its own interests. The case of Cyprus Amax and the local Council discussed above shows one sort of alliance that created an outcome that benefitted both, but with potentially problematic results for others. Presumably, there will also be cases where national or local government are willing to waive environmental or social regulations to encourage private investment.

Private sector companies are also subject to investigation from outside groups, sometimes different ones, sometimes the same sources that investigate government and international agencies. In the case of Cyprus Amax, most workers were declared redundant and told to leave in early 1998 when the company began a 2-year exploratory phase (Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer 1998:63-67). Evidently some received termination benefits but these often proved insufficient to buy new housing. There appears to have been no future job counseling; many seem to have invested their compensation in non-remunerative commercial ventures. Cyprus Amax also announced its intention to demolish all the high density housing in the mine site, even though it asked had the local Council for land to house its temporary workforce. It seems clear that no organization was planning a development project for the redundant minors. Nor is it clear what aspects of Zambian law, e.g., labor law provisions for termination, were relevant and how they were used. An Oxfam team was called in to try to offer some support, but could not get information about compensation given to the minors, who had previously received not only received salaries, but also were housed and had access to other company services. In contrast, NGO assistance to local organization from the beginning seems to have made a difference in one Philippine case. The private developer, Amari, gave much higher compensation to those with whom it negotiated directly; the payments were three times higher than those received earlier through the government agency involved (Meikle and Walker 1998).

The willingness of private businesses to negotiate follows a different logic than that of government agencies, but it is also vulnerable to pressure from organized parties. Many publicly-held private companies have developed policies in response to shareholder concerns about environmental or social issues, but Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer (1998:64) noted that Cyprus Amax’s plans to clear a large area for exploration may not have been in accord with its own environmental policies. Moreover, not all private
companies that cause displacement are either large or publicly held. There are some 700 mines in Orissa, mostly in tribal areas, and mostly operated by private parties on a lease basis. Many of these apparently managed to get the land they needed by satisfying the owner with some compensation or other. Many such transactions were never legally registered, presumably because the firms were of relatively small scale, so it is difficult to even estimate the extent of the displacement they caused (Pandey 1998:36).

In this case, the safeguards and compensation offered through a working legal system may become at least as important as a development project offered to the displaced. This becomes an important way for both individuals and groups to bring pressure upon developers, as the literature suggests. For example, Appa and Patel (1996) recounted several Indian cases where locals brought firms to court. Locals took the Adani Chemicals’ Salt Works to court when they heard rumors that their land would be taken. Evidently the Ambuja Cement Company was unable to get sufficient land through the private negotiations discussed above, so it applied to the government to get the remaining land it needed. At this point, some farmers petitioned the high court to disallow company use of this highly fertile land. Pandey (1998) suggested that court cases were very frequent, but problematic because Indian legal solutions were individual; they did not extend to others in the same situation. But those who could afford to go to court often got settlements far higher than those of their peers. Canadian Indians appear to have spent much of their time in court and count any successful outcomes as at least in part dependent on favorable legal decisions (Salisbury 1986; Waldram 1988).

Usefulness of courts is limited by both the nature of the laws and the ease of access. National laws do not necessarily follow the international guidelines. The Indian literature on involuntary resettlement is full of discussion of the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (amended 1984), which mandates monetary compensation for land at market value, rather than either land-for-land replacement or replacement-value monetary compensation (e.g. Pandey 1998; Mahapatra 1999a). While some projects have managed to engineer land-for-land replacement through the construction of resettlement colonies, monetary compensation remains officially at market rather than replacement value. Legal standing could also be an issue. Locals who wanted to testify in favor of alternative approaches to development that did not involve involuntary relocation did not have the right to be heard in existing Indian law. The Land Acquisition Act did not allow people to be heard until the acquisition proceedings started, at which point it became difficult to challenge land acquisition procedures on the basis of other efficacious or more economical alternatives (Appa and Patel 1996).

There is also the issue of access to the courts. Oxfam (1996b) noted that most of the legal cases from damages sustained by road construction in Kenya were settled out of court because the costs to bring a case were prohibitive. Pandey (1998) noted that only the better-off tended to bring cases to court because of the expense involved. Although lawyers were often willing to take cases of poorer people, he considered the fees they charged exploitative. Despite the difficulties involved, the number of people involved who were willing to go to court to fight for rights and compensation was quite striking. Government programs that provided legal costs for the displaced, as among Canadian aboriginals, increased their ability to bring effective cases, as did the work of legally oriented NGOs, for example, the groups working with those in Kenya suffering from road
If the guidelines for resettlement suggest that resettlement ought to be carried out as a development project, there are few examples where a private-sector organization itself carried out a development project for those displaced. Rather the discussions have revolved around issues of appropriate compensation for losses and perhaps reconstitution of local assets damaged by the development project (e.g., well reconstruction when quarrying affected existing wells and water table). In India, there was a time when public, private, or parastatal organizations such as power plants or mines were expected to offer jobs to the displaced, but the latest version of the Orissa state resettlement policy dropped this (Pandey 1998:21). Even with the policy, the numbers employed were often quite low because of lack of appropriate skills. In one case discussed by Pandey, NALCO, a public aluminum company, provided a program to enhance skills, but this was very rare. This raises the question of whether private developers should be required to create development projects for those displaced. Should these be paid for by the private developer and/or by a public agency? Who should implement them? Examples of economic benefits might include job counseling and training programs for those who lose jobs due to plant privatization or closing, various kinds of social service programs that deal with mental and physical stress, housing replacement costs, and transportation of family and personal effects.

A final aspect of the role of the private sector concerns its role in the development projects for the resettled rather than its role as a cause in relocation. There is little if any consideration of the role of independent private enterprises in the development projects to meet the needs of persons displaced by either public or private projects. The state-planning-bias of this literature means that the state is seen is the main actor here with NGOs as the main complement. As will be discussed in more detail below (Section 3.2.1.1), many governments do not have either the means or capacity to create jobs in areas where the risk of joblessness is high. Rather expectations will be that people will find private sector employment. Are there ways that DIDR development projects can encourage private businesses to locate in a resettlement area and hire local people?

Non-river-basin DIDR and privatized DIDR are two areas in which further research is needed. The rest of this study takes these issues into account, more in theory than in practice. This is because there is significantly less information on these issues than on rural, dam-related, publicly sponsored DIDR. There is some (e.g., Rew, Fisher, and Pandey 2000; NRCR 1999; Pandey 1998; Meikle and Walker 1998), but this information is scattered and not well synthesized. While the risks appear to be quite similar, the strategies for mitigating risks, reestablishing effective livelihoods, and creating development may be quite different.
3. The Impact of Policy Change

This section looks at the ways in which an improved understanding and better policies have led to better outcomes for people displaced and otherwise significantly affected by development activities. It is broken into two sections, areas where there seems to have been substantial improvement and areas where improvements have been limited. Since Cernea’s risk and reconstruction provides a detailed framework of potential risks, it will be used to frame the discussion.

3.1 Positive impacts of policy guidelines

While some have suggested that there is virtually no way to plan for involuntary resettlement without impoverishment (deWet 2000), the data reviewed for this study suggest that the existence of accumulated knowledge, the development of theoretical models, and the propagation of guidelines have together created an environment in which at least some DIDR is done with the goal of avoiding impoverishment and reconstituting the livelihoods of the displaced. The World Bank review of resettlement projects showed that those projects following their guidelines performed better than those that bypassed them (Rew 1996:205). The review concludes that the establishment of general principles in Chinese national resettlement law between 1978 and 1992 led to the definition of clear institutional responsibilities at national, provincial, and local levels there; in general China is seen as an example of how resettlement planning and regulations can protect the living standards of the displaced (Rew 1996:205,206).

To be sure, guidelines have not always been followed consistently or rigorously. In addition to the non-river-basin cases outlined above, certain dam projects also failed to meet the guidelines. DeWet (2000:9,10) points to the case of Nangbeto in Togo, where the World Bank did not follow up on its own guidelines. Many problems do indeed arise from bad practice, not bad policy (Pearce 1999:53). Moreover, it is important to note that there is often a substantial time lag between the use of guidelines and when the outcomes are known to a larger public. Although negative outcomes are often known quickly, positive outcomes tend to appear in the literature more slowly.

The remainder of this section looks at several aspects that have shown considerable improvement. They include avoiding displacement where possible, social welfare issues, replacement of land, socio-cultural reconstruction, and an appreciation of the complexities of calculating compensation.

3.1.1 Avoiding displacement where possible

The first strategy to avoid the problems related to displacement is to look for alternative technical and development choices that avoid or lessen displacement. Some organizations and government agencies have begun to do this. The alignment of the Danxian-Wanxian railway (China) was done in such a way as to minimize acquisition of

This could be used more often however. As Appa and Patel (1996) noted, it is important to have a legal framework in which there is the possibility for the potentially affected to comment during the initial plan. Alternative possibilities are often available, but if there is no possibility to negotiate these before activity starts, it may be difficult to act upon them later.

3.1.2 Addressing social welfare risks

The social welfare risks of DIDR seem to be the best addressed and have shown improvements in light of lessons learned.

Homelessness has been addressed in a variety of ways. There is no single appropriate strategy; rather strategies vary in light of the nature of the population displaced and the social and physical environment to which they are moving. The variety can be enormous. Mejía’s (1999:161) review of Latin American urban DIDR projects found many different strategies for housing replacement, including provision of partly subsidized housing, fully subsidized housing, single-family housing in a shared social area, apartments, the use of letters of credit, renting with an option to buy, financed lots with services, and lots with services and building supplies. She also noted that consultation with affected urban populations tended to begin at earlier stages of project planning than in the past (Mejía 1999:165).

Issues remain. One is whether people will actually use compensation meant for housing to provide it. Thangaraj (1996:228) noted that when people were given construction money in one lump sum, they often used it for consumption and the resultant quality of new housing was poor. So, in the Upper Indravati Hydroelectric Project, people were given compensation for housing over a series of small payments. Subsequent payments were linked to achievement of earlier construction, but Pandey (1998) noted that this caused problems as well, including opportunities for corruption by bank officials. Yet, many have noted improvement in housing quality after resettlement.

A second issue is if people should be expected to pay any part of the housing costs; this is particularly the case in urban projects where housing is upgraded substantially. On the one hand, some argue that people should not be required to pay anything because they did not choose to move nor do they often choose the quality of the new housing. However, some civil servants believe that having to pay a part of housing costs makes resettled families feel more rooted and increases their sense of ownership and capacity for self-management (Mejía 1999:157,158). But those involuntarily displaced themselves have repeatedly rejected being forced to assume the costs of new housing, primarily by not making monthly payments. In the Latin American projects studied by Mejía (1999:158), housing subsidies ranged from 65% to 95% of the costs. In the Philippines as well, where people were expected to amortize the costs of housing over many years, e.g., 25 in one project, they often were behind in payments (Meikle and Walker 1998). It is unclear from
most of these sources whether people were evicted for non-payment or whether this became a hidden cost to the development project.

Construction of individual housing can be and often is complemented by the construction of social infrastructure, such as schools, health clinics, administrative offices, etc. This has given many displaced better access to a variety of social services. One major exception is where the services are dependent on having a regularized administrative status. Mahapatra (1996b), for example, noted that in the Indian context, unless resettlement colonies become officially recognized villages, residents did not have access to a number of existing social programs.

The short-term risk of food insecurity can also be addressed by national or international food aid organizations. The World Food Programme has provided short-term food aid for many resettlement projects (e.g. at Manantali and Selingue in Mali). There needs to be adequate forward planning to make sure that food arrives in a timely manner, but this was not usually insurmountable. Standard food aid can be supplemented by such activities as food-for-work programs or feeding programs for the particularly vulnerable (infant, small children, pregnant women, the aged). At least some supplementary food aid has now become standard in resettlement projects, although the length and form can vary widely.

Short-term health risks can also be met through provision of temporary clinics and vaccination programs, among other activities. There also needs to be planning for the more long-term potential disease growth due to moving to a new environment. In dam-related resettlement in tropical environments, water-born diseases often increase. Indigenous peoples who have lived relatively isolated lives may also suffer from diseases that come from contact with more diverse populations. But again, many resettlement programs set up short-term health clinics or offer vaccinations. In general the short-term health risks have proved easier to address than the long-term ones.

The fact that social welfare issues tend to be rather well addressed is both an indicator of better resettlement and a sign that some of the longer-term risks are still ignored. These tend to be the most visible and immediate kinds of risk and the easiest to address, in contrast to the long-term issues of access to economic and socio-cultural resources. Sometimes project implementation staff seem to think that once the risks of food, housing, and health are addressed, the essential is done and the economic can take care of itself. Ericksen (1999:115), for example, complained that involuntary resettlement projects tended to emphasize social infrastructure such as schools, health, community centers over more clearly economic infrastructure, like markets, roads, and agricultural extension. Reconstituting economic, socio-cultural, and political resources are more important over the long term because it is through them that long-term social welfare issues are met, through the ability to create viable income-earning strategies and to influence governments to provide appropriate entitlements.
3.1.3 Land replacement

When rural people are mostly farmers, land is needed if they are reconstitute livelihoods. Two particular problems have been addressed relatively well in theory and somewhat in practice. First is the inadequacy of a system that provides cash compensation to farmers, who are then theoretically enabled to go out and buy land on an open market. The problems are many and include lack of monetarized land markets, land speculation, lack of available land for sale, and price inflation. Although the particular constellation of these problems varies from place to place, there is now general agreement that land-for-land replacement is the most appropriate way to reconstitute land assets in rural, agriculturally based resettlement. Where land-for-land is impossible, compensation needs to be based on replacement cost rather than market value. Even though Indian law requires compensation at market value, some individual projects have managed to move toward replacement value and Orissa’s 1994 Water Resources Policy even makes land-for-land the preference (Pandey 1998:20). Others give more than the minimum. For example, the Orissa Water Resources Consolidation Project and the Upper Indravati Hydroelectric Project compensated those with title to lands at market value plus 30% plus 12% interest, due to delay (Thangaraj 1996:225).

Second, the understanding of the complexities of agricultural land use and ownership has also led to general acceptance of the idea that it is not only those with legal title who ought to get land replaced, but a variety of other primary land users, including those who hold rights collectively or individually through customary tenure and a variety of long-term “squatters” and “encroachers.” Recognition of the rights of extended family members has also led to the inclusion of non-household heads as having rights to replacement land. Many Indian resettlement projects envisioned the provision of plots to major sons. Pandey (1998) has shown how the development of policy in Orissa (India) steadily increased the number of people recognized as having rights to land when their village is inundated. There was extension to the landless, to major sons aged 21 or older (and then 18 and older), to widows, and to unmarried daughters aged 30 or older.

Although scholars are almost unanimous on the advisability of land-for-land, the displaced themselves do not always agree. In India, land-for-land replacement was usually done within the context of resettlement colonies, while those who choose cash compensation could settle wherever they chose. Of some 54,634 families in 29 different projects in Orissa, only 10,886 (20%) chose the land-for-land option by settling in a colony although the rates varied widely from one project to another (Pandey 1998:117); it is not clear what factors made colonies so unpopular. In one Ugandan project, many farmers did not want land-for-land replacement because they owned plots of land elsewhere or earned satisfactory income from other sources; they preferred cash (Rew, Fisher, and Pandey 2000:33).

One of the major efforts made by Indian social scientists has been to get Indian law amended to recognize the principal of replacement value instead of market value (see, e.g., Mahapatra 1999a:154-159).
Several issues remain outstanding however. Primary is the issue of the tenure or land titling systems to be put into place; often neither communities nor individuals get full title (Ericksen 1999:114; Lassailly-Jacob 1996:195). In African projects where people were resettled in major development projects, for example, irrigated perimeters, they often remained tenants. This led people to believe they were employees of the agricultural agency, rather than working for themselves; Lassailly-Jacob (1996:196) pointed to the example of Kossou (Côte d’Ivoire). Title may be promised but take a long time in coming; this was not uncommon in India (e.g. Pandey 1998). Not only farmland, but the community land used by hunters, herders, and for bush resources needs clearly defined title (Lassailly-Jacob 1996:197). There is no necessary correlation between having a title and individual private property. Even in the United States, there are a variety of ways in which either small or large groups can own title to property, ranging from two unrelated individuals to limited liability corporations. There are also non-title options that give secure tenure to either individuals or groups, e.g. demarcation of Indian reserves South America. The many non-DIDR situations in which groups have formal tenure include Indian reservations/reserves in the United States and Canada, group ranches in parts of Africa, and agricultural villages in China. There is no reason that they could not be used as an option in DIDR programs as well.

A second issue is the return of lands that are planned for use and taken by development organizations, but not used. For example, in the case of the Karjan dam in India, the villagers wanted the unsubmerged land returned to them for their own use, but the government wanted to keep it for afforestation (Appa and Patel 1996:145).

A third issue is the appropriate size of landholdings. Rarely, in either voluntary or involuntary resettlement, was effort made to tailor the size of landholdings to the labor or capital endowments of households (Ericksen 1999:113). Note however that some projects have become aware of this issue. At Manantali, land was allocated in terms of the numbers of adults within a household, both men and women, so that larger households got more land than smaller ones. China also had a policy to allocate land commensurate with capacities (Ericksen 1999:113). Yet where this was not done, it led to decreasing average size of landholdings. Pandey’s (1998:58) analysis of projects in Orissa (India) showed a clear decline in land ownership and titles after resettlement. Middle-income farm households may not have become landless, but they often declined in status to smallholders; shopkeepers and craftspeople lost as their major clientele became poorer (Pandey 1998:108).

The final issue noted here is perhaps the most important. In areas of high population density, there simply may not be enough land available to provide land-for-land replacement, or at least, it may be difficult to provide land-for-land replacement and meet the objective of moving people as units (see the next section). In general, the more people that are displaced, the more likely it is that it will be difficult to get sufficient land. For example, at Shuikou in China, non-farm jobs made up two-thirds of all formal jobs for the displaced (Jing 1999, cited in deWet 2000:18). In some countries, land may sometimes be gotten through land reform or redistribution; for example in China, land is sometimes redistributed to new settlers, especially if some farmers have relatively large amounts of land (i.e., more than a given threshold amount) (NRCR 1999). But this strategy can be politically unpopular. In India, a Ministerial Committee recommended in 1982 that large
landholders be compelled to part with some of their land to resettle the displaced, but this remained in draft and was not implemented (Pandey 1998:11). Other strategies for getting land become problems for constituencies that are potential allies of resettlers; in India, there have been struggles between environmentalists and resettlement specialists over the advisability of declassifying forest lands to give them to resettled farmers for cultivation.

The lack of sufficient land to provide viable plots is one factor leading to the decline in land ownership among resettled farmers. In fact, Pandey (1998:15,17) delineates the decreasing size of land allocations as India’s population has grown. At Rengali in the 1970s, those who moved to agricultural colonies received either 6 acres of unirrigated land or 3 acres of irrigated land; by the 1990s, the recommended amount was 2.5 acres of unirrigated or 1.25 acres of irrigated land. Yet if resettled farmers cannot get viable plots, they will not be able to reconstitute their livelihoods. If land is insufficient to provide land-for-land for all, then from the beginning, the project should look at strategies for combining land-based and job-based economic reconstruction. This is much more complicated, for it will involve identification of alternative economic development possibilities as well as candidates for the various options.

3.1.4 Socio-cultural reconstruction

There have also been achievements in recognizing the need for maintaining functional units of social organization. In particular, the emphasis on moving people as units reflected in strategies that move people as groups. Chinese policies focus on restoring and preserving social units (Ericksen 1999:104,105). At Manantali, villages were reconstructed as units. This preserved people’s ability to use social networks to access resources. This strategy is easier in places where social units coincide with geographical ones, e.g., rural areas where people live in nucleated villages, but it can also be carried out in areas where social units are less visible.

Nevertheless, while moving as units does help preserve social cohesion and the ability to act together, there are trade-offs. For example, one of the issues in urban resettlement is the difficulty of finding sufficient land in central locations to resettle large groups. If people are to be kept together, they often must be moved at some distance from the central city, which, as already noted, tends to have negative economic repercussions. They might be able to keep vertical networks if they stay in the city, but then they would need to be dispersed, disrupting horizontal networks. Little if any literature discusses this trade-off directly although the problems are known.

There is also a trade-off between individual choice and moving as units. As already noted, people themselves sometimes wanted to change their social networks: the lower caste people who did not want to preserve their hierarchical relationships with the upper caste, younger people who wished to take advantage of new opportunities. The Lesotho Highlands project provided a range of compensation options, but that this may have affected negatively social solidarity after resettlement (DeWet personal communication). Moreover, it is not always clear what the meaningful social group is. Physical proximity does not always mean being part of a single social network or group. This was particularly evident in areas where two different ethnic groups were located, e.g.,
strains between Inuit and Cree, which started over the James Bay (Canada) agreement (McCutcheon 1991:154), distinctions made between the Kuna and Embera at Bayano (Panama) (Wali 1989), and difficulties between Cree and Métis at Easterville (Canada) (Waldram 1980).

On the other hand, people do what they can to reconstruct meaningful socio-cultural units. Many people used compensation money for marriages; this was common in India and was also found at Manantali (Mali). Pandey (1998:73) considered this a problem, since people were using compensation money to pay for marriage ceremonies instead of investing it in more tangible economic resources. Yet, he also noted that they often would have had to sell land to pay for these ceremonies before the resettlement. In any case, in social situations where kin networks provide the primary social insurance and where family labor is important for economic success, using compensation money for marriages can be seen to be a practical way to meet both economic and social needs. In fact, Pandey (1998:50) also found an increase in joint families after displacement rather than an expected decline. Although he was not sure whether families had claimed to be nuclear before displacement to get maximum benefits, or whether working together was a response to more constrained resources, it is clear that social and economic resources are interrelated.

There can be unanticipated consequences to social cohesion. As will be discussed in more detail below (Section 4.4.2.4), the social solidarity consciously built by the Cree to help them respond to the James Bay (Canada) dam brought them new economic resources. This in turn led to a boom in the town of Chisasibi, where government services and private enterprises were located. McCutcheon (1991:122) believed that Chisasibi showed most severe signs of social stress of all Native communities of northern Quebec, simply because it was the most affected by hydroelectric development. Other villages had some negative economic repercussions such as flooding of tralines, but less social stress because they were less accessible and faced neither a major influx of non-Natives nor a boom. At Manantali, a group of small hamlets that decided to relocate together created a village that rivaled the socio-cultural dominance of older villages; this new village became the site of the largest market in the zone as well as one of the two rural commune centers after decentralization. This village faced continuous problems from older, more established villages whose leaders believed that they had a right to political precedence.

Much less attention has been paid to the relevance of changing versus preserving social units for political organization and mobilization. This is a complex issue that will be raised again below (Section 4.4.2). Authors have also paid less attention to individual marginalization and the relevance of human capital formation, although Pandey (1998) noted cases where children deserted parents and sons-in-law deserted wives, leading to the impoverishment of women and older people. He also noted that older people and women, who often had jobs in old sites but not in new, became dependent on the few other family members who did get jobs post-resettlement. Hayes (1999) systematically included human capital loss and reconstruction in her model; this could facilitate better approaches to mitigating individual marginalization. In any case, socio-cultural losses need to be judged in their own terms as well as by their economic impact; as Veena Das (cited in Pandey 1998:6) noted, cultural loss cannot be compensated uniquely by economic measures.
3.1.5 Understanding the complexities of compensation

In areas where monetary compensation remains appropriate, projects seem to recognize that this is an area that is highly complex. Although laws may imply that compensation is a simple, homogeneous matter, resettlement initiatives seem to recognize that in practice it is not. For example, not only resettlers but hosts need to be considered for compensation (Pearce 1999:59). The issue of having legal documents is also recognized. Indian anthropologists have made reference to ILO Conventions on indigenous people to argue forcefully that customary tenure (i.e., that without legal documents) has been recognized by the Indian government through their acceptance of these conventions. Thus compensation ought to paid to people with customary tenure but without legal documents to prove ownership. The problems of calculating land values when there is no active land market have been recognized. In China, a multiple of the value of crops produced has been used, and social scientists have argued for adapting this strategy in areas without active land markets (Meikle and Walker 1998; Mahapatra 1996a). It has also been recognized that even where there is a land market, it may be in the best interests of all to underestimate land values, leading to problems with compensation (Rew, Fisher, and Pandey 2000). The Indian government has also recognized that it can be a problem to pay compensation in one lump sum and anticipated payment schemes that pay out compensation over time, although these too were subject to criticism (Pandey 1998). In some cases there were problems when people were paid compensation too far ahead; it was spent on consumption rather than investment because people were still in their old homes with their old resources. In contrast, there are probably more cases where compensation has been paid too late. Implementing agencies are often constrained in their ability to pay compensation in a timely fashion by bureaucratic and administrative hurdles (Rew, Fisher, and Pandey 2000).

There appears to be no ideal format for paying compensation; rather it depends on the local situation, including local and government institutions available. Presumably, more participation of resettlers in determining the modalities of compensation and its payment would help adapt standard formulas to local conditions.

3.2 Known risks that remain problematic

In contrast to the above areas where significant progress has been made, there are other areas where the risks are known but little systematic movement toward addressing them has been made. These include economic issues other than land for farms and housing, urban resettlement in general, differentiation in the resettled population (by age, class, gender, etc.), and the non-displaced affected by DIDR.

3.2.1 Economic issues

Although there are some outstanding issues involved in land replacement, the general principles are understood and accepted. Farmers need land as the basic asset to reconstitute their livelihoods, and projects need to find ways to do provide it. The other
economic risks are either much more complex (addressing joblessness) or problematic for other reasons (common property resources). A further issue is the fact that people often mix different economic resources, creating economic strategies that use a variety of resources; resettlement programs have been relatively deficient in looking for ways to reconstitute multiple economic resources. This section looks at each of these issues in turn.

### 3.2.1.1 Jobs

Finding jobs for people in developing countries is problematic, even when there is no involuntary resettlement. Involuntary resettlement makes the problem of finding employment more difficult, since it disrupts access to productive resources as well as to the social networks that assure clientele.

People need jobs in both urban and rural areas. In urban areas, there is at least a recognition that people need jobs to survive. Yet Mejía’s (1999:156) study of World Bank funded projects in Latin America suggests that most current urban resettlement programs were based primarily on housing. Among other things, the reliance of poor on the informal economy has not been sufficiently studied or taken into consideration. These activities often depend on the surrounding environment (Perlman 1982); hence site selection is crucial in restoring employment, income, and social networks (Mejía 1999:153). For recent Latin American urban resettlement projects, the proportion of unemployed averaged around 15%; about 25% of the displaced populations were underemployed (Mejía 1999:162). Yet many urban projects still seem to consider that reconstitution of jobs is unproblematic if people remain in the same city (e.g. Meikle and Walker 1998).

In rural areas, the issue of reconstituting long-term jobs is rarely raised as a problem, even though analysts have noted that many rural residents have various kinds of jobs. Displaced people tend to be defined primarily by the major occupation of the region; this has limited recognition of the secondary occupations of individuals as well as those individuals who have other primary occupations. For example, the policy in Orissa (India) may have steadily increased the categories of people eligible for land-based compensation in zones defined as agricultural, but those with non-agricultural primary occupations were still excluded and left to their own devices (Pandey 1998:111). This problem of multiple occupations will be discussed in Section 3.2.1.3 below. This section concentrates on strategies of job-based reconstruction, urban or rural.

If compensation is to be job-based, one of the major issues is which types of enterprises will provide the jobs. Many characteristics of enterprises affect the kinds of employees they will hire. Scale is directly related to the numbers of employees; large-scale enterprises offer significant numbers of jobs, while micro-enterprises may have only an owner-worker or a few employees. Medium-scale enterprises fall between the two. Enterprises have different degrees of technical modernization and reliance on labor versus capital. Highly modernized enterprises rely heavily on capital-intensive machinery for production, and hire fewer, generally more highly qualified, individuals. Less modernized enterprises may depend more on labor and may hire not only more workers, but in a variety of occupations at different skill levels. Enterprises may be either public or
privately owned. These usually have different strategies for hiring. It is worth distinguishing between employment that produces goods (e.g., factories, artisans) and that which offers services (e.g., commercial activities, repair, and social services). Finally, there are jobs considered temporary (most usually those associated with creation of the infrastructure: the dam, railroad, irrigation scheme, etc.) and those considered permanent. The DIDR literature treats these issues but not systematically.

A few countries have looked to large-scale industries to offer jobs to the displaced, sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly. For example when a nickel mine opened in the outer islands of Indonesia, it was simply assumed that the displaced would be given jobs in mining operations (Robinson 1986). Other countries made it an explicit part of rehabilitation strategies. For example, this used to be an integral part of the strategy of some Indian states for reconstituting livelihoods, especially in resettlement created by mines or factories. In the Chinese situation, the state used to be the universal employer and state-owned enterprises would take on displaced, so the issue of employment reconstruction was not even raised. When rural residents moved to urban areas as part of a resettlement project, they were given jobs by the city labor bureau (Meikle and Zhu 2000:134). This strategy was rarely found in more capitalist countries because it was linked to the idea that government-owned economic institutions serve a social welfare as well as a production purpose. Under international criticism of the inefficiency of these institutions, India, China, and other countries as well have moved toward more market-driven economies. Now in China, jobs for the displaced must be found through the private job market as even state-owned enterprises have become concerned about economic efficiency (Meikle and Zhu 2000). And in India, the 1994 Orissa water resources policy dropped provisions for mandatory or even preferential employment, which Pandey (1998:20) considered “completely out of tune” with otherwise progressive policy changes.

There were other problems with this employment policy as well. It did not always work well because the displaced could not always qualify for the jobs offered. While some mines did seem to offer substantial employment, this was not necessarily the case in other kinds of projects. For example at the Talcher National Thermal Power Corporation (India), the provision of employment was welcome, but employment opportunities were limited since the plant used the latest capital intensive technology. Most of the resettled were unskilled and of such a low educational level that they did not even have the educational background to qualify for the technical and vocational courses offered by the project (Pandey 1998). If people did get jobs, opportunities for advancement were few. In any case, even where it was offered, the employment preference was usually limited to one member per family; Pandey (1998:53) suggested that one job per family was often insufficient in the new cash economy in which people found themselves after resettlement. When the preference was not written into law, e.g., the case of the Indonesian nickel mines, the lack of qualifications among the displaced limited even more the opportunities for permanent jobs and advancement. The move toward technological modernization, which appears to be greater among large enterprises, has also led to much retrenchment; unskilled workers, among them the resettled, are particularly at risk for job loss.

To deal with some of these problems, projects have turned to micro-enterprises, those production or trading activities carried out by individuals on a relatively small scale, as a way to solve the jobs crisis. This has a certain logic in that many of the jobs already
carried out by the displaced before resettlement were of this type (Mejía 2000; Perlman 1982). Micro-enterprises have also been considered an important option for creating jobs in the non-DIDR context (e.g., Spring and McDade 1998). There are some indicators that this strategy offers reasonable options. At the National Aluminum Company Limited (India), the rehabilitation scheme not only provided preferential employment for the displaced, but also offered financial help to those who wanted to start their own businesses. Many had settled in a colony close to the plant so that there was a ready clientele. Those displaced by this project saw their average annual income increase the most of all sites studied by Pandey (1998:60). In a similar vein, the Cree decided to create an Income Security Program for hunters, an important part of their pre-resettlement life. Subsidized by the Canadian government, hunters received a check based on the numbers of days they would spend in the bush, which allowed them to pay the costs of winter hunting. Entire families often moved out to hunting camps and the meat was shared with non-hunting individuals and families, continuing pre-resettlement patterns of reciprocity. Cree who accepted this support agreed not to take other welfare payments (Salisbury 1986). Salisbury (1986:76) suggested that hunting was actually more important to the Cree economy in after resettlement than before and that people were catching more meat than furs. McCutcheon (1991:126), however, argued that when the bottom fell out of the fur market because of the anti-fur lobby, the cost of getting beaver pelts came to be more than what pelts could earn when sold. In any case, this required an up-front subsidy that all governments would not necessarily be able to provide.

The point should be clear however. If a micro-enterprise strategy is to be successful, it requires substantial planning and investments. There needs to be a good understanding of the regional economy and the goods and services it needs. This should be grounded in an understanding of the nature of the existing economy as well as the kinds of changes that are likely to occur with particular DIDR interventions. It needs a good understanding of the resources needed to carry out particular kinds of micro-enterprises and good market analyses. Plans needs to be complemented with a variety of training programs that offer the skills that the displaced need to take advantage of these new opportunities. Credit facilities are also crucial to help micro-entrepreneurs. Of particular importance may be possibilities for new activities that take advantage of resources created by the resettlement. For example in river-basin development projects, resettlers can be allocated fishing rights in the new reservoir and reservoirs can also be stocked to make fishing more productive. People can be trained do to aquaculture and to provide road and water transport.

While the emphasis on micro-enterprises is important, a development strategy within the context of resettlement that depends uniquely on these is subject to the same criticisms of micro-enterprises as a general development strategy. While smallness offers certain advantages, there are also disadvantages. Small-scale entrepreneurs cannot take advantages of some economies of scale and are subject to economic variability in ways that larger, more diverse, enterprises can sometimes confront more easily. The long-term benefits (e.g., pensions, health insurance, etc.) are often limited as well, particularly in those micro-enterprises that remain part of the informal economy.

In contrast to the discussion of large-scale private or public companies and micro-enterprises, an analysis of the actual or potential role of small and medium-scale
enterprises, particularly those privately owned, is almost absent from the literature. In China, town and village enterprises (TVEs), many of which would be considered medium-scale, are credited with playing an important role in providing employment for relocatees in some situations (Meikle and Walker 1998). Small and medium-scale enterprises may, nevertheless, provide a significant number of jobs in developing countries and may provide unexplored opportunities; the options have not been much investigated. What kinds of incentives might encourage these businesses to settle in resettlement zones? Should parts of resettlement colonies be zoned for artisanal production or light industry? In part, there seems to be a bias against the idea that displacees should be working for someone else; Pandey (1998:111) for example seemed to consider it a problem that those who used to own their means of production had become daily wage earners. While it is true that the transition to wage labor by those who have been asset (land) owners is often difficult, these kinds of comments seem rooted in the dam-and-reservoir rural bias about resettlement. Many urban resettlers already have jobs, but find themselves moved to areas where commutes are more expensive, in terms of time and money. They might well be looking for new employment possibilities.

There are a variety of ways in which medium-scale enterprises may be owned. Among the Cree, after resettlement, enterprises were developed, owned, and run by the different bands (Salisbury 1986:91). These included restaurants, groceries, hotels and motels, and handicraft production (duck and geese decoys, leather and embroidery, snowshoes). Most enterprises catered to a local market, which was growing as more people were employed and salaried income grew from 23 to 52% of income (Salisbury 1986:94).

Other things to consider are the mix between public and private-sector jobs, and the jobs that offer goods vs. those that offer services. While the global emphasis on free-market capitalism has led to a growth in private-sector production, this process is less clear in the provision of health, education, and other social welfare services, which still are often carried out by public-sector organizations. Insofar as these are civil-servant positions, they are often subject to national recruitment strategies that do not take into account the particular situation in resettlement areas. Yet service provision often does increase as a part of the resettlement activity, and another option is to look for ways to integrate the displaced into these jobs. For example, as a part of the Cree resettlement, some Cree trained to become teachers, linked to local control of the Cree educational system. Older Cree were hired to teach language and traditional knowledge (Salisbury 1986). The growth of a Cree regional authority after resettlement provided jobs for almost every high school graduate (Salisbury 1986:127). Again, training programs need to be an integral part of resettlement if local people are to have access to these jobs.

The displaced often get short-term benefits from temporary jobs created by the resettlement itself; this has occurred in India, in China, and at Manantali in Mali. This includes construction and site preparation. This kind of work can be useful because the displaced earn income during a vulnerable period. It may also help ensure that new sites reflect settler preferences. Sometimes these project-related jobs may last a relatively long time. For example, many of those displaced by the Pantabangan dam in the Philippines got jobs with the National Irrigation Authority. This created a kind of boom after the initial resettlement in early 1970s; not until 1989 was the project officially completed. At that
point, many of these ‘temporary’ laborers were laid off, and alcoholism increased and the economy plummeted. People looked to the government for aid that came only in 1993, through the efforts of the municipal government (Tamandong-Helin 1996:179). “Temporary employment is not a substitute for complete, long-term reconstruction of livelihoods” (VanWicklin 1999:247). The development projects that attempt job-based rehabilitation need to look for long-term sustainability.

One aspect of reconstituting jobs is out of the control of planners. In the context of a growing, vibrant economy, it is easier for relocatees to get good jobs. The Karelians who returned to Finland after World War II had to face the problem of smaller farms, poorer soils, less livestock, and less access to labor, but by 1960, their distribution of occupations was similar to that of the Finnish population as whole. There were many marriages between them and other Finns, and Karelians were well represented in political bodies. The framework for this was post-war economic growth (Mustanoja and Mustanoja 1993). In Panama, a period of economic growth offered new remunerative options to some displaced. When a sugar factory displaced small farmers, it actually rented their land, so each former resident got a yearly rental fee. Many then got jobs at the sugar plantation and factory; with relatively good skills, they got good jobs (Gudeman 1978).

Although it is often not possible to single-handedly engineer economic dynamism in the resettlement area, Scudder’s (1981) emphasis on the importance of regional economic growth in the resettlement zone is well taken. Planners need to look at the diverse ways in which the zone is likely to grow and look for ways to integrate relocatees into the diverse possibilities. Note that World Bank Operational Directive 4.30 does suggest this. “The resettlement plan should, where feasible, exploit new economic activities made possible by the main investment requiring the displacement. Vocational training, employment counseling, transportation to jobs, employment in the main investment project or in resettlement activities, establishment of industries, incentives for firms to locate in the area, credit and extension for small businesses or reservoir aquaculture, and preference in public sector employment should all be considered where appropriate” (paragraph 18). Simultaneously attacking the jobs problem in multiple ways seems necessary; for example, Veena Das (cited in Pandey 1998:6) suggests that a policy of preferential employment coupled with skill generation can lead to greater economic diversification over the long term.

Training programs are absolutely necessary to increase the skill levels of resettlers to help them get better, more stable jobs. These should not be narrowly conceived. For example, after resettlement, the Cree Indians of James Bay had access to adult education courses that allowed them to learn new skills like snowshoe manufacture, economic development, and office support (Salisbury 1986:123). River-basin development projects offer jobs for power plant operators, transmission line workers, pumping station staff, and reservoir maintenance (VanWicklin 1999). Other businesses related to resettlement may involve wastewater treatment, agro-processing, mining, or thermal power stations. Job creation is complex because all jobs in a capitalist economy have a certain degree of fragility, and few developing countries can afford to offer guaranteed employment. The failure rate of small enterprises is high even in developed countries and it should not be surprising that the new enterprises promoted by resettlement often have high failure rates,
leading to unemployment and underemployment. People may then be pushed into seasonal and permanent migration, bonded or child labor, and unsustainable use of their natural resources Mahapatra (1999b:204). Increasing the skill levels of people, and hence their options for employment, cannot solve the problem, but it can mitigate it. Salisbury (1986:98) argued that continued schooling has contributed to solving an employment crisis among the resettled Cree.

3.2.1.2 Common property

In the best of times, many governments are uneasy about those who use common property or open-access resources. The boundaries of this property are not always clearly demarcated and there is no single owner to approach for taxes or compensation. These resources are often used by people who central governments find problematic: non-sedentary pastoralists or fisherfolk, ethnic minorities, etc.

This section treats open-access and common property together, although there are differences. Common property is indeed property but with a group rather than an individual in charge of its management. This management can restrict access, grant use rights to some and exclude others, through either direct or indirect means. In contrast, open-access resources allow use to anyone who can get to the resource. Since use is not regulated, there are problems in excluding users (Berkes and Farvar 1989). There has been a tendency for centralizing governments to turn locally managed common property into open-access resources as they claim authority once held by local groups. In part, this is due to pressures by various governmental constituencies for access. For example, in Norway, a powerful political lobby wanted to open use of the tundra for many besides reindeer herders. More urban residents had begun using inland tundra as recreational areas, and land used for grazing was also seen as appropriate for military purposes, national parks, and industrial uses (Paine 1994:149). Similar constraints operated in the Canadian north (e.g. Charest 1982; Waldram 1988). This usually created greater competition over the resource. Although there are differences in the approaches of governments to open-access and common property resources (Koenig and Diarra 2000), this section will treat these together.

Nevertheless, three issues need to be kept in mind when dealing with either common property or open-access resources. The first has to do with the role of the common property resource in the production system. On the one hand are cases where the common property resources form the main or only resources used by the population. This is often the case among pastoralists, fisherfolk, foragers (hunters and gatherers), and some farming societies, usually those who use collective forms of customary tenure. On the other are those areas where the use of common property resources provides a complement to income or production from privately owned farms or wage work. The poorest and women, in other words the most vulnerable, are often those who depend most highly on these resources (Cernea 1996b). The use of these resources may also vary over time; an

13Under normal conditions, approximately 20% of small businesses in the United States dissolve in each of the first and second years after start-up (US Government 1999:30).
estimated 30 million Indians depended substantially on non-timber forest produce, especially during the hungry season, drought, and famines (Feeney 1998:59).

The second issue has to do with the perspective of the government on the use of those resources prior to resettlement. In some cases, use is accepted or at least tolerated. This is often the case among nomadic pastoralists, aboriginal foragers, and most notably, the many places in Africa where most farmers have collective customary tenure without formal title. There is also collective ownership of village and farmland in China. There may be non-DIDR-related efforts to individualize this tenure. For example, there has been a move to encourage individual land titling in many parts of Africa, in the belief that individual property ownership is more conducive to agricultural investment. Nomadic pastoralism has been considered an inefficient use of resources as well, and there have been (usually unsuccessful) attempts to create bounded individual or group ranches meant to “rationalize” pastoral production (e.g., Dyson-Hudson 1991). Nevertheless, these uses are seen as fundamentally licit. In contrast are the cases where the use of these resources is conceptualized as illegal. This is often reflected in the language, where those using the resources are referred to as squatters or encroachers; often there is another putative or “real” owner of the resource. Indian “tribals” who live in what have become government forests are often considered encroachers. Indian social scientists have argued for the recognition of customary tenure in these cases (e.g. Mahapatra 1999a), but they have not yet been successful. In many parts of the developing world, urban neighborhoods are created by spontaneous residents often referred to as squatters. In some cases, they are recognized as meriting compensation (e.g. the Philippines); in other cases they are not (Meikle and Walker 1998).

Governments appear on the whole more ready to reconstitute a resource where the users are considered legal or licit. It should be noted however that there is often confusion over whether users are considered licit or not; this may also vary over time or among different levels of the government. While the Ugandan government considered the residents of Kibale Forest Reserve and Game Corridor to be squatters, people had been encouraged to settle there by a preceding government (Oxfam 1996a). While the national government of Zambia considered mine workers to be encroaching gazetted forests when they created farms there, these farmers were nonetheless offered advice and support by local representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture (Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer 1998:37,38).

The status of common property or open-access resources may also be in flux. In many African countries for example, land law has grown incrementally as customary tenure is converted to other kinds of tenure. This has often led to a patchwork of land law that recognizes various different categories of ownership. There may be overlap, or different laws may even contradict one another. Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer’s (1998:22) discussion of the complexities of Zambian law showed the bewildering array of different titles with different degrees of land security that can develop. The distinctions were not always clearly understood by either government representatives or residents.

A third distinction is between common property resources that may be held collectively but are used individually to produce income or subsistence versus those used collectively. The former category includes most forest resources and most collectively
held land; in fact most productive common property resources appear to be of this type. In contrast are resources that are both collectively utilized and owned; perhaps irrigation canals or cooperative structures should be thought of in this way. This type also includes social resources, e.g., religious or community centers. The difference is important because in the first case, social groups may be used to managing access to the resource, but there is no collective production. For example, in West African areas where land is held collectively by a village, lineage, or other local unit, individual parcels are cultivated by households or individuals, not the larger group. Membership in the collectivity gives one the right to use the resource. In the second case, a resource is both collectively managed and used. These different kinds of groups will have different capacities for collective action post-resettlement. In particular, groups that have managed but not used a resource collectively cannot necessarily transfer their organizational skills to collective production.

Productive systems based on common property resources can be based on foraging (hunting, gathering, and fishing), herding, or farming. Foragers still live in relatively isolated, low population density areas although many have been steadily integrated in various ways into larger state systems. The best studies of the impact of involuntary resettlement on foragers has been the effects on Canadian Indians and Natives. The Canadian federal and provincial governments have tended to see the interests of Native resource users as subsidiary to that of Canadian society as a whole. For example, waterways are considered national or provincial resources whose development should be undertaken in the interest of the public as a whole (Waldram 1988:6). Government strategy has often been to convince the Natives to surrender their rights to valuable resources for the common good (Waldram 1988:4). In part, this is because many of the Canadian public appear to believe that foraging is a subsistence mode too primitive or simple to be viable in the modern world (Asch 1982: 367).

The experiences of the Cree at James Bay showed both the achievements and the problems of trying to maintain and reconstitute livelihoods based on foraging. In 1971, the Cree signed the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement with Quebec Province. The Cree saw potential benefits since this agreement offered them self-governance, the possibility to maintain hunting and other bush activities, and much control over local development. The negotiation process also led to the formation of the Grand Council of the Crees of Quebec as an organizational tool and a Cree Regional Authority that provided decentralized government services. Nevertheless, they lost effective control over the land that made up their homeland since some 80% of it was handed over to the James Bay Development Corporation (Scudder 1996:56). This led to a loss of range, hunting, and trapping lands, and bands have since then begun to squabble over the control of territories. Competition with hunters and loggers from the south also grew (McCutcheon 1991:119). Both tourist and other facilities came to be run and staffed almost exclusively by outsiders. More outsiders entered the zone, leading to greater degradation of natural resources. This included increased timber extraction, hunting pressure, and mercury contamination of reservoir fish (Scudder 1996:58). Both the Canadian federal government as well as that of Quebec Province disregarded some of their promises to the Cree, and the James Bay Development Corporation largely ignored the Cree in planning for this land. Nevertheless, the Cree’s Grand Council has remained an important force, with strong leadership and assistance from outside consultants (e.g., the McGill anthropology of development program at the beginning, international NGOs like the International Rivers
Planning for the particular issues facing pastoralists appears almost absent in the literature. Even the literature concerning the effects of resettlement on pastoralists is quite insignificant. There is some work on the resettlement of Bedouin in Israel (e.g. Marx 1988) and on the Navajo relocated as part of the Navajo-Hopi relocation effort (Aberle 1993; Scudder 1982). Notably, the Joint-use area was subject to major livestock reductions preparatory to resettlement, on the order of 95%; Navajos who moved to areas other than the Navajo Partitioned Land lost livestock permits (Aberle 1993:176). There is also significant work on the differential effects of resettlement on Nubian relocated farmers and Shukriya herder hosts at New Halfa. While Nubian relocated tenants got planned villages with pumped water, nomads got unplanned, emergency, and pre-scheme villages with few services (Salem-Murdock 1989:19).

Transhumant pastoralists who pass through a displacement or resettlement zone but have not settled there may be absent from consideration altogether. This was the case at Manantali (Mali), where transhumant pastoralists were not consulted or even seriously discussed during the design and implementation of the project. The locals (both resettlers and hosts) had negative attitudes toward them, which only worsened after resettlement, because the dam affected the paths cattle could take. Before dam construction, they could cross the river at various places and had spread out through the bush on both sides of the river. After dam construction, the only feasible crossing became the bridge just downstream from the dam, which put larger groups of pastoralists in closer contact with both hosts and guests in the resettlement zone, causing increased conflict.

The problematic attitude toward pastoralists in relocation appears to be linked to long-time tensions between pastoralists and agriculturalists, which pre-date resettlement initiatives. These tensions are often exacerbated by an emphasis on ethnic differences, e.g., between the Navajo pastoralists and Hopi farmers in the US Southwest, between the Arab Bedouin and the Israeli farmers in Israel. Saami reindeer pastoralists and Norwegian conservationists had allied against government backed hydroelectric development in the early 1980s, in particular a dam on the Alta/Kautokeino river, but with the publication of the Brundtland Commission report at the end of the 1980s, conservationists drew away from the pastoralists and closer to the government. Conservationists tended to see the tundra as wilderness rather than in terms of interspecies relationships; pastoralists in contrast argued that they had a special relationship with nature (Paine 1994:153). A part of the discourse revolved around Saami use of new technology such as landing-craft ferries, field telephones, all-terrain vehicles, and snowmobiles. Conservationists claimed that mechanization would change the Saami relationship to nature. They argued that to stress a distinctive ethnic status implied using traditional techniques, and the use of modern technology disqualified a group from appealing to ethnic privilege. Moreover, mechanization would raise new possibilities of ecological damage (Paine 1994:154).

Farmers who own land areas as common property may or may not have difficulties in claiming land rights upon resettlement. This appears to be linked to governmental recognition of those rights. As discussed above, Indian “tribal” groups have faced difficulties in getting their land rights and tenure respected, in part because most Indian farmers did have privately owned farms. In contrast, in much of West Africa, where
various types of collective, customary tenure has continued to be the norm, governments often respected that framework at least in part, for example at Akosombo (Ghana) and Manantali (Mali) (Sagoe 1970). Yet even here, Ghanaian authorities bypassed traditional procedures to request land and some who had ceded land in the 1960s took it back after a 1966 coup changed the government (Chambers 1970b:237). At Manantali, resettlement authorities got customary owners to cede land, but it proved insufficient and hosts were reluctant to cede more.

In general, the attention paid by DIDR projects to common property resources is insufficient. Mahapatra (1999b:208) suggested that loss of access to common property is probably the most ignored aspect in Indian resettlement projects; he listed many kinds of property that were ignored, including places to get firewood and for grazing animals, as well as burial grounds. As noted, the World Bank policy has been to treat those with customary property rights the same as those with full legal rights. In practice however, they are often treated less well. Yet Pearce (1999:57), an environmental economist, argued that resettlement initiatives would better protect land and resources as well as people’s rights by fully recognizing customary tenure.

Note however that there is a free-rider problem, where people will claim rights simply to get resettlement benefits (Pearce 1999:58). This seems to be recognized by most analysts and appears to be worse where people access resources primarily through common property or open-access. Projects do need to distinguish short-term opportunistic encroachers and long-term settlers with customary rights or implicit recognition (Feeney 1998:146).

3.2.1.3 Diversification in economic strategies

Up until now, the displaced have been lucky when a resettlement project reconstituted their major resource. If farmers were resettled, land for farming would be taken into account. In African settlement schemes from the 1960s through the 1980s, land was allocated only for fields, not for other activities such as grazing or firewood collection (Lassailly-Jacob 1996:197); non-land based activities were not even mentioned. In African situations, while land used for farming may be respected, land that farmers use for pasture is often not. For example, in Selingue (Mali), the pasture of a farming village was given by the government to a new farming cooperative without consultation. If an urban group was displaced, jobs would be taken into account. This is a very problematic approach, for it ignores both the secondary activities undertaken by individuals and households to complement their primary resource, and the multiple primary activities undertaken individually or by groups more commonly heterogeneous than homogeneous.

In many areas of the world, rural residents who define themselves primarily as “farmers” cannot and do not live by farming alone. The urban poor often undertake a variety of activities that allow them to make ends meet. The mix of different activities often changes after DIDR as the mix of options expands or contracts, and people respond to new opportunities. New options may be quite different than what people did before. Lassailly-Jacob (1996:188) noted that when resettlers became self-sustaining in rural settlement schemes in Africa, it was often because of activities other than farming. While
it is true that some people have been able to take up new opportunities to complement the primary resource reconstituted by resettlement projects, these opportunities have not been open to everyone. Increasing the resources available after resettlement does not mean one resource only; it means a variety of resources, preferably in light of the mix of activities undertaken by people before resettlement and the opportunities available afterward.

The following examples highlight the diversity of resources even in rural areas. Pandey (1998) noted that Orissa (India) farmers had two very different kinds of plots: agricultural fields and homestead plots. While policy paid attention to the necessity for viable agricultural fields, the value of the homestead plots was ignored. Overall there was a substantial decline in the size of homestead plots after resettlement, which decreased income-earning possibilities for women (who often cultivated these plots) as well as variety in the family diet. Even less have planners understood the importance of livestock to people who are farmers. This was seen in both India and Africa. At New Halfa, for example, the official attitude toward livestock was that animals were competition for space and the attention of resettlers who should be farmers. Yet the settlers themselves, even the Nubians, began to integrate livestock and crops. Salem-Murdock (1989:55) delineated three different strategies: 1) integrating livestock and agriculture for mutual support, carried out mostly by former pastoralists; 2) raising small ruminants for milk and meat, alongside primary crop production, carried out mostly by Nubians but by a few Shukriya as well; and 3) raising a large number of animals for investment, carried out by the wealthy of both ethnic groups. Lassailly-Jacob (1992:28) noted that even the Nubians began to follow economic strategies that accentuated satisfaction of their animals, as farmer-herders rather than the simple farmers envisaged by planners. Among the Shukriya, both affluent and poor followed a combination of economic strategies; the affluent tried to increase their holdings and optimize economic opportunities, while the poor were trying simply to survive (Salem-Murdock 1989:84,87).

Another aspect of heterogeneity is that viable social systems usually include people with a variety of occupations, sometimes as primary occupations, sometimes as secondary ones. While the majority of rural dwellers at a particular site may be farmers, there are often pastoralists or hunters as well as artisans, traders, and other specialized service providers (e.g., health or religious practitioners). Yet they are often ignored. For example, Indian resettlement policies often divide affected people into a number of categories, in part depending on whether they lose agricultural land or not. In practice, this means that rural residents who do not live from the land, i.e., who are not farmers, are not necessarily recognized as displaced. In particular, those who lived primarily from craft or service occupations and lost them due to displacement were not recognized as displaced persons and were not eligible for rehabilitation and resettlement (Pandey 1998:111). In addition to recognizing the diverse livelihoods present before resettlement, it may be useful to conceptualize the resettlement colony or zone as a potential site of regional development, with linkages between specialists within it as well as with organizations and individuals outside of it. Scudder (1981:360++) for example, suggested planning for the resettlement region as a whole, hosts and relocatees together, with possibilities for small business, industry, tourism, and/or mining. Planning for heterogeneous rather than homogeneous production systems may well offer greater opportunities for future development, reconstituting livelihoods in a more viable fashion.
3.2.2 Urban resettlement

Section 2.2 above noted the strong rural, dam bias of the resettlement literature. While some dams are built in urban areas (Yacyretá perhaps the best known example), most urban projects are of other types. The knowledge gained from dam-related, rural resettlement is not always directly transferable to urban resettlement. Much of the relevance of work on the effects of resettlement on indigenous peoples is also irrelevant to urban resettlement, since rarely do urban areas include territories of the indigenous. They may include indigenous peoples, often reconstituted as ethnic minorities and other kinds of ethnic minorities as well. Although urban people can and do create important resistance movements to resettlement, the aspect of resistance as resistance to the cultural domination of the state or resistance to increasing economic integration into a national economy (Oliver-Smith 1996) are less important in urban areas. People often migrate to urban areas precisely to try to increase their integration and access to benefits of the national economy and state culture. Nor are urban populations necessarily antithetical to moving in and of itself; many have moved recently and/or several times. In fact even poor urban residents are rarely tradition bound; their very survival often depends upon being able to see and take advantage of new resources quickly (Bartolomé 1993:128). Urban areas are generally commercialized and many activities are monetized. As already noted, jobs tend to be more important than farmland. Yet there is still an important difference between a voluntary and an involuntary move. Much of the language of urban DIDR needs to be different, couched specifically in the realities of the urban experience. For example, class analyses based on national class systems may be more useful than discussions of the importance of local cultural autonomy.

Urban projects are quite diverse. They include urban renewal, transport and water supply, and industrial development. Because of the high population density of urban areas, many kinds of development initiatives involve at least some involuntary displacement (Mejía 1999:150). Mejía estimates that as of 1999, the World Bank had more than 100 urban projects in preparation or under implementation in Latin America alone. High population densities also mean that even when small areas are affected by involuntary resettlement, the numbers of people displaced may be quite large.

Because of the high population density and large size of many urban areas, land costs tend to be high, even though the displaced need land primarily for housing. Because it is often difficult to find suitable land for rehousing the displaced close to their pre-displacement homes, land is found at a greater distance. Moving farther from social networks and markets may create new financial burdens, such as increased transport costs. There may be other new costs as well, such as electricity and water; services may become more expensive (Bartolomé 1993:127; Perlman 1982). There may be insufficient education or health facilities (Mejía 1999:178). If social ties are ruptured in the move, people may have to pay for services that previously were free, e.g., childcare or security. It may be possible to find land for urban resettlement in more central locations, but this may involve breaking up the resettled population into smaller units, thus perhaps compromising social cohesion. There may be trade-offs between reconstituting economic and social systems.

There are also particular problems related to land use in urban areas. For example,
when people move to the rural semiperiphery of urban areas, they may complement jobs with rural activities like gardening, livestock, or garbage recycling (Mejía 1999:177). This may put pressure on hosts as new and old residents compete for land for these purposes. Because land is already commercialized, land speculation may be a greater problem (Mejía 1999:152). On the other hand, many poor families in urban areas do not have legal titles to the land they occupy (Mejía 1999:154). This includes renters as well as those considered squatters. Although World Bank policy is to compensate regardless of legal title, this is not the case in all Latin American countries (Mejía 1999:156). In China, inhabitants without residence permits are not compensated, even though their numbers have been growing in recent years (Meikle and Walker 1998). In Latin America, where cities have seen organized neighborhood occupations, agencies often feared that not requiring squatters to pay a part of resettlement costs would encourage new occupations of public lands (Mejía 1999:157). Moreover urban populations are usually more transient and often include more recent arrivals than those found in rural areas. Therefore, the issue of keeping out people who move into zones particularly to get project entitlements may become significant (Mejía 1999:152-155).

If rural populations are more heterogeneous than resettlement initiatives recognize, urban resettled populations are even more so. Incomes are highly varied in both amount and structure; houses vary in quality of construction and size. Family size as well as the level and kind of community organization are highly diverse. These features are poorly reflected in resettlement policies and plans (Mejía 1999:163). Yet probably the greatest problem in urban resettlement is that they continue to be conceived of as housing projects rather than projects to meet economic needs. This is reflected in the institutions that are expected to take the lead in urban resettlement; in the Philippines for example, it was the National Housing Authority, not an economic development agency. It has often been naively assumed that people will simply keep existing jobs (e.g., Meikle and Walker 1998), even though the entire economic context changes. Much more needs to be done in terms of economic analysis and job creation for relocatees; strategies for addressing this problem were addressed in Section 3.2.1.1 above.

Finally, planners need to remember that “urban” populations are not only found in urban areas. Zambian mines were in rural areas, but the people living in them formed an urbanized enclave, where people lived primarily from wages. The privatization efforts did not recognize the urbanized lifestyles of most retrenched workers; they often assumed that former workers would return to areas of origin to farm (Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer 1998:34). But people mostly had no desire to return to purely rural areas. Most had lived on the Copperbelt for a long time. They wanted to stay near clinics, schools, and churches.

Involuntary resettlement projects often categorized families as rural or urban as if these were mutually exclusive. Yet, as noted, many who live in rural areas are not farmers or even natural resource users. In urban areas, in contrast, some people farm. The Copperbelt workers, who lived in an urbanized context, nonetheless often had family members who did some farming or other natural resource use, e.g. charcoal making (Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer 1998). A more useful approach to reconstituting livelihoods might be to assume that displaced families follow diversified income strategies aimed at ensuring family survival (Ericksen 1999:110,111). The goal may be better phrased as reconstituting viable economic systems rather than individual or household
livelihoods. In any case, more research is needed to understand what might be involved in reconstituting urban jobs and mixed-resource economic systems.

3.2.3 Conflicting interests within resettled populations

Discussions of involuntary resettlement have tended to stress the inequity of access to positive benefits of the larger development project between resettled groups and a relatively undefined larger society or nation as a whole. One of the main strategies for social reconstruction has been to reconstitute social groups by moving people as social units. Yet this strategy discounts another important factor: the existence of socio-cultural differentiation among the displaced and other affected persons. Those affected by resettlement, even if they seem relatively homogeneous to outsiders, have different needs and interests. The cohesion necessary for organized action is not automatic, but needs to be built, in light of this differentiation.

The displaced may or not form a community, and even in a community the needs of various groups may be quite different. Feeney (1998:129, 130) noted that when donor institutions have begun small-scale projects to compensate for some of the negative impacts of displacement (as in the case of those evicted from the Kibale Forest Reserve and Game Corridor), these usually treat communities as wholes. Yet community-level solutions often meet only some needs and may not address or correct residual harm suffered by particular individuals or households. For example, schools might be a good thing, but will not necessarily benefit elderly widows. Without better data and baseline information, the task of identifying those who have suffered the greatest losses is difficult. The needs of different groups, women and men, or elder and younger, are often quite distinct.

The displaced and others affected by DIDR also have different, often conflicting, interests. Those involved have specific agendas that they attempt to further (Oliver-Smith 1996:84). Downing (1996), for example, noted that populations usually include some who are dissatisfied with existing orders of time and place and other aspects of their culture. In his discussion of possible ways to reconstitute patterns of time and space orientation, Downing (1996:46) suggested not only identifying the times and places that a certain group finds critical, but also identifying the intragroup differences likely to be affected and finding the areas of dissatisfaction. Recognizing heterogeneity of interests may help find ways to deal with it.

Otherwise, heterogeneity may in and of itself limit the ability of people to organize effectively to respond to resettlement and negatively impact strategies for participation. For example, Barabas and Bartolomé (1996:157-160) discussed the resistance to Cerro de Oro dam in Oaxaca, Mexico. Here the local Chinantecos organized around mediatory leaders, each of whom aimed to retain privileges for his own clientele, creating factions. Each faction, linked to different political parties and peasant organizations, gathered together a group that represented their own and others’ opportunistic interests. Divisions among these groups grew to the point where even kin groups were divided. At one point, a messianic movement offered the promise of unity, but soon it too became only another faction. Persistent conflicts among factions remained, blunting their ability to negotiate
effectively; moreover, both intrafamily and intergenerational conflict around land possession issues led to social disarticulation.

Clearly it is hazardous to treat the displaced population as homogeneous. Yet this is often done. One important difference concerns those who had the most vested in the old system and those who can get access to ‘development’ in the new system. Among existing social systems that were patriarchal and gerontocratic, older men could lose the most from resettlement, while women and younger men could take advantage of certain new opportunities that were especially acceptable to those who had less status in the old system; this was evident at Manantali (Mali) (Koenig and Diarra 1998a). This part of the study looks at four major axes of social differentiation that have had an impact in DIDR projects: gender, age, class, and ethnicity. As should be clear from the examples presented below, the data suggest contradictory outcomes in different cases. In some cases, social differentiation increased, while in others it decreased, or the persons occupying the different social strata changed. It is clear that more understanding of differentiation processes and the ways that existing processes of social change are affected by DIDR are needed. These examples are only an indication of social processes that needs to be understood in more depth.

3.2.3.1 Gender

Of all the differentiating factors, gender has been discussed the most (e.g. Indra 1999; Colson 1999; Koenig 1995). Those interested in the effects of gender on the ability to benefit from development projects have suggested that women have not benefited from development in the same ways as men, even losing ground in some cases, as development projects have increased gender differences. It appears that the results are not much different within the field of DIDR.

Many accounts detail the ways in which gender affected the ability to benefit from resettlement programs. For example when the women displaced from the Kibale reserve were finally resettled, they still reported increased stress because they were required to provide food for their families, but no longer had individual gardens. Ultimately they were granted land, but the task of clearing it was enormous. Female household heads not only had to clear land but also built their own homes; they often had little cash with which to pay male laborers to help (Feeney 1998:103). In the Upper Indravati Hydroelectric Project, displaced women had little control over money given to their families for compensation and rehabilitation. In addition, their ability to produce food was reduced, which affected not only them, but also their children. The fertility rate of tribal woman was also lower after displacement (Thangaraj 1996:230). Because compensation payments went to male heads, collective assets of the family became cash owned by male household heads; no projects recognized women as separate entities. As women become more dependent on their husbands, their power within the family became reduced. They become less involved in decision-making, sometimes leading to conflict (sometimes violent) (Pandey 1998:104).

Because women’s access to resources was often mediated by men, they often faced problems in getting their pre-resettlement resources counted and in getting allocations
afterwards. On the Zambian Copperbelt, men got housing through their status as workers; women, who mostly did not have mining jobs, only got housing through their husbands. Widows had no claim to housing in their own right (Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer 1998:22), and men tended to pass heritable resources to sons or brothers. When retrenched workers did get compensated with houses or land, these belonged to men.

The collapse of the economy that followed displacement often increased the differentiation between women and men because women were more likely to depend upon secondary or informal resources. For example, there is some evidence that driving men from wage labor in turn displaced women from more lucrative informal sector activities when men turned to the informal sector (Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer 1998:30). In parts of India, women did much of the gathering from forests, commons, rivers, and wells. Pandey (1998:93) noted that women faced increasing drudgery in getting fuel, fodder, and water. They lost earnings from forest, agricultural land, common property resources, and non-farm activities, including crafts, cottage industry, businesses, and livestock. In part women were more dependent on these resources because they had less access to institutionalized productive resources and other earning opportunities (Feeney 1998:59,60). When Indian projects offered employment as compensation, hardly any jobs were available for women. When they lost the agricultural and forest-based jobs that had provided for the household, many were “reduced to the position of chattels looking after household chores only” (Pandey 1998:55). The tendency to ignore the diverse productive resources used by resettling populations seems to have had particularly negative impacts on women, decreasing their economic opportunities vis-a-vis their husbands.

Women may also suffer more from the social changes that accompany resettlement. It is often difficult for women who have lived mostly in urban areas to return to rural areas and do farm work, about which they know little. They would often prefer to stay in town and support themselves through trade. Although life in towns was often difficult for women, they many times felt that it offered a bit more autonomy. For example, they could escape rural customs like widow inheritance in Zambia (Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer 1998:32). Participation in resettlement programs was often difficult for women, for they had less time to spend on meetings than did men because of their obligation to do both domestic and productive work. In India, women sometimes found their status devalued because of loss of earnings; in some cases young women found it difficult to find marriage partners (Pandey 1998).

Yet, the situation is more complicated. Although women are in many ways more vulnerable to the risks of resettlement, they may be more open to new opportunities. In particular, women do not have the same vested interest in maintaining existing patriarchal social organizations and traditions as do men; they simply do not get the same benefits from them. Male household heads suffered from an inability to get more land in the Manantali resettlement area; they could theoretically borrow some from host-neighbors, but this would mean acknowledging political inferiority to their hosts, something they wished to avoid. In contrast, women, who were not considered to have political authority anyway and were not bound to these conventions, formed groups and borrowed land for new fields and crops (Koenig and Diarra 1998a). Spring (1982) found that Angolan refugee women were able to assimilate more easily into Zambian society, since they were seen as less threatening than men. They were able to undertake new economic activities as
traditional healers and midwives and married into Zambian households. Women at New Halfa complained that they could not get their own tenancies, but they eagerly took up new opportunities like selling milk and appreciated the greater access to water and health services, shops, and education (Salem-Murdock 1989:14). In fact, the generally greater access to better health and social infrastructure may spread benefits across the population in cases where resettlement brings cleaner water, more schools, etc. (WCD 2000).

There has been some movement toward respecting entitlements for women. When, finally, those evicted from Kibale were given some land, both male-headed and female-headed households were compensated (Oxfam 1996a:22). Indian projects have moved from ignoring women in land allocation to including women in at least some cases, e.g., single women over the age of 30. While this has been criticized as insufficient, it is an improvement.

Still, we need to know more about which aspects of DIDR programs can bring development (greater access to resources, autonomy, and influence over their society) to women as well as men. Both women and men need help to increase production assets and income sources, to have access to training and credit (e.g., Thangaraj 1996). Moreover, our understanding of gender differentiation needs to be couched in what we know about gendered structures of particular geographic areas. For example, in much of Africa, West Africa in particular, there is very little pooling of assets in households and men and women own and use different assets (e.g., Guyer 1981); in contrast, Asian households may pool more resources and members may work more together.

3.2.3.2 Age

Just as men and women often have different interests in resettlement, so too do younger and older. While the elderly often have the most problems in coping with the change of site and are most affected by placelessness, the young often greet resettlement as a chance to undertake new activities less under the control of their elders. Elders may in turn see this as an attack on their position, as at Kariba (Zambia), where tensions between fathers and sons became very high (Colson 1971:140).

Youth were often well positioned to take advantage of the opportunities that come from DIDR projects. Resistance to a thermal power project in Orissa (India) broke down in at least one village became of ideological differences between young and old; the youth wanted the project and the jobs it offered (Pandey 1998:80). The expansion of organization and bureaucracy that accompanied Cree resettlement meant jobs for every high school graduate, a contrast to other Indian communities with no jobs (Salisbury 1986:127). Taking up these new opportunities may also offer youth ways to deal with what they see as social inequities beyond their own village. In India, displacement and the opportunity of resettlement of one’s own choosing offered some young people escape from the constraints of caste (Mahapatra 1999b:211). In Manantali, the youth involved in creating the vibrant new village that became a community and market center were in effect fighting a traditional social system in which their lineages were at the bottom.

The larger social impacts of youth’s ability to adapt more easily to resettlement are
not clear. In some cases, it appears to lead to dependency among elders and splits within households. Mahapatra (1999b:210) noted that payment of compensation to the father as head of household in Indian projects led to problems between fathers and married sons and between married brothers. Thangaraj (1996:231) found that payments to major sons in two other Indian projects meant that the emotional bonds holding families together were compromised, as the need for survival became greater and money was considered vital to meet it. Pandey (1998) recounted cases of widows abandoned by their children. Yet other evidence suggests that the challenges of resettlement encouraged families to stay together to meet them better. As noted, Pandey (1998) found that the number of joint families had increased in Orissa (India) after resettlement.

3.2.3.3 Class

Existing communities are rarely homogeneous in terms of access to economic, social, cultural, or political resources. When some groups have greater structured access to certain kinds of resources, class differences become important. Even when most have access to the same kinds of resources, some often have more than others, leading to wealth differences. Elites, with access to more political power, can be found in either situation. Although there are varieties in stratification systems, this section will look at them together. Again, this aspect of resettlement has been overlooked.

Many have noted that wealthier people have an easier time when resettled. As early as the TVA (United States), larger landowners tended to have better outcomes. In this case, the appraised value of their farms usually allowed them to buy new farms. Among small farmers, back debts and mortgages were deducted, so that the new farms they could get were often insufficient (Satterfield 1937: 259,260). In contemporary India, larger farmers were more likely to have titles to their farms and were better able to get adequate compensation. They were also better served by strictly monetary compensation schemes. A greater range of benefits was available to them in many cases. In general, Scudder and Colson (1982: 268) noted that both the rich and self-relocated had a better chance to exert control over their new social and physical environment. Local elites were likely to try to manipulate project benefits to their advantage and to be more successful in doing so because they had better political access and resources. They were more likely to figure out and implement entrepreneurial strategies to make use of resettlement project spin-offs and scheme benefits (deWet 2000:16). Bartolomé (1993:127) found no strong correlation between income and repayment of mortgages for new homes provided in resettlement at Yacyretá (Argentina); while some of poorest were among the best payers, the largest debtors were some of the better off.

In some situations, existing elites were compromised by resettlement. If existing leaders and elites became too closely identified with the resettlement, they could lose position and status. Or, if they resisted too strongly, they showed their weakness. For example, in the Papaloapan dam situation, there was rapid replacement of traditional elites by new ones because the old ones refused resettlement and the opportunities for upward mobility it brought. A new elite, which used resources brought by resettlement conditions to reward allies, came to power (Partridge, Brown, and Nugent 1982:256).
Sometimes, resettlement projects were used to redistribute at least some resources more equitably. For example, in rural Chinese resettlement, land was found for some resettlers by redistributing plots within villages. As noted, those with more than a threshold amount of land were required to give up land to resettlers. Elsewhere, resettlement schemes tried to limit the amount of land available to any one household. For example, most of the projects studied by Ericksen (1999), voluntary or involuntary, offered less than 10 ha. There was also an assumption that resettled farmers would farm their own land rather than becoming absentee landlords. In other cases, individuals used resettlement to escape aspects of onerous class systems. In India, as noted, many poorer and lower caste resettlers chose not to live with upper caste groups. In Manantali (Mali), many budding entrepreneurs entered commercial activities that had earlier been monopolized by a few traders (because of the earlier isolation of the zone), spreading the benefits from these activities. Sometimes existing socio-cultural traditions made it difficult to invest wealth for individual use. Colson (1971) noted that at Kariba, people failed to form companies or engage in large-scale entrepreneurship. Their primary investments continued to be what they had invested in earlier: wives, livestock, and medicines. The prospect of sorcery against those who displayed their wealth put a premium on investment in social alliances rather than economic activities. However, if greater equality occurs after resettlement but without planning, it is usually because everyone gets poorer, not because all have more. Pandey (1998) for example noted a general tendency toward fewer larger and more smaller farmers in Orissa (India) resettlement projects.

The experience at Bayano (Panama) shows how quickly conditions can change, leading to changing stratification patterns (Wali 1993). In the case of Bayano, there was a change from an isolated frontier to a zone closely integrated into the national system. The resettlement team had favored Indian (Kuna and Embera) smallholders, helping them to modernize technology. In contrast, Panamanian colonists who had earlier immigrated to the zone were forced to resettle outside of the region. It seemed that the Indians had gained and the colonists had lost, but after the dam was completed and it became clear that the reservoir would not rise to its planned height, many colonists returned and illegally occupied land. They began to raise cattle and corn for national markets. At first the government planned to leave the forest around the dam to prevent siltation, but as the national economic and political situation faced problems in the mid-1970s, logging was allowed. By the late 1970s, colonists had begun to log for national and international markets, leading to rapid deforestation. At the same time, the government formed the Bayano Corporation, a regional development agency that had dairy, agricultural, and livestock enterprises. Land was appropriated for communal farms, and locals become paid laborers. By the late 1980s, Bayano saw phenomenal population growth. Colonist settlements become small towns, and large landowners and entrepreneurs, until then not very well organized, expanded and created ties among one another. Ranchers began to try to get formal titles and the administration who worked for the national park denied their own private economic interests. The Indians, who had been promised formal reserves, faced increasing problems in getting them demarcated. The Embera eventually got a collective title but not a reserve. The locals at Bayano, colonists and Indians, became integrated into a national stratification in which a few colonists were integrated in privileged places, but most of them as well as the Indians ended up proletarians who had lost their assets. Others as well have noted that the integration of groups into national stratification systems after resettlement often puts them at the bottom (deWet 2000;
Charest 1982; Pandey 1998). Decreasing status may also put them below other locals who used to be their peers. Kin may stop offering aid if it is clear that the displaced cannot reciprocate because of impoverishment (Mahapatra 1999b:210). In the case of the Rengali dam, the people were given a separate and derogatory name that meant ‘people of submerged areas;’ it became more difficult for them to find marriage partners outside the group of resettlers (Mahapatra 1999a:63).

The ability of local elites to get access to a disproportionate amount of benefits led Scudder (1991) to argue against including “middle-class” settlers in voluntary settlement schemes, in part because they were likely to monopolize positions of authority and influence. However, this strategy cannot apply to involuntary resettlement. Although many elite neighborhoods and individuals are able to avoid involuntary resettlement, many displaced communities do contain local elites, people with more power and influence. They also include many more of the very poor, who are often not eligible for voluntary settlement schemes. Therefore, involuntary settlement projects usually include more differentiated and heterogeneous populations than do voluntary settlement schemes. This has implications for resettlement practice that the literature has only begun to address.

While many resettled ‘communities’ may fall near the bottom of the national stratification system, they typically contain a local class system whose elites may have more or less contact and more or less status within the national system. There needs to be a greater understanding of the way that local class systems work and how local elites can be encouraged to work simultaneously for the interest of the local community and not uniquely for their own ends. Insofar as resettlement activities are structured to encourage elites to see themselves as integral members of the community, they are likely to increase the ability of the community to put pressure on national elites, precisely because they are elites. In fact, involving local elites is an extension of what has become a common strategy, calling upon emigrants who have greater knowledge of the national system (see Section 4.4.2.4 below). Strategies for change that encourage the cohesion of entire resettled communities, across classes, might offer more opportunities for reconstituting livelihoods than those that concentrate uniquely on the poorer, more vulnerable segments. While local elites and lower classes do have certain conflicts of interest, they may also have commonalities of interest vis-a-vis other classes or groups on the national scene, particularly in the context of DIDR. Resettlement strategies need to recognize the local conflicts of interest, while encouraging groups to deal constructively with them (see Section 4.4.2 below).

3.2.3.4 Ethnicity

It is important to remember that entire resettled groups are not necessarily ‘communities’ in any real sense of the word. In particular those of different ethnic groups may consider themselves to be distinctive. The Bayano (Panama) example discussed above showed how the resettlement project treated different ethnic groups (the Indians vs. non-Indian colonists) differently; the groups responded distinctively to post-resettlement options as well. Among the Indians, there were also distinctive identities. The Kuna, who had lived in the area a long time and had a reserve, exhibited greater cohesiveness than the Embera, who only came into the zone in the 1950s after construction of the Pan-American
highway and did not have a reserve. The Kuna were allowed to resettle close to the reservoir, but both the Embera and the colonists were considered destructive of the forest and were resettled farther away. Post-resettlement, the Kuna threw much effort into getting a new reserve demarcated; despite some internal conflict, their formal recognition by the Panamanian government encouraged cohesiveness (Wali 1989).

Ethnic differentiation was noted in other situations as well and could be phrased in different terms. Immigrants of one ethnic group were given the pasture land of a local host village at Selingue (Mali) as a place for their cooperative, with little consultation by the administration. At Chemawawin, Manitoba (Canada), the 280 residents of Easterville had difficulty remaining united in a legal case concerning resettlement. About one-third of the residents were Métis, who had no official representation at meetings. The other two-thirds were Treaty Indians, who had a reserve and government benefits. Within the town, the two groups lived in two distinct neighborhoods. Waldram (1980:178) attributes the difficulties in cooperation to larger structural constraints that gave reserve and non-reserve Indians different governmental resources and obligations. Pandey’s (1998) study of resettlement projects in Orissa (India) analyzed the different effects of resettlement on general castes, scheduled castes, and scheduled tribes. While the distinction between general castes and scheduled castes is perhaps best considered in terms of class, that between castes and scheduled tribes is perhaps best considered in ethnic terms.\footnote{In fact this is implied by the Indian anthropologists (e.g. Fernandes 1996:114,115; Pandey 1998) who have discussed the single socio-cultural field that links general and scheduled castes in contrast to an emphasis on the different environments and social systems of scheduled tribes.}

In contrast to people of scheduled or general castes, most of the resettlers from scheduled tribes perceived a more serious deterioration in living conditions after resettlement. This was due to loss of earnings from forest products, changes in their socio-cultural life brought about by exposure to semi-urban environments, unemployment, a growing dependence on the cash economy, and a perception of being cheated by those who were more knowledgeable about this new environment (Pandey 1998).

These distinctions (gender, age, class, and ethnicity) are not the only ones that divide the resettlers. In urban areas for example, the larger resettled group may be divided into different neighborhoods. In the relocation of groups from an island in metropolitan Manila, different groups worked with different NGOs and negotiated varying packages (Meikle and Walker 1998). Those undertaking a resettlement project ought to understand the ways in which groups subject to DIDR are differentiated and the implications for potential conflicts of interest.

3.2.4 Other project-affected persons

Scudder (1996:49) has noted that there are at least four categories of people affected by DIDR: those directly displaced, the hosts among whom they settle, all other river-basin residents, and immigrants. While immigrants usually benefit (they immigrate specifically because they foresee benefits), all the other groups are liable to suffer negative
impacts. Attention has been paid to relocatees, and more recently to hosts, but the majority of those adversely affected may be in the third category, and they are most often left out of projects. They are less apt to mount effective resistance as well, as they are often spread over wide areas, making the creation of alliances and political action difficult. The may also be at a relatively great distance from the project site. They rarely get assistance from any organizations. This third category - all other river-basin residents - is obviously applicable only to river-basin resettlement. However, all displacement situations potentially contain people who are not physically displaced but suffer from negative consequences of the development that displaced other people.

To be sure, downstreamers form a significant proportion of those affected by displacement activities, and their problems have at least been recognized. For example, the Sardar Sarovar projects will affect downstream fisherfolk from Bihar, who have become concerned about the indirect displacement of families dependent on fishing. There will also be secondary acquisition of land for the rights of ways for the main canal (250 meters at the head and 100 meters at the tail) (Appa and Patel 1996:145, 146). The Manantali Resettlement Project did a fairly good job of resettling the people in the reservoir area, creating a project based on previous lessons learned. However this project had nothing to do with the downstreamers, often hundreds of miles away, who found their agricultural systems seriously affected by the changing river regime (Salem-Murdock et al. 1994). In Canada, Indian and Métis communities 97 km downstream from the site of Squaw Rapids Dam, Saskatchewan suffered from low and fluctuating water levels, yet the public posture of the implementation organization was that there were no negative downstream impacts (Waldram 1988:62-65).

The affected but not displaced are found in other kinds of projects as well. Road projects often require the displacement of those in the right-of-way and those who live in quarry areas. But quarries also create problems for those remaining around them. For example, the quarry created as a part of a project to upgrade Kenyan roads caused property damage from blasting, air and water pollution, and a crater 30 meters deep. Property damage included structural damage to water tanks used to supplement water for agriculture. Even after blasting stopped, there was permanent damage to drainage since explosions had permanently disrupted river and spring-fed water sources. Non-porous rocks were fractured by repeated explosions, causing water to drain from surrounding farmland into the quarry. As the water table declined, wells, boreholes, and the communal cattle-dip drained. These varied conditions led to decreased agricultural production. Although not far from the city, many people considered farming to be the most important component of their livelihood. The construction company eventually agreed (in 1994) to restore flowing, clean, uncontaminated water to a central well, but independent tests in mid-1995 at the Nairobi City Council laboratory declared the water chemically unfit and bacterially unsatisfactory for human consumption unless treated (Oxfam 1996b). Similar problems were found elsewhere. Pandey (1998) noted the hazards facing those living close to mines as well as polluted water and compromised water tables of those near industrial colonies. These affected both hosts and resettlers. Mining at Talcher and Ib Valley (India) lowered the water table, too few tube wells were provided by the authorities, and water was often unfit to drink. Coal dust was a perpetual nuisance. Safe drinking water was not available at some river-basin projects (Pandey 1998:103).
DeWet (2000:12) also noted that all who use resources in the areas affected by DIDR may potentially face negative impacts. These may not always be natural resources; among people who suffer negative impacts are local merchants or artisans who may lose raw materials, supplies, labor, or clientele. As noted above, people who lived primarily from occupations other than agriculture yet were from displaced zones deemed primarily agricultural were not recognized as displaced persons and not eligible for rehabilitation and resettlement in Orissa (India) (Pandey 1998:111).

Hosts have gained more attention in recent years but it is important to remember them. Their interests may come into direct conflict with those of resettlers, even though they may have agreed to accept displaced groups. Hosts often saw themselves in competition with resettlers because of the added pressure that growing populations put on natural resources, social services, and common property resources (Pandey 1998; Koenig and Diarra 1998a). Moreover, the displaced and hosts have different perspectives. To the hosts, displaced people might seem prosperous because of the cash compensation they have received, while the displaced often realize that this cash compensation cannot replace the assets they had (and the hosts often still do have) (Pandey 1998:90). Hosts also complained of lack of consultation by authorities and lack of infrastructure that is often found in resettlement colonies, e.g., wells, schools, jobs (Pandey 1998; Diarra et al. 1995).

Displacement is symptomatic of the disruption of a regional economic system and as such, disrupts the livelihoods of many different groups who have had linkages to that system. Should all, no matter what their losses, be compensated? Practically there seem to be limits, so the question becomes establishing which losses are significant enough to merit development projects as a means of mitigation and finding appropriate ways to reconstitute livelihoods after these losses. It is clear that DIDR affects far more people than those who are immediately and directly displaced.

4. Further Measures to Decrease Poverty and Enhance Development

The risks and reconstruction model has been extremely useful in focusing attention on certain aspects of the resettlement process. It was especially important in identifying economic, socio-cultural, and social welfare risks and in suggesting ways to mitigate or avoid those risks and programs to reconstitute economic livelihoods and socio-cultural systems. In terms of the ideas about development proposed above (Section 2.1), it has been especially effective at pointing out ways to increase the availability and utility of economic resources. It has implicitly addressed the issue of equity between affected groups and other national groups. It has been linked with other efforts to increase environmental sustainability. It has been less effective at addressing the more political aspects of DIDR, including: addressing directly the human rights of the displaced, increasing local autonomy and control, and improving people’s ability to affect their interactions with national institutions, all integral to real development. The first part of this section addresses economic aspects where improvement is still nonetheless needed. The middle looks at ways in which the political aspects of development might be enhanced by integrating development programs into the larger political-economic context and
recognizing the conflicts of interest between displaced populations and other groups as well as those within displaced populations. The final part of this section looks at how these insights might be integrated into a more democratic approach to planning the DIDR and the associated development projects designed to enhance the future of displaced people.

4.1 Economic aspects of livelihood restoration

In 1982, Scudder and Colson (1982:270) noted that almost universally, governments failed to pay proper attention to how people would make a living in resettlement zones. Moreover, too much of scarce project funds were spent on social services and housing. Cernea’s (2000) model of risks and reconstruction gave economic resources a key role in reconstituting livelihoods, but it should be clear from what has been written so far that these continue to be woefully neglected, with the striking except of reconstitution of farmland, where significant efforts have been made. Cernea (1999b) attributed this directly to the lack of involvement of economists in resettlement programs. The following section owes much to the volume on economics and resettlement edited by Cernea (1999a).

There are a number of technical approaches that would lead to more viable economic systems for the displaced. First and foremost, all costs of resettlement need to be internalized within project budgets (Cernea 1999b:14). These costs need to include the full social costs, which include the loss of non-priced environmental and cultural assets, loss of social cohesion, loss of market access and psychological damage; environmental economics provides a model for how to include these costs (Pearce 1999:52,53). Forms of analysis also need to be modified. It is essential to go beyond conventional cost-benefit analysis, because some of its principles are inconsistent with some of the principles of sustainable development and because cost-benefit analysis does not take into account distribution of benefits. The WCD (2000:123) as well stressed the importance of including an analysis of the distribution of costs and benefits. Risk analysis also needs to be broadened beyond the risk to financial and implementing institutions to recognize the risks to all project actors and their distribution (Cernea 1999b:16). Ericksen (1999:119) also suggested introducing a standard format to ensure that planners enumerate the full costs and potential benefits.

Questions of economic sustainability also need to be taken into account, among them intergenerational equity. This requires that stocks of capital assets be no less in the future than now; capital assets involved in resettlement include the everyday notion of capital, but also the stock of skills and knowledge (human capital) and environmental assets (Pearce 1999:59). Hayes (1999) suggested looking explicitly at four kinds of capital: physical, human, social, and natural. Expanding the notion of kinds of capital addresses directly the issue environmental sustainability as an aspect of development. The issue of equivalence of different kinds of assets should also be considered. In his study of resettlement projects in Orissa (India), Pandey (1998:56) noted that people had less land and livestock after displacement, but for many, there was an increase in certain types of financial assets. In particular more had money in financial institutions, sometimes as a
requirement of the project. The implications for long-term development of this change in asset distribution were not clear.

In order to plan better, there is a strong need for better data. Information needs to be gathered in the beginning, before planning, on many and varied aspects of the displaced population, its economy and environment. These should begin with baseline surveys on the size and composition of the population to be displaced or affected and quantitative analysis of existing levels and sources of household and individual incomes (Ericksen 1999:96). Baseline information has been particularly deficient on levels and sources of household income and valuing fixed assets that would be lost. Without this, there is no baseline for monitoring (Ericksen 1999:97). As noted above, unless there is clear information to the contrary, it should be assumed that income sources are many and varied. In rural resettlement, for example, serious efforts should be made to analyze and project family income from all sources, not just agriculture (Ericksen 1999:111).

It is important that resettlement initiatives actually gather the necessary data rather than using estimates. The social and economic information upon which Latin American urban resettlement projects were based tended to be unreliable because it came from secondary sources (Mejía 1999:166). Using existing data to estimate even just the size of the population to be resettled could lead to underestimates, as at Sobradinho (Ericksen 1999:97). At Manantali (Mali), existing data used to estimate land use (and the needs for replacement land) proved to be serious underestimates. On-the-ground, in-depth data gathering techniques should be emphasized in contrast to estimates and extrapolations. Lassailly-Jacob (1996:194) noted in her survey of African resettlement programs that planners often did not really understand the way local production systems worked, which led to inadequate evaluation of resources lost and hence allocation of insufficient land for reconstituting production systems.

When resettlement occurs in a new area, data on the displacees needs to be complemented by in-depth knowledge of the receiving environment. This is especially important for agricultural projects, where personnel need to know the appropriate agricultural and livestock enterprises to promote, the types and levels of inputs necessary, the time needed to establish new enterprises, and the levels of potential income and risks involved in reaching them. In frontier areas or areas on marginal soils, it is important to assess climatic and biological factors (Ericksen 1999). In urban areas, it is necessary to assess the physical, social and political environment of the resettlement zone.

There also needs to be better data on potential sources of economic recovery (Cernea 1999b:13). This might include a greater analysis of the characteristics of the regional economy and existing economic development policies and initiatives. It might include studies of multiple packages and new possibilities for more remunerative income-earning activities, such as ways to add value to various kinds of local products. Both agricultural and forest products can be processed and marketed. Feeney (1998:70) discussed a project in the western Ghats (India) where a local cooperative bid successfully for a concession to collect and market soap nuts for two years. Alternatively, those who hold collective rights could auction them to a leasing company, which could bring in income. In the far north, projects could consider transforming local natural resources through activities such as fur-tanning, fish-processing, or fur-farming with fish as a feeder
stock (Asch 1982:360). Projects would benefit both from thinking about new ways to bring in income and better analysis of the real income-earning potential of those ideas.

Doing the economic groundwork well will require more time for forward planning as well as more resources for local studies. This would appear to be money well spent if it increases substantially the chance for reconstituting viable regional economic systems.

### 4.2 Resettlement is carried out in an existing political-economic context

Displacement and resettlement are not carried out in a vacuum but within a domestic administrative structure and in light of governmental strategies of development. National governments run other programs and have other concerns besides DIDR. In most countries, development strategies are influenced by both international and domestic constraints. Many factors will affect regional, national, and local growth and development. Countries also have national stratification systems that distribute more resources to some groups rather than others and give some groups more voice than others in decisions about future courses of action. As discussed above, involuntary resettlement takes away economic resources from displaced groups by the process of resettlement; by being involuntary, it stresses as well the relatively powerless position of those who must move. Development for these people includes expanding their access to economic resources and giving them greater autonomy in their own affairs and a greater ability to affect national priorities and strategies.

The issue of greater autonomy and political impact for the displaced is not addressed in existing resettlement guidelines. Barutciski (2000) attributed the lack of emphasis here to the fact that the World Bank, which is required to be ‘non-political’ in orientation, has played a lead role in the formulation of international resettlement guidelines. Yet, as noted above, even the World Bank (2001) has recognized that empowerment is necessary to reduce poverty. The relevance of the distribution of power and its effects on access to resources has been discussed above (Sections 2.1 and 3.2.3). Below (Sections 4.3 and 4.4), this study will address strategies for taking these differences into account and dealing equitably with them. This section concentrates on the administrative and economic aspects of being part of an existing political-economic context and how this might be used to improve resettlement activities.

First, most countries have existing development strategies for both national and local levels. These larger policy environments also affect resettlement projects. On the one hand, they can encourage large infrastructure projects that require DIDR. Pearce (1999:72), working in the context of environmental economics, argued that developing countries often had distorted energy and water pricing policies. Large dam projects and their associated resettlement would have occurred less often if people were required to pay the full price of energy. Therefore, alternatives might become more promising if electricity and water prices reflected the full environmental and social costs of production and distribution. On the other hand, other policies may favor displaced groups. The Cree were able to be more effective because Trudeau had just come to power in Canada; he had a vision of a just society and participatory democracy that conflicted with the bureaucratic
ways in which Indian and Native affairs had been conducted (Salisbury 1986:32). International concerns may also affect the ways in which local concerns are heard. Gray (1996:113) noted that indigenous movements arose in periods when civil-rights questions were in the forefront throughout the world. Indian social scientists made consistent reference to ILO conventions about indigenous people to which the Indian government had subscribed when they argued for better treatment for displaced tribal peoples (Mahapatra 1999a). While recourse to international agreements is an important way for displaced people to assert their rights (Barutciski 2000), many countries have internal policies that can be used in favor of the displaced and these should be used as well.

Governments also carry out other development initiatives, in resettlement zones as well as elsewhere in the country. For example, urban resettlement often becomes intertwined with public housing programs and subject to their standards (Mejía 1999:154). At Manantali, dam-related resettlement outcomes were affected by the simultaneous implementation of structural adjustment programs (Koenig and Diarra 1998b). In Indian resettlement areas, resettlers could potentially have access to existing health and nutrition, credit and subsistence programs, but they needed to live in recognized administrative villages (Mahapatra 1999a:99,122). Rew (1996) noted that most southern and eastern Asian countries already have existing schemes for area development, rural and urban housing, agricultural intensification, and other sectors. African and Latin American countries have many existing development initiatives as well. These activities will vary from country to country, but there should be attempts to coordinate the development programs of different government agencies and donors to maximize the potential positive impacts of resettlement programs.

Resettlement agencies should not attempt to take over or co-opt these other development initiatives, but at minimum, they should attempt to understand how they may impact resettlement possibilities. In some cases, changes may interfere with resettlement strategies, as when the Manantali resettlement project planned to use agricultural extension services that were in fact being phased out by structural adjustment initiatives (Koenig and Diarra 1998b). In other cases, however, cooperation with existing programs and organizations may offer real synergies for restoring livelihoods. Involving existing agencies where appropriate may also help attenuate the resentment of other, often inadequately funded, government organizations not involved in resettlement programs when they are forced to work alongside better funded resettlement projects. Rew (1996) suggested that the problems of administrative coordination are not minor; an analysis of administrative capabilities of different organizations ought to consider explicitly the coordination between different existing entities.

National governments also have administrative structures, into which resettled areas will need to gain an official place, to increase their ability to participate in the political affairs of their local zone, region, and nation, however it is constituted. This is particularly important for providing a forum in which hosts and resettlers can work together; it may also provide a framework in which local units can participate in larger regional affairs. Mahapatra (1999a:94) emphasized the importance of resettlement colonies gaining the status of administrative villages to facilitate their inclusion in forms of local self-government in India. At Bayano (Panama), the Kuna, who were officially recognized by having their own reserve were better treated by the resettlement than were
the Embera, who did not have this level of official recognition (Wali 1989). One way to conceptualize these issues is return to Scudder and Colson’s (1982) concept of incorporation. A part of resettlement needs to concern integration of the resettled population as an active political-administrative unit in its new site.

Finally, as mentioned above, the resettlement zone is part of a regional economic system that needs to be understood better so as to anticipate problems and create meaningful job generation programs. It is clear that larger contexts of political and economic development affect resettlement. As noted, the Karelians benefited from the post-World War II expansion of the Finnish economy, especially when they resettled in urban areas (Mustanoja and Mustanoja 1993). DeWet (2000) attributed the viability and continuation of services in some African settlement schemes to the availability of administrative and economic capital and to the importance of the scheme in its regional political context. He said, “These are essentially serendipitous factors which are in a sense independent of resettlement schemes, although clearly exercising an influence upon them” (deWet 2000:16). The problem is that a project cannot create administrative and economic capital for the region in which it is located merely because it needs it (deWet 2000). In areas where agriculture and other services are poor, one should expect to see emigration from resettlement areas.

The practical consequence is that resettlement programs ought to undertake more serious analysis of the regional economy and non-resettlement policies and strategies for development to consider ways in which resettlers can be involved in ongoing initiatives. This may increase the options offered resettlers, an important consideration discussed in Section 4.4.2.5 below. It may also broaden consideration of what agencies might be appropriate implementers of resettlement components (Rew 1996).

4.3 Toward more equitable integration of the powerless

DIDR activities tend to integrate people more firmly into national economy and society. This is considered a problem by some analysts, who consider that groups who are already powerless and poor can only be integrated at the bottom of a national socio-economic structure. The issue seems to be to understand how they might be integrated in ways that offer them both more relative autonomy and a greater possibility to affect the national system of which they are a part.

It is clear that many displaced people want certain aspects of integration. Many people invested in greater education for their children (Scudder and Colson 1982: 281). Mahapatra (e.g. 1999a) noted that Indian relocatees made great efforts to send children to school and suggested adding loss of educational facilities and their reconstitution to the risks and reconstruction model. The problems of urban growth faced by the Cree (Canada) were in part due to the fact that so many more of them sent their children to secondary boarding schools after dam construction. At Manantali (Mali) as well, one of the major demands of resettlers was for additional schools. Clearly, relocatees often have seen education as a strategy to avoid marginalization of their children. People also made efforts to get even the temporary jobs available from resettlement.
Even when one of the major aspects of resettlement resistance is resistance to increasing economic integration and changing relationships to the state, the reverse is likely, since successful resistance almost inevitably has meant intensifying relationships with existing allies and developing new relationships with others. Even when resistance is framed in terms of tradition and autonomy, its expression may alter the ways that the community interacts with policy makers (Oliver-Smith 1996). In other words, resistance itself creates new relationships and forms of integration with the state, yet, if successful, on less dominated terms than might otherwise have been the case. This is seconded by Barabas and Bartolomé (1996:167) who noted that social mobilizations of indigenous peoples may be based on ethnicity, but they needed to reformulate existing traditions to gain effectiveness within new systems of interethnic articulation. The Cree (Canada) experience illustrates this seeming paradox. In 1981, the Cree had more autonomy (through their own regional authority) and they felt they had more control over their lives, but they were also more integrated into Canadian society. In 1971, before the dam, few Cree could write English; by 1981, over 80% of the population spoke and read English. Their housing quality had improved and cash incomes were 20 times higher. In fact, per capita income was not much less than that of the average Canadian. Regional integration meant they came think of themselves as Cree more than as members of individual bands in 1981 (Salisbury 1986:6,7). Urban resistance movements may also change internal or external forms of social and economic integration. The activities of Italian-American women fighting urban renewal in 1960s Chicago paved the way for the entry of many women into community leadership roles (Squires et al. 1987).

Since resettled groups are internally differentiated, community reconstruction as well as the creation of effective pressure groups depends upon creating cohesion among affected persons with disparate needs and interests. A practical strategy may be to start by first promoting smaller, more homogeneous, self-help groups (Feeney 1998:70). Successful cases need to move beyond these smaller, usually more ethnically homogeneous groups to look at three distinct levels: intracommunity organization, social reconstruction that links different displaced communities, and organizations that articulate hosts and the displaced (Mahapatra 1999a). The creation of relationships, networks, and interdependence is difficult but necessary for long-term effective organization. Creating this cohesion is easier in cases where old structures have been transplanted, but it also needs to be done where there are no previous linkages between residents or between them and hosts. In these cases, mistrust or estrangement may be caused by the necessity to share resources, or tensions may be created by different ethnic traditions, exacerbating the difficulties in creating cohesion (Lassailly-Jacob 1996; Mahapatra 1999b), but also making the creation of effective social solidarity more important for long-term development.

4.4 Addressing problematic resettlement administration through democratization

The emphasis on national and international policies and planning has given many resettlement initiatives a top-down character. It is as if there is a belief that if the policies are right, good implementation will follow. Yet Rew, Fisher, and Pandey’s (2000) report suggests that this is not necessarily so. The record of on-the-ground administration of
resettlement initiatives remains wanting. Moreover, resettlement initiatives seem particularly likely to provoke strong resistance. Simultaneously, calls for greater participation have not been heeded to any great extent. Some may believe that certain kinds of participation are problematic in complex resettlement projects. Yet the critique of planning discussed above (Section 2.1) seems relevant here. Even with the best intentions (which planners and implementers do not always have), planners cannot foresee every eventuality. Among other things, they usually lack the knowledge about local conditions available to local residents, they cannot anticipate all the consequences of particular choices made for project implementation, and they cannot foresee all the consequences for implementation of independent changes in national politics and economy. Moreover, the state cannot be treated as a well-meaning, paternalist, or monolithic organization (Marx 1988:22); it needs to be pressured to work in the interests of all its citizens.

Despite the fact that our understandings of the resettlement process have improved through all the work that has been done, it is perhaps best to remember Ingersoll’s (1988) statement, “development as a process of change is basically an assault on the unknown and a creative adaptation of similar experiences from elsewhere, rather than a playing out of conventional procedures.” This section brings these strands together to make the argument that more democratic approaches to planning may be the best way to address successfully the constraints of administrative failure and resistance in framing development initiatives for resettled groups. The section first discusses some of the perceived problems in implementing resettlement programs: administrative weakness, resistance, and complexity. It then goes on to discuss democratic approaches in light of their potential to address these problems as well as their potential to open the way to greater local development.

4.4.1. The “problems”

This section discusses some of the “problems” that seem to lead to weak outcomes of the development programs aimed at resettled groups.

4.4.1.1 Administrative weakness

The policy practice study which forms part of the larger project of which this desk study is also a part (Rew, Fisher, and Pandey 2000) suggested that implementation on-the-ground will inevitably differ from policy intentions. This observation has also been made by others (deWet 2000; Koenig 1997). Various administrative weaknesses have been delineated. For example, Cernea (1996a:24) noted two linked issues in resettlement implementation: weak implementing institutions and “authoritarianism.” Weak institutions appear to be those lacking a policy mandate, organizational capacity, and professional social engineering skills. Authoritarian institutions occur where the displaced and host populations are not empowered to participate adequately; rather than putting pressure on institutions to work in their interest, affected peoples simply let themselves be directed or resist through apathy or flight. Effective legal mechanisms may either be absent or simply subverted.

Administrative weakness can appear at any level of resettlement administration.
Rew (1996) pinpointed the weaknesses of middle management in an analysis of selected Asian resettlement projects. Here failures of resettlement projects were due less to a lack of commitment or resources than a lack of management models and direction, legitimacy, and an appropriate range of skills. Especially needed was more preparation in conflict resolution and participatory planning (Rew 1996:207). The multifaceted, highly emotional, and politicized nature of resettlement required particular management skills, including flexibility and a high level of commitment to the task, yet administrators became especially risk-averse in the difficult climate of resettlement, which included high public scrutiny (Rew 1996:209, 210). There may also be deficits in legitimacy because of a history of rent-seeking by administrative structures (Rew 1996:210). It is easy to lose sight of the many possible responses and trade-offs and hard to coordinate the many and varied administrative demands and procedural links between organizations (Rew 1996:211).

In other cases, administrative agencies do not even show good faith. For example, corruption can become a problem. Pandey (1998: 70, 71) gathered the following complaints from those resettled by various projects in Orissa (India). At one project, government and project officials were accused of favoring village leaders and influential resettlers by giving them higher compensation after getting bribes; in two projects where compensation was paid through banks, resettlers said they had to pay “under the counter” to get official signatures; in two other projects, bank officials allegedly charged people to fill out standard forms; in another case, lawyers charged high fees for legal recognition of compensation certificates. Pandey (1998) noted many cases in which people believed that they were not given what they expected or were promised. At best, administrative organizations did not do all that was planned; at worst, they lied to people.

Oxfam, in contrast, faulted lenders for not following their own policy guidelines. After the evictions of people from the Kibale Forest Reserve and Game Corridor, the funder, the EC, put much effort into denying its involvement since this action was in contravention of OECD guidelines to which it was formally bound (Oxfam 1996a:16). Its East Africa Unit contended that resettlement was not a formal part of the project so that it was not responsible and that since the OECD resettlement guidelines were not in force when the project was drawn up, they were not necessarily relevant (Oxfam 1996a:17). At some point, the EC did admit that funds from the project were improperly used for evictions but argued that since the Government of Uganda had repaid the money after this was discovered, it removed any further obligation on the part of the EC (Oxfam 1996a:19). The EC also put little effort into devising action in favor of the displaced, contradicting some of the main objectives of its own aid program as defined by the Maastricht treaty (Oxfam 1996a:16). Rew (1996) suggested that one of most involuntary aspects of DIDR is often executive agency ownership; organizations do not normally easily accept responsibility for resettlement. In part, this is because doing well at resettlement rarely brings many benefits to administrators, but doing badly can lead to bad press, even internationally, and seriously affect career prospects.15

15Note, however, that in other contexts, there may be administrative competition to control the resettlement, presumably because of the resources it brings. Meikle and Walker (1998) found competition among various Philippine organizations to take the lead in one urban resettlement project they studied.
A related issue is that in public resettlement projects, the state is both player and referee, both initiator of resettlement and the source of laws and regulations (deWet 2000:10). As noted above, laws are important for they offer people one means to put pressure on resettlement institutions. The experiences on the Copperbelt suggest that both unregulated land law regimes and highly centralized land regimes have directly and negatively impacted the interests of women, the institutionally weaker, and resource-poor groups (Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer 1998:76). In many cases, laws introduced at different times may be contradictory as well; lack of consistency in the laws in a single country may lead to a certain arbitrariness in their implementation (Hansungule, Feeney, and Palmer 1998).

Some have suggested that resettlement components should be decentralized and independent since local government officials generally have better knowledge and are often more sympathetic to the displaced than officials at higher levels (e.g., Ericksen 1999:107). In principle, decentralization should be advantageous. It should be more efficient because decision makers know more about local conditions and should be able to match resources and needs more precisely. There should be greater accountability since decision-makers who live locally should be exposed to more scrutiny and be under greater pressure. There should also be more opportunities for local participation. But empirical data suggest that devolving decisions about projects is not necessarily likely to improve accountability or efficiency in and of itself. Local governments do not necessarily give greater priority to human development. Local elites may seize power. In any case, central governments have been reluctant to devolve the funds or decision-making power to permit truly effective local control. Thus, local governments often suffer from lack of administrative competence, insufficient budgets, and weak planning and control systems (Feeney 1998:19). This was the case in the Philippines where important resettlement responsibilities were given to local government units that often had neither the human or financial resources to do their job adequately (Meikle and Walker 1998). There may also be more opportunities for abuse or rent-seeking when local agencies are not constrained by strong control from above.

Clearly administrative strengthening of resettlement projects is needed to help personnel better meet the challenges of mitigating impoverishment and reconstituting livelihoods. Yet institutional strengthening should not come at the cost of improved consultation and participation. Resettlement becomes difficult to manage because of the complex and changing relationships between highly differentiated local populations and differentiated administration and consulting mechanisms. This makes resettlement hard to model and predict. Therefore, although this study argues below that administrative and institutional strengthening are important, they are themselves insufficient to produce the needed changes. Rather they need to be accompanied by more democratic approaches to planning as well.
When people are going to be displaced and they foresee few benefits, they search for ways to stop the displacement or to create benefits from it. When they do not have available formal political and legal arenas where they can defend, bargain for, and promote their interests, where policy and legal vacuums have left few alternatives to political struggle, people often turn to organized resistance activities (Cernea 1996a:28,29).

Resistance may appear at various points in DIDR initiatives and may have various goals. Resistance may be a protest against the particular development initiative that is inducing displacement. The goals of some resistance movements are to stop the development activity that causes resettlement, e.g., the Narmada Bachao Andolan. Other times, people may decide that they cannot stop the project but that resistance may lead to better outcomes. Oliver-Smith (1996:89) suggested that the choice to resist or accept resettlement may be mediated by the quality of the resettlement project. Resistance may also serve as a protest against a government organization that is not seen to be working in the interests of all its citizens. A poorly defined project may produce rejection not only of it, but also of the right of the state to define local agendas. Organized resistance at the beginning may be one factor that leads to policy and project improvements, but resistance may also appear during implementation if there are broken promises, unfulfilled plans, unanticipated negative environmental impacts, or other negative consequences. Resistance at this point can serve as a corrective (Oliver-Smith 1996:90).

Certain resistance movements may begin locally but may simultaneously contribute to creating a climate for more thorough-going policy changes. Local resistance movements often develop allies with those outside the community who can help make struggles more visible and more successful. While communities may see relevant issues primarily in local terms, their allies may see a struggle for competing models of development (Oliver-Smith 1996: 94). Barabas and Bartolomé (1996:168) suggest that indigenous social movements can be explicitly or implicitly linked to critiques of a civilizing style, questioning the national vision of the relationship between humans and nature. Resistance movements in conjunction with dam and river-basin resettlement have been important in calling into question the development potential of large infrastructure development.

Although the resistance against the dams on the Narmada has become well known worldwide, not all Indian resettlement initiatives have incited significant resistance. Among the 40 years of resettlement projects in Orissa (India) studied by Pandey (1998), there were few cases of active resistance. Notable was resistance at Banharpali, in the Ib Thermal Power Station project. Here resistors disrupted construction and blocked roads; women participated actively. Ultimately a local party leader became involved. The organization demanded adequate compensation, resettlement colonies, jobs, and control of pollution, but the movement failed to get its demands fulfilled. Pandey (1998:80) attributed this primarily to conflicts between young and old; the youth wanted the project

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16For a more in-depth discussion of resistance to resettlement, see Oliver-Smith’s companion paper.
and the jobs it offered. This conflict of interest was evident in other cases as well. Although most Dene spoke out against the Mackenzie Valley natural gas pipeline (Canada), some of the younger generation were attracted by the jobs they thought would come (Asch 1982: 351).

Pandey (1998) suggested that poor people often find it difficult to create effective resistance movements on their own. They need an organization that encompasses several villages and gets support from NGOs or political parties in order to be successful. Moreover, he suggested that when the well-to-do resisted in large numbers, the movement had a greater chance of success in getting their demands met. For example, resistance by general caste groups at Rengali forced the authorities to formulate a comprehensive rehabilitation policy for Orissa state. His analysis also showed that movements of middle-caste groups received more support from external sources than those spearheaded by scheduled tribes or scheduled castes (Pandey 1998: 80). The implication is that although wealthier local residents may have figured out more ways to use projects for personal gain, they also have more to lose from resettlement. They became among the most effective local protestors when they saw that their interests were threatened. This may be another reason to encourage local elites to see the commonalities of interest with other displaced people.

Using the national or international media to bring information about the project has become another important aspect of resistance. During the inquiry concerning the McKenzie Valley pipeline, Berger persuaded the Canadian Broadcasting Company to broadcast the highlights of each day’s deliberation in six languages (Funk 1985: 124). In Bamako (Mali), the government tore down two spontaneous neighborhoods in the mid-1990s. Among those who had their houses destroyed were civil servant social scientists. They, with others, used their contacts to facilitate production of a radio program in local languages that brought information about this activity to a wider audience. The program aired from time to time over several years until the displaced finally received compensation.

Rather than resisting outright, people may also seek to organize so as to manipulate contradictions within the state structures. Since different pieces of the state have different interests, resisters can play one set of state actors against another to achieve both immediate gains and long-term policy changes (Oliver-Smith 1996: 86-7; Koenig 1997).

Finally, at all stages, people used the existing legal system as a way to combat aspects of the resettlement. Going to court (or sometimes only the threat of going to court) could bring substantial improvements. In one Indian case, for example, those who went to court got a judgment that raised compensation ten times that fixed by the project authority (Pandey 1998: xviii). In Canada, suits by Indian groups became extremely common. Perhaps the best known was that of the James Bay Cree to stop the James Bay project. After appeals, the Cree were eventually awarded $90 million in compensation, including royalties for electric power but not future mining development; they later gave up their claim to royalties in exchange for $45 million in 4 installments (Salisbury 1986: 56-60).  

17The Cree were criticized by other Indian and Native groups for this settlement, which required them to renounce any claim to resources they might have made based on
Yet legal action did not always bring positive results. In a Kenyan road project, going to court required very high filing fees. Nevertheless, Kituo Legal Advice Centre presented over 70 well-substantiated claims for 234 individuals concerning loss of livelihood, damage to property, and nuisance. As of July 1996, however, the claims were not yet resolved (Oxfam 1996b:29,30).

People resist resettlement because they understand the impoverishment that DIDR has the potential to bring. Continued resistance to DIDR should help end projects that do not bring development for any national groups. When projects are justified, resistance, viewed as a problem by implementing organizations, can serve to bring greater development to affected groups.

4.4.1.3 Complexity

Resettlement programs involve many different actors in many different activities that usually must be undertaken in a timely fashion and in particular sequence. This makes them quite complex. DeWet (2000) raised the question of whether involuntary resettlement may be so inherently complex that it is beyond the control of rational development procedures. He suggested that the complexity inherent in resettlement process created problems not readily amenable to operational and rational planning, which all but predisposed projects to failure. Because of this complexity, outcomes are not improving. Rew, Fisher, and Pandey (2000:55) stressed that understanding the complexities of resettlement is obscured by a formal linear view of policy stages, from formulation to implementation.

It is the argument of this desk study that the combined problems of administrative weakness, justifiable resistance, and complexity require a different approach to resettlement. While planning and guidelines are necessary, they ought to be seen as the beginning of an approach to improve resettlement outcomes. They need to be complemented by a democratization of planning and implementation.

4.4.2 Democratization of planning

Democratization is closely linked to participation, but lest participation seem to be simply a technocratic exercise, the use of the term democratization should make it clear that there is a political as well as a technical component to what has been called, elsewhere, participation. This section proceeds from the assumption that top-down planning can never be successful in and of itself as a way to protect the interests of the people below, in this case the displaced. At best, it is limited in its perspectives (analyses of the problems and potential solutions); at worst it is mired in corruption and administrative inefficiency.

aboriginal rights (McCutcheon 1991:127).

18 There are divergent views; Pandey (1998:xix) has argued that rigorous planning is necessary so that the wealthier do not get the lion’s share of the benefits.
The only way that planners will work consistently in the interests of locals is if the locals keep consistent pressure on them to do so. This pressure may be polite and nuanced, or it can be raucous and confrontational; this depends to a large extent on the socio-cultural and political context. But if affected people can have a positive impact, by their own evaluation, on the activities carried out by government administrators, private-sector actors, and political operatives, they are less likely to need to resort to the kinds of resistance that delay projects over long periods or halt them completely. In other words, if they can increase their impact on the way that national systems affect their lives, so that they receive more benefits, this is itself an important aspect of development.

This section looks at some of the activities that need to be undertaken to democratize resettlement projects by increasing participation of interested parties. These include: understanding the concepts of democratization and participation, greater transparency in planning, capacity building among both local and administrative organizations, creating coalitions, and increasing choice.

4.4.2.1 Democratizing resettlement through greater participation

Among the arguments for participation is the idea that ignoring local conditions had led to a lack of commitment on the part of beneficiaries. Participation becomes a way to remedy past failures that came from top-down conceptions of development. The need to include local views has been enthusiastically endorsed by many governments, most traditional financial institutions, and bilateral donor agencies. However, the term can mean different things to many different organizations; there are also differing levels of practical commitment. Feeney (1998) discussed some of the different conceptions of the major donors. Not all who endorse participation actually implement it. For example, among resettlement projects in Orissa (India), only one-third of those interviewed said that they had been consulted by project authorities about potential resettlement sites. Over three-quarters said that sites were selected by authorities without taking into account their preferences (Pandey 1998:83). Although participation as a guideline may exist, it is not always respected. One of the key issues is how participation can become more effective.

Initial experiences with participatory approaches have suggested that to be effective, participation needs to include the ability to influence decisions, not simply involvement in implementation (Feeney 1998:15). It has come to be seen less as a tool for specific projects and more as an essential component of political life (Feeney 1998:10). Practically, participation helps increase the responsiveness and accountability of development initiatives. It needs to go beyond the ‘consultation’ so often called for in resettlement guidelines. In the terms of this desk-study, it is most effective when strategies to democratize resettlement gain from our understandings about democratizing development in a larger sense. There are many experiments in decentralization, deconcentration, and empowerment.19 Many of these attempts are still at an early stage, and it is not always clear which will be most successful at leading to more economic and political equality, but democratization within DIDR should not be carried out apart from these larger experiences.

19As only one example, see the articles in Bingen, Robinson, and Staatz (2000).
While some argue enthusiastically for participation, others perceive that it will lead to problems. For example, some agencies feared that participation at early stages of projects would lead to cost overruns and delays (Mejía 1999; Meikle and Walker 1998). Participatory approaches do usually require more time and funds at the beginning of an initiative to secure the involvement of all affected parties and to work out major disagreements (Bagadion and Korten 1991). Planners have also expressed concern that sharing information and consulting affected people will create unrealistic expectations and, in the case of resettlement, attract new “squatters” who hope to benefit from projects. To make participation work requires effort and commitment from donors, governments, and NGOs. Necessary procedures include good initial planning and early discussion, a preparation phase that includes training to increase local capacity, extra efforts to get the input of the especially vulnerable (e.g., women, indigenous, other minorities), a clear process for action, open lines of communication, and time to explore alternatives (Feeney 1998). Insofar as this extra time and effort will discourage agencies from doing unjustified DIDR, this is all to the good.

Moreover, experience shows that the up-front effort is not wasted. Genuine participation helps secure local consensus and reduces conflicts, negative social impacts, and delays later on. It improves both planning and monitoring (Feeney 1998). It builds trust and collaboration, which can mitigate later delays due to lack of agreement at the community level. Communities can gain a sense of ownership of a project and become less likely to see themselves as victims or employees of implementing agencies. Despite agency concerns, building community support in this way may actually help inhibit free-riders since the community as well as project personnel gain an interest in keeping them out. In any case, evidence from World Bank funded urban projects in Latin America suggested that delays and cost overruns were due less to participatory approaches and more to planning inadequacy, implementation weaknesses, and insufficient resources (Mejía 1999:164).

Others have argued that there are so many actors involved in resettlement that participatory approaches will complicate implementation even more. In addition to the displaced, the government and NGOs (commonly considered interested parties), there are many other affected people who are not displaced (Section 3.2.4 above). If the local private sector is not strongly impacted, but might be expected to be instrumental in creating post-resettlement jobs, they too should be involved as potential stakeholders. Not only are there many groups, but each of them is heterogeneous and includes people with multiple interests. Shas (1995:321) has suggested that addressing conflicts of interest in a public hearing room can avoid the bad decisions of closed process and the almost inevitable resistance that may follow. While it is true that the involvement of all interested parties in planning may lead to even more ambiguities, the presence of all potential stakeholders leads to broader ownership of the implementation process. Shas (1995) suggests that public accountability is more likely to lead to competence, caution, and humility among officials than if they are allowed to work without public pressure.

In other words, participation cannot simply mean involving the local people in a project whose lines have already been dictated by higher levels. Although the resettlement may be driven by development activities initiated outside of the local arena, if people can
be convinced that they will receive tangible benefits and a chance to control resettlement outcomes (a growth in economic resources, autonomy, and the possibility to impact the larger society), the involuntary nature of DIDR may be mitigated. But this can occur only if they can actually affect the outcomes to augment benefits. This requires a more democratic approach to planning and implementation, one where the outcomes will not be clear and one in which compromises will surely be made. This process does bring in the potential for abuse; the more knowledgeable or the more organized may dominate the process. “Placing different stakeholders on centre stage as if they are on a level playing field belies a situation in which power relations are extremely unequal, particularly for local people” (Rew, Fisher, and Pandey 2000:37). For example in the Philippines, some groups used their knowledge and connections to get better resettlement packages than others (Meikle and Walker 1998). On the other hand, others have argued that the process of participation can bring about a change in the relationship of locals and other groups. In 1981, after the dam, the Crees had created the Grand Council of the Crees of Quebec, as well as many small groups such as band councils, school committees, cooperatives, and the Cree Trappers Associations, all forums for public participation and village politics. Salisbury (1986:147) suggested that the need to organize to respond to dam construction and resettlement was important in enabling the Cree to rise above factionalism and create a regional organization. He also suggested that the stress of resettlement was itself important in enabling the Cree to rise above factionalism and create a regional organization, giving them a degree of control over their own destiny after a previous history of powerlessness. Although a culturally distinct group, they restructured the relationship between themselves and larger societal institutions, taking over administration and service delivery to their own people (Salisbury 1986; Feit 1982:404). Afterwards, for example, researchers could not work with the Cree unless they received their permission (Salisbury 1986:107). The process of participation created local institutions that had long-term positive repercussions for development processes within the Cree region.

The rest of this section looks at conditions that need to be met so that affected persons may participate more effectively and equitably in democratized planning. In the conclusion, we turn to the practical consequences for planning, in particular, the necessity to adopt a learning-process approach in resettlement projects.

4.2.2.2 Toward transparency

One of the first conditions of democratic participation is that all interested parties have access to the knowledge necessary to make inferences about the potential consequences of planned actions. The fact that many government agencies decide in secret often forces people to participate by opposition and resistance rather than by bargaining and cooperation (Cernea 1996a:29). The first step in increasing access to knowledge is transparency. Sen (1999:10) considers transparency guarantees one of the five necessary types of freedom that underlie development. This includes informing people in time about the need for resettlement, legal entitlements and eligibility, options, due process, and grievance mechanisms (Cernea 1996a:30). It also includes openness about budgets and public expenditures (Feeney 1998). Some work is already underway in this arena; for example, UNICEF has supported local initiatives that help demystify budgets (Feeney 1998:136). Since 1994, the World Bank has mandated that borrowers make resettlement
plans available in draft to the public before they approve funding (Cernea 1996a:30).

A second step is instituting clear operating rules that apply to all involved parties. There need to be mechanisms for conflict resolution, arbitration, and redress. The entitlement to a fair hearing and just remedy is a necessary corollary to participation; formal complaints mechanisms are a part of this process (Feeney 1998). In general these processes can be expected to work better in a society in which there is democratic space and open debate in other aspects of the society, not just resettlement (Gray 1996:117).

Third, knowledge transmission is not simply an issue of transparency by governments at the beginning, but keeping up information flows throughout the resettlement and post-resettlement period. Feeney (1998:138) suggested involving the media to disseminate relevant data on progress and to maintain momentum.

There has been some progress toward transparency in some countries, under pressure from various stakeholders. By the early 1990s, Brazil had begun to set up a widely accessible information system on the power sector with data on social and environmental issues. Agencies were moving toward greater openness in decision-making processes, including publicizing general sectoral policies and specific plans. This was a response to concerted resistance to DIDR, which in turn had followed several disastrous resettlement initiatives. Many in the power sector appear to have realized that corrective actions to deal with adverse impacts often had high economic, social, and political costs (Serra 1993). The WCD (2000:176-8) has argued as well that information disclosure has increased from the 1950s through the 1990s, and that transparency, linked with public participation, has led to improved outcomes. Yet more still needs to be done.

4.4.2.3 Building capacity

Knowledge by itself is insufficient to create effective participation. People need particular skills that allow them to participate effectively in a process whose outcomes are not necessarily known, but the result of negotiation. Therefore efforts to build capacity at all levels are necessary if participatory approaches are adopted. These include not only project implementation personnel and the displaced, but also NGOs, who have become increasingly involved in resettlement implementation and private-sector organizations that might have a future role in resettlement zones. Much of the capacity building can use techniques developed for participatory development of any type. This section looks at a few issues particularly relevant for participatory approaches to DIDR.

Improving certain skills would enable project implementation agencies to become more effective. Rew (1996) noted that parastatal authorities are not noted for their skills in linking community groups or stakeholders. Administrators need to understand that administrative planning should be a prerequisite for effective policy advice. In the case of DIDR, administrative planning is not simply a mundane or technical activity; it requires that administrators have a clear idea of what they would like to achieve and the ability to consider new solutions (Rew 1996). The administrative organization also needs to understand its particular strengths and weaknesses, linked to structural features such as its place in the larger bureaucracy, as well as contingent features linked to such things as the
capabilities and personalities of the individuals assigned to specific tasks. For example, Rew (1996:219) noted that in one case a young engineer played a key role in a resettlement project because of his good communication skills. Local administrators also need the ability to collect necessary information (Rew 1996). Each analysis should start with details of options and processes relevant to the particular case, based on information gathered about the actual context. This should help administrators foresee areas of potential cleavage or conflict as well. Local administration also needs enhanced management skills including conflict resolution and facilitation skills to encourage residents to voice their needs and put pressure on decision makers to provide adequate information, compensation, and alternative livelihood options (Rew 1996). While policy principles have an important role in setting the larger context, the local ethnographic and management task is most important in the field (Rew 1996: 220).

As noted above, the displaced typically need training to build their organizational skills so that they can participate more equitably in negotiations. It is rare that existing organizations can simply be transferred to the new resettlement situation. Small or isolated populations may find it difficult to create effective organizations. While they can often enhance effectiveness by building coalitions with others (see the following section), the development of umbrella organizations which include several local groups has often been useful. A particularly effective example was the Grand Council of the Crees of Quebec, which united different local groups. Created in the context of James Bay development, it became the political arm of the Cree in 1974. It has consistently criticized the governments of Canada and Quebec for their failure to live up to agreements. It has developed strong internal leadership and has created coalitions with outside groups as well (Scudder 1996:68-9). Scudder (1996:69) suggested that Hydro-Quebec may have finally learned that it must negotiate directly with the Cree. Yet building this capacity took time and experience. The process of living through and dealing with the rapid changes of 1971-81 gave people experience for later leadership. They had to learn to negotiate with fellow politicians and cope with the administration (Salisbury 1986).

A number of other analysts working with Canadian Indian and Native groups have also noted that building organizations takes time. Asch (1982:348) suggested that struggles with the Canadian state and multinational corporations were important in developing an explicit sense of self-determination among the Dene, northern Athapaskan-speaking people. The creation of new institutions among smaller groups created some political-economic leverage that these groups could then use in their negotiations with larger institutions (Feit 1982 :404). These organizations, a type of local coalition, could then resist more effectively the “divide and conquer” strategies that development agencies often used, for example, persuading a few communities to sign agreements so that it became more difficult for others to refuse (Waldram 1988:175). Over time, an indirect effect of Canadian hydroelectric development has been to create a politically sophisticated Native elite (McCutcheon 1991:128).

It is important to begin capacity building with existing local organizations. Feeney’s (1998:50) discussion of Brazilian development initiatives in domains other than resettlement showed the problems related to creating new associations rather than working with existing rural trade unions or local cooperatives. Yet, as noted, these organizations may not have all the capacity needed to deal effectively with involuntary resettlement; they
need capacity building programs at the beginning that allow them to transform themselves to address new situations. Given the inherent conflicts of interest between the displaced and outside organizations as well as those among the displaced, capacity building should include skills in negotiation and conflict resolution.

In addition to these two obviously involved groups, others may benefit from capacity building as well. NGOs, for example, have taken on a growing role in development in general and resettlement in particular. In addition to project work, NGOs often see themselves as taking on a growing role in democratization and becoming an essential part of civil society. Many are committed to participatory approaches, yet there is often a gap between their ideology and practice (Feeney 1998:24-27). In part this is related to their capacity. There is a real danger that a small, over-stretched NGO community may not be able to carry out the multiple roles demanded of it in various kinds of development projects; this includes planning, implementation, and monitoring. Small NGOS working in remote areas of limited experience of democratic process need some basic technical training (Feeney 1998).

Capacity building takes commitment, up-front money, time, and appropriate personnel. For example, the Cree received funds from the Arctic Institute of North America so that chiefs could meet together as a group to discuss the impact of James Bay hydroelectric development (Salisbury 1986:3). This requires looking at development project budgets in a different fashion, putting a certain amount of funding up front for capacity building with appropriate organizations. Some DIDR organizations may simply not want to fund local organizations that will make them modify their existing plans. In this context, international organizations (both public and NGOs) need to be willing to foreground the importance of development as a process of increasing local autonomy and political effectiveness as well as one of increasing economic resources. They also need to emphasize the practical aspects of enhanced local organization: greater efficiency, fewer problems down the road because of a growing sense of ownership, greater potential for local management and sustainability after the project is done. It is to be expected that many DIDR organizations will not make these changes of their own volition, but will need to have pressure put upon them by other interested parties.

To show the immediate value of democratized approaches to resettlement, involved organizations should try to find some tangible benefits that can be delivered promptly to encourage people to stay involved in future negotiations. Cernea (1996a:26) suggested that when a project can deliver good resettlement packages promptly, losses and project costs were reduced. Yet spending large sums of money in a compressed time frame may lead to the sacrifice of quality to meet project deadlines (Feeney 1998:140). A better strategy may be not to deliver whole packages, but a few particular, mutually-agreed-upon activities, which illustrate not only that benefits can come, but that democratic, consultative processes can be effective.

4.4.2.4 Coalition building

While building the capacities of the involved local parties is important, it remains true that the displaced still often find themselves with less power to put forward their
agendas, even when the capacities of their own organizations are enhanced. As noted, they will often need to form coalitions with other groups to get the resources needed to build their capacity in the first place. In many ways, coalitions with outside parties have improved the ability of populations affected by DIDR to put pressure on more powerful groups and organizations. Much of the emphasis on coalition building has been on the ability of local groups to gain visibility and clout by forging relationships with international organizations. For example, Gray (1996:117) suggested that strong international backing of local resistance groups has been one of the necessary conditions for effective pressure on governments and multilateral donors. In the case of resettlement, these alliances have been primarily with environmental and human rights groups (Oliver-Smith 1996). For example, when the Kayapo Indians protested the displacement of Brazilian Indians by the Altamira-Xingu dam project, their chiefs were supported by organizations such as Cultural Survival, Survival International, Amnesty International, and the International Society of Ethnobiology (Posey 1996). Yet these are not the only kind of coalitions that have proved useful. It is often useful for local residents to create coalitions with those of their neighbors and co-ethnics who have left the local area and have complementary knowledge and social relationships. In their case study of two different Mexican dams, Barabas and Bartolomé (1996) underlined the importance of this ability to call upon co-ethnics outside the local community. In particular, in the case of the proposed San Juan Tetelcingo dam, local Nahuas called upon their own traders and emigrants who had greater national and international experience to help. In the early twentieth century, the Yavapai Indians of Arizona saw repeated attempts by the federal government to move them so that water from the Verde River could be used to irrigate non-Indian lands. They committed time, energy, and money to the fight and called upon a Yavapai raised as a white, Chicago physician, Carlos Montezuma, to advise and lead their resistance until his death in 1923. Attempts at removal were unsuccessful through the 1930s, although new threats arose in the 1940s and later (Chamberlain 1975:32). These more cosmopolitan co-ethnics were linked directly to the protestors but had more experience with government bureaucracies and international organizations.

Groups may also create coalitions with other private individuals or groups who work in their zone. As noted above, anthropologists working with the Cree played an important role. Feit and other advisors accompanied Cree negotiators to Montreal or Quebec. Later on, students were employed by the Cree to do applied research; the Cree also employed lawyers and town planners (Salisbury 1986:155). Cree capacity was increased by the anthropologists’ insistence that the Cree themselves make decisions, even though they were willing to serve as advisors. At Itá in Brazil, the local resistance organization (CRAB - Regional Commission of Dam Victims) was supported by the Catholic Church and the Rural Workers’ Union (Serra 1993:76). Many local NGOs have been active in India as well (e.g. Patel 1995; Das, Das, and Das 1996).

It is also useful for local groups to look for allies among project administrators; this can be at any level - from local officials to international funders. Gray (1996:117) noted that, if a project is funded by the World Bank, a condition for effective resistance is that an influential sector there be opposed to the project, creating pressure against it from inside as well as outside. But local coalitions can be important as well, given the heterogeneity
within government administration. Rew, Fisher, and Pandey (2000) pointed to the need to create coalitions among different practitioners and cross-sectionally to increase the effectiveness of DIDR. To do this, a more sophisticated understanding of the differentiation among public sector agencies is required. The state is not monolithic; rather agencies lateral and subordinate to a coordinating or primary resettlement agency will have developed ways to resist and refuse demands from either above or below. Interagency and interstakeholder relationships are complex and marked by negotiation, bargaining, and other strategizing behaviors, not by the instrumentalities and command relations suggested by much of the literature (Rew 1996:218). At Manantali, displaced villagers were able to create alliances for different purposes with different parts of government and administration (Koenig 1997). In various Canadian projects, key individuals in local administrative positions played important roles in informing the subjects of DIDR and lending them their expertise. At Easterville, a community development officer was named very late, but he nevertheless quickly became a community advocate. At South Indian Lake, the federal Indian Affairs development officer showed active support for the people and facilitated the lawyers working for community, risking a reprimand from his superiors (Waldram 1988). The work of McGill University anthropologists as Cree advisors was facilitated by government anthropologists in Indian and Native Affairs and the Privy Council office (Salisbury 1986).

Looking beyond international alliances is important because these relationships may reflect some of the same international inequalities found in other domains. Sometimes the agendas of large outside organizations have threatened to overtake those of the displaced. Local organizations within Narmada were split about whether the immediate problem of resettlement or the larger problem of dam-based development was more important, yet the international organizations seem more interested in the latter (Koenig and Diarra 2000). Coalitions between environmentalists and local resources users may face problems when the locals want to continue hunting, fishing, or nomadic pastoralism (McCutcheon 1991; Paine 1994). Developing coalitions between various national actors help keep the focus on more local concerns.

Social scientists have been somewhat divided on the appropriate role for outsiders. For example, Pandey (1998:xx) has emphasized the importance of NGOs, suggesting they should form pressure groups with the displaced to ensure effective negotiation with the administration. He looked to NGOs to initiate a process of collective thinking and acting at the community level. In contrast, Mahapatra (1999a:116) has stressed the importance of what he calls People’s Organizations; as he has said, “the people’s institutions are verily, of, by, and for the people, and are fully and directly accountable to the local people.” In many if not most cases, outsiders can offer important complementary pressure on governments and private-sector organizations who do not want to change old ways of doing business; they also can help build local capacity through their knowledge and experience. However, the long-term goal of development implies moving toward a growing reliance on the people’s own organizations and building the capacity that will allow them to decide about their own affairs.
4.4.2.5 Increasing choice

The goal of democratizing planning and implementation is to increase the choice and autonomy of those affected by DIDR. As Sen (1999:3) has suggested, development should be seen as a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy. The study will talk later about options in terms of multiple possibilities or packages for reconstituting livelihoods. Choice as raised here is about reinforcing the control that people feel they have over their lives. Sometimes people will choose greater control over more tangible benefits. Thangaraj (1996:226,227) noted that people in the Upper Indravati Hydroelectric Project (India) did not necessarily want to settle on the irrigated land offered by the administration. Rather they wanted to make their own choices about where to settle, often moving near relatives and forests. This allowed them to continue their use of forests for firewood, fodder, non-timber produce, and timber. Resettling in clusters close to the forest gave them continued access to these resources and allowed them to keep social networks intact.

It is to be expected that there will be trade-offs between optimal economic and socio-cultural benefits in many resettlement projects. For example, at Manantali, new villages had to meet certain criteria of land and water availability to qualify as resettlement sites, yet the project administration was also committed to allowing them as much choice as possible. One village insisted on settling relatively close to the dam in a site that met minimum rather than optimal criteria. The project administrators spent much time meeting with them and trying to get them to choose a site with more land, but they were unable to convince them to do so. Based on their belief in the importance of self-selection of sites, administrators allowed them to move to their choice, but the head sociologist believed even years later that the village had made the ‘wrong’ choice, one that an expert could have made better. Several years after that, the village did indeed have worse access to farmland than many of its neighbors, but its youth had relatively good access to a new range of non-farm economic activities; the village had evidently believed, in a way that the project administration had not, that jobs were more important than ‘traditional’ farmland. Eight years later, this village was not by any obvious overall measurement ‘worse off.’ It is hard to evaluate that there was a single correct choice. Mahapatra (1999a:142,143) also noted the complementary advantages and disadvantages of resettlement at Ramial (India). All choices made in development projects, resettlement or other, are liable to unanticipated consequences, both positive and negative. If people are allowed to choose that which is more important to them, they are likely to be more willing to live with the adverse impacts they will undoubtedly encounter.

The participation of the displaced, organized themselves and allied with others in ways to bring pressure upon implementing organizations, is necessary to bring change and adaptation of policy guidelines. This process will be subject to all the compromises of democratic process, and it will undoubtedly lead to less predictable outcomes for DIDR and associated development projects. This is nonetheless needed to move toward situations of real development for the displaced.
5. When DIDR Occurs: Toward Better Development Initiatives

For the outcomes of DIDR to be improved, plans for infrastructure development need to be carried out more publicly, with opportunities for the range of stakeholders to have input into the goals and alternative strategies to achieve them. When displacement-inducing activities are decided upon, the nature and form of the development programs to improve the lives of the displaced need to be decided democratically. This will undoubtedly mean that certain infrastructure projects will not be undertaken because the costs will simply become too high; many would argue that this is all to the good. Some projects will still occur however. Urban transport, sanitation, and pollution control structures are among the infrastructure that many deem necessary for development; some dams may even continue to be built. This final section turns to some specific suggestions for how DIDR related development projects might be structured to reach the goals of development outlined earlier:

1) increasing the availability and utility of economic resources;
2) environmental sustainability;
3) respect for basic human rights;
4) increasing equity between affected groups and other national groups as well as increasing equity among the different groups within affected populations;
5) increasing local autonomy and control;
6) improving people’s ability to affect their interactions with national institutions

5.1 Moving from a blueprint to a learning-process approach

The theoretical benefits to participatory approaches to development are important enough to have encouraged at least one donor agency (DFID) to require participation in projects. By 1995, ODA (DFID’s predecessor) saw stakeholder participation as a way to strengthen local ownership of many types of aid activities. This was seen to be an aspect of good governance as well, or in the terms used here, an important part of increasing local autonomy and control and improving people’s ability to affect their interactions with national institutions. Emphasizing participation means that most projects promote a more flexible (i.e., a learning-process approach) with flexible planning and potential changes in midstream implementation. This approach included a recognition that dealing with people and institutions takes time and that outputs may be unpredictable (Feeney 1998:17).

Some are skeptical that this approach can work in resettlement projects, even though it has worked elsewhere. For example, deWet (2000:18,19) has questioned whether national authorities and project funders will let go of the control of projects, which a learning-process approach requires. This approach is inherently open-ended and requires more flexibility and negotiation among those involved. It also means that the costs of the project are not necessarily clear at the beginning.

Even without explicit commitment to a learning-process approach, projects are already changing course in mid-stream and adapting policies along the way. In the Latin American urban projects studied by Mejia (1999:167), there were constant changes in project design, as projects discovered unanticipated consequences due to their inadequate
attention to social context. There were also other constraints undiscovered until implementation began. So these projects found themselves based more and more on local circumstances rather than national social policy anyway. Chinese projects as well, some of the best-planned in a technical sense, also encountered similar problems, and resolutions were different in different areas as local officials adapted interventions to specific circumstances (Meikle and Walker 1998). In these cases, the incremental changes that are part of the learning-process approach were there but without the intention of learning for the future.

The planning critique suggests that to plan for all contingencies in advance requires that planners know all relevant information in advance. It assumes as well no significant changes in socio-cultural, political-economic, or physical context over the course of the project. These assumptions cannot be met. Unless the plan is created with the participation of local residents, it devalues their specific local knowledge. It is better to recognize the contingent nature of social change and envision the plan as a framework for action that will be adapted in light of changing circumstances. Given the complexity of resettlement projects, unanticipated consequences will be the rule rather than the exception. New negative impacts are likely to arise along the way. While an explicit learning-process approach does make outcomes more unpredictable, it seems to be the only way to address systematically the unanticipated consequences, to integrate more of those who suffer negative impacts along the way, and to include those who might offer unanticipated solutions.

5.2 Creating resettlement options

Intrinsic to the idea of development is increasing people’s options, as one strategy to increase their sense of well-being and control (deWet 2000:4). Options also offer a way to respond to the diverse needs and interests of displaced and affected populations. Yet Erickson (1999) found that involuntary resettlement projects in rural areas generally offered a single option. This was in contrast to voluntary resettlement where at minimum there were always at least two options, participation in the project or not. But, most voluntary resettlement projects evaluated two or more economic packages. Sometimes the choice was even more extensive, as in Brazil where two different projects promoted 5 to 7 different packages each. In involuntary resettlement the single option proposed tended either to involve major changes (e.g., from lowland riverbank agriculture to hillside systems, from dryland to irrigated agriculture, significant differences in agricultural intensivity) (Eriksen 1999:112,113), or, in contrast, no change at all, as at Manantali where the project design assumed that people would just continue the same kind of farming they had been doing. This is despite the fact that some believe that incremental improvements offer some of the best prospects for positive change (Kottak 1991). Increasing resources means improving the economic options available to people after resettlement, but without associated capacity building, people may not have the skills or resources necessary to make radical changes in economic activity. Even with training, they may try new activities experimentally and incrementally, to see if they offer benefits or not.
Ericksen (1999:119) has suggested that there need to be a wide range of compensation and resettlement options keyed to specific needs. Some cash payments should always be a part of the options. Rural programs should include non-farm activities like agricultural support (crop processing, marketing, transport, input supply, etc.) (Ericksen 1999:120). Projects should avoid options that restrict participant families’ use of on-farm resources (e.g., by requiring them to work on their own farms rather than hiring labor). Individual options should develop participation criteria so that people can be guided to options in which they have a greater likelihood of success. Among the options should probably be a safety net for those people who may have seriously compromised prospects of reconstituting economic livelihoods, e.g., older widows with little social support. This was done in the Shanxi Multipurpose Reservoir Project (China), where elderly people without dense social networks were helped to settle in retirement homes (NRCR 1999:25). Some people may need safety nets indefinitely, but if social disarticulation can be lessened, existing local social safety nets may continue to work well.

Projects also need to reconsider how to facilitate options that will not increase differentiation between rich and poor who are displaced, but will encourage more affluent people to stay in resettlement areas and use their skills for the benefits of their communities as well as themselves. For example, it is questionable whether the common prohibition against absentee landlords on irrigated perimeters (e.g., Sissoko et al. 1986; Salem-Murdock 1989) served its purpose of creating greater equity. At New Halfa, there were many absentee landlords anyway and tenants did not fit a preconceived notion about tenant status. Teachers or health workers might well take on a tenancy from an absentee landlord (Salem-Murdock 1989:67). In China, hosts welcomed resettlers into their villages when there was a shortage of labor in the factories that the hosts had created; they expected that resettlers would work for them in these enterprises (Meikle and Walker 1998). In that case, it must be asked whether resettlers would become a proletariat. The issue of what new stratification might or should look like in resettled communities has not been addressed because of the underlying assumption that resettled groups have been relatively homogeneous and poor in comparison with larger social systems of which they are a part. While moving toward more equitable social systems is an integral part of development, it would nonetheless seem unrealistic to expect that resettled communities would become egalitarian when few if any of the communities surrounding them are (cf. Scudder 1981).

Looking at options also should include borrowing and adopting ideas from other countries. For example the Chinese model for negotiating simultaneously with individuals and groups and compensating for community resources might be adopted elsewhere; Indian social scientists have even argued explicitly for this (Mahapatra 1999a:95). The Chinese also have formal collective land ownership at the village level; this might be considered as a model for areas, e.g. West Africa, that are trying to move from an informal customary collective tenure to something more formalized. Of course, it is risky simply to

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20 Chinese hosts also were keen on accepting resettlers when a part of the package was that hosts could change residence status from rural to urban. Since urban residence status had distinctly superior benefits, hosts thereby received tangible benefits from the resettlement (Meikle and Walker 1998).
borrow social institutions from one area and put them in a different socio-cultural context. They can however be used to help think through new alternatives and options.

At its best a learning-process approach can integrate new options as they appear, even in the midstream of the project. New small or medium-scale enterprises that wish to locate in the resettlement zone might be offered incentives if they will train and hire the displaced for new jobs. If new human, financial, or environmental resources appear, they can be capitalized upon at that time. Options should also allow people to mix and match different activities to create economic strategies, based on old and new activities, that allow them to make use of individual and family constellations of capacities and knowledge.

Surely, mistakes will be made and the outcomes of using a learning-process approach will not always be optimal. However, it is likely to improve the overall success of resettlement results by building on the sense of ownership of affected persons, who will be able to change the course of the project to adapt to their needs.

5.3 Personnel requirements

Of the involuntary resettlement projects studied by Ericksen (1999:105,6), most of the primary implementing agencies had mandates oriented almost exclusively to infrastructure installation. Recent years have seen the growth of social scientists specializing in resettlement. Yet the approach suggested in this desk study would require a much broader base of personnel. If resettlement needs to be conceptualized within a wider development context, members of implementation teams should have substantial experience in a wide range of development issues, including knowledge of how to achieve economically, socially, and environmentally sustainable development. Resettlement implementation teams should include not only the specialized Resettlement Officers suggested by Rew, Fisher, and Pandey (2000), but also rural or urban development specialists who have previous experience in other sectors.

Limiting personnel to those in involuntary resettlement may lead to too narrow a framework from which to approach issues. Erickson (1999) and Feeney (1998) offer two examples of the insights that can be brought to bear on resettlement by those who have experience in other aspects of development. Ericksen’s comparative analysis of voluntary and involuntary resettlement was feasible because of his extensive experience in agricultural development; it pointed to new ways of thinking about rural development within involuntary resettlement. Feeney’s extensive work on human rights issues coupled with an uncommonly deep knowledge of foreign assistance bureaucracies provided a basis for her recommendations on the particular ways of improving participation in involuntary resettlement.

As a practical matter, Ericksen (1999:95) noted that voluntary rural settlement projects generally benefited from a much broader mix of specialist skills. This was in part because agricultural development was fitted into a concern for integrated rural development. Analogously, if the focus of DIDR is on development rather than
resettlement, then a broad range of skills is needed.

The question of the mix of personnel needs to be complemented by a consideration of the best organizational structure to provide the personnel and meet the needs. Rew (1996) analyzed the benefits and costs of a variety of organizational frameworks used. Most commonly more than one agency is involved, although the kinds of relationships between the agencies and the mix between conventional public administration and specialized resettlement agencies can vary widely. Although conventional models rely on a mix of public agencies, the involvement of NGOs is growing and private-sector agencies may also be involved. The particular mix appropriate for a given DIDR initiative will depend on the particular situation.

5.4 The costs of enhanced resettlement projects

Resettlement projects are expensive, even more so if they include appropriate development projects. Ideal costs already identified include replacement costs for assets, income compensation for the entire transition period, added investment costs to secure accelerated development, out-of-pocket costs involved in actually moving, and administrative and transaction costs (Pearce 1999:63,64). Other costs may include: costs associated with consultation and participation, field studies, housing design, land acquisition and construction, investment in services, transactions with hosts, social assistance, titling, and other legal costs (Mejía 1999:171).

The enhancements recommended in this paper will render DIDR more expensive (e.g., through the provision of more and better technical assistance, through continuing the development initiatives longer, through greater training). Nevertheless, there do seem to be payoffs. The World Bank review showed resettlement projects with high financial allocations to be free of major difficulties while virtually all projects with low allocation rates had serious implementation problems (Cernea 1999b:23). In his study of 40 years of resettlement in Orissa (India), Pandey (1998:87) as well found a clear correlation: the displaced perceived more improvement in projects where the rehabilitation and resettlement policies were “better;” this necessarily involved greater expenditure as well as more planning.

Enhancing DIDR through greater democratization means more costs at the beginning, but the possibility of fewer costs at the end as people take ownership of the project. Grievances (due to lack of participation or even just continued poverty) can mean delays (e.g., in court) and hence higher costs; greater democratization should decrease these. Reconstituting lives promptly should also mean a shorter transition, which translates into fewer added costs, reduction of losses, and lower project costs over the long term. Cernea (1996a:26) even suggested reestablishing certain assets before the resettlement begins, for example, creating orchards in China so that they were harvestable when handed over to resatters.

One of the concerns is that a learning process approach means that not all costs will be known ahead of time. For example, it may be difficult to assess appropriate
compensation for those not physically displaced: host communities and other affected persons. Other categories of costs can be anticipated but the ultimate amount needed is uncertain, e.g., the level of environmental demands as hosts and resettlers begin to use the same areas (Pearce 1999). This objection assumes that costs are now known ahead of time, yet Mejía (1999:170, 171) noted that actual costs were often 300 to 400% higher than the initial estimates in the Latin American urban projects of traditional design she studied. While participatory resettlement may incur unanticipated costs as new problems or opportunities arise, this is clearly not a new issue. Without giving it a serious try, it is impossible to know if a learning process of approach to resettlement will incur significant additional costs.

Internalization of resettlement costs as a part of the DIDR activity and serious consideration of all appropriate costs may convince some infrastructure projects to be put on hold. This is probably all to the good. However, there are many cases when national interest demands the infrastructure. Should the costs necessarily be carried up-front by the national government in the case of public projects or by the private investor in the case of private ones? Should international donors be expected to pick up costs that cannot be met locally? It would seem reasonable to look for ways to supplement funding from other sources.

One approach with promise is benefit-sharing; here people benefit directly from revenues generated by the larger development project that requires displacement. This can be planned from the outset. For example, a percentage of sales revenues in the energy sector has been allocated to resettlers and the local administration in projects in China, Colombia, and the Philippines; Brazil also has a policy to do so (VanWicklin 1999:237). Those who benefit directly from the project that displaces people can be required to pay for the resettlement project through charges on output, e.g., higher electricity or irrigation fees (Pearce 1999:72). To be sure, these revenues come post-project, but they can be used to repay loans used for resettlement activities. Feeney (1998:121) noted as well the establishment of foundations to benefit indigenous people.

Thinking about new economic and political options for the displaced also leads to considering ways that funds can be generated for development projects, particularly further on in the project. Salisbury (1986:141) suggested that some of the economic issues reflect a false problem: does an administration find funds to provide services first or rather create employment so that people can demand and pay for services? If in contrast, an enabling regional society can develop and provide its own services using local people, it will provide employment and services at the same time. In any case, Salisbury (1986:140) noted that the subsidies to the Cree to provide their own services were not noticeably greater than the cost to the taxpayers of services previously provided by transient whites. They were attributed however to different government departments. Innovative ways might be found to add value to existing products.

If the development programs linked to DIDR are serious about increasing local autonomy, they might encourage projects that give local communities the rights to levy taxes and procure rents and royalties. This thinking is very much in line with national programs of decentralization underway in many countries; it simply links them to resettlement projects. To be sure, decentralization programs need much more elaboration.
in many countries. In the Philippine context, local government units were given new responsibilities without sufficient capacity or resources, and they performed poorly in regard to the resettlement. This was in contrast to the Chinese situation where local units had both human and financial resources and were able to undertake resettlement activities in line with national guidelines but adapted to local circumstances (Meikle and Walker 1998). Places where decentralized governmental institutions already exist, e.g. American Indian reservations, show that locals can earn income from their resources. For example, the Navajo Nation (United States) acquired Paragon Ranch, to be used for coal mining and coal generation; they planned to use a part of the royalties received to aid relocatees from the Navajo-Hopi joint use area (Aberle 1993:185). Many countries decentralizing have yet to solve the problem of local financing, but as the process continues, this may offer alternatives for resettlement financing as well.

Thinking about costs brings up some of the contradictions about resettlement thinking that may be addressed by a more participatory, learning-process approach. One issue is whether resettlers should participate by bearing some of the costs. While many have argued that resettlers should not be made to bear any costs because they are being involuntarily moved, this is sometimes seen to bring about a spirit of dependency. Moreover, participation itself demands costs in time and sometimes in money as well. This issue is perhaps brought out most directly in the matter of housing. It has been argued that participation in housing reconstruction (either by building or by paying for some materials) gives people a sense of ownership over their new residences. On the other hand, this requires participants to bear certain costs. Both may be true; in any case, there is a fair amount of empirical evidence that simply handing people a house involves problems, especially when the house is very different from the one they had lived in previously.

Real participation and real control over the direction of the resettlement project may make people willing to bear some of the costs, particularly those of time commitment, but also some of the costs required to adapt project benefits to their individual needs. This should not become an excuse for outside organizations to lower their financial commitment or their threshold for benefit loss. Yet it should be recognized that autonomy and control can to some extent substitute for tangible economic benefits.

5.5 Further research needs

This study has referred to an extensive literature that already exists on resettlement. Nevertheless, as should be clear from the discussion, there are still gaps that need to be studied to decrease impoverishment and reconstitute livelihoods. Many questions have been raised; for some, finding good answers requires further research.

These include:
1) a better understanding of how to create jobs for the displaced. Neither guaranteed jobs by large organizations nor micro-enterprises can suffice. Among the other options, there needs to be more consideration of the role of private-sector firms in job reconstruction, especially small and medium-size firms.
2) a better understanding of urban economic and social systems and the ways they
can be reconstituted. Urban resettlement is still too often seen as being about housing, not about economic recovery. Better ideas about job recreation and income-generation can help make urban projects about more than housing.

3) a better understanding of the particular characteristics of resettlement in the context of private-sector infrastructure development. We need to understand more about how the private sector uses existing legal structures as well as its relationship to government agencies; these appear to vary widely from country to country. We also need a better understanding of the courts as a place for carrying out resettlement resistance.

4) a better understanding of the conflicts of interest and lines of differentiation among resettled populations. The inherent conflict of interest between the displaced and project affected persons, on the one hand, and larger state and private-sector institutions, on the other, has long been acknowledged, but there has been a tendency to treat the DIDR-affected as homogeneous, instead of as a population divided by gender, class, age, ethnicity, and other characteristics. Yet divisions among resettlers render resistance difficult and complicate processes of livelihood restoration. While gender has been studied to some degree, and the conflicts of interest arising from class and age acknowledged, little has been done to understand how to facilitate inclusive development in the DIDR context. Of special concern is finding ways to encourage local elites to work in the interests of their communities as well as in their personal interest.
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