

OVERCOMING VIOLENT CONFLICT

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Volume 4

PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT ANALYSIS
IN MALUKU AND NORTH MALUKU

Graham Brown
with Christopher Wilson and Suprayoga Hadi



Publication of this book was made possible, in part, by the generous assistance of the Department for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom. Additional assistance was provided by the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR).

*Overcoming Violent Conflict:
Volume 4, Peace and Development Analysis
in Maluku and North Maluku*
First edition, 2005 © CPRU-UNDP, LIPI and BAPPENAS

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Printed in Jakarta, Indonesia, by Indonesia Printers

Front and back cover artwork: Detail of an untitled; hardboard cut
by Mohamad Yusuf; 17.5 x 13 cm., 2003.

ISBN: 979-99878-5-7

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Acknowledgements

This study, the fourth in a series of volumes titled *Overcoming Violent Conflict*, results from the contributions of a large number of individuals and institutions. Primary credit for the written material in this volume goes to Graham Brown of the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity at the University of Oxford who drew from field research carried out by a research team from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) and by Christopher Wilson from the Australian National University. Suprayoga Hadi of the Directorate for Special and Disadvantaged Areas Development at the National Development Planning Board (BAPPENAS) wrote the section on “Peace Vulnerabilities and Capacities” and Melina Nathan of UNDP-Indonesia wrote the section on “Presidential Instruction No. 6 2003” and updated materials on recent conflict dynamics and peace-building initiatives.

The editorial board, whose members oversaw the writing, editing and production of this report consisted of the following individuals: Eugenia Piza-Lopez of UNDP-Indonesia, editor-in-chief; Melina Nathan, also of UNDP-Indonesia, series editor; Suzanne Charlé, style editor; and John H. McGlynn, production coordinator.

The LIPI research team was led by Carunia Firdaus Mulya and included Latief Wiyata, Henni Warsilah, Andi Farah Diba, Nyayuk Fatimah, Sri Hargiono, Prasetyo Hadi, Diah Setiari Husodo, Syafuan Rozi and Tuti Ermawaty. Rukmiati and Euis Gigantini provided invaluable administrative assistance.

Additional inputs were provided by Enda Agustiana, Nick Mawdsley (UNDP Consultant), Nina Shetifan, Gary Swisher, Yuhki Tajima, the Institute for Studies on the Free Flow of Information (ISAI) and International Media Support (IMS). Special thanks and acknowledgment must be given to PDA workshop facilitators: James Abraham, Jusuf Madubun, Netty Siahaya and Usman Thalib in Maluku; and Siti Barora Sinay, Ismad Sahupala, Silvanus Simange and Hasby Yusuf in North Maluku.

The report was peer reviewed by Patrick Sweeting (CPRU-UNDP), Christopher Duncan, Ivan Hadar, Nick Mawdsley and Suprayoga Hadi.

Publication of this volume and the other volumes in the *Overcoming Violent Conflict* series would not have been possible without the financial assistance of the Department for International Development (DFID) of the United Kingdom and the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) of UNDP.



Mohamad Yusuf. untitled; hardboard cut, 17.5 X 13 cm, 2003.

Executive Summary

This provincial report examines a peace and development programme for Maluku and North Maluku provinces, and presents policy recommendations. Drawing on three parallel threads of research, the report analyses the causes and impacts of conflict in Maluku and North Maluku, the responses by governmental and non-governmental actors and the existing vulnerabilities and capacities for peace. Recommendations are made for the provincial and national governments in Indonesia, and for local and international NGOs and agencies.

There are both structural and proximate causes of conflict. Structural causes include:

- *Weakened traditional social structures:* The decline in institutional structures that provided both an indigenous conflict-avoidance mechanism through the *pela-gandong* alliances, and a common sense of Malukan identity that transcended ethnic and religious lines.
- *Horizontal inequalities:* The combination of severe historical inequalities between Christian and Muslim and the Islamization policies of the last decade of the New Order, which created socio-economic discontent.
- *The legacy of the New Order:* An absence of state institutions capable of coping with and mediating conflict in anything but the most brutal fashion, and a lack of experience of productive conflict resolution at the local level.

Proximate causes include:

- *Indonesia's economic crisis:* The economic crisis intensified existing tensions, by increasing competition for economic resources between religious groups and between migrant and -non-migrant groups.
- *Decentralisation and democratisation:* Decentralisation and the associated re-allocation of funding control to the local level created greater financial incentives for corrupt local elites to gain control of important positions; at the same time, democratisation meant that these positions were gained by mobilising popular support rather than by currying favour with the national elites in Jakarta. In such circumstances, the incentive to mobilise along ethnic and religious lines was great.



Mohamad Yusuf. *Sama Makan Kenyang (Full Stomachs for All)*; etching, 18 x 12.5 cm.

The report details the specific triggering incidents for each major episode of conflict, and identifies three main factors in the escalation of the conflicts:

- *Security forces and militias*: The partisanship of sections within the security forces was a key factor in driving the escalation of the conflicts, as communal groups lost confidence in the security apparatus to protect them and thus formed militias.
- *Biased media and disinformation*: Partisan local publications inflamed sentiments, and even well-intentioned media activity had potentially negative repercussions.
- *Cycles of revenge*: Cycles of revenge killing drove the escalation of conflict in some areas.

The conflict has caused negative and lasting impacts in the two provinces, not only in terms of their human and economic impact but their impact on gender as well.

- *Human impacts*: The conflicts in Maluku and North Maluku caused, by conservative estimates, over 7,000 deaths, with many more injured and displaced. Between a third and a half of the population in both provinces was displaced by the conflicts, and dealing with remaining IDPs is a major political and social barrier to reconciliation and reconstruction. North Maluku appears to have made good progress, while serious problems remain in Maluku, where the province has in effect been segregated into Christian and Muslim zones. The conflicts have had a serious impact on the access to health and educational facilities. Infant mortality, morbidity and general health problems all increased after the conflicts. Educational drop-out rates also increased, particularly among the displaced population. In some areas it is estimated to be over 40 percent.
- *Economic impacts*: In 1999, Maluku's GDP per capita shrank by almost a quarter and remained in negative growth until 2002; by the end of 2002, Maluku's GDP per capita stood at only 75 percent of its 1995 level. Falling incomes in Maluku have been compounded by high inflation rates. Ambon has one of the highest inflation rates of any city in Indonesia; food inflation is particularly high, threatening poorer groups. Maluku now has one of the highest poverty rates in the country, with more than a third of the population officially below the poverty line.

- *Gender impacts*: In Maluku and North Maluku, the conflicts have seen women move into economic roles from which they were formerly excluded, increasing their workload. Economic empowerment has not been accompanied by improvements in political and social empowerment. Serious problems of physical abuse and unwanted pregnancies remain, often associated with the presence of security forces. The situation is varied: Ambon appears to have seen a relative increase in female participation in senior positions following the conflict, but North Maluku now ranks as one of the worst provinces in Indonesia for gender empowerment.

Responses and Peace-building initiatives have been initiated by the government, international NGOs and donors and local organisations. Government responses have included:

- *Conflict Resolution*: The sudden emergence of communal violence took the Indonesian Government and many other actors by surprise. At the height of the conflicts in both Maluku and North Maluku, the national government was unable to respond effectively. The security response, however belated, was effective, with civil emergencies and massive deployments of troops in both provinces bringing the fighting under control. Civil emergency status was lifted in the North Maluku in May 2003 and in Maluku in September 2003.
- *Reconcilliation*: Initial reconcilliation efforts led by the national government did not lead to a significant reduction of tensions. More success was achieved by the Malino II talks, concluded in February 2002. Stakeholders confirm that the Malino II Agreement is still seen as important in bringing an end to the violence by providing a 'platform for future peace action'. However, frequent complaints are made about the unwillingness of the government to publish the findings of the Independent National Investigation Team. Malino Working Groups (Pokja) set up to monitor and enhance actions in support of the agreement were not empowered by authorities and lack accountability to the people.
- *Presidential Instruction No. 6 2003*: Presidential Instruction No. 6 (Inpres 6) instructed all ministries to prioritise recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities and dedicate budgets for Maluku and North Maluku over a three-year period beginning in 2004, however the ministries did not respond adequately and the North Maluku Government received lower fiscal transfers in 2004 than in 2003. The central government

eventually proposed allocating IDR 150 billion from contingency funds for IDP-related activities in 2004, and the national parliament agreed that IDR 1,210 trillion would be allocated in 2005 and an additional IDR 250 billion would be allocated to both provinces for IDP-related activities in 2005. The time frame for Inpres 6-supported activities has been extended to 2007.

- *IDP resolution:* Resolution of the IDP problem remains one of the greatest stumbling blocks to sustainable peace. Corruption in the handling of IDP funds, the lack of willingness of IDPs to return to the place of origin, lack of willingness of local communities to receive returnees, and the growing resentment among those who did not flee of perceived preferential treatment for IDPs all compound attempts to resolve the problem. In 1999, the Maluku Government set up a ‘special coordinating working group’ (Pokja) to deal with the IDP situation. The government also allocated money to assist returnees to construct their own homes, although this has reportedly resulted in an increase in property disputes. Responses to the IDP situation in North Maluku have been more successful, largely due to the spontaneous return of IDPs. By April 2004, around three quarters of the 200,000 people displaced by the North Maluku conflict had returned home.

Responses on the part of international donors and NGOs include humanitarian and peace-building initiatives.

- *Humanitarian Responses:* From 2001, the UNDP developed a multi-sectoral programme and a framework for response for other UN agencies in accordance with its mandate. Broadly speaking, the international organisations working directly in the provinces have tended to focus their activities on relatively small-scale, localised projects promoting economic sufficiency and the provision of services, particularly to most vulnerable groups such as women and children.
- *Recovery and peace-building responses:* There are considerably fewer programmes aimed at recovery and promoting peace. Livelihoods assistance programmes are designed to help communities regain economic self-sufficiency and governance and transparency programmes seek to develop better governance in the provinces.

Local organisations have also played a role in the reconciliation process. In fact, local organisation can be said to be the key to successful reconciliation, largely due to the extra legitimacy they carry with local populations. Research by the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation in 2002 found that more than 58 percent of

respondents in Maluku believed that reconciliation must come from below (*dari bawah*). The key to the success of local non-governmental responses appears to be their ability to draw on the existing legitimacy of traditional structures. However these institutions are something of a double-edged sword. Although they have apparently offered an important route to reconciliation, they have also been used to mobilise communal antipathies.

Issues arising from responses have been many and varied. A list of these would include the following:

- *Weakness and inconsistency of government policy.* Government policy towards the provinces at all levels continues to be plagued by inconsistencies. The continuing presence of high levels of security forces is inconsistent with other attempts to rebuild social cohesion and trust. These weaknesses are compounded by a lack of an integrated policy.
- *Lack of coherence of donor/INGO responses.* International agencies and INGOs have, for the most part, failed to coordinate among themselves and with the provincial and national government.
- *Responses not working on conflict.* Most responses by international organisations have failed to move beyond humanitarian assistance and, when it has, the responses often have not been conflict-sensitive, for example, economic recovery programmes implemented should bridge divided communities.
- *Structural causes of conflict not being addressed.* Some attention has been paid to reviving traditional institutions, particularly by local organisations, but there has been no systematic attempt to understand what this would involve and what its effects would likely be. Issues of intergroup inequality have been completely neglected.
- *Lack of ability to respond to the changing dynamics of conflict.* The activities of international agencies and INGOs continue to be vulnerable and lack the ability to respond promptly to the changing dynamics of conflict. Re-eruption of violence can cause severe disruption in programme development and implementation. Paradoxically, in the converse situation, international responses are also not resilient to the absence of continued violence failing to progress beyond the initial humanitarian phase of conflict response.

- *Lack of follow-through.* Both informal and formal peace-building activities appear to be plagued by a lack of follow-through. Government responses have also failed to meet expectations. Many of the initiatives agreed as part of the Malino II Peace Agreement failed to materialise.
- *Problems of top-down peace-building.* Local communities widely complain of exclusion and lack of consultation in the decision-making and planning processes. The ‘top-down’ peace efforts, symbolized by the Malino II Process in which selected leaders were whisked to Jakarta to reach an agreement, failed to connect strongly with the local populations.
- *The need for community-driven planning of peace-building activities.* More emphasis needs to be placed on understanding conflict dynamics in order to tailor programmes to meet local needs.
- *Developing the capacity of sub-national governments.* There must be a sustained commitment to capacity building by the national and local governments as well as the donor community. It is also vital to address key issues related to the governance gap such as corruption and elite manipulation of ethnic identities, and a need to professionalize security forces.

As in most conflict situations, there are both peace vulnerabilities and capacities at play. A list of vulnerabilities and and recommendations on how they should be addressed would include:

- *Weak governance:* The inability of district and provincial governments to implement effective programmes to address outstanding social and economic issues is problematic and a potential source of future conflict.
Recommendations: International donors and INGOs should support the development of good governance and engage in capacity building in both provinces. Identification of existing ‘best practices’ and support for developmental decision-making are key strategies, as is support for local civil society organisations to foster accountability mechanisms.
- *Low Social Cohesion and Social Capital.* Trust and interaction between communities remains low, presenting the potential for a rapid return to violence. The desire for revenge remains strong, although often unclearly directed.
Recommendations: International agencies and national government should not involve themselves directly in social capital building exercises,

as local communities have expressed a clear preference for bottom-up reconciliation, and distrust of many INGOs is high. Local government may be more able to engage directly in reconciliation processes.

- *Persistence of serious horizontal inequalities.* High levels of horizontal inequalities remain between the communities in both provinces, although this may be less of a problem in North Maluku, where the Christian population is now relatively small. As long as inequalities remain high, peace remains highly vulnerable.
Recommendations: Local government is the only agency with the political authority, legitimacy and influence to rectify horizontal inequalities. Long-term positive action programmes should be developed to promote equitable treatment of and opportunities for all communities.
- *Uncertainty over new conflict triggers.* As social cohesion and government capacity remain low, the potential for renewed violence cannot be ignored.
Recommendations: Identify potential provocateurs and implement strategies to minimize their impact. Create community-based conflict prevention mechanisms and link these community initiatives to security sector reform.

Capacities for peace and recommendations on how they should be enhanced are as follows:

- *Growth of a conflict-sensitive media.* Imbalanced and provocative reportage has largely been replaced by a commitment to impartial behaviour among media practitioners. The Maluku Media Centre initiative is an important and growing capacity for peace.
Recommendations: Strengthen the media environment at provincial level; develop professional skills and facilities; facilitate information flows and access; and support community-based communication.
- *Reinvigorating traditional structures.* Particularly in areas of North Maluku and Southeast Maluku, adat institutions played a positive role in ending conflict and promoting reconciliation.
Recommendations: The multiple and often contradictory impacts of traditional structures of power in Maluku and North Maluku are extremely difficult, sensitive but important issues. They can only effectively be addressed through the combined, extensive engagement of all communities with the local and national governments in discussions and decisions about the future roles of these institutions.

- *Economic recovery.* Modest but sustained economic recovery appears to be underway in both provinces. Maluku recorded growth of over 3 percent in 2002 and 2003, and this is projected to rise to 4.5 percent for 2004. North Maluku grew at 3.4 percent and 2.9 percent in 2001 and 2002 respectively. Nonetheless, major economic issues of access to credit and unemployment remain.

Recommendations: International agencies and local governments are already investing substantially in reconstruction and economic development programmes. Strategic targeting of programmes in sectors that would also benefit social cohesion will maximize their utility. Important sectors are: agriculture, fisheries and petty trading.

I. Introduction

The purpose of this provincial report is to inform the development of a peace and development programme for Maluku and North Maluku provinces, that operates within a systematic framework to promote sustainable peace and equitable human development. This means promoting the conditions for, and enhancing the capabilities of local people, as individuals, families and communities, to better their lives in a context of personal safety and in a manner that is sustainable in the long run. At the most basic level, the aim of the programme is to “safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfillment”.¹ However, it also encompasses a more positive, long-term agenda that addresses issues such as natural resource management and social equity. At both levels, the emphasis is on empowering and capacitating local communities to undertake these tasks for themselves. Based on a rigorous

1.) UNDP, ‘Conflict and conflict prevention thematic guidance note’ (New York: UNDP, National Human Development Report Unit/HDRO Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, 2004), 9.

assessment of conflict and development in Maluku and North Maluku Provinces, the report presents policy recommendations targeted not just at the UNDP, but also at the broader community of development actors, including national and local governments, civil society and media organizations and other international actors.

1.1 Research Process

This report is part of a multi-province policy-oriented study of peace and development in Indonesia. Initially, three provinces where UNDP has existing programmes were selected for study: Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi. In addition, UNDP commissioned LabSocio at the University of Indonesia to undertake primary and secondary research using this framework in West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Madura (East Java) and Nusa Tenggara Timur provinces and further secondary research and a comprehensive media review for Aceh and Papua.

The report draws on three parallel threads of research in each province:

- LIPI (Lembaga Ilmu Pengatahuan Indonesia) Indonesian Institute of the Sciences, in collaboration with UNDP staff and consultants, carried out major research, including an extensive desk review of secondary sources and statistical data, a perceptions survey of target groups in the province and three case studies;
- UNDP and its consultants facilitated provincial workshops, which featured three days of discussion by invited stakeholder representatives;
- UNDP and its consultants made thematic assessments of seven factors: governance, social cohesion, access to justice, gender, local economic development, natural resources management and the media.

This broad research strategy has a number of important advantages. It allows a greater degree of triangulation of results, which lessens the chance of erroneous conclusions

and recommendations. All stakeholders were ensured ample representation in the final report. Because of its participatory nature, the research process itself should have positive impacts on peace and development, irrespective of formal research outputs.

1.2 A Caveat of Complexity

Some analyses of the myriad conflicts in Indonesia (and elsewhere) have tended to reduce to a single or small number of explanatory variables. Early accounts of the conflicts in Maluku and Central Sulawesi, for instance, focused on the supposed role of provocateurs in fomenting the conflict; other accounts have tended to focus on the religious variable at the expense of other variables, such as access to resources, ethnicity, migration patterns and so forth.²

Oversimplification of conflict causality results in problems. Incomplete analysis leads to incomplete or even counterproductive policy recommendations. As Nils Bubandt has pointed out in the context of North Maluku, such apocalyptic explanations not only fail to capture the complexity of the situation, but also “inscribe the violence with a narrative that also suggests possible avenues for future violent action”.³

In dealing with conflict, this report thus identifies a range of structural, proximate and triggering factors that appear to have contributed to the emergence and dynamics of conflict, but does not attempt to ascribe to these a single causal relationship. The report should not be interpreted as suggesting that the presence of any of these factors was necessary for the outbreak of conflict, or that conflict would not have taken such a serious form had any of these factors been absent.

2.) See G.J. Aditjondro, *Jakarta's Rol in de Tragedie in Maluku* (Amsterdam: Indonesia House, 2002); also J. Bertrand, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

3.) N.O. Bubandt, 'Conspiracy theories, apocalyptic narratives and the discursive construction of "the Violence in Maluku"', *Antropologi Indonesia* 63 (2000), 17.

2. Background and Overview



Surya Wirawan. *Rakyat Bersatu tak bisa Dikalahkan* (*The People can not be Defeated*); hardboard cut, 10 X 10 cm, 2003.

2.1 Decentralisation, Reform and the Legacies of the New Order

Compared with the periodic rebellions and uprisings that punctuated Sukarno's rule, the New Order stands out at first glance as a period of stability and development, with gross domestic product averaging a staggering 11 percent growth per year between 1967 and 1997. In comparison, East Asia and the Pacific as a region grew at around 5 percent per year over the same period, while sub-Saharan Africa registered a net decrease in GDP incomes.⁴

Underneath this calm surface, however, was what Freek Colombijn describes as “endemic state violence”,⁵ which extended from matters of territorial security to violence against groups and individuals perceived, legitimately

4.) William Easterly and Ross Levine, ‘Africa's growth tragedy: Policies and ethnic divisions’, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112.4 (1997).

5.) F. Colombijn, ‘What is so Indonesian about violence?’ in I. Wessel and G. Wimböfer, eds., *Violence in Indonesia*, (Hamburg: Abera, 2001).

or not, as threats to the regime. The New Order regime typically repressed violent manifestations of tensions without addressing underlying causes, most notably in East Timor and Aceh, where rebellions against the central government were met with the full force of the New Order's military might, with little or no attempt to address the concerns of the local population.⁶ As a result, tensions laid dormant or simmered until the fall of the New Order in 1998, when the state, weakened by the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and undermined by the murders of the Trisakti students, no longer had the capacity or the political clout to control violent outbreaks.

Since Soeharto stepped down, Indonesia has been undergoing a series of difficult transitions: from autocracy to democracy, from centralized rule to decentralised governance, as well as major reforms in the military, the judiciary, and corporate governance systems.

Each of these transitions would be ambitious on its own, but together, under the broad title of Reformasi, this movement represents one of the most ambitious agendas undertaken by a state in recent times. While much progress has been made, Reformasi has produced unintended consequences, particularly in the arena of security, both as it is traditionally defined and in terms of the extended concept of human security. Decentralisation, for example, has provided the opportunity and motive for unscrupulous local elites to capture state authority at the local level.⁷ Moves to reform the military have met with resistance.

The impact of Indonesia's decentralization process is crucial to understanding the dynamics of conflict and peace in the country.⁸ The Habibie administration started the

decentralisation process in 1999 through two major pieces of legislation: Law 22/1999 on Local Government and Law 25/1999 on the Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the Regions.⁹ The decentralization process had three main objectives: to prevent disintegration, promote democratisation and provide for the division of labour.¹⁰ Rather than devolve powers to the provinces, the immediate sub-national level of government, legislators gave the majority of the governing and financial powers to the districts (*kabupaten*) and cities (*kota*), some 440 in all.¹¹

Decentralisation has vastly increased the opportunities for democratic participation with direct elections of district, municipality and provincial heads as of June 2005 - positions that were previously appointed by Jakarta. Regional parliaments (DPRD, or *Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah*) have increased oversight powers. But has also opened the possibility for local elites, both military and civilian to use the institutions for their own benefit. Fiscal decentralisation increased the potential gains to be made by corrupt officials at the local level, where reliance on criminal networks for political purposes may increase the threat of violence, both individual and communal. In appraising the impacts of decentralisation, the Asia Foundation found that "in several regions, the monitoring function [of DPRDs] is hindered by racketeering/extortion/thugs (*premanisme*) and nepotism".¹²

In terms of actual governance, the effects of decentralisation have also varied substantially from region to region. A comprehensive equalisation formula shifted much of the cost of local services to the national government, while giving tax and other revenue-raising

6.) Bertrand, op. cit.

7.) V.R. Hadiz, 'Power and politics in North Sumatra: The uncompleted Reformasi', in E. Aspinall and G. Fealy, eds, *Local Power and Politics: Decentralisation and democratisation*, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003); V.R. Hadiz and R. Robison, 'Neo-Liberal reforms and illiberal consolidations: The Indonesian paradox' (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, 2003).

8.) For an account of the impact of decentralisation on conflict prevention and management, see International Crisis Group, *Managing Decentralisation And Conflict in South Sulawesi*, (Jakarta and Brussels: Asia Report No 60, July 2003).

9.) For a complete list of legislation relating to decentralisation, see World Bank 2003 'Decentralizing Indonesia: A regional public expenditure review overview report', Jakarta: World Bank East Asia Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, annex 1.

10.) Asia Foundation, *Indonesia Rapid Decentralisation Appraisal: Third Report*, (Jakarta: The Asia Foundation, 2003).

11.) Following usual practice, this report uses the English terms district and sub-district for, respectively, the Indonesian terms *kabupaten* and *kecamatan*.

12.) Ibid.

powers to local governments. An extensive study by the World Bank found that the system, while ensuring adequate funding for most regions, was “highly unequal... In 2001, the richest local government had 50 times more revenue per capita than the poorest one”.¹³ The provision of services has also been varied, no doubt in part due to these revenue disparities. Short-comings in local efforts to alleviate poverty have led the Asian Development Bank to recommend that certain aspects of decentralisation be rolled back, allowing the national government more power to direct local governments.¹⁴

Reform—or the slow pace of reform--of other government institutions, including the judiciary and the military, has also impacted on the conflict and peace dynamics. Widespread disillusionment with the police and military and the judicial process has contributed to a nationwide upsurge in vigilante violence, which has often manifested along communal lines. Indeed, it is widely believed by Indonesians and some scholars that factions within the military played a deliberate role in instigating some of the horizontal conflicts across Indonesia, as a means of hampering the efforts of the Wahid administration to reform the military, by demonstrating the need for a strong, territorially-based security apparatus.¹⁵ These aspects will be dealt with further throughout the report with specific reference to Maluku and North Maluku.

2.2 Province Overview

2.2.1 Geographic and demographic profile

The provinces of Maluku and North Maluku lie in the eastern Moluccas¹⁶ archipelago of Indonesia, between Sulawesi and Papua. Before the separate province of North Maluku was carved out in 1999, Maluku was the largest

province in Indonesia, covering over 850,000 square kilometres, 90 percent of which is maritime. Between them, Maluku and North Maluku consist of over one thousand islands, of which barely a handful are larger than 1,000 square kilometres¹⁷ The capital of Maluku province, Ambon city, lies on a small island to the southwest of Seram. The current capital of North Maluku is Ternate, although this will eventually be moved to Sofifi.

The population of Maluku, estimated in the 2000 census as 1.15 million, is almost evenly split between Muslims (49.1 percent) and Christians (50.2 percent), most of whom are Protestant. Christians are slightly more concentrated in the urban areas, where they represent 56.7 percent of the population; Muslims form a slight majority in the rural areas. According to the 2000 census, the new province of North Maluku has a population of around 670,000, of whom more than 85 percent are Muslim; almost all of the remaining population – essentially Protestant, and some Catholics – lives in the countryside (Table 1). The migrant populations of Maluku and North Maluku (6.6 percent and 9.1 percent respectively) come mostly from Java and Sulawesi (Table 2).

Table 1
Population of Maluku and North Maluku by Religion, 2000

| Province | Urban | % | Rural | % | Total | % |
|---------------------|----------------|--------------|----------------|--------------|------------------|--------------|
| Maluku | | | | | | |
| • Muslim | 124,918 | 43.1 | 439,117 | 51.1 | 564,035 | 49.1 |
| • Catholic | 19,325 | 6.7 | 69,252 | 8.1 | 88,577 | 7.7 |
| • Protestant | 145,055 | 50.0 | 343,576 | 40.0 | 488,631 | 42.5 |
| • Other | 661 | 0.2 | 7,995 | 0.9 | 8,656 | 0.8 |
| Total | 289,959 | 100.0 | 859,940 | 100.0 | 1,149,899 | 100.0 |
| North Maluku | | | | | | |
| • Muslim | 202,260 | 98.3 | 368,802 | 79.5 | 571,062 | 85.3 |
| • Catholic | 1,096 | 0.5 | 2,629 | 0.6 | 3,725 | 0.6 |
| • Protestant | 1,972 | 1.0 | 91,906 | 19.8 | 93,878 | 14.0 |
| • Other | 363 | 0.2 | 805 | 0.2 | 1,168 | 0.2 |
| Total | 205,691 | 100.0 | 464,142 | 100.0 | 669,833 | 100.0 |

Source: Calculated from BPS 2001 *Population of Indonesia: Results of the 2000 Population Census*, series L2.2, Jakarta: Badan Pusat Statistik.

13.) World Bank, op.cit., iv.

14.) Asian Development Bank *Local Government Provision of Minimum Basic Services for the Poor* (Manila: Asian Development Bank 2004).

15.) Aditjondro, op. cit.

16.) In keeping with modern Indonesian terminology, this report uses the term Moluccas to refer to the geographical entity, i.e. the archipelago of islands between Sulawesi and Papua, which encompasses the political entities of both Maluku and North Maluku today.

| Table 2 Lifetime Migrants in Maluku and North Maluku by Percentage of Population and Religion, 2000 | | |
|--|--------|--------------|
| Province: | Maluku | North Maluku |
| Percentage of Population: | 6.6% | 9.1% |
| Religion | | |
| • Muslim | 47.3% | 84.7% |
| • Christian | 52.1% | 15.1% |
| • Other | 0.7% | 0.2% |

Source: Calculated from BPS Special Tabulation. Please note that figures do not include respondents who did not state their place of birth.

2.2.2 The colonial period

For more than 700 years, traders have sailed to the Moluccan islands, the famed Spice Islands. Before the arrival of European colonial powers, the history of the region was dominated by the rivalry and sometimes open conflict between the two major political centres, the Sultanates of Ternate and Tidore. Arab traders brought Islam, which was adopted across much of the archipelago, particularly in the coastal areas. By the end of the 17th Century, the Dutch had established themselves as the predominant power in the region, with Ambon as their base. Christian missionaries followed the European colonialists, and Christianity quickly gained a wide following in the region, particularly in the southern Moluccas.

By 1650, complex horizontal conflicts were already evident, dividing local populations along factional, commercial and religious lines.¹⁸ By the mid-20th Century, the Dutch colonial administration's preferential treatment of Christians had created a clear-cut social stratification along religious lines, particularly in Ambon; Christians received a level of education denied to Muslims and followers of native religions and, hence, dominated the bureaucracy and civil services.¹⁹

17.) K.A. Monk, Y. de Fretes, Y. and G. Reksodiharjo-Lilley, *The Ecology of Indonesia*, vol. V: *The Ecology of Nusa Tenggara and Maluku*, (Singapore: Periplus Editions, 1997).

18.) M.C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1200*, (Third Edition, London: Palgrave, 2001), 76.

2.2.3 Independence and the Sukarno Era

During the war of independence, many Christian Ambonese, used to preferential treatment from the Dutch and fearful of domination by Muslim Javanese, sided with their colonial masters, and even joined campaigns to subdue the republicans in other parts of Indonesia. Under the federal system initially promoted by the Dutch, the Moluccas islands were part of the state of East Indonesia. As the tide of the war turned against the Dutch, the East Indonesian Minister of Justice, Dr. Soumokil, declared an independent Republic of South Maluku (RMS, Republik Maluku Selatan) in April 1950. This mainly Christian rebellion was ultimately unsuccessful, but the RMS remains a potent symbol of political and religious divisions in Ambon.

The integration of Maluku into the Indonesian state was slow and fraught with resistance. In early 1957, a cabinet report noted that Maluku was still acting as an autonomous state. Sympathy for the on-going Permesta rebellion in Sulawesi was apparently strong in Maluku, even in the Indonesian armed forces, and Malukan leaders kept contact with the Sumatra-based Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic (PRRI, *Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia*) which challenged Sukarno's regime from 1958 until 1961. Sukarno sought to encourage Maluku towards closer integration through, among other things, the allocation of a number of prestige projects in the province such as the Wayame shipyard on Ambon, the Oceanography Research Institute at Poka, and the huge sugar mill at Makariki, on Seram.²⁰ Christian Ambonese in the RMS who had been active in supporting the Republic against the Dutch were awarded important roles in the central government.²¹

19.) D. Bartels, 'Politicians and magicians: Power, adaptive strategies, and syncretism in the Central Moluccas', in G. Davis, ed, *What is Modern Indonesian Culture?*, (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1979).

20.) G.J. Aditjondro, 'Guns, pamphlets and handie-talkies: How the military exploited local ethno-religious tensions in Maluku to preserve their political and economic privileges', in I. Wessel and G. Wimhöfer, eds, *Violence in Indonesia*, (Hamburg: Abera, 2001).

21.) Bertrand, op. cit.

2.2.4
The New Order

Under the Soeharto regime, Maluku lost what economic privileges it had received from the central state, as prestige projects were relocated to other provinces. Instead, Soeharto-linked conglomerates began to feast on the province's natural resources and governorships were allocated to non-Malukan military officials. Civil society activists the regime considered irksome were arrested and accused of sympathizing with the RMS, shipping routes were redirected away from Maluku, and the intra-island trade of the eastern archipelago "purposely curtailed".²² Throughout the New Order period, the spectre of the RMS was used against political opponents, keeping the province relatively passive. In the northern Moluccas, the centralisation of power in Jakarta saw a decline in the significance of the rival sultanates in Ternate and Tidore.²³

Socially, both the official transmigration and the spontaneous migration during the Soeharto period disturbed fragile ethnic and religious balances. Most transmigrants and a large proportion of migrants were from Java and predominantly Muslim. The impacts of migration were not just demographic, but also economic and social: transmigrants were allocated communal land traditionally owned by local communities; infrastructure projects, built to support the transmigrants, often displaced or hindered local communities.²⁴

Immigrants were often poorly integrated into traditional structures and *adat*.²⁵ The influx was particularly felt in the Christian communities, amongst whom the belief was widespread that official permission for transmigrants was

limited to Muslims only.²⁶ Internal resettlement within North Maluku has also had important repercussion, particularly the 1975 relocation of the mainly Muslim inhabitants of Makian island to the mainly Christian Kao area of northern Halmahera, following volcanic activity on Makian. By the late 1970s, tensions over land resources were already evident; these intensified after gold was discovered in the area in 1997.²⁷

22.) Ibid., 116.

23.) G. van Klinken, 'The Maluku wars: Bringing society back in', *Indonesia* 71 (2001), 24-25.

24.) J. Leith, 'Resettlement history, resources and resistance in North Halmahera', in S. Pannell and F. von Benda-Beckmann, eds., *Old World Places, New World Problems: Exploring issues of resource management in Eastern Indonesia*, (Canberra: Australian National University, Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, 1998).

25.) F. von Benda-Beckmann, F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann, 'Property, politics and conflict: Ambon and Minangkabau compared', *Law and Society Review* 28.3 (1994).

26.) D. Bartels, 'Your God is no longer mine: Moslem-Christian fracticide in the Central Moluccas (Indonesia) after a half-millennium of tolerant co-existence and ethnic unity' Unpublished manuscript, 2001.

27.) P.M. Taylor, 'Prepared testimony', Testimony to the United States Committee on International Religious Freedom Hearings on Religious Freedom Violations in the Moluccas, Indonesia, Washington D.C., 13 February 2001.

3.

Causes of Conflict



Mohamad Yusuf. *Buruh Tani Ayahanda Kami* (Farmers are our Parents); pen and ink on paper, 21.5 X 21.5 cm, 1998.

This section analyses the causes of the conflicts in Maluku and North Maluku on three levels: structural causes, which situate the conflicts in the context of the broad structural transformations of the preceding decades; proximate causes of the conflicts and triggering factors.

3.1 Conflict Overview

3.1.1 Maluku Province

The chronology of the conflict in Maluku is fairly well established.²⁸ The conflict in Maluku broke out on 19 January 1999, the last day of Ramadan, when a fight between an Ambonese Christian bus driver and an immigrant Bugis Muslim passenger sparked off two months of inter-communal violence in and around Ambon that claimed up to a thousand lives (see Figure 1). Violence

28.) J. Cutura, J. and M. Watanabe, "Decentralisation and violent conflicts: The case of North Maluku, Indonesia", (Jakarta: World Bank, 2004); ICG 'Indonesia's Maluku crisis: The issues', (Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2000); ICG, 'Indonesia: Overcoming murder and chaos in Maluku', (Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2000); ICG 'Indonesia: The search for peace in Maluku', *International Crisis Group Asia Report* 31 (2001).

resumed and intensified in July 1999, spreading to other parts of the province and continuing into January 2000.²⁹ By this time Ambon itself had been effectively divided into Christian and Muslim zones, the former controlling around 60 percent of the city, the latter 40 percent.³⁰

In May 2000, the Maluku conflict entered a new phase. This second phase was characterised by two developments: the greater involvement of security forces on both sides of the conflict, but predominantly on the Muslim side; and the influx of Muslims from across Indonesia, but primarily Java, under the aegis of the newly formed Laskar Jihad, a militia organisation formed after massive protests against violence towards Muslims in Maluku, which received tacit and possibly active support from sections of the military.³¹ The fight was militarised, as handmade weapons and bombs were replaced by professional weapons of unknown provenance; at the same time, power shifted, as the conflict, previously more-or-less evenly balanced, turned decisively in favour of the Muslims.³²

Amid continuing violence, Maluku was placed under Civilian Emergency status in June 2000, thousands of army and BRIMOB (*Brigad Mobil*, Mobile Brigades) were deployed into the province, and police and security forces were given greater powers, including curfew.

Although many witnesses accused these forces of partiality, the presence of the forces appeared effective as violence subsided. The successful conclusion of the Jakarta-sponsored Malino II peace agreements in February 2002 added to further optimism that the worst was over for Maluku and that reconciliation and reconstruction could take centre-stage (see Figure 1).


29.) Human Rights Watch, 'Indonesia: The violence in Ambon', (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999); ICG, 'The search for peace in Maluku'.

30.) INSIST, 'Conflict analysis and local capacity assessment for Maluku Remaking Program', (Institute for Social Transformation, [2003]).

31.) ICG, 'The search for peace in Maluku'. Formed in Yogyakarta in January 2000, in part as a response to the Tobelo massacre, Laskar Jihad was – depending on the analysis – tolerated, condoned or encouraged and trained by the military.

32.) van Klinken, op. cit.

Figure 1
Conflict Intensity in Maluku by Quarter, 1998 – 2002



Source: UNSFIR Conflict Database.

While Maluku as a whole has avoided a return to major conflict, Ambon in particular has experienced periodic upsurges in ethnic and religious tensions, occasionally breaking out into violence. The most serious outbreak occurred in April 2004, when over 40 people died in rioting following the raising of the RMS flag at the home of Alex Manuputty, a prominent Christian leader of the Maluku Sovereignty Front (*Front Kedaulatan Maluku*, FKM), accused of being a front for the revival of the RMS. Communal conflicts beyond Ambon have also occasionally escalated into violence, such as a fight between Wakal and Mamua groups in Central Maluku that left one person dead and seven injured in December 2004 and more recent villages clashes in Maluku Tenggara Barat.³³ What is important to note here, however, is that these conflicts did not escalate.

33.) 'Mamua returns to normal', *Jakarta Post*, 6 December 2004; M. Azis Tunny, 'Three die in fresh clash in Maluku,' *Jakarta Post*, 25 May 2005.

3.1.2 North Maluku Province


The major period of conflict in North Maluku was much shorter, almost half the deaths occurring within the space of one month (December 1999), but also much more intense (see Figure 2). Throughout the first half of 1999, when central and southern Maluku were ablaze with communal conflict, the northern islands remained remarkably calm. Although the outbreak of violence in North Maluku predates the announcement of its separation from Maluku, the escalation of violence is generally linked to political machinations surrounding the separation, which revived and intensified the old rivalries between Ternate and Tidore.³⁴ In August 1999, localized conflict emerged in the Kao area between the local population and the Makianese settlers over the formation and control of a proposed new *kecamatan*, Malifut. The intervention of the Sultan of Ternate brought about a brief peace, but conflict resumed in October 1999, when North Maluku was officially created, and quickly spread to Ternate and other parts of the new province.

At this stage, the violence – which in Malifut had been primarily ethnic – took on religious overtones, triggered by the arrival of Muslim Makian IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons) from Kao and by the circulation of propaganda, including a pamphlet purportedly signed by the synod chairman of the Maluku Protestant Church, GPM, calling on Christians to join in a holy war. Muslim warriors (known as ‘White’ forces) gathered in Tidore, where they attacked and killed Christians. Christians moved to north Ternate, seeking the protection of the Sultan of Ternate; many fled to north Sulawesi. In Ternate city, Christian ‘Yellow’ forces formed. The White forces consisted mainly of ethnic groups from Tidore, Makian and migrants from Gorontalo in North Sulawesi, while the Yellow forces included supporters of the Sultan of Ternate, the political party Golkar³⁵ and Christians from Halmahera. They fought a pitched battle in December 1999.

34.) ICG, ‘Overcoming murder and chaos’.

35.) Golkar was the former political vehicle of President Soeharto, which has reinvented itself as a significant electoral force in the post-New Order period.

Figure 2
Conflict Intensity in North Maluku by Month, April 1999 - December 2000



Source: UNSFIR Conflict Database.

About the same time, violence returned to Halmahera following rumours that Jihad forces had arrived in Galela, which was mostly Muslim, and that an attack on Christian villages in Tobelo was imminent. In December 1999, Christian fighters travelled from Kao to Tobelo and attacked Muslims in Tobelo; a day later violence broke out in Galela. Violence and destruction spread to Bacan, Obi and Morotai and as far as Ibu, Sahu and Jailolo. In South Halmahera, the violence spread in May 2000 when Jihad forces, both local and outside from Ternate and Tidore, attacked Christian villages. Although this is well known as a Muslim area, both Christians and Muslims suffered during the violent

conflict. The Christians fled to the forest and some Muslims fled to Ternate. After more than 100 Christians were killed by Laskar Jihad militias in June 2000, North Maluku (along with Maluku) was placed under civil emergency and extra troops were shipped into the province, bringing an end to major conflict. Unlike Maluku, North Maluku has remained relatively peaceful since, largely due to the demographic dominance of the Muslim population, although tensions remain high in some areas.³⁶

3.2 Structural Causes Structural Causes

This section identifies three broad structural causes for the conflict in Maluku: the decline of traditional structures of power; shifting inter-group horizontal inequalities in the province, and the effects of three decades of rule by an authoritarian government. The first enabled conflict by removing an important historical barrier to the emergence and escalation of conflict in the province. The second was the key source of communal grievances on all sides. The third was both a cause of resentment, as the state exploited the resources of the province for the benefit of a select few, and also indirectly contributed to the escalation of conflict because of the absence of local conflict-resolution mechanisms within the context of a centralized state.

3.2.1 Traditional structures of power

One important structural cause for the conflict in the Malukus was the shift in power structures in the provinces, in which traditional coping mechanisms that had controlled violent outbreaks in the past were removed. Traditional systems in Maluku and North Maluku – particularly, the *pela-gandong* system found mainly across the central Moluccas – are widely seen as having fostered inter-communal harmony.

Pela-gandong or *pela* is an oath of allegiance that ties together two villages – either two Christian or one Islamic with one Christian – in a relationship of mutual help and

defence.³⁷ Writing in the 1970s, the anthropologist Dieter Bartels claimed that *pela* formed the basis of an Ambonese identity which transcended religion: “Without *pela*... Ambonese Muslims and Ambonese Christians would then deal with one another not primarily as Ambonese, but as Muslims and Christians first and Ambonese second”.³⁸ *Pela*, Bartels argued, was the foundation of a particularly Ambonese religious ontology, which tied together Islam and Christianity as different branches of what he termed the “religion of Nunusaka”.³⁹ Bartels also warned, however, that the institutions of *pela* were not robust and indications of their weakness were already apparent. Some observers doubt the importance of *pela*’s contribution to good communal relations, since there relatively few *pela* allegiances and the fact that most *pela* arrangements are between distant villages, whereas conflict usually involved neighbouring villages.

In 1979, the traditional Maluku system of village governance, based on the *negeri* as a geographical unit with a raja as its hereditary leader, was replaced, as across Indonesia, by the Javanese system of *desa* (village) and elected *kepala desa* (village headman). The collapse of the *negeri/raja* structures over the two decades prior to the conflict destroyed traditional forms of social cohesion and mechanisms of inter-communal conflict resolution that might have prevented or mitigated violence. By the 1990s, the impact on community relations was clear as studies found that *pela* “has insufficient political strength

37.) Although the *pela* inter-religious village alliances of Ambon and the central Moluccas do not exist in the northern islands as such, anthropologists familiar with Halmahera report that in the past Christian and Muslim villagers regularly aided each others’ villages, including in the construction of places of worship, and that such aid was “accepted and expected” (Taylor, op. cit.). Other observers also note an almost contemptuous attitude towards *pela* in Halmahera, where the view is often that Muslim and Christians are of one family (*bersaudara*) and that there is thus no need for institutions such as *pela* (Nick Mawdsley, UNDP Consultant, personal communication, April 2005).

38.) Bartels, D. ‘Guarding the invisible mountain: Intervillage alliances, religious syncretism, and ethnic identity among Ambonese Christians and Muslims in the Moluccas’, PhD Thesis, Cornell University (1977): 325.

39.) Others have observed that Nunasaka is more appropriately termed a myth of origin than a religion per se. Nick Mawdsley, op. cit.

36.) ICG, ‘The Search for Peace in Maluku’.

to become a bridge to connect Islam and Christianity”.⁴⁰ This collapse of *pela* institutions was particularly marked in urban areas such as Ambon.⁴¹ Even before 1999, village elections in Ambon were noted for the levels of conflict they provoked.⁴² It is thus commonly argued that, as traditional values and systems fell by the wayside, “[t]he resulting vacuum was filled partially by Indonesian nationalistic ideology and partially by an acceleration of Christianisation and Islamisation”.⁴³

The *pela-gandong* alliances and associated *adat* institutions such as *sasi* (traditional environmental management strategies) are undoubtedly historically important and have been a focus of peace-building efforts in the region, but it is also important not to romanticize them or overstate their potential for promoting social cohesion, both in the past and in the future.⁴⁴ As Bartels notes, *pela-gandong*, originally a specific form of relationship between two villages, has become a political discourse encompassing “some sort of mythical pact of brotherhood encompassing all Ambonese Muslims and Christians”.⁴⁵ Even at its height, *pela-gandong* did not, and was never meant to, ensure cohesion between broad social groups across the region.

While a decline in the influence of *pela* over the past half century is empirically verifiable, the counterfactual nature of the claims about *pela* make it difficult either to prove or disprove that this decline can help explain the conflict. Put simply, we cannot really know whether stronger *pela* bonds would have helped prevent conflict. Indeed, some analysts have suggested that *pela* may actually have contributed

40.) T. Ratnawati, ‘Interactions between adat and religious institutions and the New Order state: A case study of two Islamic and Christian villages in Central Moluccas’, *Jurnal Masyarakat Indonesia* 29.1 (2003), 6.

41.) D. Mearns, ‘Urban kampongs in Ambon: Whose domain? Whose desa?’ *Australian Journal of Anthropology* 10.1 (1999)

42.) von Benda-Beckmann & von Benda-Beckmann, op. cit.

43.) Bartels, ‘Your God is no longer mine’.

44.) Similar conclusions about the over-stated role of *adat* institutions in managing or preventing conflict can be found in International Crisis Group, *Managing Decentralisation*, op.cit., 28-29.

45.) Bartels, op cit.

to the conflict. They argue that, although *pela* forms a strong bond between two villages, it is based on a concept of a common outsider enemy – easily identifiable with migrants – and thus constitutes “the instrument through which existing tensions may be amplified”.⁴⁶ It is worth noting, however, that *adat* institutions appear to have been successfully employed in the Southeast Maluku regency (Kabupaten Maluku Tenggara) to bring a speedy resolution to the conflict there and a reconciliation of the parties involved.⁴⁷

These contradictory aspects of traditional institutions in relation to social cohesion were also evident in the North Maluku conflict. On the one hand, *adat* loyalties were utilised to recruit and mobilise for conflict, most notably the move by a power block associated with the Sultan of Ternate to revive the *pasukan adat* (traditional soldiers) to engage in battle with the opposing power block. The traditional enmity between Ternate and Tidore, tied in *adat* loyalties, was instrumental here.⁴⁸ On the other hand, the PDA Social Cohesion Assessment undertaken in North Maluku as part of this PDA process found that conflict tended to be lower and inter-communal relations better in areas where *adat* institutions were strong. In the East Halmahera *kecamatan* of Maba Selatan, for instance, Christian villages were apparently protected from attack by Muslims, reportedly because these people are indigenous people (Maba and Buli) and belong to “one big family” under the traditional authority of the Sultan of Tidore and *adat* law.⁴⁹ Peace agreements were made early on through the intervention of the village heads and *adat* leaders.

3.2.2 Horizontal inequalities

Inter-group horizontal inequalities are an important potential cause of conflict, but the relationship is not straightforward. High inequalities can persist for many years without sparking conflict. It is often abrupt changes

46.) Tanja Hohe and Bert Remeijns, quoted in Aditjondro, ‘Guns, pamphlets and handie-talkies’, 107.

47.) P.M. Laksono, ‘We are all one: How custom overcame religious rivalry in Southeast Maluku’, *Inside Indonesia* 70 (Apr-Jun 2002).

48.) Bubandt, op. cit.

49.) Nick Mawdsley, personal communication. April 2005.

in inequality levels – even if these changes even out pre-existing inequalities – that cause conflict. In Maluku, the decade prior to the eruption of conflict saw such changes. Politically, socially and economically, the Christian community increasingly lost the advantages it had held since the Dutch era; their resentment fuelled by the fact that many beneficiaries of this redistribution were migrants from Java and Sulawesi.

Soeharto's 'Islamic turn'⁵⁰ and the rise of ICMI (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia*, or Indonesia Muslim Intellectuals Association) in the 1990s aggravated religious tensions as Christian domination of the administrative and government services in the provinces was undermined. In Maluku, this was particularly apparent after the appointment of Akib Latuconsina as governor. Latuconsina took a stridently pro-Muslim approach to government appointments, such that by 1996, all the *bupati* in the province were Muslim, even in Christian-majority areas.⁵¹ This combination of religious marginalisation in the political sphere and economic pressures caused by migration and often defined along ethno-religious lines, created conditions ripe for conflict, and even before 1999 minor inter-communal fights were commonplace.

After more than three decades of rule, the New Order had transformed local Malukan politics. Heavy-handed centralization undermined the political importance of regional elites, bringing them under Jakarta's close control. At the same time, Ambonese Christian elite lost their dominant position as Muslims, many from outside Maluku, were appointed to key positions in the state. This process accelerated in the 1990s with the 'greening' (Islamisation) of the New Order. In 1992, M. Akib Latuconsina, was appointed governor of Maluku, the first native Malukan and the first non-military figure to be appointed to the post under the New Order. Latuconsina vigorously promoted the appointment of Muslims to key positions; by 1996, all the

50.) R.W. Liddle, 'The Islamic turn in Indonesia: A political explanation', *Journal of Asian Studies* (1966) 55(3): 613-634.

51.) Bertrand, *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*.

bupati in Maluku province were Muslim and "Christians were left with very little control over top positions".⁵²

Top local positions became all the more important with reformasi decentralisation when governors and bupati stood to gain substantial political power and, more importantly for corrupt elements, resource control. Under decentralisation, a greater percentage of the profits from local resources extraction are returned to the local administrations.⁵³ Political struggles over power and resources in North Maluku have been evident for at least a decade, but were intensified by the decentralisation process.⁵⁴ The roots of these struggles have also been traced to the greening of the New Order. In the early 1990s, a group from the ICMI-linked HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam or Association of Islamic Students) gained control of the North Moluccas chapter of Golkar, and installed as its chair the Sultan of Ternate, who had himself spent many years in Jakarta as a Golkar functionary. Drawing on the traditional support of the Sultan of Ternate, this power bloc also encompassed many *adat* and Christian communities. Ranged against it was an alternate grouping gathered under the *bupati* of Central Halmahera claiming the allegiance of supporters of the Islamic PPP (*Parti Persatuan Pembangunan* or United Development Party), a major political force in the region. Thus two contending power blocks emerged in the region, whose antimony was intensified as decentralisation raised the stakes for local contenders.⁵⁵

As noted in the introduction, a privileged Christian group and an economically marginalized Muslim community were legacies of Dutch colonialism. The decline of Christian dominance was thus in many respects simply a corrective measure and, indeed, one that even Christian religious leaders had argued for as necessary to promote lasting peace in the region.⁵⁶

52.) Ibid., 118.

53.) World Bank, *Decentralizing Indonesia* op. cit.

54.) T.A. Tomagola, *The Bleeding Halmahera of North Moluccas*, (Centre for Development and Environment, University of Oslo: Workshop on Political Violence in Asia, 2000).

55.) Ibid.

56.) Bertrand, op. cit., 120.

The level of socio-economic imbalance between religious and migrant groups prior to the conflict is demonstrated in Table 3, which shows the proportion of the population employed in high-rank jobs⁵⁷ in Maluku province in 1990. Migrants (defined by province of birth) of all religions were over-represented in this echelon of employment, and Protestants of all migration status were also over-represented. The most over-represented group were migrant Catholics: despite forming less than 1 percent of the population, they occupied four times the average number of high rank jobs. In contrast, non-migrant Muslims who constituted almost half the population in 1990, were employed in top jobs in less than half the provincial average.

Statistical data evidencing the changing dynamics of these inequalities during the 1990s are difficult to come by due to the New Order SARA regulations (*Suku, Agama, Ras, Antar-Golongan* or Ethnicity, Religion, Race and Inter-group Relations). These suppressed the collection and disclosure of socio-economic data disaggregated by communal factors. Data collected by international Demographic Health Surveys (DHS) in Maluku between 1991 and 1997 give an idea of the trends at work (see Table 4 and Figure 3).⁵⁸ In 1991, there was a clear disparity in the socio-economic standing of followers of the two main religions – Protestant and Muslim. Literacy rates were almost 12 percent higher among Protestant respondents, and more than twice as many Protestant households had easy access to a source of drinking water.

| Table 3 Proportion of Population in Maluku employed in High-rank jobs by Religion and Migration Status, 1990 | | | |
|---|-------------|--------------|-------------|
| | Non-Migrant | Migrant | Combined |
| • Islam | 2.5% | 7.4% | 3.1% |
| • Catholic | 4.2% | 16.7% | 4.4% |
| • Protestant | 7.4% | 12.7% | 7.6% |
| • All Religions | 4.4% | 8.8% | 4.8% |

Source: Calculated from sample of Census 1990.
Please note, cells give the proportion of workers in each category employed in high rank jobs, e.g. 16.7% of Catholic Migrants workers are employed in high rank jobs. Figures in bold are above the overall province average.

Table 4
Protestant-Muslim Socio-economic Disparities, 1991-1997


| | 1991 | | | 1994 | | | 1997 | | |
|---------------------------------|------|------|-----|------|------|-----|------|------|-----|
| Social Indicator | P | M | R | P | M | R | P | M | R |
| • Reads Easily | 82.3 | 69.0 | 1.2 | 86.1 | 73.2 | 1.2 | 92.8 | 84.3 | 1.1 |
| • Education rate (Female) | 48.3 | 18.4 | 2.6 | 48.2 | 33.7 | 1.4 | 55.1 | 37.7 | 1.5 |
| • Education rate (Male) | 56.5 | 34.3 | 1.6 | 55.0 | 47.0 | 1.2 | 63.6 | 53.0 | 1.2 |
| • Easy source of drinking water | 31.4 | 13.9 | 1.2 | 31.8 | 19.3 | 1.6 | 26.7 | 22.2 | 1.2 |
| • Housing has electricity | 54.8 | 41.4 | 1.3 | 53.2 | 60.2 | 0.9 | 65.7 | 66.2 | 1.0 |
| • Housing has solid floor | 71.0 | 58.6 | 2.3 | 67.2 | 66.8 | 1.0 | 72.2 | 65.1 | 1.1 |

Notes: P = Percent of Protestants; M = Percent of Muslims; R = Ratio of P to M.
Source: Calculated from the Demographic Health Surveys (<http://www.measuredhs.com>)

Overall, the province recorded an improvement in all socio-economic indicators over the period 1991-1997: the average literacy rate improved from 72 percent to 88 percent, and the proportion of houses with electricity went up from 44 percent to 66 percent. While both groups improved their socio-economic standing in absolute terms, the Muslim population began to move toward parity with Protestants, as the improvement in their conditions was far greater than that of the Protestants. These figures only tell a partial story: they are broken down by religion, not ethnicity or migration status, and they do not demonstrate the effects of the 1997 economic crisis, which may have varied according to group. Nonetheless, these numbers confirm what has been qualitatively argued: in the 1990s, the socio-economic dominance of the Protestant population in Maluku began to erode.

57.) The 1990 census distinguished between nine different categories of occupation. 'High-Rank' is here defined as the top three categories, namely: Government Officials, Professionals, and Technicians.

58.) The DHS surveys ask mainly health and nutrition related questions targetting female respondents. The surveys also include a range of socio-economic variables and have been used internationally as indicators of horizontal inequalities, e.g. G. Østby, 'Do Horizontal Inequalities Matter for Civil Conflict?' (Oslo: Centre for Study of Civil War, International Peace Research Institute, 2004); and A. Langer, 'Horizontal inequalities and violent group mobilization in Côte d'Ivoire', Oxford Development Studies, forthcoming (2005). Comprehensive socio-economic data broken down by ethnicity (but not religion) can be calculated from the 2002 SUSENAS survey, but the ethnicity variable used is inadequate, not differentiating, for instance, between Christian and Muslim Ambonese or between Tidorese and Ternatan.



Source Calculated from Table 4; indices calculated as the average of the relevant disparity ratios.

A simple socio-economic rebalancing along religious lines might have been accepted by the Christian population, but the speed of the process, along with the influx of transmigrants and other migrants, complicated the situation. As noted above, it is difficult to give accurate data on the number of in-migrants or their ethnic and religious backgrounds, but they clearly contributed to a shifting ethno-religious balance in the province. According to figures from the 2000 census, three-quarters of the 75,000 residents of Maluku born outside the province were Muslim, a fact that virtually negated the slight numerical advantage previously enjoyed by the Christian population. In North Maluku, local migration was also an important factor in raising tensions. In the 1970s, the inhabitants of the island of Makian were relocated to Kao sub-district following volcanic activity on their island, although there never was an eruption. The Makian were predominantly Muslim; the Kao Christian. Many Kao thus feared a hidden Islamisation agenda behind the population resettlement and claimed that the Makian were receiving preferential treatment from the provincial government.

By the late 1990s, then, socio-economic imbalances in the province were raising grievances on all sides. Many Muslims were aggrieved by the long-standing dominance of the Christian population in the province. Some Christians resented the government's moves during the 1990s to promote the political and economic standing of the Muslim population. These dynamics were further complicated by the influx of migrants, many of whom took high-ranking jobs in the urban areas and, in the rural areas, were allocated large lots of prime land under the transmigration programme.

3.2.3 The legacy of the New Order

The two structural causes identified above were both inherently linked with the politics of the New Order regime. Beyond these specific manifestations of New Order politics, however, the legacy of a three-decade-long rule that often ruthlessly suppressed political difference was an important structural factor in explaining why the Maluku conflicts escalated so quickly and so severely. There was no room for opposition, and a culture of silence was promoted.

Although there is a strong argument that the fall of the New Order was not in itself the direct cause of the various horizontal conflicts across the country,⁵⁹ the legacy of the New Order was an absence of state institutions capable of coping with and mediating conflict in anything but the most brutal fashion, and a broad lack of experience of productive conflict resolution at the local level. It is clear from the World Bank's studies in East Java and Flores that the key to successful conflict resolution on a micro-level in Indonesia is often early intervention by local elites, but the New Order regime undercut precisely such institutions.⁶⁰

59.) See, for instance, A. Varshney, R. Panggabean, and M.Z. Tadjoeuddin, M. Z. 'Patterns of collective violence in Indonesia (1990-2003)', (Jakarta: UNSFIR Working Paper 04/03, 2004).

60.) P. Barron, R. Diprose, D. Madden, C.Q. Smith, and M. Woolcock, 'Do participatory development projects help villagers manage local conflicts? A mixed methods approach to assessing the Kecamatan Development Project, Indonesia' (Jakarta: World Bank CPR Working Papers, 2003).

3.3 Proximate Causes

3.3.1 Economic crisis It is difficult to assess the direct impact of the 1997 economic crisis on (pre-division) Maluku in terms of conflict potential. While the crisis was a key factor in bringing about the end of the New Order regime, its direct impact in Maluku was relatively minimal. Maluku did experience a fall in regional GDP per capita of 6 percent from 1997 to 1998, but this was less than half the overall fall for Indonesia as a whole. Moreover, there is no strong evidence that one communal group, whether defined by religious or migration status, suffered more than others. Nonetheless, in the context of the increasing competition for economic resources between religious groups and between migration-non-migrant groups it is reasonable to surmise that the economic crisis could only have intensified these pressures.

3.3.2 Decentralisation and democratisation The twin transformations of decentralisation and democratisation were fundamental structural shifts in the deepest structures of the Indonesian state, but can also be interpreted as an important proximate cause of conflict in Maluku. The period of transition created a level of political, social and economic uncertainty that was ripe for conflict, intensified by uncertainty over the future role of the military in Indonesia – a factor of particular importance in Maluku. Decentralisation and the associated re-allocation of funding control to the local level created greater financial incentives for local elites to gain control of important positions; at the same time, democratisation meant that these positions were gained by mobilising popular support rather than by currying favour with the national elites in Jakarta. In such circumstances, the incentive to mobilize along ethnic and religious lines was great.

In North Maluku, the increased revenue returned to the local community from natural resources seems to have motivated the Makian to lobby for their own sub-district, which would include a lucrative goldmine on Halmahera even though sub-districts, unlike districts and provinces, do not enjoy any political power or resource

control under decentralisation. Indeed, there are some claims that the ultimate objective was the formation of a new district with Malifut as its capital, which would allow the Makian exclusive access to these resources. Powerful Makians in the local government assisted and facilitated this initiative, which met fierce opposition from the local indigenous community, the Kao. The Kao, comparatively unrepresented in the local government, failed in their efforts to have the sub-district cancelled. Pressure by the Makian and the national government to accept the new sub-district and the Kao's continued refusal to do so led to conflict between the two communities. The evacuation of the entire Makian community led to the spread of the violence to Ternate and elsewhere in North Maluku. In addition, political competition among members of the elite played an important role in the December 1999 violence, as the followers of rival gubernatorial candidates clashed in Ternate.

At the same time, democratisation and decentralisation impacted Maluku indirectly through the reactions of the national elite who stood to lose from the transition, most notably the army and the political and economic elites linked to the Soeharto family. It has been widely alleged, although never conclusively proved, that some of these elites deliberately sought to destabilise Maluku and other outer provinces in order to reassert the need for strong central leadership.⁶¹

3.4 Immediate Causes and Triggers

The actions of local and national elites have proved vital in explaining recent conflict across Indonesia, and this is no less the case in Maluku and North Maluku. With the political uncertainty following the fall of Soeharto and the democratic transition, Maluku was arguably a tinderbox waiting for a spark. The initial outbreak of violence in Ambon in January 1999 has been widely blamed on provocateurs with political backing, seeking to cause unrest in the province and, in some accounts, throughout

61.) Aditjondro, 'Guns, pamphlets, and handie-talkies'.

the country. A Human Rights Watch report categorises three broad conspiracy theories regarding the immediate causes behind the violence:

- The conflict was provoked by factions within the military and the national elites to destabilise the democratisation process and allow the military to resume power in Indonesia;
- The conflict was provoked by Christians seeking to restore their local dominance through reinvigorating support for the RMS and attacking Muslim migrants, and
- The conflict was instigated by certain local military officers through the mobilisation of RMS support but with the intention of benefitting from the expected Muslim backlash.⁶²

Although corroborative evidence is sketchy at best, it appears that the mobilisation of criminal gangs in Ambon was linked to a political struggle for the governorship of Maluku. In 1992 and again in 1997, Latuconsina's main rival for the governorship was a Christian, Freddy Latumahina. Both men had links with religious-based networks, apparently each incorporating criminal elements. As the scholar of Indonesia Gerry van Klinken writes, each contender was tied into "completely separate and increasingly anxious communication networks.... Each had prepared contingency plans for an attack from the other. When a trivial incident occurred at the city's bus terminal, the word flew around each side that "it had started".⁶³ In North Maluku, the immediate trigger for the escalation of the conflict in Ternate is widely reported to have been the circulation of a pamphlet allegedly signed by the synod chairman of the Maluku Protestant Church calling for a holy war against the Muslims. Given the minority position of the Christian population in North Maluku, it is highly unlikely that the pamphlet was authentic.

62.) Human Rights Watch 'Indonesia: The violence in Ambon' (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 6.

63.) van Klinken, op. cit., 14.

3.5 Escalation Factors

3.5.1 Security forces and militias

In both Maluku and North Maluku the, partisanship of sections within the security forces was a key factor in driving the escalation of the conflict. In the early stages of the Maluku conflict, the security forces were accused of being incompetent or disinterested, doing nothing to resolve low level violence.⁶⁴ As the conflict progressed, sections of the security forces reportedly took sides and became actively involved in sectarian violence. The partisanship of the security forces escalated conflict as communal groups lost confidence in the security apparatus to protect their communities and thus turned to and formed militias to protect themselves. Most important was the formation and deployment of Laskar Jihad, which drove a major intensification of the conflicts.

3.5.2 The media and (dis)information

Media played a crucial role in the dynamics of the conflicts in both Maluku and North Maluku, with partisan local publications inflaming sentiments. Even prior to the conflicts, specific media outlets tended to be owned by one religious group or the other. Following the outbreak of violence, "media had to split into two organisations, one with Muslim staff only, and another with Christian staff only".⁶⁵ In 2003, it was reported that virtually all the local newspaper and broadcast organs in Maluku had been sectarianised.⁶⁶ Much media reportage in the early stages of the conflict was divisive and inflammatory; Laskar Jihad ran a radio station, Radio Suara Perjuangan Muslim Maluku (Voice of the Maluku Muslims' Struggle). Even well-intentioned media activity had potentially negative repercussions: one public service announcement broadcast to promote peace instead intensified communal stereotypes and was the source of the derisory nicknames for the contending groups.⁶⁷

64.) ICG, 'Overcoming murder and chaos', 4.

65.) ISAI and IMS. *The Role of Media in Supporting Peace-building and Reconciliation Efforts in Central Sulawesi, Maluku and North Maluku*. (Jakarta: UNDP-CPRU, 2004).

66.) S. Yunanto, S. Nuryanti, R. Farhan Effendi, and J.F. Hasyim, *Militant Islamic Movements in Indonesia and South-East Asia*, (Jakarta: The RIDEP Institute, 2003), 158-9.


67.) P. Spyer, 'One slip of the pen: Some notes on writing violence in Maluku', in H. S. Nordholt and G. Asnan, eds, *Indonesia in Transition*, (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2003).

Disinformation was not the sole domain of the media, however. Of 350 people surveyed in Maluku about their main source of information about the conflict, more than 40 percent responded “Gossip or Friends”. The national and provincial governments were also partially responsible for the spread of disinformation. In July 2001, the Office of the Coordinating Minister for Political, Social and Security Affairs issued an erroneous, and consequently inflammatory, report on the violence in Maluku stating that 1,382 mosques compared with 18 churches had been burned between June and October 2000; the report was withdrawn a week later after Governor Latuconsina confirmed that the actual figures were 87 mosques and 127 churches.⁶⁸

3.5.3 Revenge: Inter-personal and inter- communal relations

One of the key factors that sustained the conflicts after they broke out was the desire for revenge. Revenge can be experienced and acted upon directly or indirectly and at the individual or communal level. Revenge is particularly important in relation to social cohesion because of the tendency for transferred or indirect revenge, which can

Figure 4
Survey Responses on Sources of Conflict Information,
Maluku.



Source: LIPI Perceptions Survey.

68.) UN-OCHA, *Indonesia Consolidated Situation Report*, No. 34, 27 July 2001.

lead to a quick escalation of conflict from a personal to a communal level, as studies in other parts of Indonesia have shown.⁶⁹ The transferred desire for revenge was evident as far afield from Maluku as Jakarta in the mass demonstration at the National Monument in January 2000 against perceived anti-Muslim atrocities in Maluku, and the subsequent formation of Laskar Jihad.

Case Study of Lokki village, Seram Island, Maluku

Lokki village, in the West Seram sub-district, is typical of many areas beyond the epicentres of violence in the Moluccas in that a relatively short period of conflict had long-lasting consequences. Despite its geographical proximity to Ambon, Lokki escaped major conflict for seven months after the outbreak of violence in Ambon. Finally, however, in August 1999, two days of rioting in Lokki saw first Christians attack Muslims and then Muslims seek reprisals. Around 50 families fled the village (out of a total of around 300 families), of which most have since returned.

The hardships faced by the community in the wake of the conflict were severe. Cash crop small-holdings such as cloves and nutmeg, the mainstays of the local economy, were all but destroyed in the rioting. Children's education was been completely disrupted, particularly at the elementary level; all the school buildings were destroyed so volunteer teachers had to conduct classes in their own homes.

Despite these problems, however, PDA research found an encouraging commitment to restoring inter-communal relations in Lokki. Informants reported emotional reunions as friends of different religions returned to the village. Lokki locals, like locals elsewhere, increasingly blame outsiders for the riots.

Nonetheless, tensions and security concerns remain high; wedding festivals are not arranged at night-time for fear of encouraging violence and Muslim students have not been able to return to the new schools in the main village of Lokki. The presence of a BRIMOB unit appears to be welcome and on good terms with both communities. Often local people accompany the unit on night-time patrols.

PDA research has found evidence that points in opposing directions. In some cases, it appears that while many members of affected communities continue to harbour a strong desire for revenge, this appears to be mostly a desire for direct revenge against former assailants, or the murderers of loved ones, rather than a desire for indirect revenge against communities. For instance, the following account was related to the PDA Social Cohesion Assessment team by a 22-year-old *ojek* driver in the Jailolo *kecamatan* of North Maluku:

Now I live with my uncle and aunt in Galela, but I lived in Idamdehe before. All Muslim families were evacuated, except for the men, who guarded the village. I still remember that night, 9 January 2000, when a mob attacked our village, and we fought them back. My father was killed at that moment. I do want revenge, but I do not know on whom I should take my revenge because I do not know the man who killed my father.

69.) F. Colombijn, 'Maling, maling! The lynching of petty criminals', in F. Colombijn and J. T. Lindblad (eds) *Roots of Violence in Indonesia: Contemporary violence in historical perspective*, (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2002); Human Rights Watch, 'Breakdown: Four years of communal violence in Central Sulawesi', (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2002).

4. Impacts of conflict

4.1 Human Impacts

At the most fundamental human level, ethnic and religious conflict in the Moluccas has claimed thousands of lives. The UNSFIR conflict database recorded almost 4,800 deaths in ethno-communal conflict in Maluku between 1999 and 2002, and 2,800 more in North Maluku. Together, the two provinces accounted for almost four-fifths of the recorded fatalities from ethno-communal conflict in the country.⁷⁰ In both provinces, around a third of the population was displaced by the conflicts, causing huge suffering across all social groups. Displacement on this scale undermines economic growth as displaced populations are often unable to participate in productive activities. Destruction of property and infrastructure exacerbates suffering and hampers economic recovery.

70.) The dataset did not include Aceh, East Timor, and Irian Jaya. The methodology of the database was deliberately conservative, so these figures represent the bottom end of the likely scale of casualties.

4.1.1 Displacement

The conflict in Maluku led to massive displacement of around half a million people, or up to half of the province population. In October 2003, the Indonesian Government estimated that there were around 70,000 refugee families in Maluku, or over 330,000 people.⁷¹ Another 160,000 fled to other provinces, mainly Southeast Sulawesi; most of these were migrants originating from that province.⁷² In Maluku, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) were mostly located in Ambon and Central Maluku (see Table 5). As a result of displacement, Maluku was effectively segregated into Muslim and Christian areas. In 2003, the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimated that “full economic, infrastructure and service recovery in Ambon, remote areas, and IDP influx sites are still many years distant”.⁷³

The conflict in North Maluku led to the displacement of over 200,000, more than one-third of the province’s total

Table 5
IDP Figures in Maluku, end 2003

| No. | Area | Receiving HA + LA | Receiving HA | Not Managed | Total IDPs | % Not Managed |
|-----|-----------------------|----------------------|-----------------|----------------|----------------|------------------|
| 1. | Ambon City | 23,340 | - | 66,494 | 89,834 | 74.0 |
| 2. | Central Maluku | 16,625 | 49,920 | 43,558 | 110,103 | 39.6 |
| 3. | Southeast Maluku | 22,245 | 16,145 | 27,383 | 65,773 | 41.6 |
| 4. | West Southeast Maluku | - | - | - | - | n.a. |
| 5. | Buru | 16,913 | - | 26,708 | 43,621 | 61.2 |
| | Total | 79,123 | 66,065 | 164,143 | 309,331 | 53.1 |

Note: HA=Housing Allowance; LA=Living Allowance


Source: Calculated from Government of Maluku, ‘Proposal for IDP Management in Maluku Province 2004’, 20 December 2003

71.) NRC ‘Profile of internal displacement: Indonesia’, (Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council, 2000).

72.) ‘Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Indonesia 2003’, UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 19 November 2002.

73.) UN-OCHA Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Internally Displaced Persons in Indonesia, 14 February 2003: <http://www.reliefweb.int/appeals/2003/files/idn03feb.pdf>.

Figure 5
IDP Estimates for North Maluku by Quarter, 1999-2004



population.⁷⁴ In general, those displaced were minorities in particular parts of the province where they lived, with Christians fleeing Muslim majority areas such as Ternate and Bacan, and Muslims fleeing Christian majority areas such as Tobelo. The first displacement occurred in August 1999. Most displacement in North Maluku then occurred in the following months as the conflict spread across the province. For example, when violence broke out in Ternate, about 12,000 Christians living there moved to North Ternate to seek the protection of the Sultan of Ternate and then fled to North Sulawesi, while Moslems from Tobelo fled to Galela, Morotai and Ternate. This pattern was repeated across North Maluku, leading to almost complete segregation of religious communities in mid-2000. Christians from Bacan fled to Bitung, Manado, Seram, Tual, Samlaki and Sorong, while Muslim migrants returned to Java, Buton and other points of origin.

74.) This section is drawn largely from the Social Cohesion and Reconciliation Assessment for North Maluku.

Roughly two-thirds of the displaced were located in just four areas – Ternate (Muslim IDPs), North Sulawesi (Christian IDPs), Tobelo (Christian IDPs) and Jailolo (mixed). While the number of IDPs in other areas was relatively small, in some sub-districts such as Galela, Gane Timur, Loloda, Kao/Malifut and Sahu, displaced people represented over half the resident population. Although almost all areas of North Maluku were in some way affected by the conflict, the majority of refugees came from the northern areas.

The first returns of IDPs were initiated by the Indonesian Government working closely with the army and local reconciliation teams, at the end of 2000, relatively soon after the violence had receded. Few IDPs returned in 2001 and much of 2002, but the rate increased in 2003, presumably as a result of improved security conditions and the fact that the government's policy on IDP returns was taking effect. The majority of people displaced in North Maluku were displaced for about three years, an experience that had a dramatic impact on all aspects of their lives and that will probably take many years to overcome.

4.1.2 Health and education impacts In addition to fatalities and casualties caused by the fighting in Maluku and North Maluku, conflict has impacted the health of the public. The destruction of health facilities

| Table 6 Health Statistics for Maluku and North Maluku, 1999 and 2002 | | | | | | | | |
|---|--|------|-------------------------------------|------|--------------------|------|--------------------------------|------|
| | Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 births) | | Population with health problems (%) | | Morbidity rate (%) | | Population self-medicating (%) | |
| | 1999 | 2002 | 1999 | 2002 | 1999 | 2002 | 1999 | 2002 |
| Maluku (pre-division) | 40.0 | - | 16.5 | - | 11.4 | - | 54.9 | - |
| Maluku (post-division) | - | 46.9 | - | 21.5 | - | 17.0 | - | 83.0 |
| North Maluku | - | 57.1 | - | 23.1 | - | 18.2 | - | 78.3 |

Source: UNDP, Indonesian National Human Development Report, 2004

and clinics has decreased access to medicines and doctors with the proportion of the population who self-medicate when ill rising from 55 percent in Maluku in 1999 to a staggering 83 percent and 78 percent in Maluku and North Maluku respectively in 2002 (Table 6). Before the outbreak of the conflicts and the separation of Maluku and North Maluku, infant mortality in the combined province stood at 40 deaths per 1,000 births; by 2002 this figure had risen to 47 and 56 deaths per 1,000 births in Maluku and North Maluku respectively. Less than one third of births in North Maluku is assisted by medical personnel. According to OCHA, "the capacity of the Health Department [in Maluku] to implement basic primary health services was greatly reduced due to a reduction in staff caused by displacement, and a disruption in the Department's supply chain of pharmaceuticals and medical commodities".

Education has also suffered substantially due to the conflicts, particularly among the displaced population. According to the government of North Maluku, 110 schools were destroyed during the conflict.⁷⁵ According to a survey

| Table 7 Drop-out Rates among IDP Children aged 6-15 (%) Maluku and North Maluku | | | | |
|--|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|
| | Never attended school | Dropped out during primary school | Dropped out after primary school | Total incompletion rate |
| Maluku: | | | | |
| • Buru | 17.1 | 24.8 | 2.3 | 44.2 |
| • Ambon | 1.7 | 1.4 | 2.4 | 5.5 |
| North Maluku: | | | | |
| • Maluku Utara | 7.0 | 2.7 | 4.4 | 14.1 |
| • Halmahera Tengah | 4.5 | 6.8 | 4.5 | 15.8 |
| • Ternate | 2.6 | 0.6 | 2.6 | 5.8 |

Source: World Food Programme Surveys of IDP sites.

75.) Kantor Menteri Negara Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional/Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional *Rencana Tindak Pemerintah Pusat dalam Rangka Percepatan Pembangunan Provinsi Maluku Utara Tahun 2003*, (2002).

of IDPs undertaken by the World Food Programme, school drop-out rates among school-aged children in IDP camps throughout Maluku and North Maluku are as high as 44 percent, although much lower in the urban areas of Ambon and Ternate (see Table 7). Similarly, in the IDP camps in Buton island, Southeast Sulawesi, populated mainly by refugees from Maluku. Save the Children UK reports drop-out rates of over 40 percent. Higher education in the provinces has also been decimated by the destruction of Pattimura University in Ambon.

4.2 Economic Impacts


The economic impacts of the conflicts in Maluku and North Maluku are difficult to measure precisely, but Figure 6 gives an indicative overview. From 1995 to 1997, Maluku's economic growth broadly matched that of Indonesia as a whole and, when the crisis of 1997-98 hit, Maluku appeared to be spared the worst, faring considerably better than other provinces by registering a fall in provincial GDP per capita of only 6.5 percent compared to the national fall of 12.8 percent (see Figure 6). In 1999, however, Maluku's GDP per capita shrank by almost a quarter and remained in negative growth until 2002; by the end of 2002, Maluku's GDP per capita stood at only 75 percent of its 1995 level.

Falling incomes in Maluku have been compounded by high inflation rates. Ambon has one of the highest inflation rates of any city in Indonesia, but the situation is even more alarming in respect of basic food stuffs. The price of rice in Ambon has increased almost four-fold since 1996, compared with less than three times in Jakarta. Figure 7 shows the overall and (non-prepared) foodstuffs inflation rates for Ambon and Jakarta. Overall inflation in Ambon was running lower than Jakarta until 1998, suggesting that the financial crisis affected prices less in Ambon than Jakarta. After the outbreak of violence at the end of 1998, however, the overall rate in Ambon outstripped Jakarta. Most disturbing, however, is the trend in the foodstuffs index in Ambon, which shot up drastically in 1999 and continued to rise at a faster rate than the other indices through 2002 (Figure 7). Food inflation is important for human security,

as it affects poor people, who spend a large proportion of their income on food. In both Maluku and North Maluku, on average more than two-thirds – in some districts as much as three-quarters – of household expenditure is spent on basic foodstuffs, between 10 and 20 percent higher than the Indonesian average. Only in Gorontalo Province in Sulawesi is food expenditure a greater proportion of average expenditure than in Maluku.⁷⁶ Time-series inflation data for Ternate are unavailable, since North Maluku is a new province.

This combination of falling incomes and rising prices has led to Maluku Province having the highest proportion of people below the poverty line in the country, with more than a third of the population officially impoverished. Of 700 people interviewed in Maluku and North Maluku for the PDA process, over 300, or 45 percent, listed rising prices as the greatest problem facing them currently (see Table 8).


Figure 6
GDP per capita Growth in Indonesia and Maluku, 1995-2002



Source: BPS, Statistik Indonesia, various years

76) UNDP *Indonesia National Human Development Report 2004*, (Jakarta: United Nations Development Programme Indonesia, 2004).

Figure 7
Inflation in Ambon and Jakarta, 1996-2003



Source: BPS, Statistik Indonesia, various years

4.3 Gender Impacts

Armed conflict has a devastating effect on women and gender relations, but also sometimes has unexpected positive effects on gender relations. In Maluku and North Maluku, the conflicts have seen women move into economic roles from which they were formerly excluded. As yet, however, the positive political repercussions of this

| | Maluku | North Maluku | Total |
|--------------|--------|--------------|-------|
| Inflation | 41.7% | 49.1% | 45.4% |
| Unemployment | 22.3% | 19.1% | 20.7% |
| Education | 11.4% | 10.3% | 10.9% |
| Housing | 7.1% | 14.0% | 10.6% |
| Security | 9.7% | 2.3% | 6.0% |
| Criminality | 2.3% | 3.4% | 2.9% |
| Other | 5.4% | 1.7% | 3.6% |

Source: LIPI Perceptions Surveys

have yet to emerge and the short-run effect has been an increased burden upon women, many of whom have had to take on multiple roles as economic agents and carers for conflict victims, in addition to their traditional role as homemakers. Moreover, economic empowerment has not been accompanied by improvements in political and social empowerment. Tables 9 and 10 illustrate these processes using the gender measures in the national Human Development Reports.

While the gender-related development index (GDI) has improved consistently in Maluku province since 1996, the gender empowerment measure (GEM) has fallen consistently over the same period.⁷⁷ Improvement in the gdi is not necessarily an entirely positive development as it represents the additional economic burden being carried by women, a burden that has not been met with increased emancipation. A major factor in the improvement in the gender-related development index is the increased participation of women in the labour force, which jumped from 33.1 percent in 1996 to 49.2 percent in 2002. Over the same period, however, the proportion of female parliamentarians in the province has fallen from a desultory 6.5 percent to an even worse 4.5 percent (compared to a national average of 8.8 percent). A notable exception here is Ambon, which ranks second out of 336 districts in the entire country on the GDI and ninth on the GEM. The average non-agricultural wage for women in Ambon is actually higher than that for men.

Because of its status as a new province, time series data are not available for North Maluku, but it is clearly among the worst performing provinces in the country on gender issues. It is still a highly patriarchal society, with few women in positions of power or influence. The 2004 legislative elections saw only two women returned to the provincial parliament. North Maluku thus ranked amongst

77.) GDI and GEM are indicators developed by the UNDP for measuring the gender aspects of human development. Broadly speaking, GDI measures the gender disparity in human development, while GEM measures female participation in the economic and political spheres.

| Table 9 Gender-related Human Development in Maluku and North Maluku, 1996-2002 | | | | | | |
|---|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| | 1996 | Rank | 1999 | Rank | 2002 | Rank |
| GENDER-RELATED DEVELOPMENT INDEX (GDI) | | | | | | |
| Maluku | 59.8 | 11 | 61.0 | 4 | 62.6 | 3 |
| North Maluku | - | - | - | - | 55.0 | 23 |
| Indonesia | 58.9 | | 55.9 | | 59.2 | |
| GENDER-EMPOWERMENT MEASURE (GEM) | | | | | | |
| Maluku | 56.5 | 20 | 52.7 | 5 | 51.8 | 9 |
| North Maluku | - | - | - | - | 31.2 | 30 |
| Indonesia | 58.8 | | 49.5 | | 54.6 | |

Source: UNDP, Indonesian National Human Development Report, 2001 and 2004.

| Table 10 Gender Equality Measures in Ambon and Central Halmahera, 2002 | | | |
|---|-------|-------------------|-----------|
| | Ambon | Central Halmahera | Indonesia |
| GDI | 71.3 | 47.9 | 59.2 |
| Rank | 2 | 293 | |
| GEM | 59.4 | 29.1 | 54.6 |
| Rank | 9 | 317 | |
| Wage Ratio | 1.06 | 0.45 | 0.68 |

Note: Wage Ratio is the ratio between the female and male average non-agricultural monthly wage.

Source: UNDP, Indonesian National Human Development Report, 2004.

the worst provinces on the gdi in 2002 and the absolute worst on the gem. Particularly poor here is the district of Central Halmahera, which came in 317th out of 336 districts on the gem and 293rd on the GDI. The average female non-agricultural wage in Central Halmahera district is less than half that of men.

Violence against women has been an issue consistently pointed out as an impact of ethno-communal conflict in both provinces. Violence (both in the public and the private spheres) has taken many forms, from intensified domestic violence in IDP camps to sexual harassment and rape. According to information gathered by the UNDP Gender Thematic Assessment team, in the Sayoan IDP camp on Bacan Island in North Halmahera complaints were made about the rape and humiliation of women by the security forces. Beyond the camps, women in both provinces report frequent harassment and sexual violence in particular by security forces. Many unwed mothers were left behind when the security forces departed.

The gender perspective highlights the fundamental paradox of peace-building in the two provinces: a strong military and police presence is widely considered necessary to prevent further outbreaks of violence, but the presence of these security forces has a negative impact on the broader human security situation. In the consultative workshops held in both provinces for this assessment, female participants were uniformly more ambiguous in their attitudes towards the security forces than the male participants, who tended to view them positively.



Kelompok Rakyat Biasa, *Damai di Hati, Damai di Bumi* (Peace at Heart, Peace on Earth), silkscreen on paper, 60 x 45 cm, 2001

5. Responses and Peace-building Initiatives

In the wake of the humanitarian crises in Maluku and North Maluku, the UN (though OCHA) in close coordination with local and national governments, set up a framework to coordinate humanitarian responses with a particular emphasis on addressing the immediate needs of the large numbers of displaced persons. The initial response of the Indonesian Government was centred on two priorities: the evacuation, sheltering and support to return or resettle of IDPs, and the management of localised violence through the presence of additional police and military units to re-establish order as well as initiating the Malino Peace Process to promote peace and reconciliation.

The initial responses to the conflict were primarily humanitarian in nature. Following the humanitarian crisis, a range of actors provided post-conflict responses. These actors included the UN agencies, international NGOs (INGOs), local NGOs and government agencies. In looking at ways to move peace-building forward in Maluku and North Maluku, it is important to examine the types

of response previously implemented to learn lessons from their successes and failures. This section provides an analytical overview of responses to date, although the difficulty in obtaining detailed and systematic data on responses means that the assessment is necessarily incomplete. Nonetheless, there are some important lessons that can be learned.

5.1 Government Responses

5.1.1 Conflict resolution and reconstruction

The sudden emergence of communal violence and violence took the Government of Indonesia and many other actors by surprise. At the height of the conflicts in both Maluku and North Maluku, the national government was unable to respond effectively, as exemplified by President Abdurrahman Wahid's inability to prevent Laskar Jihad soldiers leaving Java for the Moluccas. The security response, however belated, was effective. The central government in Jakarta responded to the outbreak of intense violence in North Halmahera in late December 1999 with a massive deployment of security personnel to North Maluku. 500 Kostrad personnel from the Brawijaya 512 Battalion arrived in Morotai on 1 January 2000. On 14 January, the Commander of the Indonesian National Military (TNI) Admiral Widodo stated that there were 15 battalions of security personnel in Maluku and North Maluku. Of this figure, four battalions were present in North Maluku on the island of Halmahera.

In June 2000, following the deaths of approximately 211 people in the village of Duma in Galela, the central government implemented a Civil Emergency status in both Maluku and North Maluku on 27 June 2000. The implementation of Civil Emergency increased military (TNI) and police (Polri) personnel numbers and also the powers of military commanders. The government maintained a status of civil emergency in the North Maluku until May 2003 and in Maluku until September 2003.⁷⁸

78.) 'State of emergency lifted in Maluku', *AFP*, 15 September 2003.

As the initial reconciliation efforts led by the national government did not lead to a significant reduction of tensions, a more concerted attempt was made under the auspices of the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare to replicate the Malino peace talks that had been influential in bringing an end to the conflict in Central Sulawesi. The Malino II talks were concluded in February 2002, with representatives of both sides of the conflict in Maluku province agreeing to a package of measures including rehabilitation measures focused on 'educational, health, religious, and housing facilities'.

Stakeholders consulted as part of BAPPENAS/UNDP PDA process, confirm that the Malino II Agreement retains broad legitimacy in the province and it is still seen as important in bringing an end to the violence by providing a 'platform for future peace action'. However, as later violent events testify the agreement did not manage to achieve sustained absence of violence. Many interviewed groups point out to a number of key factors for this. Prominent amongst them is the unwillingness of the government to publish and make public the findings of the Independent National Investigation Team. In addition, the Malino Working Groups (Pokja) set up to monitor and enhance actions in support to the agreement were not empowered by authorities and lacked accountability to the people.

In 2003, the Maluku provincial government released a new five-year Strategic Plan (RENSTRA, *Recana Strategis*), which focused on development and post-conflict peace-building. The plan divided the following five years into two phases, the Security and Stabilisation Phase from 2003/2004 – 2005 and the Creating a Competitive Environment Phase from 2006 – 2008. The first phase focuses on three areas: Social stability and peace, community empowerment, and infrastructural development. The second phase will focus on economic development and equality, community empowerment, social stability and peace. It is clear that in financial terms at least, the provincial government's immediate priority is infrastructural development, which will take up more than

half of its development budget for 2005 (see Table 11). Due to budgetary constraints, the provincial government has placed little direct emphasis on restoring social cohesion between ethnic and religious groups. Programs to improve religious relations (under Social Stability and Peace) will receive only IDR 21,926 million over the five years of the plan, just 1 percent of the total budget. Equivalent budgetary information for North Maluku was not obtainable.

| Table 11 Maluku Government Development Budget, 2005 | | |
|--|---------------|------|
| | IDR. Billions | (%) |
| Social Stability and Peace | 490.1 | 22.8 |
| Community Empowerment | 556.7 | 25.9 |
| Infrastructure Development | 1,102.6 | 51.3 |
| Total | 2,149.3 | |

Whilst local governments appear to be taking some serious action towards reconstruction and reconciliation, however, concerns remain about the apparatus of government, particularly in North Maluku, which has been hampered by the process of setting up new provincial and district administrations (*pemekaran*). The PDA Local Governance Assessment reported that only Kota Ternate had made 'serious' efforts towards good governance goals.

5.1.2 Presidential Instruction no. 6 2003

At the national level, Presidential Instruction No. 6 (Inpres) was signed by President Megawati on 21 September 2003, instructing all coordinating and line ministries to prioritise recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in their work plans and dedicated budgets for Maluku and North Maluku over a three-year period beginning in 2004, based on input and proposals from the Maluku and North Maluku governments. This was a major central government recovery initiative that could be started in 2004 in a context of better local social and economic conditions as well as improved security as illustrated by the removal of the civilian emergency status in North Maluku and Maluku.

Inpres 6 failed to materialize fully in 2004 primarily because of inadequate response from the ministries who did not focus on recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction activities in their 2004 work plans and budget allocations for Maluku and North Maluku. Instead they only submitted routine development and maintenance activities. In fact, a dismayed North Maluku government received lower fiscal transfers from the central government in 2004 than in 2003. In the face of mounting complaints and disappointment from both regional governments at the lack of financial support for recovery efforts, the central government eventually proposed allocating IDR 150 billion from contingency funds for IDP-related activities in 2004, constrained by the absence of supplementary budget funds for fiscal year 2004.

To prevent a recurrence of inadequate support for Inpres 6-related activities from the ministries in 2005, the National Planning Agency (BAPPENAS) coordinated an inter-ministerial review in August 2004 to ensure that the respective ministries' Sectoral work plans and budgets reflected both routine development and maintenance activities as well as Inpres 6-related recovery and reconstruction activities in time for the 2005 national budget. On 14 September 2004, the national parliament agreed that IDR 1,210 trillion would be allocated in 2005 in order to implement Inpres 6 in both Maluku and North Maluku and an additional IDR 250 billion would be allocated to both provinces for IDP-related activities in 2005. The three main coordinating ministries will oversee preparation and implementation of Inpres 6-related activities whilst the Ministry for the Accelerated Development of Disadvantaged Areas will monitor implementation and progress in 2005. This will form the basis for the overall Inpres 6 action plan as well as individual ministerial work plans and budget allocations in 2006. In view of initial implementation and budgetary constraints, the time frame for Inpres 6-supported activities will be extended to 2007.

5.1.3 IDP resolution

In 1999, the Maluku government set up a special coordinating working group (Pokja) to deal with the IDP situation in the province. The Pokja was tasked with overseeing programmes aimed at alleviating the suffering of IDPs and facilitating their return, as well as coordinating with other national institution such as BAKORNAS, the national body for IDP management. Through the Department of Social Affairs and the Department of Manpower and Transmigration, the national government allocated IDR 3.75 million (USD375) per IDP family, to be dispersed through aid and assistance packages. As of end 2002, however, it was reported that only 10,000 out of an estimated 64,000 IDP families had received these funds.⁷⁹ More success has been achieved in the rehabilitation of housing; in 2002, around 22,000 of the estimated 49,000 houses destroyed had been rehabilitated, mostly under the auspices of the two departments mentioned above and the Department of Resettlement and Regional Infrastructure.

Acknowledging the slow rate of progress, the government also allocated money to assist returnees to construct their own homes, although this has reportedly resulted in an increase in property disputes. More recently, following the upsurge in violence in April 2004, the government budgeted an additional IDR 33 billion (US\$ 3.3 million) for immediate assistance to the estimated 10,000 new IDPs. Responses to the IDP situation in North Maluku have been more successful, largely due to the spontaneous return of IDPs shortly after the conflict ended. In April 2004, OCHA reported that around three quarters of the 200,000 people displaced by the North Maluku conflict had returned home. Pockets of IDPs remain, however, with around 5,000 families still in Ambon and a similar number in North Sulawesi. Lack of funds for reconstruction of homes has been cited as the main reason for non-return and the governor of North Maluku has stated that he need an additional IDR 70 billion (USD 7 million).

79.) Norwegian Refugee Council, *Profile of Internal Displacement in Indonesia: Compilation of information available in the Global IDP Database of the Norwegian Refugee Council as of 13 November 2003* (Geneva: Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project, 2003). Downloaded from <http://www.idpproject.org>, 23 April 2004.

The situation is equally complicated in North Sulawesi, where many IDPs have no desire to return to North Maluku. The local governments of these provinces have been unable to reach agreement on how to manage this situation, both administratively and financially.

The respective provincial governments' efforts to resolve the IDP situation in both Maluku and North Maluku have been further complicated by increasing resentment among the non-displaced population against what is seen as preferential treatment of IDPs by the government. A lack of coordination has also been reported between provincial and district authorities in North Maluku.⁸⁰ Efforts to resolve the IDP situation have been further complicated by the "confusing deadlines" of the national government.⁸¹ Nonetheless, the experience of IDP management in North Maluku has been broadly successful and has received plaudits from the UN for its "very serious commitment" to the problem.⁸² Although the Provincial Government of North Maluku has been relatively successful in handling the IDP situation, the UNDP Governance Assessment of North Maluku found major gaps in local government capacity.

Major obstacles facing the complete resolution of the IDP problem include corruption in the management of funds as well as the reluctance of IDPs and host communities to support government relocation initiatives. In November 2004, *Suara Pembaharuan* reported that IDPs in the village of Waai had not received IDR6 billion (US\$600,000) of allocated aid.⁸³ IDPs in Waitatiri village in Central Maluku who had fled from neighbouring Banda district reportedly refused relocation to state-built housing until they received repatriation funds.⁸⁴ Similarly, intended host communities for relocated IDPs, such as Lisabata in West Seram district, have refused to accept them.⁸⁵

80.) OCHA, *Consolidated Situation Report Indonesia*, 19 June 2004.

81.) C. Duncan, 'Confusing Deadlines: IDPs in Indonesia'. *Forced Migration Review* 17.1 (2003), 35-6.

82.) Bakornas-PBP and OCHA, 'Follow-up Workshop on the Management of IDPs in Indonesia', (Sukabumi: Bakornas PBP/OCHA, 2003), 14-15.

83.) Reported in Crisis Centre Diocese of Amboina, *Ambon/Moluccas Situation Report 451*, 15 November 2004.

84.) E.g., 'Refugees reject relocation plan', *Jakarta Post*, 1 December 2004.

85.) M. Azis Tumny, 'Maluku residents say no to returnees', *Jakarta Post*, 29 November 2004.

5.2 Donors and INGOs

5.2.1 Humanitarian responses by the UN agencies and INGOs

From 2001, UNDP, a key player in the Maluku and North Maluku provinces developed a multi-sectoral programme and a framework for response for other UN agencies in accordance with its mandate.

OCHA focused on coordination, information sharing and capacity building to address IDP crises, and undertook extensive advocacy *vis-à-vis* the Indonesian Government and other actors in the dissemination and promotion of the UN Guiding Principles for Internal Displacement (e.g. they were distributed in Indonesian and in an accessible cartoon form). UNESCO contributed to building media and educational capacities to support its theme of “Building a Culture of Peace” in Maluku and North Maluku. UNICEF also worked on education, teacher training, youth civic participation, children’s rights and psychosocial support. The UNHCR, besides setting up emergency management training and contingency planning to deal with the IDP crisis, also provided human rights training to selected units of the Indonesian National Police.

Broadly speaking, the international organisations working directly in the provinces have tended to focus their activities on relatively small-scale, localised projects promoting economic sufficiency and the provision of services, particularly to most vulnerable groups such as women and children. The two main categories of humanitarian relief programmes that are still ongoing include:

- *Health and sanitation programmes.* The humanitarian (as opposed to peace-building) category of response has been focused on providing vital services disrupted or destroyed by the conflicts. Immunisation and water sanitation programmes by organisations such as the WHO, IMC and MSF were among the first to be set up in both provinces, as well as in IDP settlements outside of the Moluccas, after the initial waves of conflict. More recently, health programmes are being integrated with

other aspects of recovery, such as UNICEF’s programme for “Recovery and post-conflict support for women and children”, which is focused on the provision of health, water-sanitation and education services.

- *Education programmes.* Emergency education has been a priority for Save the Children UK, CARDI, and smaller organisations such as the Jesuit Refugee Service. The UNDP is collaborating with UNICEF and World Vision to support AJEL (Active, Joyful and Effective Learning) programmes in North Halmahera.

5.2.2 Recovery and peace-building responses

There are considerably fewer programmes aimed at recovery and promoting peace.

These programmes fall under two main categories:

- *Livelihoods assistance programmes* designed to help communities regain economic self-sufficiency, particularly IDPs and recent returnees. Examples include the Livelihoods Recovery Programme of the FAO, which provides equipment and training to fishing and farming communities in both provinces, and CARDI’s programme of economic empowerment in rural areas.
- *Governance and transparency programmes* to develop better governance in the provinces. Through these programs, international agencies focus on strengthening capacity within government institutions and supporting the development of civil society.

UNDP implemented two key recovery programmes in the two provinces: the Kei Islands Peace-building Programme, and the North Maluku and Maluku Recovery Programme. In both, UNDP’s strategy consisted of supporting the rehabilitation of infrastructure, supporting IDPs through international and national NGOs as well as community-based economic recovery through the Community Recovery Programme, which was also aimed at enabling civil society organisations to effectively deliver assistance and services to the poorest of the poor. The UNDP’s North Maluku and Maluku Recovery Programme, for instance, addresses

recovery and peace-building issues through five strategies: development planning, service delivery, civil society development, capacity building in the legal and judicial sector, and media development.

International agencies have generally been less involved in direct peace-building activities, and more in the humanitarian responses. ICMC and Mercy Corps are two of the few international or governmental organizations working in Maluku that actively address issues of reconciliation and peace-building, rather than emphasising humanitarian responses and economic recovery. In doing so, however, they recognise the potential pitfalls, noting that “traditional direct peace-building or conflict mitigation efforts could jeopardize both programmes and staff”,⁸⁶ because peace-building by international organisations is widely seen as running the risk of either generating local resentment against outside interference or else being seen as taking sides in the conflict. ICMC and Mercy Corps have thus mainly sought to work through local organisations, which are seen as better able to effect grassroots reconciliation. The UNDP has instituted a number of social and cultural activities aimed at peace-building, including sporting tournaments and youth activities.

5.3 Local Organisations

Local organisations working in Maluku and North Maluku have also proliferated in response to the crises. Mercy Corps estimates some 400 to 500 NGOs are now operating in the region, although “civil society in Maluku remains fractured along many fault lines including religious identity”.⁸⁷

Despite these problems, local organisations have been key to successful reconciliation, largely due to the extra legitimacy they carry with local populations on both sides

of the conflicts. Research by the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation in 2002 found that more than 58 percent of respondents in Maluku believed that reconciliation must come from below (*dari bawah*). The Baku Bae initiative in Maluku exemplifies this type of reconciliation, and was important in establishing neutral zones around market-places to foster reintegration. In Tobelo and Galela in North Maluku, initiatives launched by community leaders, independent of any assistance from either INGOs or local government were central to reconciliation between Christians and Muslims in that area.

In addition to local NGOs, reconciliation teams have been set up at the local level, often at the instigation or with the backing of the military and local government. These teams, usually comprising equal numbers of religious, adat, community and youth leaders from both sides of the conflict, are aimed at facilitating dialogue and reconciliation processes on the local level, as well promoting IDP returns. Drawing on the legitimacy of their participants and with financial support from the local government, these organisations were deemed successful in the first phase of facilitating dialogue and reconciliation. The teams however are concerned about these processes are to be sustained going forward and conveyed to the PSA Social Cohesion Assessment of North Maluku team that “now, after the conflict, although the teams still have concerns about sustainable reconciliation, real integration of IDPs and normalisation of inter-group relationships, they lack support from government”. In addition, they have been criticised for the selection of mainly male participants. In spite of the lack of local government support, the local reconciliation teams are still active and in North Halmahera district, were instrumental in quelling potential tensions between the Muslim and Christian communities when an pamphlet derisory of Islam was circulated in December 2004. The local teams promptly deployed inter-religious delegations to all sub-district mosques and churches to inform communities that the pamphlet was a forgery

86.) Mercy Corps Indonesia ‘Maluku case study: Integrating relief, recovery and civil society principles in a conflict-affected environment’ (Jakarta: Mercy Corps Indonesia), 22.

87.) UNDP-CPRU 2002.

that was not supported by the local synod or the Christian community and should not be taken seriously.⁸⁸

Broadly speaking, the key to the success of local non-governmental responses appears to have been their ability to draw on the existing legitimacy of traditional structures. However, these institutions are something of a double-edged sword. Although they have apparently offered an important route to reconciliation, they have also been used in the mobilisation of communal antipathies and remain deeply patriarchal.

5.4 Issues Arising from Responses

That both early post-conflict humanitarian and subsequent recovery interventions were necessary and urgent and that the response of the Indonesian Government and the international community was timely and important, is beyond doubt. However, the fact that conflicts persist in some areas to date signals that there were gaps between conflict dynamics and responses. Currently we still find barriers to the return or resettlement of IDPs; problems associated with youths who appear to be easily mobilised to violence, and societies divided along ethno-religious lines. All of these have prompted concerns amongst development actors and led to an interesting, if low key, process of reviewing lessons learned and assessing gaps.

- Weakness and inconsistency of government policy. Government policy towards the provinces at all levels continues to be plagued by inconsistencies. The continuing presence of high levels of security forces between 2002 and 2005 emphasises that the security approach remains the main response to conflict prevention and management at the expense of other attempts to rebuild social cohesion and trust. These weaknesses are compounded by a lack of an integrated policy framework. Symptomatic of this was the failure

88.) Based on field research conducted by Melina Nathan, UNDP consultant, in North Halmahera district, North Maluku province between January to February 2005.

to follow through on the promises of Inpres 6, which mandated special recovery funds for conflict-hit areas. Local officials, including the *bupati* of Maluku Tenggara Barat, publicly complained that Maluku received nothing while Nagro Aceh Darussalam and Papua received trillions of rupiah.⁸⁹ For the year 2005, however, IDR540 billion (USD 54 million) and IDR670 billion (USD 67 million) have been allocated for Maluku and North Maluku respectively, the most substantial proportion of which in both provinces has been allocated to the Social Department which handles IDP issues.⁹⁰

- Lack of coherence of donor/INGO responses. International agencies and INGOs have failed to coordinate among themselves and with the provincial and national government as effectively as possible. While some joint efforts have been implemented at the national level – notably the BAPPENAS-UNOCHA workshop on the management of IDPs – systematic collaboration on the provincial level is notably lacking. As the UNDP enters the next phase of assistance, under the Peace through Development Programme, it is exploring ways to best collaborate in synergy with other major programmes in conflict areas, such as the World Bank Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas Programme.⁹¹
- Responses not working on conflict. Much of the response by international organisations has failed to move beyond humanitarian assistance and, when it has, the responses often have not been conflict-sensitive. An evaluation of UNDP's programmes in the provinces highlighted that inadequate understanding of the causes and dynamics of conflict on the ground resulted in: uneven transition from humanitarian activities to recovery activities; lack of attention to gender questions including the social and economic empowerment of women and their

89.) 'Post conflict Maluku seeks recovery funds from Jakarta.' *Jakarta Post*, 20 March 2004.

90.) BAPPENAS, 'Evaluasi kinerja dan tindakan lanjut implementasi Inpres 6/2003', (Jakarta: BAPPENAS, 2004).

91.) UNDP, *North Maluku and Maluku Recovery Programme*, (Jakarta: UNDP, 2004), 26.

involvement in peace-building; and too much emphasis on rehabilitating physical infrastructure rather than prioritising the economic recovery of communities.

The UNDP-BAPPENAS supported PDA process concluded that what was needed were more strategic responses to foster social cohesion and peace-building. Such outcomes require that the economic recovery programmes implemented must bridge divided communities. Although there was some aid (from the U.S., notably) to support social cohesion programmes, the funds were not significant enough to transform the current absence of conflict ('negative peace') into a more sustainable and 'positive' peace where communities recognise their inter-dependence and the value of the peace dividend.

- *Structural causes of conflict not being addressed.* Expanding on the previous comment, responses by all sectors have not addressed the structural causes of the conflict. While a humanitarian approach was necessary during the conflict and in the immediate post-conflict phase, post-humanitarian programming has been characterised by attention to the proximate causes of the conflict – with a focus on issues of governance and economic recovery – without much attention to the structural causes. Some attention has been paid to reviving traditional institutions, particularly by local organisations, but there has been no systematic attempt to understand what this would involve and what its effects would likely be. Issues of intergroup inequality have been completely neglected.
- *Lack of ability to respond to the changing dynamics of conflict.* The activities of international agencies and INGOs continue to be vulnerable and lack the ability to respond promptly to the changing dynamics of conflict. Re-eruption of violence can cause severe disruption in programme development and implementation. The disturbances of April 2004 in Ambon led to an exodus of international, and in some cases local, staff from the province. Paradoxically, in the converse

situation, international responses are also not resilient to the absence of continued violence. International organisations are to a large extent dependent on donors for the funding of their programming activities, funding which often dries up when the immediate humanitarian emergency is eased.

- *Lack of follow-through.* Both informal and formal peace-building activities appear to be plagued by a lack of follow-through. Symptomatic of these failures are the reconciliation teams in North Maluku that received initial support from the government but saw this support dry up after the initial post-conflict period was over. PDA workshop participants reported that the government did not act on program recommendations coming out of the Malino II process and other consultations, and many such programs suffer from fatigue. Government responses have also failed to meet expectations. Many of the initiatives agreed as part of the Malino II Peace Agreement have failed to materialise.
- *Problems of top-down peace-building.* Local communities widely complain of exclusion and lack of consultation in the decision-making and planning processes. Bottom-up initiatives appear to offer the best chance of lasting reconciliation, but are not well supported. Locally, a kind of division of labor in peace-building responses has emerged: government and international groups focus on security, economic development (e.g. road-building, housing construction) and political development (e.g. institution-building), while local NGOs focus on rebuilding social cohesion. In some respects this division of labor is both inevitable and desirable. Infrastructural redevelopment entails huge costs and organisation that cannot be provided by local NGOs. Also, active involvement by the government and international agencies in direct peace-building activities might result, as Mercy Corps concluded, in perceptions of taking sides. If such a division of labor is advantageous in some respects, it also presents problems and challenges. One of the key concerns raised by local community

stakeholders throughout the PDA process was the top-down nature of peace efforts in the province, symbolized by the Malino II Process, in which selected leaders were whisked to Jakarta to reach an agreement. This meant that peace initiatives failed to connect strongly with the local populations whose support was necessary to ensure their success.

- *The need for community-driven planning of peace-building activities.* One element in the construction of peaceful societies, is the design of comprehensive responses that take on board the range of perspectives, needs and interests of post-conflict recovery actors (e.g local governments, communities, religious groups, etc). UNDP has supported these consensus-building processes (e.g. the PDA process) to generate a sense of collective ownership and renew the engagement of all actors in the building of peace. This process, together with the experience of other players such as JICA and USAid, show that more emphasis needs to be placed on understanding conflict dynamics in order to tailor programmes to meet local needs. Bottom-up user-driven planning is now a term commonly used in local governments to describe their governance practice (though it will take more time for genuinely participatory and transparent practices to become the norm throughout Maluku and North Maluku).⁹²
- *Developing the capacity of sub-national governments.* Decentralisation provides a unique opportunity to build capacity to adjust planning practices towards local goals, including peace-building. Although important investments are required for this engagement with local governments to be successful,⁹³ it appears that broad consensus has been reached on the necessity of such a sustained commitment by the national and local governments as well as the donor community. Capacity

building will aim at better policies at sub-national levels to address conflict drivers, greater clarity on the part of local governments on how to design peace promoting budgets and planning processes, as well as more engagement on common priorities between civil society and government. It is also vital to address key issues related to the governance gap such as corruption and elite manipulation of ethnic identities, to professionalize security forces and create safer environments for all communities and the business sector.

92.) D. Madden, *Conflict-related Development Analysis: Stage 2, Phase 2 – Province Level Rapid Assessment: Central Sulawesi, North Maluku and Maluku*. (Jakarta: CPRU-UNDP, 2004).

93.) Ibid.

6. Peace Vulnerabilities and Capacities



Surya Wirawan. *Seri Lagu Mentari (Sun Dance)*; linoleum-cut, 30 x 42 cm, 2002.

This section identifies the major vulnerabilities and capacities for peace in the two provinces. In doing so, it also presents key recommendations for addressing vulnerabilities and enhancing capacities.

6.1 Peace Vulnerabilities

There are four primary peace vulnerabilities: weak governance; low social cohesion and social capital; persistence of serious horizontal inequalities, and uncertainty over new conflict triggers.

6.1.1 Weak governance

Weak governance at the district and provincial levels continues to present a major impediment to peace. The inability of governments to implement effective programmes to address outstanding social and economic issues is problematic in itself, and also a potential source of future conflict, if dissatisfaction with government is high. This problem is particularly marked in North Maluku, where good governance has been impeded by the rudimentary state of the provincial administration.

International Donors and INGOs should support the development of good governance and engage in capacity building in both provinces. Identification of existing ‘Best Practices’ and support for developmental decision-making are key strategies. Support for local civil society organisations to foster accountability mechanisms is also important for long-term governance. Specific issues would include:

- Promoting good governance in addressing IDPs: Develop programmes to support good governance in handling with IDPs - the main problem in Maluku and North Maluku. A group of NGOs concerned with IDPs in Maluku has already held a preliminary workshop in formulating a model of how multi-stakeholders should address the IDP problem in transparent and accountable ways. This could be achieved by supporting NGOs in the creation of the model and through facilitating collaborative and cooperative works between government and NGOs in dealing with the IDPs.
- Promoting a civil society alliance for anti-corruption movement: This would aim to support efforts in enhancing the capacity of civil society in monitoring and campaigning against corruption. This could be done through education and training on corruption monitoring and anti-corruption campaigns for NGO activists and journalists as well as facilitating civil society “United Front” on monitoring and conducting campaigns against corruption.

6.1.2 Low social cohesion and social capital

Trust and interaction between communities remains low, particularly in Maluku, presenting the potential for a rapid return to violence, as occurred in April 2004. The desire for revenge remains strong, if unclearly directed.

International agencies and national government should not involve themselves directly in social capital building exercises, as local communities have expressed a clear preference for bottom-up reconciliation, and distrust of many INGOs remains high. Support should come in the form

of financial support and training for local organisations working on these issues. Local government may be more able to engage directly in reconciliation processes, although this depends largely on their ability to address weak governance legitimacy issues.

Local government projects could include:

- Develop inter-faith and religious dialogue programmes. These programmes could promote tolerance, an inclusive approach towards religion, and stimulate and enhance reconciliation and peace processes. Initiatives could include: inviting prominent and respected scholars and leaders to discussions and seminars on inter-faith issues; support for the Inter-Faith Dialogue Institute; support in enhancing existing cooperative programs between the University of Immanuel Christian and State Institute of Islamic Studies (STAIN) Maluku in Ambon, and other relevant religious institutes in North Maluku.
- Develop multi-cultural and multi-religious education programs. These would promote the dissemination of values emphasising tolerance and the appreciation of a multi-cultural and multi-religious society. Initiatives could include: rebuilding the multi-religious Muhammadiyah high school, supporting other schools with similar programs and supporting lecturer exchange programs between STAIN Ambon and the University of Immanuel Christian Maluku.
- Develop cultural programs for reconciliation and peace. These would enhance the reconciliation and peace process through cultural and traditional approaches. Initiatives could include reviving the Pela mechanisms, supporting existing art and cultural groups that include both communities and promoting new multi-ethnic groups through art and cultural festivals.

6.1.3 Persistence of serious horizontal inequalities

Persistence of serious horizontal inequalities
High levels of horizontal inequality remain between the communities in both provinces, although this may be less of a problem in North Maluku, where the Christian

population is now relatively small. As long as inequality remains high, peace remains highly vulnerable. To complicate the issue, moves to rectify inter-group inequality can in themselves generate hostility and conflict.

Local government is the only agency with the political authority, legitimacy and influence to rectify horizontal inequalities. Long-term positive action programmes should be developed, with the support and involvement of local and international organisations, to promote equitable treatment of and opportunities for all communities in both the public and private sectors.

6.1.4 Uncertainty over new conflict triggers

As social cohesion and government capacity remain low, the potential for renewed violence in the wake of relatively innocuous triggers cannot be ignored. The resurgence of violence in Ambon in April 2004 is indicative of this problem.

Identifying potential provocateurs and implementing strategies to minimize their impact is vital. Rumour prevention and repudiation mechanisms can play a key role. Experience suggests that these mechanisms are most effective where they are community-based. International organisations and local and national government can best support this objective by supporting local organisations in the formation of community response mechanisms in conjunction with security sector reform.

- Empowering the police. Develop programmes and allocate resources to enhance the capacity of the police in handling security issues in the post-conflict situation, including disciplining partisan police members; coping with conflict triggers in society; professional skills in intelligence and criminal investigation as well as improving police equipment.
- Empowering civil society in monitoring the security apparatus. Enhance the capacity of civil society to monitor and oversee the professional conduct of the police and the security apparatus in general, through relevant training and education programmes.

6.2 Capacities for Peace

There are three main capacities for peace: growth of a conflict-sensitive media, the revitalization of traditional power structures, and economic recovery.

6.2.1 Growth of a conflict-sensitive media

The imbalanced and provocative reportage in the early stages of conflicts has largely been replaced by a commitment to more impartial, conflict-sensitive behaviour among media practitioners. The Maluku Media Centre, an independent body which promotes and disseminates unbiased news reportage, is an important and growing capacity for peace. The media can also play an important role in preventing new conflict triggers by quashing rumours and avoiding innuendo.

Support for the media's role in promoting peace falls under four broad categories: strengthening the media environment at the provincial level; developing professional skills and facilities; facilitating information flows and access, and supporting community-based communication. The international community can play a supporting role in developing these practices at the local level, particularly by providing training and resources for media organisations that support peace and reconciliation.

6.2.2 Reinvigorating traditional structures

Particularly in areas of North Maluku and Southeast Maluku, adat institutions played a positive role in ending conflict and promoting reconciliation. Traditional social and political structures are not without their problems, since in some contexts they can be a negative force.

The multiple and often contradictory impacts of traditional structures of power in Maluku and North Maluku are extremely difficult, sensitive but important issues. They can only effectively be addressed through the combined, extensive engagement of all communities with the local and national governments in discussions and decisions about the future roles of these institutions and how the institutions can be shaped to aid the community as a whole.

6.2.3
Economic
recovery

Modest but sustained economic recovery appears to be underway in both provinces. Maluku recorded growth of over 3 percent in 2002 and 2003, and this is projected to rise to 4.5 percent for 2004. North Maluku grew at 3.4 percent and 2.9 percent in 2001 and 2002 respectively. Nonetheless, major economic issues remain to be addressed, notably access to credit and unemployment problems.

International agencies and local governments are already investing substantially in reconstruction and economic development programmes. Strategic targeting of programmes in sectors that would also benefit social cohesion will maximize their utility. Programmes that combine economic initiatives with reconciliation mechanisms should be promoted. Important sectors include agriculture, fisheries and petty trading.

- Support for priority sector (fisheries) and strategic sector (informal sector economy). Develop programmes to promote fisheries as a priority business sector, since both Maluku and North Maluku are rich in maritime resources. The growth of the informal economic sector in urban areas, particularly in Ambon and Ternate, should also be prioritised as these are strategic areas. This could be done through such activities as providing technical, financial and equipment assistance for workers in the fishing industry; supporting the government in providing facilities for the informal economic sector and providing financial and management assistance for informal economic sector.
- Alleviating poverty and urban unemployment. Develop programmes to relieve the problems of poverty and urban unemployment in Maluku and North Maluku by providing vocational training and education for self-help economic activities; providing technical and financial assistance for the poor and unemployed in order to conduct small-scale economic activities both for groups and individuals.

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