Key Myths about Corruption:

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Introduction

Corruption has been one of the major international concerns of the past decade. It is an issue that affects all countries, rich and poor, in different ways and to differing degrees. Exactly how corruption affects particular societies has, however, been the subject of some discussion in the literature. The major international institutions promoting governance reforms have, for example, persistently argued that corruption has a direct negative impact upon overall economic growth levels and can depress the climate for attracting international investment; although these are far from universally-held assumptions, even in the mainstream economics literature.

Amidst heightened international concern for tackling the abject poverty which continues to affect such large sections of humanity (expressed most clearly in the evolution of the millennium development goals or MDGs), perhaps the most important concern that has been expressed about corruption is that it disproportionately affects the poor and marginalized, through excluding them from access to services or reducing the funds available for direct use in social programmes. Donor-country fears over corruption in the handling of development aid monies may also act to erode the political will necessary to ensure adequate international funding of the actions needed to meet MDG targets, whilst within Southern countries perceptions of widespread corruption within political life can act decisively to depress popular support for state reforms and/or open democratic political systems. Clearly, then, corruption – its extent, nature, dynamics, causation and how it might be tackled – is an issue of fundamental importance to those working in the field of international development.

One of the things noticeable on a first exploration of the literature on corruption and development is the singular lack of attention that was devoted to the issue for most of the period since the second world war and, in turn, the sudden rediscovery of the issue towards the end of the 1980s and the explosion of international legislative initiatives, institutional formation and academic work that has occurred since then. Clearly, the end of the bipolar geopolitical world of the cold war and the onslaught of contemporary globalization appear to have presented considerable opportunities for international collaboration in placing the issue at the centre of the international stage. Nevertheless, those very same global processes also present
important challenges to the international community in dealing with the issue because of the difficulties involved in tracing international flows of capital, the increasing complexity of international criminal networks and non-criminal tax evasion networks and the complex and hazy lines between the private and public sectors.

Since the early 1990s large amounts of public money have been spent on the development of new legislation at national and international levels, the creation of national anti-corruption programmes and the evolution of anti-corruption departments within just about every major international development institution. The impact of such measures, however, has been, at best, partial. As such, whilst the international community should continue to do what it can to raise the international profile of corruption and how it might be better combatted, we argue that it is even more important that a more detailed independent assessment of the effectiveness of existing interventions is carried out.

Our position is that the first steps towards such a review of international anti-corruption initiatives must involve subjecting the ways in which the issue has been constructed in the mainstream development arenas to closer scrutiny. This workshop is intended to be a first step in this direction. As such, this paper is intended to generate debate about the meaning of corruption, its complexity, how it relates to particular areas of development policy intervention and the means whereby it might be combated (if indeed this is considered feasible or even desirable). Given this, what follows is (i) deliberately provocative, (ii) deliberately broad and (iii) deliberately polemical. We thought long and hard about how best to organize this session and in the end decided to organize it around the presentation of a series of key myths which we have identified as important amongst those involved in anti-corruption activities and research. Some of these myths relate to the academic community, some to a kind of general common sense amongst development practitioners and some to those involved in the implementation of anti-corruption initiatives. Here, they are organized into four broad sections dealing with (a) basic definitions, (b) states and markets, (c) actors and anti-corruption initiatives and (d) economic factors.

**Basic Definitions and Issues**

**Myth One.**

_Corruption is so widespread and ingrained that it cannot be combated._

As opposed to some of the myths which follow below, this myth of the perceived impossibility of tackling corruption is one which has already been identified by those promoting the importance of tackling corruption on the international stage. In fact, it is to be hoped that anyone involved in development in some capacity, be it as an academic, a politician, an activist or a skilled practitioner, would be keen to lay this kind of myth to rest. It is, however, worth exploring the nuances of this type of attitude a little. These
types of arguments are varied. Perhaps the most understandable emanate from those within particular countries who feel trapped by the prevalence of corruption within their own society. Clearly where corruption is seen to be widespread, it can seem inevitable. This can lead to a form of fatalism about the possibilities for change amongst those who live in societies where corruption seems to be particularly embedded. This clearly emphasizes the absolutely crucial importance of involving local communities within any anti-corruption initiatives – a factor which unfortunately, despite much rhetoric, has not been a central feature of most anti-corruption initiatives. It is also important that the local specifics of political cultures (particularly in terms of public attitudes towards the definition and acceptability of corruption) are central to the design of any such programmes, emphasizing the point, explored below, that corruption is a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon that is not amenable to quick-fix solutions.

More worrying, however, is the labelling of whole societies as somehow warped or ‘irredeemable’ because they do not conform to the politico-cultural expectations of outsiders. This type of cultural insensitivity characterizes the perspective of some extreme free-marketeers who seek to find cultural explanations for the ‘unexpected failure’ of their policy recommendations and also underlies some of the failures of externally-formulated anti-corruption programmes. Knee-jerk reactions such as these are also debilitating because they can be used to justify the employment of bribery or other corrupt business practices by powerful external private sector interests in negotiating with governments, leading to the familiar ‘you don’t get anywhere here unless you do it” arguments. Both of these aspects of this type of perspective (the internalized and the external) need addressing if anti-corruption activists are to be successful in overcoming an unhealthy fatalism about their chances of success.

Myth Two.

Corruption can be simply and effectively defined and is understood as meaning the same thing in all societies and cultures.

One of the problems with the publications and pronouncements of the major international institutions on corruption is that they create the impression that corruption is easily identifiable and means the same thing in every social/cultural context. The dominant economic literature on corruption defines it as basically to do with the rent-seeking behaviour of individuals. For example the World Bank (1997:8) define it as “the abuse of public office for private gain.” This is, in our view, insufficient. Leaving aside the clearly inappropriate association of corruption exclusively with the public sector (to which we return below), such definitions are too limited because they assume that all corruption is both personal and monetary in nature and fail to deal with the interests underlying politically motivated corruption. Even within political science approaches to corruption, which have generally been more nuanced than the more econocentric approaches, there has been a tendency to focus upon identifying some kind of ‘universal’ standards of public office (the legal, norms-based and public interest approaches) which have invariably ended up
promoting Northern values and norms as universal. This is not to say that there is nothing to be gained from sharing experiences of best practice across cultural and political divides, but there is a need to explore more relativistic approaches that reflect local cultural values and explicitly recognize the breadth of divergent cultural and political understandings of corruption and the fact that they change over time.

As such, the important thing when talking about corruption (and more importantly how to combat it) is to remember that it is multi-faceted and fluid in meaning. As Williams (1999) suggests, how corruption is defined depends on the context in which it is located, as well as the perspectives of the definers and their purpose in defining it. As such, as two of us argued in a recent paper, “analysis might more usefully centre around the more specific phenomena that comprise corruption or, at the very least, there should be greater cross-fertilization between the competing ideas of corruption, clientalism and rents to produce alternative hybrid terms” (Brown and Cloke, 2004:285). The problem is that, whilst these debates might take us nearer to a more malleable and responsive understanding of corruption, they do not provide easy answers.

Myth Three.
Corruption is chiefly a problem in so-called developing countries.

A further problem with much of the current preoccupation with corruption is that it has a tendency to treat the issue as (i) a feature of national societies, rather than an intimate part of global connectivities and (ii) characteristic mainly of countries at earlier stages of industrialization and development. These issues are connected because the tendency to situate corruption as a feature of ‘underdevelopment’ means that the role of external actors in the causation of corruption in the South is not recognized sufficiently (here we are thinking of factors such as the role of individual TNCs in using bribes to secure contracts or the weak transparency and accountability mechanisms frequently employed by the international institutions in the handling of development finance).

The idea that corruption is a phenomenon that only affects the South can be easily countered by pointing to the succession of scandals which have rocked both governments (thinking in particular of the European commissioners and the cases of individual British MPs like Jonathan Aitken) and major corporations (Enron, Worldcom etc.) in the North. As Girling (1997) suggests, corruption does not disappear in highly industrialised, democratic societies, but rather it takes on new forms. Nevertheless, there is still a tendency in many circles to see corruption as a characteristic of ‘backward’ political systems or ‘young’ democracies. In its most extreme form, this type of perspective traces problems of corruption in Africa to the end of colonial rule, as if colonial administrations were models of probity and honesty and corruption only flourished as a result of handing over control, at independence. More generally, the problem is that, rather than seeing corruption as a complex socio-political phenomenon linked to global
processes and specific national cultural and political economies, the issue is often reduced to a kind of political backwardness which needs ‘treatment’ via the imposition of Northern institutional forms, legal systems and so on.

**Myth Four.**

*All corruption is illegal.*

This is a simple but important point that is often missed. One common-sense definition of corruption defines an action as corrupt if it is illegal in the place where it was committed. This of course sidesteps the important debates about the meaning of corruption which we considered above but it also leads to a severely limited grasp of the ways in which corruption affects any given society. One of the obvious limitations is the fact that different countries’ legal systems may treat corruption in different ways, reflecting different institutional capabilities and political frameworks. However at a deeper level it also raises all sorts of issues about the ethical elements in discussions of corruption – i.e. there are many activities which citizens of a given country might identify as corrupt but that are not actually against the law.

Just to take one example, that of corruption in service delivery, actions which may not actually be illegal (or certainly extremely difficult to prove as such), but could certainly be labelled as corrupt, include: the favouring of high value infrastructural projects rather than those that might serve the best interests of the poor, inappropriate project design, inflated costs, elite capture of project benefits, the delivery of low quality and/or inappropriate services, discrimination against women, ethnic minorities and the poor, bad behaviour, rude treatment, abuse, poor motivation, lack of interest in finding and fixing problems, and a lack of focus on outcomes. None of this is illegal in most national circumstances. The question is how do we tackle these sorts of issues in discussions of accountability and transparency when none of them are actually illegal?

A further complication arises in those circumstances when corruption can become a way of making service delivery more efficient and equitable to the extent that it’s net effects can even on occasion be positive, at least in the short to medium term. In these circumstances, particularly where local people see it as involving the breaking of unjustifiable rules, can corruption be seen as a necessary evil, wrong in principal but necessary in practice?

**States, Markets And Corruption:**

**Myth Five.**

*Corruption is purely a phenomenon of the public sector and market liberalization and privatization automatically lead to a decline in corruption problems.*
One of the most important and debilitating myths that has guided the evolution of anti-corruption initiatives across the South has been the idea that corruption is purely a phenomenon of the public sector. This perspective flows from the basic definitional problems which we explored above where, rather than locating corruption at the intersection between public and private arenas, it is conceived of purely as a phenomenon of the public sector. Even if we were to accept this definition, this should not lead us to jump to the conclusions promoted by USAID or the World Bank in their analyses of how to combat corruption. In major works on corruption (e.g. USAID’s Handbook on Corruption and the Bank’s first pronouncements on the issue in 1997), both organizations make the bald claim that the more the size of the state sector is reduced the less chances for corruption there are. This is incredibly misleading and perhaps the most important of the myths considered in this briefing paper.

The institutions’ interpretation obscures the rising possibilities for a range of forms of private sector corruption that can be caused by market-led economic reforms and privatization. For example, White (1996) analysed the relationship between corruption and economic liberalisation in China and found that the transition to a market economy has been accompanied by increasingly pervasive and large-scale corruption. More generally privatization, in particular, appears at the very least to have created as many opportunities for corruption as it has solved (corrupt bidding processes, undervaluing of public assets, bribery in concession bidding, exploitative contracting arrangements, ghost companies etc.)

The continued tendency (despite the supposed Post-Washington consensus) of the international institutions to treat the state as an enemy in need of ‘cutting down to size’ has also impacted on the ability of state institutions to fulfill the role envisioned for them within anti-corruption programmes. The requirement of meeting greater demands for public scrutiny does not sit well with the continued attempts to squeeze state budgets and trim regulatory powers. Similarly, there is a kind of perversity to the logic which locates self-interested rent-seeking behaviour to those in the public sector and yet relies upon the creation of new public bodies to tackle the issue – quite why the workers within anti-corruption offices are expected to be any less corrupt than other public sector workers is unclear. We are not arguing here that the state does not provide opportunities for corruption (clearly it does) but rather that the knee-jerk assumption that the private sector is inherently less corrupt than the public needs to be challenged. In fact, most corruption occurs at the hazy interface between the public and private spheres which is where our attention should be focused.

**Myth Six.**
*Democratic governments are less corrupt*

Discussions over how and if democracy controls corruption are immensely complicated, not simply by attempting to define corruption, but also by defining what we mean by democracy. The ex-Soviet Union regularly held
elections in which the will of the majority was said to have prevailed by margins of victory unknown in western European democratic practices, and yet the idea of the Soviet Union being democratic would rightly have been dismissed out of hand. Conversely, although it may be the case (using some given measure such as the TI Corruption Index) that within the UK there is a higher degree of effective and open functioning of civil society under a particular form of parliamentary democracy, it is also undoubtedly the case that outside the UK, historically British companies and the UK government have at the very least turned a blind eye to corruption, if not been actively complicit in it.

As is so frequently the case, the prevalence of corruption in a country or region has less to do with arbitrary definitions such as ‘democratic’ or ‘undemocratic’ than it does with the complexity of political economy and socio-cultural dynamics that go to make up its’ current civic reality. An example might be taken from Singapore, for instance, where the prevalence of a de facto one-party state dominated by Lee Kuan Yew and now his son scarcely counts as an actively democratic state, given the close control of the press, judiciary and political opposition that occurs – this notwithstanding, there is a perception outside Singapore (and by its’ own citizenry) of the country as an example of cleanliness in Asia (in the 2004 TI index Singapore is 5th overall with a score of 9.3).

Myth Seven.
Corruption is a technical problem requiring technical solutions

This particular myth goes hand-in-hand with other corruption myths, such as the rich have no need to be corrupt and corruption is essentially a public sector problem, and is to be discerned very much as part of the orthodox economic discourse; people are essentially rational in both their expectations and their behaviour, and whether a person behaves in a certain way or not is controlled by logical boundaries such as marginal utilities. From this, one implication is that legislation and regulation will set up controlling mechanisms, as if (amongst other things) the controlling authority itself is outside or above the problem and can therefore deal with it in a neutral and objective manner.

It is plainly the case that in a country where the average wage for policemen, say, is at or below the level of mere survival, then the virtual certainty is that the police will seek other means to supplement their income. What is not certain and in many cases may still be extremely unlikely, however is that raising the wage of the police to a comfortable level will of itself end their corruption. Corruption (as noted above) is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon that is heavily dependent on such factors as history (particularly of colonialism), culture, civic structure, the political make-up of the country, ethnic and religious divides, clientelistic and clan-based networks and the record of what might be called general governance in the country. Corruption is at once real and perceptual, dishonest and loyal, obedient and disobedient.
Actors and Corruption:

Myth Eight.  
_Sunshine is the best disinfectant (the more we talk about corruption, the quicker the problem will go away)_

What this myth refers to is the assumption that simply because so much is now being said and written about corruption the situation is somehow automatically getting better. At the simplest level, this reflects a naive assumption that people are committing corrupt acts because they don’t know any better and that when educated into the impacts of what they are doing they will modify their behaviour. A further example of the same sort of thinking comes from the acceptance at face value of government pronouncements about dealing with corruption. Take, for example, the way in which USAID and the World Bank praised the Nicaraguan government for its National Integrity Plan at the same time as President Arnoldo Aleman was systematically siphoning off huge amounts of Hurricane Mitch reconstruction monies to his own ends. Just because the language of transparency and accountability has crept into official documentation does not mean that real changes are occurring in the conducting of government etc.

Another way of looking at this issue, however, is that as people get to know more about their rights (and the responsibilities of those in positions of power and authority) then the more they are likely to make them live up to grand words over improvements in accountability etc. In explorations of corruption in service delivery, if service users (and particularly the poor) have information on their rights then this changes the incentives for corruption facing service providers. Although the poor also need power or some kind of leverage over service providers. Clearly, in addition to knowing where and how to get information, people also need to have the capacity and power to make it useable. Most effective in this context has been the right to information legislation (Goetz and Gaventa, 2001), community-based audits of public works (Parivartan in Delhi), joint state-citizen initiatives such as budget analysis on South Africa or expenditure tracking in Uganda, vigilance committees monitor municipal councils in Bolivia, or systematic Report Cards of user satisfaction carried out by NGOs in Bangalore.

Myth Nine.  
_Signing an International Declaration or developing a Corporate Responsibility Policy will automatically lead to declining corruption levels._

Since the collapse of the Soviet bloc (a pivotal event of itself) there have been a plethora of international initiatives designed to tackle corruption, these have included the 1997 OECD International Convention on Combating the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, UN attempts to develop legal instruments, major International Conferences (IACC and Global Forums), as well as regional initiatives by, amongst others, USAID, OAS, and the IADB. There has then clearly been a major impetus to ‘combat corruption’ through institutional reform programmes (focussed upon
the poor south only, of course) funded by the international financial institutions. Donor conditionality for aid now regularly includes the enhancement of transparency and accountability and the control of corruption as major components.

It is reasonable to suggest that this is largely smoke and mirrors, however, whilst the G8 not only refuse to clean up their own acts, or even to implement the agreed-on legislation when it is not deemed politically convenient to do so. For example the City of London, as a Transparency International working group found in 2003, is a hotspot for money-laundering on a massive scale. The TI group estimated the amounts being laundered to be higher even than UK government estimates of £18 billion per year – on the other hand, the federal government of Nigeria has waited seven years after making a formal request to the UK government with the relevant details, for any of the money stolen by the dictator Sani Abacha to be returned. Egregious acts of bribery such as those of BAE are reported every day and yet nothing is done – the political will to do so being absent.

**Myth Ten.**

*International institutions know how to deal with corruption and are themselves immune from its impacts.*

The issue that we want to touch on here is the assumption that the international financial institutions (and major Northern donors) have the right to lecture others about how to ensure transparency and accountability in the use of public money. We have already addressed issues surrounding the limitations of IFI understandings of the nature and causes of corruption, as well as the continuing occurrence of corruption in supposedly more advanced democracies. Here, however, we want to raise a few points about the actual practices of the institutions themselves. I.e. “do what I say, not what I do….”

As Hawley (2000) suggests many of the organizations promoting governance reforms in the South are not themselves the models of probity, accountability and transparency (in relation to their internal audit procedures for example) that one would expect. Concerns have been expressed in relation to the impacts of lobbying upon the decision-making processes of the World Bank and their internal audit procedures and perhaps more worryingly in relation to political pressures on the contracting decisions of the Interamerican Development Bank (Andersen, 2002). Furthermore, the responses of bilateral donors and the international institutions when cases of corruption do surface has also left a lot to be desired. For example, whilst the World Bank operates a blacklisting system in relations to companies found committing abuses, none of the companies listed there have had to pay any penalties for their actions.

Finally, if aid/loan disbursement by the institutions and unilateral donors continues to be dominated by the strategic and economic interests of the most powerful (thinking particularly of the changes to aid budgets in light of the war on terror and the awarding of contracts in the ‘rebuilding’ of Iraq) then any
international initiatives to deal with corruption are probably doomed to failure, given their location within a system that is itself clearly lacking in accountability.

Myth Eleven. 
*If you pay people more they will be less corrupt.*

At first glance this assumption seems both sensible and useful. I.e. one of the reasons that corruption occurs in the public sector is the poor conditions of service and remuneration of public employees, particularly in the aftermath of the austerity measures pushed on governments across the South as part of the structural adjustment programmes of the IFIs. Public-sector corruption does seem to be worsened by low wages, lack of meritocratic recruitment and promotion, the low morale of employees, poor staff motivation, and poor general conditions of service. Indeed, Van Rijckeghem & Weder (1997) point to a negative relationship between corruption and wages across developing countries.

However, on closer reflection, there are some problems. Firstly, if we take the argument to its logical extreme then we would make the assumption that (a) the poorest are the most corrupt group in society (rather than the major victims of corruption as is the case in reality) and (b) those with most money are likely to be the least corrupt, in other words we should leave the running of our societies to the traditional moneyed elites since they don’t need additional money and won’t be tempted to act corruptly in pursuit of it. Clearly both assumptions are absurd. As such, it is also clear that we need a more complex model of corruption causation that links propensity to act corruptly to factors such as the existence of incentive schemes, internal institutional governance and the external legal and political environment (reflecting the degree of professionalization of the state bureaucracy), as well as the conditions of service and remuneration arrangements for public employees. Thus, incentive reforms should be accompanied with wider reforms in the internal organisation of bureaucracies.

Myth Twelve. 
*Corruption is primarily an ethical issue*

Corruption is often presented as simply an issue of right and wrong. There is certainly an ethical component to corruption but those interested in combating it also have to consider awkward cost-benefit assessments of the costs of combating corruption versus the costs imposed by corruption (as well as the political motivations underlying corrupt activities). Furthermore, whilst corruption may involve interventions that target the ethical principles of individuals, they will mostly also have to recognize the need for sanctions. Ultimately, the most appropriate and pragmatic solution to dealing with corruption will probably relate less to ethical debates of right and wrong and more to interventions that seek to redistribute political power between social actors and influence social behaviour in particular directions through the targeted use of incentives and sanctions.
The more ethically-generated policies frequently fail to address the real causes of corruption. Codes of Conduct, for example, tend to be drafted at the top by senior officials, so codes fail to reflect adequately, the situation and aspiration of staff at all levels.

**Corruption and the Economy.**

**Myth Thirteen.**
*There is a direct relationship between corruption and economic growth.*

The idea that corruption always negatively affects economic growth is frequently treated as a truth amongst the anti-corruption fraternity. The history of the development of virtually all the primary industrializing countries contradicts this, however; Great Britain and the USA experienced massive increases in global economic and political power when corruption was the norm in local and national politics. In the USA from the 1860s onwards administrations such as that of Taft and of Ulysses S. Grant were extensively corrupt and ‘graft’ in the US was widespread at the beginning of the 20th century.

As if this were not enough, however, the more recent history of countries such as South Korea (Moran 1998), in which a series of repressive and corrupt military governments oversaw a prolonged period of massive and relatively egalitarian growth and Japan, virtually all of whose modern economic success has taken place under the aegis of a political system characterised by nepotism, clientelism, amakudarism (Maruyama 1996) and massive bribery, seem to challenge the accepted wisdom.

Earlier literature on economic development, equally devoid of a political economy context, often suggested that corruption might be a source of innovation and helped release resources for productive activities – often ‘lubricating the wheels of economic growth’ as it were. This is also associated with one of the other myths that we identified, that ‘corruption does not hurt the poor.’ It would be difficult to look at the massive corruption and poverty in a country like Nigeria, however, where figures suggest that 80% of the oil wealth in that country goes to no more than 1% of the population, or indeed the persistence of widespread poverty in an oil-wealthy country like Venezuela where (at least until 1998) corruption dominated the political system, and agree with this perception either.

**Myth Fourteen.**
*Corruption is fundamentally an economic issue*

The current dominance of perspectives that treat corruption as entirely about individual rent-seeking and personal enrichment ignore corrupt activities that reflect much more complex motivations and wider political/societal issues and
goals. As Winter (2000) points out: “A remarkably candid 1996 U.S. Government Accounting Office study observed that “much of the impetus behind U.S. participation in the Bank during the Cold War era was derived from the perceived utility of the Bank in containing communist expansionism in the developing world. One Bank official commented, for example, that because of U.S. concern about communist insurgency in the area, the Bank remained active in several sub-Saharan African countries long after the corrupt nature of these governments became evident.”

There are numerous examples where the G8 countries not only ignore rampant corruption when it suits them to do so, but actively profit from it because of geo-strategic concerns (al-Yamameh in Saudi Arabia) and historically have encouraged it, as in the case of the Philippines under Marcos and Indonesia under Suharto. As the World Bank itself says: “What seems to us today an obvious economic issue was then considered too politically sensitive, or simply too political per se, and thus outside the limits of the Bank’s non-political mandate (This was also true for the vast majority of other development agencies bilateral and multilateral.)…” (World Bank 2001)

Further than this, however, economics itself is a geo-political issue, particularly in the case of structural adjustment: “Liberalization….has contributed to a more generalized process of political decay. This reduces the incentives for probity on the part of officials and politicians, and creates a widespread social alienation from the political process” (Harris –White and White 1996. The neo-liberal account which has driven the structural processes of the 1980s and 1990s, far from decreasing opportunities for rent-seeking public servants, is generally accepted to have increased opportunities for corruption as the state has been rolled back and deregulation has proceeded apace in countries particularly where the state and the legal system were undeveloped and ineffective already.

**Conclusion:**

This is the point at which we would normally be expected to present an overview of our argument and we imagine our blueprint for how corruption should be tackled. This will not be forthcoming. As we established in the introduction to this paper, this was to be treated as a preliminary venture designed to be provocative and to ask some hard questions about the current consensus on tackling corruption. As such, we recognize that there contradictions between some of the points that we have raised here and that we could be accused of slinging mud without offering something constructive in its place. We hope, however, that participants in this workshop will enter into the spirit in which this paper was written and work with us in exploring the significance of some of the issues that we have raised here.