

**THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRIME REDUCTION
SCHEMES FOR AT-RISK GROUPS:
*Context-Specific Approaches for
Transitional Societies***

FINAL REPORT

For the

Department for International Development

**Department of Criminology
University of Leicester**

FINAL REPORT

The Development of Crime Reduction Schemes for At-Risk Groups: Context-Specific Approaches for Transitional Societies

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*The comments expressed in this report are of those of the authors
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INTRODUCTION

This is the evaluation report prepared for the Department of International Development (DfID) for the project, 'The Development of Crime Reduction Schemes for At-Risk Groups: Context-Specific Approaches for Transitional Societies'. This project ran from January 2001 to March 2004 and was aimed at addressing the problem of domestic burglary in Russia. In overall terms, the project had four objectives:

- To generate detailed information on the extent, nature and degree of reporting of burglary victimisation together with the militia response in three Russian cities.
- From this knowledge base, to introduce and then subsequently evaluate context-specific burglary reduction initiatives derived from UK experience.
- To use this data to investigate whether the key theoretical developments in recognising, understanding and responding to repeat victimisation are equally valid for transitional societies as they are for more established countries.
- Based on the results of the research, to revise the existing course on crime prevention taught to trainee and serving militia officers at law institutes throughout Russia.

The project was broken down into three phases of activity:

Phase I involved the collection of data on the extent and nature of the problem of burglary in Russia and included the collection of crime statistics, extensive victimisation and attitude surveys of the public in each of the 3 cities involved in the project (1,500 respondents in each)¹, meetings with the chiefs of militia, beat officers and other interest parties, including local NGOs in each of the cities, and numerous meetings and round table discussions with academics working at the three law academies taking part in project. The project thus aimed to include both theorists and practitioners in the design and implementation of the burglary reduction schemes.

On the basis of this research phase, which also included a 3-week fact-finding visit by the Russian research teams to the UK in September/October 2001, a report was produced to detail the types of schemes to be introduced during **Phase II** of the project – the implementation phase - in the three areas in each of the Russian cities taking part in the project.² This report highlighted the importance of developing schemes that, while based upon UK experience, were 'tailor-made' to meet the local context in Russia in general, and more specifically the chosen areas in the three cities. It was critical to develop schemes that would offer valuable lessons in terms of transferability to other areas within the cities and more broadly across Russia, and that were sustainable once funding of the project came to an end. They also had to be manageable, given existing resources and the constraints imposed by the legislative framework governing the work of the militia in Russia.

Given the overall aim of the project, it was also important that the selected schemes had as positive an impact as possible upon not only preventing domestic burglary, but also

¹ The three cities are Omsk, Smolensk and Volgograd

² Beck, A. and Robertson, A. (2002) *Public Attitudes to Crime and Policing in Three Russian Cities: Burglary, Victimisation and the Militia Response*. (A Research Report) Leicester: University of Leicester.

responding to the needs of victims. On the basis of these criteria, the implementation phase covered five broad areas of activity:

- advice to the public;
- training courses for MVD staff and others;
- specific burglary-reduction initiatives;
- improving militia performance; and
- partnership development.

1. Advice to the Public

- A series of infomercials
- Crime prevention literature/material (leaflets/brochures/posters)
- Victim Support Network

2. Training Courses for MVD Staff and Others

- Local Beat Officer Training
- Victim Support Network Training
- Local Resident Association (LRA) Co-ordinators' Training

3. Specific Crime Prevention Initiatives

- Property Marking Scheme
- Local Residents' Associations

4. Developing Partnerships

- Crime Prevention Committees
- Militia-Public Consultative Committees/Meetings

This report is the culmination of **Phase III** of the project – the evaluation phase – which ran from November 2003 to February 2004. The report is divided into several sections: evaluation methodology; outputs delivered; evaluating the expected outcomes; the implementation process; and conclusions and recommendations.

1 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

1.1 Expected Outcomes

Each of the schemes developed for the implementation phase was designed to contribute to the project objectives via a series of expected outcomes, which are summarised below in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1 Expected Outcomes

Schemes	Expected Outcomes
Advice to the Public <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Infomercials • Crime prevention materials • Victim support network 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduced victimisation (property crime) • Reduced levels of fear of/concern about crime • Increased use of security measures by public • Increased satisfaction with the militia • Increased awareness of victims' rights • Creation of victims support/crime prevention offices
Training for MVD Staff <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Beat officer training • Victims support network training • Local resident association training 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased levels of positive contact with the militia • Increased levels of confidence/trust in the militia • Increased satisfaction amongst the general public • Increased satisfaction amongst victims of burglary • Lower levels of repeat victimisation • Lower levels of fear of/concern about crime • Lower levels of victimisation • Improved standards of service offered to victims • Improved victims' awareness of services available • Creation of professional services for victims of crime • Reduced levels of fear/concern
Specific Burglary Prevention Initiatives <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Property marking • Local residents associations 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduced crime through increased risk to offenders • Lower levels of fear of crime • Reduced crime through increased detection of offenders • Reduced crime via target hardening • Increased detection rates • Improved satisfaction with the militia via improved detection rates
Developing Partnerships <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crime prevention committees • Police-public consultative committees/meetings 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creation of mechanisms to coordinate the work of key agencies involved in reducing crime and improving community safety • Reduced levels of crime and victimisation • Increased public satisfaction with the militia • Increased detection of offenders • Increased number of agencies/people involved in crime prevention • Reduced area specific crime and nuisance problems • Reduced fear of/concern about crime

In order to establish the extent to which the expected outcomes were achieved, 'before' and 'after' measurements were taken in the project areas in all three cities.³ These measurements included both primary and secondary data, but given the poor reliability of secondary crime data in Russia, the main source of data used in this report is the before and after surveys conducted of the public in the three cities taking part in the project. These data have been used to measure the impact of the project against the expected outcomes. The outcomes were represented through a number of variables, in particular:

- Levels of burglary victimisation.
- Levels of repeat victimisation.
- Levels of fear of/concern about crime in general.
- Levels of fear of/concern about burglary.
- Use of security measures to prevent burglary.
- Public satisfaction with the militia (general and amongst victims).
- Level of service offered by the militia.
- Levels of confidence/trust in the militia.
- Detection rates (as identified by victims).

1.2 The Survey

As with the previous survey conducted in 2001, the 2003 survey questionnaire covered a range of issues, including:

- Experiences of crime, including burglary.
- Experiences of repeat victimisation.
- The likelihood of reporting crime to the militia.
- Attitudes towards crime prevention and household security.
- Concerns about crime and the fear of crime, especially burglary.
- Experiences of dealing with the militia both generally and as a victim of crime.
- Expectations of the militia.
- Willingness to become involved in local crime prevention schemes.

It was also divided into two main parts: all respondents were asked the same core set of general questions about their experiences of crime during the previous 12 months, their concerns about becoming a victim of crime, attitudes towards the militia, experiences of contact with the militia, and measures they had taken to protect their property from burglary. More general demographic data (age, gender, employment status, education levels, income etc.) were also collected to facilitate data analysis. The second part of the questionnaire was

³ Owing to problems identified by the UK project team with the second set of survey data collected in Omsk, their results are not included in this report except where specifically referred to.

designed along the lines of the victim forms used in the British Crime Survey (BCS). Respondents who said they had been the victim of burglary or attempted burglary were asked a series of specific questions about the incident, including when it happened, how it happened, the impact of the burglary on the victim, whether it was reported to the militia, and how the militia responded. In contrast to the 2001 questionnaire, the 2003 schedule also included an additional set of questions on public awareness and perceptions of the implementation phase, in particular what respondents knew about the project schemes; whether they had taken part; and what they thought about how the schemes were organised (see Appendix 1: Additional Questions in the 2003 Survey). These results are summarised in Section 4 of this report – the Implementation Phase.

Sample Design

The survey was stratified, with three residential areas originally chosen (in 2001) in each of the three cities based upon high, medium and low recorded rates of burglary during the previous 12 months.⁴ Around 1,500 people were interviewed in each city, providing a total sample of 4,500. For both surveys, a combination of area and random sampling was used in each of the three districts within each city, whereby a number of streets were randomly selected and then homes were selected systematically (e.g. every 10th home) and visited by trained interviewers from the local law institute/academy (the project partners). As burglary is a household, rather than an individual crime, the selection of a specific respondent at each address was not important. The sample was instead drawn to cover a cross-section of the population in each city in terms of age (one half of the respondents between the ages of 18 and 40 and the other half above the age of 40) and gender (roughly 50 per cent men and 50 per cent women) in order to capture a wide range of experiences of, and attitudes to various crime-related issues.

Data Collection

Interview training was provided in each city by those responsible for conducting the survey. Data for the repeat survey were collected in October/November 2004. Respondents were encouraged to participate in the study with assurances that their responses were confidential and would only be used for the purposes of the research. The research team in each city was responsible for inputting the data collected into a data file, which was then sent to Leicester University, where the data from all three cities were combined into a master data file for analysis. Data were analysed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). Missing data are not included in the results. Reported results are significant at the 95% confidence interval, unless otherwise stated ($p < 0.05$).

⁴ For a similar approach to ranking burglary risk, see Mayhew, P., Aye Maung, N. and Mirrlees-Black, C. (1993) *The 1992 British Crime Survey*. Home Office Research Study 132, London: HMSO.

2 OUTPUTS DELIVERED

This section considers the outputs that were delivered by the project within each of the selected schemes. Before reviewing the outputs delivered, it is important to note that the intention was to adopt a high profile media approach during the Implementation Stage of the project, that is to make extensive use of various types of media to publicise the aims, work and successes of the project. This involved in the first instance developing a brand name or image, which not only provided a unifying focus to the range of activities envisaged by the project, but also helped to show how they could be linked to achieve the defined objectives (enhanced domestic security, reduced incidences of burglary, improved relations and co-operation between the police and the public). The team therefore created a highly effective name and logo for the project as a whole: **BLOK**. As well as being a Russian acronym for ‘*bezopastnost’ lichnosti, okrana kvartir*’ (personal safety, home security), BLOK also more literally means ‘block’ and therefore has associations with the concept of obstructing, impeding or preventing (burglary).

2.1 Advice to the Public

Research from the first phase of the project highlighted the lack of information the public felt they received from the militia and other agencies on how to protect their property from victimisation. The overall objective of providing advice to the public was thus to raise awareness of the risk of victimisation and to provide general and targeted crime prevention advice. This was done by producing a series of infomercials for broadcast on television and radio (the most important sources of information according to most respondents), producing and distributing crime prevention literature, developing a poster campaign and developing a victim support network.

Infomercials

A series of infomercials was produced for broadcast on local TV channels in each of the cities to raise awareness about the risk of victimisation and the benefits of adopting preventative measures and provide information and support for burglary victims, including advice on how to cope with the emotional impact of this type of crime. Various broadcasts were prepared in each city for broadcast throughout the implementation phase (2003) in all three cities. The channels used and broadcast times were varied to maximise the publicity given to the project and its aims and objectives. Crime prevention information was also produced for local radio and newspapers throughout the life of the project.

Crime Prevention Literature/Material

Leaflets/brochures

A series of leaflets were produced and distributed to the public in the three areas in each of the cities taking part in the project. This material focussed upon practical home security advice and was distributed in various ways: by the local beat officers and militia officers attending the scene of a burglary; by representatives of the non-departmental guard service (semi-commercial militia service), and by social workers. This material was also made available in local militia stations and other public buildings such as libraries, local authority buildings and schools and shops.

A separate leaflet was produced for burglary victims, to provide advice on how to secure their property in the future and on what support and help they are entitled to from the militia and other agencies. These leaflets also directed victims to the Victim Support Scheme outlined below.

Posters

In addition to the crime prevention and victim support leaflets, a range of posters were produced and distributed in similar locations to the leaflets and brochures. Additionally, two cities adopted novel approaches to publicise the project and its crime preventions messages:

In Smolensk advertising hoardings were used in each of the three districts involved in the project.

In Volgograd the research team obtained permission from the local authorities to hang their posters on public transport in order to reach as large an audience as possible.

Property Marking Stickers

As part of some of the other initiatives outlined below, property-marking stickers were produced and distributed in all three cities. These were given to residents who had their property marked and also used in the entrances, stairwells and lifts of blocks of flats where property was marked to act as a general warning/deterrence.

Street Signs

It was originally intended to install metal street signs to warn potential offenders that various initiatives were underway in the area, such as Neighbourhood Watch, but this proved financially and practically unfeasible and the funds earmarked in the original budget were reallocated to produce more of the other materials mentioned in this section.⁵

Beat Officers Cards

Finally, local militia officers were provided with 'contact' cards to give out to the public to facilitate communication with them. These also provided contact details of the Victim Support/Crime Prevention Offices that were set up in each city. The table below summarises the total number of crime prevention materials produced in each city. The amounts differ as a result of the different formats adopted in each city.

Table 2.1 Total Number of Crime Prevention Materials Produced

Type of Material	Omsk	Smolensk	Volgograd
Crime prevention leaflets	15,000	12,000	12,600
Victim support leaflets			
Brochures	5,000	1,500	2,000
Posters (3 types)	1,500	3 street hoardings	5,000
Stickers	35,000	5,000 large format	9,850
Contact Cards	15,000	15,000	19,750

⁵ Metal signs like those used in the UK to warn that Neighbourhood Watch Schemes are in operation were exorbitantly priced in Russia and questions were raised about the feasibility of installing them (this would have required the agreement of the local council and dealing with Russian bureaucracy can be time consuming) and their durability (concerns were raised about vandalism).

Victim Support Network

As the survey results from Phase I highlighted the extent to which victims of burglary were dissatisfied with the 'after incident' response from the militia, it was decided to set up facilities in each of the participating cities to enable burglary victims to talk to trained counsellors and obtain crime prevention advice. One office was set up in each city, located in the district identified by the survey as having the highest victimisation rates, or in the area deemed the most accessible for the city's population. In the first instance this service was available for several hours each day in each city and co-ordinated by the local project director.

The existence of the offices was widely advertised through the infomercials and publicity material outlined above, and by militia officers responding to burglary incidents who were asked to provide details of the service to victims. The service was housed in permanent accommodation, and equipped with telephone, computer and copying facilities. In each city the running of the office varied according to the people/organisation selected to develop and run this facility.

Volgograd

In Volgograd, the office was created under the auspices of the Russian Institute of Youth Policy and Social Work, which is the city's main educational establishment for the provision of training to social workers. Trainee social workers were closely involved in the development of other parts of the implementation phase in Volgograd, including the property marking scheme (see below). The office was staffed by 3 senior employees at the Institute who underwent training at the Academy and were subsequently responsible for training the social workers attending courses at the Institute.

During 2003 more than 2,100 people approached the Centre for various reasons, including 710 who turned to the Centre for advice on various aspects of burglary prevention (e.g. advice about target hardening: doors, locks, alarms etc.) and counselling (psychological support and legal advice). In addition around 350 people received advice and support by telephone. More than 200 people visited the centre specifically to obtain markers and property marking instructions, although this scheme was largely administered by visiting people's homes (see below).

An unexpected outcome in Volgograd was that some locals used the Centre in a similar way to the 'Crimestoppers' hot line in the UK, that is calling to report suspicious behaviour (such as a drugs' den operating in a block of flats), problems with neighbours (including missing persons and abandoned children) and illegal activities ('moonshine' sales and incidents of domestic violence). Such complaints were reported to the relevant militia departments or social welfare services.

The Centre was also responsible for conducting the training of social workers involved in the property-marking scheme. In total 45 people underwent training in 3 groups on 'Social Work in Burglary Prevention'. The training consisted of seminars and workshops on international experience, the social psychology of working with victims of crime and communication skills for working with the public. Upon completion of the training course, social workers were issued with a certificate and sent out on probation to implement property marking. Since the initial round of property marking, this service has continued to be offered by social workers, which should continue in the future. In this respect, the scheme is proving sustainable beyond the lifetime of the project.

Feedback from the participants on the training offered was largely positive. Participants appreciated the information they received on burglary prevention, the psychology of working with victims and communicating with the public. In addition to the initial training three roundtable discussions were held on 'Interaction between the law enforcement organisations, social services and public organisations to prevent domestic burglary', which involved representatives from the militia, local administration and social welfare services.

Smolensk

In Smolensk the Victim Support Office was created along the lines of the UK's Victim Support Service, primarily to provide psychological support to victims of crime and was therefore staffed by a qualified psychologist. It also offered legal advice to callers and visitors. The provision of psychological counselling for victims of crime was a first for the city, as a result of which the methodology underlying the Centre's work with victims was carefully planned and developed before the centre opened.

The existence of the centre was widely publicised in the crime prevention leaflets and booklets produced, on posters and in TV and radio broadcasts. It was housed in the premises of the Smolensk Law Institute's Centre for Social Partnership to Improve Relations between the Public and the Militia (which is a separate building from the Law Institute).

One unexpected outcome in Smolensk was that victims of other crimes, including bribery, car theft and GBH, asked for legal advice pertaining to their victimisation. Legal advice was provided by the staff of the Institute, of whom between 12 and 15 were involved in supporting victims of crime who approached the Centre for advice and counselling. Between February and December 2003 more than 1,250 people called the Centre for assistance and 201 attended in person.

Omsk

In Omsk the Centre for Crime Prevention was housed in a local militia station and staffed by a retired militia officer, Mr. Roman Levinskiy, with the assistance of a trained psychologist, who offered counselling to victims of crime. More than 500 people approached the Centre for advice between February and December 2003. According to the Centre director, they were primarily interested in home security and property safety, but also asked for advice on dealing with law enforcement agencies, legal advice and help with domestic and housing problems.

It was initially planned that these facilities were to be made available to the Local Resident Association Coordinators and local Beat Officers, working closely together to raise awareness of community and individual safety, and to promote greater co-operation between the militia and the public. This co-operation took the form of the organisation of public meetings (see below) to discuss concerns about crime, advertise the anti-burglary campaign as a whole and encourage involvement in the schemes. The office facilities were used for the purposes of planning and as a base for the dissemination of information – e.g. fliers/newsletters.

2.2 Training Courses for MVD Staff and Other Groups

Research from the first phase of the project highlighted the gulf in levels of trust between the militia and the public. Partly this is a legacy of the past when the militia were perceived to be more interested in serving the needs of the state than protecting the public, which fuelled distrust on both sides. More recently the Russian militia have begun to seek ways of building a better relationship between themselves and the public, through, amongst other things,

improved training programmes for officers and making their services more accessible to the public.

The aim of this part of the implementation phase was to provide training to a range of groups who either come into contact with members of the local community or provide support and advice to victims of domestic burglary. Its purpose was partly to facilitate the implementation of the project as a whole (that is, to give those groups tasked with delivery the necessary skills and competences), but also to explore the extent to which ‘better’ relations between the militia and the public improve levels of reporting of incidents of burglary, and also the extent to which members of the public are likely to give the militia information on likely offenders.

All training was organised by the local law academies (the project partners) and included:

Local Beat Officer Training: key beat officers in the participating areas were given a short course on ways of improving relations with the local community. Training was also given on providing crime prevention advice and working with the local resident associations (see below). In addition, where appropriate, beat officers were given training on how to implement the schemes outlined below.

Victim Support Network Training: the legal advisers and counsellors providing the victim support services were given specific training, partly based upon the experience of the Victim Support organisation in the UK, which donated some training materials.

Local Residents’ Association Co-ordinators’ Training: one of the proposed initiatives was to establish local neighbourhood associations to co-ordinate community action to reduce the threat of burglary and to liaise more closely with the local beat officer. In practise this type of initiative involving local people took various forms (outlined below), but local people who volunteered to act as the co-ordinators of these associations were given special training, focusing on the ways in which local groups can respond to the problem of domestic burglary and how they can liaise more effectively with the local militia.

Table 2.2 Total Number of People Trained⁶

Training	Omsk	Smolensk	Volgograd
Beat Officers	102	111	318
Cadets	ongoing	103	ongoing
Department Chiefs	n/a	27	n/a
Victim Support Network Training	56	n/a	n/a
Social Workers	n/a	n/a	47
Local Resident Association Training	49	52	n/a

⁶ Not all of the boxes in the table contain data because of the different combinations of training used in the cities.

Table 2.3 Total Number of Training Manuals Produced

Audience	Omsk	Smolensk	Volgograd
For militia officers	500	500	500
For militia cadets	500	500	300
For volunteers	150	n/a	300
Total	1,150	1,000⁷	1,100

One of the aims of the project was to revise the course on crime prevention or develop a new course on crime prevention to be taught at law/militia academies. This course was prepared and piloted in Smolensk Law Institute and is now being used in the other cities and awaiting ratification from the MVD.

2.3 Specific Crime Prevention Initiatives

In addition to the crime prevention and publicity materials, and training programmes outlined above, two specific large-scale crime prevention initiatives were planned for the areas taking part in the project. These were property marking and the establishment of local resident associations to champion the concept of ‘community safety’.

Property Marking

Such initiatives have been used with varying degrees of success in the UK and elsewhere, and rely upon increasing the risk to the offender of being caught, and therefore deterring them from committing the crime in the first instance.⁸ Property marking also improves the prospects of militia officers being able to detect stolen property and return recovered goods to their rightful owners.

It was intended that both local beat officers and resident association co-ordinators would encourage residents to mark their household property with a unique code based upon a flat, block and district identifier. Patrol officers and other staff engaged in investigating burglaries were issued with fluorescent torches to enable property codes to be seen. Those participating in the scheme were issued with stickers to be displayed on doors and windows warning offenders that the militia had marked all the property at that address. Posters and stickers were subsequently hung in the entrances of blocks of flats to increase the deterrent aspect of the initiative.

Again each city developed their own approach to property marking, in accordance with the local context, but all were based on the same principle of encouraging the public to take some responsibility for protecting their own property. All three cities received the same volume of property marking equipment:

- 3,000 property marking pens;
- 35 large fluorescent torches (for use in militia stations); and
- 100 small fluorescent torches (for use by the beat officers outside the stations).

⁷ The same training manual was used for volunteers as for officers.

⁸ For example, see Laycock G. (1985) *Property Marking: a deterrent to domestic burglary*. Crime Prevention Unit Paper No. 3, London: Home Office.

Volgograd

As mentioned previously, trainee social workers were closely involved in developing the property marking scheme in Volgograd. The rationale behind their involvement was their access to large groups of particularly vulnerable people, whom it might otherwise have been difficult to target. The property marking scheme and delivery of crime prevention advice was to all intents and purposes built into their general training programme. A total of 45 social workers were trained within the framework of the project, and subsequently were involved in marking property in more than 1,300 flats. In addition to the social workers, beat officers in the three districts participating in the project were also involved in property marking: they were responsible for marking property in around 1,500 flats.

Smolensk

Smolensk took a different two-pronged approach to property marking. They relied on the involvement of various groups to mark property:

- The project team
- Residents' associations
- The Extra-Departmental Guard Service (EDGS)⁹
- Local Housing Department Officers
- Psychological counselling service
- Local beat officers

Property marking was widely advertised by the crime prevention materials produced as part of the project: the leaflets, booklets, posters, TV and radio; and during the training sessions for the volunteers, beat officers, and cadets. It was implemented in three phases:

- January-March 2003: most property marking was carried out by the project team, the psychological counselling service and the EDGS;
- April-May 2003: property marking began on a larger scale, involving representatives of the residents' associations and local housing department officers; and
- May-September 2003: property marking was extended to all three districts and as a result of the acquisition of more convenient torches, the beat officers became involved in the scheme.

Most importantly, existing local residents' associations were involved in property marking using the following mechanism. Representatives of residents' associations were invited to a presentation by a member of the project team, who demonstrated how property marking works and spoke of its potential benefits. Interested parties were then issued with pens, instructions and stickers to take back to their associations/blocks.

⁹ The EDGS is a semi-autonomous part of the militia force that is responsible for providing security services to members of the public and commercial and public institutions and organisations on a commercial basis. Clients pay for the installation of security systems (burglar alarms) and a monthly fee, which is calculated on the basis of the total cost of the goods covered by the contract. In terms of providing domestic security solutions, their work largely consists of installing networked burglar alarm systems, which are centrally monitored. In the event of a burglar alarm being triggered, the EDGS guarantees a 5-minute armed response.

Omsk

A similar process operated in Omsk, although the groundwork was conducted by Roman Livinskiy the Director of the Centre for Crime Prevention created under the auspices of this project. He organised meetings with local residents' associations (K.T.O.S.), who then accompanied him to blocks of flats to carry out property marking. Although it was originally intended that local beat officers would be involved in property-marking, this proved unfeasible as local people preferred to work with the residents associations via block representatives ('friendly faces').

As might be expected with the different approaches taken, the outputs also differed. Using a process of extrapolation, the property-marking co-ordinator in Omsk estimated that around 20,000 flats were offered this service, whereas in Smolensk it was calculated that the residents in 60% of the housing stock were covered by the service. The property of around 3,000 residents was marked in Volgograd, where the approach taken allowed for very precise records to be kept. These outputs are summarised in the table below.

Table 2.4 Number of Homes Potentially Covered by the Property Marking Scheme

City	Coverage
Omsk	19,695
Smolensk	60% of housing stock
Volgograd	3,000

While these figures are very different, this project was intended to pilot burglary reduction schemes with a view to establishing what works and why. In this respect, Volgograd's total should not be compared with Omsk's and Smolensk's, which are extrapolations and not precise figures.

Local Resident Associations (LRAs)

Working with the local beat officers, NGOs and existing housing associations, the research teams aimed to establish a number of residents' associations in each of the districts taking part in the project. It was intended that these LRAs would act as a means of encouraging local residents to work together to deal with common problems and provide a forum for the local beat officer and others to meet with residents on a regular basis. Each LRA was to have a designated co-ordinator, to be elected by the members of the LRA, who would serve as the link with the beat officers, with whom they were to work closely. It was envisaged that the elements of Neighbourhood Watch adopted in each district would depend to a great extent on the area in question and what the local residents wanted.

Like a number of the other proposed schemes, the local Beat Officers, working with the Local Resident Association Co-ordinator, were to play an important role in setting up and assisting the NW schemes. It was discovered that such organisations already exist in some cities: the Committees of Territorial Public Self-Management (in Russian the K.T.O.S.). These organisations exist in most towns at least in name, although the level of organisation/activity varies greatly. Participants in all three cities mentioned the fact that, although K.T.O.S. organisations had been revived during the later 1990s in response to terrorist attacks in Moscow and other cities, they had all but ceased their neighbourhood watch activities by 2001, largely as a result of the perception that the threat to their safety was less serious. In other words, the imperative for preventative action had disappeared.

In Omsk significant use was made of these local associations' willingness to be involved in the project, whereas in Smolensk local residents' associations were involved to some extent in property marking, but in Volgograd it proved impossible to use this approach, hence the alternative approach of using social workers to gain access to vulnerable groups. In this respect, the teams' willingness to be flexible was very significant in terms of seeking alternative mechanisms when the planned approach failed to achieve the desired results. It is beyond the scope of this report/project to establish why there were differences in the three cities in respect of levels of organisation/participation/willingness to participate in the schemes: the reasons could be cultural, historical, and/or political.

2.4 Developing Partnerships

Having studied UK experience to combat crime, particularly the development of partnerships between the militia, local authorities, and other agencies against crime, the Russian project partners were keen to adopt a similar approach in the implementation of Phase II of the project. This was to involve the establishment of two different types of forum – Crime Prevention Committees and Militia-Public Consultative Committees – to encourage as many different groups of people as possible to become involved in the fight against, and the prevention of, crime and disorder.

Attempts were made to create **Crime Prevention Committees** at regional and local level, bringing together representatives of the militia, the local authorities, NGOs, local businesses and other relevant agencies to develop a local focus for crime (particularly burglary) prevention and reduction. They aimed to provide a mechanism for co-ordinating the work of key agencies involved, both directly and indirectly, in reducing crime and improving community safety. It was envisaged that these committees would meet on a quarterly basis beginning in April 2002, initially to formulate a community safety strategy and subsequently to monitor and evaluate the situation.

Attempts were also made to organise **Militia-Public Consultative Committees/Meetings** at district level to solicit the views of the public and provide them with feedback. The committees/meetings had four broad aims:

- To enable the militia to reach a broad cross-section of the population.
- To identify public priorities for militia action.
- To provide the public with information on policing activities/initiatives.
- To develop partnerships between the militia and the public.

It was envisaged that meetings would be held once every two months for the duration of the project, also starting in April 2002, to be chaired by the district chief of militia, with the active participation of the local beat officers and the resident association co-ordinators.

The overall aim was to experiment to find new ways of delivering a militia response that is more accountable, sensitive to local priorities and based upon a partnership approach to seeking solutions.

Smolensk

The project enjoyed the support and understanding of the leadership of the Smolensk Region Directorate of Internal Affairs, the City Administration and other public bodies. The public were also kept informed about the project via the mass media. For example meetings with

local residents' associations were filmed and shown on regional news programmes. Official agreements were signed on co-operation with the EDGS and Smolensk Region Directorate of Internal Affairs. An important part was played by the early organisation of a training seminar for department heads and district militia chiefs and others involved in tackling domestic burglary. It was not possible, however, to create a permanent committee to deal with the issue of domestic burglary.

Meetings between the beat officers and public were advertised in the regional media. Such meetings were not a new occurrence for Smolensk: they had been held since 2000 and it was therefore relatively easy for the project partners to come to an agreement with the head of the beat officers' unit to hold meetings about preventing burglary. Between four and six meetings were held each month in three districts, attracting between 100 and 160 members of the public.

Volgograd

Meetings were held between the district militia and members of the public throughout the implementation phase of the project. As an example, one of the districts involved in the project, Voroshilovskiy, held 144 meetings about property-marking, with between 10 and 30 people in attendance at each. A recurring problem noted by the militia and project team was low levels of public or civil responsibility and the lack of public interest in participating in such crime prevention initiatives. However, it was also noted that the provision of property marking pens and the distribution of information acted as an incentive for participation in such meetings.

Omsk

The project team in Omsk considered it a crucial aspect of the project to increase civil initiatives in respect of crime prevention and home security. Meetings between the militia and public began in February 2003 and continued throughout the year. The approach used was targeted: it was recognised from the outset that it would be difficult to attract the general public to such meetings and therefore representatives from selected groups, including residents' and veterans' associations, were invited to meet with the militia. In this respect the local authorities played an invaluable role and steps were therefore made towards developing a multi-agency approach to crime prevention and community safety. It is anticipated that this approach will be further developed in the future.

3 EVALUATING THE EXPECTED OUTCOMES

This section focuses on the results of the Evaluation Phase, in particular the impact of the project upon the variables outlined in the previous section, including:

- The fear of crime/burglary;
- the risk of burglary;
- household security;
- the impact of burglary;
- public perceptions of the militia; and
- co-operation between the militia and public.

3.1 The Fear of Crime/Burglary

The repeat survey found that fear of crime had increased since 2001, when 61% of all respondents were ‘quite’ or ‘very worried’ about crime in general, compared with 74% in 2003 (Table 3.1). Levels of concern were uniform in Smolensk and Volgograd in 2001 (64%), but had increased in 2003 to a greater extent in Smolensk (76%) than in Volgograd (to 72%). The rise in levels of concern may be related to a general raising of awareness about the risk of victimisation, although paradoxically, victimisation rates have fallen (see Table 3.4 below).

Table 3.1 Extent of Worry About Crime in General

City	Not/Slightly Worried		Quite/Very Worried	
	2001	2003	2001	2003
Smolensk	36	24	64	76
Volgograd	36	28	64	72
All	39	26	61	74

The 2001 survey found that burglary was the offence people were most likely to express concern about (67%), and whilst the 2003 survey showed that burglary remains the crime that people are most likely to say they are ‘very worried’ about (23%), this is 10% fewer than expressed this level of concern in 2001 (33%) (Table 3.2).

Table 3.2 Percentage of Respondents Who Feel ‘Quite’ or ‘Very Worried’ by Type of Crime

Type of Crime	2001	Ranking	2003	Ranking
Burglary	64	1	58	4
Theft from a motor vehicle	58	2	33	11
Theft of a motor vehicle	56	3	31	12
Theft from dacha	52	4	44	7
Theft from a garage	50	5	24	13
Damage to a motor vehicle	50	6	34	10
Aggravated burglary	49	7	49	6
GBH	47	8	64	2
Vandalism/Graffiti	36	9	51	5
Robbery	46	10	64	2
Minor Assault	44	11	67	1
Racketeering	29	12	37	8
Extortion	24	13	36	9

In fact the 2003 survey revealed a significant change in patterns of concern away from property crime towards personnel or violent crime. Respondents were much more concerned about minor assault (67% were quite or very worried) followed by GBH (64%) and robbery (64%) than burglary in 2003 (57%). However, once again, levels of concern remain far in excess of actual risks, which is a common phenomenon.

When respondents were asked a more specific question about how worried they were about having their homes broken into and something stolen, a similar level of concern was obtained (Table 3.3).

Table 3.3 Extent of Worry About Burglary

Variable	Not/Slightly Worried		Quite/Very Worried	
	2001	2003	2001	2003
Smolensk	28	40	72	60
Volgograd	31	26	69	74
All	33	42	67	58

Compared with 2001 (67%) almost 10% fewer respondents were concerned or very concerned about burglary in 2003 (58%), which is an encouraging sign. This reduction in the level of concern may be a reflection of the lower risk of burglary, which was suggested both by official crime statistics and our comparative survey data. In this respect, one of the main objectives of the project – to reduce concern about burglary – has been achieved.

3.2 Risk of Burglary

The Nature of Burglary

In order to establish the total number of burglaries that had occurred during the previous 12 months, respondents were asked whether they had been the victim of burglary, attempted burglary, aggravated burglary or attempted aggravated burglary. The overall results for 2001 and 2003 are presented in Table 3.4 below, which includes both total figures and the percentage represented by each type of burglary as a share of the total. The 2003 results show an overall fall in the total number of burglaries reported of 114 or 49%, which compares very

favourably with an official increase of 1% for all burglaries throughout Russia.¹⁰ The percentage figures are also useful in terms of establishing trends and patterns and they show that the share of aggravated and attempted aggravated burglary remained more or less constant, while the percentage of successful burglaries (with entry) increased by 10% and attempted burglaries fell correspondingly from 25% to 17%.

Table 3.4 Number of Burglaries by Type and as Percentage of Total¹¹

Type of Burglary	Number		As % of total		Total Reduction	
	2001	2003	2001	2003	In numbers	As a % of 2001
With entry	139	83	59	69	56	40
Attempted	59	21	25	17	38	64
Aggravated	17	8	7	7	9	53
Attempted aggravated	19	8	8	7	11	58
All burglaries	234	120	100	100	114	49

Prevalence Rates

In 2001 the average prevalence rate (the percentage of households/individuals who were victimised at least one during the previous year) for all burglaries and attempts was 5.5 (Table 3.5). The risk was highest in Smolensk (6.6%).

Table 3.5 Percentage of Respondents Who Were Victims Once or More During the Previous Year

Type of Burglary	Smolensk		Volgograd		Total	
	2001	2003	2001	2003	2001	2003
With entry	5.5	3.0	3.0	2.5	4.2	2.7
Attempted	2.1	0.5	1.5	0.7	1.8	0.6
Aggravated	0.8	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.3
Attempted aggravated	0.7	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.2
All burglaries	6.6	3.6	4.5	3.1	5.5	3.3

The 2003 survey found that Smolensk still had the highest prevalence rate, but that this had fallen quite significantly to 3.6%, which contributed to the overall decline of risk from 5.5% in 2001 to 3.3% in 2003, which is a striking indicator of achievement in terms of cutting victimisation rates.

Incidence Rates

Incidence rates offer a different measure of risk – per 100 inhabitants – which allows for comparisons to be made between different populations. The 2001 survey estimated that 7.6 burglaries were committed per 100 inhabitants, 5 of which were successful (entry was gained) and 2.6 were attempts (see Table 3.6 below). The 2003 survey estimated that incidence rates have fallen significantly to 4 per 100 inhabitants, 3 of which were successful and 1 was attempted. Smolensk showed the biggest decrease from 10.2 to 3.9 burglaries per 100 people, which largely accounts for the dramatic decline in overall incidence rates. However rates also fell in Volgograd from 5.4 to 4.6.

¹⁰ Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (2004) *Summary of Crime Statistics January-December 2003*. <http://www.mvdinform.ru> (Accessed May 2004).

¹¹ These figures are for Smolensk and Volgograd only.

Table 3.6 Number of Burglaries Experienced During the Previous Year per 100 Inhabitants (Incidence Rates)

Type of Burglary	Smolensk		Volgograd		Total	
	2001	2003	2001	2003	2001	2003
With entry	6.1	3.0	3.2	2.5	4.5	2.7
Attempted	2.3	0.5	1.6	1.0	2.0	0.7
Aggravated	0.9	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.3
Attempted aggravated	0.9	0.1	0.4	0.3	0.6	0.3
All burglaries	10.2	3.9	5.4	4.6	7.6	4.0

Income and Burglary

In terms of associations between income and victimisation, the 2001 survey found that respondents who placed themselves in the two lower income categories (not enough to eat or just enough for food, but nothing else) were around twice as likely to have been burgled as those who said they had enough food and clothing but nothing else, had some savings, or had all that they need. The 2003 survey suggests that the gap between the poor and more prosperous has narrowed and that those who placed themselves in the lower income categories are now less likely to experience burglary than those who place themselves in the higher income groups. Victimisation rates had, however, fallen across all income categories, which is a positive sign (Table 3.7).

Table 3.7 Victimisation Rates for Different Income Groups

Income Group	2001	2002
Not enough even for food	8.2	2.6
Just enough for food, but nothing else	9.3	2.9
Enough for food and clothing, but nothing else	4.4	2.9
Some savings and can sometimes afford luxuries	4.2	4.3
Have all that we need	4.6	3.5

Given that one of the aims of the project was to target vulnerable groups, these results are very positive: people from the lower two income groups are no longer more likely to be burgled than those in the higher income groups. This is doubtless at least partly the result of the project teams' explicit targeting of their initiatives (especially leafleting to raise awareness, and property marking) at vulnerable groups in particular.

Multiple/Repeat Victimisation

Whilst prevalence rates indicate the overall proneness or risk of victimisation, they do not measure how many times people have been the victim of crime. Respondents were therefore asked how many times they had been the victim of any type of burglary or attempted burglary during the previous 12 months. The results for 2001 and 2003 are shown in Table 3.8 below.

Table 3.8 Number of Times Victims Were Victimised

Type of Burglary	Once		Twice		Three times or more	
	2001	2003	2001	2003	2001	2003
With entry	95	99	3	1	2	0
Attempted	91	83	8	17	1	0
Aggravated	95	100	0	0	5	0
Attempted aggravated	91	86	5	14	5	0
All burglaries	76	87	18	9	6	4

The 2001 results indicated that around one in four burglary victims (24%) could expect to be victimised more than once during the year, whereas the 2003 survey results suggest that this has fallen to around one in seven (13%). This result may be related to the fact that fewer households were being victimised overall (see Table 3.5), and that people were more aware of the measures they could adopt to secure their property (see Table 3.9). However, it could also be related to the targeting of initiatives towards burglary victims in keeping with the principle that victimisation is the best single predictor of future victimisation.¹² Assistance was offered to burglary victims by the beat officers and victim support offices, who provided both advice and practical assistance (including property marking) to try to prevent them from future victimisation. This targeted assistance appears to have had a very positive outcome in terms of addressing the problem of repeat victimisation.

3.3 Household Security

Given the high levels of concern about burglary expressed by respondents to both surveys, we could expect people in Russia to have taken all possible steps to make their homes more secure. However, the results of the 2001 survey (see Table 3.9) suggested that this was not the case. The results showed that the most popular method of burglary prevention was not to leave flats/homes empty, which 44% of respondents tried to do. Various target hardening measures were also popular amongst respondents: 41% had fitted a double door, 28% better locks, 15% bars on windows and 14% had fitted a metal door. Less costly measures such as making arrangements with neighbours (22%) and owning a dog (21%) were also popular. Very few respondents had fitted a burglar alarm system (8%), obtained insurance cover (5%), had an entry phone (4%) or paid for a security guard (3%). Around 14% said they took no precautions to protect their property.

¹² Pease, K. (1998) *Repeat Victimisation: Taking Stock*, Home Office Crime Detection and Prevention Series Paper 90, Home Office.

**Table 3.9 Percentage of Respondents
Taking Steps to Protect Their Property by Type of Measure***

Precautions	Smolensk		Volgograd		Total	
	2001	2003	2001	2003	2001	2003
Try not to leave home empty	49	44	41	33	44	38
Double door	42	55	35	37	41	46
Better locks	35	71	22	28	28	49
Arrangements with neighbours	26	36	18	20	22	28
Own a dog	24	30	22	26	21	28
Bars on windows	17	6	10	17	15	12
Metal door	22	22	10	6	14	14
Burglar alarm	8	25	4	11	8	18
Insurance	6	3	1	3	5	3
Entry phone	9	24	1	6	4	15
Pay for a guard	4	7	1	2	3	5
None	11	1	16	21	14	11

* Respondents were asked to mention all the measures they had taken

Two years of raising awareness amongst the target populations appears to have made a significant difference to people's attitudes to home security. Table 3.10 below shows that, in contrast with the 2001 survey, the 2003 results revealed a significant increase in target-hardening measures, including double front doors (46% of respondents) and better locks (49%). More than twice as many respondents said they had a burglar alarm (18%) and almost four times as many had an entry-phone system (11%). A similar share of respondents continues to rely on not leaving the house empty (38%), making arrangements with neighbours (28%) and keeping a dog (28%). Slightly fewer respondents than in 2001 (11% in 2003) said they took no precautions to protect their property. Many fewer respondents said they took no precautions for financial reasons (35% compared with 51%) or because they thought it would not make any difference (35% compared to 43%) (Table 3.10).

Table 3.10 Reasons Given by Respondents for not Taking Precautions to Protect Their Property

Reason	Smolensk		Volgograd		Total	
	2001	2003	2001	2003	2001	2003
Too expensive	65	32	65	35	51	35
Nothing would make a difference	54	21	42	36	43	35
No fear of burglary	26	26	20	20	23	20
This is not a priority	18	11	9	3	11	4
Lack of information	13	0	4	8	7	8
Other	2	5	4	1	5	1

The results show that fewer respondents said they took no precautions because this was too expensive (16% fewer), or because nothing would make a difference (8% fewer). Many fewer respondents said this was not a priority for them (only 4% in 2003).

3.4 The Impact of Burglary

Stolen Property

The 2001 survey estimated that four in every five cases (80%) of burglary resulted in the loss of property. This had risen to 88% in 2003, which is in keeping with the structure of burglary previously indicated showing that successful burglaries had increased as a percentage of total burglaries in 2003 (see Table 3.4 for details). It should be kept in mind, however, that overall burglary rates were much lower in the 2003 survey when compared with 2001 (again see Table 3.4 for details).

Table 3.11 Whether Anything was Stolen

Response	Smolensk		Volgograd		Total	
	2001	2003	2001	2003	2001	2003
Yes	76	91	86	85	80	88
No	24	9	14	15	20	12
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

The 2001 survey showed that burglars in Russia had a preference for certain kinds of goods, including jewellery (mentioned by 40% of victims), clothing (37%), cash (36%), televisions (35%) and video equipment (34%) (Table 3.11). In contrast respondents to the 2003 survey indicated that cash is now the most commonly stolen item (mentioned by 40% of burglary victims), followed by video equipment (37%), televisions (30%) and various consumer durables (household electrical goods and stereo equipment), while jewellery was much less commonly stolen (17%), which may reflect changing consumption patterns (e.g. an increase in such consumer durables).

Table 3.12 Items Stolen*

Item	2001		2003	
	%	Rating	%	Rating
Jewellery	40	1	17	7
Clothes	37	2	20	6
Cash	36	3	40	1
Televisions	35	4	30	3
Video equipment	34	5	37	2
Household electrical goods	30	6	22	5
Stereo/hi-fi equipment	20	7	26	4
Food	15	8	11	9
Purse/wallet	13	9	4	11
Documents	9	10	3	12
Video cameras	8	11	16	8
Tools	6	12	2	13
Computer equipment	4	13	10	10
Other	7	–	0	–

* Percentage of respondents who said they had lost these items as a result of burglary

Insurance Cover

Although the 2001 survey suggested that insurance levels were very low – only 8% of property stolen was insured, the 2003 survey revealed that even less property is now covered by insurance – only 3%. Although the low level of insurance cover is not surprising (since, unlike in the West, insurance cover continues to be neither widespread nor comprehensive in countries in transition), this pattern suggests that the public continue to have little confidence in the Russian insurance industry.¹³

Table 3.13 Extent of Insurance Cover for Stolen Property

Response	Smolensk		Volgograd		Total	
	2001	2003	2001	2003	2001	2003
Yes	8	2	2	3	8	3
No	92	98	98	97	92	97
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Emotional Impact

As burglary can have as much of an emotional as financial impact, respondents were also asked whether the burglary had affected them ‘a little’, ‘a lot’ or ‘very much’. A comparison of the 2001 and 2003 results (Table 3.14) suggests that burglary continues to have a significant impact on victims. Respondents were more likely to say they had been affected very much in 2003 (60%) than in 2001 (44%).

Table 3.14 Extent to Which Victims Were Affected by Burglary

Response	Smolensk		Volgograd		Total	
	2001	2003	2001	2003	2001	2003
Very much	37	59	46	57	44	60
Quite a lot	43	33	46	29	39	31
A little	20	8	8	14	17	9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

No significant differences were found between victims who had used the support services available and those who had not.

3.5 Public Perceptions of the Militia

One aim of the project was to improve militia/public relations: although the repeat survey suggests that public perceptions of the militia remain poor, there is evidence that some aspects of the relationship are improving.

Levels of Trust in the Militia

The 2001 survey found relatively low levels of trust amongst respondents: fewer than half (45%) trusted the militia to any extent. This had decreased very slightly to 43% in the 2003 survey (Table 3.15), although this was mainly due to a significant increase in the percentage

¹³ It should be noted that the semi-autonomous branch of the militia, the Extra-Departmental Guard Service, does provide a type of insurance to domestic and other properties (commercial and industrial) whereby they install monitored burglar alarm systems for an installation fee and thereafter monthly payments, which are based on the total value of the property being guarded.

of respondents in Smolensk who do not trust the militia (from one in two to two-thirds). In contrast, there was a significant increase in levels of confidence in the militia in Volgograd (from 48% in 2001 to 59% in 2003).

Table 3.15 Whether the Public Trusts the Local Militia

Response	Smolensk		Volgograd		Total	
	2001	2003	2001	2003	2001	2003
Probably/definitely yes	34	28	48	59	45	43
Probably/definitely not	49	67	36	30	39	49
Don't know	17	5	16	11	16	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Effectiveness of Militia

Respondents were also highly critical of the militia's general performance in 2001 – only 17% thought they did a good or very good job, compared with 47% who thought they did a bad or very bad job. Although still low, 22% of respondents to the 2003 survey considered that the militia did a good or very good job, while 47% considered they did a bad or very bad job (Table 3.16). The biggest change in opinion was found in Volgograd, where 30% said they thought the militia did a good or very good job, compared with 19% in 2001, which meant that more than twice as many respondents in Volgograd made a positive assessment of the militia as in Smolensk (13%).

Table 3.16 Effectiveness of the Militia

Response	Smolensk		Volgograd		Total	
	2001	2003	2001	2003	2001	2003
Good/very good	10	13	19	30	17	22
Neither good/bad	55	49	50	45	53	47
Bad/very bad	35	38	31	25	30	31
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Burglary Victims' Opinions of Militia Work

In 2001 respondents who had been victims of burglary were highly critical of the militia's work: only 27% of burglary victims were 'quite' or 'very satisfied' with the way the militia had handled their cases, compared with 70% who were 'a little' or 'very dissatisfied' (Table 3.17). By 2003 even fewer respondents were 'fairly' or 'very satisfied' with the militia response (17%) compared with 78% who were 'a little' or 'very dissatisfied'. This result was influenced by a huge increase in levels of dissatisfaction amongst respondents in Smolensk (90% were 'a little' or 'very dissatisfied'). In Volgograd in contrast a positive change was observed from 22% being 'fairly' or 'very satisfied' in 2001 to 31% in 2003. This still means, however, that almost two-thirds of burglary victims were dissatisfied with the militia response.

Table 3.17 Overall Satisfaction With the Way the Militia Handled the Matter

Response	Smolensk		Volgograd		Total	
	2001	2003	2001	2003	2001	2003
Fairly or very satisfied	23	6	22	31	27	17
A little or very dissatisfied	71	90	76	61	70	78
Too early to say	6	4	2	8	3	5
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

This lack of satisfaction with the militia may be related to the decrease in detection/clear-up rates: whereas in 2001 more than half (54%) of all burglaries were detected, by 2003 this had fallen by more than half to 20% (Table 3.18). Consequently the percentage of burglaries that were not detected increased from 32% to 59%. This fall in detection was particularly spectacular in Smolensk, where 90% of burglaries were not cleared.

Table 3.18 Whether the Militia Found out or Knew who was Responsible for the Burglary

Response	Smolensk		Volgograd		Total	
	2001	2003	2001	2003	2001	2003
Yes	43	4	66	42	54	20
No	39	90	28	19	32	59
Not yet	9	6	0	31	5	17
Don't know	9	0	6	8	9	4
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Treatment by the Militia

With regard to specific contact with the militia, around half of all respondents (46%) to the 2001 survey thought they had been treated with either indifference (36%), irritation (8%) or hostility (2%) by the militia. The results of the 2003 survey were slightly better: fewer than one in three (28%) said they had been treated with either indifference (24%) or irritation (4%), while none believed they had been treated with hostility (Table 3.19). In contrast a significantly higher number of respondents said they had been treated with attention and sympathy or some attention in 2003 (77%) compared with 2001 (54%), suggesting some improvement in how the militia treats the public, or at least how the public perceives this treatment.

Table 3.19 Respondents' Perceptions of how the Militia Treated Them

Response	Smolensk		Volgograd		Total	
	2001	2003	2001	2003	2001	2003
With attention and sympathy	14	5	12	19	16	11
With some attention	33	74	39	45	38	61
With indifference	43	21	37	27	36	24
With irritation	9	0	7	9	8	4
With hostility	1	0	5	0	2	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Taking these results together it could be argued that the service offered by the militia has improved in some respects (treatment) but not in others (detection) as a result of which the public's overall view of the service provided remains poor.

3.6 Co-operation Between the Public and the Militia

Importance of Co-operation

Finally, respondents were asked whether it was necessary to establish closer links with the militia and the public. The results are shown in Table 3.20: in 2001 around three-quarters (74%) of all respondents definitely or probably thought it necessary to establish closer links between residents and the local militia, compared with one in ten who definitely or probably did not think this necessary. By 2003, even more respondents thought this important (80%), while 12% thought it unnecessary.

Table 3.20 Importance of Co-operation

Response	Smolensk		Volgograd		Total	
	2001	2003	2001	2003	2001	2003
Yes, definitely	44	38	35	35	41	37
Probably yes	33	51	34	35	33	43
Probably not	8	9	5	9	6	9
Definitely not	3	1	5	5	4	3
Don't know	12	1	21	16	16	8
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

Contact with Beat Officers

When respondents were asked in 2001 whether they would like to meet their local beat officers and be more in touch with them, almost half of them (48%) were in favour of more frequent contact to one extent or another, compared with 38% who were not in favour. By 2003 the percentage in favour of greater contact had increased to 68%, compared with 23% who were against (3.21). This suggests that the public need for contact with the beat officers is still not being met.

Table 3.21 Whether Respondents Would Like to Meet the Beat Officers More Often and be More in Touch With Them

Response	Smolensk		Volgograd		Total	
	2001	2003	2001	2003	2001	2003
Yes, definitely	17	24	29	25	21	24
Probably yes	31	58	25	29	27	44
Probably not	31	15	13	17	23	16
Definitely not	14	3	15	12	15	7
Don't know	7	0	18	17	14	9
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100

3.7 Summary

Although the fear of crime in general has increased, concern about burglary has declined, which is a positive result. More significantly, burglary rates have fallen significantly, whichever measure is used: in overall terms by almost half (49%); prevalence rates fell from 5.5 to 3.3; and incidence rates from 7.4 to 4.0. The most vulnerable groups – those in the two lower income groups – are no longer more at risk of victimisation and repeat victimisation has

fallen almost by half from 24% to 13%. Home security has also improved and fewer respondents now consider this to be pointless.

With regard to the militia, public perceptions and attitudes have deteriorated in some respects and improved in others. For example, levels of general trust in the militia were lower overall and victim satisfaction with the militia has also fallen. This latter statistic is most likely explained by the fact that detection rates fell from 59% to 20% between 2001 and 2003. In contrast, victims reported slightly improved treatment from the militia, which is also a positive result and generally the public want to help the militia and to have more contact with the beat officers in particular. Whilst this is a positive sign on the part of the public, it also indicates that their needs continue not to be met by the militia.

4 THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

This section evaluates the process of implementation of the schemes developed under the auspices of the project. It covers levels of awareness and involvement amongst the populations of the three cities involved in the project and what they thought about the organisation and usefulness of the schemes.

4.1 Public Awareness of the Project

In order to evaluate public awareness of the project as a whole, respondents were asked two questions: whether they had seen the 'BLOK' project logo and whether they had heard about the project at all. The results of both questions are summarised in Table 4.1 below.

Table 4.1 Percentage of Local Residents who had Seen the 'Blok' Symbol or Heard About the Project¹⁴

	Smolensk	Volgograd	All
Have seen BLOK logo	39	47	43
Have heard about the project	38	49	43

In general terms there was a relatively high level of public awareness about the project. Around one-half of all respondents had definitely or possibly seen the project logo and heard about the project from various sources. Respondents had primarily heard about the project via the media, including television (47%), newspapers (29%) and radio (21%). Also significant was the high percentage of respondents who had heard via word-of-mouth from their neighbours, relatives or friends (26%). Levels of awareness were much higher in Volgograd than in Smolensk, where levels were nonetheless impressive.

Public Awareness of the Schemes

The various schemes implemented as part of the project achieved a significant level of local awareness, as summarised in Table 4.2 below.

Table 4.2 Percentage of Local Residents who had Heard About the Schemes

Scheme	Smolensk	Volgograd	All
Property marking ¹⁵	55	52	53
TV programmes and adverts ¹⁶	54	39	46
Radio programmes ¹⁷	44	37	40
Victim support/crime prevention office ¹⁸	38	39	39
Crime prevention materials ¹⁹	24	44	34
Burglary prevention posters ²⁰	36	27	32

¹⁴ These figures are for respondents who answered 'yes' or 'possibly'.

¹⁵ These figures are for respondents who answered 'yes' or 'possibly'.

¹⁶ These figures are for respondents who had seen TV programmes or adverts 'once' or 'several times'.

¹⁷ These figures are for respondents who had heard radio programmes or adverts that mentioned BLOK either 'once' or 'several times'.

¹⁸ These figures are for respondents who answered 'yes' or 'possibly'.

¹⁹ These figures are for respondents who answered 'yes' or 'possibly'.

²⁰ These figures are for those who answered 'yes'.

In overall terms, local residents were extremely well informed about the property marking scheme (53%), followed by the TV programmes and infomercials (46%), radio programmes (40%), and victim support/crime prevention offices (39%). One-third of respondents had heard about the crime prevention materials and literature produced as part of the project (34%) and had seen the burglary prevention posters (32%). The differences between cities are likely to be related to the way in which the schemes were publicised and organised in each of the cities.

In terms of publicity, the media played a significant role in relaying information about the different schemes to the public, which reflects the media-intense approach adopted for Phase 2 of the project. TV infomercials and other coverage played a significant role in raising awareness of property-marking (41%), the victim-support/crime prevention offices (33%) and crime prevention materials (26%). Next to the media, public interaction between neighbours, relatives and friends was an important source of information about the various schemes, including the crime prevention/victim support offices (20%) and property marking (19%).

4.2 Level of Involvement in the Schemes

There were four schemes in which the public could be involved – either passively (receipt of crime prevention materials and literature) or actively (property marking, meetings with beat officers and use of victim support/crime prevention office). The average level of participation in the first two schemes was relatively high compared with the last two (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3 Percentage of Local Residents who Took Part in the Schemes

Scheme	Smolensk	Volgograd	All
	Percent		
Dissemination of crime prevention materials	23	23	23
Property marking ²¹	21	22	21
Beat officer meetings	4	15	9
Victim support/crime prevention office ²²	3	6	5

Almost one in four respondents in both Smolensk and Volgograd received crime prevention materials and literature at least once during the implementation phase of the project, which indicates a very high rate of coverage. However, very few respondents had approached the victim support/crime prevention office, despite comparatively high levels of awareness amongst respondents of the existence of these centres. This may reflect the novelty of this scheme, since such victim support services generally do not exist in Russian cities or the relatively low level of victimisation.

4.3 Evaluation of the Organisation of the Schemes

All respondents to the survey who said they had heard about any of the project schemes were asked what they thought about the level of organisation and asked to choose from the possible replies: ‘very good’, ‘good’, ‘poor’, ‘very poor’ or ‘don’t know’. Table 4.4 below shows the percentage who answered ‘good’ or ‘very good’.

²¹ This figure is for respondents who were offered this service.

²² This figure is for respondents who had contacted the office/centre.

Table 4.4 Percentage of Positive Evaluations of the Organisation of the Schemes

Scheme	Smolensk	Volgograd	All
	<i>Percent</i>		
Property marking	44	40	43
Beat officer meetings	95	20	38

Whilst the evaluation of the organisation of the beat officer meetings was extremely high in Smolensk, it should be kept in mind that these figures are based on very low absolute numbers, since involvement levels were generally low (for example, 4% of respondents had attended meetings in Smolensk).

4.4 Evaluation of the Usefulness of the Schemes

All respondents who said they had heard about the various initiatives implemented as part of the project were also asked to rate the usefulness of such schemes for the local population. Table 4.5 below summarises the responses of those who answered ‘useful’ or ‘very useful’.

Table 4.5 Percentage of Positive Evaluations of the Usefulness of the Schemes

Scheme	Smolensk	Volgograd	All
	<i>Percent</i>		
TV programmes and adverts	97	46	76
Burglary prevention posters	86	69	74
Radio programmes	94	43	72
Crime prevention materials	90	45	68
Victim support/crime prevention office	66	67	67
Property marking	47	71	56
Beat officers’ meetings	98	34	48

Participants’ evaluation of the schemes they had been involved in was overwhelmingly positive, but again, it should be kept in mind that relatively small numbers participated in some of these schemes.

4.4 Summary

To summarise this section, as previously mentioned the aim was to have a high profile media campaign and in this respect, the survey results indicate that the project teams in Russia were successful in publicising the projects aims and work. Awareness amongst the target populations was extremely high in terms of the project as a whole and some of the schemes developed under its auspices. Public participation in the schemes was also relatively high and their evaluation of them, both with regard to organisation and usefulness, was particularly good.

5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This section reviews the success of the project in terms of its original objectives. From the results presented in this report, the project has been successful in:

- Raising awareness.
- Reducing victimisation, particularly amongst the poor.
- Reducing repeat victimisation.
- Establishing non-police victim services, which have been warmly received.
- Encouraging the public to take precautions: this is a real change in mindset, since traditionally security has been seen as a police and not a personal problem.

However, it did not have the planned impact in some areas:

- The militia proved resistant to change. There are still major structural issues that need to be resolved, particularly in terms of the status and the organisation of the militia.
- The training courses for the militia would not appear to have had a positive effect: the public are still unhappy with how the militia treat them.
- It was difficult to engage the militia in the project: with the exception of the Non-Departmental Guard Service, non-militia services proved more effective.
- Although senior militia officers were keen to participate in the project, their positive attitudes do not appear to have filtered down to the rank and file militia who interact with the public on a daily basis.
- The fear of crime has increased.

Given these conclusions, in lieu of recommendations, the following points are offered for consideration:

- Publicity campaigns can work and should be encouraged as a means of raising awareness and persuading the public to take responsibility for their own security.
- Work with agencies and groups other than the police should be encouraged to raise awareness about community issues. These groups exist and their members can be motivated to contribute/participate.
- Performance indicators remain a problem and continue to impact on the ability of the police to want to participate in crime prevention.
- The militia continue to be/operate like a reactive force rather than a proactive service.
- The militia pay lip service to the idea of crime prevention, but only in so far as it is linked to performance measures.
- High levels of public mistrust of the militia remain, which suggests that all reform to date in this area has largely been ineffective and should therefore be reviewed.

- Training for militia officers remains problematic. Too much emphasis continues to be placed on teaching the law and not on policing skills. The courses developed by this project do not seem to have had much impact in this respect.
- A major gulf appears to exist between the platitudes of senior officers and the practices of the rank and file militia.
- There appears to be a continued ideological (Soviet) and deterministic approach to making plans and generating reports without any intervening action.
- Public needs are not currently being met by the militia. This is a major problem and perhaps a key factor in terms of explaining the lack of public trust in them.
- Violent crime appears to be more of a problem amongst the public than property crime. Programmes need to be developed to address this issue.
- The national context is crucial, but so is the local context. This project showed that different approaches might be required in different cities for maximum impact.

APPENDIX 1: ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS IN THE 2003 SURVEY

During the past two years a pilot project has been implemented related to crime prevention, particularly domestic burglaries. We are interested in your level of awareness of this project and your attitude towards and opinions of some of the measures that have been implemented.

*Let's start with the project in general:
The project is called BLOK.*

64. Have you ever seen this symbol (the BLOK symbol)?

1. Yes
2. Maybe
3. No

65. Have you heard about the project at all?

1. Yes
2. Maybe
3. No

66. Where did you hear about the project?

1. From TV
2. From newspapers
3. From the radio
4. From written announcements in my district/block of flats
5. From a family member/neighbour/work colleague
6. From the local head of residents
7. From adverts on public transport
8. From adverts on the street (hoardings)
9. From the local beat officers
10. From local NGOs
11. Other (please specify)

Now some questions about the various schemes that have been implemented as part of the project.

Firstly, leaflets and brochures containing advice on securing property:

67. Have you heard about this scheme?

1. Yes
2. Maybe
3. No

68. From what source (mark all responses)?

1. From TV
2. From newspapers
3. From the radio
4. From written announcements in my district/block of flats
5. From a family member/neighbour/work colleague
6. From the local head of residents
7. From adverts on public transport

8. From adverts on the street (hoardings)
9. From the local beat officers
10. From local NGOs
11. Other (please specify)

69. Did you receive any such material?

1. Yes, several times
2. Yes, once
3. No

70. How would you rate the usefulness of this material for local people?

1. Very useful
2. Useful
3. Of some use
4. Useless
5. It's difficult to say

Now about the burglary prevention posters:

71. Have you seen these posters?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Difficult to say

72. Where did you see them?

1. On TV
2. In the newspapers
3. On public transport
4. In various institutions
5. At the police station
6. In my block of flats
7. In the office (crime prevention/victim support)
8. Other (please specify)

73. What is your opinion of their usefulness for local people?

1. Very useful
2. Useful
3. Of some use
4. Useless
5. It's difficult to say

Now about TV programmes and adverts:

74. Have you seen any TV programmes or adverts which mentioned BLOK?

1. Yes, several times
2. Once
3. No

75. What is your opinion of their usefulness for local people?

1. Very useful
2. Useful
3. Of some use
4. Useless
5. It's difficult to say

Now about radio programmes which mentioned BLOK:

76. Have you heard any radio programmes or adverts which mentioned BLOK?

1. Yes, several times
2. Once
3. No

77. What is your opinion of their usefulness for local people?

1. Very useful
2. Useful
3. Of some use
4. Useless
5. It's difficult to say

Let's move on now to property marking:

78. Have you heard of the property marking scheme?

1. Yes
2. Maybe
3. No

79. From what source (mark all responses)?

1. From TV
2. From newspapers
3. From the radio
4. From written announcements in my district/block of flats
5. From a family member/neighbour/work colleague
6. From the local head of residents
7. From adverts on public transport
8. From adverts on the street (hoardings)
9. From the local beat officers
10. From local NGOs
11. Other (please specify)

80. Were you offered this service?

1. Yes
2. No

81. If yes, by whom (mark all answers)?

1. A officer from the extra-departmental guard service
2. The local beat officer
3. Social workers
4. Neighbour/relative/acquaintance
5. Representative of the housing authorities
6. Someone from the crime prevention/victim support office
7. Senior block resident
8. Other (please specify)

82. Did you agree to have your property marked?

1. Yes
2. No

83. If yes, why (what was the main reason)?

1. In the hope of scaring off burglars

2. In the hope of getting my property back if it was stolen
3. Curiosity
4. Other reason (please specify)

84. If not, why not?

1. It's pointless: no-one will look for the stolen property
2. It won't scare off burglars
3. Other (please specify)

85. How would you rate the organisation of this scheme?

1. It was well organised
2. More organised than disorganised
3. Difficult to say
4. More disorganised than organised
5. Badly organised

86. How would you rate the usefulness of this scheme?

1. Very useful
2. Useful
3. Of some use
4. It's difficult to say

Let's look now at meeting with local beat officers:

87. Did you attend any of the meetings organised with the local beat officers as part of the project?

1. Yes
2. No

88. If not, why not (what was the main reason)?

1. I didn't want to waste time doing so
2. I don't want anything to do with the police
3. The meetings were not organised at a convenient time for me
4. Other reason (please specify)

89. How would you rate the organisation of this scheme?

1. It was well organised
2. More organised than disorganised
3. Difficult to say
4. More disorganised than organised
5. Badly organised

90. How would you rate the usefulness of this scheme?

1. Very useful
2. Useful
3. Of some use
4. Useless
5. It's difficult to say

Towards the end of 2002/beginning of 2003 an office was opened in the (...) part of town to offer victim support and crime prevention advice.

91. Have you heard anything about this office?

1. Yes
2. Maybe
3. No

92. From what source (mark all responses)?

1. From TV
2. From newspapers
3. From the radio
4. From written announcements in my district/block of flats
5. From a family member/neighbour/work colleague
6. From the local head of residents
7. From adverts on public transport
8. From adverts on the street (hoardings)
9. From the local beat officers
10. From local NGOs
11. Other (please specify)

93. Have you contacted the centre at all?

1. Yes
2. No

94. If yes, why (give as many reasons as you want)?

1. To receive additional information about the BLOK project
2. To obtain a property marking pen
3. To obtain written crime prevention material
4. To obtain legal advice
5. To obtain emotion/psychological support
6. To obtain advice on target hardening
7. Because I was burgled
8. Other (please specify)

95. How would you evaluate the level of service offered by the centre?

1. Good
2. More good than bad
3. More bad than good
4. Bad
5. Don't know

96. How would you rate the usefulness of the office?

1. Very useful
2. Useful
3. Of some use
4. Useless
5. It's difficult to say