# Recognising, explaining and measuring chronic urban poverty in South Africa

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Chronic poverty in South Africa, like elsewhere in Africa, is overwhelmingly understood as a rural phenomonon. This paper seeks to counter this belief and provides a broad overview of the current issues and debates around the urbanisation of poverty. Against background analysis of why apartheid made urban blacks poor and why these patterns of poverty are being entrenched to create chronic poverty for many urbanites, the paper sets out a methodology for profiling poverty in 9 South African cities. The objective of generating a baseline poverty profile is to provide an evolving framework for the ongoing monitoring of poverty in cities. In particular the methodology of the City Development Index CDI is explored as a comparative, quanitfiable measure of urban poverty that provides an appropriate and flexible tool for policy interventions.

## 1 Recognising Urban Poverty

*If there is a typical 'face of poverty' in South Africa then this picture is no longer only a rural women engaged in subsistence agricultural production. It is an HIV positive child living in an environmentally degraded informal settlement in a rapidly growing city - without services and subjected to organised and household violence and vulnerable to global economic and political regime changes.*

Despite the fact that the apartheid government removed all African people who were unemployed from urban areas, there is no South African City that is free of poverty. Since the democratic elections of 1994 urban regeneration and integration has been a key national objective (Box 1). However, every formal poverty reduction programme run by government has an overtly rural bias, and there is a very widely held conviction that the problem of chronic poverty is located in rural areas.

Box 1: Key national and international urban poverty reduction policies and objectives

| National policy imperatives and targets for reducing urban poverty | International policy imperatives and development targets on urban poverty |
|---|---|
| ?? *Reconstruction and Development Programme* [1] <br> ?? *The Urban Development Strategy* [2] <br> ?? *The Urban Development Framework* [3] <br> ?? *Developmental Local Government* [4] <br> ?? *Urban Renewal Programme* [5] | ?? *Millennium targets for 2015* [6] <br> ?? *Habitat Agenda* [7] <br> ?? *New Partnership of Africa's Development (NEPAD)* [8] <br> ?? *Cities Alliance without slums* [9] <br> ?? *World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg Plan of Action* [10] |

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[1] ANC, 1994: *The Reconstruction and Development Programme*, Praxis Press, Durban

[2] http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/rdp/urbanrdp.html#CONTENTS

[3] SA Government, 1997: *National Urban Development Strategy*. Pretoria.

[4] South Africa, 1998: *Local Government White Paper*, Department of Constitutional Development, Pretoria

[5] Details available from Department of Housing and Department of Provincial and Local Government

Largely arising out of the work of the recently formed South African Cities Network (SACN) there is a growing recognition that meeting national and international targets for poverty reduction requires an urban as well as a rural focus. Because of the South African history of migrant labour poor peoples' lives often straddle rural and urban boundaries. It is thus a case of needing **both** an urban **and** a rural poverty reduction strategy, rather that seeing the problems of poverty in rural **versus** urban poverty terms, as is too often the case.

In South Africa the categories 'African' or 'rural' are often assumed to be a proxy indicators of poverty because these groups show higher <u>average</u> levels of poverty than the categories 'white' or 'urban' (Tables 1 and 2). While these patterns are generally true, and can be explained with reference to the apartheid legacy, they mask important variations within and between the categories.

Table 1: Urban/non urban unemployment by race[11]

|  | African | Coloured | Indian | White | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *Strict definition* |  |  |  |  |  |
| Urban rate | 28.9% | 17.3% | 15.3% | 4.8% | 21.7% |
| Non-urban rate | 29.6% | 7.3% | 22.7% | 3.7% | 27.0% |
| *Expanded definition* |  |  |  |  |  |
| Urban rate | 40.9% | 26% | 19.9% | 6.9% | 31.7% |
| Non-urban rate | 48.1% | 13.7% | 29.6% | 5.8% | 44.8% |

Table 2: Urban/rural distribution of households without electricity

| Number of urban houses without electricity | Number of rural houses without electricity | Province |
|---|---|---|
| 69 742 | 548435 | Eastern Cape |
| 21415 | 14475 | Northern Cape |
| 67490 | 70029 | Free State |
| 174137 | 563112 | KwaZulu-Natal |
| 5699 | 193788 | North West |
| 472154 | 34091 | Gauteng |
| 56957 | 92518 | Mpumalanga |

The problem with the comparison between rural and urban places is that, especially in urban areas, we fail to acknowledge the extent of poverty. While it is true that cities

[6] http://www.developmentgoals.org/

[7] http://www.unchs.org/mdg/

[8] http://www.dfa.gov.za/events/nepad.htm

[9] http://www.citiesalliance.org/citiesalliancehomepage.nsf/Attachments/auualreport02/$File/2002_AR_FINAL.pdf

[10] http://www.earthsummit2002.org/

[11] South African Institute of Race Relations 2001: *South African Survey 2000/2001,* Johannesburg, p.380.

are centres of wealth, they are also the focus of intense poverty. We also know that there are high concentrations of poverty within particular cities, making poor urban areas (normally ex townships or informal areas) the highest concentrations of poverty in the country. Moreover, the generally accepted notion that women and children are more vulnerable to poverty holds equally well for urban areas. The post apartheid demographic reality counters sterotypes that have depicted South African cities as predominantly white, adult and male places: in fact African women and children make up the bulk of the total urban population (Figures 1 and 2)

**Total Urban Population, by Race
1996**

Legend:
- Indian Men
- Coloured Men
- White Men
- African Men
- Indian Women
- Coloured Women
- White Women
- African Women

Age groups (top to bottom): 95-99 Years, 90-94 Years, 85-89 Years, 80-84 Years, 75-79 Years, 70-74 Years, 65-69 Years, 60-64 Years, 55-59 Years, 50-54 Years, 45-49 Years, 40-44 Years, 35-39 Years, 30-34 Years, 25-29 Years, 20-24 Years, 15-19 Years, 10-14 Years, 5-9 Years, 0-4 Years

X-axis (Population): -1300000, -800000, -300000, 200000, 700000, 1200000

The age structure of our cities means that young people and children are especially affected by poverty.

**1996 City Population by Race**

*Legend: Indian/Asian, Coloured, White, African Black*

*Y-axis: Population (0 to 3,000,000)*

*X-axis: Joburg, East Rand, Pretoria, Durban, Pieter-maritzburg, Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Buffalo City, Mangaung*

The legacy of apartheid means that African, coloured and Indian people, who form the majority of the urban population, bear the brunt of poverty. However there is increasing inequality within the old apartheid categories of race and a more nuanced understanding of the profile of the urban poor is required.

One reason why the position of the urban poor in South Africa has been ignored is because of the way that the figures on the distribution of poverty are presented. There are different ways of measuring poverty and not all reveal the same patterns. Some of the most standard measures include income poverty in the form of poverty gaps[12] or infrastructure poverty, for example using informal housing as an indicator of poverty and need.[13] Using informal housing as an indicator of poverty accentuates the urban problem while the use of a single income poverty line tends to underestimate the extent of urban poverty, because of the higher cash demands of living in town (compare Figures 3 and 4).

In line with the latest development practice, the definition of urban poverty adopted in this report rejects narrow income based measures and adopts a wider definition of poverty that is located within a sustainable development approach.

> *Poverty is more than a lack of income. Poverty exists when an individual or a household's access to income, jobs and/or infrastructure is inadequate or sufficiently unequal to prohibit full access to opportunities in society. The condition of poverty is caused by a combination of social, economic, spatial, environmental and political factors.*

This wide definition of poverty seeks to embrace the diverse causes, experiences and manifestations of poverty that are outlined in the growing international literature on urban poverty (Box 2) while being relevant to South African specificities, including the legacy of apartheid that underscores the persistence of the chronically poor (Box

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[12] Presidents Office – National Spatial Development Plan

[13] South Africa 2002: *Housing Atlas,* Department of Housing

3). Recognising the multiple dimensions of poverty also directs attention to the range of actors who need to be involved in poverty relief and poverty reduction.

Box 2: International debates on the definition and measurement of urban poverty

| APPROACH TO POVERTY | TYPE OF INDICATOR |
|---|---|
| **INCOME PERSPECTIVE:** <br> This is the argument that categorises people as poor if their income falls below a defined income measure. | GGP, welfare payments, wage levels and poverty datum lines are income indicators. |
| **BASIC NEEDS:** <br> This is one of the most influential international perspectives on poverty, especially in the context of the South or 'third world' where millions of people live without adequate food, shelter or sanitation. Basic needs can include 'hard' infrastructure such as storm water or 'social' infrastructure such as schools or clinics. | There are a number of well known poverty indicators that come out of a basic needs perspective, for example: access to potable water, literacy, life expectancy and nutrition levels. |
| **SOCIAL EXCLUSION:** <br> Social exclusion refers to the fact that despite welfare and general wealth, there remains a group who are excluded from the mainstream benefits of the society and who are prevented in some way from gaining from the general prosperity. | Indicators of social exclusion emphasise political, social and economic components of poverty and inequality and are thus either multi-part or composite indicators. These indicators are often qualitative measuring, for example, racism or sexism. |
| **SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS:** <br> This approach stresses the involvement of individuals and communities in defining and solving their own poverty. The assumption is that everyone is not poor or vulnerable in the same way and that identifying local variations in poverty or deprivation are crucial to effective development strategies. | Community generated indicators focus on vulnerability or the inability to cope with hardship rather than poverty, so crucial issues that emerge may not be the lack of an income or even jobs but rather factors such as disability, the breakdown of the family or social problems like alcoholism. |
| **LOCALITY:** <br> Space or geography is seen by some to be an independent variable in the poverty equation. | Indicators used by poverty analysis interested in locality include segregation indices, transport indicators and other mapping tools. The use of GIS facilitates a locational analysis of most other indicators. |
| **ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE** <br> Equitable access to a healthy, pollution free environment and to the environmental resources required to support a healthy life without compromising the opportunities of future generations. | Indicators typically found in the State of Environment reports including air pollution, water quality and environmental health indicators. |
| **HUMAN DEVELOPMENT:** <br> The emphasis here is on a holistic understanding of poverty where anti-poverty action enlarges peoples' life choices. Specifically this refers to enabling individuals to lead a long and healthy life, in which they are educated and have access to a decent standard of living. Included in this notion of poverty alleviation is ensuring that human rights are upheld and that political and social freedoms are secure. | Indicators are varied and complex indicators that reflect the diversity of the poverty condition. The Human Development Index and the Gender Development Index are well known examples. A more recent measure designed specifically for cities is the City Development Index. |

Figure 3: Poverty measured by the shortage of adequate housing

Figure 4: The poverty gap



The post apartheid tendency to ignore urban poverty reflects a general lack of awareness of the causes and expansion of poverty in South African cities. The steady increase in the urban population can be seen in Table 3 and Figures 5 and 6.[14] Note that while there has been a steady increase in the number of people living in cities in South Africa over the past century, the rate of increase has not been uniform across race, gender or location. Most particularly the growth in the size of the poor urban population is associated with the Africanisation and feminisation of cities.

[14] These figures are drawn from Crankshaw, O. and Parnell, O: 2002: Urban change in South Africa, report prepared for IIED, London.

Unsurprisingly the poorest urban dwellers are commonly among those who have most recently moved to town. [15]

**African Urban Population by Gender, 1911-1996**



**Urban Population by Race, 1911-1996**



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[15] Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell, 2003, African urbanisation, forthcoming in D. Brycon and D. Potts (eds.)

**Table 3 Annual Population Growth Rate, 1890-1996 (Percentage)**

**Metropolitan Areas and Larger Cities[16]**

|  | Greater Johannesburg | Greater Cape Town | Greater Durban | Port Elizabeth | East London & Mdantsane | Bloemfontein, Botshabelo & Thaba Nchu | Total Metropolitan Areas & Cities |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1891-1911 | 17.6 | 3.4 | 8.7 | 2.5 | 5.2 | 3.0 | 8.0 |
| 1911-1921 | 1.3 | 2.2 | 0.1 | 2.2 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.4 |
| 1921-1936 | 4.7 | 3.1 | 7.1 | 5.6 | 2.5 | 3.2 | 4.5 |
| 1936-1946 | 3.8 | 3.3 | 3.7 | 3.5 | 2.5 | 1.3 | 3.6 |
| 1946-1951 | 4.0 | 4.2 | 5.6 | 5.3 | 3.1 | 10.1 | 4.4 |
| 1951-1960 | 3.1 | 3.4 | 3.8 | 4.1 | 2.8 | 3.4 | 3.3 |
| 1960-1970 | 3.0 | 3.2 | 4.3 | 3.1 | 5.8 | 2.3 | 3.3 |
| 1970-1980 | 2.7 | 2.9 | 2.6 | 3.0 | 3.0 | 1.6 | 2.7 |
| 1980-1991 | 2.3 | 2.8 | 2.4 | 2.4 | -3.3 | 6.9 | 2.4 |
| 1991-1996 | 2.8 | 3.6 | 3.2 | 2.7 | 19.0 | 3.8 | 3.5 |

Source: Calculated from Population Censuses

The follow section turns to an examination of the origins and current dynamics of urban poverty. The purpose of this discussion is to highlight the complexity of characterising poverty in purely economic terms. The historical perspective highlights the complex and interconnected structures and strategies that entrench people in poverty in urban areas.

## 2 The causes of chronic urban poverty

Apartheid as a strategy depended on the fact that not all black people were treated in the same way or treated equally badly. The objective in this section is therefore to isolate the diverse ways in which urban apartheid made people poor. Six aspects of apartheid policy which caused black urban poverty are highlighted (Box 3). These include racist forced removals, the nature of housing provision for blacks, the character of urban jobs, the costing of urban services and the municipal financial base, the regulation of urbanisation and the financial impact of struggle politics on the poor. Each sub-section concludes by identifying how the particular aspect of the overall apartheid urban strategy translates into post-apartheid poverty, inequality or vulnerability.

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[16] Table complied before the 2000 Demarcation Board boundaries were defined see Crankshaw, O. and Parnell. S. 2002: Urban Change in South Africa, Report for IIED, London for a full list of magisterial districts included in calculations. Note a number of the fluctuations relate to the inclusion/exclusion of homeland settlements in the census.

Box 3: Apartheid and urban poverty[17]

Racist forced removals
?? Removals robbed black people of their property or tenancies.
?? Victims of removal did not get proper compensation.
?? Removals destroyed urban economic niches.
?? Removals increased costs because new housing was far from town.
?? Removals disrupted established community structures.

Segregationist and apartheid housing provision
?? The poor quality of the stock available to black, men women and children negatively affected their urban productivity and performance.
?? The value of houses transferred from rental to ownership was less for blacks than for whites.
?? There were missed opportunities for black investment in urban property.
?? Women were especially badly affected by policies of state controlled housing.
Restrictions on free trading rights for all, and racist employment codes
?? Black urban residents earned very low wages in unskilled jobs and therefore did not have enough money to meet basic needs.
?? Even once job reservation was lifted, Africans struggled to compete because of poor educational levels associated with inferior segregated education.
?? Black people struggled to create independent economic opportunities for themselves under apartheid because of restrictions on trading and retail activity in the townships.
The high cost of black household expenditure on basic goods and services
?? The irrationality of the segregation driven location of the residential areas of the poor has increased costs such as transportation.
?? Because of the system of financing locations, there is a legacy of the unfair cross subsidisation of rates to rich white neighbourhoods instead of poor African residential areas.
?? Residents of informal settlements pay the highest per item costs on basic commodities such as water and fuel.
Distorting patterns of urbanisation and urban growth
?? Because of influx control settlements have grown in places where there are no jobs or infrastructure.
?? Opportunities for wealth creation are much better in metropolitan areas than they are in old homeland areas where many Africans were forced to live.
?? Traditional land tenure makes it difficult to transfer property assets from settlements within the old homelands.
?? The position of migrants who move between town and countryside is much less sustainable than those with an established urban or rural base.
Payment for the anti-apartheid struggle
?? Many students who stayed away from school now have no formal education.
?? Workers who participated in strikes and boycotts and had their wages cut .
?? Residents who, if only for the sake of fear, shifted from the violence torn trains and onto the more expensive taxis.
?? Families had to pay fees or dues to the shacklords, warlords, civic, and other political structures that effectively governed the townships in the 1980s.

## 2.1 Racist clearances and the impoverishment of black urbanites

It is now more than fifty years since forced removal of African, coloured and Indian families from the inner cities under the overtly segregationist legislation of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 and the covertly segregationist Slums Act of 1934 began. Because these removals took place over a generation ago we tend to under-emphasise how important they were in creating the patterns of contemporary urban inequality. But the impact of these forced removals is still felt by the families evicted

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[17] SANGOCO 1998: Background Paper for the Urban Poverty Hearings.

from conveniently located, well-loved properties in the heart of the city. Across the world poor communities were removed from unsanitary inner city housing as city centres grew and as states were able to intervene to improve the general conditions of the built environment. In much the same way in South Africa, white families who were evicted from slums in the 1930s received state compensation for their housing, or they were rehoused in better quality accommodation provided by the state. Slum clearance for this select group amounted to a welfare pay out.

Supposedly reformist anti-slum measures (which included the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 and the Slums Act of 1934) were also some of the most important instruments through which the state imposed a pattern of racial residential segregation, thereby disrupting the consolidation of newly urbanised African communities and undermining the conditions under which blacks lived in the city by disrupting social networks. Whereas white families were compensated or accommodated in sanitary public housing schemes, black people were often financially ruined by the forced relocation from 'slums'. African people were especially badly affected by racially selective state action to impose high standards of urban development in the inter-war years. Most Africans were tenants, so they were not eligible for compensation for removal from slum housing. Also, unlike whites, Indians or coloureds, they were only eligible for public housing in the locations if they could prove that they had an urban job. Often, especially in the case of Africans, evicted slum occupants rejected the rigidly controlled state locations and were then forced into paying exorbitant rentals in the few overcrowded black freehold suburbs like Cato Manor in Durban and District Six in Cape Town.

A second wave of racist forced removals took place after World War Two. Many of the same families cleared from inner city suburbs like Doornfontein in Johannesburg during the 1930s were once again forcibly relocated from their 'new' homes in places like Sophiatown to the mass housing developments that make up today's coloured, Indian and African townships. The social and personal costs of securing a house in an apartheid location cannot be ignored. Because access to accommodation depended on being married, Africans would construe relationships with virtual strangers. Although for many the townships offered a respite from persistent state harassment over housing, not everyone who moved into these matchbox-like houses was guaranteed a secure place of urban residence. Women were especially vulnerable to the threat of eviction: as if their husbands died or divorced them they lost the right to urban status and could be repatriated to a rural area.

Whereas the segregationist years had seen extensive and brutal emphasis placed on segregating Africans living in towns into separate places, the apartheid years affected coloured and Indian people more harshly. The Group Areas Act of 1950 resulted in hundreds of thousands of people being moved from well established and entrenched communities to newly built housing schemes where nobody knew who their neighbour might be. The Group Areas Act targeted owners as well as tenants. Property owners especially lost money because of the removals. Compensation for land and housing was hopelessly inadequate. Alternative sites allocated to blacks have not appreciated at anything like the same rate as the original holdings. Take the example of removals in Newlands or Claremont in Cape Town. These well-established suburbs with their distinctive Victorian and Edwardian housing from where coloured residents were evicted in the 1960s and 1970s have subsequently seen significant appreciation and gentrification in the late 1990s. Suburbs on the Cape Flats reflect the fairly harsh development style of modern low-income housing stock

and, predictably, these areas have not appreciated as part of the 1990s Cape property boom.

What the forced removals of the 1920s, the 1930s, the 1940s, the 1950s, the 1960s and 1970s have in common is the erosion of hard-earned urban economic niches, the increase in costs brought on by settling into new housing far from town, and the disruption of established community structures. Crime, high urban costs associated with locational peripheralisation and poor quality living environments of urban South Africa have their roots in the nearly century long trajectory of removing and relocating blacks from prime land to less and less desirable locations within the city. Recognising that the cost of urban racial residential segregation were borne by blacks robbed of their property or tenancies provides the starting point of acknowledging the apartheid legacy of inequality and poverty.

*2.2 Poverty and urban housing supply*

Segregation and apartheid controls regulated not only where people lived, but also the conditions of their private accommodation. The most extreme example of this is the hostel. Both segregation and apartheid were founded on the practice of migrant labour. The far reaching and detrimental impacts of forcing men to live alone in compounds or hostels are difficult to assess. Among the more obvious impoverishing aspects of migrancy are the low wages paid to so called 'single' workers, the costs of commuting between a rural home and urban work, of maintaining two homes, and of being forced to live in appalling compound conditions while working in town. Migrants are not the only urban workers who have been denied family housing and lifestyles in South Africa. From the early 1920s large metropolitan authorities encouraged white home builders to include domestic servants' quarters on their properties. In 1994 over 30 percent of African women were employed as domestic workers[18], many housed in rooms at the back of their employers' houses. Typically, white South African family life depended on the presence of a full-time live-in domestic worker, usually a woman. More recently domestic or servants' quarters are occupied by piece workers, who pay 20 percent of their income, or a day's wages, in lieu of rent. Wages for domestic work are notoriously low, while the hours and terms of work are arduous and the standard of accommodation abysmal. Across the cities of South Africa the negative conditions that black people occupy can be ascribed to poor levels of affordability. The contradictions of urban wealth and poverty are nowhere more apparent than in the suburban home.

Collectively, there are a number of ways that residential domestic service and migrancy have undermined the quality of urban development in South Africa. Aside from the incalculable social and political costs of destroying the African family, the fact that a major portion of the income of the poor has been forcibly devoted to unproductive investment in transport between town and countryside, rather than in consolidating their already tenuous positions in either place makes little moral or economic sense. Additional evidence of the madness associated with the commitment to migrancy and segregation was the apartheid government's decision to place a moratorium on building houses in African locations in 'white' urban areas after 1968. In line with the political logic of territorial separation and separate development, state construction of African housing in metropolitan areas virtually ceased in the 1970s. Urban population growth and urbanisation continued apace, and drastic overcrowding ensued. As a result many African households defied the township regulations and

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[18] Valodia, I., 1996: Work, in D. Budlender (ed.) *The Women's Budget,* IDASA, Cape Town, 53-96.

began sub-letting in backyard shacks. Throughout the 1980s when the occupants of the main houses were involved in rent boycotts, these sub-tenants continued to pay rent. Not surprisingly renters were among the first to abandon the violence torn township areas for squatter camps in the mid 1980s. There is some evidence suggesting that these residents of informal settlements and site and service schemes are amongst the poorest of the poor urban population. While there is growing knowledge about this residual component of the African population, much less is known about the marginalised sectors of the coloured or Indian populations who have been unsuccessfully waiting for public housing assistance for 20 years or more. The awful standard of housing available to urban blacks, even in metropolitan areas, has seriously impeded the performance not only of migrants in the urban economy, but also of permanently urbanised African families. Only when unsatisfactory domestic conditions have undermined and threatened economic productivity or political stability has anything direct been done to improve basic housing standards in urban areas. The prospect of infectious disease saw basic codes of hygiene applied to black sectors of town in the early twentieth century. Increasing demand for semi-skilled African workers in the 1930s was associated with some improvement in official housing standards for black urban areas. Similarly in the 1950s the private sector intervened to subsidise formal housing construction instead of the proposed site and service delivery. In the 1970s, the challenge of urban poverty resulted in massive corporate pressure on the state to reform apartheid laws that prevented individual urban land ownership and therefore undermined the formation of a black middle class. In the dying years of apartheid the government tried to legitimise tricameralism by upgrading the amount of money spent on coloured and Indian housing. Despite gradual refinement of the housing code and periodic increases in the amount of money invested in black shelter, most township families face the daily frustration of leaking roofs, shared beds, outside ablutions, badly insulated structures and unsightly neighbourhoods. This inadequate physical environment of the township houses provides the backdrop to the domestic stresses of how to distribute inadequate incomes so they cover schools, transport and basic food and health requirements. Poor primary, secondary and tertiary performance among black students has to be set against overcrowding, lack of electricity and even the absence of running water. Additionally, women forced to maintain households without electricity or running water are burdened with physically arduous and time consuming tasks normally associated with rural poverty. The inferior quality of much black urban housing stands in start contrast to the affluence of suburbia.

The unequal physical standard of housing created under segregation and apartheid links directly to the residential property assets of the different urban race groups. Leaving aside the issue of the private housing market and concentrating on public stock, the racial hierarchy is clearly visible. In state-built housing schemes whites were allocated bigger houses, better finishes and more associated services like recreation halls and parks. In accordance with the unofficial racial grading system in South Africa, Indians had slightly lower housing standards than whites; for coloureds the quality of accommodation deteriorated further; and in African areas normal levels of finish were abandoned altogether. Many township houses still do not have interior ceilings, walls or floors. The unequal standards of accommodation which resulted from highly varied racial expenditure on housing over most of the twentieth century were reinforced by differential building codes for white and black sections of the city. As ownership of most of these state built houses have now been transferred to their

established tenants, the racially uneven profile of housing stock has been translated into an individual's capital assets today.

Individual accumulation of wealth occurs through wages, but also inheritance and speculation. Poverty occurs when individuals are excluded from these sources of wealth. Under apartheid there were only limited opportunities open to coloureds and Indians to speculate in prime residential, commercial and industrial land. For Africans there were no opportunities for investing in property within 'white' urban areas. As a result, the sizeable gains in capital investment made by many white South Africans through urban property investment over the decades have not been shared by all. Moreover black South Africans are now entering a mature property market and they must compete with well-established investors to secure expensive property in good locations.

Segregationist and apartheid housing provision created poverty in three distinct ways. First, the poor quality of the stock available to black, men women and children negatively affected their urban productivity and performance; second, the value of houses transferred from rental to ownership was less for blacks than for whites; third, there were missed opportunities for black investment in urban property.

*2.3 Poverty, inequality and urban jobs*

Poverty is about not having enough money to buy basic food, clothing and other essential commodities like health care or education. In an urban context the fact that everything needs to be purchased means that the cash costs of survival are high. The extent of urban poverty should not therefore be compared to that of rural areas using income as a measure, as it is almost always done in South Africa. Especially in the large urban centres black people rarely had enough cash to survive. Poverty was endemic. One reason for this widespread poverty among black workers was institutionalised job reservation. Job reservation not only meant that blacks were barred from skilled and semi-skilled work, but that differential wage rates applied to black and white workers for the same job. Even in the declining years of apartheid, once the skills shortage necessitated greater inclusion of people of colour into better paid jobs, poor educational levels among blacks prevented significant entry into the high-paying professions. The racial allocation of jobs, racially unequal wages and poor black occupational mobility lies at the core of the urban poverty in South Africa. Through much of South Africa's history most black urbanites were required under the Native's Act (Urban Areas) and its amendments to have a formal job. Until the abolition of influx controls in the mid 1980s levels of metropolitan unemployment were kept artificially low. But even this deceptive strategy of deflecting the poverty problem from the urban to the rural areas could not mask the widespread poverty faced by township residents. The fact is that wages for black urban labour were generally too low to meet the needs of a family in town. Individual accounts of hunger, sharing, borrowing and 'making do' pervade the life histories of black South Africans. In their efforts to survive and get ahead many black South Africans sought economic opportunities outside of the formal, rigidly segregated employment system. However, under segregation and apartheid moonlighting or making extra money was not easy for black people.

The precedent of restricting and controlling black economic activity to prevent any conflict with whites dates back to the late nineteenth century when competition from Indian retailers resulted in the passage of the Asiatic Bazaar legislation which limited where Indians could trade. The Natives (Urban Areas) Act also included clauses prescribing where and under what terms Africans could establish businesses. The incredibly harsh and inadequate provision that was made for any retailing activity

within townships under apartheid not only forced residents into the white towns to shop, but it also limited the number of economic opportunities for people of colour. During the apartheid years many of the opportunities now open to informal traders in a deregulated environment of the 1980s and 1990s did not exist, and street vendors were actively harassed by municipal officials and the police. Official rules did not of course always work, especially within the townships where official regulation was much less overt. Thus, despite the fact that the state held a monopoly on beer brewing a significant number of households survived on running illegal shebeens and spaza shops, a practice which some suggest may contribute to some of the townships' current pathologies of widespread alcohol abuse.

The lifting of trading restrictions from black areas has had mixed responses from the poor. On the one hand the introduction of major retail outlets into townships reduces prices, but on the other hand it undermines traditional niches of small informal operators. Changes in government policy have made significant improvements for the survivalist informal sector, and there is now an explicit commitment to SMMEs and LED initiatives that include anti-poverty strategies. Once the new framework of local government is established (see discussion below) economic development will become a core responsibility of local government.

Urban poverty in black South Africa is directly related to restrictions on free trading rights for all, and racist employment codes. Black urban residents earned very low wages in unskilled jobs and therefore did not have enough money to meet basic needs. Even once job reservation was lifted, Africans struggled to compete because of poor educational levels associated with inferior segregated education. Black people struggled to create independent economic opportunities for themselves under apartheid because of restrictions on trading and retail activity in the townships.

*2.4 Quality and cost of urban services and municipal finances*

Poverty is a function of both income and essential expenditure. There are a number of ways in which apartheid increased the cost of urban living for blacks relative to whites. First, the framework of segregation meant that residential development for blacks was located in isolated locations on the urban periphery, thus dramatically increasing the cost of commuting. Second, low levels of funding for township schools placed considerable burdens on parents to provide books and other essentials for educational achievement. Third, the state's failure to establish a retailing infrastructure within townships meant that the poor were forced to purchase goods from small, often informal, outlets who charge higher prices than those available to affluent suburbanites at local supermarkets. Fourth, many urban residents were able to spend only a small portion of their incomes on their urban homes, either because they supported rural families or because the prospect of inadequate pensions and high urban costs encouraged them to remit a portion of their wages to maintain their own rural base as a sort of insurance policy. Fifth, black residential areas were not provided with the same services as white suburbs.

Electrification of black urban areas is not yet complete and 20 percent of households do not have electric power. In the informal settlements the position is much worse. More worrying, given the link to health issues, is that 6 million metropolitan and 1 million small town households have an inadequate water supply. Much the same number of urban households have no appropriately organised system of sewerage. The absence of formal service provision has forced many township households to depend on private unregulated suppliers. Especially in the peripheral urban settlements the real cost to a poor family of a litre of water is reportedly as high as 125 times that paid in the city centre. Typically basic services are three times the price

when paid for from unregulated sources. While some vendors have undoubtedly done very well out of the failure of apartheid to service all settlements, the poorest in the city have borne the costs in their daily lives.[19] Unfortunately the costs of retrospective servicing of black areas with power, water and sewerage are relatively higher than they might have been if they had been provided before construction. Focus is on cost recovery from consumers and this must further impact on the relatively higher prices paid for services by the poor.

The impact of segregation and apartheid on the disproportionate costing of urban services also relates to the structuring of the urban-fiscal base. Traditionally money generated from rates from lucrative industrial and commercially zoned properties are redistributed to residential infrastructural investment. Thus the rates and taxes paid by individual residential households do not necessarily cover the full costs of their services provided by the local authority. The principle of commercial and industrial cross subsidisation in South Africa never extended to African residential areas. Under the Natives (Urban Areas) Act locations became self financing through money raised from the municipal monopoly on the brewing of beer. Thus, despite the fact that Africans were forced to shop in centrally located retail establishments, the rates never contributed to the development of their generally poor neighbourhoods. Instead, the rates from commercial property were invested in white suburbs. Unsurprisingly the index for the quality of life in white suburbia during the apartheid years ranks amongst the highest in the world, while that of the townships is amongst the lowest. The post-apartheid government is acutely aware of the importance of addressing the service backlog. The municipal infrastructure fund was specifically established for this task. There are additional positive aspects of the government's attention to infrastructure because of the job creation associated with the labour intensive nature of service provision. There do remain unresolved issues in this area. The cross subsidisation of service costs and the fiscal base of municipalities are the most important for poverty alleviation.

Poverty in South Africa is more than usually associated with the high cost of household expenditure. The irrationality of the segregation driven location of the residential areas of the poor has increased costs such as transportation. Moreover, because of the system of financing townships, there is a legacy of the unfair cross subsidisation of rates to rich white neighbourhoods instead of poor African residential areas. In common with other third world cities, residents of informal settlements pay the highest per item costs on basic commodities such as water and fuel.

*2.5 Poverty through the manipulation of urbanisation*[20]

The power of apartheid policy came from regulating African urbanisation. Apartheid planners understood that the location of service provision, however inadequate, provided an effective mechanism of social control. The schism between urban Africans and those barred from the city by influx controls is now well understood. Those Africans who live in cities in South Africa are clearly financially better off than those in rural areas (but this may not mean they are less poor). But this urban group is itself internally split. Apartheid did not only separate the 'urban' and 'rural' African population, the urban working class was systematically divided within itself.

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[19] All figures extracted from Abrahams, G. and Goldblatt, M. 1997: Access to urban infrastructure by the poor: progress in the public provision of infrastructural assets, Background Report for the Report on Poverty and Inequality.

[20] This sub-section is based on a conference paper prepared by Owen Crankshaw and Susan Parnell, similar ideas were then published in 1996 in *Urban Forum.*

Under the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923, no African people were recognised as permanent urban residents. But there was one portion of the urban workforce that enjoyed *de facto,* if not *de jure,* urban status. Stable employment and relatively secure rental housing in urban areas for selected families married under Christian rites provided a level of permanence unknown to hostel residents, sub-tenants and others in the townships or inner-city slums. For all of the hardships endured through slum clearances or Group Areas removals, over the last century some urban Africans were able to build skills, find work and secure state housing. This is the constituency that is now able to make the most of post-apartheid opportunities. Ensconced in the old council houses which they now own, established urbanites have a far greater chance of optimising the opportunities of the new South Africa than those who were left in the Reserves, working in industrial-incentive zones for slave wages, or those who survived as urban migrants. Although the personal dignity of urban Africans was undermined by the heavy-handed implementation of the pass laws and the denial of freehold tenure, this did not stop most urban Africans from calling the Council houses their homes. The stability of this urban community is evidenced by the fact that even the rent boycotts of the 1980s failed to dislodge any of the township tenants from their homes. Residents of townships such as Langa, Soweto or New Brighton have enjoyed extraordinary neighbourhood stability and most have lived alongside their neighbours for more than fifty years. This urbanised community, especially the offspring of first-generation Council tenants, are the elite African community of the post-apartheid dispensation.

The position of migrant workers contrasts starkly with that of the occupants of formal township houses. Restricted to hostels or domestic servants' quarters, these African workers were, as they are now, commonly employed in less-skilled and less-stable employment. Under the influx control regulations, work and housing in urban areas were linked. Migrants were subject to rigid policing by the apartheid state and there was little choice but to hold onto a rural homestead. Under Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act, full urban status could only be secured by many years of continuous employment in urban areas.

In the African urbanisation hierarchy constructed by apartheid planners, the bottom metropolitan niche was occupied by illegal immigrants. Housed in backyard shacks and as sub-tenants, the class of workers that undertook the least desirable jobs or sought opportunities outside the formal sector which were illegal were not provided for by apartheid regulations that coupled work and housing supply. In the immediate aftermath of the abolition of influx controls, many of the illegal urbanites spilled out into the squatter camps that mushroomed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The fortunes of this population under the new government are very mixed. For those who are able to demonstrate that they are South African citizens there are housing subsidies and opportunities to become small scale contractors through local economic development projects. The plight of illegal immigrants holds much less promise in an increasingly xenophobic South Africa.

Johannesburg, Durban, East London and other 'white' metropolitan areas were not the only centres of African urban settlement. In the 1970s the Apartheid government embraced industrial decentralisation and deconcentration policies as a way of displacing African urbanisation. In these decentralised and deconcentrated settlements, Africans depended on the state to develop an urban infrastructure and to provide the subsidies that would lure investors and provide jobs. The poverty profile of these urban Africans can be very clearly distinguished from metropolitan urban

residents and from other important groups of apartheid African urbanites, most notably those who lived under heterogeneous conditions in Bantustan towns.

The tendency to talk about the Bantustans as 'rural' reserves masks the fact that from the 1970s a major focus of African urbanisation was in these territories and that the nature of the urban experience across the Bantustans varied enormously. Apartheid fostered urban social differentiation even within Bantustans. The major beneficiaries were the civil servants who lived in towns such as Thohoyandou or Bisho and who received generous home ownership subsidies and as result the massive state outlay on infrastructure in the new capitals to promote separate development enjoyed high quality urban services. Only the minority gained from the policies of separate development however, even in the Bantustan urban context.

Beyond the veneer of sophisticated urban shopping precincts, street lighting and water-borne sewerage of the apartheid Bantustans' administrative centres lay a very different reality. In reality few would be readily or conventionally described as urban. Across South Africa, tens of thousands of people clustered in the 'toilet in the veld' settlement camps that were laid out on conventional grid iron street plans without access to work, services or viable rural production. Equally desperate conditions were found in the huge sprawling homeland settlements like Botshabelo which, despite having an estimated population of 400,000, was habitually omitted from South African maps.

Under apartheid, displaced urbanisation led to housing being created far from places of employment. In some cases, especially in the greater Durban area, these displaced urban settlements were well within reasonable commuting distances of employment opportunities. For the most part, however, they are situated at great distances from centres of employment. These sprawling settlements are dormitory towns with little or no conventional urban infrastructure or industrial and commercial development. Their residents are either long-distance commuters or labour migrants who are employed far from their families and homes. Well known examples of this type of urban settlement are Botshabelo (60km outside Bloemfontein), Kanyamazane (20km outside Nelspruit), Winterveld, Mabopane and numerous settlements in KwaNdebele (between 30 and 110km north of Pretoria).

Although many senior officials are aware of the issues around migrancy and land tenure, this has been a very difficult question to address. Not only does defining an urbanisation policy demand extensive inter-departmental discussion, it also challenges the interests of important political constituencies such as the traditional leaders. Apartheid not only created inequality within urban spaces but also created major discrepancies between urban places. Opportunities for wealth creation depended very largely on what kind of urban centre individuals found themselves in. Addressing the urban poverty legacy of apartheid necessitates an examination of the entire system of urban settlement and a holistic assessment of migrancy, urbanisation and the long term viability of dormitory towns.

*2.6 Poverty, the struggle and politics*

The 1976 Soweto uprisings unleashed waves of student activism that severely disrupted education. Student leaders particularly were unable to concentrate on their studies and many never completed their education. Since then they have assumed an insecure and inferior place in the labour market. School boycotts disrupted generations of pupils' learning and created a 'lost generation' of illiterate, uneducated and unemployable people. The impact of work-place boycotts were less harsh, but here too individuals paid the price for demonstrating the power of mass action.

Employers generally deducted wages from boycotters and it was not unknown for people to lose their jobs because of participating in stay-aways or strikes.

As opposition to apartheid mounted and unrest spread from the schools and factories to every aspect of urban life, the transport system became a major focus of political violence. Because of their relative safety, the taxis became the preferred means of getting to and from work. But taxis are significantly more expensive than buses and trains, and in households with limited budgets the additional price of commuting in safety was severely felt.

In the relief and satisfaction over the successful overthrow of apartheid it is easy to forget what the campaign to make the townships ungovernable entailed for black urban residents. As the full power of the state's security forces were diverted into containing civil war any form of effective township policing was derailed. In the dying days of apartheid the line between criminal activity and resistance blurred, but the negative impact on ordinary people who bore the brunt of escalating rates of theft, rape and murder was unambiguous.

In the absence of formal structures of legitimate state authority and administration alternative power bases evolved in apartheid urban centres. As highlighted earlier, informality of service and land delivery often increases costs for the poor. In South Africa, especially in the 1980s, political organisers often tried to establish or extend their political power bases through dominating the allocation of land, water and trading licences. Very similar patterns of unregulated, costly and coercive payments from households to traditional leaders, the civics and shacklords occurred across black urban settlements. Failure to pay your dues or levy could be construed as political dissidence and opposition and few residents dared not part with the money.

The Masakhane campaign was the first national effort to turn around the culture of non-payment and boycott inherited from the apartheid years. Since then there have been a number of state-sponsored projects where communities who have begun paying service charges have been able to re-attract investment funds. The dynamics of coercive/alternative payment persist, especially in areas of weak local government.

The victory over apartheid came at a price. Struggle politics was indirectly funded by students who stayed away from school and who now have no formal education; workers who participated in strikes and boycotts and had their wages cut; residents who, if only because of fear, flooded off the violence torn trains and on to the more expensive taxis; and the families who paid their fees or dues to the shacklords, warlords, civics, and other political structures which effectively governed the townships in the 1980s.

Urban poverty in South Africa has been hidden behind the concern for apartheid-generated rural poverty. Also the precise dimensions of urban poverty have been masked by the overt attention to questions of racial inequality. The foci on race and the rural poor are necessary and laudable aspects of the struggle to overcome inequality in South Africa, but these legitimate concerns should be extended to incorporate the battle against the legacy of urban poverty. In order for this to occur there needs to be an explicit initiative to isolate the causes of apartheid generated inequality, to map the extent of urban poverty, to identify appropriate anti-poverty mechanisms or strategies, and develop indicators or targets for its amelioration.

As a result of the apartheid tendency to ignore or negate the importance of black urbanisation there are insufficient statistics providing useful information on African living conditions at the local or urban scale. In addition what data exists tends to equate rich and white, poor and black, and does not sufficiently disaggreagate poverty profiles within racial groups. As there are clearly a number of structural dimensions of

poverty which are likely to survive and even to strengthen since the demise of racial classification, a more textured and informed approach is required.

In developing urban planning indicators the impact of poverty alleviation on vulnerable groups must be emphasised or poverty will not be overcome. The temptation is to use easily measurable indicators. For example, it is easier to emphasise the total housing stock, not its location or suitability for target groups. A useful starting point is to specify the needs of special interest groups, like women, the youth and the aged and to question if the proposed indicators will serve their needs as adequately as those of the rest of the population. Some progress has already been made in this regard and can be seen in the array of post-apartheid government policy and action that establishes a framework for urban management that is targeted, and anti-poverty specific. To this end the South African Cities Network has pioneered the development of poverty profiles for its member cities as a baseline for monitoring chronic poverty.

## *3. Recording and monitoring poverty*

Urban poverty profiles of have been developed following the multi-criteria definition of poverty. Broad categories of information including environmental and health, social and governance, housing and infrastructure and economic indicators inform the poverty profile framework. It is envisaged that these profiles will provide useful diagnostic information in order to identify areas where interventions are required as well as the platform from which trends in chronic poverty might be measured. City and sector based data has been collected and composite indicators such as the City Development Index (CDI) have been calculated using available data.

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The CDI was developed in 1997 and measures the level of development in cities. The Urban Indicators Programme of the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) developed the indicator so that they could rank cities of the world according to their level of development and as a display of indicators depicting development.[21] The CDI cuts across the different clusters identified in the Urban Indicator Framework as it is based on five sub indices namely, infrastructure, waste, health, education and city product. It is useful as it provides a snap-shot view of how cities are doing with respect to the different indices.



Buffalo City Municipality Standard of Living Index CDI

CDI = 41.3
Infrastructure = 49.5
Waste = 59.0
Health = 34.3
Education = 50.0
City Product = 13.8



Cape Town Standard of Living Index CDI

CDI = 73.2
Infrastructure = 80.0
Waste = 91.0
Health = 35.4
Education = 60.0
City Product = 99.

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[21] See global urban observatory – www.unchs.org/programmes.guo.

**Ethekwini Standard of Living Index CDI**

CDI = 58.6
100.0
80.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
City Product = 76.8
Infrastructure = 57.8
Education = 56.0
Waste = 68.0
Health = 34.7

**Ekurhuleni Standard of Living Index CDI**

CDI = 63.0
100.0
80.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
City Product = 62.8
Infrastructure = 70.5
Education = 57.0
Waste = 89.0
Health = 35.9

**Joburg Standard of Living Index CDI**

CDI = 71.4
100.0
80.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
City Product = 100.0
Infrastructure = 72.0
Education = 60.0
Waste = 89.0
Health = 35.9

**Mangaung Standard of Living Index CDI**

CDI = 42.9
100.0
80.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
City Product = 14.3
Infrastructure = 45.3
Education = 50.0
Waste = 70.0
Health = 34.7

**Nelson Mandela Standard of Living Index CDI**

CDI = 54.7
100.0
80.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
City Product = 23.8
Infrastructure = 66.3
Education = 55.0
Waste = 94.0
Health = 34.3

**PMB/Msunduzi Standard of Living Index CDI**

CDI = 39.6
100.0
80.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
City Product = 11.0
Infrastructure = 49.3
Education = 54.0
Waste = 49.0
Health = 34.7

**Tshwane Standard of Living Index CDI**

CDI = 62.0
100.0
80.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
City Product = 71.3
Infrastructure = 66.8
Education = 62.0
Waste = 74.0
Health = 35.9

**All Cities Standard of Living Index CDI**

CDI = 56.30
100.00
80.00
60.00
40.00
20.00
0.00
Product = 56.30
Infrastructure = 61.92
Education = 56.00
Waste = 75.89
Health = 35.13

| Methodology for calculating CDI | | |
|---|---|---|
| **Index** | **Formula as stipulated by the Guo** | **As calculated for the Cities** |
| Infrastructure | 25* water connections + 25* sewerage + 25* electricity + 25* telephone | |
| Waste | Wastewater treated*50 + formal solid waste disposal*50 | Formal solid waste disposal*100 |
| Health | (Life expectancy – 25)*50/60 + (32-child mortality)*50/31.92 | (Life expectancy – 25)*50/60 + normalized infant mortality rate. |
| Education | Literacy*25 + combined enrolment*25 | Literacy*50 |
| Product | (Log city product – 4.61)*100/5.99 or where city product is not provided it can be calculated as 0.45* mean household income | The mean household income for all income groups in the different cities were obtained from the 1996 Census. This was compared, with the highest mean household income normalised to a value of 100 |
| **City Development Index** | **(Infrastructure index + waste index + education index + health index + city product)/5** | |
| In calculating the CDI we have as far as possible used the methodology employed above. In general Census information was used. Where Census information was not available, proxy data sets were used. Care was taken to use 1996 figures. Where indicators were not available at a city level, provincial estimates were used. For example, it proved difficult to obtain health indicators for all cities and so provincial estimates and proxies were used instead. The use of Census data also means that the CDIs for the various cities are dated. Many cities have made substantial developmental progress since 1996. | | |

The political and strategic importance of poverty reduction as a pillar of developmental local government in South Africa means that there is a call for closer scrutiny of the CDI as a tool to review the position of the chronically poor. While the CDI provides an excellent baseline of poverty that covers not only infrastructure but also economic, health and educational dimensions of well being, there is scope to extend the CDI especially to reflect local specificities of chronic poverty. We therefore propose the introduction of the SAPIC (South African Poverty Indicator for Cities) to be run in conjunction with the CDI. A methodology for producing the SAPIC is outlined below. Like the CDI the SAPIC (Table 4) uses the notion of the graphic presentation of various composite indicators clustered around a general theme. The five spokes of the SAPIC might include:

1. Safety and Security
2. Good governance
3. Spatial integration
4. Social and economic exclusion
5. A poverty adjusted CDI

Table 4: Calculating the South African Poverty Index for Cities (SAPIC)

| SAPIC (Possible indicators) | DATA 'WISH LIST' AND DATA ISSUES | RELEVANCE TO POVERTY IN SOUTH AFRICAN CITIES |
|---|---|---|
| SAFETY AND SECURITY Black male victims between 16 and 30 who are homicide victims. Police per 10000 population Juvenile offenders per 10000 population Proportion of alcohol/drug related crimes. | City and sub city scale collation of crime, prison, and medical data. The weighting and formation of the index needs to balance issues of access to justice, negative impacts of crime and violence and the dependence on criminal livelihoods within poor communities. Figures on crimes against women and children are not included in this part of the SAPIC as they are used as proxy indicators of social exclusion. | Although all South Africans are negatively affected by crime, the poor bare the brunt of the violence and social dislocation of crime. Crime in South African cities, especially among poor communities, is closely associated with drug and alcohol trade and abuse. Unchecked criminality as a livelihood strategy among poor households may threaten overall city governance and public safety. |

| GOOD GOVERNANCE | These indicators draw from the Department of Provincial and Local Government's (DPLG's) Key Performance Indicators (KPI's). They are collected at a municipal scale intended for reporting to national government. The proposed indicators would not be appropriate for sub city application, for instance in an IDP, where alternatives should be proposed. | Although all citizens benefit from sound financial practice, transparent government and effective participatory processes, the poor are most likely to gain from democratic and good governance. They are also most likely to suffer from municipal fiscal crisis and corruption. Without democracy and participatory forums their voices cannot be heard on how the city should be run.<br>Despite its prominence in the pro-poor literature good city governance is not an area where there has been much work on urban indicators and we have therefore adopted some of DPLG's general KPIs for local government. |
|---|---|---|
| SPATIAL INTEGRATION<br>Affordability of commuter fares x25<br>Accessibility to public transport x25<br>Door to door journey times x 25<br>Proportion of the population stranded without access to transport x25 | Transport is used as a proxy indicator for spatial isolation and exclusion.<br>These indicators draw from the Department of Transport's *Moving South Africa.*<br>Collection of the data at the city (and sub city) scale is required for the inclusion of the indicator as proposed.<br>Elements of the index overlap with the CDI and there is an ambiguity over the definition of secure tenure with a possible over emphasis on ownership over rental.<br><u>Slums Index</u>:<br>% households without tenure<br>% households without water<br>% households without sanitation and other services<br>% households without permanent structures | The legacy of apartheid planning and the high cost of well located land for new subsidy based housing development means that the urban poor in South African are located on the periphery, far from jobs and subject to expensive travel. Extensive subsidies currently maintain this pattern of race and class segregation and mitigate against the integration of cities in line with urban reconstruction policy frameworks that are deigned to enhance the opportunities of the poor.<br>It may be appropriate to use the UN's Slums Index as it captures the problem of the prevalence of the blighted conditions of the urban poor, and it forms part of South Africa's required reporting to the UN for the Millennium Goals, but we have reservations about the proposed computation of the Slums Index. |
| SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC EXCLUSION<br>RDI (Racial Development Index) = HDI of Africans as a proportion of that of the population as a whole.<br>GDI (Gender Development Index)<br>Rape<br>Gini coefficient for Africans<br>Reported child abuse per 10000 of population | The HDI is a globally accepted index of well being. HDI (Human Development Index) indicators include longevity, education and income – these can all be extracted from the South African census at the city and sub city scale and calculated using the apartheid race classification of African as a proxy for racist exclusion.<br>GDI (Gender Development Index) uses the same variables as the HDI but measures the performance of women relative to that of men. It is used here as a proxy indicator of gender discrimination<br>Although rape and child abuse figures are notoriously underreported, they are collected and can be used to reflect fear and vulnerability.<br>Gini coefficents measure inequality – traditionally in income. The use of the African Gini is designed to show that race is no longer a reliable predictor of poverty, as there is increasingly extreme inequality within 'race' groups. Similar measures could | Key lines of exclusion and marginality in South Africa include racism, sexism, language discrimination and xenophobia. An overt 'class' inequality transcends these divisions and is a force that prevents many of the urban poor from attaining their full human potential. Many of the best indicators of exclusion are qualitative rather than quantitative. We have adopted racialised, gendered and income linked versions of standard indicators of well being (the HDI) and of inequality (Gini coefficient) as well ass rape and child abuse figures to highlight vulnerable groups. |

| | be made of any 'race' group. | |
|---|---|---|
| POVERTY ADJUSTED CDI CDI for Africans CDI for residents of informal backyards and informal settlements CDI for the lowest income quintile | Not all variables of the CDI can be adjusted for race or for housing type and income quintile. But the infrastructure, waste, health and education variables can be disaggregated in this way and if income rather than GGP is used for the product Census 1996 can be used to calculate the poverty adjusted CDI. | The CDI is a solid general measure of poverty, but it measures average performance and, especially in highly unequal contexts such as South African cities, fails to reflect the position of the poorest of the poor. By running the CDI for Africans (the population most negatively impacted by apartheid); the lowest income quintile and those in informal settlements (the housing and infrastructure poorest) we establish a general idea of development from the perspective of the poor of the city. |