International Policy Levers

By Frances Stewart[1]

Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE

Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford

----

1. Introduction

The Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE) is devoted to investigating the relationships between ethnicity, inequality and human security in a wide range of countries[2]. We define 'ethnicity' very broadly, to encompass many perceived cultural differences among people, including those with religious, tribal, clan or 'racial', characteristics. We recognise the 'constructed' nature of ethnicities, yet find ethnicity is a critical concept from the perspective of social relations because it is perceived as so important by so many people.

Our ultimate objective is to identify policies that will promote harmony in ethnic relations, and help to bring about conditions which prevent large scale violent conflict erupting among ethnicities. To achieve this we are carrying out in-depth investigation into up to eight countries as well as making some broader international comparisons.[3] The eight countries have had varied success in avoiding ethnic conflict over time, as well as compared with each other.

This is the beginning of our research – which is intended to take place over the next four years – so that any policy conclusions at this stage would be premature. However, work in developing our research agenda has enabled us to identify the broad policy areas that we expect to be relevant,[4] which is necessary if we are to identify the potential levers of power, both nationally and internationally. This paper considers international policy levers. We are preparing parallel national policy papers for most of our eight countries.

The next section will review the major policy areas which we expect to be included in our final conclusions. We should note that the particular policy areas relevant are certain to vary across countries – and, of course, new policy areas are likely to emerge from the research. However, it is useful to identify international policy levers

---

[1] I am grateful to comments on an earlier draft from Valpy Fitzgerald, Adam Higazi and Rosemary Thorp.
[2] For more details about CRISE, see Inception Report, September 2003.
[3] The countries are Malaysia and Indonesia; Ghana, Nigeria and Cote D'Ivoire; Peru, Bolivia and possibly Guatemala.
[4] See e.g. Stewart (2000, 2002a)

for all the areas identified, even if they may not be applicable to some countries. After identifying the range of policy areas, section 3 reviews the major international policy levers, which, at this stage of our research, we consider relevant to our work.

2. Policy Areas

A huge range of policy areas potentially affect ethnic relations. These include:

(a) factors that determine political, economic and social resource access and inequalities across ethnic groups;
(b) factors that determine *perceptions* of difference and/or unity;
(c) factors that determine the possibility of and the willingness to resolve differences peacefully.

These three categories cover almost every aspect of policy-making. In relation to the political system and resources, they extend to the nature of the constitution, whether federal or unitary, the nature and extent of decentralisation, the voting system, and many other more detailed aspects of the political system which can determine the power of different groups, such as the determination of electoral districts' boundaries, and the division of powers across institutions and levels of government; they also include determinants of the composition of the army and police, and of the civil service. On the economic side, they include the many factors determining the distribution of resources in both public and private sectors. On the social side, they include policies determining access to services (education, health, water, housing) as well as to social capital.

As far as the second area – that of perceptions -- is concerned, policies encompass those affecting culture in a particular society, including education, religion and the media, policies towards the writing of history, towards sports, and so on. The nature of the political system is also relevant because political leaders are particularly influential in enforcing perceptions of identity.

The third area may potentially be affected by many of the policies already mentioned, especially those determining the nature of the political system and those affecting perceptions. But relevant policies also include those affecting opportunities and incentives to take either peaceful or militant actions, both with respect to potential leaders (sometimes called 'ethnic entrepreneurs') and to followers, i.e. those who do most of the fighting. These ethnic entrepreneurs can be located outside the country and yet have a great influence via international communications networks, including the internet and diaspora links[5]. The state of the economy generally is of relevance here, particularly the employment situation; while the nature of the state (strong or weak, authoritarian or democratic) can determine whether potential violence actually erupts or is suppressed. The legal system is also of pervasive importance – both in terms of its characteristics (formal and informal) and its accessibility to people of different ethnicities and income levels. Included in this is how far internationally agreed human rights – both those loosely termed 'negative' and the 'positive' ones -- are respected. Where both types of right are respected and enforced, the probability of ethnic violence in poor countries is likely to be smaller.

In a nutshell, the Centre's research encompasses a very big issue which relates to most aspects of life, and the potential policy arena is correspondingly very large. As already noted, the arena of relevant policy-making could be much smaller in

---

[5] See Dudley and Lloyd, 2003.

particular countries. A country's history is of course the most important influence on its current situation and possibilities for change – this includes how perceptions of ethnicity have been formed, its history of conflict, the development of institutions at local and national level for dealing with conflict, as well as its inherited economic structure and resources. Current policies cannot change this heritage – and the arena for relevant policy interventions is determined by it. Our aim will be to identify policies that can alter the current and future situation, recognising the constraints of the past. While policies cannot change what has happened they can change how history is perceived. Policies relevant in particular countries will then be heavily influenced by history, depending on country conditions and prevailing policies in relation to our concerns, and, particularly, what appears to be the major source (or potential source) of ethnic strife.

3. International Policy Levers

While most of the policies briefly described above are determined at the national (and some at the local) level, there are strong international influences over them - through international regulations, conditionalities etc. Yet in this arena, of greater importance than specific regulations, are international norms which are hugely influential in affecting the boundaries of policy debate, and the type of policy considered relevant or appropriate by policy-makers in developing countries. By international norms I mean the views obtaining among the donor community, in the organs of the United Nations, in the Universities and the media, which strongly influence the ways élite policy-makers think, even without any overt conditionality or legal constraints. These norms and influences mainly emanate from industrialised countries, but developing countries too are making an increasing contribution in a variety of ways including through the media and political interaction at an international level. While we can list specific international levers which affect policy on a day-to-day basis, it is impossible to be specific and comprehensive on the influences over the formation and impact of norms. Yet, in our arena taken as a whole, it is these, rather than the specific institutional influences which probably have greatest effect.

The International Agencies

With respect to the economy and social sectors, the IMF and the World Bank wield most international influence in most developing countries.

The IMF has most power over macro-policy-making – when it is called in – because countries which call it in have an immediate need for resources and may change their policy rapidly and radically in order to get the resources. But the borrowing larger countries retain a strong negotiating position even then, while the IMF has much less power between emergencies, and in relation to countries (such as Malaysia) who avoid calling it in, although the IMF reports on all countries regularly, and retains indirect influence over countries without programmes, which sometimes have 'shadow' programmes. The IMF's remit is mainly confined to macro-issues. It may thus influence the growth rate, the growth of public expenditure, the rate of unemployment, the inflation rate and the broad distribution of resources between traded and non-traded goods, but it does not directly affect the distribution of government expenditure among sectors or across households or ethnic groups, although macro-policies do have major implications for such distribution. These macro issues are important from CRISE's perspective, not only because of their distributional implications, but because the employment rate, the growth rate and the

growth of public expenditure are likely to affect incentives for conflict, and influence the felt resentments of particular groups.

However, in general sectoral issues are likely to be of more importance for CRISE than macro issues. Sectoral or meso-policies influence relative access to social as well as economic resources. Here the World Bank has much more influence through the various ways it influences public expenditure distribution (sometimes collaboratively with the IMF). There have been a succession of instruments by which this influence is exercised – for example, structural adjustment loans, sectoral adjustment loans, Medium Term Expenditure Frameworks (MTEFs), Sector-Wide Approaches (SWAPs) (in collaboration with governments and other donors), Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), or the Comprehensive Development Frameworks (CDFs), the last two of which the World Bank orchestrates, with, in principle, a strong government and civil society input[6]. Doubtless, the instruments will continue to be refined, but even with the adoption of extended participatory approaches the World Bank is likely to retain a strong influence over sectoral and public expenditure policies. World Bank programmes and influence extend well beyond the distribution of public sector expenditure to a whole variety of policies which could be relevant to ethnic shares of resources. For example, policies affecting the distribution of assets – such as privatisation and (occasionally) land reform; regional policies; employment policies; subsidies and user charges; decentralisation. While to date, the World Bank influence over these has not taken ethnic dimensions into account, at least explicitly, potentially it could. This makes it a powerful international policy lever for CRISE concerns. Moreover, the influence of the World Bank is extensive, with operations in almost every developing country.

The World Bank is also increasingly active in post-conflict reconstruction, often in collaboration with the United Nations and bilateral donors. CRISE policies are likely to be particularly relevant in such contexts.

The World Bank not only undoubtedly has an important direct influence on policy-making in relevant countries and relevant areas, but it also exerts considerable indirect influence in the formation of norms of policy-making. Its influence there derives from an impressive array of publications, widely disseminated, with the *World Development Report* at its apex. In many of the economics libraries I have entered in poor developing countries, the World Bank accounts for a significant proportion of the publications, and, in Africa, has almost total dominance in recent (post-1985) publications. Recently, its influence over norms has extended through its own extensive website and the Development Gateway it sponsors. In general, the World Bank has led the donor community in determining policy norms over the past fifty years.[7]

The regional development banks perform a similar role to the World Bank in their respective regions. They also enter the policy debate although they rarely differ significantly on this from the World Bank. For some countries, the financial flows of the regional Development Banks exceed those of the World Bank. Hence the Asian Development Bank, for the S E.Asian part of the research, the African Development Bank, for West Africa, and the InterAmerican Development Bank, for Peru and Bolivia, are significant policy levers.

---

[6] To date this appears to be more in rhetoric than reality. See Killick (2000); McGee (2000); Stewart and Wang (2003).
[7] I trace some of this influence in Stewart, 2002b.

I should mention the WTO because its rules and regulations are increasingly making it an extremely powerful international actor. However, its influence with respect to our arena is indirect (more so than the IMF), depending on how trade and investment regimes translate into an ethnic distribution of costs and benefits. For some countries, trade policy à la WTO could be important, but for the most part WTO is unlikely to be an important policy lever for CRISE policies. The criteria determining WTO rules, and their process of negotiation, are such that it seems highly unlikely that CRISE could make a significant input.

The United Nations encompasses a large range of institutions, most with some relevance to CRISE, in varying ways. Some United Nations institutions play a direct role on the ground, during and after conflict; in contributing to and organising peace negotiations, and so on. Though CRISE will not be concerned with political aspects of negotiating, promoting or keeping peace, its policy recommendations are likely to be relevant to any economic and social interventions, and to the design of post-conflict political systems. The relevant organs of the United Nations here are: the Secretary General's Office; the Department of Political Affairs which deals with preventative diplomacy; the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations which organises peace-keeping missions mandated by the Security Council; and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the associated office and committees are influential in supporting internationally agreed human rights (negative and positive) throughout the world.   Despite global agreement to these rights (embodied in the Universal Declaration proclaimed by the General Assembly in 1948; the 1976 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the 1986 Declaration on the Right to Development), there remains considerable ambiguity in their interpretation in particular contexts, as well as on how they are to be implemented. CRISE findings may contribute to both interpretation and implementation. More generally, CRISE is likely to make a direct contribution to the growing discourse on Human Rights as a development paradigm.

 Other UN bodies are concerned with development policy. Probably most influential is the UNDP, whose *Human Development Report* is a powerful influence over international opinion and development norms, having been a compelling lever in reorienting development thinking towards a more human-centred approach. Policies towards children are widely influenced by the work of UNICEF, while the FAO, UNIDO and the ILO influence health, agricultural, industrial and employment policy respectively. UNESCO and WHO affect world-wide policy towards education and health. The Department of Economics and Social Affairs, in the Headquarters Secretariat exercises some (though generally not substantial) influence over the direction of economic policy. The regional commissions of the UN are more influential in their particular regions with respect to economic and social policy making – particularly the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), which continues to make important contributions to development norms and policies in the region. Probably of lesser influence, but still possibly significant actors in their regions are the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the Economic and Social Commission for Asian and the Pacific (ESCAP).

CRISE findings and policy conclusions are likely to be relevant to all these institutions, with the World Bank and the regional Banks particularly powerful among the IFIs; and the Secretary General's Office, UNDP and ECLAC particularly influential within the UN. The national offices of particular agencies will be of especial relevance for the country findings: for example, in Indonesia, the World

Bank office in Jakarta, the UNDP office and UNSFIR (The United Nations Support Facility for Indonesian Recovery) are all active in developing and implementing policy in the CRISE area.

Bilateral Donors

Bilateral donors influence the distribution of resources through the allocation of aid, as well as through policy dialogue. The largest bilateral aid donor (2000/1 data) is the US, followed by Japan, German, the UK and France, although the Scandinavian countries together provide more than the last three countries do individually. Nearly a third of bilateral aid goes to the social sectors, and 16% to economic infrastructure – both closely related to CRISE concerns. The countries giving the largest share of their aid to the social sectors are Australia, Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg, while Japan, Denmark and Germany give most to economic infrastructure (again based on 2000/1 data).

While multilateral aid is in fact smaller than total bilateral – at $35b in 2001, compared with $50.6 for bilateral – multilateral institutions still have more influence because the resources are controlled by only a few, generally well coordinated, institutions; moreover, a significant proportion of their aid is for programmes of various kinds which permits policy conditionality. There are many more bilateral aid donors (22 countries in the OECD list of aid donors), and less coordination among them. Most bilateral aid consists of project aid, which limits their influence over policies. Where they do support programme aid it is generally is as part of a World Bank organised programme. Governments of individual countries, especially those with more economic weight and therefore votes in the boards of the IMF and the World Bank, are, of course, also influential through their role in the governance of the international institutions considered above.

The British Government and DFID

As a DFID-financed centre, located in the UK, it goes without saying that our most direct contact with bilateral donors will be DFID. The most relevant divisions are the Office of the Chief Advisers, the Policy Division, the International Division, Human Resources and the relevant regional/country programmes. Apart from DFID it is likely that our work will also be relevant to some of the activities of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

The European Union

CRISE hopes to be able to involve relevant parts of the European Commission. Within the Commission, the relevant directorate is the Directorate General for External Relations.

Relevant tasks of the External Relations Directorate General are:

- relations with South Eastern Europe, including the reconstruction of Kosovo;
- relations with Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asian Republics;
- programming <u>Tacis</u> assistance to Eastern Europe, Caucasus, Central Asian Republics;
- relations with the Middle East and the South Mediterranean;
- relations with Latin America;
- relations with Asia;

- relations with international organisations, i.e. United Nations, NATO, WEU, OSCE, the Council of Europe;

The EuropeAid Cooperation Office, which is under the Director for External Affairs, manages the European Development Fund (specifically for ACP countries) as well as aid to non-ACP countries. In 2000 new funding amounted to over $7 billion (E7.6 b), of which 55% went to ACP countries, 13% to Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East, 11% to the Balkans and territories in the former Soviet Union, 7.5% to non-ACP countries in Asia and Latin America, and oround 15% to issue based activities, such as food security, NGO co-financing, the environment and human rights. CRISE findings are potentially relevant to most of this financing.

The International NGOs (INGOs)

Over the past decade or so, the major Northern-based NGOs have devoted an increasing proportion of their resources to advocacy rather than the direct finance of projects. Such advocacy is addressed mainly to Northern policy-makers, while some campaigns are directed at multinational companies. The NGO campaigns can be highly effective mainly because of the support they garner among Northern electorates and/or consumers. Recent examples which have affected official policy are Jubilee 2000; the anti- Land Mines campaign; and the campaign against the Narmada River dams (which also had much local NGO support).

INGOs have also been long-term critics of the policies advocated by the IFIs. Although they have had little direct impact on the core policies, they have helped to persuade the bilateral aid donors and the IFIs to focus more on poverty reduction, to take a more multidimensional view of poverty, and to promote a number of measures to support the poverty reduction objective (e.g. micro-credit). INGOs, thus, can be powerful policy levers in an indirect way, by reorienting other powerful international organisations.

INGOS have also been effective actors in monitoring MNC behaviour and campaigning for social corporate responsibility (SCR). Prominent examples of effective direction action in this respect are the environmental campaign directed at Shell in Nigeria, and the activities of International Alert with respect to conflict diamonds which led to the Kimberley process. The more general issues of INGO interaction with the private sector through SCR will be discussed below in the section on the private sector.

Collectively, of course, INGOs also account for quite a large amount of project finance, with a growing proportion of official aid channelled through international or national NGOs. By appropriate dialogue CRISE might influence how NGO resources are deployed. From a CRISE perspective major INGOs such as OXFAM, Christian Aid, Action Aid could be usefully involved in the development of the research as well as research dissemination.

The Private Sector

The North-South flow of funds accounted for by the private sector currently substantially exceeds that of the public flow of resources. Private capital flows to developing countries from OECD countries in 2001 were $120b, significantly above ODA, at $68b. However, the private flows are, of course, uncoordinated, coming from many diverse companies. Nonetheless, the large presence of the international private sector in developing countries, and their undoubted influence on employment

and resource distribution, makes them potentially influential. CRISE might be able to use the private sector as a policy lever in a number of ways: by direct communication with companies that play a prominent role in areas subject to conflict, such as oil, timber, and diamond companies; by discussions with industry representatives, such as the Confederation of British Industry or the US National Association of Manufacturers; or indirectly via pressure from official bodies and INGOs.

The growing movement for Corporate Social Responsibility is of relevance here. CRISE conclusions could feed into the debate on the nature of corporate social responsibility. Following pressure from NGOs, a number of official bodies have taken leadership in defining and advocating corporate social responsibility including the European Commission, the ILO and the UNDP, while some associations of companies aim to promote corporate social responsibility, such as Business for Social Responsibility. NGOs, of course, have been particularly active in monitoring company behaviour, some specifically in conflict areas, such as Global Witness, International Alert and Human Rights Watch. Other NGOs have been concerned with corporate social responsibility at a more general level - for example those listed in Table 1 below who have participated in the Ethical Trade Initiative, which is an alliance of companies, NGOs and workers' associations supporting ethical trade. Much might be achieved if those concerned with corporate social responsibility were persuaded to include CRISE concerns in their campaigns and monitoring activities.

Table 1: NGOs involved in the Ethical Trade Initiative

Africa Now	Oxfam
Anti-Slavery International	Quaker Peace and Social Witness
CAFOD	Save the Children
Central American Women's Network	Traidcraft Exchange
Christian Aid	TWIN
Fairtrade Foundation	War on Want
Home Workers Worldwide	Women Working Worldwide
Labour and Society International	World Development Movement
National Group on Homeworking	

The Media[8]

The media is an extremely powerful instrument since it not only communicates ideas, but also affects perceptions at many levels. One of the most palpable and significant consequence and cause of globalisation is the globalisation of communications networks. Gupta and Ferguson claim that 'something like a trans-national public sphere has … rendered any strictly bounded sense of community locally obsolete' (Gupta and Ferguson 1992) p. 9.

International newspapers, such as the *Financial Times* and the *International Herald Tribune,* influence policy-makers the world over. At the same time, diaspora newspapers provide a new space for previously unheard voices, e.g. in the UK, *New Nation, Eastern Eye, African Times, Asian Times* and *Caribbean Times*. The most important quality newspaper in Arabic is *al-Hayat,* published in London, and printed simultaneously by satellite in Bahrain, Beirut, Cairo, Frankfurt, New York & Marseille. These newspapers provide an alternative perspective on contemporary news which has helped to shift mainstream reporting. *Q-News,* for example, a glossy Muslim

---

[8] This section draws heavily from Dudley and Lloyd, 2003.

journal published in London, has the explicit aim of joining the debate about the future of Islam. An excerpt from this journal indicates its relevance to CRISE concerns:

'in the internet cafes, around the local youth hangouts, within the mosques and in-between prayers, among mini-cab drivers, city professionals, social workers, teachers, kebab sellers – everywhere the demand is to identify and embrace aspects of our faith that have immediate relevancy to our own identities, spiritual or otherwise.'[9]

Global television channels, such as CNN and BBC World reach a wider worldwide audience than most newspapers, though mainly still among the elite. The span of radio channels, such as the Northern-based BBC world service and Voice of America, is even greater, reaching people who do not have access to television. South-based media are becoming increasingly important, with networking of print journalism, and widely transmitted television channels, such as *al Jazeera, al-Arabia, Manar, Abu Dhabi* and the Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation (*LBCI)*. It is not only a matter of news channels - soap operas can be highly influential in changing attitudes.

Websites also have global reach; cheap to produce, they have proliferated. Diaspora, religious and movement-based sites influence perceptions of the world and of participants' perceived identities. Since the mid-1990s many movements for self determination have used the Internet 'to mobilize exposures of ethnocide, genocide and ecocide' and to gain support (Haveman 2000) p. 28. The Zapatista movement has been particularly successful in informing the wider world about the situation of people in Chiapas.[10] And there is a proliferation of websites expressing solidarity for Palestinian self-determination.[11]

Castells suggests that the 'networked society' may give rise to two main forms of organization: 'cultural communes' centred on a self-contained approach to a religion or ethnicity, or an alternative network which can build bridges of communication, as in inter-faith dialogue or human rights movements (Castells 2000). The example of Islam indicates how the new media can strengthen perceptions of 'community', promulgating an idea of community defined by a set of cultural, political and moral values, but not necessarily confined by conventional geographical boundaries.[12]

It is evident that the global media is highly relevant to CRISE in the way that it depicts the world and influences people from many different groups, locations and classes on how they see the world and themselves.

---

[9] www.q-news.com 8 September 2003.

[10] http://www.ezlnaldf.org/index.php (14 August 2003).

[11] Two striking examples are the Friends of Bizreit University http://www.fobzu.org/ and the Jewish Friends of Palestine http://www.eccmei.net/j/ (both 15 August 2003).

[12] In the Gulf States, for example:
'Satellite systems, whose technology, and management are largely external to the GCC[12] beam into the sites from which their funding comes images of domestic and Islamic community. GCC nationals, meanwhile, as they travel abroad, own foreign residences, and master languages with impressive skill, become increasingly tightly defined as an exclusive group, exemplified by concerns for hypergamy and, increasingly, endogamy.' (Dresch, et al. 1998) p. 4.

Academia and Think Tanks

The influence of academia is indirect, albeit potentially powerful. Keynes famously said that "practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist"(Keynes 1936). This statement almost certainly exaggerates the importance of ideas – which are as much the product of their times as the cause of them. Ideas become important when they correspond to the interests and needs of a particular context. Where they do so, they are influential. Particularly so when they become dominant within academia and spread to think tanks and bureaucracies, becoming so widely accepted that they are almost invisible, the intellectual background to every day life (as Keynes notes above, the practical men, then believe themselves to be *quite exempt from any intellectual influences*). While CRISE, of course, would not expect to have that much influence, the hope would be that the findings could feed into 'the epistemic community'[13] which determines the intellectual context in which policies evolve.

Think tanks have a more immediate impact on policy-makers, contributing to the day-to-day policy debate. They act as the bridge between academia and policy-makers. There are, of course, a huge range of academic institutions and think tanks, and it would only be possible for CRISE to link up with a small subset. Moreover, very few of these institutions are truly international, the United Nations University and associated institutes probably coming closest to it. In reality, all institutions are located in a particular place – in the North, or in the South, and within them in a particular region and country. Northern, and particularly US, elite academic institutions are especially powerful because they educate many of the future policy-makers in developing countries and set the standards for academic 'excellence' throughout the world. Educational institutions in the South have local influence, but international influence is more unusual – though there are important examples of individuals and institutions that have had a strong inernational influence including, historically, the planning policies emanating from Mahalanobis' institute in Delhi in the 1950s, the dependencia movement in Latin America, and similar work by Samir Amin in Africa, and Prebisch' views on the trends in the terms of trade and policy implications. The work of de Soto in Peru, Yunus in Bangladesh and that of Martin Khor and the Third World Network have extensive international influence today.

Most think tanks, likewise, have a particular location and tend to be most influential in that location. A few, perhaps, have a wider impact: for example, the Brookings Institution, the Global Development Centre, the International Economics Institute, the International Peace Academy, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Stockholm Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. These institutions probably come nearest to being international policy levers in CRISE-related areas.

4. Conclusions

The very large range of CRISE concerns means that potential policy levers are numerous. In this short paper, I have just touched on the major categories of potential policy levers. As noted earlier, there are specific institutions which influence policy quite directly on a regular basis. And then there are the much greater number of actors who help determine the general attitudes to policy and perceptions of

---

[13] Wellman and Berkowitz, 1988.

identity – in other words, who establish norms in this field. Often, of course, the same institution contributes both to shaping prevailing norms and to specific policies, the World Bank being a particular important actor in this regard.

We want to communicate with both sets of actors. Because of the range we will necessarily have to be selective, but we will certainly aim to include representatives of each of the major categories of actor, delineated above, in some of our activities. In so far as we need to prioritise among this large range, the international policy levers we are likely to communicate with most are DFID and the EU; the UNDP (particularly via the *Human Development Report*); important campaigning INGOs; and the relevant academic community in both developed and developing countries.

References

Castells, M. 2000, 'Materials for an exploratory theory of the network society', *British Journal of Sociology* 51(1): 5-24.

Dresch, P., Piscatori, J. and al-rasheed, M. 1998 'Connection and Imagery: transnational culture flows and the Arab Gulf': ESRC Transnational Communities Research Programme.

Dudley, S. and C. Lloyd, 2003, 'Global-local cultural links: diaspora, trans-nationalism, solidarities and the media', in Report on research programme on Global Influences on Self-Determination, Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford.

Gupta, A. and Ferguson, J. 1992 'Beyond 'culture' space, identity, and the politics of difference', *Cultural Anthropology* 7: 6-23.

Haveman, P. 2000 'Enmeshed in the Web', in S. Rai (ed) *Global Social Movements*, London: Althone Press.

Killick, T. (2002) The 'Streamlining' of IMF Conditionality: Aspirations, Reality and Repercussions. Report submitted to DFID. Available from www.eurodad.org

McGee R. (2000) Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategies: A Synthesis of Experience with Participatory Approaches to Policy Design, Implementation and Monitoring. IDS Working Paper 109. Brighton, IDS.

Stewart, F, 2000, 'Crisis prevention: tackling horizontal inequalities', *Oxford Development Studies,* 28,3, 2000, pp 245-262

Stewart, F., 2002, 'Horizontal inequalities: a neglected dimension of development', WIDER Annual Lectures 5, Dec. 2001, WIDER, Helsinki.

Stewart, Frances, forthcoming, 'The Evolution of Economic Ideas: From Import-substitution to Human Development' in V.Fitzgerald and R.Thorp (eds).

Stewart, F. and M. Wang, 2003, 'Do PRSPs Empower Poor Countries And Disempower The World Bank, or is it the Other Way Round?' QEH Working Paper QEHWPS108.

Wellman, B, and S.D. Berkowitz, 1988, *Social Structures: a Network Approach,* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.