OVERCOMING VIOLENT CONFLICT
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Executive Summary

This provincial report examines the development of a peace and development programme for Central Sulawesi Province. Drawing on three parallel threads of research, the report analyses the causes and impacts of conflict in Central Sulawesi, the responses by governmental and non-governmental actors, and the existing vulnerabilities and capacities for peace. Recommendations are made both for the provincial and national governments in Indonesia, and for local and international NGOs and agencies.

There are both structural and proximate causes of conflict. Structural causes include:

- **Horizontal inequalities**: The combination of severe historical inequalities between Christian and Muslim with the Islamization policies of the last decade of the New Order, created socio-economic discontent.

- **Intensification of competition due to migration**: Official transmigration from Java and Bali and spontaneous migration of Bugis from southern Sulawesi created an additional dimension of inequality and tension.

- **Weak legal system**: The lack of effective legal institutions to police and adjudicate episodes of violence (however small or large) has contributed to the escalation of violence, as seen in Poso, where the two scuffles that set off the first and second phases of the conflict led to vigilantism, which escalated the violence. Here, as elsewhere, the reliance on vigilantism as a means of seeking justice stemmed from disillusionment with legal institutions.

- **The legacy of the New Order**: An absence of state institutions capable of coping with and mediating conflict in anything but the most brutal fashion, and a broad lack of experience of productive conflict resolution at the local level.

Proximate causes of conflict include:

- **The economic crisis**: Between 1996 and 1999, poverty in Central Sulawesi increased by 251 percent, more than twice the national average. During the crisis years, the struggle for resources between religious and migration groups became much more desperate, as more people vied for government...
positions and economically productive resources such as land. The financial crisis indirectly spurred migration into Central Sulawesi and exacerbated tensions, as cash crops such as cocoa suddenly became lucrative exports, thanks to the devaluation of the Indonesian rupiah.

- **Decentralisation and democratisation**: The decentralisation of governance to the district level created new political opportunities that spawned dynamics hitherto unseen in Central Sulawesi. Informal power-sharing arrangements that, in the past, had helped to mitigate tensions related to the balance of religious representation in political offices eroded, intensifying religious tensions.

Impacts of the conflict have been varied in nature, ranging from human to economic and from social to political.

- **Human impacts**: Conservative estimates place the number of deaths in the conflict at around 700, a number that is still growing – including the recent bomb in Tentena that claimed over 20 lives. Much of the population of Poso was displaced by the conflict, and dealing with remaining IDPs is a major political and social barrier to reconciliation and reconstruction. The conflicts have had a serious impact on the people’s access to health and educational facilities. Drug abuse and alcohol dependency have increased.

- **Economic impacts**: As the epicentre of the violence, the economy of Poso District shrank 16.1 percent between 1999 and 2001, or around IDR 140 billion (US$ 16 million). Men have been killed or lost their livelihoods, creating food insecurity for many families. In addition, the violence has destroyed many businesses and uprooted many families.

- **Political impacts**: Local politics polarized along religious lines. For Protestants, the perception of political marginalisation was exacerbated by uneven criminal prosecutions. Although Protestants and Muslims were involved in the violence in phases one and two, the blame fell largely on Protestants. A positive sign was the peaceful conduct of the 2005 district head elections, where all five candidates selected a running mate from another religion.

- **Social impacts**: Communities in and around Poso have become segregated along religious lines. The structural shifts in the gendered nature of the economy have naturally had an impact within the household. In particular, many women have assumed the role of breadwinner. This has had the dual effects of putting more strain on women as well as giving them greater decision-making power. Health and educational facilities and services have been severely affected, particularly for displaced communities.

Responses and peace-building initiatives have been initiated by the government and international NGOs. These were initiated both prior to and after negotiation of the Malino Declaration.

- **Responses prior to the Malino Declaration**: The four phases of violence that spanned the period from December 1998 until the Malino Declaration in December 2001 were met mainly by security and recovery responses oriented toward stopping the conflict and mitigating its effects. Government deployed security personnel and provided emergency humanitarian services. International NGOs, agencies and donors also poured in significant resources toward the provision of humanitarian services.

- **The Malino Declaration**: A major peace accord, the Malino Declaration was negotiated between representative of stakeholder groups in Poso in December 2001. Following the declaration, several working groups—consisting of leaders from government, civil society and religious groups as well as experts—were established to ensure the implementation of the accords. The working groups have achieved very little, suffering from a lack of resources; many members, who have full-time jobs, have devoted little time to Malino-related activities.

The current situation in the province can be seen in the light of various factors, including:

- **Security**: The continued presence of large numbers of security personnel has prevented the resurgence of pitched battles. Although there have been some accusations by NGOs and activists of military and police involvement in stimulating the violence, there has been little direct evidence of such links. Some residents have expressed concerns about discipline and professionalism of security forces, in particular citing reports of sexual assault and harassment committed by security personnel in IDP camps.

- **Recovery**: The national government has made available funds for the management of the IDP problem, but many IDPs have yet to return home. Corruption in the management of IDP funds is an increasing issue, and has been linked to recent incidents of violence. The government faces significant challenges in transitioning from short-term humanitarian to
longer-term development responses. Many IDPs do not want to return to their original homes out of security concerns.

• **Economic Development.** The Social Affairs Department, in partnership with other government departments including the Agriculture and Fisheries Department, has developed the Kelompok programme aimed at stimulating economic activity for conflict-affected communities, by giving groups of families equipment and vocational training. The World Bank's Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) has provided IDR 16.75 billion (US$ 1.8 million) to the poorest subdistricts in Poso, Morowali and Tojo Una-Una for participatory community development projects. The World Bank will launch another community development program specifically for conflict-affected areas, with plans for implementation in late 2005. From the international NGO sector, Mercy Corps has funded 26 projects related to economic development, reaching 14,457 beneficiaries.

• **Reconciliation** Since Malino, a number of ad hoc activities to promote reconciliation have been carried out by non-governmental groups, including a community dialogue between Christians and Muslims and a monthly magazine. Religious groups have worked together on peacebuilding activities among youths and are now expanding their activities groups in the community. A dialogue in early 2004 was attended by approximately 2,000 young Christians and Muslims. As mentioned above, these moves bore fruit in the 2005 local elections.

There are both peace vulnerabilities and capacities at play in the province. A list of vulnerabilities and recommendations on how they should be addressed would include:

• **Weak governance.** Weak governance at the district and provincial levels continues to present a major impediment to peace, particularly in Poso, Morowali and Toja Una Una, which are in transition. Weak legal institutions and perceptions of bias also constitute an important impediment to peace. If these institutions increased their capabilities, thus restoring citizens faith in them, the reliance on extra-legal and violent means of justice-seeking could be significantly reduced. **Recommendations:** International donors and INGOs should support the development of good governance and engage in capacity building. Technical support for new district and sub-district administrations is particularly important, as is support for the development of transparent, inclusive and consultative governance practices. National and local governments should support the legal processes underway in the provinces and ensure that justice is open and accountable.

• **Persistence of high horizontal inequalities:** High levels of horizontal inequalities remain between the communities in the province. As long as inequalities remain high, peace remains likewise highly vulnerable. This is an extremely problematic issue, however, as moves to rectify inter-group inequalities can in themselves generate hostility and conflict. The redistricting of Poso into more religiously homogenous areas is particularly problematic as local centres of growth may become increasingly associated with one or other community. **Recommendations:** Local government is the only agency with the political authority, legitimacy and influence to rectify horizontal inequalities. Long-term positive action programmes should be developed, with the support and involvement of local and international organisations, to ensure that the benefits of economic growth are enjoyed by all communities.

• **Continuing insecurity and provocation:** The recent wave of attacks in Central Sulawesi underlines the potential for renewed violence. That widespread violence has not yet been sparked is a positive sign, but this remains a dangerous development. **Recommendations:** Identify potential provocateurs and implement strategies to minimize their impact. Ensure that legal processes are transparent. Local and national governments are the key actors. The circulation of weapons among the civilian population, both militia groups and individuals, must be reduced and ultimately eliminated. Building the professionalism of the police is vital to effective law enforcement and better conflict prevention and management. The practice of deploying non-organic police reinforcements on a rotational basis should be reviewed as disciplining unprofessional behaviour is difficult when the perpetrators have already been transferred elsewhere. Private business interests and any other illegal activities by police force personnel should be eliminated.

• **Economic recovery:** Economic recovery has been much slower in Central Sulawesi than in other provinces, and remains a major peace vulnerability. **Recommendations:** Economic development programmes to assist livelihoods recovery should be the main form of direct intervention by international agencies. Sectorally, the agriculture sector is most in need of attention. Involvement of local NGOs in the selection of programme sites will help reduce perceptions of bias. Economic recovery programmes should focus on promoting inclusive economic activity that fosters interaction...
between communities. Small-scale business associations, which could mediate among economic actors in Christian and Muslim communities, should be promoted.

- **Civil society empowerment.** The lack of transparency, low level of community participation in conflict prevention and peace building, and the lack of coordination between the local government and civil society in implementing peace building are all obstacles to peace. The community strongly distrusts government policy because of corruption and the lack of transparency. On the other hand, NGOs have launched new peace-building initiatives. Community dialogues at grass-roots level, although limited in scope, also contribute to peace and stability at the village level. **Recommendations:** It is important to strengthen the capacities of civil society and societal organisations, so they can participate in decision-making and political processes. Also important is coordination among stakeholders in addressing the situation of IDPs and unemployment. NGOs should be encouraged to transform their short-term approach from crisis management and humanitarian assistance to a long-term approach that focuses on conflict prevention and peace building.

Capacities for peace and recommendations on how they should be enhanced are as follows:

- **Social cohesion.** Given the problem of social cohesion following the conflict, it might be assumed that this represents a peace vulnerability rather than an asset. Its inclusion here is representative of a deliberately optimistic assessment that social cohesion in the province appears in fact to be relatively strong. This finding is one of the most important of the PDA process and has important ramifications for peace-building responses. **Recommendations:** In a 'above all do no harm' spirit, programmes by all actors to promote reconciliation and social cohesion should build on the organic reconciliation already underway in the province. Particularly for international agencies, this means restricting their direct interventions in peace-building and focusing instead on indirect support of local groups and organisations that are working to rebuild inter-communal relations.

- **Growth of a conflict-sensitive media.** Imbalanced and provocative reportage in the early stages of the Central Sulawesi conflict has been replaced, for the most part, by a commitment to impartial, solid reporting. **Recommendations:** Support for the media’s role in promoting peace falls under four categories: Strengthening the media environment at the provincial level; developing professional skills and resources; facilitating information flow and access; and supporting community-based communication.

- **Local initiatives.** Local initiatives such as social networking, inter-religious forums, peace education forums and economic associations significantly contribute to the long term peace-building process. **Recommendations:** The potential of these organisations could be enhanced through transforming the short-term orientation of the inter-religious forums and inter-group associations toward long-term strategies.
The purpose of this provincial report is to inform the development of a peace and development programme for Central Sulawesi province, that operates within a systematic framework to promote sustainable peace and equitable human development. This means promoting the conditions for, and enhancing the capabilities of, local people, as individuals, families and communities, to better their lives in a context of personal safety and in a manner that is sustainable in the long run. At the most basic level, the aim of the programme is to “safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfillment”. However, it also encompasses a more positive, long-term agenda that addresses issues such as natural resource management and social equity. At both levels, the emphasis is on empowering and capacitating local communities to undertake these tasks for themselves. Based on a rigorous

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assessments of conflict and development in Central Sulawesi, the report presents policy recommendations targeted not just at the UNDP, but also at the broader community of development actors, including national and local governments, civil society and media organisations and other international actors.

1.1 Research Process

This report is part of a multi-province policy-oriented study of peace and development in Indonesia. Initially, three provinces where UNDP has existing programmes were selected for study: Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi. In addition, UNDP commissioned LabSocio at the University of Indonesia to undertake primary and secondary research using this framework in West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Madura (East Java) and Nusa Tenggara Timur provinces and further secondary research and a comprehensive media review for Aceh and Papua.

The report draws on three parallel threads of research in each province:

- Lembaga Ilmu Pengatahuan Indonesia (LIPI – Indonesian Institute of the Sciences), in collaboration with UNDP staff and consultants, carried out major research, including an extensive desk review of secondary sources and statistical data, a perceptions survey of target groups in the province and three case studies;
- UNDP and its consultants facilitated provincial workshops, which featured three days of discussion by invited stakeholder representatives;
- UNDP and its consultants made thematic assessments of seven factors: governance, social cohesion, access to justice, gender, local economic development, natural resources management and the media.

This broad research strategy has a number of important advantages. It allows a greater degree of triangulation of results, which lessens the chance of erroneous conclusions and recommendations. All stakeholders were ensured ample representation in the final report. Because of its participatory nature, the research process itself should have positive impacts on peace and development, irrespective of formal research outputs.

1.2 A Caveat of Complexity

Some analyses of the myriad conflicts in Indonesia (and elsewhere) have tended to reduce to a single or small number of explanatory variables. Early accounts of the conflicts in Maluku and Central Sulawesi, for instance, focused on the supposed role of provocateurs in fomenting the conflict; other accounts have tended to focus on the religious variable at the expense of other variables, such as access to resources, ethnicity, migration patterns and so forth.²

Oversimplification of conflict causality results in problems. Incomplete analysis leads to incomplete or even counterproductive policy recommendations. As Nils Bubandt has pointed out in the context of North Maluku, such apocalyptic explanations not only fail to capture the complexity of the situation, but also “inscribe the violence with a narrative that also suggests possible avenues for future violent action”.³

In dealing with conflict, this report thus identifies a range of structural, proximate and triggering factors that appear to have contributed to the emergence and dynamics of conflict, but does not attempt to ascribe to these a single causal relationship. The report should not be interpreted as suggesting that the presence of any of these factors was necessary for the outbreak of conflict, or that conflict would not have taken such a serious form had any of these factors been absent.

2.) See G.J. Aditjondro, Jakarta’s Rol in de Tragedie in Maluku (Amsterdam: Indonesia House, 2002); also J. Bertrand, Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Decentralisation, Reform and the Legacies of the New Order

Compared with the periodic rebellions and uprisings that punctuated Sukarno’s rule, the New Order stands out at first glance as a period of stability and development, with gross domestic product averaging a staggering 11 percent growth per year between 1967 and 1997. In comparison, East Asia and the Pacific as a region grew at around 5 percent per year over the same period, while sub-Saharan Africa registered a net decrease in GDP incomes.¹

Underneath this calm surface, however, was what Freek Colombijn describes as “endemic state violence”, which extended from matters of territorial security to violence against groups and individuals perceived, legitimately or not, as threats to the regime. The New Order regime

typically repressed violent manifestations of tensions without addressing underlying causes, most notably in East Timor and Aceh, where rebellions against the central government were met with the full force of the New Order's military might, with little or no attempt to address the concerns of the local population. As a result, tensions laid dormant or simmered until the fall of the New Order in 1998, when the state, weakened by the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and undermined by the murders of the Trisakti students, no longer had the capacity or the political clout to control violent outbreaks.

Since Soeharto stepped down, Indonesia has been undergoing a series of difficult transitions: from autocracy to democracy, from centralised rule to decentralised governance, as well as major reforms in the military, the judiciary, and corporate governance systems.

Each of these transitions would be ambitious on its own, but together, under the broad title of reformasi, this movement represents one of the most ambitious agendas undertaken by a state in recent times. While much progress has been made, reformasi has produced unintended consequences, particularly in the arena of security, both as it is traditionally defined and in terms of the extended concept of human security. Decentralisation, for example, has provided the opportunity and motive for unscrupulous local elites to capture state authority at the local level. Moves to reform certain aspects of the military have met with resistance.

The impact of Indonesia's decentralisation process is crucial to understanding the dynamics of conflict and peace in the country. The Habibie administration started the decentralisation process in 1999 through two major pieces of legislation: Law 22/1999 on Local Government and Law 25/1999 on the Fiscal Balance between the Central Government and the Regions. The decentralisation process had three main objectives: to prevent disintegration, promote democratisation and provide for the division of labour. Rather than devolve powers to the provinces, the immediate sub-national level of government, legislators gave the majority of the governing and fiscal powers to the districts (kabupaten) and cities (kota), some 440 in all.

Decentralisation has vastly increased the opportunities for democratic participation with direct elections of district, municipality and provincial heads as of June 2005 – positions that were previously appointed by Jakarta. Regional parliaments (DPRD, or Dewan Pewakilan Rakyat Daerah) have increased oversight powers. But it has also opened the possibility for local elites, both military and civilian, to use the institutions for their own benefit. Fiscal decentralisation increased the potential gains to be made by corrupt officials at the local level, where reliance on criminal networks for political purposes may increase the threat of violence, both individual and communal. In appraising the impacts of decentralisation, the Asia Foundation found that “in several regions, the monitoring function [of DPRDs] is hindered by racketeering/extortion/thugs (premanisme) and nepotism”.

In terms of actual governance, the effects of decentralisation have also varied substantially from region to region. A comprehensive equalisation formula shifted much of the cost of local services to the national government, while giving other revenue-raising powers to local governments. An extensive study by the World Bank, Decentralizing Indonesia: A Regional Public Expenditure Review Overview Report, (Jakarta: World Bank East Asia Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, 2003), annex 1. For a complete list of legislation relating to decentralisation, see World Bank, Local Power and Politics in North Sumatra: The Uncompleted Reformasi, in E. Aspinall and G. Fealy, eds., Local Power and Politics: Decentralisation and democratisation, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003); V.R. Hadiz and R. Robison, Neo-Liberal Reforms and Illiberal Consolidations: The Indonesian Paradox (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Southeast Asia Research Centre Working Paper Series, 2003).

For an account of the impact of decentralisation on conflict prevention and management, see International Crisis Group, Managing Decentralisation And Conflict in South Sulawesi, (Jakarta and Brussels: Asia Report No 60, July 2003).

6.) Bertrand, op. cit.
8.) For an account of the impact of decentralisation on conflict prevention and management, see International Crisis Group, Managing Decentralisation And Conflict in South Sulawesi, (Jakarta and Brussels: Asia Report No 60, July 2003).
9.) For a complete list of legislation relating to decentralisation, see World Bank, Decentralizing Indonesia: A Regional Public Expenditure Review Overview Report, (Jakarta: World Bank East Asia Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, 2003), annex 1.
11.) Following usual practice, this report uses the English terms district and subdistrict for, respectively, the Indonesian terms kabupaten and kecamatan.
12.) Asia Foundation, op. cit.
13.) International Crisis Group, Managing Decentralisation, op.cit.
Bank found that the system, while ensuring adequate funding for most regions, was “highly inequal… In 2001, the richest local government had 50 times more revenue per capita than the poorest one”. The provision of services has also been varied, no doubt in part due to these revenue disparities. Short-comings in local efforts to alleviate poverty have led the Asian Development Bank to recommend that certain aspects of decentralisation be rolled back, allowing the national government more power to direct local governments.

Reform—or the slow pace of reform—of other government institutions, including the judiciary and the military, has also impacted on the conflict and peace dynamics. Widespread disillusionment with the police, military and the judicial process has contributed to a nationwide upsurge in vigilante violence, which has often manifested along communal lines. Indeed, it is widely believed by Indonesians and some scholars that factions within the military played a deliberate role in instigating some of the horizontal conflicts across Indonesia, as a means of hampering the efforts of the Wahid administration to reform the military, by demonstrating the need for a strong, territorially-based security apparatus. These aspects will be dealt with further throughout the report with specific reference to Central Sulawesi.

2.2 Province Overview

2.2.1 Geographic and demographic profile

The province of Central Sulawesi occupies an area of 69,727 square kilometres on the island of Sulawesi, which lies in eastern Indonesia between Kalimantan and the Maluku islands. The province itself came into existence in 1964 after being separated from North Sulawesi. The terrain of Central Sulawesi varies from the coastal lowlands to the highlands of the interior, a geographic division that has influenced the region’s economy and society. Palu, the capital, lies in the northwest of the province, a nexus of rivers and roads leading to a trading port on the Makassar Strait. Poso district, where the conflict originated, also occupies a strategic position on the Maluku Sea, and Poso city is an important trading port.

For all of this, Central Sulawesi is one of the poorer provinces of Indonesia, with a gross regional domestic product (GRDP) in 2002 of IDR 4.5 million (US$450) per capita, compared with the national GDP per capita of IDR 6.5 million (US$650); 24.9 percent of the population lives below the poverty line, more than a third higher than the national average. Nonetheless, Central Sulawesi is relatively well off compared with other Sulawesi provinces, which have a combined GRDP per capita of IDR 4 million (US$400). Income inequality in Central Sulawesi is roughly the same as in the rest of Indonesia and Sulawesi as a whole, with a Gini coefficient of around 0.30. Agriculture is Central Sulawesi economy’s largest sector both in terms of employment and output, with coconuts, cloves and cocoa as the primary commercial crops.

Central Sulawesi is home to a variety of ethnic groups. Those of significant size include the Pamona, Bugis, Makassarese, Togian, Balinese, Javanese and Chinese. Central Sulawesi’s population is predominantly Muslim (78.4 percent); 16 percent are Protestant. These numbers, however, ignore the geographic concentration of religious groups within the province. Historically, the highlands have been dominated by Protestants, while the coastal regions have been largely Muslim. These historical demographic concentrations have changed in recent times due to government transmigration, which brought substantial numbers of Javanese and, to a lesser extent, Balinese into the province, and spontaneous in-migration, particularly by Buginese from South Sulawesi. Recently, the numbers of Muslims in the province declined, particularly in Poso, as many fled the violence.

In Poso, where the violence has been most intense, the numbers are more balanced than in the rest of Central
Sulawesi: Muslims account for 57.2 percent of the population and Protestants 40.2 percent. Nonetheless, many areas were ethnically concentrated even before the violence. Among the 17 subdistricts in Poso in 2002 (some subdistricts have since become part of the new district of Tojo-Unan), 10 subdistricts had a religious majority (either Muslim or Protestant) of over 80 percent.

While a snapshot of the current situation is necessary for understanding the dynamics of conflict and peace, the historical context is equally important. What are the historical processes that have contributed to violence and what lessons can be culled from the social history of Central Sulawesi? The following sections provide a brief survey of Central Sulawesi’s history as it impacts present-day issues of comprehensive human security.

Despite their geographic proximity, the coastal and interior parts of Central Sulawesi have had markedly different historical trajectories. The coastal areas are intimately tied to their exposure to Muslim sea-traders who settled in the area in pre-colonial times, bringing Islam with them. The various groups inhabiting the interior highlands had far less contact to outsiders and followed their animist beliefs until the late 19th century, when Dutch Protestants, spurred on by the Dutch colonial administration, began to proselytize. Lorraine Aragon reports “the routine existence [during the early colonial period] of small-scale warfare, but no persistent division” between the mainly animist highlanders and mainly Muslim lowlanders. Indeed they were economically, politically and socially interdependent through trade, war alliances and inter-marriages.

Once the highlanders were converted, the Dutch treated them as their colonial proxies, rewarding them with agricultural support, health and educational facilities, as well as positions in the bureaucracy. To disrupt the existing links of interdependence and interaction between the coastal and interior communities, the Dutch prohibited so-called ‘tribute’ relations between highlanders and lowlanders by introducing imported goods. By favoring Christians over Muslims, the Dutch helped create a situation in which Islam came to be associated with anti-colonial resistance, an association which later fed into budding nationalist movements.

Following Indonesia’s independence after the Japanese and Dutch occupations, two regional rebellions swept the region: Darul Islam from 1952 to 1965 and Perusta from 1957 to 1961.

The Darul Islam rebellion, led by Kahar Muzakkar who had been an important commander during the revolution, brought together a coalition of regional and religious insurgents in Sulawesi, in a somewhat loose allegiance with the parallel Darul Islam movements in Java and Aceh. With a campaign against the republic, Darul Islam controlled much of rural Southern Sulawesi by the mid-1950s. Darul Islam fighters pushed northward into Central Sulawesi to drive out animists and Protestants who were occupying the highlands, resulting in hundreds of deaths and displaced persons.

In 1957, another secessionist movement called Perusta was established. At times, Perusta forces–

**Table 1**

Population of Central Sulawesi, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>337,932</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>1,239,579</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>1,577,511</td>
<td>78.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>52,063</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>270,251</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>322,314</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>2,811</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>74,481</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>77,292</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>5,093</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>18,736</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>23,829</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4,226</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>7,221</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>11,447</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>402,125</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,610,268</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2,012,393</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


17.) L.V. Aragon, “Waiting for Peace in Poso: Why Has This Muslim-Christian Conflict Continued for Three Years?” Inside Indonesia, 70 (2002), 55.
mainly Christians from North Sulawesi—fought against Darul Islam; at others, they fought against the Indonesian military that was seen as trying to Islamicise the highlands. Permesta and Darul Islam briefly fought together against the government, pushing for regional autonomy. The Permesta forces carried out their own violence against highland communities, which led to the establishment of Gerakan Pemuda Sulawesi Tengah (Central Sulawesi Youth Movement, or GPST), a highland militia that opposed Permesta. Thus, while the conflicts often pitted Christians against Muslims, the dynamics of conflict were more complex, reflecting very dynamic political agendas that were not exclusively defined by religious cleavages.

The Permesta rebellion ended in 1961 with a negotiated settlement and the Darul Islam rebellion ended on the eve of the New Order in 1965 when the Indonesian army shot and killed Muzakkar.

Throughout the New Order regime, however, outbreaks of violence occurred intermittently between Muslims and Christians. In the last decade of Soeharto’s rule, migrant and indigenous groups clashed in Palu, Poso and various transmigration sites in Central Sulawesi. The Soeharto government responded with swift repression.20

While Soeharto’s regime physically repressed the outbreaks, a number of its policies exacerbated the underlying social and economic tensions. Despite the government’s nominal policy of equality of world religions (articulated by Pancasila), Islam was increasingly privileged over other religions. Soeharto’s ‘Islamic Turn’ in the last decade of his rule saw Muslims (many of them recent immigrants) challenge the Protestants’ dominance of the civil service in Central Sulawesi and elsewhere in the nation (a colonial era legacy).21

The resentment within Christian communities over their loss of status in the government was compounded by the migration of Muslims to Central Sulawesi, drawn by the government’s transmigration program as well as spontaneously for economic reasons. The new migrants were viewed as threats to Christians’ historic domination of the highlands. As in other parts of Indonesia, transmigration was viewed unfavorably by the indigenous communities amongst whom migrants settled. The government gave transmigrants significant economic aid and incentives—often including land traditionally claimed by local groups—which caused economic disparity and fueled resentment.

2.3

Overview of Conflict

A basic timeline of the conflict helps to provide a picture of the conflict’s dynamics as well as its proximate and underlying causes.22

2.3.1

Phase 1:
December 1998
– outbreak of violence

On Christmas Eve, 1998, which fell that year during Ramadan, a Protestant youth in Poso town stabbed a young Muslim. Interpretations of the incident quickly took on religious overtones, leading religious leaders from both sides to join in banning alcohol during Ramadan. Police began seizing the liquor, but some Muslims began their own vigilante actions. Clashes ensued when Protestants tried to defend the Christian Chinese shops.23

Rumors of church burnings fanned the conflict, which escalated rapidly. On 27 December, district assembly member Herman Parimo from Tentena trucked in his Christian militia called the Central Sulawesi Youth Movement (GPST). Armed with machetes, they clashed with hundreds of Muslims, who also had arrived by truck

22.) As the purpose of this report is primarily analytical rather than descriptive, this is a relatively brief timeline. For more comprehensive chronologies, see Aragon, ‘Communal violence in Poso’, op. cit.; Human Rights Watch, op. cit. and YAPPIKA, Suara dari Poso: Kerusuhan, Konflik, dan Resolusi (YAPPIKA, 2003); International Crisis Group, Indonesia Backgrounder: Jihad in Central Sulawesi (Jakarta and Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2004).
23.) Human Rights Watch, op. cit., 14. The account of violence that follows is taken from this report.
from other parts of Central Sulawesi. A week of violence and looting left 200 people (mostly Protestants) injured, approximately 400 Protestant and Catholic homes burned, and scores of Protestant and Catholic stores destroyed.

Muslims believed that Parimo had been unhappy that Patiro, a Protestant politician, had not been nominated for the position of *bupati* or region leader. After a trial, he was imprisoned along with seven other Protestants; no Muslims were prosecuted, a fact that fueled Protestant anger.

Although the violence was typically cast in religious terms, in this and subsequent situations, it appeared that some elites in Poso district were willing to stoke ethnic and religious polarization for political gain, particularly in the run-up period to elections.

A year and a half later, another fight between two youths—another knife killing of a Muslim—ignited another riot: Muslims searched for young Protestant, burning homes and causing their Protestant and Chinese owners to flee to the hills. Brimob (mobile brigade) riot control unit was summoned by the Poso police. While quelling the riots in Poso, Brimob shot and killed three Muslims, further incensing Muslims and leading to their recall back to Palu. After the Brimob left Poso, arson and violence resumed. Ultimately, 600 soldiers were sent from Makassar to put an end to the violence, but not before seven people were killed, 38 injured, roughly 700 Protestant and Catholic homes destroyed and 4 churches burned.

Two successive phases of Muslim-dominated violence and the lack of even-handed and effective justice were soon followed by a third phase in which Christians, seeking vengeance, attacked and killed Muslims. Roughly a dozen Christian ‘ninjas’—so called for their stealth—targeted Muslims they believed were responsible for much of the previous violence, killing three and burning down a church in which the Muslims took refuge.

Over the next weeks, various fights broke out between Christians and Muslims. At a transmigration village near Kilo Sembilan, the site of tensions between migrant Muslims and indigenous Christians, Christian militias attacked Muslim villagers, killing the men (even after they surrendered) and violating the women, who were held for several days with their children. The fighting was brought under control after the military sent 1,500 soldiers, ten tanks and a combat unit to the area in addition to Brimob forces from Java. Soldiers secured hotspots, built barracks for IDPs and confiscated weapons. In all, between 300 and 800 died, most of them Muslims.

In August 2000, after the violence had subsided, the governors of Central, South and North Sulawesi agreed to return internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their homes. They gave verbal guarantees of the IDPs’ safety and offers of government aid—guarantees that were unclear and ineffective. President Wahid participated in a peace ceremony, meant to reconcile both sides. However, these top-down efforts, lacking the active participation of leaders from the key local communities, had little robustness.

Absent any earnest reconciliation efforts, low levels of violence continued, until members of the arrival of the militant Muslim group Laskar Jihad, predominantly from Java, armed with weapons including automatic rifles. Fighting quickly became more organised and deadly, leading to many refugees.

In the beginning, the government did nothing to stop the Laskar Jihad; provincial and district officials even met with the militia after their arrival.

Laskar Jihad coordinated with local Muslims to burn Christian villages to the ground, one at a time. Again, there was a new infusion of police and military troops, which were soon pitted against Laskar Jihad and local Muslim fighters. In two clashes at Mapane and Toyado villages, security forces were accused of human rights violations. During this phase, at least 141 were left dead, 90 injured and over 2,400 houses razed.
The Dynamics of Religious Violence

The commitment of significant numbers of security personnel at each stage of violence has been instrumental in the immediate end of pitched battles with the imposition of roadblocks and weapons seizures. However, various episodes of vigilante violence were reported when the police did not investigate thoroughly, and also when they made one-sided arrests. The uneven application of the law has been cited by Protestant leaders as evidence of biased legal institutions and has led to distrust of formal institutions of dispute-resolution and justice. The characterization of a politicized judiciary is supported by the fact that no Muslims involved in the violence were prosecuted in the early stages of the violence. With little faith in achieving justice through legal avenues, communities resorted to vigilantism to ‘even the score’. The third phase of mainly Christian violence has been widely interpreted as a reaction to the one-sided violence and the lack of a police response to previous violence. The involvement of Laskar Jihad in the fourth phase of the violence has been attributed to the local Muslims’ fear of anti-Muslim attacks, which the security forces failed to prevent. By casting the conflict in religious terms, more fighters could be mobilized than if the conflict was simply between the migrant and indigenous population. Such a religious interpretation opened the way for the participation of Laskar Jihad fighters from Java and the revival of the regionalist Christian militia GPST. Indeed, because religion is a cleavage that unites (and divides) groups from the local level to the transnational level, it can potentially be used to mobilize national or even transnational actors in local conflicts. In Central Sulawesi, national groups such as Laskar Jihad shifted the dynamics of the violence, while there are indications that transnational actors have funded some Protestant militias and paramilitary groups. Despite its violent tactics, Laskar Jihad recognizes the legitimacy of the Indonesian state. Indeed, Laskar Jihad informed members of government of their arrival prior to entering Poso. On the other hand, outside groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Mujahidin KOMPAK fundamentally reject the legitimacy of the state. The fact that these groups do not recognize the legitimacy of the current state poses difficulties in how to address their continued presence in Poso. Whereas Laskar Jihad members have largely left since they disbanded in October 2002 following the Bali bombing, JI and Mujahidin KOMPAK members do not engage the government and similarly do not recognize the Malino process.

The Malino Declaration and after

In December 2001, Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono initiated the joint military-police Security Restoration Operation (Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan), which had three stages: 1) ending the violence, 2) expelling outsiders, confiscating weapons, and carrying out legal actions, and 3) rehabilitating damaged infrastructure and reconciling communities.24

The National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM) along with top security and cabinet officials began to initiate the Malino peace process on December 19 and 20, 2001. Representatives of both religious communities were chosen by leaders of each side, reflecting the geographic, ethnic, professional and thematic complexity of the conflict. The agreement that emerged consisted of 10 key points which were intended to address mostly the proximate causes of the violence by deferring to legal procedures, recognizing pre-conflict rights and ownership, returning IDPs and rehabilitating infrastructure.25

Following the declaration, basic security was maintained, thanks to a weapons confiscation program, deployment of security troops, and the people's overall weariness of violence. Working groups, Pokja Malino, were formed at the provincial, district and sub-district levels to monitor and help implement various aspects of the Malino Declaration. At first, the groups focused on areas such as security, law, mental and spiritual rehabilitation, economic rehabilitation, physical rehabilitation, IDP repatriation, education and health. Later, the groups were consolidated thematically: peace and reconciliation, economic rehabilitation, education and spiritual welfare.

In the years since the declaration, conflict fatigue and the increased presence of security forces have changed the nature of violence, forcing it underground. Instead of pitched battles among communities, combatants have shifted to targeted terror methods. Following the

25.) See Appendix for the ten points of the Malino Declaration.
dissolution of Laskar Jihad, many outsiders left. Mysterious bombings and shootings, however, have continued. In October 2003, masked gunmen killed 13 in Poso and Morowali and in March 2004 an attack on a church left a reverend dead. Following the attacks, police quickly arrested 18 local men, members of Mujahidin KOMPAK, a local militia with ties to the regional Southeast Asia terror group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI).

Bombs and other attacks continue sporadically in Poso, but these seem to be related to corruption in the disbursement of funds for IDPs rather than to communal tensions. The beheading of the village chief of Pinedapa in October 2004 has been tied to his refusal to sign for IDP funds that his village had never received. Similarly, in April 2005, bombs were set off outside the offices of two major NGOs in Poso, after the NGOs publicly named civil servants and legislators involved in corruption. Although these attacks did not provoke further violence or displacement – an indication of increasing confidence in the peacebuilding process – tensions remain, not least over the failure to bring those responsible for such attacks to justice.

On May 28 2005, two bombs exploded in a crowded market in the mainly Christian town of Tentena in Poso, killing 22 people and injuring more than 40 others. In the weeks following the explosions, police questioned 142 witnesses and detained dozens of suspects using anti-terrorism laws introduced after the Bali bombings. This in turn led to a demonstration by 1,500 members of the Ties of Faith and Muslim Community Struggle Forum (FSPUI) on June 10 against the police whom they felt were randomly arresting Muslim suspects in the wake of the Tentena bombing. Finally, after negotiations with the police, three men were released amidst much cheering from the crowd. Subsequently, all detainees were released due to lack of evidence and the police had to compensate two men whose accusations of police brutality were upheld by the local court.

Such incidents that point to questionable policing methods as well as a tendency to cave in to public pressure, have eroded public confidence in the local police from both Christian and Muslim communities. The police have failed thus far to find the motive of the Tentena bombing. Local NGOs and activists maintain that the bombing was intended to divert attention away from investigations into the embezzlement of IDP assistance funds. But Vice President Jusuf Kalla, the driving force behind the Malino peace process, believes that the bombings were committed by a terrorist group trying to destabilise the region. Once again, the bombings did not give rise to local retaliation due to the leadership demonstrated by both Muslim and Christian local leaders.

Another theory linked the bombings to forthcoming district head elections scheduled for June 30 2005. Indeed, on the eve of the district elections, there were minor explosions by small homemade bombs in various locations in Poso town. Unlike 1998 however, local communities did not react and the ballot itself proceeded smoothly and peacefully. The winning team backed by the Christian Peace and Prosperity Party comprised a Christian district head and Muslim deputy. Disappointed supporters of other candidates registered their protests through demonstrations but these protests did not lead to violence and were not confined to Poso – similar demonstrations accompanied local executive elections throughout Indonesia in 2005.

26.) International Crisis Group, Indonesia Backgrounder 2004 op. cit.
27.) Interviews conducted by Melina Nathan with community leaders and local NGOs in Poso between in January and May 2005.
29.) Ibid., 26-29.
The varied roots of violence in Central Sulawesi can be divided into structural causes and causes related to Indonesia’s political and economic transition beginning in 1997. As mentioned earlier in this report, there are some structural causes of conflict that are pervasive throughout Indonesia such as competition over resources, tensions related to migration, social inequalities and weak governance institutions. In addition, there are others related to the growing pains of a democratising and decentralising state and a changing economy. This section examines the causes of violence within the particular context of Central Sulawesi.

3. Causes of Conflict

3.1 Structural Causes

3.1.1 Inter-group horizontal inequalities have been identified as potential underlying sources of ethnic or religious conflict. Often, however, it appears to be not just levels of inequality but sudden changes in relative socio-economic inequalities that fuel communal violence.
As noted above, Christians had historically dominated the province, but data collected in 1990, well before the outbreak of conflict, presents a more complex picture. In the formal, urban economy, Christians dominated. Figure 1 demonstrates this graphically. Proportionately, 50 percent fewer Muslims completed senior high school in the province than Christians, and an even smaller number made it into the upper ranks of employment.

Particularly noticeable is the disparity in employment as government officials: almost 40 percent of government officials were Christian, who constituted only 21 percent of the adult population in 1990.

In rural areas, however, the main disparity was not between Christians and Muslims but between migrants and non-migrants. Table 2 shows the relative average landholdings of the agricultural population. While Christians as a whole had slightly larger landholdings than Muslims, the difference is negligible. Far more evident is the disparity between migrants, whose landholdings were, on average, 17 percent larger than non-migrants.

An examination of basic development indicators in Central Sulawesi reveals a reduction in disparities between Muslims and Christians (as indicated by indicator ratios between Protestants and Muslims, P/M, approaching 1 over time in Table 3). Received wisdom would predict that the broad-based reduction in socioeconomic inequalities should lead to lower probabilities of violence. However, the fact that violence occurred in Central Sulawesi despite improvements in these measures of inequality suggests that changes in social status (and social inequality) may be more important sources of the conflict than the degree of inequality itself.

A closer look at the data reveals that Protestant advantages in the measures for educational advantage (e.g., percentage of male secondary school graduates and reading easily) were reduced over the period from 1991 to 1997. Educational level is important to understanding the conflict situation in Central Sulawesi because, with an increase in relative educational attainment and a rising share of the population, Muslims are more able to compete

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**Table 2**

Relative Median Landholding of Agriculturalists by Religion and Migration Status, Central Sulawesi, 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-Migrant</th>
<th>Migrant</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>0.975</td>
<td>1.178</td>
<td>0.995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>1.012</td>
<td>1.147</td>
<td>1.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0.982</td>
<td>1.172</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures in bold represent higher than average. Source: 1990 Census sample.

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30.) There is considerable difficulty in obtaining religiously differentiated socioeconomic data (such as income) because of the government’s sensitivity to inequality. As such, this analysis relies on less direct means of measuring inequality between both groups through the use of DHS household surveys.

31.) The study of local violence between 1998 – 2002 in Luwu district, South Sulawesi draws similar conclusions about changes in social status being an important source of conflict in International Crisis Group, Managing Decentralisation, op.cit., 17-18.
with Protestants for highly coveted civil service positions that require minimum levels of education. Such a change has intensified competition for these jobs, which were traditionally dominated by Protestants.

At the same time, however, a metric that proxies for government-resource allocations (such as access to drinking water) has shown relative improvements for Protestants vis-à-vis Muslims. Similarly, a proxy for economic development (solid flooring material) shows Protestants gradually catching up to Muslims. While these measures point to mixed changes in inequality, they are not equal in weight. In the case of Central Sulawesi, the issue of changes in educational disparity is likely to be more central to the conflict because of the effect on competition for coveted civil society positions, which have a symbolic, political and economic importance. Moreover, Muslim gains in key governmental positions could be seen as a threat by many Protestants in Central Sulawesi as Muslims could displace Protestants from these positions. Meanwhile, Protestant gains in development are non-exclusive, meaning that improvements experienced by Protestants do not necessarily imply a worsening situation for Muslims.

In addition, migration, resulting from both the government-sponsored transmigration program and spontaneous migration, had shifted the demographic mix in Central Sulawesi by the end of the New Order regime. This migration, primarily consisting of Muslims from Java and other parts of Sulawesi, intensified competition over scarce economic resources such as land and lucrative government appointments. In Poso, the influx of migrants shifted the religious balance toward Muslims, adding to Protestant anxieties of political and economic marginalisation. Thus, the contestation of political office became symbolically important to Protestants, signalling their ability to avoid marginalisation.

In Central Sulawesi, a variety of social, political and economic factors have contributed to a hardening of identity divisions, the most salient of which are the Christian-Muslim and migrant-indigenous cleavages. Throughout the period of conflict, class and migrant-indigenous cleavages have become conflated with the lower common denominator of religion, enabling the greater mobilisation of individuals.\textsuperscript{32}

As is well developed elsewhere in this and other reports, Indonesia’s official transmigration program has been identified as contributing to tensions between migrant and indigenous groups. Demographic shifts from in-migration intensified competition for increasingly scarce resources, especially land and government positions. In addition to transmigration, smallholder export cash crops (especially cocoa) became more profitable, following the devaluation of the rupiah following the 1997 financial crisis.\textsuperscript{33} These new sources of wealth have benefitted migrants (who

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
 & \multicolumn{2}{c|}{1991} & \multicolumn{2}{c|}{1994} & \multicolumn{2}{c|}{1997} \\
 & P & M & P/M & P & M & P/M \\
\hline
Reads easily & 85\% & 77\% & 1.10 & 95\% & 87\% & 1.09 & 90\% & 87\% & 1.03 \\
Education (Female)- secondary or higher & 35\% & 23\% & 1.54 & 51\% & 33\% & 1.55 & 48\% & 36\% & 1.36 \\
Education (Male)- secondary or higher & 55\% & 34\% & 1.61 & 57\% & 42\% & 1.35 & 54\% & 45\% & 1.20 \\
Drinking water - piped or public tap & 12\% & 19\% & 0.62 & 16\% & 21\% & 0.74 & 20\% & 22\% & 0.91 \\
Electricity & 30\% & 29\% & 1.05 & 32\% & 45\% & 0.70 & 55\% & 57\% & 0.97 \\
Solid flooring material & 38\% & 48\% & 0.79 & 50\% & 58\% & 0.85 & 53\% & 64\% & 0.83 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Protestant-Muslim Socio-economic Disparities, Central Sulawesi, 1991-1997}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{32} The production of large-scale communal violence requires mobilizing large numbers of individuals. Such mobilisation entails the identification of an in-group with whom to collaborate and an out-group to attack. As such, identity is used instrumentally in the organisation of communal violence, which often serve a deeper purpose, such as the consolidation of power, wealth or social status. Identities defined by ethnicity, nationality, religion, class, gender and migrant status are used in the process of labeling members of an in-group and out-group and form the cleavages across which violence occurs.

are usually Muslim) and urban Chinese rather than the highlander Protestant groups. Furthermore, the scarcity of available land has left many Protestant (Pamona) youths without access to land resources, thus narrowing their employment opportunities to increasingly scarce civil service positions.35

An examination of provincial migration statistics reveals some important patterns. Central Sulawesi was a significant destination for Indonesia's migrants during the New Order and post-New Order regimes. Compared with the proportion of migrants nationwide of 10.1 percent, Central Sulawesi has a larger migrant population share with 18.4 percent (see Table 4).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>(%)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>(%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Sulawesi</td>
<td>297,880</td>
<td>74.1%</td>
<td>1,344,879</td>
<td>83.5%</td>
<td>1,642,759</td>
<td>81.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Province</td>
<td>104,245</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
<td>265,389</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>369,634</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The great majority of migrants into Central Sulawesi (71.8 percent) have settled in rural areas, drawn by transmigration programs. Others have been drawn spontaneously to rural areas by market forces, particularly export cash crops such as cocoa, clove and copra. Until the late 1990s, the district of Poso had a Protestant majority. By 2002, due to the massive influx of migrants, Muslims comprised 57 percent of Poso's population and Protestants comprised 40 percent.36 Because almost all the migrants were Muslim, the migrant/indigenous competition over resources was frequently reinterpreted as tensions between Muslims and Christians.

34.) International Crisis Group, Managing Decentralisation, op.cit. 9. In North Luwu district, South Sulawesi, predominantly migrant cocoa farmers saw prices for their crops increase overnight by 300 to 500 per cent and were able to buy motorcycles and build bigger houses much to the resentment of local farmers who were less successful.
35.) Aragon, 'Communal Violence in Poso', op. cit., 56.
36.) Badan Pusat Statistik (Poso), Kabupaten dalam Angka 2002.

3.1.3 Natural resource contestation

Competition over natural resources, especially land, has been cited by communities as well as scholars as a major source of tensions in Central Sulawesi.37 In contesting land resources, two clashing frameworks have been applied by migrant and indigenous communities and their advocates.

Migrants and often government officials base claims of legitimacy on Western legal concepts of property rights, while indigenous communities rely on concepts of indigenous, customary rights.

The 1960 Basic Agrarian Law recognizes adat concepts of land rights, but stipulates that the state maintains the ultimate rights to land and can appropriate it in the interests of the state.38 State interests, however, have sometimes been broadly interpreted, allowing the state to appropriate indigenous people's land for projects, including transmigration. Often fields left temporarily fallow by indigenous communities were reappropriated to transmigrants, creating additional foci of conflict.39 Since the fall of the New Order, however, civil society organisations have debated these issues more openly and have contested various interpretations of the 1960 agrarian law. The recognition of indigenous rights, particularly regarding the governance of local resources via customary law (adat), is a major demand by reformers.

Even the meaning of indigenous is being contested as the label itself increasingly carries the weight of post-colonial legitimacy when making claims to rights based on indigenous identity.40 The emphasis on indigenous claims has further added to the tensions between native and migrant groups in Central Sulawesi over the rights to land.

37.) T. Murray Li, op. cit. Similar comments were made by participants in the UNDP's PDA workshop in the province.
38.) Government of Indonesia, Undang-undang No. 5 Tahun 1960 tentang Peraturan Dasar Pokok-pokok Agraria.
The legitimization of both legal frameworks further reified the cleavages between indigenous and migrant groups as the indigenous groups referred to customary law, while migrants appealed to Western property rights. As most of the migrants were Muslim who moved into rural, often Protestant areas, competing frameworks to claim land further created tensions among the religious groups. As most of the migrants were Muslim who moved into rural, often Protestant areas, competing frameworks to claim land further created tensions among the religious groups. As most of the migrants were Muslim who moved into rural, often Protestant areas, competing frameworks to claim land further created tensions among the religious groups.

Throughout Indonesia, the lack of strong and just legal institutions has been cited as a major reason for the prevalence of vigilantism. The lack of effective legal institutions to police and adjudicate episodes of violence (however small or large) has contributed to the escalation of violence, as seen in Poso, where the two scuffles that set off the first and second phases of the conflict led to vigilantism that escalated the violence. Here, as elsewhere, the reliance on vigilantism as a means of seeking justice stemmed from disillusionment with legal institutions.

Access to legal means of resolving disputes has not been equitable and has been linked heavily to access to legal aid NGOs and to connections in local government. The legal system is perceived by many communities as corrupt, unreliable and lacking capacity and accountability. According to the World Bank, most villagers prefer to utilize informal institutions of dispute resolution, which they see as less socially disruptive, cheaper and more easily understood. Reliance on informal institutions for dispute resolution requires that opposing parties recognize the same process as legitimate. In the absence of a strong legal system to provide dispute resolution, differences over the legitimacy of a dispute-resolution process often leads the aggrieved side to attempt to settle things through vigilantism. Informal institutions also face difficulties in enforcing agreements when disputants violate dispute resolutions that can perpetuate the cycle of conflict.

Transparency and accountability as well as the capacity of government to provide services and respond to crises have been significant factors in conflict in Central Sulawesi. As noted earlier, competition over lucrative government positions is a cause of violence. Christian resentment due to their increasing marginalization in government was cited during PDA consultations in Central Sulawesi as a latent cause of future conflict. Suspicions of corrupt and nepotistic appointments abound due to the lack of transparency that characterizes the appointment process, and further intensify tensions.

The lack of transparency is accompanied by a lack of accountability of the government to its citizens. Civil society organisations have difficulty monitoring government expenditures because public documents are not easily accessible to the public. In addition, there are only a few advocacy NGOs, and they are often small and poorly funded. This makes it difficult to monitor government activities effectively, which contributes to the lack of government accountability. In addition, many NGOs were more preoccupied with peace-building and administering to the local community in the wake of the violence. Since 2004 however, as local communities increasingly turned their backs on violence, NGOs have focused their attention on the performance of local government in general and corruption in particular where they faced a bureaucracy unwilling to act against its own members. However, a change in police leadership in Poso in late 2004 as well as the new President of Indonesia's crackdown on corruption nationwide has led to the arrests of local officials who embezzled IDP funds.

Conversely, many in government distrust local NGOs, claiming that they were unwilling to work with the

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41.) The emergence of adat law in land management as a consequence of regional autonomy leading to more disputes over the status of land is addressed in International Crisis Group, Managing Decentralisation, op.cit., 29-30.
42.) Ibid., 18-20.
45.) Ibid., 28-29.
46.) Interviews conducted by Melina Nathan with local NGO LPS-HAM, Poso police chief and Poso Pesisir sub-district heads in January and May 2005.
government within the formal peace processes. While there is no direct evidence for a link between advocacy and responsiveness, it is striking that there is little local government programming in conflict preparedness in an environment of a weak civil society.

3.2 Proximate Causes

The Asian Financial Crisis, which hit Indonesia in 1997, helped spur the downfall of Soeharto’s New Order regime and fueled political reforms, the Reformasi era. These simultaneous economic and political transitions profoundly reordered various social structures in Central Sulawesi, creating opportunities and pitfalls, winners and losers. Intense struggles over these new opportunities have led to an exacerbation of old tensions as well as the creation of new conflicts. This section examines the causes of violent conflict related to economic and political transition in Central Sulawesi.

Prior to the Asian Financial Crisis, Central Sulawesi was already one of the poorest provinces in Indonesia. The income per capita of Central Sulawesi is IDR 4.5 million (US$450) substantially lower than the national per capita income of IDR 6.5 million (US $650).47 Doubts about the health of banking systems throughout Southeast Asia set off a financial crisis in Indonesia: the rupiah was devalued four fold, inflation skyrocketed and investment fled the nation. Millions fell below the poverty level, riots and protests spread across the country, ultimately undermining the Soeharto regime.

The crisis impacted some areas more than others. Central Sulawesi, already a poor province, was hit harder than most of the other provinces. The devaluation made imports much more expensive, setting off inflation, which reduced the consumption level of the population and dramatically increased poverty. Figure 2 shows the impact of the financial crisis on poverty (as defined by the Indonesian government) in Central Sulawesi and Indonesia.

While poverty increased throughout Indonesia by about 107 percent between 1996 and 1999, poverty soared by 251 percent in Central Sulawesi. Central Sulawesi recovered more quickly, however, with poverty levels falling by 45 percent in three years from 1999 to 2002, compared to the rest of Indonesia, where poverty fell by 22 percent.

During the crisis years, the struggle for resources became much more desperate, as more people, facing poverty, vied for government positions and economically productive resources such as land. In the Reformasi era, political expression was no longer repressed, and citizens articulated their grievances openly; at the same time, tight budgets further weakened government institutions, that might have worked to mitigate tensions.

The financial crisis indirectly spurred migration into Central Sulawesi and exacerbated tensions, as exports of cash crops such as cocoa suddenly became lucrative exports, thanks to the devaluation.48

Figure 2
Percentage of Population below Poverty Line, Central Sulawesi and Indonesia, 1996-2002

47.) Badan Pusat Statistik, Statistik Indonesia 2002.

3.2.2 Reformasi

The *reformasi* agenda is an ambitious attempt at reconstituting Indonesia's fundamental institutions of governance to achieve a more democratic republic. In principle, this agenda of democratisation is characterized by decentralisation, improving the capacities and services of government, and fostering greater transparency and accountability within the civil service and government. *Reformasi* is an agenda to reorder the institutions of governance and change the means of allocating the resources of government. This reordering is creating winners and losers at both the national and local levels. In local politics, various groups are competing for the new opportunities and are mobilising under the banners of clan, ethnicity and religion.

After the fall of Soeharto, a variety of regionalist agendas emerged. Prominent among these was the call for decentralisation of governance. The decentralisation of governance to the district level created new political opportunities that spawned dynamics hitherto unseen in Indonesia. In particular, decentralisation gave greater budgetary authority to the districts than they had previously, thus making political positions such as district head and district secretary extremely important in the distribution of government resources. The concomitant democratisation opened prominent positions to electoral contestation. These new political circumstances led to intense political competition and the use of various means of political mobilisation, including the use of religious and migrant cleavages.

Arrangements that, in the past, had helped to mitigate tensions related to the balance of religious representation in political offices eroded. In Poso, for instance, under an informal consociational power-sharing arrangement, if the district head (*bupati*) were a Protestant, the district secretary (*sekwilda*) would be a Muslim. However, by 1999, although the *bupati* was Muslim and *sekwilda* was Protestant, the assistant *bupati*, district assembly chair and mayor of Poso were all Muslims. Moreover, the 1990s saw a steady decline in the number of Christians in the top 50 prominent government positions from 54 percent in 1989 to 39 percent in 1999.49

There appears to be at least circumstantial support for a connection between the contestation of important political offices and violence. In particular, the first phase of rioting began soon after the Muslim *bupati* of Poso, announced that he would not seek re-election on 13 December 1998. Similarly, after a year and a half of relative peace, the second phase of rioting erupted prior to the selection of district secretary in April 2000. Predictions printed in a local newspaper of violence if one particular candidate were not chosen added to tensions. The selection of the new district secretary was closely preceded by the fourth phase of violence.50

Redrawing district boundaries (called *pemekaran*) became an accepted solution to competition over increased government resources. By dividing one district into two, local elites in both districts gained access to funds from the central government.51

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50.) Ibid.
The violence in Central Sulawesi has had an impact on the lives of thousands of people, most palpably in the terms of physical security: people died, were injured and those who survived lived in fear. Conflict has had a negative impact on the economy of Central Sulawesi, as well as a polarizing impact on the local political processes, social structures and culture.

4. Impacts of Conflict

4.1 Human Impacts

Conservative estimates, calculated by the United Nations Special Fund for Indonesian Recovery (UNSFIR), place the number of deaths due to the conflict in Central Sulawesi at around 700. The number of IDPs is estimated at over 110,000 people, mostly from Poso district. Numerous houses, places of worship and community facilities such as health posts and schools were destroyed. The UNSFIR data recorded over 500 houses, 500 shops and almost 200 public buildings – including schools and places of worship – destroyed in Central Sulawesi between 1998 and 2003.
Nonetheless, there have been reports of violence perpetrated by security forces. Some police and military forces have been charged with using excessive force and revenge attacks. There have been reports of rape by military and police personnel, especially in IDP camps, and resultant unwanted pregnancies, termed, respectively KORAMIL and SSB. KORAMIL (Korban Rayuan Militer) roughly translates as ‘the victims of military’s seduction’ and SSB (Sisa-Sisa Brimob) means ‘mobile brigadier’s leftovers’. Many of the women are further victimized, when their families and friends ostracize them for pre-marital pregnancies. This is one of the fundamental gender impacts of violence here and elsewhere in Indonesia and the world.

**Economic Impacts**

While the GRDP data for Central Sulawesi show an economic recovery from 1999 to 2002, these data conceal the impact of the violence on the economy in districts that have suffered the most: Poso and, to a lesser extent, Morowali and Tojo Una-Una.

An analysis of economic data from Poso district reveals a significant impact of violent conflict on economic output. By examining the growth trajectory of Poso and comparing it with the rest of Central Sulawesi as well as Indonesia, the impact of the conflict can be estimated. Figure 3 shows the normalized Gross Regional Domestic Product in 1993 prices, allowing comparisons across time and between geographical units. Central Sulawesi has recovered robustly, along with the Indonesian economy. In Poso, however, the economy began to recover in 1998, but from 1999 to 2000, the economy actually shrank, only recovering to the 1998 level in 2002. Since the structure of Poso’s economy is very similar to that of the rest of Central Sulawesi, it is very likely that Poso’s faltering economy is due to the negative impact of violent conflict.

53.) Ibid.
54.) E.T. Agustiana, Gender Thematic Assessment: Central Sulawesi (Jakarta: UNDP-CPRU, 2004).
55.) Huber, op. cit., 2; IC6, Jihad, 2004, op. cit.
57.) Agustiana, op. cit.
58.) There may also be a downward measurement error due to the difficulty in conducting surveys in violence-ridden areas.
Poso’s economy should have a growth rate similar to the rest of Central Sulawesi. From these data, it is possible to measure the impact of the conflict on the total output of Poso. Using a simple difference-in-difference formula, it can be estimated that, without the conflict, the Poso economy should have grown by an additional 16.1 percent from 1999 to 2001. In nominal 1999 terms, this is an impact of IDR 140 billion or roughly US$14 million. It is likely that future economic activity has also been affected as investors worry about future instability.

Beyond the aggregate economic impact of the conflict, qualitative assessments undertaken as part of the PDA process demonstrate a significant shift in the types of employment available.

Figure 3
Estimated Economic Loss due to Poso Conflict,
Indexed Gross (Regional) Domestic Product in 1993 Prices

120
115
110
105
100
95
90
85

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Poso Indonesia Central Sulawesi w/o Polo

The negative economic impact of the conflict is well known and often expressed by locals. Although poverty resulting from the conflict increases competition for political and economic resources, it also engenders war weariness. That is, many communities affected by the conflict have recognized the high socioeconomic costs of violence. This has been evident in the manifold bottom-up responses at reconciliation and conflict prevention that have emerged at the village level. At the UNDP’s Central Sulawesi PDA workshop, participants cited the resumption of normal economic activity as a priority.

The conflict has also created food insecurity for many families because men have been killed or lost their livelihoods. The threat of violence prevents men from going to certain locations, precluding them from employment. In addition, the violence has destroyed many businesses and uprooted many families from the land. Recent returnees have found their land infertile, due to being untended for as many as four years during the violence. These factors have lowered the overall income of families and have made them more vulnerable to food insecurity. Women have been forced to work as the primary breadwinner, commuting long distances through dangerous areas. Still responsible for most of the work at home, some of the women have suffered physically and psychologically, while others, paradoxically, have been empowered at home and in public.

Political Impacts

As indicated earlier, greater competition for governmental positions, a history of Protestant domination of the civil service, and Protestants’ fears of marginalisation all contributed to the emphasis on the religiously symbolic nature of government appointments. Thus, when government positions were being contested, religion became an obvious vehicle by which to mobilise support for certain candidates, as noted above. Civil service positions continue to be allocated with little transparency as vacancies are filled through in-house means. The lack of transparency does little to allay suspicions of unfair allocations of civil service positions.

For Protestants, the perception of political marginalisation was exacerbated by uneven criminal

59) Huber, op. cit.
prosecutions. Although Protestants and Muslims were involved in the violence in phases one and two, the blame fell largely on Protestants. Although the prosecution of the eight Protestant provocateurs was an important step toward achieving law and order, the lack of any prosecution of Muslim provocateurs further fueled Protestant fears of political marginalisation. Thus, local politics has been cast in a decidedly religious manner. Further evidence of this religious polarization is seen in the recent parliamentary Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (DPRD, Regional People's Representative Assembly) elections in which the Golkar party, having dominated politics for many years in Poso, has fewer seats than the Christian Party.

As described earlier in this report, decentralisation has raised the stakes of district-level political and administrative positions, creating increased competition. In addition to increased competition, decentralisation has had an impact on the administrative units of governance. In an attempt to avoid conflict, new districts have been created through a process known as pemekaran. Whereas previously two groups would compete for positions in one district government, splitting districts allowed for both groups to have their own district government and therefore access to funding from the central government.

Although creating new districts was seen as a way to allow two competing groups to win, there are significant drawbacks to the process. Gerrymandering new districts along religious lines has created more homogeneous districts and has disrupted key demographics such as the size of minority populations. New minorities may be created within a district, which could stoke resentment among groups that used to form a majority. In addition, new districts lead to a dilution of government capacity, as entirely new administrations must be created from the same scarce pool of skilled human resources. This inhibits the government's ability to provide security and to respond to crises. In 1999, a new district called Morowali was split off from Poso district. Following the violence, groups gravitated to co-religionists so that Poso had a large Christian majority while Morowali had a greater share of Muslims. In 2003, Tojo Una-Una was split from Poso district and plans are being floated for an entirely new province of East Sulawesi. As Figure 4 shows, Tojo Una-Una was formed from the eight subdistricts of Poso with the highest concentration of Muslims (indicated by the lighter colors on the map).

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Subdistricts numbered 10 to 17 were formerly part of Poso District until the district of Tojo Una-Una was created. Before the Poso District was split, the population breakdown in 2002 was 57.2 percent Muslim, 40.2 percent Protestant and 2.6 percent of other religions. Created

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62.) Aragon, Communal Violence in Poso', op. cit., 63.
63.) Shetifan, op. cit., 7.
64.) Huber, op. cit.
out of the eight subdistricts with the largest Muslim concentrations, Tojo Una Una had a Muslim population comprising 89.9 percent of the total population, with Protestants accounting for only 9.6 percent. Poso District changed from a district with a majority of Muslims to a district in which Protestants account for 62.8 percent of the population, Muslims 33.2 percent and 4.1 percent from other religions. The change has led to heightened expectations among Christians that the next bupati to be elected will be a Christian, unlike the past, when bupatis were Muslim. It is feared that such expectations, if unmet, may spark violence.65 In the event on 30 June 2005, a Christian bupati and Muslim deputy backed by the Christian Peace and Prosperity party won the elections demonstrating that even religiously dominant political parties recognise the necessity of power-sharing to increase social cohesion.

Pemekaran has not been confined to district splitting. In October 2004, Poso Pesisir sub-district which has experienced the worst violence was further sub-divided into three sub-districts: Poso Pesisir, North Poso Pesisir and South Poso Pesisir resulting in different ethnic balances. The original Poso Pesisir had marginally more Christians than Muslims, although unevenly distributed. After pemekaran, in North Poso Pesisir, Balinese Hindu transmigrants are a significant group together with Muslims and Christians; in South Poso Pesisir, deeper in the hinterland, Christians account for 80 percent of the population whilst the new Poso Pesisir has marginally more Muslims. Whilst more efficient delivery of local services is the official reason given for this administrative splitting, local communities have also welcomed this as an opportunity for greater power-sharing between the communities.66 In North Poso Pesisir, the Muslim sub-district head shares power with a Balinese sub-district secretary; in South Poso Pesisir, the Christian sub-district head works with a Muslim sub-district secretary and in

4.4 Social Impacts

The violence in Central Sulawesi has had diverse social effects on inter-group relations, gender relations and the provision of education and health services.

Prior to the conflict, there were significant daily interactions between Protestants and Muslims who often lived in the same neighborhoods. As the conflict progressed, however, those living in religiously heterogeneous neighborhoods felt increasingly insecure. As in other cases of communal and ethnic violence, a process of segregation began taking place in which internally displaced Muslims moved to areas with a Muslim majority, while internally displaced Christians resettled in predominately Christian areas.67

The murders of Christian Pamona in Saatu and Pinedapa on 12 October 2003 reignited fears and undermined trust and efforts at reconciliation. Future sources of social cohesion have also been eroded as the geographic and social segmenting of society has left schools more homogeneous than before.68

The conflict in Central Sulawesi has affected men and women differently. During the course of violent conflict, gender roles tend to change. Combatants in violent conflict are overwhelmingly men, and as a result, most research has focused on the role of men in conflict and peace, ignoring the significant role of women. To better understand violent conflict, the interaction between gender and violence must be examined.

A key finding of the UNDP Gender Thematic Assessment, conducted in Central Sulawesi in 2004, is that the role of women shifts—economically, politically and socially—from domestic spaces to public spaces, economically, politically and socially. This shift is manifested in the economic

65.) Shetifan, op. cit., 14.
66.) Interviews with community members, leaders, NGOs and sub-district heads in all three sub-districts conducted by Melina Nathan in January 2005.
67.) Huber, op. cit.
68.) Ibid.
opportunities available to men and women. The violence has forced many farmers to avoid working alone or after dusk, and has limited the geographic areas accessible by men. While physical risks have also limited the mobility of women, the assessment has found that women have retained more freedom of movement than men. This has limited the economic opportunities for men and increased them for women. The structural shifts in the gendered nature of the economy have naturally had an impact within the household. In particular, many women have assumed the role of breadwinner, traditionally associated with men. This has had the dual effects of putting more strain on women (as they perform both domestic and external work) as well as giving them greater decision-making power within the household and the community.

There is some evidence that the increased prominence of women in the economy and the greater limitations on men to access public spaces have made women more central in the decision-making processes within households and within communities. In the public realm, increasing numbers of village heads and village council members are women.

Despite their increased prominence in local economies and politics, women still are absent from certain key roles. Women, who are often involved in informal peacebuilding processes are seldom involved in formal processes. The Malino negotiations were dominated by male religious and political leaders, with only one female participating.

Violent conflict disrupts the institutions that enable communities to achieve improvements in human development, particularly in the health and education sectors. Such disruptions impact human security, as conflict-affected communities are rendered more vulnerable to disease and unemployment.

This has been particularly true in Central Sulawesi, where many health facilities were destroyed. Even in areas where health facilities still exist physically, services such as the government health centers program, have been available only sporadically.

Violence has displaced many health workers, curtailling the provision of health services. Most of the functional health facilities are located in urban areas such as Poso City and Tentena, while facilities in rural areas have been shut down. Violence has created additional health risks: in refugee camps, IDPs cope with poor water and sanitation, and youths—bored and frightened—often engage in risky sexual behavior. Many of the IDP-related health risks are likely to persist until IDPs are fully resettled or repatriated into communities with more permanent social infrastructures and sustainable sources of income.

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4.4.3 Health and education impacts

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69.) Agustiana, op. cit.
70.) Ibid.
71.) Ibid.
72.) Agustiana, op. cit.
73.) Ibid.
74.) Ibid.
The lack of education is likely to have long-term impacts on human security in the region. In the future, under-educated children will be precluded from high paying jobs, and therefore will be more vulnerable to human security threats related to poverty. Furthermore, schools provide a setting in which children of diverse backgrounds can learn to coexist and forge bonds of social cohesion. Combined with the religious segregation resulting from the violence, lower school attendance is leading to fewer spaces for positive inter-group interaction among young people.75

5. Peace: Responses and Peace-building Initiatives

5.1 The Malino Declaration

The four phases of violence that spanned the period from December 1998 until the Malino Declaration in December 2001 were met mainly by security and recovery responses oriented toward stopping the conflict and mitigating its effects. Government deployed security personnel and provided emergency humanitarian services such as shelter and food. International NGOs, agencies and donors also poured in significant resources toward the provision of humanitarian services (see Appendix 2 for indicative programs).

Following the Malino Declaration (see Appendix 1), several working groups (Pokja Malino) were established to ensure the implementation of various aspects of the accords. At the provincial level, an umbrella Pokja Malino, based in Palu, is made of representatives from throughout the province. At the district level, several sectoral working groups focus on key concerns highlighted in the Malino conference such as economic development and security.

75.) Huber, op. cit., 6-7.
The Pokja Malino groups consist of government, civil society, intellectual and religious leaders, as well as experts in relevant fields. In theory, these working groups were charged with helping the government to implement the 10 points of the Malino Declaration and to socialize the communities involved. In practice, the PDA consultations found that the Pokja Malino groups have achieved very little in concrete terms, despite their significant mandate. The working groups have suffered from a lack of resources; many members, who have full-time jobs, have devoted little time to Malino-related activities.

Lacking resources, the working groups, which are mandated as monitoring bodies that could act as bridges between the government and civil society, have not yet been effective.76

5.2 The Current Situation
Following the Malino Declaration, there has been intermittent, low-level violence, including small bombs and shootings. This relatively more stable fifth phase has permitted a gradual shift from efforts to stop the violence to building peace. Increasingly, emphasis has been placed on sustainable, long-term strategies, as communities have prioritized economic development and reconciliation.

5.2.1 Security
Currently there are more than two thousand security personnel on active duty in Central Sulawesi.77 The mobile police (Brimob) have taken a much more visible role than the military in the maintenance of security in the province. The link between security forces and peaceful conditions is clear. During the second phase of violence from April to May 2000, Brimob forces were withdrawn after being accused of excessive force. This was immediately followed by an escalation of violence, which was only halted by the deployment of 600 soldiers from Makassar. During the third phase from May to July 2000, heavy fighting was only brought under control by the deployment of 1,500 additional soldiers and several tanks and additional Brimob forces.78 Furthermore, during the lead-up to the Malino Declaration, the joint military-police Security Restoration Operation (Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan) was deployed to stop the violence, expel outsiders and help with rehabilitation. The operation successfully quelled any escalation of violence. The continued presence of large numbers of security personnel has prevented the resurgence of pitched battles. Although there have been some accusations by NGOs and activists of military and police involvement in stimulating the violence, there has been little direct evidence of such links.79

While the military and police have been instrumental in maintaining broader conditions of security and stability, some residents of conflict-affected areas have expressed concerns about the lack of discipline and professionalism of security forces. In particular, reports of sexual assault and harassment committed by security personnel in IDP camps came to light in focus group discussions by the Gender Thematic Assessment Team. The phenomenon of Koramil has emerged after short relationships with military forces, single mothers are left behind with their infants. In response, plans have been made to phase down the presence of military and police and move towards greater reliance on community-based security.

5.2.2 Recovery
Satkorlak (Satuan Koordinasi Pelaksanaan Penanggulangan Bencana, Provincial Disaster Management Coordination Body) and Satlak (Satuan Pelaksanaan Penanggulangan Bencana dan Pengungsii, Disaster and Refugee Management Body) are the Provincial and District Coordinating Bodies for Disaster and IDP Management, respectively. They are charged with handling humanitarian emergencies and coordinating rapid responses to crises.80 Most of their activities have been reactive, responding to conflicts as they occur. Although there has been some interest in promoting rapid response preparedness and

76) Interview, Owais Parray, August 2004.
78) Ibid., 16-19.
79) ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, ibid., 23.
away from strictly humanitarian intervention to long-term economic recovery and development for conflict-affected communities. It is hoped that these groups will eventually evolve into village cooperatives.

The World Bank’s Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) has provided IDR 16.75 billion (US$1.7 million) to the poorest subdistricts in Poso, Morowali and Tojo Una-Una for participatory community development projects. Villages submitted proposals for projects ranging from roads and water systems to seed money for small businesses. While the project has been very popular among communities, it targets poverty and does not set out to be a peace-building programme. To respond to conflicts, the World Bank will launch a community development program specifically for conflict-affected areas, called Support for Poor and Disadvantaged Areas (SPADA), with plans for implementation in late 2005. The program will complement the KDP projects in Poso, Tojo Una-Una, Morowali, Palu and Luwuk districts. These block grants, dispersed in addition to the KDP grants, are earmarked for all subdistricts in these five districts.

From the international NGO sector, Mercy Corps has been active in stimulating economic development through microfinance schemes, skills training and the provision of seeds, tools and equipment. Mercy Corps has funded 26 projects related to economic development, reaching 14,457 beneficiaries.

Reconciliation

A number of reconciliation efforts have been made. The first occurred in August 2000, following the third phase of violence. President Abdurrahman Wahid tried to effect reconciliation between Christian and Muslim communities through a traditional adat ceremony, in which leaders witnessed the burial of a buffalo head. Critics claimed the ceremony was pro-forma and top-down, with little resonance in the warring communities.

The most prominent attempt was the Malino Declaration in December 2001, which brought factions together
in an officially sanctioned process to outline the basis for reconciliation. While some participants in the PDA consultation criticized the Malino peace accords as top-down, there were attempts at broad representation among the communities, as well as follow-up on the accords.

A number of ad hoc activities to promote reconciliation have been carried by non-governmental groups such as RKP (Kelompok Kerja Resolusi Konflik Poso, Poso Conflict Resolution Working Group), LPS-HAM (Lembaga Pengembangan Studi Hak Asasi Manusia, Human Rights Development Study Institute), NGOs funded by Mercy Corps, and CBOs through social events such as music concerts and sports events. Pokja RKP has created peacebuilding projects, including a community dialogue between Christians and Muslims and a monthly magazine, Baruga, which offers information and perspectives on peacebuilding. LPS-HAM has facilitated peacebuilding and pioneered economic recovery activities bridging both communities. It has also been intensively involved in conflict sensitive analysis community programmes where communities are educated about the structural and proximate causes of conflict as well as sensitised to the instrumental use of religion and violence by local elites.

The Central Sulawesi Sinode, the governing body of the Central Sulawesi Christian Church, and Al-Khairat, a Muslim education and community organisation, have worked together on peacebuilding activities among youths and are now expanding their activities groups in the community. A dialogue in early 2004 was attended by approximately 2,000 young people from the Tentena Christian community and Islam ToPoso (indigenous Muslims who share the same ancestry as the Tentena Christian community). Four rounds of inter-communal dialogues alternating between Tentena and Poso took place in 2004 alone, spawning other inter-communal youth activities and groups.

In Poso Pesisir, all villages responded to the socialisation efforts of the Malino working groups by creating Forum Komunikasi Antar Umat Beragama (FKAUB, Interfaith Communication Forum) bringing together Christians and Muslims in mixed villages. They agreed to repel all outside intervention, even if it came in the form of “help” for one side. In this way, the people prevented outsiders from importing violence into their village.82

A similar cross-religious alliance to prevent provocations was arranged in Matako by Malei-Tojo and Malei-Lage villages. Various inter-religious associational ties, especially in the form of farmer’s groups (kelompok tani), public projects (kerja bhakti), nighttime patrols (ronda) and schools, have strengthen trust so that there is no religious segregation and intra-community religious violence has not occurred.

A local military officer attempted to replicate the FKAUB model in other areas. Unfortunately, this top-down approach was less effective at stopping the spread of violence; the model appears to require buy-in by local communities to be effective.

As mentioned previously, the up-coming bupati and deputy bupati elections in Poso in June 2005 were identified by PDA consultations in 2004 as potential sources of conflict. In the event, in spite of the Tentena bombings in May and small explosions from homemade bombs on the eve of the elections, there was no violence and the local community and political parties demonstrated their commitment to peace and power-sharing, significantly lowering the risk of election-related violence. All five candidates running for bupati paired themselves with a deputy from the other main religion, in other words a Muslim bupati candidate is running with a Christian deputy, and vice versa. This formula indicates understanding on the part of local elites that religious reconciliation is vital and, in the short term is an important step toward normalization of the political process. How long this power-sharing formula will last remains to be seen.

82) Huber, op. cit.
5.3 Lessons learned
Since the beginning of violence in Central Sulawesi in December 1998, there have been many governmental and non-governmental responses to mitigate and end the conflict. By discussing lessons learned from key peace-building interventions, participants of the PDA Workshop identified a range of factors that contribute to success or failure of peace efforts, especially concerning the handling of IDPs and the implementation of the Malino Declaration. In addition to lessons learned that have been identified by the PDA Workshop, other lessons have been identified in the analysis of this report. These can be used to inform future interventions.

Key findings from the workshop consultation are presented in Table 5.

5.3.1 Participation
The participation of various stakeholders in the provision of aid resulted in some degree of success. However, where aid was provided only to one particular community, this led to jealousies, which created new tensions between communities. In some cases aid was provided without proper assessment of community needs. While there has been improvement in the coordination processes among actors such as donors, government, and local and international NGOs over the past two years, this has only taken place in the planning stage of programs; there seems to be little coordination during implementation.

5.3.2 Continuity
Peace-building efforts in Central Sulawesi have lacked continuity and are generally carried out in an ad hoc manner. Donors, including the central government, have funded events rather than processes that evolve over time. Standing alone, these events/activities have facilitated interaction between the two communities. However, building on past events is likely to lead to more effective peacebuilding initiatives.

The recovery from violence and the financial crisis has been aided by the infusion of government and donor funding into various peace and development projects. A

Table 5
Findings of PDA Consultation, Central Sulawesi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peace-building Intervention</th>
<th>Factors contributing to success</th>
<th>Factors contributing to failure</th>
<th>Recommendations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Handling of IDPs</td>
<td>• The willingness and awareness of IDPs to improve their lives</td>
<td>• Use of incorrect and invalid data</td>
<td>• Improve system of data collection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provision of land by the government for IDPs</td>
<td>• Misdistribution and misappropriation of aid</td>
<td>• Improve coordination in the implementation of programs and in the distribution of aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Coordination between stakeholders</td>
<td>• Limited aid that did not reach all IDPs</td>
<td>• Involve IDPs in the planning and the distribution of aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provision of start-up capital, tools and training by government, NGOs and communities</td>
<td>• Overlaps in aid received by IDPs</td>
<td>• Rebuild infrastructure to meet the needs of IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Financial support from government and NGOs</td>
<td>• No guarantees of security</td>
<td>• Provide soft loans for IDPs to build houses on their land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Increased feelings of security among IDPs</td>
<td>• IDPs were not consulted regarding relocation plans</td>
<td>• Job creation and support for economic institutions, which are managed by the communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malino Process</td>
<td>• Served as an entry point for peace</td>
<td>• Not adequately participatory, only involved elite groups</td>
<td>• Intensive socialization of Malino Declaration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• All levels of government were involved – central, provincial and district</td>
<td>• Lack of socialization of process</td>
<td>• Improved and increased support from government (at all levels, from central to sub-district)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The formation of Malino Working groups at provincial and district levels</td>
<td>• Limited funding from government to implement the Malino Declaration</td>
<td>• Utilizing different approaches to involve groups that show resistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Communities were open to accept the points of the Malino Declaration</td>
<td>• Lack of funds from government to support working groups</td>
<td>• Ensure involvement of all stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Coordination</td>
<td>• Resistance from certain groups</td>
<td>• Establish an official media information centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• IDPs return home as peace is restored</td>
<td>• Uneven distribution of humanitarian aid</td>
<td>• Increase transparency of distribution of aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Nurturing trust between communities</td>
<td>• Lack of transparency in distribution of aid</td>
<td>• Improve standards of law enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Public awareness of conflict</td>
<td>• No security guarantees for IDPs</td>
<td>• Improve the system for dealing with IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Government support</td>
<td>• Lack of coordination among actors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Involvement of international and national NGOs</td>
<td>• Unclear division of tasks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Overlapping of beneficiaries receiving assistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• No evaluation of the Malino Declaration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
substantial number of organisations and networks have been established to respond to conflict and development issues in Central Sulawesi as well as to capture and distribute funds. Rather than diluting organisational capacities with redundant organisations, the best way to coordinate the distribution and use of these funds would be through building capacities of effective existing organisations. Emphasizing continuity in institutions that respond to conflict and build peace helps establish the expectation of a peaceful future.

5.3.3 Pokja Malino, the government-sponsored peace mechanisms established at district levels have demonstrated the limitations of relying on individuals with full-time commitments other than peace-building. Such bodies may be better suited to advocacy roles rather than the direct provision of services. Partly due to the lack of resources, concerns were raised during the PDA consultation about the Pokjas’ ability to monitor the conditions of the Malino Declaration.

Although vocational training was provided, few resources were provided, resulting in people with new skills but no means to put them to use (i.e. sewing training without the provision of sewing machines).

The on-going P4K/UNTAD (Research Centre on Peace and Conflict, Tadulako University) peace initiative has brought combatants from Muslim and Christian communities together to engage in dialogue. By the end of the meeting, the participants agreed that the conflict was not religious, but that religion was used as a vehicle for the two groups to clash. The two groups decided to conduct a follow-up meeting and undertake visits to each other’s communities. They also agreed they would jointly organise a social work camp but funding became an obstacle. Members of the communities are still visiting each other and are in constant communication.

A significant number of nongovernmental organisations and informal community-based groups has formed in response to the conflict in Central Sulawesi. Although many lack technical capacity and resources, they are rich in connections to the communities they serve. These deep community connections are essential assets in facilitating community reconciliation, an area that is beyond the reach of outside international NGOs and multilateral organisations.

Responses by local NGO and civil society organisations (CSO) have been mixed. The proliferation of local NGOs has come with the flood of donor monies into Central Sulawesi. The lack of strong capacity as well as opportunism has led government and communities to view NGOs as ineffective. More trust is placed in the community-based CSOs, which are perceived to be more willing to participate in formal peace processes. The CSOs that are most directly involved in local communities and are truly bottom-up tend to be more sustainable and robust. The FKAUB in Tambarana village, Poso Pesisir sub-district, which prevented outside militias from entering the village, is a positive case in point. Top-down attempts to replicate the FKAUB in other places have been unsuccessful.

International actors, the government and civil society organisations have different comparative advantages that suit different types of interventions. For example, bottom-up responses by local civil society organisations are appropriate for reconciliation and social cohesion exercises, since they require genuine buy-in from key local actors. Top-down attempts at reconciliation (such as the FKAUB transplants and the neo-traditional peace ceremony attended by President Wahid) have been unsuccessful, while organic, bottom-up attempts have been robust.

The Malino Declaration, which many see a top-down process, is partially credited with ending pitched battles between the two communities. However, top-down reconciliation projects may actually crowd out earnest, bottom-up attempts. Supporting such projects with outside funding may introduce individual, monetary incentives, which may complicate sustainable and deep reconciliation and social cohesion.
Coordination can be important in the provision of certain services, where duplication is wasteful or counterproductive. For example, IDP assistance and agricultural supplies were sometimes provided in duplicate; closer coordination could have enhanced effectiveness of the programs.

5.4 Relevance of Responses

During the UNDP Peace and Development Analysis Workshop in Palu 12 through 15 July 2004, a broad cross-section of Central Sulawesi's key stakeholders identified causes of conflict and their priorities to avoid conflict. The following are the most cited:

1. Economic development
2. Effective law enforcement and access to justice
3. Empowerment of civil society and DPRD in policy making and conflict management
4. Return and proper handling of IDPs
5. Peace education
6. Women's roles in peace-building
7. Role of media in conflict
8. Natural resource management

Such consultations with communities provide useful insights into the relevance and effectiveness of responses to conflict. In their priorities, key stakeholders from the affected communities focused on long-term issues, such as economic development. The government and donors seem to be in line with these priorities, as they have begun to shift from humanitarian and recovery programs to economic development projects.

Although the need remains, the government and donors have shifted some resources away from infrastructure recovery towards more long-term strategies. Indicative of this shift is the move away from simply providing housing for IDPs to supporting the Kelompok program, which helps groups of families to pool resources to stimulate economic activities. The emphasis is on creating sustainable livelihoods rather than simply maintaining a minimum level of nutrition and food security.

The priority of effective law enforcement and access to justice has mixed results. Although recently security forces have been effective in preventing large escalations of violence, they have been unable to prevent the sporadic and targeted violence that has marked the post-Malino phase. Investigations of violence have yielded mixed results: the prosecutions in the October 2003 killings have not been followed by further breakthroughs in spite of continued attacks and acts of terror up to the present. Local communities are more angered by police failure and a lack of professionalism than they are by the perpetrators.

The violence has underscored the importance of good governance as a means of preventing conflict and has rendered the current period an opportune moment to introduce important changes in governance institutions. Lack of transparency in civil society appointments has been identified as a key factor in fueling violence, as has the government's unresponsiveness and the lack of preparedness for violence. However, there have been no significant reforms in these areas of governance. No crisis strategies have been planned.

Government and non-governmental actors have yet to fully respond to the third priority of the key stakeholders: the empowerment of civil society and responsive government in conflict management. Few programs are set up to assist the government and communities in conflict preparedness and other practical conflict prevention work. Given the possibility of future violence (despite the recent improvement in security), this is a significant need left unaddressed. Without conflict prevention work, responses to conflict remain reactive rather than proactively oriented toward peace-building.

83) Interviews with local community members, leaders, NGOs and local government officials conducted by Melina Nation in May 2005.
84) The restoration of the social and economic situation to what it was prior to the violence may be a misguided goal. Rather, responses that take into account the changed situation and that take advantage of the post-conflict context may help prevent a recurrence of violence.
Obstacles to Peace

In the Central Sulawesi Provincial PDA workshop, key stakeholders from the government and civil society were consulted on their perceptions of the political, economic, social and security-related obstacles to peace. Here, obstacles to peace refer to the immediate hurdles to obtaining peace and fostering an environment of cooperation. The points listed by the participants as the most vulnerable areas of the current peace are cataloged in Table 6.
According to the consultation, the most pressing obstacle to peace is the issue of internally displaced persons. This issue affects the political, economic, social and security aspects of achieving a sustainable peace. Without lasting solutions for repatriating, resettling and integrating IDPs back into the economic and social fabric of Central Sulawesi, the IDP issue will continue to be a source of tension, with significant potential for undermining peace. Further, the widespread perception that IDP funds are being improperly handled is undermining trust of the government, while hindering IDP repatriation efforts.85

The consultation also revealed that the violence and responses to the violence have caused significant distrust between communities and of the government. In particular, the religious violence that has wracked the region has polarized social interactions so that little trust remains with which to build cooperative relations. The government’s inability or unwillingness to follow up on the 10 points of the Malino Declaration has increased skepticism. Furthermore, although security has greatly improved, the ongoing occurrence of incidents of violence have raised questions about the professionalism of the police.

Finally, the lack of sufficient job opportunities has been identified as a major obstacle to keeping the peace. Without such jobs, communities lack the resources to recover from the violence and youths are much easier to recruit for violence.

The analysis in this report points to additional obstacles to peace. Ongoing provocative targeted attacks, bombings and killings, including the recent bombings in Tentena, have fostered a climate of continued tension. War-weary communities are still jittery, and the ongoing violence has thwarted any sense of security. Although pitched battles have been successfully stopped, the ongoing terrorization of communities has hindered the resumption of everyday activities. While many outsiders who travelled to Central

85.) Huber, op. cit., 5.
Sulawesi to engage in violence have left, others remain, undermining attempts at building trust between Christian and Muslim communities. In some areas, support among local communities for militants remains strong. In particular, thousands of Muslims attended the funeral procession of one of the alleged perpetrators of the October 2003 attacks and approximately 1,000 Muslims marched in protest of the arrest of a Mujahidin KOMPAK member implicated in the same attacks. A similar protest by over a thousand Muslims occurred in response to the detention of dozens of Muslims by the police in the wake of the Tentena bombing. In this case however, the protest was more against questionable policing than a show of solidarity for militants. Needless to say, such incidents only polarise both communities with Christians believing that attacks against Christians are not being taken seriously whilst Muslims feel that members of their community are being made scapegoats.

The liberalization of the media by President Wahid allowed many new media outlets to come into existence. The increase in media outlets led to diluted capacity and poorer journalistic standards. While international actors and the two journalist organisations have attempted building capacity, many members of media lack professional training. This lack of professionalism has led to biased or inflammatory news reporting. Professional standards are often not known, leading to unverified reporting, which propagates rumors. In addition to poor training, professional standards suffer from low salaries, leading many reporters to accept bribes for favorable reporting (called envelope reporting). Poor funding has also led to sensationalist reporting instead of balanced reporting in order to carve a partisan niche, sell more newspapers and attract more advertisers. Good reporting is expensive, and sometimes it is dangerous or troublesome to obtain perspectives from multiple sides to a story. Consequently, many journalists gave one-sided accounts.

Some improvements have been made since 2002, however reporting related to crime stories continues to be potentially inflammatory and might trigger violence.

6.2 Vulnerabilities and Capacities

In addition to the immediate obstacles to peace, it is necessary to identify key vulnerabilities of and capacities for peace. Vulnerabilities are the longer-term factors that may exacerbate tensions or trigger future conflict. Capacities are those social factors that represent assets that could be leveraged for building cooperation and sustainable peace.

6.2.1 Vulnerabilities

The low levels of violence since the Malino Declaration belie the vulnerabilities of the recent peace. Identifying these vulnerabilities is crucial in preventing a recurrence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 7</th>
<th>Peace Vulnerabilities identified at PDA Workshop</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vulnerabilities</strong></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| **Unresolved issues** | • Competition between Luwuk and Poso to become the capital of the proposed new province of East Sulawesi. There are concerns that if Poso is not named the capital, new conflicts may be triggered.  
• Future bupati elections may trigger new conflicts. The Christian community supports one candidate, while the Muslim community supports another. Should this process not be managed properly new conflicts may be triggered.  
• Unemployment and widespread poverty, socio-economic gap and limited access to resources could lead to provocation and conflict.  
• Improper planning is seen as contributing to social jealousies and misappropriation of aid and resources. |
| **Sectoral and relational issues** | • Poor coordination and lack of leadership within government leads to unclear and ill-defined roles in peace efforts.  
• Lack of transparency in conflict and IDP management policies.  
• Lack of public participation in peace efforts.  
• Unfocussed IDP management.  
• Lack of attention to civil rights issues.  
• Lack of law enforcement and security guarantees.  
• Limited access to information on the implementation of peace agreements.  
• Lack of trust between public and government. |

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87.) Interviews conducted by Melina Nathan with local community members, leaders and NGOs in June 2005.  
of large-scale violence in Central Sulawesi. In the PDA Workshop in Palu, key stakeholders identified several vulnerabilities to peace, including IDP policies, security and law enforcement and public distrust of government (Table 7).

Workshop participants also expressed fears that the creation of a new province of East Sulawesi supported by local elites in Poso city will spark competition. This new province would consist of Poso, Morowali and Tojo Una-Una districts, and there are already tensions surrounding the designation of the provincial capital. Some advocate Poso City and others have voiced support for the capital to be located in Luwuk in the eastern part of Banggai. The city that becomes the provincial capital will have access to many new government resources.

Changes in the religious demographics resulting from redistricting (Morowali and Tojo Una-Una) and internal displacement have created new risks to, and opportunities for, future peace. In particular, the shifting demographics have changed expectations of religious representation in prominent political positions. For instance, Protestants, formerly the minority in Poso district, are now the majority. Expectations are high for a Protestant to win the upcoming direct election for bupati in 2005. Combined with the past correlation of violence with contestation over political positions, these expectations pose a prominent risk. The recent victory of the new sectarian party, the Peace and ProsperityParty over the secular and traditionally powerful Golkar party in parliament provides evidence for the rise of religious-based political mobilisation.89

It is unclear whether the demographic shifts in Central Sulawesi caused by displaced persons will foster or inhibit violence. Since the violence began in 1998, a process of religious segregation has resulted in more homogenous populations. Such segregation may reduce the number of isolated pockets of religious groups, making attacks on such groups less likely. On the other hand, segregated communities inhibit meaningful cross-religious social interactions. Such interactions may improve the robustness of communities to prevent communal violence. While religiously-defined politics characterise Poso at present, this has been accompanied by an awareness of the importance of power-sharing if peace is to endure. Significantly, in the 2005 direct bupati elections, the dominant Christian Peace and Prosperity party backed a Christian-Muslim team and did not push for an all-Christian slate.

Problems of social cohesion may be exacerbated by improperly managed development strategies. In particular, widespread poverty and inequality foster unstable social conditions. Without programs to reduce poverty, high unemployment rates will continue to provide dissatisfied pools of youths from which provocateurs can recruit individuals for violent political mobilisation. Furthermore, development policies that reinforce inequalities and differences among communities risk exacerbating social jealousies among groups, especially between migrants and indigenous groups and between Christians and Muslims. Development policies that are not sensitive to these dynamics pose a long-term vulnerability to sustainable peace.

The PDA workshop consultation revealed the following areas that could contribute to achieving a lasting peace (Table 8).

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89. Shetifan, op. cit., 7.

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Table 8
Peace Capacities identified at PDA Workshop, Central Sulawesi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capacities</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Strengthened awareness and increased public participation in the management of conflict and IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Increased trust between communities, including the blaming of outside ‘provocateurs’ for the violence, rather than each other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Multi-stakeholder involvement in conflict and IDP management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Government and public roles in stopping violence and mitigation of conflict towards peace.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While the human, social and economic tolls of the conflict have been profound, violence has produced significant conflict fatigue. This has become a significant asset for the promotion of peace and cooperation. Suspicions that outside provocateurs have been driving the violence have prevented violent reactions to recent targeted, religious-based violence. Even following the October 2003 killings of Christians, the reaction by Christians was measured. Community leaders encouraged calm rather than retaliation against unknown perpetrators. This prevented the outbreak of large-scale communal violence and allowed police to investigate the crimes. While there continues to be distrust between Christian and Muslim communities, there is limited trust and a shared understanding that outside provocateurs are behind the recent bouts of low-intensity violence.90

The heightened awareness of the government and public of the negative consequences of reactive, rather than proactive, conflict management has become a valuable asset in responding to violence. The government, recognizing the high costs of conflict, has allocated significant resources to improve security and humanitarian response. Security personnel continue to be posted to sensitive areas, and significant resource allocations have been made available for the IDP returns (despite concerns regarding the mishandling of funds).

Public participation in the Malino process, the Malino working groups and the PDA workshop has allowed public demands to be aired, and has involved the public in actively carrying out solutions leading to peace. In addition, community-based conflict-resolution initiatives as well as national and international actors have accumulated knowledge and experience allowing them to react to outbursts of violence and to work to prevent future incidents.

7.1 Overcoming Peace Vulnerabilities

There are numerous vulnerabilities. Following are five major concerns and suggestions for addressing them.

7.1.1 Weak governance

Weak governance at the district and provincial levels continues to present a major impediment to peace. Weak governance is particularly a problem in the local governments of Poso, Morowali and Toja Una Una, which are in transition. Weak legal institutions and perceptions of bias also constitute an important impediment to peace. If these institutions increased their capabilities, thus restoring citizens faith in them, the reliance on extra-legal and violent means of justice-seeking could be significantly reduced. International donors and INGOs should support the development of good governance and engage in capacity building. Technical support for new district and sub-district administrations are particularly important factors. Support should also be given to the development of transparent, inclusive and consultative governance practices. National and local governments should support

90) ICG, Jihad in Central Sulawesi, ibid.
the legal processes underway in the provinces and ensure that justice is open and accountable.

Programs that may help promote governance as a conflict-prevention and peace-building mechanism in the region include:

- Capacity building for local politicians to improve legal drafting and government regulations;
- Capacity building for local politicians to conduct participatory peace planning and formulate peace-building policies that accurately reflect the participatory processes;
- Building democratic institutional mechanisms to prevent and manage ethnic and religious conflicts;
- Strengthening interaction between political parties, between government agencies and between government and civil society.

High levels of horizontal inequalities remain between the communities in the province. As long as inequalities remain high, peace remains likewise highly vulnerable. This is an extremely problematic issue, however, as moves to rectify inter-group inequalities can in themselves generate hostility and conflict. The redistricting of Poso into more religiously homogeneous areas is particularly problematic as local centres of growth may become increasingly associated with one community or the other.

Local government is the only agency with the political authority, legitimacy and influence to rectify horizontal inequalities. Long-term positive action programmes should be developed, with the support and involvement of local and international organisations, to ensure that the benefits of economic growth are enjoyed by all communities.

The recent wave of attacks in Central Sulawesi underlines the potential for renewed violence. That widespread violence has not yet been sparked is a positive sign, but this remains a dangerous development. Identifying potential provocateurs and implementing strategies to minimize their impact is vital. As above, ensuring that legal processes are transparent and are not hampered by these events is vital to ensuring that communities’ faith in the legal system and their sense of security. Local and national governments are the key actors. The practice of deploying non-organic police reinforcements on a rotational basis should be reviewed because prosecuting unprofessional behaviour is made more difficult when the perpetrators have been transferred elsewhere. The circulation of weapons among the civilian population, both militia groups and individuals, must be reduced and ultimately eliminated. Building the professionalism of the police is vital to effective law enforcement and better conflict prevention and management. Private business interests and any other illegal activities by police force personnel should be eliminated.

Economic recovery has been much slower in Central Sulawesi than in other provinces, even those suffering greater conflict. This may be indicative of an underlying weakness in the provincial economy irrespective of violence; regardless, a weak economy remains a major peace vulnerability.

Economic development programmes to assist livelihoods recovery should be the main form of direct intervention by international agencies. The agriculture sector is in most need of attention. Involvement of local NGOs in the selection of programme sites will help reduce perceptions of bias. Whether implemented by government or non-governmental actors, economic recovery programmes should focus on promoting bridging economic activities that foster interaction between communities.

Small-scale business associations which could mediate among economic actors in Christian and Muslim communities should be promoted. For instance, associations among fish traders who work across borders could prevent potential conflict due to the competition between Muslim and Christian traders. Economic development projects, especially in agricultural and...
informal trading sectors, could mediate between both the Christian and Muslim community, including inter-religious economic associations that strengthen social cohesion.

The lack of transparency, low level of community participation in conflict prevention and peace building, and the lack of coordination between the local government and civil society in implementing peace-building are all obstacles to peace. The community strongly distrusts government policy because of corruption and the lack of transparency. On the other hand, NGOs have launched new peace-building initiatives. Community dialogues at grassroots level, although limited in scope, also contribute to peace and stability at the village level.

It is important to strengthen the capacities of civil society and societal organisations, so they can participate in decision-making processes. Such capacities include: conflict management and negotiation strategies. The engagement of civil society organisations in the political process will create an open space for political dialogue and negotiation. This, in turn, will help in the coordination of policies, helping prevent distortions. Other important initiatives would include strengthening peace forums, such as peace education forums, women’s forums and NGO coalition forums which involve stakeholders from government and civil society elements. Also important is coordination among stakeholders in addressing the situation of IDPs and unemployment. While continuing humanitarian assistance, NGOs should be encouraged to transform their short-term approach from crisis management and humanitarian assistance to more long-term approaches that focus on conflict prevention and peace-building.

Enhancing Capacities for Peace

In an ‘above all do no harm’ spirit, programmes by all actors to promote reconciliation and social cohesion should build on the organic reconciliation already underway in the province. Particularly for international agencies, this means restricting their direct interventions in peace-building and

Instead focusing on indirect support of local groups and organisations that are working to rebuild inter-communal relations.

As in Maluku, the imbalanced and provocative reportage in the early stages of the Central Sulawesi conflict (which has been accused of inadvertently escalating the conflict) has been replaced, for the most part, by a commitment to more impartial, solid reporting. This is an important and growing capacity for peace.

Support for the media’s role in promoting peace falls under four broad categories: strengthening the media at the provincial level; developing professional skills and resources; facilitating information flow and access, and supporting community-based communication. The international community can play a supporting role in developing these practices at the local level, particularly in providing training and resources for media organisations.

Local initiatives such as social networking, inter-religious forums, peace education forums and economic associations significantly contribute to the long term peace-building process. Supporting these initiatives is a vital way of empowering local communities. The potential of these organisations could be enhanced through transforming the short-term orientation of the inter-religious forums and inter-group associations toward long-term strategies.
1. Ending all forms of conflict and fighting;

2. Obeying all forms of legal enforcement efforts and encouraging the impose [sic] of legal sanction for whoever [sic] conflicted;

3. Requiring the state apparatus to conduct strictly with justice to maintain safety;

4. Maintaining the peaceful situation, avoiding the imposing of a civilian emergency situation and the intervention of foreign forces;

5. Eliminating all kind [sic] of slander and dishonesty towards all groups and establishing the respectful and forgiving attitude of one to another, in order to generate a friendliness relationship among the people;

6. Poso is an integral part of the Republic of Indonesia, therefore, each citizen has a right to live there, coming and going peacefully and respecting [sic] the local customs.

7. All rights and ownerships have to be returned to the legal owners as it was before the conflict and fighting;

8. Returning all indisplaced [sic] persons to their original places;

9. Along with the government conduct the facilities and economic infrastructure rehabilitation thoroughly;

10. Performing each religious obligation by the respectful way or righteous principle, and obeying all agreed rules, both Laws, government regulations, and other legal products.

Mohamad Yusuf. Menanam Melawan (Planting Resistance); etching, 32 X 27.5 cm, 2003.
## Appendix 2
### Indicative Humanitarian and Development Activities in Central Sulawesi Province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Government Offices</th>
<th>Type of Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Dept. of Social Affairs</td>
<td>• Returning of IDPs to their areas of origin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Stimulate economic activity by forming ‘working groups’ and providing them with equipment and training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Dept. of Health</td>
<td>• Reconstruction/rehabilitation of health facilities and services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Support the return of health workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Provision of health workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Dept. Kimpraswil</td>
<td>• Shelters for IDPs &amp; Infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Satkorlak / Kesbang Linmas Office</td>
<td>• Support to IDPs in camps.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Reconciliation initiatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Dept. of Agriculture and Dept. of Fisheries</td>
<td>• Livelihood empowerment program/income generating support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Support the return of teachers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Provision of textbook, learning materials, school supplies, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Organised sports events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>BPMD</td>
<td>• Implementation of ADB and World Bank community development programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Pokja Malino</td>
<td>• IDP repatriation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Mental health survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Advocacy &amp; monitoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>• Advocacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Conflict prevention and social cohesion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Reconstruction/rehabilitation of community infrastructure/basic services (health, education, water supply).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Food security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Job creation/income generation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Psychosocial (trauma counselling, women’s empowerment for reconciliation, child rights awareness).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Support to peace and reconciliation activities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### International NGOs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>International NGOs</th>
<th>Type of Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>CARE International</td>
<td>• Assistance to IDPs with shelter and livelihood recovery packages in fishing and agricultural tools and seeds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Water and Sanitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Ecological Conservation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Nutrition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Church World Service</td>
<td>• Food security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Psychosocial mental health provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>International Medical Corps</td>
<td>• Rehabilitation of community health clinics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Training of midwives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Building health department capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Mobile Clinics for IDPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Mercy Corps</td>
<td>• Education support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Water Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Reconciliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Micro finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Building capacity of local NGOs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Multilateral Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Multilateral Institutions</th>
<th>Type of Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>• Support for Pokjas Malino in strategic planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sept 2002-Present</td>
<td>• Support civil society initiatives for peace &amp; reconciliation and capacity building for NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Support for crisis management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Economic recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Conducted thematic assessments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>OCHA (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs)</td>
<td>• Humanitarian coordination and support services, including facilitating assessments and missions, and field surveys in conjunction with agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>WFP (World Food Program)</td>
<td>• Emergency food security for IDPs and returnees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May 2001-Present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>• Economic Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Local governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Health and Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Access to Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>ADB (Asian Development Bank)</td>
<td>• Governance capacity building for communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Rural finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Rural infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Rural community credit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Much of the information in this table is derived from UN OCHA’s Briefing Notes on Humanitarian and Development Activities from 4 June 2004
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