HOW DO INTERNATIONAL LENDERS AND INVESTORS REALLY BEHAVE? WHAT THE MARKETS TELL US WE DIDN’T KNOW

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Abstract

Drawing on interviews with international financial players based in London, New York, Chicago and other US financial centres, this paper aims to provide further information and insights into lenders’ and investors’ behaviour and their attitudes towards developing countries, and to identify new elements since the financial crises of the late 1990s. Aspects to be highlighted include players’ most recent traits, as well as trends they are following, in terms of investment strategies, allocation decisions and risk management procedures. The paper ends with policy suggestions on how to encourage international lenders and investors to channel a larger proportion of their funds to developing countries.

1 This paper draws heavily on interviews conducted by the research team of the DFID-funded project 'Enhancing the flows of private capital to poor countries', led by Professor Stephany Griffith-Jones. I would like to thank Stephany Griffith-Jones and Valpy FitzGerald for their insightful comments and suggestions, and Gabriella Carolini for her excellent interview material, on which this paper draws extensively.
Introduction

Since the financial crises of the late 1990s capital flows (other than FDI) to developing countries have declined dramatically, reaching in aggregate zero levels in net terms in the year 2001, and being just marginally positive in 2002.\(^2\) For emerging markets, FDI has been the main source of external private capital, remaining positive although on a declining trend, whilst bank lending has been negative. An immediate question that arises is whether this new trend in flows is temporary or permanent.

In a recent paper, Griffith-Jones (2002) shed some light on this issue, by trying to identify which factors are behind the decline in bank lending and portfolio flows to developing countries. For each type of flows, both temporary and permanent factors were identified. The temporary factors included the current world recession, an increase in risk aversion by both lenders and investors, and in certain cases insufficient demand from developing countries. The permanent (or structural) factors included, in the case of banks, a gradual shift from cross-border lending to within countries lending, and in the case of portfolio equities, an increasing lack of good investment opportunities (and, in connection with that, lack of liquidity) in local stock exchanges.

If one agrees that developing countries still need to complement their domestic savings with foreign capital in order to finance their growth and development needs, the next questions that arise are what can be done to reverse the current trends in flows, and more generally, what can be done for these flows to be more stable and long term. Recent econometric work shows that a large part of portfolio flows to developing countries is explained by source country factors (FitzGerald and Krolzig, 2003). Thus, a possible answer to these questions is to propose regulatory changes and incentives in the source countries to encourage international financial players to lend to, and invest more in, developing countries. This, of course, should be done as a complement to the need of stable macroeconomic and political environments in these countries.

However, in order to propose changes that can effectively alter lenders' and investors' behaviour in a way that leads to more capital flows to developing countries, more needs to be known about how these financial players act. For example, it is important to understand better how they operate, what factors are key in their lending and investment decisions, and what they perceive as obstacles to investing more in developing countries.

In previous work we have already searched this subject (see Griffith-Jones, Gottschalk and Cailloux, 2003) and Griffith-Jones (1998). However, knowledge gaps remain, and the purpose of this paper is to move a step further by attempting to fill some of these gaps.

To this end, this paper takes two steps. First, it reviews the theoretical arguments the business literature provides in support of international portfolio diversification and the

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\(^2\) See IIF, 2003.
reasons given to explain why diversification is in reality fairly limited. Second, drawing on a series of interviews with financial players based in London, New York, Chicago and other US smaller financial centres, we aim to provide further information and insights into lenders’ and investors’ behaviour and their attitudes towards developing countries, and to identify new elements since the crises of the late 1990s.

The paper will thus discuss financial players' most recent traits, as well as the trends they are following, in terms of investment strategies, allocation decisions and risk management procedures. Aspects to be highlighted include the role of information in the investment decision process and the barriers (real and perceived) these players face when lending to, and investing in, developing countries.

Following this introduction, the paper is divided in two main parts. Part I reviews mainly the business literature on international portfolio investment decision, with references to the strands of the literature that highlights human psychology in explaining why international portfolio diversification is not more widespread. It also discusses current risk management procedures and their implications for herding. Part II draws mostly on interview material. It first looks at the broad lending and investment strategies that lenders and investors adopt. Second, it discusses in detail how they make their main asset allocation decisions, how they manage risk and what models they use. Third, the following issues are discussed: investors’ perception of risk since the East Asian crisis, the role of information in the different phases of the investment process, possible factors that influence herding behaviour, and the constraints investors face for investing both in emerging market countries and poor countries. Finally, the paper provides a summary of the main findings and, on a tentative basis, possible policy recommendations for lending and investing more in developing countries.
Part I

1. The business literature

1.1. Why international portfolio investment?\(^3\)

The modern portfolio theory asserts that an international portfolio of assets should be preferable over a domestic portfolio, because the former can reduce risk through portfolio diversification. International portfolio diversification will reduce risk to the extent that the correlation between assets of different countries is markedly lower than between assets of the same country.

Empirical evidence as reported by various text-books of business finance shows that the prices of stock markets across the world bear a much lower degree of correlation than stock prices within a country, thus supporting the notion that cross border diversification can result in lower risks than intra country diversification. The evidence also shows that a portfolio that combines bonds and stocks can reduce risks even further, as the correlation between stocks and bonds tend to be low.

Empirical work carried out by IDS international finance team goes further to show that including developing countries in lenders’ and investors’ portfolio of assets can reduce risks even further due to their low correlation with developed countries’ assets, and be very rewarding in the long term. Work has been done both for portfolio equity and debt securities (see Kimmis, Gottschalk, Armendariz and Griffith-Jones, 2002) and bank lending (see Griffith-Jones, Segoviano and Spratt, 2002).

It is true that correlation between assets of developed and developing countries has gone up recently, but it is still lower than correlation among developed countries. Recent evidence shows that correlation between US stocks and stocks of other developed countries increased from 0.15 in early 1987 to nearly 0.8 in 2001 (Hodrick, 2001). IDS work, in turn, shows that correlation of equity asset returns among developed countries is higher than between developed countries and emerging markets over the period between 1985 and 2002, and that although both correlations went up over the 1994-2002 period, the correlation between developed countries and emerging markets was still considerably lower – at 0.33 against 0.57 (see Kimmis, Gottschalk, Armendariz and Griffith-Jones, 2002). Correlation has generally moved up because markets are increasingly integrated, with shock waves being transmitted very rapidly across markets, with co-movements of assets being a major resulting characteristic of such markets.\(^4\)

A further reason for international portfolio diversification would be to outperform the world market portfolio. This may be attainable due to the fact that the hypothesis of efficient markets does not hold at the world level. This hypothesis is a key one in the modern financial theory. Under efficient markets, prices reflect all relevant past information and are adjusted instantaneously to any new un-anticipated information.

\(^3\) The section reviews mainly the arguments put forward by the business literature, with a focus on portfolio equity assets (although references are made to other types of assets); to add a developing country perspective, it makes reference to work carried out by IDS as well.

\(^4\) In the case of portfolio equity securities, correlation tends to move up particularly during steep downturns, precisely when investors expect low correlation as a hedge against large losses.
Assuming efficient markets, it would be not possible to outperform a given market index.

International markets seem to be clearly less than efficient, among other reasons because a considerable degree of market segmentation at the international level still exists, due to legal restrictions and transaction costs. A major example of legal restrictions is capital controls (in various forms, though these have been to a large extent dismantled worldwide); in their turn, transaction costs include currency transaction costs, access to information worldwide, management fees, custodian services, and so forth.

1.2. The degree of international portfolio diversification in reality

According to Cooper (2001; see also Cooper and Kaplanis, 1995) the evidence is that portfolios such as UK funds or US and German pension funds are highly concentrated in domestic equities. Cooper also reports that IMF statistics show foreigners own only below 7 per cent of the US equity market. Below we will also see that the share of developing country assets in the total assets of international portfolios is very low, at around 2 to 3%. If international portfolio diversification seems so beneficial, the question that thus arises is why are portfolios still so little diversified?

The business literature identifies a number of obstacles to international portfolio investment. These include currency risk\(^5\), lack of sufficient information for forecasting and analysis, information comparability (for example reports between firms tend to follow different accounting practices), the cost of information, cost of international management\(^6\) and international custodian costs.

Still according to the business literature, other factors that discourage international portfolio investment or that affect negatively rates of return are associated with the characteristics of stock markets across countries, which can be perceived as additional sources of risk. For example, investors are less keen on markets that are shallow, lack liquidity and hold a high level of concentration, as such markets would be more vulnerable to shocks and manipulative actions. These characteristics are commonly found in the stock markets of small and emerging countries. Montiel and Reinhart (2001) have focused on this aspect in recent empirical work; interestingly, their econometric results indicate that in fact market features such as market capitalisation and number of listed companies do influence portfolio flows to the emerging economies. In addition, capital market breadth is important to all types of capital flows (except for short-term flows).

Other markets’ characteristics, such as patterns of share ownership and degree of government regulations, are also believed to be considered by investors when taking investment decisions. Further sources of risk are the multitude of existing financial instruments (each with specific rights and obligations which are not easy to quickly

\(^5\) It is argued, however, that currency risk can be hedged at low cost (see Jorion, 1989).

\(^6\) International management can be passive or active. The first type of management refers to building a portfolio that is believed to reproduce the performance of an international market index, whereas the second type of management seeks to build a superior portfolio through asset allocation and market timing, under the belief that markets are not efficient. The latter type of management tend to charge higher fees.
visualise), commissions and transaction costs which vary widely across markets and tax effects, which can affect returns considerably. The question is whether these sources of risk and uncertainty are really important especially for big lenders and investors; it will be seen below that some of these factors are indeed relevant in the investment-decision process of such international players.

Behavioural finance theorists point to the home bias phenomenon to explain why portfolios are so little diversified despite the clear benefits of diversification. Home bias means that investors tend to invest in assets that are more familiar to them, assets about which they feel they have more information and understanding (Barberis, 2001). Behaviour finance also suggests that investors’ overconfidence can lead to portfolio under diversification. For example, an investor may hold just a few stocks for believing that he/she has chosen the winners (Gervais and Odean, 2001). If factors such as home bias and overconfidence reduce investors’ interest in foreign assets, this should be especially the case regarding developing country assets, given investors’ relatively limited knowledge and information on this latter category of assets.

A further aspect that may deter diversification is that risk between home and foreign assets is assessed differently. As Tucker et al (1991) discuss, specifically on bond returns, bond prices (and yield) have the following components: a risk-free interest rate for a free-risk bond, a risk premium and an adjustment component. They then report the results of a regression analysis that tests the factors that determine the yield differential between a risky bond yield and a free-risk bond yield, first for the United States, and then for eight different countries. The exogenous variables of the regression are employment, change in the stock market index, inflation and the variability in the long-term government interest rate. The findings indicate that the factors that are important in the determination of the yield differential in the United States are different from those that are important in the determination of yield differentials in the other countries. They conclude that investors’ criteria for determining risk premium vary across countries. This is a hypothesis that deserves further investigation.

Finally, Cooper (2001) focusing on the supply-side constraints to international portfolio diversification, observes that many funds prohibit the use of instruments that may facilitate international portfolio diversification, such as derivative trades. To this type of restriction, one could add that national regulations also sometimes deter funds from investing abroad, for example by ruling that a fund should hold a minimum percentage, say, of certain types of domestic equities, or limits on holding foreign assets (Davis, 2002; see also section 8 of Part II further below). A further problem is that fund managers have their performance measured by domestic benchmarks. So, even if he/she can diversify his portfolio internationally, still it is not advisable for him/her to deviate too much away from such a benchmark, as the penalty for underperforming the domestic benchmark would be more serious than missing the opportunity of outperforming it.

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7 Based on research conducted by Barret and Kolb (1986), cited by Tucker, Madura and Chiang (1991).
8 From the developing country perspective, restricting the use of derivatives should be seen as a positive rather than negative trend, as the case of banks discussed below suggests.
2. Managing risk of diversified portfolios

We have seen thus far what rationale the business literature provides in support of international portfolio diversification, and the factors that inhibit it. A further issue that the business literature discusses in connection with portfolio diversification is the fact that an internationally diversified portfolio requires, even more than a domestic portfolio, sophisticated tools (statistical, analytical) to monitor the risk that cannot be eliminated through portfolio diversification or that arises from changing circumstances.

To place risk management into the broader picture of asset portfolio building, it is important to mention that much of the risk a fund manager is willing to take (risk tolerance) is influenced by his/her investors’ risk preferences (Culp, 2001). Fund managers take into account investors’ risk preference over each of a three-stage process: asset allocation, security selection and market timing. Asset allocation refers to the broad categories of assets to invest; security selection, in turn, involves choosing assets within each category; and market timing relates to the decisions about buying and selling assets when it is judged most appropriate.

It is in the third phase – market timing – that risk management takes place. A technique commonly used in risk management is the value-at-risk (VAR), which along with judgement guides investors in their portfolio management activities. A VAR analysis measures the probability of having a certain amount of earnings at risk. More specifically, it measures the loss probability of a portfolio of assets, over a specific period of time that will be exceeded on, say, 1% of the occasions.9 For that purpose, it estimates the distribution of returns of each asset (i.e. their variance) and their covariance, using historical data (Jackson et. al., 1998).

Culp (2001) notes that in its simplest form VAR assumes the hypothesis of normal distributions of risks. However, if this hypothesis is not observed, more advanced statistical techniques that allow for different types of return distributions can be used within the VAR framework. The problem with these alternative techniques is their degree of complexity, which reduces the feasibility of their application.

Knowledge seems thin on how really important VAR models are in fund managers’ risk assessment process, and how much their own judgement is a key input. The degree to which each of these elements affects their risk analysis may vary widely across different investors. In part II we provide information based on interviews on whether – and if so, to what extent - lenders and investors rely on VAR models in risk management. The use of VAR models may be an important source of volatility of capital flows to developing countries and even herding, which is an important concern in this work. Given that and the fact that the proposed new Basle Capital Accord (Basle II) wants to encourage banks to adopt such models, in what follows we look specifically at their use by banks, for which some empirical evidence has been gathered. In addition, we discuss in some depth the role these models may play in exacerbating credit crunch particularly to low-rated borrowers, and contributing to pro-cyclicality of bank lending and herding behaviour.

9 The loss may be associated with default or with the change of the economic value of the assets.
Banks’ risk management

A recent assessment of how banks evaluate credit risk has revealed that there is no single model or methodology used for that purpose. Instead, banks use different assessment procedures, ranging from judgement of expert personnel to the sole reliance on statistical models (Basel, 2000). However, it has been observed a gradual increase in the use of statistical models to assess risk.

A basic approach, believed to have been increasingly adopted by banks and elsewhere, but which our interviews do not confirm (see below) has been the VAR analysis.

In assessing credit risk, banks rely on different types of VAR models. The evidence available suggests that these models tend to deliver very different results, though these results tend to converge when the models are parametrised in a similar fashion (see Jackson, Nickell and Perraudin, 1999, based on Crouchy and Mark, 1998 and Gordy, 1998). This may be seen as a problem as it indicates that models are not very robust to a change in parameters.

Another major problem among the parametric VAR models is that the variables used are assumed to be stationary, normally distributed and independent over time. However, these assumptions usually do not hold, which implies these models tend to generate biased and even inconsistent estimates. For example, in a number of cases the assumption that returns on a given asset have normal distribution is not observed in practice. According to Danielsson et al., 2001, of the LSE Financial Markets Group (FMG), these models thus tend to perform poorly in their task of measuring risk.

One example given by the LSE FMG of poor risk measurement arising from the violation of the normality assumption is that the principle of sub-additivity is no longer observed. According to this principle, the VAR of a portfolio of assets will be bounded from above by the sum of VARs of the individual assets that constitute that portfolio. But when non-normal distribution is the case, the VAR of a portfolio may turn out to be bigger than the sum of the VAR of the individual assets, and the latter will no longer serve as a reliable indicator of the maximum risk faced by an investor. They thus wonder why other, more reliable measures of risk, are not used instead. These shortcomings suggest that at least some of the banks (and investment funds as well) using these models do not assess risk accurately.

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10 In Basel (2000), basically three approaches to assessing risk and rating borrowers are identified: the ‘statistical-based process’, the ‘constrained expert judgement-based process’ and the ‘based on expert judgement process’. Under the first approach, rating assignment is based solely on quantitative tools; under the second approach, quantitative tools are used, but the final rating is adjustment by judgement. Under the third approach, expert judgement is basically the element to assign ratings. It is noted that whilst the statistical approach has a more prominent role in assigning ratings to small corporates, expert judgement becomes more relevant in large corporate lending.

11 Jackson, Nickell and Perraudin (1999) identify at least four main types of publicly available models, which have been developed in the past few years: the Merton-based models, Ratings-based models, Macroeconomic models and Actuarial models.

12 On that point, see also Danielsson et al. (2001), who tested for the robustness of different models, failing to find consistent risk forecasts, for example across different assets and time horizons.
The current Basle II proposal aims to incentivise financial institutions to use these statistical models to assess risk and assign ratings for each type of risk for the purpose of capital requirements – the internal ratings based (IRB) approach. In order to ensure these models can provide more accurate measures of risk, the Basle Committee intends to promote common procedures in how these models are used, including the use of historical data and correct model parametrisation.\(^\text{13}\)

A number of criticisms have been raised in relation to the proposal of encouraging banks to rely on these models for the purpose of assessing risk and assigning ratings. At least three negative effects can be identified: i. credit reduction to low-rated borrowers; ii. procyclicality; and iii. more herding.\(^\text{14}\)

i. The proposed regulation can result in credit reduction to low-rated borrowers, among other reasons, due to the way it has been designed to account for the shortcomings of the statistical model it aims to promote. That is, the regulation being aware that VAR models lack accuracy, proposes that banks should incur additional capital charges if they do not perform back tests correctly (which is likely to happen given the complexities involved in running the tests), and that a multiplier should be applied over the VAR estimate.\(^\text{15}\) The latter will certainly affect low-rated borrowers disproportionately.

ii. Pro-cyclicality. As the downturn phase of a business cycle starts, the loss probability estimated by the models will increase, and as a result the assets of a portfolio will be downgraded. This phenomenon has been referred to as migration. Due to migration, more capital will thus be required, but given that banks would have difficulty in raising capital in a context of recession, this may create a credit crunch and thus contribute to the further deepening of the downturn of the business cycle. Current estimates indicate that the additional capital required, due to portfolio assets’ migration, would be very big – of an order of 60%, against an increase of 7% under the current system. The same sequencing of events would happen during the upturn of a business cycle, which could thus cause an excessive, and therefore unsustainable, economic boom.

A key fact underlying the phenomenon of migration is that banks tend to assign ratings using the point-in-time approach, rather than the through-the-cycle approach. Under the point-in-time approach, borrowers are assigned ratings in the light of their current (or over a specified time-horizon) condition, whereas under the through-the-cycle approach the conditions of the borrowers over the whole business cycle, including the worst scenario, are accounted for. Thus, whilst under the former approach ratings change as conditions change over the business cycle, under the latter approach the ratings remain the same. A survey of banks’ practices carried out by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (see Basel, 2000) reports ambiguous findings regarding what approach financial institutions adopt. A member of the Basel committee, however, expressed quite forcefully the view that banks indeed adopt the

\(^{13}\) The latter includes the time horizon to be used.

\(^{14}\) For a comprehensive critique of the current Basle II proposal, see Griffith-Jones and Spratt (2001).

\(^{15}\) The proposal requires capital to be equivalent to the highest of either i. the current VAR measurement or ii. the average VAR estimate over the preceding 60 days, multiplied by three (Jackson, Maude and Perraudin, 1998, p. 10).
point-in-time approach and seem strongly opposed to changing this practice.\textsuperscript{16} This point is important because the use of the through-the-cycle approach could reduce pro-cyclicality of lending quite significantly.

iii. Herding behaviour could be encouraged through the dissemination of VAR techniques among financial institutions and the homogenisation of procedures that accompany the use of these techniques. This is because as these institutions start to increasingly rely on the same methods to assess risk, they will tend to follow similar behaviour in moments of increased risk; and herding that already happens during times of euphoria and crises would be intensified (this is a hypothesis discussed in more detail in Part II). As the LSE Financial Markets Group (FMG) puts it in its comments to the current Basle proposal – see Danielsson et al., 2001 – ‘[o]f special concern is how the proposed regulations would induce the harmonisation of investment decisions during crises with the consequence of destabilising the global financial system’ (p. 3).

Persaud (2000) provides a very compelling example on how the use of statistical models for the purpose of managing risk can increase herding. Using historical data on returns’ volatility and correlation, banks first estimate the distribution of future returns. They next calculate the daily earnings at risk (DEAR), which means how much they expect to lose the next day with, say, 1% probability. They then impose a limit to what they are prepared to lose. As volatility and correlation of returns of specific assets increase, DEAR of those banks with higher exposure to those assets increase and eventually hits the banks ’ loss limit. This event will induce such banks to sell such volatile assets, which will further reduce their prices and increase volatility. This will in turn make the DEAR of less exposed banks to these assets to also hit their limits, thus igniting a second wave of selling, which will just reinforce the falls and, thus, further selling of assets.

Thus, the actions of one bank based on its DEAR analysis ends up contaminating the DEAR of other banks and therefore their actions. If herding already happens because lenders and investors have a tendency to mimic other agents’ actions, such behaviour could be intensified with the use of similar models across agents, particularly in times of crises. Persaud believes that the practice of DEAR limits helps to largely explain the numerous financial crises that characterised the decade of the 1990s. Thus, a major problem with the current regulatory proposal is that it will encourage further convergence in behaviour which may in turn intensify herding and thus lead to increased systemic risks. Developing countries would be particularly affected by these developments.

Along the same line of reasoning, Danielsson et al. (2001) of the LSE FMG have stressed the potentially destabilising role of VAR models and how they can contribute to crashes. This is because, as is suggested in Persaud’s example, volatility - and therefore risk - is an endogenous process, affected by the interaction between players, rather than exogenous as usually assumed by the models. They further argue that in times of crisis, these models become strongly impaired in their ability to predict risk accurately. As players change their strategies towards a more convergent pattern

\textsuperscript{16} Interview material.
among themselves, the data that reflects this process suffers a structural break, becoming no longer appropriate to be used in these models.

The LSE FMG has recently carried out research that provides empirical evidence on some of these issues. For example, the hypothesis that similar behaviour patterns among lenders and investors can aggravate a crisis is tested in Danielsson and Zigrand (2001) and Danielsson, shin and Zigrand (2001). Their findings are that the price of a particular asset falls sharply and liquidity dries up, events that are likely to lead to a market collapse. It is important to note at this point that herding could be intensified not only among one group of actors (e.g. banks) but, to the extent that similar techniques are disseminated across different actors, herding would affect different actors simultaneously.

3. The role of human psychology in determining herding

A key issue to be addressed in the context of this discussion is that herding in financial markets has been prevalent since much before statistical models were created. Moreover, herding is such a prominent feature during euphoria and crises that one should wonder whether using statistical models in risk management can possibly have any further negative impact at all.

The two most common explanations for herding have been investors' impulse to exploit other investors' information implied in their trading actions, and the fact that investors prefer to lose together with their peers than to lose alone (due to peer pressure, prestige, performance criteria, the fact that it would more likely for them to be bailed out, etc.).

The behavioural finance theory has in turn highlighted psychological features of the human behaviour, which can also contribute to herding. An example is overconfidence. Empirical research suggests that individuals tend to be overconfident in their ability to predict events. This overconfidence arises from their perception that their successes are due to their own skills, and failures to bad luck.

Interestingly, overconfidence in the ability to predict events may be most strongly manifested during times of euphoria, when uncertainty about the future dissipates and gives way to bold predictions (Bernstein, 1998). Thus, at the same time euphoria may stimulate overconfidence, the latter may reinforce euphoria in the market. Moreover, as Gervais and Odean (2001) point out, even if an investor realises that other investors are overconfident and thus driving prices too high, still they may be discouraged from taking short positions in the face of the prospect that prices will move even further up.

It is also believed that as investors start comparing their predictions with the actual outcomes, they become more realistic overtime. However, even if that happens, new overconfident investors who lack the maturity of the older ones enter the markets, making overconfidence be less than just a temporary phenomenon.

Another human characteristic that can fuel a phase of boom in financial markets is the tendency to categorise simple events, or see them as representing a broader phenomenon. This characteristic, known as representativeness, may result in mistakes, which may occur when events do not really represent what in the eyes of
investors they seem to represent in a first moment (Barberis, 2001). In financial markets, a classical case is that of investors who see patterns in events that are just random. That is, it is common that investors see trends in random walks, or expect events that are just short term to continue in the long term (Shiller, 2001). These kinds of perceptions may be translated into actions that can feed booms or crises. For example, financial market players invest in stocks that are going up in the short run, thus sustaining their growth for a while until, eventually, prices collapse.

Shiller (2001) also highlights other human characteristics, believed to be behind booms and busts. These include excessive optimism, the trust in others' judgement when making his own judgement, conformity pressures (i.e. tendency to follow a group behaviour in order to maintain status), pressures (from clients, or committees) to follow fads, and the reliance on popular theories that actually lack solidity. Finally, he also calls attention to the role of institutional and social phenomena. Examples of these include the prudent person standard, according to which a person should invest 'according to conventional wisdom', or 'in a way seen as prudent'; and the media, which, by producing a well-written story, 'can have powerful impact on public thinking'.

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4. Conclusions

We have seen that the business literature puts forward two main arguments in favour of international portfolio diversification: risk reduction (due to the relatively low degree of correlation between assets from different countries) and the possibility of outperforming world markets given that the latter are less than efficient. On these two accounts, diversification towards developing countries would be even more justified, as asset correlation between developed and developing countries is still relatively low, and market failures, which lead to lack of efficiency, is even more acute in developing countries than in the world as a whole.

However, we have also seen that investors face a number of constraints on investing internationally, and in particular, in developing countries. These constraints are related to host country factors and supply-side factors. The latter factors, which are of main concern in this study, include home bias and overconfidence, the use of domestic benchmarks and the fact that these are used for performance assessment, and restrictions of different sorts, ranging from the use of derivatives to national regulations biased towards home assets.

As regards home bias and overconfidence, a possible policy response would be to educate investors about the advantages of investing in developing countries and working on ways whereby they could have easier and less costly access to information on these countries. However, such a course of action, although important, may not be sufficient. For such barriers to be significantly reduced, regulatory incentives would have to be provided. These could take the form of tax incentives for example, and could be justified on the grounds that they were dealing with international market failures. As regards the use of benchmarks and performance assessment, regulators could encourage the markets to change the criteria used and the time-length considered to assess investors' performance. As regards national regulations that restrict investment abroad, where these are still in place, they could be relaxed or totally removed.

Policy responses to some of the other restrictions should be considered with care, as their removal could have a negative rather than positive effect on developing countries. For example, allowing investors to use derivatives freely could exacerbate financial volatility in the economies of developing countries, as discussed below.

To the extent that portfolio diversification towards developing countries is encouraged, an issue that should be addressed concerns the use of more sophisticated techniques that are required to manage the complexity and risks associated with international portfolio diversification.

A particular risk management technique whose use regulators are encouraging at present are the VAR models. The dissemination of the use of VAR models would reduce the divergence that still exists today, in terms of the use of models for risk management - by banks and investors, as confirmed below. These models are parameterised differently and thus deliver different results. As is argued by Persaud (2000) and the LSE Financial Markets Group, from the perspective of financial
stability and of developing countries, the use of different criteria should not be discouraged, since it has the benefit of reducing the likelihood of polarisation of positions. Promoting similar statistical models for risk assessment would increase convergence in behaviour, with the possible undesirable effect of increasing herding. Moreover, such a convergence would increasingly take place based on statistical models whose ability to assess risk, already poor in normal times, tend to collapse in times of crises.
Part II.

Part I of the paper firstly discussed the rationale behind international portfolio diversification, and the constraints lenders and investors face on investing internationally and in particular in developing countries. As regards the latter issue of constraints, both host country and source country factors were identified. A key factor constraining lending to and investment in developing countries is information, in terms of availability, costs and comparability. A policy recommendation suggested above is to increase the flows of information on developing countries to international lenders and investors. However, while there seems to be clear benefits associated with the provision of information, in the second part of the paper we address the questions: how is information fed into the portfolio allocation process, how beneficial is it in reality and what are the possible costs associated with it? More generally regarding the constraints on lending and investing in developing countries facing international lenders and investors, the second part of the paper identifies new ones, in particular those that emerged after the financial crises of the late 1990s.

Secondly, part I of the paper also discussed the adoption of VAR techniques to manage portfolio risk. A main issue raised was that the increasing use of VAR among international lenders and investors could exacerbate herding behaviour. However, as noted earlier, herding in financial markets has been prevalent since much before statistical models were created. What other factors are behind herding? Could the generalised use of such models really increase volatility and herding? Would capital flows to developing countries become more volatile as a result, thereby reducing the promised benefits such flows are expected to bring to these countries? How really important are these techniques in fund managers' risk assessment process today? How much is their own judgement a key input and how receptive they are to the idea of adopting VAR? What other arguments are put forward in favour of diversification in the use of risk management techniques? What can regulators do in this respect?

To throw additional light on these and related issues, this part of the paper provides further information on, and insights into, lenders’ and investors’ behaviour. It takes a broader perspective by examining the following issues: investment (and lending) strategies of different financial actors; allocation decisions, with a discussion of the three-stage process that characterises such decisions; the degree of risk aversion by lenders and investors; the role of information; herding behaviour; and constraints on investing in developing countries. It draws mostly on interviews with different financial players based in London, New York, Chicago and other US smaller financial centres, and includes fund managers, pension funds and bankers.17

1. Investment (and lending) strategies

It is a common view that investors, in their large majority, do not attempt to obtain an absolute performance, but a relative one, by comparing their performance with a chosen market index, which is used as a benchmark.

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17 The list of names and institutions interviewed can be found in the Appendix.
Yet, investors that follow benchmarks can be active or passive. Passive investors attempt to match the market portfolio performance. Active investors, in turn, try to outperform market indices; they may adopt specific investment strategies, associated with different categories of assets, which can be labelled in a number of ways, such as growth, momentum, and contrarian strategies. They may also adopt a combination of investment strategies and rely on historical returns as a guide in their investment decisions.

A number of reasons have been brought forward to explain why investment management funds adopt particular investment strategies. These can be associated with legal constraints, their liability structure, the mandates they receive from their client base and the pool of skills they hold. In what follows we will be looking at the investment strategies of investment management funds and pension funds. In addition, we will also discuss the lending strategies international banks are adopting towards developing countries. As regards investment and pension funds, it will be seen that global funds tend to adopt momentum strategies ('buying the winners and selling the losers'), whereas dedicated funds, along with pension funds, have more scope for investing long term. To the extent that dedicated funds to emerging markets are disappearing, this clearly would have negative implications for developing countries, as the result would be predominance of funds with a more volatile behaviour investing in such countries.

1.1. Investment management funds

Investment management funds adopt investment strategies set by the decision-making body of the firm. The decision-making body (or structure) is fairly complex in most cases, differing widely across funds. Some have committees, made up of people with different expertise (can be financial market professionals, lawyers, academics), while others hold less formal consultative groups, in some cases formed by (in-house or sub-contracted) country teams, and in others by corporate analysts specialised in specific sectors that cut across countries. A key component of this overall structure is their client base, which is usually broad, and includes pension funds and other institutional clients, charities and retail. As will be seen below, clients can play an important role in setting the guidelines on how fund managers should invest.

Investment funds manage different sorts of asset portfolios. Broadly, these can be opportunistic (or crossover) and specialised portfolios. Crossover portfolios usually cover a wide range of asset categories, which may include the emerging markets as a specific asset category. Specialised portfolios, in turn, are focused on specific asset categories. Of interest here are the dedicated emerging markets portfolios, which can be global, regional or country based.

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18 Dimson, Nagel and Quigley (2001) have identified a number of different investment strategies, each of which associated with a specific asset category. These include: value (assets with a low ratio of market to book price); growth (assets with a high ratio of market to book price); momentum (stocks that have performed very well in the recent past); contrarian (stocks that have performed poorly in the recent past, but which are expected to perform better over the long term); small-caps (companies with small market capitalisations) and large-caps (big companies, known as blue chips).
Within these broad categories (of crossover and specialised funds), it is possible to identify the following: benchmark funds, which tend to be the majority, and total return funds.

Benchmark funds often (though not always) have behind them clear mandates coming from clients, who set the targets to be achieved. The degrees of freedom funds have to manage assets vary, however. For example, managed balanced funds are given a specific peer group benchmark fund to beat, but have freedom (though the degrees vary from fund to fund) to take general asset allocation decisions. In other cases, clients specify that a specific benchmark (peer group, index) should be beaten, and set the guidelines on how general asset allocation should be. Clients may also impose restrictions on specific asset categories (e.g. derivative instruments, countries, level of liquidity or maturity, etc.). Within these general guidelines set by the client, a fund manager has some freedom to take allocation decisions, and deviate from the benchmark the client sets (tracking error). This is exercised with caution, however. As recent events have shown, the fund manager can be sued if he or she underperforms.  

Passive funds, in turn, just track an index, with little or no room for asset management.

Finally, total return funds do not follow a benchmark; they may be small but very active; they may act globally and go to emerging markets. Although some market participants associate total return funds with crossover funds, this may not necessarily be the case. Dedicated funds can also adopt total return strategies, with the possibility of acting as contrarians by holding value assets for long periods of time.

In principle, one may expect total return funds to be more volatile than benchmark funds, due to the fewer constraints these funds face. However, this may not necessarily be so. A fund manager argues that actively following or trying to beat a benchmark may result in too a high turnover and, therefore, higher volatility, than searching for total return. The latter strategy may allow an investor to hold an asset until it matures (thus acting as a contrarian), and, as a consequence, be less volatile - though they can also be very aggressive, with a very high turnover, as a result. What emerged from the interviews is that those funds less attached to benchmarks claim to invest more long term, and that it is the objective to invest long term, reflecting the clients' preferences, that influences the investment strategy, rather than the other way round.

The issue of volatility is more commonly raised regarding global investment funds versus dedicated emerging market funds. According to a market participant, the latter may be seen as more long term, for having more long-term liabilities and for being more committed to value assets. In addition, they invest more in information and thus have more knowledge about their asset holdings (i.e. information advantage). This gives them more confidence about their actions, and reduces the need to follow herds.

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19 See, for example, the Unilever-Merrill Lynch case, in which the Unilever Superannuation Fund sued Merrill Lynch Investment Managers (MLIM) for underperforming an agreed benchmark index by 10.5% in one specific year, while the downside threshold specified in the contract was no more than 3% (Financial Times, ‘Merril faces payout to avoid court action’, October 8th 2001, page 29).

20 Today, more than 30% of US institutional investors have their assets managed by funds that track indices, while in the UK this figure is around 20-25%. On the other hand, retail investors worldwide have only about 3% of their assets managed by index funds (see Skorecki, A. 2002 ‘Trade plays active role in passive investing’, Financial Times Fund Management Supplement, April 29, p. 3).
Dedicated emerging markets funds, however, are visibly declining in number, with investments in emerging markets being increasingly made by global funds investing in emerging market assets, amongst other asset categories.

Our interviews also revealed that a same investment house operating globally on both sides of the Atlantic has been pursuing quite dissimilar investment strategies in its different investment divisions. For example, a division working mainly with bonds, and managing both global and dedicated emerging market portfolios, essentially follows benchmarks, with performance being assessed (informally) on a daily basis, with a yearly average turnover between 200% and 300%. At the same time, another division dedicated to emerging markets’ equities adopts an active strategy that does not follow benchmarks. Their view is that 'benchmarks change and following a benchmark would, therefore, imply a too high turn over'. They prefer to invest long term, with rolling periods from 3 to 5 years (average annual turnover between 20% and 30%). This shows that different investment cultures can be found in the same investment house, a phenomenon that may be possibly explained by mergers of hitherto independent investment firms operating in different segments of the market.

More generally, some investment houses - whether managing global or dedicated portfolios - are more aggressive than others in their asset allocation decisions (and therefore more short term), thus taking the initiative of switching asset allocation and 'being at the forefront of the herd'. Other players tend to be more conservative, and act cautiously particularly with respect to emerging markets, being relatively more careful in moving away from a neutral position, as they perceive higher risks involved. (The neutral position regarding emerging markets is in most cases around 2% to 3%, within a range from 0% to 5%. – see below).

Other characteristics shared by investment funds can be summarised as follows. Their portfolio of assets may comprise bonds (sovereign, corporate), equities, property and cash. Performance is often assessed on a quarterly basis (though this may vary - some assess their performance on a daily basis, as mentioned above). Turnover varies widely across investment funds; in a few cases the average annual turnover is between 20% and 30%, while in others it may be around 300%, or even higher. Their horizon for holding an asset may be 6 to 9 months amongst momentum investors and 3 to 5 years amongst contrarians. They operate with different vehicles, which can be pooled (open-ended, close end) or segregated (individual). Table 1 summarises some of the points made above for different types of funds.
Table 1. Main features of different types of funds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of funds</th>
<th>Main features</th>
<th>Risk</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total returns</td>
<td>Often small and very active; generally they are crossover, but can also be dedicated. The latter can draw on detailed information its own research department provides, and tend to adopt bottom-up approach in their allocation decisions. Room for acting as contrarians, with relatively low turn over, though they can be very aggressive as well.</td>
<td>Risk takers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peer group benchmark (balanced funds)</td>
<td>Clients specify the benchmark to follow, but the fund manager has degrees of freedom (though these vary) to take general asset allocation decisions.</td>
<td>Risk neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index benchmark</td>
<td>They can be specialised in different categories of assets, incl. EM. Have clear mandates; try to outperform the index benchmark, by having tracking-error targets; this may lead to high turn over and volatility. Managers may deviate from benchmarks, but not excessively.</td>
<td>Risk cautious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index tracking</td>
<td>Mimics a chosen index; can be very volatile.</td>
<td>Risk averse</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interview material. Shaded areas: passive funds

Pension funds

Like investment management funds, pension funds' decision-making structure is fairly complex. But it differs from other funds' in a fundamental way: it is the trustees\(^{21}\) who are charged with determining the overall asset allocation of a pension fund. However, because they lack sufficient expertise, and, even more important, because they may face legal responsibility for their actions, having to respond with their personal assets in order to protect themselves, they rely heavily on the advice of consultants, who ultimately decide how overall asset allocation should be.\(^{22}\) This is particularly true in the Anglo-American world. In the Continent, they are absolved of responsibility, and are therefore less in need to draw on consultants for advice.

In countries like the UK and the US, consultants play a major role not only in asset allocation, but also in manager selection (though in the US there has been a gradual shift towards defined contribution schemes in which individual investors have a bigger say on investment decisions). More specifically, consultants take decisions on how to allocate funds between different assets (e.g. equities, bonds), and how to distribute them geographically. Also, they choose which investment management fund to hire, and which mandates to give them\(^{23}\). Finally, consultants choose the benchmarks the fund manager should follow, for bonds and equities.

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\(^{21}\) Trustees can act like a corporate board, but they represent the clients of the fund (interview material).

\(^{22}\) Trustees’ reliance on consultants is an aspect of pension funds’ decision-making structure strongly emphasised in the Myners report (2001). The report points to trustees’ lack of expertise as the main reason for that.

\(^{23}\) According to some of our interviewees, in the US mandates tend to be global, whilst in the EU they are becoming increasingly specialised (e.g. global equity mandate, emerging market equity mandate, etc.).
There are instances, however, of pension funds that act more independently, with much less reliance on the advice of consultants. For example, a major UK pension fund has an investment committee (formed by financial professionals and other experts) that advises the trustees on how to allocate their fund across different assets and countries. Moreover, the committee gives advice on which fund managers to hire to run the funds, and which investment strategy each fund manager should follow. They still have consultants, but rely on them only lightly. It is not clear, though, how trustees would, in this case, protect themselves from possible legal charges, to which they would have to respond with their personal assets. Asked this question, an investment manager of a fund operating in this way answered that their long-term liabilities permit them to be more long term and take risks, and even to underperform, and that their clients should accept that.

It can be seen from the above that, on the whole, the investment strategy a pension fund chooses is largely determined by its consultants, who tell them where and how to invest. In the UK, the few largest consultancy firms dominate the market. As a consequence, pension funds follow similar advice and investment patterns, with therefore little diversification. An observed characteristic of their investment pattern is the low share of developing countries’ assets in their total portfolio of assets (see below).

Given pension funds' long-term liabilities, one would expect the building up of long-term portfolios. However, like other types of investors, their fund managers are locked-in in a system of short-term performance assessment, which works as a major constraint to more long-term asset holding. The recent trend amongst pension funds from the defined benefit to defined contribution schemes is giving more power to individual investors. They have, however, acted rather conservatively in their investment decisions, among other reasons due to the fact that risks are not pooled (Myners, 2001). According to a consultant, it would be important that they become more informed and educated to be able to take on more long-term investment strategies. Also, it would be important they learned about the benefits of portfolio diversification and in particular of investing in developing countries.

Banks

Banks' lending strategies have been changing in important ways in the past few years. They are moving gradually from cross-border lending to within country lending in developing countries (Lubin, 2001). This has implied a substitution of domestic lending for foreign lending. According to some figures provided in Hawkins (2001), whilst net foreign lending to developing countries has declined dramatically in the past few years, turning net negative, within country lending has almost doubled over the same time period.²⁴

To the extent that developing countries permit foreign ownership of their local banks, and that, as a result, foreign banks take them over, it would be natural to expect an increase in their on-shore exposure. However, given the decline in foreign lending at the same time that in-country lending has increased, we wonder whether these two trends are inter-connected. Some market participants argue that they are not, and that

²⁴ Between June 1998 and December 2000, international banks’ loans by subsidiaries in local currency with local residents increased 75% (see Hawkins, 2001, table 8).
actually cross-border lending by a bank may be facilitated by the presence of affiliates in that country, as 'the affiliates have the advantage of knowing the country better'. Thus, one type of lending would complement, rather than replace, the other.

Intra-country lending has been based on local deposits, which are being used mainly to provide personal financial services. At the same time, there is a tendency to withdraw from corporate lending in developing countries. The alleged reason for that is 'they do not get the same returns as in the past'. Also, they do not get paid in crises.

Banks, of course, still provide foreign lending to developing countries, but not long-term lending, as was the case in the past, especially during the 1970s; today these are short-term lending (even so, in net terms such lending is negative for many developing countries). They lend to the big domestic banks, as they are believed to be too big for the government to let them fail when a major crisis hits. Long-term loans are becoming rare. The risks involved are perceived as too high. Long-term debt, in the form of bonds, through the trading desk, could be an alternative. But, again, according to one of our interviewees, bonds are seen as 'too risky and extremely volatile'.

2. Allocation decisions

As seen earlier, investment funds take into account investors' risk preference over each of a three-stage process: asset allocation, security selection and market timing. In this section we will see how investors and lenders allocate their assets and do security selection. Market timing will be discussed in the section on risk management.

Asset allocation

As with the funds' investment strategy, the general guidelines on how to allocate funds across different asset classes are set by a decision-making body (or structure).

In the case of pension funds - and the same applies to investment funds that have pension funds as their main clients -, the pension funds' consultants set the general guidelines on how asset allocation should be. For that purpose, they use the asset-liability match (ALM) approach. They take into account their clients' preferences and characteristics. For clients such as mature pension funds, which tend to be more averse to risk, they normally recommend to hold less equities (and less emerging market assets). Younger funds with more cash flow are given the flexibility to invest more in value assets, with capitalisation gains expected to be reaped in the long term (over 10 years).

The Myners report clearly notes, however, that a majority of pension funds still outsource the management functions to their fund managers. For example, most fund managers of peer group benchmark funds retain power (though at varying degrees) to take general asset allocation decisions. According to the report, of a sample of 275 UK pension funds managing £407 billion of assets (taken for the year 1999), 191 were classified as some sort of peer group benchmark funds. Although they are the majority, their numbers have declined steadily in the past several years (see Myners, 2001, Figure 3.2, page 54).
Asset allocation patterns seem to vary considerably across investment and pension funds. For example, a big UK based investment fund (with pension funds amongst its clients) has informed us that it allocates 50% of its funds to bonds, 30% to equities and 20% to properties. In contrast, a major UK pension fund invests around 75-80% in equities, 5-10% in bonds, 10% in properties and 0-5% in cash. The latter roughly reflects how UK funds build the asset portfolio of their pension fund clients. According to a survey from Russell Mellon Caps, in 2001 balanced funds’ asset portfolios consisted of 80.3% of equities, 13.6% of bonds and 4.7% of cash.\textsuperscript{25} The current market trend is to gradually switch from equities to bonds, as the latter outperformed the former over the past five years, and more recently due to the steep fall in equity prices. However, as hinted earlier, it is not unusual that relatively young pension funds stick with the strategy of investing mainly in equities rather than bonds.

For our purposes, a first important question is to know how much emerging market assets investment (and pension) funds hold, in proportion to their total assets. For this asset category, figures seem to converge. Global investment funds and pension funds based in the UK claim that of their total asset portfolio, only around 2% to 3% correspond to emerging market assets.\textsuperscript{26} Before the Asian crisis, emerging markets asset shares in total assets were higher, having reached 5%, but have declined to the current levels since then. For certain funds, levels have declined even further, to around 1% or less. According to fund managers, today there are no lower limits in terms of emerging markets assets, while upper limits tend to be around 5%.

A second, and more important, question to address is why so little - around 2-3% - is allocated to emerging markets. This question is a crucial one in view of the promised benefits of international portfolio diversification, as discussed above. According to a fund manager that has mainly pension funds in his portfolio of clients, consultants adopt a mathematical model to allocate assets, and they look at aspects such as inherent return and risk characteristics; this could be explaining lack of investment in emerging markets.

However, the use of models in the allocation process is not sufficient to explain why different funds converge in the proportion of EM assets they hold. It seems that not technical, but other reasons explain better the current levels of asset allocation to EM, in addition to a variety of obstacles investors face to invest in developing countries more generally (see below). For example, these funds started investing in EM in the late 1980s and early 1990s from near zero levels, and from then increased the share of EM assets in their total assets gradually until this trend was interrupted (and somewhat reversed) by the East Asian crisis.

Security selection

This sub-section will focus on the security selection by investment (and pension) funds in regard to the emerging market asset class. We will first look at the types of assets they choose to hold and, second, at the geographical distribution of such assets.

\textsuperscript{26} Information based on interviews; FitzGerald and Cobham (2002); Trustnet (www.trustnet.com).
As regards types of assets, funds hold emerging market assets mainly in the form of bonds (sovereign and corporate) and equities. Some funds split their emerging market assets evenly between bonds and equities, while others are skewed strongly towards either of these two asset categories. Whether to hold more of one type of asset than another depends on a variety of factors. These include their investment strategies (e.g. preference for value or growth assets), the expected returns on each type of asset, risks involved (including exchange risk), degree of liquidity, whether their liabilities permit them to hold long term, and on which asset category they have more accumulated expertise.

To illustrate some of the points outlined above, in the case of bonds, since the Asian crisis some fund managers have searched for greater safety and, therefore, have strongly skewed their holdings towards sovereign bonds as opposed to corporate emerging market bonds. Corporate bonds are seen with caution. As a fund manager put it, 'investors' exposure to corporate emerging market debt had to be from issuers of the highest quality with hard-dollar or hard-euro earnings'. The flight to safety is a phenomenon that always happens after every crisis.

As regards the choice between equities and bonds, another fund manager, when asked why his preference for emerging market equities, gave as answers their accumulated expertise in equities (and insufficient knowledge on bonds), and the fact that equities have 'a built-in protection against currency devaluation', as the latter can lead to companies' improved performance. Of course, such a preference for equities should not be understood as part of a general phenomenon among investors, as capital flows to developing countries have gone mostly to bonds rather than equities.

As regards the geographical allocation of funds (and banks as well) in emerging markets, investment (and pension) funds adopt different strategies, and rely on very specific decision-making structures for that purpose. Some funds adopt a top-down approach while others a bottom-up approach. The top-down approach involves setting overall allocation across different asset categories; next, limits for emerging markets may be set, first on a regional basis, and once EM countries within each region are chosen, further limits are set, this time for each country. Some investors do not categorise EM countries on a regional basis, but by economic characteristics instead (e.g. whether they are oil-exporting or oil-importing countries). Others, like the banks we interviewed, do not impose overall country limits, but set them country by country. According to a bank, there are, however, limits by maturity (that is, the longer the maturity, the lower the limit).

The bottom-up approach means, in the words of a fund manager who adopts this approach, looking at the company, with little regard to the country information. This approach might imply more stable flows to developing countries, as the investor is less inclined to react to changes in a country’s circumstances. This approach seems rather unusual, however. It is more common amongst investors to look primarily at the country level, setting country limits (while others not), and to look at the economic fundamentals. In addition, in their allocation process, they look at returns, risk and liquidity. To the extent that the bottom-up approach implies more stable flows, as opposed to the other approaches, a policy advice would be to provide more information at the micro/sectoral level to encourage investors to adopt such an approach.
A common feature across funds is the constraints they face, such as concentration limits. For example, the top five stocks cannot be more than 40% of the total portfolio, and no single stock can be more than 10% of total portfolio. These limits, which are imposed by the Institute Monetaire de Luxembourg (IML), make them underperform, as they cannot hold too much of a big EM company's asset that has done well. In other cases the investor has the power to decide internally country-specific restrictions. For example, if he/she follows an index, he/she does not overweight an EM country more than, say, 10% in the relation to the portfolio's index.

It is also possible that an investor makes off-index country bets, provided it follows broader limits imposed from above, such as holding no more than 5% of a country's assets that is outside the index. This strategy leads, however, to large tracking errors, and investors tend to avoid falling under such a situation - they risk underperforming alone, and the price for that is perceived as too high (much higher than underperforming together).

3. Risk management and the use of models

Once a portfolio is built, investors start managing risk, an activity that essentially requires the ability to know when the most appropriate time is to buy and sell assets. For the purpose of risk management, a well-known technique that can be used is the value-at-risk (VAR), as discussed earlier. VAR can have a critical role in asset changes in response to changing circumstances. The current Basle II proposal aims to incentivise banks (and other financial institutions) to use VAR models to assess risk (see discussion above). This initiative seems to reflect a belief by regulators that markets are increasingly adopting VAR analysis in their risk management activities, and that the new proposal can be a move towards adjusting regulation to current market practices.

Surprisingly, our interviews reveal that the VAR analysis is less common than we have been made to believe. This applies not just to investment and pension funds, but to banks as well. In fact, some banks have informed that they do not use VAR models, nor is it their intention to use them in the future. In their view, these models have no real application. A banker went further to say that VAR 'could even distract them from what matters'. If these interviews are representative, this would mean that VAR models are not so much responsible for volatility, as stated by Persaud and the LSE Financial Markets Group (see above). However, if VAR is pushed by the regulators, then it is possible that volatility may intensify.

According to a major international bank investing and lending in emerging markets, they assess country risk based on qualitative analysis, and for that purpose they draw on various pieces of information, which can be grouped as the country's economic and political structures. In addition, they have their own rating system, in which country risk is scored; as inputs, they quantify economic and political information. Other banks also have their own rating system, which is constructed with the use of economic variables, and in which political variables are also used as inputs into the total rating generating process.
Investment and pension funds, for their part, use a wide variety of models for the purpose of risk management, some of which are similar to VAR. To illustrate what has just been said, a few examples are given.

A fund manager informed us that his investment fund uses a dynamic risk model (as opposed to the more static models), which has little to do with the VAR model. Their model’s purpose is to offer a range of possible outputs in terms of tracking errors. This is possible because they do not attempt to beat a specific index. In other words, 'they do not want to have a tracking error target', which means that they act differently in relation to the more common balanced managed funds. A balanced fund manager, in turn, reported he assesses risk using a model similar to the VAR. The idea is to assess how returns would be if failure occurred.

Another fund manager informed us that they use their own in-house models; one example is the risk assessment model, which requires quantified variables on a wide range of aspects such as solvency, liquidity, vulnerability, socio-economic fragility, governance, transparency, politics, etc.

So far, what emerges from the above is, first, that the decision-making process is complex, consisting of different phases, each of which dealing with specific issues (e.g. allocation, risk management); moreover, different actors are involved in the process (e.g. consultants, managers, specialised consultants, clients). This complexity poses difficult dilemmas to policy makers, as it is not clear where to target their intervention in order to change behaviour patterns so that more funds are channelled to developing countries. Second, in each phase of the decision-making process, systematic forms of assessment are often employed; these can be quantitative and/or qualitative based. And third, there is no homogeneity within or across classes of investors and lenders, in terms of the models they use. More importantly, few of them claim to use VAR models. Each uses a specific model, and the choice seems to be more related to the firm’s history (and culture) on asset allocation and management risk, than to the nature of the business in question.

Having said that, homogeneity can be found in the basic principle underlying the portfolio allocation process; for example, the use of a mean-variance analysis seems to serve as a basic guideline to different portfolio investors. Econometric work conducted by Disyatat and Gelos (2001) shows that mean-variance optimisation is an important factor in explaining how dedicated emerging market funds manage their portfolios overtime, although benchmark following behaviour plays an even more important role.

In addition to risk assessment activities, investors and especially banks have been adopting risk management practices that increasingly include the use of hedging. International banks are at present hedging the total capital that goes to a specific country. The purpose is to protect them against exchange rate risk, which has become a major source of concern since the EM currency crises of the late 1990s. According to a banker, hedging takes place equally in countries with fixed and floating exchange regimes and is done, for example, through holding dollar-linked government bonds.

Among investors other than FDI, hedging is less common. According to a consultant, in the case of pension funds, foreign exchange risk is seen as a major concern, but
hedging this risk, though permitted, is seen as somewhat complex. A further problem is that some hedging practices may be interpreted as 'trading', and therefore may be taxed.

Hedging is an important risk management practice to highlight, given its major macroeconomic implications. First, the widespread use of hedging by lenders and investors may result in lower net inflows to developing countries. And second, when a crisis threatens, it may lead to major outflows, which can exacerbate a country's foreign exchange problems and contribute to triggering a currency crisis. These possible developments pose a major challenge for policy makers of developing countries, as it is difficult to avoid their occurrence or to cope with their potentially destabilising effects.

4. Degree of risk aversion

As suggested above, hedging is a risk management practice that has been growing in recent years by lenders and investors dealing with emerging markets; this has been due to volatility of exchange rates, associated with the frequency of international financial crises. More generally, hedging has been undertaken in response to increased risk aversion.

Increased risk aversion has been associated with a change for the worse in investors’ perception of what emerging markets can offer in terms of returns and risk. As a fund manager sees it, in the emerging markets 'the decade of the 1990s was characterised by two halves: a first half of high returns and low assets' correlation, and a second half of low returns and high correlation'. In addition, a further issue that has been repeatedly mentioned by all sorts of investors is the lack of liquidity in emerging markets.

This change in perception has affected all types of investors and the way they look at the different asset categories. On the whole, the response to increased perceived risk by investment and pension funds has been a retreat from emerging markets, and amongst those remaining in emerging markets, a shift from emerging equities to emerging bonds. The response by banks, in turn, has been in the form of reduced cross-border lending to emerging markets. At the same time, they have acquired domestic banks in these markets, which have been on offer at relatively low prices. This contributed to an increase in within country lending.

As regards investors, their response to increased perceived risk (which can be regarded as a cyclical phenomenon) has come in the form of structural changes in the nature of investment funds. The EM crises of the late 1990s have led to a significant reduction in investment funds exclusively specialised in emerging markets; at the same time, global investment funds have taken over the role of investing in EM. To the extent that the latter have less knowledge on developing countries, this may have had a negative impact on such countries, in terms of volume of flows and their volatility.

27 See Dodd (2001) for an analytical discussion of hedging activities and their macroeconomic impact; see also Moguillansky (2001) on hedging by MNCs in Latin America.
A further possible change in connection with increased risk perception and risk aversion (for a given level of risk) refers to a growing preference for index tracking funds as opposed to balanced managed funds or even total return funds. This seems to be due to increased fear of underperforming, given the context of higher uncertainty concerning returns and risks.

In this new context of increased risk aversion, how much has the role of information changed regarding investors' and lenders' decision making process?

5. The role of information

It not easy to assert the precise role information has, or can have, in the decision-making process of lenders and investors. In a previous paper, Gottschalk (2001a) observes that investors claim they attach high importance to information, but also argues that in crucial moments of the investment decision process, information tends to have a rather marginal role. This is because in such a process performance assessment is the variable that matters. Performance assessment is usually based on how close an investor gets to a pre-established target, set in turn in relation to a specific benchmark index. Given that investors do not want to deviate too much from their benchmarks (as the penalties for that are very high), information ends up having little room to influence the decision-taking process.

However, the story is somewhat more complex. As seen earlier, decision taking can be observed in different phases of the investment cycle: in general portfolio allocation, security selection, and market timing. Apparently, market timing is the phase in which balanced fund managers and index trackers, which constitute the majority of investors, face the most binding constraints. However, relatively more room for considering alternative investment choices seems available in portfolio allocation decision and security selection phases and when, therefore, information can have an important role.

Our interviews reveal that as risk perception and risk aversion aversion went up following the crises of the late 1990s, lenders and investors started investing more in acquiring and systematising information on developing countries, which could be used in qualitative and/or quantitative analysis. This did not imply, however, more people employed in their research departments, but, as put by a fund manager, having the same analyst covering more ground, in terms of sectors and countries. Given the reduction in the number of dedicated emerging market funds, the total net result has been less people collecting and analysing developing country information, not more. This is not good as it takes time to build again expertise in developing countries.

An international bank that does qualitative analysis with the use of a wide range of information informed that it is their intent to design a new model that will take into account the following broad areas: transfer risk, domestic/economic environment, financial sector environment and political environment. The latter includes corporate governance and rules of law. In order to make their model feasible, they are looking for information on Codes and Standards (C&S). Their expectation is that such information can be made available in a quantifiable way.
For policy purposes, developing countries may see that as a problem, though. Developing country officials see as very worrying markets’ demands for quantifying information on C&S. They believe that it will be very harmful and unwelcome, if the markets start to judge and compare sovereign and corporate risks using scores, as seems is being already the case. In their view, this would mean making a process simplistic that is complex by nature and aimed at achieving greater transparency (Gottschalk, 2001b).

The bank's interest in information on C&S contrasts with the more general indifference the markets have expressed concerning C&S. It would be interesting to know whether the bank's interest in C&S reflects an emerging trend within the markets or whether it is just an isolated phenomenon. This is an important issue from the policy perspective, given that developing countries have been strongly encouraged to invest heavily in implementing C&S of international best practice, under the promise that by doing so they may be rewarded by the markets.

As regards information sources, some investors have in-house research; others rely on outside sources of information, which can include outside consultants, academics and international organisations, like the IMF. Some investors inform they cultivate contacts with policy makers and also travel to the countries in order to have a more accurate idea of the country's real problems.

A fund manager also noted that the EM investment community constitutes another key source of information. The community is relatively small, and therefore everybody knows who the major players are (amongst investment funds, hedge funds and local investors) and what assets they own. This enables them to detect their peers' intentions, in terms of buying or selling a specific asset of a given EM country, and therefore anticipate the impact of their intended actions on the asset's price.28

More information available may be helping investors to discriminate amongst EM countries, with less contagion happening as a result. However, from the perspective of the individual country that comes under severe scrutiny by the investment community, too much information may anticipate a crisis, thus having a counter-productive role. This is the opposite of what one would expect - that information could help investors be aware of potential problems early on, forcing the country concerned to take corrective actions in order to avoid a crisis at some point in the future.

According to our interviews, all types of lenders and investors seem to take due account of information during the different phases of the investment-decision process. However, momentum investors usually focus their attention on prices' analysis, while investors that follow contrarian strategies do seem to hold a more solid information base and rely more heavily on fundamental analysis in their decision-making process.

International banks, in turn, should be seen as a category apart. In normal times, for the purpose of lending they assess country information carefully (and benefit from information their affiliates can provide on the EM countries). Thus, their actions are more similar to those investors that act as contrarians. However, the crises of the late 1990s have shown that in moments of distress they seem more prone to herding.

28 That is analogous to keynes’ beautiful contest story.
behaviour, thus acting like momentum investors. Nonetheless, Fraga and Gleiser (2002), based on their experience with Brazil's crisis of 1999, argue that if bank creditors are provided with accurate and credible information about the country's situation and crisis management strategy, and on other banks' intentions, a run to the exit door can be altogether avoided.

Finally, it is important to address the following issue. Increased flows of information may indirectly contribute to herding, through lenders' and investors' risk management activities. That is, information (provided in large quantities and high frequency) may induce lenders and investors to adopt quantitative based techniques to manage risk. If these techniques become similar between them, due to new regulation, like the proposed Basle II, which wants to encourage the use of VAR approach, our interviewees agree that herding behaviour can be intensified (see discussion above).

6. Herding behaviour

However, as seen earlier our interviews reveal that lenders and investors diverge quite considerably in the techniques they use to manage risk. Thus, other factors may still be more important to explain herding.

A major factor behind herding which analysts seem to agree on, and our interviews confirm, is performance assessment and its frequency. This is because the penalty it imposes on an investor erring alone is much higher than on them doing so collectively. In the case of erring alone, the penalty may come in the form of a job loss. But the penalty may go beyond that. Legal constraints may further exacerbate the problem. As the Unilever case has recently demonstrated (see above), fund managers can be sued for underperforming, or not meeting the targets.

An additional factor that at present contributes to herding is the increased risk aversion amongst lenders and investors. As mentioned earlier, risk aversion has increased as a result of the crises of the late 1990s, especially the Russian crisis. As one investors put it, 'the Russian experience taught many investors that when there is a problem in a country, you simply abandon it entirely, and explain to your clients immediately that the country in question could be a repeat of Russia. In this way, clients do not blame you if you underperform relative to an index'. Moreover, investors argue that a further reason for panic today is the lack of a lender of last resort. Thus, today, if a country is facing difficulties, investors will simply pull out. The consequences of their actions will, however, be that spreads will shoot up and, then, banks will cut their credit lines and pull out as well. This means contagion taking place across different actors, a phenomenon already observed during the Asian crisis (see Gottschalk and Griffith-Jones, 2003).

Finally, in addition to peer pressure, performance criteria and legal threats, human psychology may play an important role in determining herding (see discussion above).
7. Constraints on investing in EM

This section complements previous discussion on the possible constraints on investing in developing countries, which inhibits capital flows to these countries despite the promised benefits of international portfolio diversification.

For all types of lenders and investors, today's low returns and high risks constitute the main problem for lending to, and investing in, emerging markets. These reflect, at least in part, the economic downturn the global economy is experiencing, and the corresponding slow growth prospects amongst most emerging market economies.

Other macroeconomic factors concerning EM economies that have inhibited capital flows to them are lack of investors' confidence in the policies pursued and in their sustainability. Nowadays, investors express caution about countries that adopt rigid exchange rate regimes (in the pre-East Asian crisis period they would have probably expressed the opposite view). On the political front, problems mentioned include the election cycles, lack of good governance, etc.

As regards EM capital markets, the main problems international investors face relate to lack of liquidity and size of the market. As some financial market analysts put it, 'liquidity is key', and in emerging markets, 'there are some liquidity holes'.

At the regulatory level, a constraint that affects portfolio flows refers to the limits OECD pension funds face to invest abroad. For example, German pension funds face upper limits for investing in non-EU equities and bonds of 6% and 5%; and Switzerland and Sweden impose limits on foreign assets of 30% and 5-10%, respectively (Davis, 2002, table 7). However, these types of restrictions are not generalised amongst OECD countries. Countries such as the US, UK and Japan impose no restrictions on foreign investments.

Another regulatory constraints that affect UK pension funds in particular, refer to the Minimum Funding Requirement (MFR) and the new accounting standard FRS17, which have been recently implemented with the purpose of encouraging a closer matching of assets and liabilities for pension funds. Because these regulations compare assets and liabilities at a given point in time, they may be inhibiting risk taking and portfolio diversification (see Kimmis, Gottschalk, Armendariz and Griffith-Jones, 2003).

In addition to the general constraints mentioned thus far, the interviews have also made clear that each category of flows - equities, bonds and lending - faces at present specific problems.

As regards equities, an important structural change that has been mentioned earlier is that companies in EM are raising capital in New York and other stock exchanges through ADRs and GDRs. Although this is in itself a mechanism to attract foreign flows, it contributes to emptying local stock exchanges. Moreover, big companies

29 Persaud (2001) presents an interesting analysis of possible causes of liquidity holes in emerging markets, in which the current trend in international capital markets towards lack of diversity amongst investors is highlighted (see further below).
have already been acquired by foreign capital, so investors think there are only few companies left that can offer adequate risk/return characteristics; and in East Asia in particular, many companies are still family-controlled. A further structural change that is affecting equity flows to emerging markets concerns the trend, pointed out above, in the increasing predominance of global funds and a decline in exclusively dedicated funds. Global funds are in search of liquidity - a key problem in EM as just mentioned - and suffer from information asymmetry. These factors tend to make such funds focus on big markets in detriment to the emerging markets.\(^30\)

On issues related to what is nowadays known as Codes and Standards (C&S), investors point to information asymmetries, poor corporate governance and levels of disclosure, and poor settlements systems as obstacles to investing in emerging market equities. Specifically on corporate governance, legislation is unfavourable to minority shareholders' rights.

As regards bonds, investors claim that lack of a lender of last resort, the official sector inclination towards supporting PSI initiatives and orderly debt workouts are factors that can potentially affect new flows to emerging markets negatively. A further problem relates to liquidity. Investors normally avoid trading with bonds that are less than US$ 300 million when issued. This is a problem that affects in particular small countries.

In the case of banks, a key regulatory issue is the Basle II proposal. International lenders agree with the view that although the level of bank lending to developing countries is already very low, such rules, if implemented, could crystallise this situation.

Table 2 summarises the specific constraints on lending to/investing in developing countries faced by different financial actors.

**Table 2. Lenders’ and investors’ specific constraints on lending on and investing in developing countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constraints on investing in EM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pension funds</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some OECD countries face restrictions on foreign investment: asset-liability structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global investment funds</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of liquidity and information asymmetry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dedicated investment funds</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems with investing in EM stock markets that increasingly lack depth and breath.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Banks</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>problems with personal security</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: interview material

Finally, in addition to the constraints for investing in EM, investors see specific problems regarding poor countries. These include acute lack of liquidity, lack of companies in which one can invest and problems with personal security. The latter was a factor mentioned by various interviewees. Furthermore, poor countries suffer from 'information failure' more acutely than medium-income developing countries. Lack of information that can be appropriately quantified by potential investors is seen

\(^{30}\) These funds, of course, also invest in bonds.
as an additional deterrent to investment to this category of countries. In the case India, which is a large poor country and a major recipient of investment, an investor mentioned as problems the various sorts of restrictions on foreign capital still in place, taxes on capital gains, among others.

Discussing the possible constraints investors face to investing in poor countries, it is really important to understand why Sub-Saharan Africa, which comprises a large number of poor countries, is perceived as having been largely unaffected by international capital flows. The question, to which we turn now, is whether this perception is really true, and, to the extent the answer is affirmative, what the constraints are for lending and investing more in the region, according to previous research on the subject.

8. Capital Flows to Sub-Saharan Africa

Recent research indicates that private capital flows to the region during the 1990s were considerably larger than what is believed (after the crises of the late 1990s some decline has been observed); part of this gap between perception and reality has to do with published data by international organisations, which underestimates these flows, due to problems they face in assembling and interpreting information obtained from national sources, which tend to be incomplete (Bhinda, Griffith-Jones, Leape and Martin, 1999). Data gathered by senior officials of selected Sub-Saharan African countries show that these flows were much higher; in any case, overall data information, be national or international, points to the fact that for some countries capital inflows amounted to 10-15% of their GDPs in certain years of the last decade, thus causing a significant impact on their economies.

If that is true that substantial capital has flown to Sub-Saharan Africa, what can then explain this phenomenon?

As regards portfolio equity flows, push factors have been identified as important in explaining the flows to Africa in the 1990s, particularly the decline in the US interest rate and the cyclical downturn in developed countries (see Bhinda, Griffith-Jones, Leape and Martin, 1999). That is, investors searched for higher returns through portfolio diversification. Moreover, shares in these countries were seen as undervalued, which increased expected returns and compensated for perceived higher risks. A further reason for investing in these countries’ stock exchanges was that these markets were seen as bearing a relatively low correlation with developed markets, at least much lower than correlation between developed countries’ markets and those of Latin America and other developing regions. However, as argued above, as flows increase, correlation is expected to move up as well as the degree of volatility in stocks’ returns. Thus, in so far as the region becomes more integrated into the world capital markets, some of the factors that had helped attract flows to the region may disappear.

Perceptions of the region vary considerably among investors (Bhinda, Griffith-Jones, Leape and Martin, 1999). Dedicated fund managers are generally better informed, whereas global ones have rather volatile perception, being euphoric in good times (e.g. positive performance in stock exchanges) and very pessimistic in bad times. An interesting point is that as investors diversify their portfolio, they have less
information to support their decision (Calvo and Mendoza, 1995, cited by Bhinda, Griffith-Jones, Leape and Martin, 1999). This is mentioned as a cause for less investment in the region. As seen above, the business literature supports this hypothesis. In addition, managers are subject to short-term assessments (every three months), which works as a disincentive to invest in the region, since its economic volatility is perceived as higher, which jeopardises short-term returns and therefore performance.

What about the role of national factors in affecting the investment decision process?

Table 2 displays the national factors (compiled by Bhinda, Griffith-Jones, Leape and Martin, 1999) that are seen by investors as important in their decision-making process. They range from purely economic factors, such as growth performance and exchange rate prospects, to institutional, such as private ownership, to more political ones (e.g. political stability).

Table 3: National factors underlying investors’ behaviour in Sub-Saharan Africa

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macro</th>
<th>Structural</th>
<th>Institutional</th>
<th>Sectoral</th>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Growth performance; other macroeconomic variables; Economic policy coordination; Exchange rate prospects.</td>
<td>Soundness of domestic financial system; regional economic integration; availability of natural resources; transport and telecom networks.</td>
<td>Private ownership; common regional regulation and supervision in banking; development of stock exchanges.</td>
<td>Low cost, volume-driven primary sectors.</td>
<td>Political stability.</td>
<td>Levels of corruption; Bureaucracy; motivated labour force; donor support for portfolio investment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s elaboration, based on Bhinda, Griffith-Jones, Leape and Martin (1999).

Bank lending

Bank lending to the region has been mainly associated with foreign presence of banks in the region’s countries. In the case of short-term and medium-term lending, the level of risk involved and the existence of risk mitigation mechanisms have been key in explaining these flows to the region. For example, short-term lending has been linked to better export performance; medium-term lending, in turn, has been made possible with reduced risk through guarantees and co-financing by IFIs (WB, IFC, EIB). FDI involvement in a project is pointed out as another important risk-reducing factor.

On the other hand, important factors deterring lending are: provisioning guidelines banks have to follow, the fact that export credit agencies have suspended guarantees against non-repayment of loans in most SSA since the 1980s, and the external debt burden.  

31 Table A.1 in annex summarises the recent characteristics of the different types of players.
Table 3 summarises all the factors mentioned in the literature review, the interviews and in this section that may have been working as possible constraints on lending to, and investing in, developing countries, including the poorest ones.

Table 3. Factors working as constraints on lending to, and investing in, developing countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors related to:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supply-side</strong></td>
<td>Prohibition of the use of instruments that may facilitate portfolio diversification (e.g. derivatives); slow-moving governance structure of funds; industry restrictions on investment abroad; performance assessment based on domestic benchmarks; regulatory constraints.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Information</strong></td>
<td>Information asymmetry; predominance of global funds (which suffer particularly from information asymmetry); lack of insufficient information for forecasting and analysis; cost of information; information comparability.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Risk</strong></td>
<td>Perception of low returns and high risks since the Asian crisis; currency risk; sources of risk: shallow markets; lack of liquidity; high level of concentration; multitude of existing financial instruments; risk between home and foreign assets is assessed differently.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Costs</strong></td>
<td>Cost of international management; international custodian costs; commission and transaction costs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Psychological</strong></td>
<td>Home bias; investors’ overconfidence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Host country factors</strong></td>
<td>Lack of confidence in policies and their sustainability; rigid exchange rates; election cycles; lack of good governance; market characteristics (patterns of share ownership); degree of government regulations; tax effects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equity specific</strong></td>
<td>Emptying local stock exchanges (due to companies raising capital through ADR and GDR); few companies left following privatisation; family-controlled firms (esp. in East Asia); C&amp;S related (poor corporate governance and levels of disclosure; poor settlements systems; legislation biased against minority shareholders’ rights).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bonds specific</strong></td>
<td>Lack of lender of last resort; official sector inclination towards supporting PSI initiatives and orderly debt workouts; liquidity related (avoiding trading with bonds that are less than US$ 300 million when issued).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Investment Banks specific</strong></td>
<td>Lack of lender of last resort; PSI initiatives and orderly debt workouts; problems with personal security; Basle II: may crystallise low levels of lending.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poor country specific</strong></td>
<td>Acute lack of liquidity; lack of companies to invest in; acute ‘information failure’; lack of information that can be quantified; personal security.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the business literature (see Part I); interview material and Bhinda et al. (1999).
9. Summary and Policy recommendations for lending and investing more in EM

This section summarises some of the findings reported in this study and attempts to outline a set of policy proposals aimed at encouraging more capital flows to developing countries.

A key finding that deserves further analysis is the fact that investors’ behaviour is not so homogeneous as we have been made to believe. Diversity can be found among investors, between investors and lenders, and among lenders as well. According to our interviews, even the same investment house adopts different investment strategies in its different investment divisions. How does this fit with our pre-conceived idea that investors behave very similarly?

As we have seen, the decision-making process is complex, consisting of different phases – asset allocation, security selection and risk management. These phases together comprise what we call here the investment cycle. During the first two phases of the investment cycle, diversity in investment behaviour may be indeed the case. Moreover, this diversity may have had positive, though limited, implications for developing countries. In normal times, some lenders and investors seem to have been inclined to invest in such countries more than others, through an allocation process in which alternative investment choices are considered and information can play an important role.

However, in times characterised by high uncertainty, lenders’ and investors’ behaviour tends to converge very rapidly, particularly in their risk management activities. This convergence takes place not only within the same categories of financial players, but across different categories of players. Thus, although some degree of diversity may also be found during the risk management phase, this diversity collapses and is replaced with herding behaviour, which is a key factor behind financial crises in developing countries.

This leads us to the issue of information. Under circumstances of high uncertainty, which may lead to herding, information’s role tends to become very limited (although some investors may argue that it may be used for the purpose of discriminating between countries, which could help reduce contagion effects). This is because management risk systems under such circumstances tend to collapse and, as a result, information, which is a key input in such systems, becomes irrelevant.

In normal times, information seems to have ambiguous effects. On the one hand, information can have a very positive role, when it is used to inform lenders and investors in their allocation and security selection process. Given that lack of information (which leads to asymmetric information problems) and in particular the cost of information have been pointed as major reasons behind little portfolio diversification towards developing countries, providing information on such group of countries could effectively contribute to the channelling of lending and investment funds to them.

On the other hand, the use of information may turn out to be problematic. An increase in the availability of information, which has been amply encouraged as a way to
reduce the occurrence of crises in developing countries, may have the opposite effect of accelerating a crisis. It could even contribute to the occurrence of a crisis that could have been perfectly avoided. This hypothesis, which is not confirmed by a recent study by Gelos and Wei (2002)\(^{32}\), should be further investigated.

Moreover, to the extent information becomes available on a continuous basis (e.g. high frequency data), it may make possible the use of VAR techniques that could not be used before due to lack of quantifiable information. The generalised use of similar techniques may intensify herding. Again, this is a crucial hypothesis that deserves further investigation. If true, it poses serious dilemmas to policy makers. While increasing the flow of information to markets may encourage the adoption of VAR models, it may well be the case that the markets will in any case adopt such models sooner or later, and those countries unable to provide information may be excluded from investors' portfolio geographical allocation.

Another important aspect of the decision-making process is that it involves various actors - investors, consultants, trustees, fund managers, analysts, and so forth. This poses a major challenge to policy-makers, as it is difficult to know whom to target in order to generate a change that can result in more capital flows to developing countries.

As regards the constraints on investing in developing countries, we have seen that, in addition to information, the obstacles to investing in such countries can be related to factors that are country specific (e.g. related to macroeconomic conditions, corporate governance, etc.), supply-side, which are the focus of the project (industry restrictions to invest abroad; investment performance based on domestic benchmarks), risk (e.g. currency risk, different risk assessments for different countries, liquidity), and to psychological aspects (home bias, overconfidence). Specifically as regards poor countries, aspects mentioned as particularly problematic include lack of liquidity, lack of companies in which to invest, acute 'information failure’ and personal security.

Drawing on the above, in what follows we provide a set of preliminary policy recommendations with the purpose of encouraging more private capital flows to developing countries, in addition to those already suggested in the part I of the paper. Some of these recommendations were discussed with financial market participants, and thus incorporate their suggestions for improvement. Others are drawn from the market participants themselves.

Market participants emphasised the need for developing countries to promote sound macroeconomic policies; moreover, in their view it is important that these countries improve their legal and political systems. They put much emphasis on the need for the rule of law and corporate governance, and improved environment for business in the country. Although these recommendations are very important, in what follows our focus will be on those policy measures and initiatives that can be implemented in the source countries.

A first measure we believe could encourage more private flows to developing countries and overcome psychological barriers such as ‘home bias’ could be in the

\(^{32}\) Gelos and Wei (2002) show that those countries most transparent (through the provision of information) are less likely to suffer a financial crisis.
taxation area, as suggested earlier. For example, tax incentives could be offered to pension funds, and eventually to other investors. It is the view of a fund manager, and apparently shared by many others, that these incentives would have to be provided on substantial terms to be effective. Therefore, more consultation is needed for the design of a scheme that can have a maximum impact.

A second measure refers to provisions of guarantees, as a way to, at least partially, address the problem of risk of different sorts, which has been repeatedly mentioned by lenders and investors as a major barrier to investing in developing countries, especially the poorer ones. These could be provided in normal times to encourage flows to those countries that otherwise do not have access to international financial markets, and also in times of risk aversion. Providing guarantees in a context of high risk could help influence investors’ appetite for risk. As seen above, tackling risk aversion is crucial, as it has been a major factor behind the decline in flows to developing countries since the East Asian crisis.

As seen earlier, a key problem deterring investors going to developing countries is lack of liquidity. In this regard, it is interesting to note that (Persaud, 2001) calls attention to the link between investors’ behaviour and the creation of liquidity holes in developing countries. He believes that this has to do with the fact that investors use similar models, which lead them to act in similar ways in face of changes in circumstances in developing countries. If a negative event takes place, they may overreact collectively thereby creating acute liquidity problems in specific developing countries’ markets. He suggests international regulators should encourage more diversity in terms of models used by investors. Each model could be tailored to their specific needs, and thus induce them to react to specific events in different ways. This, Persaud believes, could reduce the likelihood of a market liquidity drying-up.

Moreover, diversity in risk management should be encouraged in order to reduce herding thereby helping reduce the occurrence of financial crises in developing countries. More generally, diversity should be encouraged in all phases of the investment cycle. If diversity during the asset allocation phase increases, developing countries would have a higher chance to have access to capital flows, as some investors would be more inclined to invest in such countries.

The measures just mentioned may be useful to different asset categories. In what follows, we will consider measures that would be useful to specific kinds of investors/categories of assets.

As regards bonds, a financial market participant put forward a very interesting idea. He suggests the creation of a Latin American Borrower Authority. It would be an entity that would pool countries of the LA region (of course, this idea could be also applied to other groups of countries), and would issue bonds on behalf of these countries; these bonds would be issued at AA credit rating, and would be supported by collaterals. The authority would also be able to raise money in the international financial markets as an AA borrower, and thus lend to member countries at reasonable interest rates. The authority would also be able to set limits on the amount of money a country could raise, in the form of bond issuing or through borrowing, in order to avoid excessive flows, with tends to be the case in good times. The Borrower Authority would, of course, benefit in particular those countries that, for being small,
are not able to raise money in the international capital markets. This proposal is very similar to the already established institutions that have been very successful in their tasks of raising capital for a group of countries. The *Corporacion Andina de Fomento* (CAF) is a case in point.

A regional approach could be also applied to equities. For example, a number of market participants suggested that developing countries should try to create regional stock exchanges. Some players, however, see that with a degree of scepticism. They believe that the current trend in increasing reliance on major stock exchanges based in developed countries is inevitable, and that it is hard to conciliate this trend with the existence of developing countries’ stock exchanges. The latter would greatly suffer from acute liquidity problems, seen as key by investors.

Given the current trend in raising capital in developed countries’ stock markets, a market participant suggested that an important initiative would be to facilitate the path of a company that, although not very big, has a critical size to go to developed stock markets. Local markets would be for small companies.

Finally, in light of the problems raised throughout the paper concerning the constraints fund managers face regarding the use of benchmarks and the pressures they are under not to deviate too much from them, policy recommendations to investors, particularly to pension funds, could include:

- As regards pension funds, one possible way to move forward would be to change the way in which these funds look at the asset-liability match. Developing countries would particularly benefit from it, because pension funds tend to have long-term liabilities, while developing countries can offer long-term rewards, even when the short-term gains look uncertain.
- Given the power consultants hold at present, it would be important to try to influence them. Alternatively, as suggested in the Myners’ (2001) report, trustees could be trained to become more skilled in the investment management field (or to delegate their work to an expert); they should in particular learn about the benefits of diversification and of investing in developing countries, and give more long-term mandates. In addition, they should invest more in in-house research and set up investment sub-committees, as already is the case for a major UK pension fund (see above).
- One could draw on the idea of socially responsible investment (SRI) to propose something similar for developing countries. That is, institutional investors could be encouraged to invest in developing countries for moral and economic reasons, in the same way they may do for social, ethical or environmental reasons.


Dodd, R., 2001 ‘Derivatives, the shape of international capital flows and the virtues of prudential regulation’, paper prepared for UNU-WIDER project Capital flows to developing countries since the Asian crisis: how to manage their volatility, December.


Persaud, A. (2001) ‘Liquidity black holes – and why modern financial regulation in developed countries is making short-term capital flows to developing countries even more volatile’, paper prepared for UNU-WIDER project Capital flows to developing countries since the Asian crisis: how to manage their volatility, December.


Appendix 1. Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Person</th>
<th>Occupation/Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>David Lubin</td>
<td>Economist, HSBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>Avinash Persaud</td>
<td>State Street Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>Patricia Jackson</td>
<td>Head, Financial Industry and Regulation Division, Bank of England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Paul Dickson</td>
<td>EM Manager/Head Debt Team, JP Fleming Asset Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston</td>
<td>Jeff Kaufman</td>
<td>EM Debt Portfolio Manager and Senior Vice President, Putnam Investments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicago</td>
<td>Maria Mednikov</td>
<td>EM Portfolio Manager, UBS Asset Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newport Beach</td>
<td>Mohamed El-Erian</td>
<td>EM Debt Portfolio Manager, Pacific Investment Management Company (PIMCO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Amer Bisat</td>
<td>EM Portfolio Manager, Morgan Stanley Investment Management (MSIM)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>John Carlson</td>
<td>Portfolio Manager, Fidelity Management and Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>Arnab Banerjii</td>
<td>Chairman, Investment Division, F&amp;C Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>Cliff Dammers</td>
<td>Director, International Primary Market Association, IPMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>Michael Howell</td>
<td>Managing Director, Cross Border Capital</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>Mark Gunton</td>
<td>Senior Manager, Group Credit Portfolio Management, HSBC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Role and Additional Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>Raja Iyer</td>
<td>Senior Portfolio &amp; Country Risk Manager, Financial Institutions Credit Control, HSBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>Michael Lynch</td>
<td>Economist, Financial Institutions Credit Control, HSBC</td>
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<td>London</td>
<td>Peter West</td>
<td>Chief Economist in London, BBVA</td>
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<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Paul Masco</td>
<td>Managing Director, Salomon Smith Barney (SSB) – front desk; Head Trader (Department Manager), Global Emerging Markets Trading Dept (Fixed Income)</td>
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<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Modesto Gomez</td>
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<td>Roger Urwin</td>
<td>Global Head, Investment Consulting, Watson Wyatt</td>
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<td>Ernest Stern</td>
<td>Managing Director, JP Morgan Chase</td>
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<td>London</td>
<td>Steven Bates</td>
<td>JP Morgan Fleming Asset Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>John Calverley</td>
<td>Chief Economist – American Express Bank - AMEX</td>
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<td>London</td>
<td>Kenneth King</td>
<td>Rexeter</td>
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<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>Philip Barleggs</td>
<td>Head of Asset Allocation, Rothschild Asset Management Limited</td>
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<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>Brandon Davies</td>
<td>Head of Retail Market Risk Unit, Barclays</td>
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<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>Peter Moon</td>
<td>Chief Investment Officer, Universities Superannuation Scheme Limited - USS</td>
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<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>Stephen Gosztony</td>
<td>Capital International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>Luis Oliveira</td>
<td>Capital International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>Andrew Kirton</td>
<td>Head of UK Team, Mercer Investment Consulting</td>
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</table>
Table A1. Lenders and Investors’ recent traits

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lending/Investment strategy</th>
<th>Allocation decision</th>
<th>Degree of risk aversion</th>
<th>Role of information</th>
<th>Use of models</th>
<th>Herding behaviour</th>
<th>Constraints on investing in EM</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pension funds</td>
<td>Contrarians</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Important.</td>
<td>Little.</td>
<td>Below average</td>
<td>Some OECD countries face restrictions on foreign investment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Global investment funds</td>
<td>Top-down approach</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate.</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Lack of liquidity and information asymmetry.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dedicated investment funds</td>
<td>Bottom-up approach</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Crucial.</td>
<td>Little.</td>
<td>Below average</td>
<td>Tend to be equity investors that are facing problems in investing in EM stock markets that increasingly lack depth and breadth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>Increasing within country lending and declining cross-border lending.</td>
<td>Top-down approach</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Important.</td>
<td>Some do.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: interview material