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Who participates? Civil society and the new democratic politics in São Paulo, Brazil

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Summary

This paper explores the participation of collective civil society actors in institutional spaces for direct citizen participation in the city of São Paulo, Brazil. The data was produced by a unique survey of civil society actors who work for, or with, sectors of the lower-middle class, the working class, and the urban poor. The paper identifies factors that influence the propensity of civil society actors to participate in three types of institutions: the participatory budget, the constitutionally mandated policy councils, and other local participatory councils and programmes. Many political leaders, policy-makers and researchers believe that such forms of direct citizen participation can help democratise and rationalise the state, as well as provide politically marginalised populations with a say in policy. Whether these hopes materialise depends in part on the answer(s) to a question the literatures on civil society, citizen participation and empowered participation have not addressed – *Who Participates?* Contrary to the focus on *autonomy* in much of the work on civil society, the statistical findings support the claim that collective actors with relations to institutional actors, and the Workers’ Party and State actors in particular, have the highest propensity to participate. The findings also support the idea that the institutional design of participatory policy-making spaces has a significant impact on who participates, and that this impact varies by type of civil society actor. Unlike what has been found in research on individual citizen participation, there is no evidence that the “wealth” of collective actors influences participation.

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Preface

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1 Introduction

The forms of direct citizen participation that are being pioneered in middle and low-income countries appear to harbingers a new democratic politics. The innovative experiments in, among others, participatory budgeting and planning in Brazilian cities, the Uruguayan capital Montevideo, and the Indian state of Kerala, are creating large democratic arenas and novel practices outside of the boundaries of classic representative institutions.¹ A wide array of researchers, policy-makers and political leaders now believe that direct participation in policy-making can help democratise and rationalise the state, as well as provide politically marginalised groups a voice in policy.²

Whether any of these hoped for outcomes materialise, however, depends on complex constellations of factors which are little understood and have only begun to receive attention from researchers. We know little about the effects of particular institutional designs of participatory spaces or how broader social forces shape decision making dynamics within these spaces, let alone their effectiveness in producing public policy and concrete outcomes. Because of the central concern with greater democratic inclusion, one of the high priority questions that need to be addressed in research on participation is *Who Participates?* The question pushes one to explore which factors increase the likelihood that ordinary citizens or collective civil society actors will engage with participatory institutional arrangements.

The diverse literatures that address citizen participation have not distinguished, empirically or at the level of theory, between the participation of individual citizens and that of collective civil society actors.³ Yet the two obey quite distinct logics – individuals and collective actors have different capacities for action (including participation), and these capacities are likely to be shaped by different constellations of factors. Furthermore, these literatures – those on civil society, deliberative democracy (Habermassian and others), and empowered participation – share the assumption that it is relatively unproblematic for individual or collective actors to reach and use institutional arrangements for citizen participation. Intellectual energy has centred mostly on the deliberative dynamics within participatory spaces or general features that are thought to make civil society a democratising and rationalising force. Notwithstanding diverse normative and theoretical agendas, these literatures share a broad “civil society perspective” on participation, in which few analytic distinctions are made within civil society and little attention is given to the factors that shape actors’ differential capacities for action. With the partial exception of empowered participation, institutions and their effects on collective action are absent.

¹ See Abers (1998), Baiocchi (2001), Avritzer (2002 and 2003), Santos (1998 and 2002b), Heller (2001).

² Expectations do vary. For some, participation increases public accountability, reduces corruption and bureaucratic sclerosis, and provides better (local) inputs to public policy (World Bank 1997 and 2001). For others, participation is a fundamental right that stands at the centre of democratic governance and human development (UNDP 2002: 51). And yet others see empowered participation as part of a new inclusionary and redistributive project that presents an alternative to both market and statist models of development (Heller 2001 and forthcoming; Fung and Wright 2003; Santos 2002a).

³ The literature on democratic decentralisation has a distinct perspective from these but it also has few works that explore in a systematic way the ability of different civil society actors, or ordinary citizens who occupying different positions in a community, to access and use the new institutional arrangements.

This paper focuses on the participation of collective civil society actors in the city of São Paulo, Brazil (population 10 million). It uses data produced by a unique survey of civil society actors to identify the factors that increase the propensity of these actors to participate in that city's institutions for participation in policy-making. The analysis takes as its point of departure the idea that civil society actors have differential capacities to engage with the state, and hence to reach and use participatory institutions.

To interpret the data, the paper adopts a polity-centred perspective. In contrast to the civil society perspective, it highlights how the capacity to participate is contingent on historically constructed actors, their relations to other actors (state and societal), and the terrain of political institutions in which these relations are negotiated.⁴ Contrary to the civil society perspective, which has focused on the importance of civil society *autonomy* and has not developed a broad sensitivity to the causal importance of political institutions, a polity perspective suggests that the civil society actors who are most likely to participate are those with strong ties to institutional actors – that is, collective actors who have classic political institutions as one of their principal arenas of action. Institutional actors include political parties, labour movements, state actors, and in some contexts some organised religious groups. The polity perspective suggests that it is possible to invert Peter Evans' (1995) argument that states that enjoy embedded autonomy have greater capacity to be effective counterparts to the private sector in industrial transformation, and to argue that it is those civil society actors who are *institutionally embedded* that have the greatest capacity to participate and work with state actors to produce public policy.

Three features distinguish this paper from most work on citizen participation. First, it explores the participation of collective civil society actors and not that of individual citizens. Second, it uses an innovative analytic strategy that makes it possible to test a series of hypotheses about which constellations of factors (suggested by the civil society and polity perspectives) may affect participation. The most common strategy used in empirical studies on participation is to select on the dependent variable – that is, to focus on actors who are participating – which makes it impossible to compare the characteristics and strategies of actors who are in participatory spaces with those who have stayed out of them. In contrast, this analysis works with a diverse universe of civil society actors and asks which have a higher propensity to participate. It compares this participation across three distinct institutional arrangements for citizen participation: (i) the well known participatory budget pioneered in the south of the Brazil, (ii) the constitutionally mandated policy councils in areas such as health and the rights of the child and adolescent, and (iii) a host of other types of local councils, committees, and participatory programs.⁵ The paper is

⁴ This polity-centred approach has its origins in the works of, among others, Skocpol (1992 and 1999), Tilly (1978 and 1997), and other lineages of comparative institutionalism, such as that of Evans (1995 and 1996). For a summary statement, see Houtzager (2003 and 2001). Parts of the social movements literature, represented by McAdam, McCarthy and Zald (1996) and Tarrow (1998), as well as Melucci 1996, offer bits and pieces of a theoretical framework that are consistent with a polity approach.

⁵ The city also has a variety of participatory institutions created by and for civil society actors, in which state actors are not regular participants, such as the municipal Health Forum and the Forum for Garbage and Citizenship in the City of São Paulo. These institutions seek to enhance public debate, strengthen the hand of civil society actors *vis-à-vis* the state, and coordinate action in particular issue areas. The survey collected information on participation in these institutions as well, but this paper only touches on this information briefly.

particular concerned with civil society actors that work for, or with, sectors of the lower-middle class, working class, or the urban poor.⁶

Third, the field research on which this paper is based sought to construct a novel research method that could meet the challenges posed by the diverse and disperse nature of civil society actors. Empirically driven research and analysis of participatory arrangements, and specifically of civil society actors' participation, is still incipient, although growing at an accelerating pace.⁷ Most research has taken the form of case studies of particular experiments or of particular civil society actors, and run the risk of spotlighting a few spectacular examples of inclusive participation, while such participation may in fact be rare or biased toward the wealthy.⁸ To draw conclusions that are reasonable across diverse contexts, analysts have had to engage in forms of comparative anecdotalism – that is, idiosyncratic cases from different contexts are herded together into a single explanation or generalisation. These cases, however, are rarely comparable because they are either not instances of the same things or occur in markedly dissimilar socio-political contexts.⁹

The dataset on which the paper is based is the product of a survey of 229 actors undertaken in 2002 within the municipal boundaries of the city of São Paulo. We used a snowball sampling strategy which is intentionally biased towards those actors who are more active in helping poorer people solve individual or collective problems of a material nature. This strategy in effect produced a best case scenario of associational activity – if civil society actors are participating in new democratic institutions, they would most likely be found amongst this sub-population of civil society. The data is cross-sectional – that is, drawn from four regions of the city (and from multiple starting points) – but parts of the questionnaire includes a temporal element and make possible limited inferences about, for example, whether different waves of association formation have distinct patterns of participation.

A word of caution is necessary before continuing. The goals of this paper are defined narrowly – it seeks to identify which civil society actors in São Paulo participate in different institutional arrangements for citizen participation in the policy process, and what factors increase the likelihood of this participation. The paper *does not* explore important questions about the deliberative dynamics of participatory institutions, nor their efficacy as policy-making arenas, nor their ability to influence the behaviour of state

⁶ The phrase “civil society actor” is used in a broad sense to denote a diverse set of collective actors – local associations and federations of associations, social movements, NGOs, charitable organisations, etc. – that do not have either public office or profit as their primary goals.

⁷ See, for example, the large multi-country projects undertaken by Santos, with MacArthur Foundation support, “Reinventing Social Emancipation,” www.ces.fe.uc.pt/emancipa; the Ford Foundation “Civil Society and Governance Project,” www.ids.ac.uk/ids/civsoc/index.html; as well as research of The Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies at www.jhu.edu/~ccss/

⁸ Patrick Heller and Shubham Chaudhuri's ongoing work on “The People's Campaign for Decentralised Planning” in Kerala, India, represents an exception, as does some of the work on the participatory budget in Porto Alegre. See Chaudhuri and Heller (2002), and Chaudhuri, Heller, and Mukherjee (2001); and in the case of participatory budgeting in Brazil, Abers (1998) and Avritzer (2002).

⁹ See the projects cited in fn 8. In the case of Fung and Wright (2003), Cohen and Rogers (2003: 243) observe that the editors of *Deepening Democracy* ‘sampled on a dependent variable. Given the immature state of theory and data in this area, this judgement made sense. Its downside, however, is that we lack the variation needed for testing hypotheses’.

agencies, or civil society actors. It does not examine final outcomes such as reduced inequality or higher caloric intake.

2 Perspectives on civil society participation and five hypotheses

What factors lead collective actors to participate in São Paulo's new democratic politics? Theorising in this area has hardly begun but it is possible to speak of a civil society and a polity perspective on participation. This section will not discuss in any detail the respective literatures that share the civil society and polity perspectives, but will instead paint in broad strokes the contours of the two perspectives. When the paper revisits the two perspectives in light of the statistical findings, the principal literatures are discussed in more detail.

The civil society perspective has a set of features that are shared by the literatures on civil society, deliberative democracy, and empowered participation.¹⁰ They are centrally concerned with deepening democracy and bet heavily on, for analytic and normative reasons that are held in common to varying degrees, the rationalising and even emancipating potential of civil society. In broad strokes, the core of the civil society perspective is a normative dichotomous reading of the relations between state (authoritarian) and society (democratic); and, the conviction that authentic civil society actors are a democratising and rationalising force of public action because of their deliberative logic (vs. interest-based), decentralised nature and rootedness in the social life of local communities, and autonomy (for most people, from the spheres of the state, political parties, and interest groups politics).¹¹ These features give civil society a particular democratising logic that contrasts favourably to that of the interest-based logic of representative bodies, the techno-bureaucratic logic of state agencies, and the exclusionary logic of the market. Finally, it is an article of faith in the civil society perspective that citizen participation, whether individualised or collective, increases political and social inclusion. Lower income and other excluded populations, whose

¹⁰ Work within the civil society literature includes, Keane (1992), Costa (1994 and 1999) and Dagnino (2003); within the deliberative democracy literature, Avritzer (1998 and 2003), Elster (1997), and Joshua Cohen (1998); and within the emerging empowered participation literature, see the essays in Fung and Wright (2003), and Fung forthcoming.

¹¹ Cf. Keane (1992), Cohen and Arato (1992), Costa (1994 and 1999); UNDP (2002). It is these three features that have led some analysts to claim that in the third wave transitions a distinct civil society has emerged, different from that predating authoritarian rule, which carries a new political culture, characterised by a deliberative logic (Avritzer 1998 and 2003). More generally, however, these features are part of a turn-of-century polycentric zeitgeist that appears to have a particular hostility toward large political organisations, be they state entities, political parties, or supra-local organised groups such as labour movements and professional associations (Houtzager 2003).

interests are marginalised in classic representative institutions, are expected to gain the opportunity to influence policies that most directly affect their lives (Avritzer 2003; Fung and Wright 2003; UNDP 2002).¹²

The polity-centred perspective is particularly concerned with understanding the differential ability of civil society actors to reach and use the new participatory institutions.¹³ Whereas the civil society perspective has paid little attention to sociologically real actors and political institutions, the polity perspective is foremost concerned with the historical and comparative analysis of institutionally situated actors. It suggests that participation is a contingent outcome, produced as collective actors (civil society, state and other) negotiate relations in a pre-existing institutional terrain that constrains and facilitates particular kinds of action. In this theoretical context, the notion of institutionally embedded actors suggests that it is those actors who have ties to institutional political actors – in the context of Brazil, political parties, union movements, certain organised religious groups, and the state – that have the capacity to reach and engage the new institutions for citizen participation.

The civil society and polity perspectives point to different constellations of factors that shape collective action such as participation. They suggest a number of hypotheses about which factors influence participation that can be examined in some detail using the dataset of associational life in the city of São Paulo. Some of the key components of the civil society perspective, such as the idea of a deliberative logic and of autonomy, are not suitable for hypotheses testing. They operate at such a high level of abstraction that a substantial exercise in theory building, to create a range of intermediate concepts, would be necessary before testable hypotheses could be generated. Furthermore, accepting arguments over civil society autonomy depends in good measure on embracing a theoretical model that defines civil society itself. The five hypotheses that follow, however, are drawn from both the civil society and polity perspectives.

Hypothesis 1

New institutions for citizen participation in São Paulo have created opportunities for segments of society that are excluded from other public decision making arenas, in particular segments of the poor, to participate in the policy process. This hypothesis is taken as an axiomatic truth in the civil society perspective. The polity perspective suggests some caution. Students of participation in political campaigns and in voting behaviour in the wealthiest countries have shown a powerful income effect on participation

¹² Although not contributing to the civil society perspective, the bilateral and multilateral actors who stand behind initiatives to make neoliberal globalisation a reality have since the 1990s sought to append their own normative and programmatic content. Advocating a market-based economic and social model, decentralisation and participation have been placed alongside deregulation and marketisation. Civil-society organisations, and NGOs in particular, are viewed as solutions to market failure. Traces of the peculiar civic neoliberal mix that results are common in the policy statements and official publications of multi-lateral, and some bi-lateral actors (World Bank 1997 and 2001). Much of what has been said in this paper in relation to the civil society perspective applies as well to this civic neoliberal view.

¹³ Restated in its broadest terms the question becomes, what are the institutional effects on associational life or on the micro-foundations of collective action. In general the question, although fundamental to the understanding of collective action, has received little attention on the research agenda on social actors.

– that is, wealthier groups of people vote more and participate at higher levels in associational activity and political campaigns than lower income groups (Verba, Lehman Schlozman and Brady 1995: ch. 7). The findings of that particular literature suggest that social inequalities will be mirrored in participatory institutions. From a polity perspective this seems entirely possible, but the protagonists in this study are collective actors, not individual citizens. They might therefore obey a different logic. For example, the design of the participatory institutions and the alliances civil society actors have constructed might mitigate the effect that disparities in wealth have on the participation of individual citizens.

Hypothesis 2

Institutionally embedded civil society actors have a higher propensity to participate than those who do not share this attribute. The polity perspective suggests that actors with ties to classic 20th century institutional actors, such as political parties, union movements, some organised religious groups, and the state, are more likely to participate than those lacking such relations. Although the civil society perspective has, in Brazil, not given attention to these ties or the capacities for action derived from them, there is ample literature on the close ties between the Workers' Party (PT) and social movements, on the relations between the social movement unionism of the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT) that involves both labour unions and community-based organisations, and on the extensive role of progressive sectors in the Catholic Church in organising and supporting civil society actors.¹⁴ Less is known about the role Evangelical churches have played but limited evidence (based on case studies) suggest a tendency to depoliticise members and isolate them from the political arena. From the civil society perspective, however, *autonomy* emerges as the most important attribute of the type of collective actors who were protagonists in the third democratic wave and whose mobilisation is still seen as central to the construction of new participatory experiments. Hypothesis Two is therefore the principal dividing line between polity and civil society perspectives.

Hypothesis 3

The organisational form and substantive concerns of civil society actors will influence whether they participate in the new institutional arrangements for participation in policy-making. The civil society perspective makes a few gross analytic cuts, such as differentiating between NGOs, CSOs (community organisations), and social movements, but by-and-large all bets for participation are on NGOs, often vaguely conceived but commonly equated with the advocacy NGOs. From a polity perspective, actors' capacity for action is contingent on several factors, including their internal organisation and substantive concerns. For this reason comparative analysis is only possible once an initial typology of civil society actors has been devised along those dimensions that are thought to influence participation. This is done

¹⁴ See Seidman (1994) and Diomo (1995), respectively.

below (on pages 22–23), where we suggest a classification of collective actors as Advocacy NGOs, Local Associations, Coordinators, Service Non-Profits and Others that have differential propensities and forms of participation.

Hypothesis 4

The foundational moments of civil society actors have a long-term influence on whether they are likely or not to participate. In the case of Brazil, both perspectives suggest, actors with foundational moment during a democratic transition (roughly from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s) are more likely to participate. Both perspectives work with a notion of path dependence – that is, both embrace the idea that civil society actors cannot dramatically reinvent themselves or how they work, in relatively short periods of time. Foundational moments leave a long-term imprint on an actor. The nature of this imprint is somewhat different in the civil society and polity perspectives, however. For the former, actors forged during the highly politicised period of the democratic transition are the product of, and carriers of, a new political culture that is the antithesis of the authoritarianism and clientelism that has historically prevailed. In this case, path dependence consists fundamentally of a legacy of the successful self-organising initiatives by collective actors, which in this sense were born autonomous. From the polity perspective, path dependence is rooted in, above all, the capacities for action collective actors construct on the bases of institutional embeddedness. During moments of significant institutional flux, such as the democratic transition in Brazil, the opportunities for creating such embeddedness, to a new and wider array of actors, are far greater than during periods of normal politics.

Hypothesis 5

The institutional design of the participatory arrangements – that is, the rules that set out the extent of an arrangement's legal mandate, its composition, criteria for participation, decision making procedures, as well as geographic and temporal location – influences which civil society actors are likely to participate. In the case of São Paulo, who can participate, as well as spatial and temporal distribution of opportunities for participation, are markedly different in the participatory budget and the policy councils, and within the budgeting process between two cycles that have distinct rules covering the number of meetings, where they are held, and the issues over which deliberation can take place. The polity perspective suggests that these institutional design features will constrain some actors and enable others to take advantage of the new opportunities for participation. The civil society perspective in general has not developed the institutional sensitivity required to generate hypotheses in this area, although empowered participation has a limited sensitivity (to some features of institutional design of participatory spaces).

3 Brief summary of major findings

The statistical models developed in the paper show that, contrary to the central focus of the civil society perspective on the importance of civil society *autonomy*, the actors in São Paulo who are most likely to participate, in all three institutional arrangements for citizen participation, are those with ties to two classic institutional political actors – political parties and the state. Ties to unions and religious organisations do not appear to affect civil society actors' propensity to participate. These findings broadly support the idea that *institutionally embedded* actors have a greater propensity to participate.¹⁵

We also found that the organisational forms civil society actors take affect the likelihood of participation. The label NGO is now being widely deployed for purposes of public representation and as an analytical category has lost its utility. Actors who varied greatly in organisational form, types of activities, and relation to their beneficiaries/members identified themselves as NGOs. A new typology of civil society actors, however, reveals that *advocacy NGOs* – a specification of the concept NGO – are no more active participators than any other kind of civil society actors, contradicting expectations raised by the literatures that emphasise the democratising attributes typical of advocacy NGOs. In contrast, actors that in the typology are labelled *coordinators* (which include federations of associations and social movement centrals) and *local level associations* (such as neighbourhood associations) have a far greater propensity to participate. Coordinators and associations, the models suggest, participate in distinctive ways: the former participates particularly in the policy councils and other spaces; the latter particularly in the participatory budget. This finding points to, among other things, the need to move towards a more disaggregated reading of both civil society and participatory institutions.

More generally, the analysis found that a substantial proportion of the more active segment of civil society actors that was surveyed participate, irrespective of their wealth (measured by budget size), in all three types of institutional arrangements. This suggests that individual and collective actors obey different logics and the two should not be conflated. There are also clear signs that the latter are constructing *new forms of representation* that cannot simply be understood in terms of direct democracy, and that appear to differ from those operating in the conventional representative institutions of liberal democracies. This further suggests that the distinction between participation of ordinary citizens and civil society actors is an important one. And, that there is a need to initiate a discussion on citizen representation in participatory policy institutions.¹⁶

¹⁵ One might hypothesise that they also have a set of capabilities that make them more effective inside participatory institutions than non-embedded actors (though our data does not shed any light on this question).

¹⁶ Santos (2002a) is one of few people to focus on the relationship between representative and participatory institutions, but he has not ventured to discuss emergent forms of representation within the latter.

4 Participation as dependent variable

The city of São Paulo has a diverse set of institutional arrangements for participation in policy-making. In each of these arrangements there are multiple ways in which actors can participate. The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 and the process of administrative decentralisation that has its roots in the state reforms and structural adjustment policies of the 1990s have concurrently produced significant changes in Brazilian state-society relations. The Constitution in particular creates a series of institutional mechanisms for citizen participation, with the explicit intention of amplifying democratic institutionalisation by offering new opportunities for direct participation in the design of public policy and the regulation of government action (Article 1). As a result of these two processes there has been a remarkable proliferation of institutionalised participatory arrangements at all levels of the state (municipal, state and federal) and across various policy and social areas. A veritable institutional jungle has in fact emerged, populated by diverse (along every dimension imaginable) types of institutions for direct participation.

To handle this diversity analytically there are two options. One is to reduce analytic scope and focus *a priori* on a sub-set of participatory institutions. The loss of generalisability, however, is substantial. The other option, adopted in this paper, is to make a limited number of analytic cuts, based in part on empirical patterns apparent in the data and in part on analytic concerns, to produce a small number of types. The most cited arrangements in the São Paulo survey fall into two broad categories: the *participatory budget* implemented by the Workers' Party in 2002 and the constitutionally mandated *policy councils*. These two variables we call PARTBUD and PARTCNL. A third dependent variable, PARTALL, consists of all institutionalised forms of participation in policy-making – that is, the participatory budget, the policy councils, and the host of less common participatory councils, committees, and programs. The advantage of PARTALL is a large statistical universe with which to work and the ability to include in the analysis a diverse grouping of participatory spaces that are rarely studied.

Collective actors can participate in each of the three types in several ways. The new participatory institutions were intentionally designed to include civil society, and in some cases individual citizens, in the different moments of public decision making and action – in the design of policy and regulation, in supervising or monitoring implementation, and even in the implementation of policy or management of programs. In the councils, for example, it is possible to be a sitting member of the council, a recipient of financing from a council managed fund, or a participant in public hearings held by the council. The forms of participation that are possible in each type of space are discussed below. Although we are relatively sure that, in the example above, actors would only have indicated participation if they were sitting members of the council, for the analytic purposes of this paper, the important analytic point is that these forms of participation are organised in institutionally predefined mechanisms and moments. It is not necessary, for our analytic purposes, to distinguish between the different forms of participation.

For our purposes it is also not necessary to ascertain the frequency or intensity of participation. It is possible to affirm, however, that the vast majority of the actors who participate in one or more of the

institutional arrangements, stated that, to them, participation was either “very important” or “indispensable.”¹⁷

PARTBUD. The participatory budget (*orçamento participativo*) is the best known experiment in the democratisation of public policy in Brazil and possible elsewhere. Although clearly tied to the municipal administrations of the Workers’ Party (PT), and in particular to that of Porto Alegre where it originated, the participatory budget has in various guises spread through much of the country, including in municipal administrations of other parties.¹⁸ In São Paulo, the budgeting process is currently in its second year. In 2002, the spending priorities of approximately a third of the municipal budget for public investment (which is itself around a third of the entire municipal budget), or 12 per cent of the total municipal budget, were set in the participatory budgeting process. The municipal administration estimates that 55,000 people participated in that year’s budgeting exercise.¹⁹

The participation of societal actors in the budgeting process is complex and occurs at several distinctive moments and spaces. In São Paulo it has two cycles – a Policy-Area Cycle and a Territorial Cycle (Diagram 4.1) – each of which appear to have been designed to favour the participation of distinctive actors. The Policy-Area Cycle starts with assemblies in nine macro-regions of the city, where, after the municipal administration’s Secretariats present their projects and programs to participants, the assembly defines the priorities for the next year and elects policy area delegates to policy-Area plenaries (1 delegate for every 20 voters present at the assembly). These plenaries set spending priorities for five policy areas where the municipal administration is active, and they elect councillors to the participatory budget council – CONOP – which oversees the administration’s implementation of the decisions made during the budgeting process and negotiates changes proposed by public officials, usually for technical reasons.²⁰

The Territorial Cycle follows a similar process but with a few notable differences when it comes to the breath of citizen participation and the types of demands participants are allowed to make. The preparatory assemblies occur in 270 small territorial divisions that cover the entire city, and the deliberative assemblies are organised according to the city’s 96 administrative districts. Residents and delegates present and debate proposals for public works and services for their regions in the areas of


¹⁷ A five point scale was used: indispensable, very (*muito*) important, more or less (*mais ou menos*) important, a little (*um pouco*) important, and not important. About a third of participants said participation was indispensable to the actor and 57 per cent said it was very important.

¹⁸ One estimate places the number of municipalities that undertake some form of participatory budgeting at around 150. Depending on definitions of participatory budgeting, however, that number could be significantly smaller. As a growing number of political groupings, with highly variable political and administrative practices, claim to be engaged in such budgeting exercises, there is a new discussion about where the conceptual boundaries should be drawn.

¹⁹ São Paulo 2003.

²⁰ Among the 92 councillors of CONOP, only 14 represent the municipal administration. The council also has seats for eight associations that work with special segments of the population and four representatives appointed by the respective Municipal deliberative councils.

Diagram 4.1 Structure of the participatory budget in the city of São Paulo



CONOP Composition: 10 Policy-Area councillors and 56 Territorial councillors
 14 councillors appointed by the municipal government
 8 councillors representing, respectively: women, blacks, street people, disabled, children & adolescents, GLBT, and Indians.
 4 councillors chosen by, respectively, the Municipal Health, Housing, Rights of the Child & the Adolescent, and Social Services Councils.

education and health, and in a third area that is decided by the assemblies themselves. The particular dynamics of the Territorial Cycle appears to favour the involvement of neighbourhood and community associations.

PARTCNL. A truly baroque structure of deliberative councils, with distinct and mandates and organisational features, exist in Brazil's larger cities. They can, however, be classified in four categories (see Table 4.1 for details): policy councils, program councils, policy-area councils, and public unit and autarky councils.²¹ The policy councils fit most closely with the widely held image of deliberative participatory spaces and are what constitutes PARTCNL. They have the most expressive levels of participation of the councils within our sample.²² These policy councils are federally mandated, by the 1988 Constitution, and are organised in a federated structure that parallels that of the government, in policies areas that the Constitution itself defines as high priority. They are, therefore, institutions whose creation and areas of competence, in addition to the forms of civil society participation, are legally mandated, and guaranteed.

The councils provide equal representation to civil society actors, public authorities, and professional associations involved in the relevant policy area.²³ The number of seats each sector receives is determined by specific enacting legislation or by the Council's internal statutes, the content of which is ratified by newly elected councillors at the beginning of their term.²⁴

PARTALL. In addition to containing within it PARTBUD and PARTCNL, this variable includes a mix of different institutionalised forms of citizen participation that link societal and state actors to facilitate consultation, regulation, or the design or implementation of public policy. These forms range from program councils and public infrastructure councils, to working groups, committees and commissions, as well as the tutelary councils which attend the public on issues related to the rights of the child and adolescent. Annex 2 lists the specific spaces that were reported in the interviews.

²¹ This typology is a slightly modified version of those found in Tatagiba (2002) and IBAMA, IPEA *et al.* (1997). Omitted from this typology is the Council of the Participatory Budget, already discussed.

²² Among policy councils, the municipal, state, and national Health Councils and the Council for the Rights of the Child and Adolescent (Conselho dos Direitos da Criança e do Adolescente, DCA), created in 1991 and 1992 respectively, have the highest participation rates.

²³ The Tutelary Councils (Conselhos Tutelares) are entirely different. Created by the same legislation as the Council for the Rights of the Child and Adolescent, the council is not a deliberative body but instead services the public directly. The councillors occupy full-time and remunerated positions and carry out executive functions. Each of the 34 Tutelary Councils in the city of São Paulo has five representatives elected by the general public on a territorial basis.

²⁴ Furthermore, in most cases the number of seats for civil society actors is legally specified, and in a few instances even the actual actors are specified. Although the policy councils have equal representation between representatives from civil society and public authorities, the Health Council has significantly increased the weight of the former by reserving additional seats for representatives of user and/or of health worker organisations. In order to placate the health movement, the city's administration in 2001 expanded its representative structure and created what it calls Popular Health Councils. These councils are supposed to mediate between society and the councils in the health sector – that is, the numerous public unit and autarky councils at the municipal, state, and national levels. The composition of the popular and these other health councils are set by administrative decree.

Table 4.1 Types of participatory councils in the city of São Paulo, Brazil

Type	Policy councils (Conselho de Políticas Públicas)	Program councils	Issue councils	Public unit & autarky councils
Legal status	Constitutionally mandated, with Federal implementing legislation	Created by Federal, State or Municipal legislation	Created by Municipal ordinance	Created by Municipal ordinance or by agency rules
Mandate	Policy deliberation, including over annual budget allocation, and exercise of control over implementing government agency. Includes the Municipal Health Council and Municipal Council of the Rights of the Child & the Adolescent	Support specific programs of the administration which created the council. Includes the Municipal Council for Housing and Council on School Nutrition	Support a diverse set of issue areas considered priority by the municipal administration. Includes, the Council on Race and Gender and Councils for extraordinary events and celebrations.	Manage and regulate specific public infrastructure. For example, the Health Post Council.
Members	Varies by council and level of government (municipal, state, federal)	Particular to each council. In the case of the <i>Municipal Council for Housing</i> , 65 members, distributed evenly between representatives from civil society and government and professional associations	Varies by council	Varies by council
Selection of civil society representatives	Varies by council and level of government (municipal, state, federal). For example, <i>Municipal Health Council</i> – selected by entity with seat on the council <i>Municipal Child & Adolescent Council</i> – elected in assembly of representatives of entities registered with the Council	Particular to each council. In the case of the <i>Municipal Housing Council</i> : regional pre-conferences of housing open to any citizen over 16 years of age, who elected 1,600 delegates to the Municipal Housing Conference in 2002 ((20,000 people voted). The delegates in turn elected the civil society representatives to the current Provisional Housing Council.	Varies by council	Varies by council

5 Explanatory variables

The indicator needed to test *Hypothesis 1*, whether poorer actors participate at (at least) comparable rates to wealthier actors, is straightforward. The *budget size* of the actors is a suitable indicator for “wealth.” Finding adequate indicators to explore the other four hypotheses requires a little more effort, and explanation of those efforts.

Do relations with political parties, union movements, organised religious groups, or the state increase the likelihood of participation? The dataset contains a number of variables that make it possible to test *Hypothesis 2*. It has two indicators for ties/autonomy to political parties. There are whether the actor declares that it has (i) formal or informal ties to political parties (TIEP) or to the Workers’ Party in particular (TIEPT), and (ii) supported a political candidate in recent elections (SUPCAN). Because TIEP and TIEPT co-varied significantly we used TIEPT to obtain a more precise result. It is possible that the relations actors have with the PT are a result of participation, rather than a cause. We can calculate how long the actors have maintained their relation to the party to verify this sub-hypothesis: if it is longer than two years – that is, prior to the PT administration – than the possibility can be safely discarded.²⁵ Ties to the union movement and Catholic Church can be tested using TIEU and TIEREL.

Relations to the state can be explored in several ways. On the one hand, ties to the state can be verified by looking at whether actors have public funding (BUDGV) or contracts for the delivery of services on behalf of the state (CON). The variable BUDGOVS (an continuous variables), tells what share of an actor’s budget is made up of public money.

To verify whether participators with ties to the state are simply clients in patron-client chains or are coopted in other ways, the variable APROT, which indicates whether actors have among their activities the organisation of protests and other forms of mobilisational (extra-institutional) politics, offers a useful test. We added a third type of indicator, whether the entity had registered with any government secretariats (REGS). Such registration is necessary to obtain service delivery contracts and will catch those entities that are registered but at the time of the survey did not have a service delivery contract with the government.

5.1 Types of civil society actors

Exploring *Hypothesis 3* – whether the organisational form and substantive concerns of civil society actors influence participation – requires a typology of civil society actors. The categories used in existing typologies, such as those that distinguish between NGOs and community-based organisation (CBOs) and social movements, are of limited use.²⁶ For a start, defining an empirical indicator for NGO is surprisingly

²⁵ Although one can argue that civil society actors with relations to the Workers’ Party, or who have supported its candidates during elections, may still enjoy relatively high degrees of autonomy from the party, the idea of autonomy as a signifier of a democratising role in the civil society perspective does not allow for such an interpretation. Autonomy in this context entails little contact and certainly excludes ongoing relations over extended periods of time.

²⁶ The use of this classification is not limited to work that adopts a civil society perspective. Cf. Evans (2002: fn.16, 30).

difficult. The ambiguous use of the category in the social sciences is mirrored in civil society. Over 40 per cent of the actors in the sample identified themselves as NGOs. These self-proclaimed NGOs, however, were a remarkably diverse group – in terms of activities, organisational structures, relations to members/beneficiaries, and so forth. Many actors appear to use the label NGO for the purposes of public self-representation. This discursive use of NGO has emptied the concept of whatever analytic content it might have had, creating a new challenge for the analysis.

It is nonetheless possible to devise a typology that has analytic content and uses categories that resonate with public discourse. Here we avoid a lengthy theoretical debate on the contours and specific logic of civil society – in this paper civil society actors are those that do not have as their primary concern accumulation of material wealth or exercising public authority. Two dimensions provide the underpinnings for the typology used in this paper. The first is, how actors work, that is, the type of activities in which they are engaged: service delivery to individuals, community organising, individual mediation with the state, representation *vis-à-vis* the state, define problems as public issues and influence policy debates, or other. The second dimension is the nature of their relation to their stated members/beneficiaries. Members/beneficiaries can be: members who are individuals or who are other actors, target population, imagined community which is territorially defined (such as the neighbourhood) or defined in terms of other identities (the homeless), or other.

With these two dimensions we created five categories of actors that are of sufficient size to allow statistical analysis. The five types are Advocacy Non-Governmental Organisations (ANGOs), Associations (ASSN), Coordinators (COORD), Service Non-Profit (SERVNP), and Others (OTHER). Table 5.1 gives the frequency of each type in the sample, the share of the 229 actors they represent, a description along the two analytic dimensions, and a few examples for each of the types. Annex 2 has a more complete description of the two dimensions and an expanded typology with nine categories.

We have avoided creating a category for “social movements” or “social movement organisations” for empirical and conceptual reason. Social movement as a concept suffers from the even greater difficulties than “NGO”. Similar to NGOs, a very diverse set of actors identified themselves as social movements. An even more diverse set of actors, however, claim to be members of social movements. This is the crux of the difficulty. The concept is used in the social sciences and in public discourse to refer to both specific actors, who often use the phrase “movement” in their name (the Movement of the Homeless or the Movement for Housing in Downtown São Paulo), and to groupings of collective and individual actors who share a common agenda or identity (the health movement, environmental movement or women’s movement). In the latter case, individual civil society actors *belong* to (or participate in) a social movement, which appears the sociologically most correct and analytically useful usage of the concept. It is adopted in this paper.

Local associations encompasses a variety of territorially-based actors who have either members or who work on behalf of a territorially defined “imagined community” – the local community of in the district of Grajaú or the movement of the homeless of the downtown area. In contrast to advocacy NGOs such as Ação Educativa (Education Action) or Geledes (a black women’s rights organisation)

which tend to specialise in particular issues and tasks, local associations are usually involved in a variety of tasks that can cut across several issue areas.

Coordinators encompass a variety of actors which bring together other actors or represent the interests of issue-based imagined communities at the municipal, state, or national level. The definitions cover the types of federated nation-wide organisations discussed by Skocpol (1992 and 1999) in the context of the nineteenth-century United States, but in the case of twenty-first century São Paulo, most coordinators are more horizontal organisations that coordinate networks of local and regional actors, such as the Union of Housing Movements of Greater São Paulo and the Interior (UMM), the Central of Popular Movements (CMP), and the Network of Brazilian Philanthropic Service Entities (REBRAF). Unlike Women's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) and the Independent Order of Odd Fellows (IOOF) that Skocpol discusses, the coordinators in São Paulo are frequently created from below, by local and regional civil society actors.

Advocacy NGOs is a specification of NGO that focuses on the central task of transforming social problems into public issues and campaigning around those issues to influence public policy or private behaviour, whether at the local, national or transnational level. This is not to suggest that ANGOs do not, as a set of additional activities, undertake community projects of various types, advise various community organisations and other actors, and even attend certain populations directly. It suggests only that the actor's primary goal is producing, and campaigning around, public issues. The beneficiaries of ANGOs can best be characterised as a "target population," on the behalf of which the actor campaigns.

Service non-profits have as their primary mission direct serve provision to the public, often individual clients, which may be defined narrowly or broadly. Service provision can be undertaken as charity or as part of an empowerment strategy. Their beneficiaries are individual clients. Service non-profits include actors who provide professional training or employment counselling, medical care, and shelter for battered women. Many in São Paulo have a religious origin but certainly not all.

The category Other includes a broad range of types of actors which have only a small representation in the sample. These include philanthropic foundations, pastoral organisations of the Catholic Church, and such classic civil society actors as the Lions and Rotary clubs. Combined they make up 11 per cent of the sample but individually each type is statistically insignificant.

5.2 Hypothesis 4 and 5 – path dependence and institutional design

The civil society and polity perspectives both suggest that associations created during the transition to democracy in Brazil, considered broadly to run from 1979 through 1989, are more politicised and more likely to participate, than previous or latter associational waves (*hypothesis 4*). That is, associational activity has a degree of path dependence. The dataset provides the year the actors were created, from which we can calculate AGE. If the hypothesis is valid, actors that were part of the 1980s associational wave, with AGE between 14 and 24 years, ought to be over-represented in the sample. We took one additional step to explore path dependence, from a view point close to that of the polity perspective. Three survey questions were combined into a single discontinuous variable to capture who, if anyone,

Table 5.1 Typology of civil society actors

Category	Freq	%	Relation to beneficiaries	Nature of activities	Examples
Associations	62	27	Territorial-based imagined community Members that are individuals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Service delivery • individual mediation • representation of neighbourhood • demand making • other 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • neighbourhood associations • community associations organised around specific activities, such as those with a civic/cultural purpose • social movement organisations such as the Downtown Housing Movement
Coordinators	45	20	Members that are collective actors Issue-based imagined community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • representation • demand making • community organising 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Popular Movements Central (a social movement coordinator) • Association of Brazilian NGOs • Association of Housing Movements of São Paulo
Advocacy NGOs	62	27	Target population	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Demand making • define problems as public issues & influence policy debates 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • popular education and community organising centres • institutes concerned with gender, race, reproductive rights, AIDS, the environment, etc.
Service non-profits	35	15	Individual clients	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • service delivery 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Baptist Association for the Encouragement and Support of Man • Centres for social promotion • Centres for professional training of youth
Others	25	11	Varies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Varies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • corporate and other foundations • Catholic church pastoral organisation • Rotary and Lions Clubs

helped to create the actor during its foundational moment. HELPC can take on any of the following answers: None, Government, Catholic Church, Political Party, Workers' Party, Unions, and Civil Society Actors.

The institutional design of the participatory budget and policy councils, discussed above, differ significantly and make possible a test of *hypothesis 5*. If specific design features, such as the number and physical distribution of locations where meetings are held in the city, influence who participates, there should be variation by *types of actors* across the three types of participatory institutions. The design of the budgeting process should favour local associations, which are territorially-based actors, and, in addition, actors who work in the issue areas of health and education, both of which are mandatory areas in the budgeting process (see Diagram 4.1). The councils are policy-area specific and should favour actors with greater geographic reach and who specialise in particular policy areas. In addition to variation in participation by actor type as an indicator of institutional design effects, it is therefore also possible to look for variation by *issue area* in which actor's work. It is possible first to make a distinction between actors who have clear issue area specialisations versus none specialised actors, and among the former between areas of specialisation.

The findings on institutional design have to be carefully contextualised, however, because the councils and budgeting process are only two among several institutional channels through which actors might attempt to influence policy. The contextual factors such as the responsiveness of particular government agencies to popular actors, as well as that of city council members and the mayor's office, or the efficacy of the councils themselves, may have their own influence on actors' decision to participate.

6 The survey in brief

The dataset used in this paper was produced by a survey of associations that work with or for people in lower-middle class, working class, and poor neighbourhoods to solve individual and collective problems, and/or provide some degree of representation *vis-à-vis* government.²⁷ The survey consisted of approximately one-hour interviews using a questionnaire that contains clusters of questions that seek to characterise (i) who contributed to the actors' foundation, (ii) types of activities undertaken, (iii) relations to members/beneficiaries, (iv) relations to a series of actors, including neighbourhood associations, political parties, and the state, (v) participation in participatory institutions, (vi) internal organisation, (vii) sources of funding, and (viii) degree of organisational formalisation. An English translation of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix 5. Portuguese and Spanish versions of the questionnaire, along with other field materials, are posted at www.ids.ac.uk/gdr/cfs/index.html

²⁷ At a later moment, the São Paulo data will be compared to similar work currently being undertaken in Mexico City and in the Indian cities Delhi, Bangalore and Coimbatore.

6.1 Sampling technique

The survey relied on a snowball sampling strategy that targeted civil society actors in São Paulo who are more active in helping people in lower middle class, working class, and poor neighbourhoods solve material problems (whether individual or collective in nature). Snowball techniques use “chain referrals” to build up samples that are purposefully targeted, and hence not random.²⁸ They are best suited for reaching difficult to access populations, or to identify populations that remain invisible when using other sampling techniques.

The universe of associational life in São Paulo that the survey was concerned with had both difficulties of access and visibility. On the one hand, there is no reliable listing, nor a census, of associational life from which a random (or weighted) sample could be drawn.²⁹ Such a listing would also entail accepting an *a priori* definition of what is associational life or civil society, which we were not keen to do. Constructing a universe from the rosters of the participatory institutional spaces carried a series of its own problems, not the least of which is losing the ability to compare actors who participate with those who are active but do not participate. At the extreme, using lists of entities participating in councils, under these conditions, makes an inference blind to the universe of excluded associations. On the other hand, it was likely that interviews would suffer a high refusal rate, which would limit access. Because of the politicised nature of parts of the city’s associational universe, a certain number of entities would be hesitant to incur the one hour cost of an interview to researchers who arrived without introduction.

The sample was purposefully biased towards those parts of São Paulo’s associational universe that work with poorer populations. It is possible that, as the sample grew, actors who also work with wealthier populations were interviewed. The responses to questions about the mission and objectives of the actor indicate that the overwhelming majority do work primarily with the poorer segments of São Paulo’s population.

Despite the use of the snowballing technique, we believe that we have collected a representative sample of civil society actors that are more active, and hence most likely to enter and use the three types of participatory policy-making institutions in São Paulo. Because snowball samples are based on chain referral, the entry (or starting) points have a particularly big impact on the composition of the sample and can be a source of unwanted selection bias. We therefore diversified our starting points as much as possible. We started the snowball at 20 different entry points, which were distributed evenly across four

²⁸ On snowball sampling, see Atkinson and Flint (n/a), Goodman (1961); Sudman and Kalton (1986).

²⁹ The lists used most commonly in research on civil society are registries or directories of member organisations of coordinators, such as that of the Brazilian Association of NGOs (ABONG 2002) in the case of Brazil, and are therefore lists with a strong bias that relate to dynamics of affinities, alliances, and conflict within the associational field. The Secretariats of the municipal government have a number of lists of civil society actors but these are not unified and are biased towards entities that either have service delivery contracts or participate in specific government programs. There are other lists of associations, which have broader criteria for inclusion: the registry of entities in the East Zone of São Paulo (SEBRAE/SEADE), but this covers only one of several regions in the city; and the General Registry of Companies (*Cadastro Geral de Empresas*, IBGE), which lists all the entities with a tax registration. The latter is by far the most complete list of civil society actors, but entities with out tax registration are excluded and recent tests of local associations showed serious problems of updating – that is, actors that no longer exist remain on the list.

distinct lower income regions of the city. The 20 collective actors that were interviewed as entry points were selected using four distinctive sources. Tests for biasness, discussed below, confirm that the sample does not suffer from unwanted bias that can arise in simpler snowball sampling strategies. A detailed discussion of the sources and the sampling procedure is available in Annex 3.

7 The propensity to participate: statistical methods and findings

The statistical techniques used in this section are appropriate for dichotomous variables – univariate relative risk ratios and multivariate logistic regressions. The three dependent variables – that is, whether or not an actor participates in PARTALL, PARTBUD, or PARTCON – are dichotomous. The statistical analysis explores different factors that influence participation in the three types of participatory institutional arrangements. Simple univariate relative risk ratios provide a useful description of factors that influence participation. The relations revealed in the univariate analyses are further explored through control factors using multivariate logistic regressions. The appropriateness of the relations is explored through goodness of fit tests and examining the possibility of sample selection bias in the data.

Our first step, however, was to ascertain whether actors in our sample participated at all, in any of the three categories of participatory institutions. The answer is a strong positive – 135 of 229 collective actors, or 59 per cent, participate in PARTALL, 33 per cent in PARTBUD, and 34 in PARTCNL. Participation of collective actors in our sample of the more active societal actors is without a doubt substantial.³⁰

Next we used simple logistic regressions to test the income effect on participation (Hypothesis 1), using *Budget size* as an indicator of an actor's wealth. It gives us a significant finding. Wealth in the sample of civil society actors who work with lower-middle class, working class, and the poor, does not affect participation. Rich and poor civil society actors in the sample are as likely to participate in all three institutional arrangements.

We then tested the path dependence hypothesis (no. 4), which is shared by the civil society and polity centred analyses. We use *Age* to explore whether there is a form of path dependence in participation – that is, whether civil society actors created during a particular historical moment, are more likely to participate. Our second finding is that *Age* also does not appear to matter.

The unique relations between these variables lead us to exclude them from any subsequent multivariate models. Exclusion of these variables is unlikely to have induced any omitted variable problems. We can conclude that these two variables do not influence participation in any of the three types of institutional arrangements for citizen participation.

³⁰ Because the sample has a built in bias and the size and characteristics of São Paulo's associational universe is unknown, it is impossible to extend this finding beyond the subset of organisations we interviewed.

7.1 Logistic regressions I: the structural models

Hypotheses 2, 3 and 5 were tested in a multi-step process. First, risk ratios helped to identify a number of factors that increase actors' propensity to participate.³¹ (Annex 3 contains an explanation of the procedure, a list of the variables and their relative risk ratio values, as well as a brief interpretation of these values.) Because it is likely that some of these factors co-vary or are structurally similar – that is, measure the same underlying characteristic – the second step was to identify which of these factors have the greatest influence on the propensity to participate, when all the significant factors are controlled for. To do so we created a number of statistical models using multivariate logistic regressions. We obtained three different models that are applicable and are valid for the three types of participatory institutions. Third, for the basic structural models, which test the dependent variables in our principal hypotheses, we examined the goodness of fit. Finally, we tested specific factors that are not part of the structural model but that had significant risk ratio values in the first step.

The principal hypotheses we wanted to test with the logistic regressions are those related to the idea that institutionally embedded actors are more likely to participate than relatively autonomous actors. **Hypotheses 2** suggest that actors with significant relations to political parties (TIEPT) or contractual relations to the state (CON) – have a higher propensity to participate. The basic structural model therefore centred the relationship of actors to political parties and the state. We also wanted to test **Hypotheses 3** about the importance of actor's organisational form, and particularly the centrality of advocacy NGOs. Does our typology of civil society actors shed light any light on who participates once other factors were controlled for? Hence, the basic model included ANGO, COORD, ASSN, and OTHER.

Table 7.1 presents the models for each of the three independent variables. Note that, COORD, ASSN, ANGO, SERVNP, and OTHER are mutually exclusive and exhaustive of types of actors. SERVNP is the reference category; hence, left out of all three regressions.³² TIEPT and CON are not mutually exclusive and act as controls for each other as well as other variables. Of the three models we can say the most about participation in the Budget, then in non-Budget and non-Council spaces, and finally far less about participation in PARTCNL. The pseudo-R² measures the goodness of fit; the interpretation of these values are less intuitive than R² in linear models. For that reason we conducted goodness of fit tests. The first goodness of fit test for participation in PARTALL yielded 20 covariate patterns with a Pearson χ^2 of 16.72; thus showing that the model cannot be rejected at the 21 per cent level. The same

³¹ Risk ratios is a statistical technique developed originally by epidemiologists to identify whether a specific event or factor causes illness in people. Risk-ratios are comparisons of two probabilities: the probability that a person or actor within a particular environment who has a certain feature (government financing, ties to political parties etc.) will engage in a particular behaviour (participate) and the probability that a person or actor without this feature will engage in that particular behaviour. For an example of the use of risk ratios in the social sciences, see Crowley and Skocpol (2001).

³² Inclusion of SERVNP would make the model completely multicollinear – that is, there would be no variation amongst the categories of types, they would always add up to 1. This is a standard technique in the use of categorical variables. The interpretation of the results does not depend on which category is used as the reference.

test showed that the model for participation in the budget could not be rejected at the 60 per cent level. Thus, our results are particularly strong for participation in the budget. Participation in councils could not be rejected at the 13 per cent level. Although our results are weak for participation in the council space, we are confident that these models provide interesting explanations for determining factors in all of the three participatory institutions.

Table 7.1 Three models of participation

	PARTALL	PARTBUD	PARTCNL
Pseudo-R ²	0.2060	0.2138	0.0963
TIEPT	5.73 **	3.68 **	2.29**
CON	4.28**	3.04 **	2.28**
COORD	8.23**	7.99 **	5.76**
ASSN	2.65**	15.39 **	2.03
ANGO	1.79	3.55 *	1.87
OTHER	0.72	3.23	0.87

All of the numbers can be understood as propensities; they are odds ratios.³³ A single asterisk indicates significance at 10 per cent level and double asterisks indicate significance at 5 per cent level. No asterisk implies statistical non-significance. As we have two control variables, the odds ratios should not be understood simply in terms of odds ratios with respect to the reference category of SERVNP. *The significance level and trends are more important than the values.*

The simple logistic models reveal that relations with the PT, government service contracts, being a coordinating body or being an association significantly increase an actors’ propensity to participate in all three cases. Holding the effects of all other variables constant, collective actors with relations to the PT (TIEPT) are five and-a-half times more likely to participate in PARTALL than those without such ties. They are three and a-half-times and two and-a-quarter more likely to participate in PARTBUD and in PARTCNL, respectively, than those without such ties. This raises an important question: does the significance of relations with the PT reflect the fact that the PT currently holds the municipal administration? Were another party to take over the São Paulo administration, would the significance of this relation for participation decline substantially? The answer is no. The overwhelming majority of actors with ties to the PT had established those ties well before the party won the municipal elections in 2000. The mean length of time for ties to the PT is over 12 years.

While having a government contract increases the propensity to participate, the size of the government’s contribution to an actor’s budget, or the share of the actor’s budget it accounts for, does not

³³ Odds ratios have slightly different formula from relative risks ratios discussed in fn.33. Although the meanings assigned to both odds ratios and relative risk ratios are essentially the same, the formulae differ. The qualitative results are not likely to differ.

appear to matter. BUDGOVS, a continuous variable, indicates that how much of an actor’s budget comes from the government has no effect on participation.

To understand the odds ratios for type of organisation, the values should be compared to Service Non-Profits (SERVNP) that provide services to individual clients. Actors that are COORD are roughly eight times likely to participate in the government space than actors that are SERVNP. Thus COORD are roughly three times more likely to participate than actors who are ASSN. Similar conclusions follow for other variables in the model.

7.2 Logistic regression: other factors

There are several clusters of factors in Annex 4 that had significant relative risk ratio values and which are not in the structural models. When some of these are added to the structural models, such as Activities, they proved not to be significant. A few, however, are statistically significant in particular institutional arrangements. Some of these factors tend to be correlated, which is evident from the fact that they rarely are significant when they appear together in a model. That is, they cancel out each other’s effect.

In order to examine if the models above can be strengthened, and consequently challenge or qualify the institutional embeddedness hypotheses, we expanded the models to incorporate the effects of the other factors that in the risk ratio Annex 4 appear to influence participation. Table 7.2 gives the models and the additional variables.

Table 7.2 Significance factors in participation

	PARTALL	PARTBUD	PARTCNL
TIEPT	**	**	**
CON	**	**	**
COORD	**	**	**
ASSN	**	**	
ANGO		*	
OTHER			
<i>Variables other than type of organisation and party and government ties:</i>			
TIEASSN	*		
TIESNP	*	**	
TIECOORD	*		** negative relation
TIEPAS			**
TIEFOR			*
ADEM	**	**	
HEALTH		**	
EDUCATION		** conditional	

Supposing that institutional embeddedness and type of organisation mattered less than, say activities or informal and formal ties to churches or unions, then inclusion of these factors in our model would statistically weaken the impact of type of factors stated in Table 7.1. Table 7.2 notes that while other factors do affect participation, they do not weaken the relations depicted in Table 7.1.

Table 7.2 shows variables that were significant when they were introduced with the basic variables that were significant in Table 7.1. None of these additional variables proved significant together. One activity, however, appears significant on its own: actors who engage in mobilisational politics (protest and demonstrations) are considerably more likely to be involved in the participatory budget. This does not hold true for policy councils.

The issues areas on which actors work proved not to be significant, but the one exception is particularly interesting. Working in the area of Health significantly increases the likelihood that an actor will participate in the budgeting process. This “issue area effect” is not present for the councils.

The effect of having relations to other kinds of actors, Table 7.2 shows, varies considerably across institutional spaces. Ties to coordinators (TIECOORD) and to civil society forums (TIEFOR) are significant for participation in policy councils. Ties to association (TIEASSN) increase the probability of participation outside of the budgeting process and policy councils. In contrast, ties to coordinators (TIECOORD), halve the likelihood of participation in councils, while ties to civil society forums (TIEFOR) make participation around 70 per cent more likely. The positive relationship between TIEFOR and participation is not terribly strong but nonetheless of interest.

Finally, we want to examine why the type of activities actors undertake, covered in the survey by 16 questions (hence the dataset had 16 variables for activities), did not show an effect on participation. The questions were divided into four blocks of activities: service delivery, community organising, mediation with the state for individuals, and representation of groups *vis-à-vis* the state. Some of the questions in each block could be thought of as overlapping – that is, a particular type of activity will coincide with the undertaking of another type of activity. For that reason we used factor analysis to obtain a measure of crucial characteristics of these variables together. Although the variables are dichotomous, we are still justified in using factor analysis. We identified a single principal factor. When using the scoring coefficients, the principal component extraction produced a variable, ACTFACT, which was not significant in any of our models.

8 Interpreting the findings: *who participates?*

What do the statistical findings tell us about *who participates?* They support the claims that, in the case of São Paulo, there are powerful institutional effects on the participation of civil society actors – relations to institutional actors and the design influence participation in all three types of spaces. The organisational form actors take, in terms of the typology developed in the paper, also has a significant impact on who participates. In contrast, wealth does not influence participation, nor do the issue-areas in which an actor

works, or how it works. The foundational moment of an actor also does not exert influence. Each of these findings is expanded on below.

The findings offer important confirmation of the hypothesis (no. 1) that the new participatory institutions create opportunities for social groups excluded from other public decision making arenas. The wealth (*Budget size*) of an actor does not affect participation. Rich and poor civil society actors in our sample are as likely to participate in all three institutional arrangements. This contrasts strongly to the well established finding that individual political participation is strongly affected personal wealth – i.e. wealthier people tend to vote more and participate more in political and civic activities (Verba *et al.* 1995). This difference between the participation of individuals and collective actors supports the claim that civil society participation increases inclusion of lower income groups. This is a significant finding with potential implications for democratic theory and for policy-making. Potential, because the finding cannot shed light on how responsive participating actors are to the groups they claim to work for or represent. Shedding light on this responsiveness will require a different research design and further conceptual work (on forms of responsiveness and representation).

There is strong support for hypothesis (no.2) that actors who are institutionally embedded have a higher propensity to participate. Furthermore, the statistical models help to specify which ties matter in the case of São Paulo. Ties to the Worker's Party or to the government via contracts to deliver services are, together with coordinators and associations, the best predictors of participation in all three types of participatory spaces. This does not mean that institutionally embedded actors lack autonomy, but rather that the results consistently point to the analytic cost of the cognitive myopia that result from placing too much emphasis on civil society autonomy.

There is published research that raises the possibility that relations to organised labour and sectors of the Catholic Church may influence participation of civil society actors. Seidman's (1994) work on urban labour in Brazil, which suggests that unions associated with the Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT) represent a form of social movement unionism that flows from the workplace into urban communities, raises such a possibility. A similar possibility is raised by Diomo (1995), and many others' works, on the crucial role progressive sectors of the Catholic Church played in creating and supporting community organisations and social movements, particularly during the 1980s.³⁴ Although a substantial share of actors in the sample did have relations with labour unions or sectors of the Catholic Church, both close to 40 per cent of the sample, none of the statistical exercises show any effect of these relations on the propensity to participate.³⁵ In São Paulo, therefore, relations to these two institutional actors do not increase the propensity of actors to participate in any of the three types of institutional arrangements.

³⁴ Cf. Sader (1988).

³⁵ Research on Evangelical churches (non-traditional Protestant churches) suggests that they tend to depoliticise and demobilise their members, hence actors with relations to such groups might have lower propensities to participate. The dataset does not contain enough cases of actors with such relations to test this hypothesis. The small number of cases may itself be interpreted to support this hypothesis but anecdotal evidence points to a more complex relationship between Evangelical groups and the political arena.

Does the design of participatory institutions (hypothesis 5) – that is, the specification of their legal mandate, formal criteria and procedures for participation, physical distribution of spaces for participation, etc. – influence who participates? Design effects on participation are statistically significant, but their interpretation is complicated by evidence of “interaction effects”. That is, the influence of design varies according to the type of actor. Table 7.2 shows that the significance level for type of organisation varies across the three types of participatory institutional arrangements. Coordinators have far higher participation rates in councils than they do in the participatory budget, while associations have the reverse pattern. In the participatory budget, the design of the electoral processes through which spending priorities are determined and delegates elected to the budget council generally favours actors with territorially or community-based roots (e.g. ASSN). Councils, in contrast, are municipal-wide bodies and territoriality is not a factor in selecting civil society participants.

The impact of institutional design should also be apparent when we look at the issues areas in which actors work. Policy councils, as well as the other kinds of councils and institutions included in PARTALL, have authority to act in particular policy areas (health, education, housing etc.), while the participatory budget, in its territorial cycle, mandates that spending decisions have to be made in health and education, in addition to areas the participants choose to address. Surprisingly, the models do not show any evidence that the issue areas in which actors work affect the propensity to participate, including in policy councils. There is one illuminating exception, which is discussed further below.

In the case of the policy councils, it is very likely that the lack of statistically significant results is related to the small number of actors who participate in any one council. When all policy councils are taken together, the number of participating actors in the sample is substantial, but when disaggregating by individual councils the statistical results are not significant.³⁶ In the sample, the average of participating civil society actors per council is less than 10.

The participatory budget provides a more interesting result. Actors who have health as one of the primary areas are significantly more likely than other actors to participate. This may be best explained by the fact that Health is one of two mandatory issue areas in the participatory budget and hence there are institutional mechanisms and incentives that encourage participation in this area. The importance of institutional design receives some support from this finding. The other mandatory policy area in the budgeting process – education – does not stimulate similar participation, however. Institutional design therefore cannot be the entire explanation. It is likely that the vitality and long history of São Paulo’s health movement, which has long played a substantial political role, including in the 1980s transition politics, is also an important factor in explaining why actors working in health have a higher propensity to participate. In contrast, the “education movement” is poorly organised and many of the organisations involved in educational issues also work in other issue areas. Taken together, institutional incentives to

³⁶ There is an exception when Housing is one of the two principle issue areas in which an actor works (see IHOUSM in Annex 4, table 2). In such cases there is an inverse relation to participation. This could be explained by, on the one hand, a large number of actors who are involved in housing issues and, on the other, the housing councils’ youth and inactivity.

participation and civil society actors' capacity for action offer a reasonable explanation for why health is an exceptional case.

The organisational form actors take (hypothesis 3), defined according to the typology developed in this paper, has a significant influence on participation. The three models identify important differences in the levels and forms of participation of different types of collective actors. This confirms that the categories of civil society actors in the typology capture important distinctions that, among other things, influence participation.

The three models do not support a narrow focus on ANGOs as the principle participatory agents – ANGOs are no more likely to participate than non-ANGOs. Instead, they show that local associations and coordinators have substantially higher propensities to participate. In addition, the models identify a division of labour between associations and coordinators when controlled by two strong factors – relations to the PT and government through the service delivery contracts. Associations participate at high levels in the participatory budget and at much lower levels in the policy councils. Coordinators participate at high levels in the councils and at lower levels (including lower than associations) in budgeting. In contrast, local associations and coordinators participate at far higher rates.

Disaggregating civil society actors into the five categories of the typology also makes it possible to identify whether an actor's relations to other civil society actors influences participation. Table 7.2 shows that being a coordinating body is the strongest indicator for participation in a council (nearly six times more likely than non-coordinators), yet having relations with such bodies makes it far less likely that an actor will participate. The explanation for this inverse relationship between participation in councils and ties to coordinators may lie on the one hand, in the limited number of seats available on councils and on the other, in a division of labour amongst civil society actors in which the seats are in large measure occupied by coordinators. Associations with ties to coordinators would therefore tend not to participate. This interpretation has some support from the fact that coordinators have in large measure been created by other civil society actors – particularly advocacy NGOs, which do not have a significant participation in the councils.

Foundational moments, and specifically who helped to create the actor at that moment, did not have an effect on participation. This suggests that path dependence rooted in the foundational moment does not exercise an influence on the propensity to participate – actors constituted prior to the democratic transition period or after it are as likely to participate as those who were formed during the period of political and institutional flux that characterises transitions. Furthermore, there is no apparent variation in participation according to what kinds of actors played a significant role in the foundational moment – that is, whether organised religious groups, civil society actors, agents of the state, or political parties played a significant role in helping to form the new collective actor. This does not mean that foundational moments do not have other types of long term effects on actors, such as how they are organised, the levels of politicisation, or the kinds of activities they undertake or goals they set. Path dependence may occur in these areas even when they do not show any effect in terms of the propensity to participate.

Finally, two findings emerge from the statistical analysis that are not related to the hypotheses but that have interesting implications and are therefore reported here. One, actors who engage in mobilisational politics (protest and demonstrations) are considerably more likely to be involved in the participatory budget. This finding is consistent with arguments in the social movement literature that groups who engage in extra-institutional activity are often also involved in institutionalised channels of politics (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2002). The result runs counter, however, to the arguments frequently voiced in the public arena that groups involved in protest are either marginalised people acting out frustrations or irrational (and destructive) impulses, or are marauding gangs of anti-social elements. This second type of argument aims to criminalise protest activity and, thereby, legitimise a state response that is primarily coercive.

Second, there is a positive relationship between involvement in civil society fora and in policy councils. In the sample, a significant number of civil society actors participated in both. One possible explanation for this pattern is that fora provide an institutional setting in which civil society actors can deliberate and reach common positions prior to engaging with state agents in formal (legally defined) deliberative spaces. This suggests there may be a relation between the creation of institutions for participation in policy-making and the creation of civil society fora.

9 Perspectives on civil society participation revisited

The most significant findings – that institutional effects and the organisational form of actors matter – strongly suggest that the civil society perspective’s emphasis on autonomy, its normative dichotomous reading of civil society and state, and an undifferentiated view of civil society, is likely to produce substantial misunderstandings of current dynamics of participation. The findings, in contrast, suggest that the polity perspective’s insight into the differential capacity for action that collective actors enjoy, and into how these capacities are shaped by political institutions, at a minimum focuses analytic attention on factors that influence participation in substantial ways. This section looks more closely at what the literatures that constitute the civil society and polity perspectives can contribute to interpreting participation of civil society actors. Reversing the order of exposition in the earlier part of the paper, the section starts with the polity perspective.

Participation, from the polity perspective, is contingent in part on actors’ ability to engineer *fit* with political institutions. The idea of engineering fit is not a lapse into voluntarism. Actors’ engineering efforts are constrained by their own organisational form and capacity, their relations to other actors, and the institutional terrain they confront (Houtzager 2003).³⁷ Whereas the civil society perspective has paid little attention to sociologically real actors and political institutions, the polity perspective is primarily concerned with the historical and comparative analysis of institutionally situated actors. It helps to identify how

³⁷ Restated in its broadest terms the question becomes, what are the institutional affects on associational life? We are talking of the institutional micro-foundations of collective action (Gurza-Lavalle 1998; Houtzager 2001). In general, the question, has received little attention on the research agenda on social actors despite being fundamental to the understanding of collective action.

actors develop differential capacity for action over time. It suggests that participation is an outcome produced by historical processes in which collective actors (civil society, state and other) negotiate relations in a pre-existing institutional terrain that constrains and facilitates particular kinds of action. It therefore pays particular attention to institutional effects – political institutions shape in multiple ways how people organise to engage in collective endeavours, and when these may become politicised and produce forms of political participation. In the case of civil society actors' participation in the city of São Paulo, the statistical findings suggest that these effects are those related to actors' relations with institutional actors – political parties and state actors – as well as those related to the institutional design of participatory institutions themselves, which provide some actors greater access and leverage than others.

It is in this theoretical context that the idea of institutional embedded actors arises. Evans (1995: 11), engaged in a quite different debate on state autonomy and its role in industrial transformation, suggests that states 'vary dramatically in their internal structure and relations to society' and that 'different kinds of state structures create different capacities for action'. The same can be said for civil society actors. The notion of embedded autonomy he develops to help explain why certain states are better at this role than others, is meant to emphasise that capacity comes from a combination of internal coherence and external connectedness – that is, the 'concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalised channels for the continual negotiation and renegotiation of goals and policies' (Evans 1995: 12). Again, this could be said of civil society actors as well.

Institutional embeddedness and the design of participatory institutions, when they interact with actors' organisational form, condition in substantial ways the ability of actors to engineer fit. Although the polity perspective suggests that this embeddedness is historically constructed and possibly path dependent from the foundational moment of the actor, the findings suggest this is in fact not the case. There is more room for agency than was hypothesised.

At least one of the literatures that (broadly speaking) has a civil society perspective – empowered participation – also argues that the institutional design of participatory spaces has important effects and another – on civil society – shares the polity perspective's concern with path dependence arising from foundational moments. It is therefore necessary to take a more careful look at what the findings in this paper tell us about what the distinct literatures that share the civil society perspective – those on civil society, deliberative democracy, and empowered participation – can contribute to interpreting participation of civil society actors.

The findings do raise questions about one feature that all three literatures share which deserves comment first. The findings strongly suggest that the undifferentiated view of civil society that is common in all three, as well as in international policy debates on civil society, is a substantial analytic handicap. The distinction between individual citizen and collective civil society actor participation has not been made, and distinctions between civil society actors' participation, which make it possible to explore differential capacities for action and to engineer fit, even less so. To the extent that the civil society perspective has been concerned with differentiating amongst actors, it has tended to authorise particular actors as "authentic" civil society. The category civil society during the 1980s in Brazil and elsewhere was generally

applied to a wide array of actors, including churches, unions, and political parties.³⁸ A decade later the civil society actors authorised in academic and policy debates have narrowed significantly. Particularly in the literature and international debates on civil society there has been a conflation between NGO and civil society actors. Although few would disagree with the assertion that civil society should not be equated with NGOs (however broadly defined), much of the civil society debate and that in international policy circles nonetheless continues to do exactly this. The high propensity of local associations to participate is also interesting in light of the civil society perspective's tendency to relegate actors who are primarily driven by specific material demands to a secondary role in its analysis. The central role is not infrequently reserved for actors who purvey issues of general interest or post-material issues.

This study has not sought to explore the question of civil society autonomy or its deliberative logic directly, for reasons given earlier on. The findings, however, do point to some of the analytic costs of over emphasising autonomy, and maintaining the underlying normative dichotomous reading of civil society (democratic) and state (authoritarian). The dichotomous reading of state-society relations, born in the struggles against various types of authoritarian rule in the second half of the 1970s and 1980s, has been central to the literature on civil society and has unfortunately been reinforced recently in two ways. On the one hand, by the continued (post-democratic transitions) elitism of representative institutions, authoritarian practices of state elites, along with, in many regions, growing levels of social inequality.³⁹ Although discussions of civil society have abandoned early oppositional interpretations of state and society in order to address a series of emerging themes – citizenship, new participatory spaces, local development, governance and accountability – the dichotomous interpretation of state-society relations has largely been reproduced, albeit in more subtle forms (Gurza Lavallo 2003). The new leitmotif, found most obviously in the large Ford Foundation 'Civil Society and Governance Project', has become *encounters* between state and society (Dagnino 2003).⁴⁰ The metaphor suggests autonomous agents who cross paths, discover certain overlapping interests and choose to engage with each other through various institutional mechanisms.

On the other hand, new work that draws on the deliberative democracy literature, also reinforces the civil society perspective's dichotomous reading of state-society relations, albeit in a quite different way (Avritzer 2003). In particular, those works that employ Habermasian communicative action theory presuppose an ontology of communication that predetermines and organises discursive practices, making them capable of producing results that are normatively desirable and politically democratic (Cohen and Arato 1992). This communicative ontology is specific to the sphere of societal relations – it is by definition separate from, and prior to any contact with, the logic of the state. This characterisation does

³⁸ Caldeira Brant, Singer (1983); Sader (1988).

³⁹ The emphasis on *autonomy* in the civil society perspective is in part a response to the experience with authoritarian or clientelist control of left or populist parties, as well as a varieties of corporatist social control.

⁴⁰ See also Civil Society and Governance Programme, IDS, 2000, 'Summary Notes, Amsterdam Conference, 25–28 September' www.ids.ac.uk/IDS/civsoc/index.html. There are exceptions. Santos (2002a: 69), for example, has identified the role progressive political parties play in the new democratic politics and makes the basic point that for citizen participation to work, political parties in power have to make 'the political decision to open hand of their decision making prerogatives.'

not apply to works that do not meet the requirements of a macro-theory, but instead addresses more specific concerns such as the conditions under which deliberative inclusion can be achieved in a democracy (Cohen 1998), or even the procedural conditions required for deliberation in specific contexts (Elster 1997). Nonetheless, both the macro and micro approaches to deliberative democracy pay little attention to the fact that some actors are better equipped and positioned than others to deliberate and direct public attention to their arguments (Hendriks 2002). In this sense, both approaches use a perspective that is poorly suited for thinking through the dynamic interdependence of civil society and state.

Fung (forthcoming), Fung and Wright (2003) and others, can be said to fall within the civil society perspective but the empowered participation framework they are developing represents an attempt to situate some of the highly abstract theorising on deliberative democracy in relation to concrete state institutions.⁴¹ This work has a distinctive emphasis on the institutional design of spaces for citizen participation, and hence pays attention to the nature of state reforms, and explores deliberation in specific participatory institutions, over concrete issues such as paving streets, improving schools, and managing habitat.⁴² But while the polity approach focuses on the capacity for action of different types of collective actors, empowered participation is more preoccupied with how various forms of power may skew the deliberative playing field, and even lead to a ‘rule of reasoners (not of reason)’ (Cohen and Rogers 2003: 245). The question of who participates is assumed away, and there is a surprising silence, given the focus on state reforms, on the role of political parties and representative institutions, which in most contexts produce the political leaders who would have to implement the kinds of reforms that are being suggested.⁴³ Empowered participation therefore looks at participation through a very narrow institutional lens.

10 Testing for bias

Our results show strong effects of PT-ties and government contracts on actors’ participation in all three types of institutional arrangements. This raises the possibility that our sample may have an overrepresentation of actors with these two characteristics – that is, a sample collection bias. Snowball samples are particularly susceptible to this kind of bias because they are produced through chain referrals and it is possible that actors with PT-ties only had relations with actors who also had such ties. Once a snowball enters such a network of actors it can be difficult to escape. The same applies for actors with government contracts.

⁴¹ Originating primarily in the wealthiest countries, empowered participation is framed in part as a response to lower voter turnout, the public’s declining confidence in government, and the perceived declining capacity of the classic representative institutions and techno-bureaucracy to solve the problems of modern (complex) society, as well as its inability to produce egalitarian outcomes.

⁴² In Fung’s (forthcoming: 4) words, ‘decentralization, direct citizen participation, deliberative problem solving, and a muscular center that simultaneously supports local units and holds them accountable’.

⁴³ Fung and Wright (2003: 27) for example simply state that ‘broad and deep participation’ occurs when channels for participation are established over (local) issues people care deeply about and when these channels ‘offer distinct inducements to participation’ such as ‘the real prospect of exercising state power’.

We checked for these two potential sources of bias. First we asked, do only those actors with PT-ties or government contracts participate? Using the model with the highest explanatory power we find that while nearly 58 per cent of our sample of actors participates, our model predicts that 50 per cent of our sample would participate even if these actors had no ties to PT and 46 per cent would participate even if they had no contractual obligations. Thus sample collection does not show any biases toward over-sampling of actors with PT ties or contract among the participants. The interviewees cited relations with a range of other actors, and not only those that have relations with the PT or are contract holders.

A second possible source of over-sampling of actors with PT ties or contracts is if these actors have extremely high participation rates. In that case, naming any actor with PT ties or contract would influence participation positively. In fact, only 16 per cent of actors with PT *do not* participate in the government space, while 25 per cent of the contract holders do not. Hence, the bias would stem from the fact that interviewees selectively thought of other actors who have PT ties or are contract holders more often than other types of actors. But there is no reason to think that interviewees should be naming actors with PT ties or contracts at a disproportionate rate – the 20 interviews that were the starting points of the snowball sample do not have a tilt towards either actors with PT ties (only 3 out of 20 had such ties) or with contracts. Thus we believe sampling did not produce a bias sample of participators who are holders of contracts or maintain ties to PT.

A final source of possible bias could be that active actors with PT ties and government contracts participate at high rates for some reasons other than the fact they have these two characteristics. This is a variant of what is known in the econometrics literature as the latent variable problem. We believe that there are no strong statistical instruments which we could use to test for the latent variable problem in this dataset. However, only the 20 starting points were selected to be from the most active segment of civil society actors. Whether the actors these initial interviewees stated having relations with, and which were subsequently interviewed, belong to the most active segment we do not know.

11 Concluding comments

State and societal actors at the local, national and transnational levels, as well as multilateral actors such as United Nation agencies and the World Bank, are investing growing political and financial energy in institutional reforms that attempt to create greater opportunities for citizen participation in policy-making. Because of the dispersed and heterogeneous nature of citizen participation, its relative youth in many parts of the world, and the particular epistemological and historical origins of the debate on civil society and participation, the state of knowledge in this area lags behind the concrete experimentation that is being undertaken. Of the many unknowns about participation, this paper used a unique dataset of associational life in the city of São Paulo, Brazil, to address who participates. It explores what factors affect the propensity of civil society actors to participate.

The first step in proceeding to answer these two questions is distinguishing between the participation of ordinary (individual) citizens and that of civil society actors. This simple but critical analytic distinction

is often missing in the literature. It brings to light that, in the case of São Paulo, citizen participation is not simply an exercise of political involvement by ordinary citizens in the policy process, but rather includes a diverse set of collective actors. This raises a significant new question in the debate on citizen/civil society participation: what forms of representation are civil society actors constructing in the new participatory institutions, and how do these new forms of representation involve ordinary citizens in policy-making?

The findings that emerge from the statistical analysis undertaken in this paper provide substantial support for the institutional factors highlighted by the polity-centred perspective. In particular, the findings support the idea that institutionally embedded actors, at least in São Paulo, have a higher propensity to participate than those lacking such relations. This propensity is not abstract, but is situated in specific institutional contexts that support or restrict the opportunity for societal actors' participation, including those actors who are most active and are better positioned in the field of societal relations. Actors with relations to political parties, and the PT in particular, and contractual ties to the state, participate at substantially higher rates than those without such ties. This suggests that focusing on the autonomy of civil society may lead down the least interesting analytic path when it comes to understanding the dynamics of participation. Whether or not civil society actors enjoy autonomy is an entirely different question, which raises a number of difficult conceptual and empirical issues, not the least because of the very ambiguity of the concept of autonomy as it is used in the civil society literature. For this reason the paper has not entered the discussion on autonomy.

The high significance of coordinators in all three models of participation reveals that a degree of aggregation is occurring in society outside of the political party system. Although the survey cannot tell us much about how the dynamics of the party system may influence aggregation in civil society, the influence that relations with the PT has on participation should alert us to the possibility that the party system may significantly influence the formation of coordinators amongst civil society actors.

More boldly, we can argue that these findings point to the emergence of new forms of representation in which there is a three-way relationship between (i) diverse forms of participation, (ii) diverse forms of incorporation or interpretation by civil society actors of the interests of their beneficiaries, and (iii) the delegation and division of labour between these actors and a constellation of COORD, created as means of intermediation of, and within, civil society actors themselves.

The unexpectedly dense and diverse web of relations amongst societal actors, the differentiation in roles, and the close interconnections with political parties and the state, appears to indicate that a new form of mass politics (in the strong sense of the phrase) is emerging in the city of São Paulo. Although this assessment has to be tempered by the fact that the survey focused on the most active segment of civil society, the findings are nonetheless intriguingly impressive.

Annex 1

Table 1 Expanded typology of civil society actors

Category	Relation to beneficiaries	Nature of activities
Neighbourhood association	imagined community, territorial	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • service delivery • individual mediation • representation of neighbourhood • demand making
Community association	members, individuals	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • other • service delivery
Coordinating body	members, actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • representation • demand making
Service non-profit	target population	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • service delivery
Religious organisation	target population	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • community organising • demand making?
Foundation	target population	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • service delivery • other (financing of projects)
Advocacy Non-Governmental Organisation	target population	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • demand making • other (transform collective problems into public issues)
Movement organisation	imagined community, other	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • community organising • representation • demand making
Other	Varies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • varies

Annex 2

Other participatory institutional arrangements

CIC – Centro de Integração Cidadania (rede)	Operação Urbana Centro
Colegiado do SAB (Secretaria de Habitação)	Ouvidoria Municipal
Comissão de Desenvolvimento Urbano da Câmara dos Deputados	Planejamento da Cidade
Comissão de elaboração do Plano Nacional de Intervenção para Reprodução da gravidez na adolescência	Planejamento da Cidade: Santo André cidade Futuro
Comissão de Revisão do Código de Obras	Planejamentos areas: Transporte/ Segurança
Comissão Provisória	Plenárias de Moradia
Comissões Culturais da Secretaria da Cultura	Plenárias de Saúde
Comitê Brasileiro do Habitat	Plenárias sobre Percapita das creches
Comitê das Bacias do Tiête e Guarapiranga	Plenárias sobre Percapita dos EGJs
Comitê de Combate a Violência Sexual do Estado de São Paulo	Pré-Conselho Municipal de Habitação
Comitê de Direitos Humanos	Programa Morar Perto
Comitê de Vigilância a Morte Materna	Projetos Educativos e do Ambiente de Trabalho
CONEM – Conselho Estadual da Mulher	Rede Compromisso Social – CDHU
Conferência da Cidade	Telecentro
Conferência de Municipalização (prefeitura)	Transição de Secretarias de Creches
Conferência de Saúde	
Conferência dos Direitos da Criança e do Adolescente	
Conferência Municipal de Assistência Social	
Conselho da Condição Feminina	
Conselho de Direitos da Mulher	
Discussões do Orçamento do Plano Diretor	
Discussões do Plano Diretor	
Estatuto da Cidade	
Fórum da População de Rua	
Fórum da Secretaria de Assistência Social com a Secretaria Municipal de Educação	
Fórum de Empresários pelo Município	
Fórum de Erradicação do Trabalho Infantil	
Fórum do Conselho Legislativo de SP	
Fórum do Conselho Tutelar da Capela do Socorro	
Fórum Social	
Frente Nacional de Saneamento	
Fundo Municipal de Habitação de São Paulo	
Fundo Social de Solidariedade	
GT de Mulher Aids – Ministério da Saúde	
Implantação de Cursos Profissionalizantes	
Instituto de Saúde	
Lei da Responsabilidade Fiscal nos Municípios	

Annex 3

Sample technique

Controlling the snowball sample

One of the challenges of snowball samples is establishing rules that define the boundaries of the sample – i.e. which actors to include and exclude after the first round of 16 interviews. As the snowball gains momentum decisions of inclusion/exclusion become increasingly complicated. The criteria used for establishing the boundaries of the sample follow:

- (a) Horizontal contacts (those with actors that carry out the same kinds of activity on a similar geographic scope) of starting points are interviewed until they leave the district. I.e. neighbourhood association A mentions a relation to neighbourhood association B; B is interviewed and mentions relations with neighbourhood associations C and D. C is in the same district and is therefore interviewed; D is not in the same district and is not interviewed.
- (b) Vertical contacts going “up” (see diagram) are always interviewed, with a few notable exceptions. All of the entities in the following chain would be interviewed: a starting point mentions a relation to a ANGO; then the ANGO mentions a social movement; the movement mentions a national federation of organisations. If an interviewee mentions any of the following entities, they would not be interviewed: union, political party, university, church or religious order (church-supported or church-based groups are interviewed), companies (corporate foundations and associations are interviewed), government departments, agencies, etc., foreign govts.
- (c) Vertical contacts going “down” are generally not interviewed. For example, an interview with a city-wide health movement produces a list of local associations who participate in the movement. These local associations will not be interviewed, even if they fall within one of the districts where fieldwork is underway. These names of these associations are recorded however.
- (d) Horizontal contacts between NGOs are interviewed only one step beyond the 1st ANGO cited. That is, an association or movement mentions a relation to an NGO-A, which is therefore interviewed. ANGO-A mentions ANGOs B, C, D. These ANGOs are an outer boundary of the sample – they will be interviewed but any contacts they mention will not, excepting contacts that appear especially interesting in the context of the study.
- (e) Horizontal contacts between popular movements are interviewed, as long as they are in fact different movements (and are not regional parts of the same movement). For example, the movement for popular housing in the southern region of São Paulo mentions (i) the regional movement for popular housing in the centre of the São Paulo, (ii) the association of popular housing movements of São Paulo, and (iii) the southern São Paulo movement of favela residents. The former would not be interviewed. The latter two would.

Reducing unwanted bias

The issues of greatest concern when using snowball sampling is *unwanted* selection bias. This can result from poor choice in the starting points of the snowball – that is, the first interview – or the degree of connectedness of particular networks, which a “chain referral” technique will over sample (Atkinson and Flint na).

To minimise these two sources of unwanted bias we developed a multi-starting point strategy. In each of the four low income districts selected (see below), four distinct starting points were selected according to the following criteria:⁴⁴

- (a) an association recommended by local representatives of the Catholic church
- (b) a local organisation recommended by an evangelical church
- (c) an association recommended by local representatives of the municipal government
- (d) a neighbourhood association drawn from the Cadastro Geral de Empresas do IBGE (see footnote 18).

The result was a first round of interviews that consisted of 16 actors located in different geographic areas of the city and drawn from distinct associational networks. Each interview set its own mini-snowball in motion.


During the interviews the associations were asked to list the formal and informal contacts they maintain with different types of actors or groups (for example, ANGOs, neighbourhood associations, and federations or forums of associations). The research team then used a set of criteria (see Annex 2) for deciding which of the referrals were in the sample and which were out, and then set about the second round of interviews. Adhering in a consistent way to clear criteria for decided whether to interview a cited contact or not is essential to the integrity of the sample. Appendix 1 gives an account of the boundaries that were used.

The selection of the four districts had several steps. We first ranked the 96 districts that make up São Paulo by average per capita income and excluded those districts that were either indigent or upper-middle class or higher. The latter cut is intuitive but the former requires a brief explanation.

We then selected eight of the remaining districts using two institutional variables that would allow additional tests of the core hypotheses of the studies. These were the strength of electoral support for left parties and the level of state presence in the district. Low income areas where left parties have stronger support, our hypothesis was, are likely to have higher levels of associational life and entities with a stronger commitment to citizens rights and participation. The indicator used for the former was the percentage of the vote in proportional representation elections during the 1994–2000 period (Figueiredo *et al.* 2002). These elections were for city council member, state assembly, and the lower house of Congress.

⁴⁴ City govt. – We contacted the four regional administrations responsible for each of the four districts obtained short lists of local associations with whom they have regular contact. We also contacted the four regional administrations for the Secretariat for Social Services, which has a large number of contracts with local organisations to deliver a variety of services. From these two lists the lead investigators selected which organisations to contact. From those actors that agreed to the interviews, the lead investigators selected one or two for interviews (with a preference for associations recommended by the regional administrations). Selecting two covers the possibility that one of the interviews fails to take place or that one of the entities has virtually no contacts other than with the municipal government. Catholic church – The Archdiocese of São Paulo is divided into regional administrations (which closely parallel those of the city government). In each of the four relevant regional areas we contacted one or two pastoral agents and, again, asked them to recommend three local entities with whom they work. Pastoral agents, however, tend to roam the community a fair amount and can take some effort/time to contact. Evangelical churches entry points were obtain from a city-wide association of Evangelical organisations in our interviews. Before encountering this organisation efforts to track down social organisations linked to Evangelical churches in the four districts had little success.

Diagram A1 Snowball sample



The reality of the state in people’s daily experience, along with the ease with which one can physically moving about the city, we also hypothesised would influence participation. Participation should be higher in those areas where people have experience with effective public services and easy of dislocation to those parts of the city whether municipal government offices are housed. State presence has many dimensions and we selected three that appear most relevant to this hypothesis: urban infrastructure, social services, and public order.⁴⁵ The empirical indicators used to measure each dimension were:

Infrastructure	URBINFRA: households with sewerage
Social services	HEALTH: residents per basic health unit (local health posts) and infant mortality rate;
Public order	ORDER: homicide rate ⁴⁶

Within the universe of districts that fall into the 2x2 defined by Left and State presence, two additional selection criteria came into play. One was the share of the workforce in industry. Two districts were chosen because they have a significant share of their economically active persons (EAP) in industry. The other was the share of residents in favelas (larger shanty towns that are de facto cities within the city, with their own forms of authority and order, and possibly with quite distinct forms of political participation and associational activity). We selected one district that has the largest favela in São Paulo, with approximately 90,000 residents, or about a third of that district’s population. Map 1 shows the choice of districts.

⁴⁵ Although access to public transportation is an obvious candidate, difficulty in finding reliable empirical indicators led us to abandon this variable.
⁴⁶ We weren’t able to get data on police presence/police equipment per capita.

Annex 4

Relative Risk Ratios (RRR)

In order to understand what individual factors may encourage or inhibit participation, we first use relative risk ratios. The Relative Risk Ratio (RRR) is the relative propensity of actors with a particular characteristic (such as large budgets) to participate compared to those without that characteristic (actors with small budgets).⁴⁷ An RRR value that is higher than 1 indicates that actors that have a specified characteristic have a higher propensity to participate than ones that do not have that characteristic. A value lower than 1 indicates the collective actors with that characteristic have a lower propensity to participate than those without it. Hence in Table 1 of the annex, Coordinators have a RRR value of 1.37 in PARTALL – that is, they are more likely to participate than not participate in participatory institutions, and they are 37 per cent more likely to participate than organisations that are not coordinators.

The “**” in the column next to the RRR value is all important, however. It indicates the degree of significance of RRR. That is, it measures the likelihood that RRR is a statistical accident, using a chi-square formula. Rather than report the chi-squares for each variables, however, we designate with an asterisk results that are significant at the 10% level, and with a double asterisk those that are significant at least at 5%.⁴⁸ When there is no asterisk the result we obtained is not statistically valid; this could be the result of more or less equi-proportion participating as well as not participating, or that our sample contains too few instances of the particular characteristic.

Table 1 lists the propensity of actors to participate in any participatory institutions in Part I, in the participatory budget in Part II, and in the policy councils in III. In each part there are three columns. A full description of the independent variables can be found in Table 2 of the annex. The first (Freq of participation) tell us what share of the actors with a particular characteristic participate; the second (RRR) gives the relative risk ratio value of those actors; and the third whether the RRR is significant and should be heeded or not. Hence, if we take Coordinators and read across from left to right we first see the frequency with which they appear in the sample (45 times), then that 75 per cent participated in PARTALL, that they are 37 per cent more likely to participate than non-Coordinators; and the “**” indicate that RRR value is significant at the 5 per cent level. Coordinators participation in PARTBUD is far lower (33 per cent participate) and the RRR value is not significant. Their participation in PARTCNL is more substantial – 51 per cent participate – and their propensity to participate is three-fourths higher than that of non-coordinators.

Table 3 is divided into groups of factors that cover actor type, issue areas work, and types of activities undertake, to ties to other actors, ties to the state, who helped create the actor (assisted during is founding period), and other. Here we will report the principal findings for each group of factors.

⁴⁷ The relative propensity is measured as the ratio of the fraction of a particular group, say group A, participating and the fraction of all non-A groups participating. Suppose 10 per cent of group A participated and 5 per cent of all others (non-group A); then the relative propensity for group A to participate is 2.

⁴⁸ A lower chi-square value indicates higher significance. Within statistics the 5 per cent and 10 per cent significance levels are the accepted standards.

Table 1 Probability of participation (RRR – Relative Risk Ratio)

		PART I – Participation in PARTALL			PART II – Participation in PARTBUD			PART III – Participation in PARTCNL		
Variable	Freq in Sample	Freq of participation	RRR		Freq of participation	RRR		Freq of participation	RRR	
I-Types										
ANGO	62	0.56	0.94		0.26	0.72		0.32	0.94	
SERVNP	35	0.43	0.69	**	0.08	0.23	**	0.20	0.55	*
ASSN	62	0.69	0.90		0.60	2.55	**	0.37	1.15	
COORD	45	0.75	1.37	**	0.33	1.00		0.51	1.74	**
OTHER	25	0.32	0.51	**	0.20	0.57		0.16	0.45	**
II-Issue areas										
IEDUC	100	0.64	1.16		0.37	1.22		0.35	1.07	
IHEALTH	50	0.66	1.16		0.46	1.55	**	0.38	1.17	
ICHILD	26	0.77	1.14	**	0.46	1.46		0.50	1.58	*
IHOUSE	42	0.45	0.73	**	0.28	0.83		0.24	0.66	
IHEALTHM	25	0.60	1.02		0.48	1.53	*	0.40	1.22	
ICHILDM	18	0.78	1.36	*	0.44	1.38		0.50	1.55	
IHOUSM	33	0.33	0.53	**	0.21	0.60		0.18	0.5	**
IPRIN	109	0.56	0.91		0.29	0.81		0.33	0.98	
III-Activities										
ATRAIN	183	0.57	0.84		0.33	0.94		0.31	0.72	
AORG	135	0.65	1.32	**	0.39	1.66	**	0.39	1.59	**
ACLAIM	182	0.65	2.00	**	0.39	4.54	**	0.38	2.18	**
AINFO	185	0.64	1.71	**	0.36	1.73	*	0.37	2.29	**
AOPEN	135	0.58	0.96		0.30	0.52	**	0.34	1.05	
AREP	155	0.68	1.85	**	0.44	4.70	**	0.40	1.97	**
APROT	143	0.71	1.79	**	0.40	1.94	**	0.42	2.12	**
DCITYH	178	0.61	1.12							
DSTATEG	164	0.58	0.96							
DFEDG	141	0.56	0.87							
DMUNC	150	0.61	1.10		0.34	1.04		0.33	0.90	
DSTATEA	125	0.59	0.99		0.36	1.17		0.32	0.90	
DNATC	106	0.54	0.83	*	0.29	0.79		0.29	0.77	
IV – Participate in...										
TIEFOR	95	0.65	1.20	*	0.30	0.87		0.41	1.45	*
V-Ties to other Actors										
TIEPOL	81	0.79	1.65	**	0.55	2.65	**	0.43	1.52	**
TIEPT	71	0.83	1.72	**	0.56	2.47	**	0.48	1.75	**
TIEPTYR*		10.10	-	-	12.85			13.70		
TIEANGO	150	0.63	1.21		0.36	1.29		0.37	1.31	
TIEASSN	129	0.64	1.24	**	0.36	1.26		0.34	1.03	
TIESNP	67	0.66	1.17		0.41	1.41	*	0.37	1.16	
TIEPAS	36	0.69	1.22		0.44	1.43		0.53	1.76	*
TIECSOC	71	0.69	1.27		0.31	0.91		0.41	1.34	
TIECOORD	133	0.52	0.75	**	0.33	0.99		0.25	0.57	*
TIEU	91	0.57	0.95		0.30	0.83		0.30	0.82	
TIEREL	99	0.63	1.11		0.34	1.06		0.36	1.09	
TIEPROF	51	0.51	0.83		0.37	1.16		0.25	0.7	

VI-Ties to the State										
CON	103	0.73	1.53	**	0.45	1.87	**	0.41	1.47	*
BUDGV	78	0.72	1.21	*	0.38	1.26		0.40	1.31	
VII-Who Helped Create the Actor										
CGOV	38	0.76	1.37	**	0.42	1.34		0.45	1.42	
CUNION	33	0.48	0.80		0.24	0.70		0.33	0.99	
CPPOL	52	0.54	0.89		0.23	0.64	*	0.33	0.96	
CPT	41	0.66	1.15		0.32	0.95		0.36	1.11	
CREL	103	0.56	0.92		0.30	0.84		0.30	0.82	
CCSOC	115	0.54	0.84		0.30	0.85		0.30	0.83	
VIII – Relation to beneficiaries or members										
BPARTPL	114	0.59	0.98		0.32	0.91		0.33	0.96	
BPARTIMP	130	0.52	0.78	**	0.28	0.74		0.34	1.05	
BPARTMOB	96	0.54	0.86		0.27	0.72	*	0.32	0.93	

Table 2 Glossary of variables

I -Types of Actors	(see Annex 1 for detailed description of each category)
ANGO	Advocacy non-governmental organisation
SERVNP	Non-profit organisations that provide services to individual "clients"
ASSN	Neighbourhood and community association
COORD	Coordinating Body
OTHER	Residual category
II - Issues work on	
IEDUC	Education is among the issue areas in which work
IHEALTH	Health is among the issue areas in which work
ICHILD	Child and adolescent is among the issue areas in which work
IHOUSE	Housing is among the issue areas in which work
IHEALTHM	Health is one of two principle issues on which work
ICHILDM	Child and adolescent is one of two principle issues on which work
IHOUSM	Housing is one of two principle issues on which work
IPRIN	Principle issue area in which work. Note that the majority of actors worked in multiple areas rather than in a single principle issue area.
III-Activities Undertake	
ATRRAIN	Training community leaders and activists
AORG	Organising communities
ACLAIM	Help individuals make claims on the government
AINFO	Provide information and documents to individuals on government programs and agencies
AOPEN	Open doors for individuals to public officials
AREP	Represent the interests of the community or groups in government institutions
APROT	Organise or help organise public demonstrations and protests
DCITYH	Make demands on the City Hall / Mayor's Office
DSTATEG	Make demands on the State Government
DFEDG	Make demands on the Federal Government
DMUNC	Make demands on the Municipal Council
DSTATEA	Make demands on the State Assembly
DNATC	Make demands on the National Congress
IV – Participate in...	
TIEFOR	Participate in civil society Forums
V - Ties to other Actors	Have formal or informal ties to...
TIEPOL	Political parties
TIEPT	Workers' Party
TIEPTYR*	Number of years have ties to Workers' Party
TIEANGO	Have formal or informal ties to Advocacy NGOs
TIECOORD	Have formal or informal ties to Coordinators
TIEASSN	Neighbourhood and community associations
TIESNP	Service non-profits
TIECSOC	Civil society organisations
TIEU	Have formal or informal ties to Unions
TIEREL	Have formal or informal ties to Religious Groups
TIEPAS	Catholic Church Pastoral organisations
TIEPROF	Have formal or informal ties to Professional Associations
VI-Ties to the State	
CON	Have government service delivery contract
BUDGV	Receive share of budget from the government

VII-Who Helped Create the Actor	
CGOV	Government officials helped create the actor
CUNION	Unions helped create the actor
CPPOL	Political parties helped create the actor
CPT	Worker's Party helped create the actor
CREL	Religious groups helped create the actor
CCSOC	Civil society organisations helped create the actor
VIII – Relation to beneficiaries or members	
BPARTPL	Stated beneficiaries/members participate in the <i>planning</i> of the actor's activities
BPARTIMP	Stated beneficiaries/members participate in the <i>implementation</i> of the actor's activities
BPARTMOB	Stated beneficiaries/members participate in <i>public mobilisations</i> (demonstrations and protest actions, for example) undertaken by the actor

The analysis in Table III starts with the effect of the type of actor may have on participation in the different institutions. The typology of actors, as mentioned above, is built on two dimensions, type of activity and relation to beneficiaries. We are therefore testing combinations of these dimensions. There are a few striking findings. First, ANGOs do not have a higher propensity to participate than non-ANGOs. Second, associations are far more likely to participate in the PARTBUD than any other type of actor, and coordinators the most in PARTALL. Third, service non-profits (SERVNP) have an inverse relationship with participation – being a non-profit significantly decreases the likelihood that the actor will participate in any of the three sets of institutions. Clearly the type of actor, as defined by the typology set out above, is an important factor in participation. How important will be explored further using logistic regressions in the next section.

Turning to the *issue areas* in which actors work, they appear to have little effect on the propensity to participate. Only health appears as significant in PARTBUD, and those working on housing issues are half-as-likely to participate in PARTALL and PARTCNL when compared to actors not working on housing. The first result is explained in the body of the text.

Why does having Health as one of the principal areas of work not increase the likelihood of participation in the policy councils? The answer could lie in the fact that the councils have a relatively small number of participants and when the sample is disaggregated by individual council the statistical results become meaningless. This may also be part of the explanation why none of the other issue areas are significant for PARTCNL, except IHOUSM which has an inverse relation.

The negative relationship between involvement in housing and participation is puzzling on the surface. The housing movement in São Paulo is well organised, covering much of city and networked through a series of regional and municipal-level housing coordinators. There are, however, institutional characteristics of the councils and participatory spaces that can help explain the inverse relationship. The housing council is a recent (2002) municipal government creation (see Table 1) and it has weaker institutional position and legal mandate than constitutionally mandate policy councils.

A number of *types of activities* appear to increase the propensity for participation, except making demands on various levels and branches of government, which does not. The number of actors engaged in the activities is high for all them (between 106 and 195 out of 229 actors). It is likely that there is significant covariation among these, however and we therefore used factor analysis to identify how many factors were in fact present. The result is discussed in the next section.

Taken together the RRR values in *Ties to Other Actors* and *Ties to the State* represent important findings that strongly support the institutionally embedded actor hypothesis. Ties to political parties, and the PT in particular, and to the Government, in the form of service delivery contracts, both substantially increase an actor's propensity to participate in all three institutional arrangements board. The political party effect appears particularly strong and is primarily a PT effect.

Ties to any other actors, such as ANGOs, labour unions, or other civil society actors have little effect on the propensity to participate, with the exception of ties to Coordinators (COORD), which decreases the propensity to participate in PARTALL and PARTCNL. It is reasonable to suggest that COORD own high participation rates in both leads more local actors with ties to coordinators not to participate. If this is indeed the case, it would support the idea that there is a form of aggregation occurring in the associational sphere and that a division of labour over participation has emerged.

Who *helped create* the actor, along with the *Age* of the actor, offers a partial assessment of path dependence. Many actors reported that they were either founded by existing collective actors, or persons who left existing organisations to create the organisation, or received substantial help during the founding period from external actors. There is little evidence, however, that the actors who formed or helped form the actors in our sample set these on particular participatory trajectories. And, there is no evidence here to support that idea that actors who were created during a particular period, for example, during the democratic transition have a higher propensity to participate.

Finally, we have a small number of factors that give an indication of how participatory the actors themselves are, in terms of *beneficiary or membership participation* in various activities. Participation by beneficiaries in planning and mobilisational activity does not affect the propensity to participate. Participation of beneficiaries in the implementation of actors' programs increases the propensity of actors to participate in institutional arrangements other than the budget and councils.

ASSOCIATIONAL ACTIVITY AND POPULAR REPRESENTATION
Comparisons between Latin America and India

An international project of the research institutes:



SCRIPT

I'm working for a research project coordinated by universities and research centres in SP and England. We are carrying out research in six different countries of Latin American and in India. Our goal is to help understand how organisations in society contribute to improving the situation in each country. That is why we would like to get to know the work of your group. [we're not sure whether 'organisations' or 'groups' is the best word here. In Port. we used 'entities', which works well, but this is not an option in Engl.]

The interview will take about 50 minutes. You don't have to answer questions you don't want to answer, and if at any moment you want to terminate the interview, please feel free to do so.

A. CONTROL DATA

Number of Interview: _____

Name of interviewer: _____

Date _____ / _____ / 2002

Location of interview: _____

Street: _____ No.: _____ Postal code: _____

Neighbourhood: _____ District: _____

Municipality: *São Paulo* City: *São Paulo*

B. IDENTIFICATION OF ORGANISATION/GROUP

Name of ORGANISATION [WRITTEN OUT & ACRONYM]: _____

Name of interviewee: _____

Position of interviewee in ORGANISATION: _____

Name of another contact: _____

Address of office: [ONLY FILL OUT IF ADDRESS IS DIFFERENT FROM LOCATION OF INTERVIEW]

Street: _____

_____ No.: _____ Postal code: _____

Neighbourhood: _____ District: _____

Telephone: _____

E-mail: _____

Time interview began: _____ : _____

I. FOUNDATION OF ORGANISATION/GROUP

1. In which YEAR was [NAME OF ORGANISATION] created/founded? _____.

NS / NR

2. Was [NAME OF ORGANISATION] founded by one person, a group of people or by another organisation?

[here the distinction between a group of people and organisation is meant to capture the difference between: 'the neighbours' or 'the congregation' and 'NGO' or 'Union']

1 One person or a group of people

2 Another ORGANISATION -----> 2a. Which ? _____

----->[GO TO 2c]

99 NS / NR ----->[GO TO 3-7]

2b. Before its foundation/creation, were these people part of any association or ORGANISATION?

Did they participate in ...

1 Unions -----> 2b.i. Which? _____

2 Political Parties -----> 2b.ii Which? _____

3 Churches or religious associations--> 2b.iii Which? _____

4 Other association or ORGANISATION -----> 2b.iv Which? _____

5 None

99 NS / NR

2c. What led this person, group, or ORGANISATION to creating [NAME OF ORGANISATION] at that particular point in time?

3-7 For the following questions, I'd like you to answer with a "Yes" or a "No."

**[ATTENTION: For questions 3-7 use either:
1 -YES ; 2 - NO ; 3 - NS/NR]**

Did any of the following entities, or someone related/tied to them, have an important role in the FOUNDATION of [NAME OF ORGANISATION]? Any ...

3. Government Institution --> 3a. Which?
 i _____
 ii _____

4. Religious group -----> 4a. Which?
 i _____
 ii _____

5. Union ----->5a. Which?
 i _____
 ii _____

6. Political Party ----->6a. Which?
 i _____
 ii _____

7. Other entities ----->7a. Which?
 i _____
 ii _____
 iii _____

How important was the role of these entities or people in the foundation?

[ASK ONLY ABOUT THE ENTITIES WHICH WERE MENTIONED IN QUESTIONS 3-7]

	1 Very important	2 More or less important	3 Somewhat/ little important	4 Was not important	99 NS / NR
8. Government institution(s)					
9. Religious group(s)					
10. Union(s)					
11. Political Party(ies)					
12. [other entities i]					
12a. [other entities ii]					
12b. [other entities iii]					

II. AREAS OF ACTIVITY, GOALS, AND STRATEGIES

13. What type of ORGANISATION/association is [NAME OF ORGANISATION]? Is it a ...

- 1 Neighbourhood association
- 2 Popular organisation [examples are CSOs or associations without members but that work directly and closely with their beneficiaries]
- 3 Religious group or association
- 4 Cooperative
- 5 NGO
- 6 Foundation
- 7 Social movement
- 8 Other -----> 13a. Which? _____
- 99 NS / NR

14. In few words, what is currently the mission of [NAME OF ORGANISATION]?

99 NS / NR

14a. In the period when [NAME OF ORGANISATION] was being created, what was its mission?

99 NS / NR

15. Currently, what are the principal work areas or issues in which you are involved?

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____

99 NS / NR

15a. And during the first years of work of [NAME OF ORGANISATION], what were the principal (work/ programmatic) areas or issues?

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____

99 NS / NR

16. Of the principal areas or issues in which you currently work, which are the two most important for [NAME OF ORGANISATION]?

1. _____

2. _____

17. In general, what would be the best way to solve the problems in [AREAS/ISSUE NO. 1 IN QUESTION 16]?

Would it be through the activities of the government, private companies, community associations and NGOs, or should each person have to take care of himself?

[MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE]

1 Government

-----> 17a. Which level of government ... 1 Municipal

[MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE]

2 State

3 Federal

99 NS/NR

2 Private companies

3 Community associations and NGOs

4 Each person for himself

99 NS / NR

18. In general, what would be the best way to solve the problems in [AREAS/ISSUE NO. 2 IN QUESTION 16]?

Would it be through the activities of government, private companies, community associations and NGOs, or should each person have to take care of himself?

[MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE]

1 Government

-----> 18a. Which level of government ... 1 Municipal

[MULTIPLE ANSWERS POSSIBLE]

2 State

3 Federal

99 NS/NR

2 Private companies

3 Community associations and NGOs

4 Each person for himself

99 NS / NR

I'm going to ask you a few questions about how you work in the areas you've already mentioned. Please answer with a "Yes" or "No."

[ATTENTION: FOR THE BLOCKS OF QUESTIONS A, B, C, & D WRITE

1 -YES; 2 - NO; 3 - NS/NR]

A. Do you:

19. Provide free services or products

20. Sell services or products

21. Run any social program for the government (on contract)

22. Carry out any other activities in the area of service provision

B. Does [NAME OF ORGANISATION] undertake any of the following popular organising activities?

- 23. Train community leaders or activists
- 24. Organise, advise or participate in grassroots self-help groups or other collective work
[this question attempts to capture the whether the organisation helps people in efforts at collective self-provisioning]
- 25. Coordinate actions or activities of different associations or NGOs
- 26. Carry out any other activities in the area of popular organisation

C. Do you carry out any of the following activities that help individuals obtain access to government institutions. Do you

- 27. Help individuals make claims on the government
- 28. Provide information or documentation to facilitate access to the government
- 29. 'Open doors' so that the individuals is seen by government officials/civil servants
- 30. Carry out any other activities that help individuals obtain access to government institutions

D. And do you carry out any of the following representation activities?

- 31. Make complaints or demands on government agencies or programs
- 32. Represent the interest of a community or group in government institutions
- 33. Organise or help organise public acts [i.e. demonstrations, protests...]
- 34. Other representational activities

**35. What have been [NAME OF ORGANISATION]'s three accomplishments of greatest importance?
[INSIST TWICE, USING THE ALTERNATIVE PHRASE 'GREATEST RESULTS' OR 'CONQUESTS']**

- 1. _____
- 2. _____
- 3. _____

36. Where does [NAME OF ORGANISATION] carry out most of its work? Is it in the ...

- 1 Metropolitan area of São Paulo
- 2 Municipality of São Paulo
- 3 A region of the city
- 4 Neighbourhood
- 5 Other
- 99 NS / NR

III. MEMBERS/BENEFICIARIES AND WORK AREAS

37. Which specific group of people does [NAME OF ORGANISATION] work for?

- 99 NS / NR _____

37a. Have you worked for this specific group since the foundation of [NAME OF ORGANISATION] or have there been changes?

99 NS / NR

38. Which of the following categories best describes the relationship/ties you have with this group of people? Are they ...

1 Members of [NAME OF ORGANISATION]-----> **38a. How many members are there** _____

2 Target population

3 The community

4 Other entities or associations

5 Have another kind of relation -----> **38b. What kind** _____

99 NS / NR

39. Does [NAME OF ORGANISATION] consider itself a representative of this group of people?

1 Yes

2 No -----> [GO TO 40]

99 NS / NR

39a. Why does it consider itself a representative of the interests of this group of people?

40. What criteria are used to define who can benefit from your work and who cannot?

99 NS / NR

41. How does this group of people find out that they could benefit from your work?

99 NS / NR

41x. Who is your organisation accountable to?

99 NS / NR

Could you tell me whether this group of people participates in any of the following activities of [NAME OF ORGANISATION] ?

42. Do they participate in the planning of activities or programs?

- 1 Yes -----> **42a. Do they participate...**
- 1 Rarely
 - 2 Sometimes
 - 3 Almost always
 - 98 Don't know how much participate
- 2 No
- 99 NS / NR

43. And in carrying out your programs?

- 1 Yes -----> **42a. Do they participate...**
- 1 Rarely
 - 2 Sometimes
 - 3 Almost always
 - 98 Don't know how much participate
- 2 No
- 99 NS / NR

44. Does [NAME OF ORGANISATION] mobilise this group of people in public demonstrations or protests to carry out its work?

- 1 Yes -----> **44a. Do you mobilise them ...**
- 1 Rarely
 - 2 Sometimes
 - 3 Almost always
 - 98 Don't know how often mobilise
- 2 No -----> **[IR A 45]**
- 99 NS / NR

44b. And, do people from this group participate in these mobilisations?

- 1 Yes -----> **44c. Do they participate ...**
- 1 Rarely
 - 2 Sometimes
 - 3 Almost always
 - 98 Don't know how often mobilise
- 2 No
- 99 NS / NR

IV. EXTERNAL TIES/LINKAGES

Now I'd like to ask you about the relations [NAME OF ORGANISATION] CURRENTLY has with other organisations or associations.

45. Does [NAME OF ORGANISATION] maintain formal or informal relations with any NGOs?

1 Yes

-----> 45a. Which?	i. For how long?
1. _____	i. _____
2. _____	i. _____
3. _____	i. _____
4. _____	i. _____
5. _____	i. _____

2 No

99 NS / NR

----->[GO TO 46]

45c. For [NAME OF ORGANISATION] are these relations with NGOs...

1 Indispensable

2 Very important

[the response categories are on a 5-point scale]

3 Moderately important

4 A little important

5 Not important

99 NS / NR

-----> [IR A 46]

45d. What is the nature of these relations? Generally speaking, are they institutional or informal relations?

1 Institutional

2 Informal

----->45e. Are these relations based on

1 Friendship or family ties

2 Political affinity

3 Affinity for the type of work developed

99 NS / NR

3 Its not possible to generalise, it varies to much

99 NS / NR

45f. And why are these relations important to [NAME OF ORGANISATION]? Is it because you ...

1 Have work or projects in partnerships

2 Exchange information and ideas

3 Participate together in debates about public policy

4 Obtain funds for [NAME OF ORGANISATION]

5 Coordinate your political activities

6 Other reason

99 NS / NR

46. Does [NAME OF ORGANISATION] maintain formal or informal relations with any religious groups or entities?

1 Yes

-----> 46a. Which?	i. For how long?
1. _____	i. _____
2. _____	i. _____
3. _____	i. _____

2 No

99 NS / NR

-----> [GO TO 47]

46b. For [NAME OF ORGANISATION] are the relations with these groups or religious entities ...

1 Indispensable

2 Very important

[the response categories are on a 5-point scale]

3 More or less important

4 A little important

5 Not important

99 NS / NR

-----> [GO TO 47]

46c. What is the nature of these relations? Generally speaking, are they institutional or informal relations?

1 Institutional

2 Informal

-----> 46d. Are these relations based on

1 Friendship or family ties

2 Political affinity

3 Affinity for the type of work developed

99 NS / NR

3 Its not possible to generalise, it varies to much

99 NS / NR

46e. And why are these relations important to [NAME OF ORGANISATION]? Is it because you ...

1 Have work or projects in partnerships

2 Exchange information and ideas

3 Participate together in debates about public policy

4 Obtain funds for [NAME OF ORGANISATION]

5 Coordinate your political activities

6 Other reason

99 NS / NR

47. Does [NAME OF ORGANISATION] maintain formal or informal relations with any social movements?

1 Yes

-----> 47a. Which?	i. For how long?
1. _____	i. _____
2. _____	i. _____
3. _____	i. _____
4. _____	i. _____
5. _____	i. _____

2 No

99 NS / NR

-----> [GO TO 48]

47b. For [NAME OF ORGANISATION] are the relations with these movements...

1 Indispensable

2 Very important

[the response categories are on a 5-point scale]

3 More or less important

4 A little important

5 Not important

99 NS / NR

-----> [GO TO 48]

47c. What is the nature of these relations? Generally speaking, are they institutional or informal relations?

1 Institutional

2 Informal

----->47d. Are these relations based on

1 Friendship or family ties

2 Political affinity

3 Affinity for the type of work developed

99 NS / NR

3 Its not possible to generalise, it varies to much

99 NS / NR

47e. And why are these relations important to [NAME OF ORGANISATION]? Is it because you ...

1 Have work or projects in partnerships

2 Exchange information and ideas

3 Participate together in debates about public policy

4 Obtain funds for [NAME OF ORGANISATION]

5 Coordinate your political activities

6 Other reason

99 NS / NR

48. Does [NAME OF ORGANISATION] maintain formal or informal relations with any neighbourhood associations?

1 Yes

-----> 48a. Which?

i. For how long?

1.	i.
2.	i.
3.	i.
4.	i.
5.	i.

2 No

99 NS / NR

----->[GO TO 49]

48b. For [NAME OF ORGANISATION] are the relations with these neighbourhood associatons...

- 1 Indispensable
- 2 Very important [the response categories are on a 5-pint scale]
- 3 More or less important
- 4 A little important
- 5 Not important
- 99 NS / NR

-----> [GO TO 49]

48c. What is the nature of these relations? Generally speaking, are they institutional or informal relations?

- 1 Institutional
- 2 Informal

----->48d. Are these relations based on

- 1 Friendship or family ties
- 2 Political affinity
- 3 Affinity for the type of work developed
- 99 NS / NR
- 3 Its not possible to generalise, it varies to much
- 99 NS / NR

48e. And why are these relations important to [NAME OF ORGANISATION]? Is it because you ...

- 1 Have work or projects in partnerships
- 2 Exchange information and ideas
- 3 Participate together in debates about public policy
- 4 Obtain funds for [NAME OF ORGANISATION]
- 5 Coordinate your political activities
- 6 Other reason
- 99 NS / NR

49. Do you maintain formal or informal relations with any political parties?

- 1 Yes

-----> 49a. Which? i. For how long?

1. _____	i. _____
2. _____	i. _____
3. _____	i. _____
4. _____	i. _____
5. _____	i. _____

- 2 No
- 99 NS / NR

----->[GO TO 50]

49b. For [NAME OF ORGANISATION] are the relations with these parties...

1 Indispensable

2 Very important

[the response categories are on a 5-point scale]

3 More or less important

4 A little important

5 Not important

99 NS / NR

-----> [GO TO 50]

49c. What is the nature of these relations? Generally speaking, are they institutional or informal relations?

1 Institutional

2 Informal

----->49d. Are these relations based on

1 Friendship or family ties

2 Political affinity

3 Affinity for the type of work developed

99 NS / NR

3 Its not possible to generalise, it varies to much

99 NS / NR

49e. And why are they important to [NAME OF ORGANISATION]? Is it because you ...

1 Have work or projects in partnerships

2 Exchange information and ideas

3 Participate together in debates about public policy

4 Obtain funds for [NAME OF ORGANISATION]

5 Coordinate your political activities

6 Other reason

99 NS / NR

50. Does [NAME OF ORGANISATION] maintain formal or informal relations with any unions or professional associations?

1 Yes

-----> 50a. Which?	i. For how long?
1.	i.
2.	i.
3.	i.
4.	i.
5.	i.

2 No

99 NS / NR

----->[GO TO 51]

50b. And are the relations with these unions or professional associations...

1 Indispensable

2 Very important

[the response categories are on a 5-pint scale]

3 More or less important

4 A little important

5 Not important

99 NS / NR

-----> [GO TO 51]

50c. What is the nature of these relations? Generally speaking, are they institutional or informal relations?

1 Institutional

2 Informal

----->50d. Are these relations based on

1 Friendship or family ties

2 Political affinity

3 Affinity for the type of work developed

99 NS / NR

3 Its not possible to generalise, it varies to much

99 NS / NR

50e. And why are they important to [NAME OF ORGANISATION]? Is it because you ...

1 Have work or projects in partnerships

2 Exchange information and ideas

3 Participate together in debates about public policy

4 Obtain funds for [NAME OF ORGANISATION]

5 Coordinate your political activities

6 Other reason

99 NS / NR

51. Do you maintain formal or informal relations with any organisations that we have not yet mentioned?

1 Yes

-----> 51a. Which?	i. For how long?
1. _____	i. _____
2. _____	i. _____
3. _____	i. _____
4. _____	i. _____
5. _____	i. _____

2 No

99 NS / NR

-----> [GO TO 52]

51b. For [NAME OF ORGANISATION] are the relations with these entities...

1 Indispensable

2 Very important

[the response categories are on a 5-point scale]

3 More or less important

4 A little important

5 Not important

99 NS / NR

-----> [go to 52]

51c. What is the nature of these relations? Generally speaking, are they institutional or informal relations?

1 Institutional

2 Informal

-----> 51d. Are these relations based on

1 Friendship or family ties

2 Political affinity

3 Affinity for the type of work developed

99 NS / NR

3 Its not possible to generalise, it varies to much

99 NS / NR

51e. And why are they important to [NAME OF ORGANISATION]? Is it because you ...

1 Have work or projects in partnerships

2 Exchange information and ideas

3 Participate together in debates about public policy

4 Obtain funds for [NAME OF ORGANISATION]

5 Coordinate your political activities

6 Other reason

99 NS / NR

V. NETWORKS AND INSTITUTIONAL PARTICIPATION

52. Does [NAME OF ORGANISATION] participate in any forum, congress, network, or federation that coordinates the activities among associations?

1 Yes

-----> 52a. Which?	i. For how long?
1. _____	i. _____
2. _____	i. _____
3. _____	i. _____
4. _____	i. _____
5. _____	i. _____

2 No

99 NS / NR

----->[GO TO 53]

52c. For [NAME OF ORGANISATION] is this participation ...

1 Indispensable

2 Very important

[the response categories are on a 5-point scale]

3 More or less important

4 A little important

5 Not important

99 NS / NR

-----> [GO TO 53]

52d. In general terms, why is this participation important to you? Is it because...

1 Have work or projects in partnerships

2 Exchange information and ideas

3 Participate together in debates about public policy

4 Obtain funds for [NAME OF ORGANISATION]

5 Coordinate your political activities

6 Other reason

99 NS / NR

53. Does [NAME OF ORGANISATION] participate in any popular council, participatory budget, or other space for citizen participation?

1 Yes

-----> 53a. Which?	i. For how long?
1. _____	i. _____
2. _____	i. _____
3. _____	i. _____
4. _____	i. _____
5. _____	i. _____

2 No

99 NS / NR

----->[GO TO 54]

53b. For [NAME OF ORGANISATION] is this participation...

1 Indispensable

2 Very important

[the response categories are on a 5-pint scale]

3 More or less important

4 A little important

5 Not important

99 NS / NR

-----> [GO TO 54]

53c. In general terms, why is this participation important for you?

99 NS / NR

For the following questions I'd like you to answer with "Yes" or "No".

[ATTENTION: FOR THE BLOCKS OF QUESTIONS E, F & G WRITE

1 -YES ; 2 - NO ; 3 - NS/NR]

E. Does [NAME OF ORGANISATION] make demands on any of the following levels of government? On ...

54. City hall

55. State government

56. Federal government

F. And on any of the following political institutions? On ...

- 57. Municipal Council
- 58. Legislative Assembly of the state of São Paulo
- 59. National Congress

G. Do you make demands on any of the following private entities? On ...

- 60. Small and medium enterprises
- 61. Associations that represent the private sector

62. And is there any kind of association, institution or group of people who try to make your work more difficult?

Yes -----> 62. Which? _____

No

99 NS / NR

63. Has any political candidate asked for the support of [NAME OF ORGANISATION] in the last five years?

1 Yes -----> 63a. From which parties? _____

2 No -----> [GO TO 64]

99 NS / NR

63b. What commitment did the candidate make to you?

99 NS / NR

64. Has [NAME OF ORGANISATION] supported any political candidate in the last five years?

1 Yes

2 No -----> [GO TO 65]

99 NS / NR

64a. From which political parties were these candidates?

99 NS / NR

64b. What did [NAME OF ORGANISATION] do to support them?

99 NS / NR

65. In the *last two years* have you organised or helped organise any seminars or courses on: citizenship and rights; electoral participation, social rights such as those of social security; or any other similar themes?

1 Yes -----> 65a. On which? _____

2 No

99 NS / NR

65x. Who is your target audience for these seminars? _____

V. LEVEL OF FORMALISATION

[ATTENTION: IN QUESTION 66 write:

1 -YES ; 2 - NO ; 3 - NS/NR]

66. Does [NAME OF ORGANISATION] have any type of public registration or is it registered with any bureau or registry recognised by the government?

1 In a notary public that registers Juridical Persons

a. In which year did you obtain this registration? .

2 With CNPJ [tax authority]

a. In which year did you obtain this registration? .

3 Any program of a government secretariat

a. Which (i) _____

Which (ii) _____

Which (iii) _____

b. In which year did you obtain this registration? i _____ ii _____ iii _____

4 In any registry that provides recognition or title of public utility (municipal, state, federal)

a. Which (i) _____

Which (ii) _____

b. In which year did you obtain this registration? i _____ ii _____

99 NS / NR

67. What volume of funds does [NAME OF ORGANISATION] have annually, or how much do you have to spend monthly?

R\$ Annual ----→ **IF ANSWER MORE THAN R\$10,000 ANNUAL GO TO 69, if less GO TO 68**

R\$ Monthly -----→ **IF ANSWER MORE THAN R\$1,000 MENSAL GO TO 69, if less GO TO 68**

99 NS / NR

67a. Could you tell me then, which of the following levels of funds best correspond to that which [NAME OF ORGANISATION] can count annually

- 1 Over R\$750,000
- 2 More than R\$250,000 to R\$750,000..... [R\$20,833 a 62,500]
- 3 More than R\$100,000 to R\$250,000.....[R\$8,333 a 20,833]
- 3 More than R\$20,000 to 100,000..... [R\$1,666 a 8,333]
- 4 More than R\$4,000 to R\$20,000.....[R\$333 a 1,666]
- 5 Less than R\$4,000..... [R\$333 mensal]
- 99 NS / NR

68. Does [NAME OF ORGANISATION] have its own bank account (in its own name)?

- 1 Yes
- 2 No
- 99 NS / NR

69. Roughly what share of the budget of [NAME OF ORGANISATION] comes from the following sources?

- 1 Members %
- 2 Associations or organisations : **69a. National**..... %
International..... %
- 3 Religious Organisations : **69b. National**..... %
International..... %
- 4 Government agencies : **69c. National**..... %
Foreign..... %
- 5 Political Parties: name %
- 6 Sale of services or products %
- 7 Other %
- 99 NS / NR

70. Does [NAME OF ORGANISATION] have directors/administrators?

[whether to use directors or administrators depends entirely on language-cultural context and the types of organisation that are likely to be interviewed; what has been tricky in SP is the diverse organisational structures and political leanings of the organisations interviewed – some strongly object to calling their ‘leaders’ administrators, others prefer the term....]

- 1 Yes -----→ **70a. How many are there:** _____
- 2 No -----→ **[GO TO 71]**
- 99 NS / NR -----→ **[GO TO 71]**

70b. How much of them receive a salary? _____

- 99 NS / NR

70c. In what way are the **directors/administrators** chosen, ...

1 Through elections

2 Other way ----->[GO TO 71]

99 NS / NR ----->[GO TO 71]

70d. Who elects the **directors/administrators**?

 99 NS / NR

71. Not counting the directors/administrators, how many paid workers does [NAME OF ORGANISATION] have?

 99 NS / NR

72. Do you depend on voluntary work?

1 Yes -----> 72a. How much do you depend on voluntary work?

1 Almost entirely

2 A lot

3 More or less

4 Little

99 Doesn't know how much

2 No, do not depend on voluntary work

99 NS / NR

73. Are you owners of the place where [NAME OF ORGANISATION] functions, is the space lent to you, is it rented, or do you meet in a public place?

1 Owners

2 Lent

3 Rented

3 Meet in public place

5 Other

99 NS / NR

74. Does [NAME OF ORGANISATION] function/work all year round?

1 Yes

2 No -----> 74a. During which occasions does it function? _____

99 NS / NR

99 Doesn't know when works

That's all the questions. Thank you very much, your participation is extremely valuable for us and we thank you for the time you've given to the interview.

Time interview was concluded: _____ : _____

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