The DBBS programme is a collaborative research programme between the University of the Western Cape (UWC) in Cape Town and the Flemish universities under the auspices of the Vlaamse Universitaire Raad (VLIR). The aim of the programme is to engage in collaborative research at postgraduate level in the following research niche areas:

- Policy management, governance and poverty alleviation in the Western Cape
- Youth wellness in community development
- Addressing the direct and indirect impact of HIV/AIDS on pre-and school-going children in South Africa
- The sustainable utilisation of subterranean water resources for improvement in the quality of life
- Culture, language and identity

Migrants and water service delivery in the Western Cape

Lisa Thompson
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Migrants and water service delivery in the Western Cape:
A gendered analysis

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Project: Policy Management, Governance and Poverty Alleviation in the Western Cape

This new research programme focuses on the three key areas of government activity in housing, health and employment, through:

1. **Policy Reviews**, which entail analysis of policy documents prepared by each level of the governing hierarchy to assess their appropriateness and to determine the coherence of policy between different levels of government, and interviews with key informants at all three levels of government;

2. **Process Studies**, which are informed by the findings of the policy reviews. As well as assessing the policy framework, the process studies entail interviews with officials at different levels of the administrative hierarchy in both provincial and local governments;

3. **Skills Audit**, aimed at comparing skills in health departments with the requisite skills for optimal health care delivery (in terms of financial management, strategic management, technical skills etc) and entailing a review of departmental organograms, of the skills and qualifications of key staff and of the quantity and quality of human resources training available to staff, as well as interviews with both management and workers; and

4. **Analysing the Interface between the State and Civil Society**, aimed at establishing how ordinary citizens perceive the services delivered to them and ascertaining what they believe to be their entitlements and obligations as citizens.
Migrants and water service delivery in the Western Cape: A gendered analysis

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2005
Introduction

This paper follows on from the work of Sinclair (1996, 1998) and Meintjies (2000) on internal migration in South Africa and its political, social and economic implications, both in terms of the social realities of migrants and the broader political context within which internal migrants are located. Over the last ten years internal migration in South Africa has been characterised by a steady influx of former ‘bantustan’ residents into urban contexts in the former ‘white South Africa’, particularly those cities which are seen as holding potential for employment opportunities. Thus Johannesburg, Pretoria, Durban, Bloemfontein and Cape Town have had the largest influx of migrants both just prior to the democratic elections of 1994 and thereafter. This study focuses on the Cape Town urban area, and in particular the socio-economic conditions of women migrants in urban townships. Khayelitsha has served as the fieldwork site for this study, as with previous research on this issue. However, the intention here is to emphasise a particular facet of the challenges facing women migrants, namely basic living conditions relating to water and sanitation and the related issue of housing, and how these conditions are mediated at the level of local and provincial government by service delivery policies that aim to reduce poverty and improve living conditions for informal housing dwellers, in particular women, and woman-headed households.

The study draws on a sample of 55 interviews undertaken in Khayelitsha in 2003/4. A video of several interviews also illustrates some of the most pertinent issues raised by the research. The interviews aimed at assessing basic water and sanitation service delivery conditions for women and men to illustrate differential living conditions and access to services. The socio-economic realities of women migrants is discussed below in the context of local and provincial policies on service delivery, particularly water and sanitation. The issue of water service delivery
also highlights the second trajectory that this paper seeks to explore, namely the question of the exercise of political rights by internal migrants, and related to this, the degree to which migrants exercise their political identity through participation around inadequate service delivery. The degree of social mobilisation in townships such as Khayelitsha illustrates the extent to which a new sense of community and belonging emerge in migrant communities. To try to determine this social cohesion, as well as its potential for activism and resistance in the face of political discontent, the notion of social movements is explored with particular reference to gender and human rights. Do internal migrants bring a sense of political identity with them to cities which translates into political participation, especially in exercising basic rights? To what extent do women and men share similar or different political identities? To what extent do more marginalised groups, especially women, organise themselves to exercise their rights? Do chronically poor woman-headed households even know their rights? Do they actively engage politically and socio-economically? These are some of the questions that the paper seeks to address against the backdrop of the fieldwork in Khayelitsha.

Claiming space: Internal migration and political identity

Gendered and general analytical issues linking the local to the national and global

To what extent do migrants mobilise, especially marginalised, chronically poor women heads of households? This question has been discussed in various contexts. This analysis aims to place the question of internal migrant mobilisation and political identity dynamics in the context of social movements. Mobilisation can occur on the basis of an
already organised social movement (represented by a number of non-
governmental organisations [NGOs], community-based organisations [CBOs] and other informal community groupings) or it can arise around an issue. In South Africa two such issues-based forms of mobilisation, among many others, stand out in recent years: around the provision of antiretrovirals to those finding themselves HIV-positive, and around service delivery. In particular, the provision of Free Basic Water (FBW) to all communities has brought to the fore the question of public goods as human rights (Bond, 2000; 2002). Certainly the mobilisation around HIV/AIDS has been stronger; however, the institutionalisation of a FBW policy has led to further mobilisation on the issue of water and services to the poor, both on the part of ‘old’ and ‘new’ types of social movements. However, it is not clear to what extent the overwhelming number of migrants in formal and informal settlements exercise their rights to the constitutionally enshrined right to water. Compounded with the lack of adequate housing and employment, many township communities are still living in conditions of chronic poverty, and even basic water and sanitation remain far from adequate in many urban township areas. As the case study undertaken by the CSAS highlights (and as is graphically illustrated by the video made in Khayelitsha), despite government promises on service delivery, basic water and sanitation conditions leave much to be desired in many areas.

How have marginalised groups, particularly women, located themselves within broader streams of resistance to poor service provision? In terms of the analysis of social movements in developmental contexts, there is some scepticism about the degree to which the marginalised mobilise. For example, approaches to national social movements tend to focus on the motivations that groups develop for being involved in the kinds of activities that characterise social movements. More positivist accounts tend to emphasise aspects such as political opportunity structures, social capital and public opinion frames (Ibarra et al, 2003: 8-9).
Approaches that emphasise the more anti-systemic revolutionary potential of social movements tend to focus more on the interplay between political and economic power between the global and the local that discipline social movements. For example, Arrighi et al (1989: 27) and Cox (1987) point out that one of the growing weaknesses of old social movements, i.e. labour movements, has been the international commodification of labour and the transnationalisation of production. Cox (1987) has pointed out that this has led to a cooptation of organised labour and the fragmentation of casual labour on a global scale.

Stienstra (1999: 264) drawing on the critical theory of Cox (1987, 1997) notes how he collapses the liberal distinction between state and civil society. This approach argues that “the state relies on the institutions which make up civil society to reinforce, or respond to the underlying principles of consent”, or, as Gramsci (1971: 244) put it: “the State is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules”. Civil society, and social movements, both national and global, may find that their activism results in influencing ruling elites and knowledge, but not necessarily in radical transformation of existing power relations. Feminists also emphasise aspects other than class that lead to marginalisation and lack of participation. Stienstra (1999: 262-266) points out that in addition to class, gender, race/ethnicity and sexual orientation also play into power dynamics at both the local and global levels and further, “norms are shaped by historical inequalities as well as local situations” (see also Tickner, 1992, Parpart, 1995 and Steady, 2002). The success or failure of some social movements above others thus has to do with both local/global alliances, as well as the relations of social movements to dominant national and global institutions.

There is considerable controversy, borne out in the literature in international relations, development and other disciplines, about the ex-
tent to which NGOs (local, national and international) ‘represent’ social movements, as well as how collective identities and social movements coalesce. However, Stienstra (1999: 264) states:

Although social movements are not limited to organisations, they do need organisations to mobilise resources over a sustained period of time. Organisations provide structure and leadership to social movement activity and are able to mobilise resources and place demands on the state and other institutions.

This institutionalisation of social movement activism may also bring about the gradual cooptation of the movement, thereby weakening its transformative potential. Also, the degree to which grassroots social movements link up with broader national and global social movements can remove some of the specificity of purpose of local and regional alliances. Steady (2002: 79-94), for example, argues that the women’s movement in Africa has been successful in ensuring representation and political equality but not in global economic or developmental terms and that global solidarity with the ‘white feminist’ movement has been of limited usefulness to the needs of the African women’s movement, particularly in terms of economic marginalisation. Sen and Grown (1987), Tickner (1992), Parpart (1995), Pettman (1996) and Steinstra (1999), point out in a similar vein that there are many factors that mediate the concerns of the women’s movement in the South as opposed to the North. The degree to which economic marginalisation affects women in developmental contexts is one of the primary factors which distinguish ‘Northern’ (white) feminist activist concerns from their ‘Southern’ counterparts.

An aspect which is not highlighted in this context, but which may be of considerable importance, is the degree to which internal migration may influence political identity formation and social mobilisation. To what extent do the very marginalised represent communities that have
been set adrift from their communal and societal ties? Does this correspond with migration/geographical dislocation? These questions may help to determine with greater accuracy which groups in local contexts tend to mobilise and which do not. As Stienstra (1999: 264) points out, “gender, race/ethnicity, class and colonisation also shape the internal relations within movements”. This goes for local and national as well as global manifestations of the movement.

Solidarity, even in a national context, can be problematic. Steady (2002: 91-92) says of the South African women’s movement context:

(i)n the new South Africa, feminist struggle is especially complicated by the challenge of bringing together women from diverse racial, class, ethnic and geographical backgrounds. For many black women, the struggle against racism is supreme because many institutionalised forms of racism remain intact...(m)any black women rejected feminism as a white American import that would dilute the liberation struggle. After all, although apartheid has been legally abolished, South Africa remains a country of extreme contradictions.

Similarly the North and South blend across geographical boundaries: discrimination on the basis of race and gender is prevalent in states and societies usually thought of as westernised and developed (the so-called North, or the ‘West’).

Sen and Grown (1987), Tickner (1992), Stienstra (1999), Steady (2002) and Murphy (2002) all emphasise the degree to which the internationalisation of production in the current globalised world economy has, to a large extent, prevented the success of liberal, egalitarian politics, including the more ‘bourgeois’ forms of national and global social movements. As Murphy (2002: 205) puts it:

Specific regional and national patterns of effective egalitarian politics reflect historical political opportunity structures that may or may not allow the formation of coalitions of a
scale necessary to transform neoliberal globalisation. Over the last two decades, egalitarian politics have made a difference, but they have not contained - and perhaps they cannot contain - the forces now working to make a less equal world.

Stienstra (1999) and Murphy (2002: 208) also point out that different states provide different ‘political opportunity structures’ (as well as notions of equality) within which social movements must form and function. The opportunities for social mobilisation among women in mainland China or in Malaysia and Indonesia would be, in this context, somewhat different from the realities of women’s movements in Africa.

Nonetheless, the global women’s movement is said to be one of the strongest of such ‘supranational’ movements currently active in the global arena. Local and national mobilisations on women’s issues, while divided on issues of ideology and purpose, have nonetheless frequently managed to share sufficient solidarity to influence both national and global governance institutions (Steinstra, 1994, 1999). There also seems to be a general acceptance of the need for solidarity, not only in terms of the women’s movement locally, nationally, regionally and globally, but also between the women’s movement and other movements (Sen and Grown, 1987: 96; Murphy, 2002: 210). Emphasising the need for solidarity and learning between national and global social movements, O’Brien et al (2000: 64) point out that the success of the women’s movement in lobbying various multilateral institutions, in particular the World Bank, has been tempered by the its lack of resources, but also:

...lack of lobbying expertise, as well as the technical barrier of economic planning languages, and the fact the women’s economic interests can clash, particularly across differences of class and nation.

Turning to the ways in which social movements arise and mobilise in different national contexts, there is dispute among social movement
approaches on whether the lack of participation of poorer groups in urban areas is simply due to very marginalised groups being too concerned with survival to become too involved in socio-economic developmental issues, and consequently in forms of activism - be these part of social movements or not. Survey work, such as that undertaken by the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) for the 2002 Chronic Poverty Report (CPR) in the Western Cape supports the former view. Levels of education and knowledge are said to be of critical importance here, as these affect the ability of groups to participate in meaningful ways, especially in areas requiring at least some scientific or technological know-how. Furthermore, as the CPR underlines, with the vast majority of households earning less than R1 000 per month (and many of these even less than that), survival issues have both an immediate and ongoing significance.

Cox, an historian working in the area of global political economy, has developed a framework that locates the relation of social forces to production in the developing world as a way of understanding their capacity to become involved in transformatory social movements. Cox's argument is the reverse of the commonly held belief that poorer groups do not mobilise. He emphasises that these communities have the most to benefit and the least to lose in attempting to change their socio-economic position. Cox's conceptualisation of social forces is not narrowly equivalent to classes (although classes form part of social forces). As Leysens puts it:

...social forces consist of groups who are conceptualised in terms of what material and non-material goods are produced, and to the state which attempts to manage the environment in which this takes place.

According to Cox, social change (transformation) at the state and world order levels can be expected to emanate from the group that is
excluded from the benefits of the dominant mode of production, i.e. the marginalised (Leysens, 2004: 7). Cox adds, however, that this group does tend to be the most powerless, and thus its transformative potential is reduced by its lack of influence and by an inclination towards apathy.

Cox defines three categories of relations in the global world order. These categories apply in the developed as well as the developing context, but the numbers which make up those who are marginally and precariously integrated are far higher in the developing state context. According to Cox (1999: 9) the categories are as follows:

- Those who are fully integrated into formal production processes. These include those who find themselves in managerial positions and are influential in decisions surrounding global production (i.e. the transnational managerial class).
- Those who are precariously integrated. This would include semi-skilled workers whose production function is dispensable and who can easily be replaced by cheaper labour elsewhere (i.e. in terms of the transnationalisation of production).
- Those who are marginalised in global production processes. This includes groups that are not part of formal production processes, or that are poorly integrated into these structures, semi-subsistence and subsistence farmers for example, as well as the unskilled and those who have been pushed off their land or who have left rural areas to find better economic opportunities and living conditions in urban areas.

Leysens (2004: 7-8) has used Cox’s categories above to show, using Afrobarometer survey data, that the ‘marginalised’ in southern Africa tend to participate less in both formal and informal participatory processes, as their ‘transformatory potential’ is curtailed by the effort to survive on the periphery of the formal economy. In effect this brings
Cox’s argument into line with the perspective he sets out to debunk, namely that the poor have less transformatory potential.

The study of gendered participation on service delivery in the area of urban water service delivery and resource management undertaken in this paper, while very small, indicates that the transformatory potential of some marginalised groups may tend to be circumscribed by their peripheralisation and hence their immediate preoccupation with survival. But such a generalisation is precisely that, and in many cases can detract from what mobilisation does in fact take place. Even though the case study is small – 55 randomly chosen families representing a segment of ‘the poor’ – it shows that mobilisation does take place – albeit not necessarily in the realm of local-global social movements. It is argued here that the theory of social movements does tend to highlight organised resistance but leaves understandings of ad hoc behaviour rather unclear. This has led towards a popular (and academic) perception that marginalised groups do not mobilise or that they exercise relatively little power. This may not always be the case. Rather like ‘grey literature’, it seems more the case that such activism is overlooked because it does not fit into the frame of social movement activity.

In the context of this research, namely the Western Cape, though some issues relating to water resource management have resulted in organised grassroots activism (namely the process leading up to the approval and building of the Skuifraam Dam), at the same time there does seem to be some evidence to show that quite a large proportion of marginalised households participate sporadically on issues regarding services as well as on service related issues (Thompson, 2005, forthcoming). Steady (2002: 78) argues that:

Movements can seize or create political opportunities through continuous consciousness raising efforts and responses to specific events. Events that threaten women’s livelihood or that
of their families, such as a steep rise in the cost of living, structural adjustment conditionality, armed conflict and oppressive governments have had the most galvanising effect.

The degrees to which ‘threats to livelihood’ are posed seem to be key to understanding women’s mobilisation, as well as the local and national political opportunity structure. However, it would seem that activism does not always add up to ongoing collective identity or action. The case study work, while aiming to generate some basic statistical information, is obviously too small a sample to make major quantitative generalisations. The idea behind the interviews was to get a feeling for the sub-text of Khayelitsha – the everyday realities of service delivery to households with incomes ranging from as little as R 500-600 to above R 2 000. The degree to which lack of adequate water and sanitation services affected different households was quite varied, as the discussion below indicates. However the degree to which communities mobilised showed more clear-cut characteristics: while there was evidence of community mobilisation around services, it tended to be largely ad hoc, largely unorganised and sporadic. Nonetheless it is there.

Related to this is the degree to which political identity and forms of social mobilisation occur in migrant communities in Khayelitsha, especially woman-headed households. Do migrants from within South Africa have a sense of their rights and do they act upon them? To what extent do government policies influence or become influenced by patterns of social mobilisation (or the lack of them)? Before turning to an analysis of the Khayelitsha fieldwork, a brief sketch is provided of the context within which national/provincial water service delivery takes place.
Informal housing studies and water services and sanitation

Who participates as ‘stakeholders’ in water security?

In terms of the fieldwork on water security, stakeholders and participation in the Western Cape, one of the first, most apparent aspects has been the relative lack of organised participation of certain communities on the periphery of the urban economy. These groups have the most to gain from participation, and the direness of their circumstances in terms of even basic technologies concerning water and sanitation is the most acute. For example, in a study conducted for the Cape Town Metropolitan Council (CMC) in 2003, it was shown that in informal settlements (i.e. zinc housing or the equivalent) the majority of households (84%) do not even have access to bucket-type toilets and 98% do not have access to toilet facilities that are hygienic and safe (Nielson, 2003). Nonetheless, formal participation in the area of water security and service delivery is low in the townships generally and in informal settlements in particular. It is also clear that even where housing has been upgraded (to brick housing with taps and toilets either inside or in the yard), levels of participation around service delivery are very low, with 98% never having interacted with local municipalities on water services or service delivery. In the context of the very low integration of community organisations into policy debates and discussions around ‘brown’ environmental issues, it goes without saying that participation around ‘green’ environmental issues is virtually non-existent, possibly due to a lack of interest as well as knowledge. In Nielson’s 2003 survey in informal settlements, 61% of all respondents had not heard of National Water Week, National Arbor Day, National Marine Day or World Water Day, for example.
On the other hand, taken in broader perspective, there is evidence of participation as well as the formation of nascent social movements on the basis of participation in housing forum initiatives (which include service delivery in general), such as the Homeless People's Federation and similar groupings, for example, the People's Housing Network Forum (established under the auspices of the Development Action Group [DAG], which is financed by international donors). In the urban context, then, it is clear that concern with, and involvement in, water resource management on the part of the majority of poorer households is in terms of 'brown' environmental issues concerning basic water and sanitation provision, even though representation and participation seems very uneven. Housing groups are the most active in already established or establishing formal housing clusters in the townships (Shamil Manie, DAG, interview, 15 March 2004). Participation and representation in informal housing areas remains very poor. These groupings do have women representatives - mostly internal migrants - but there is a tendency for broader social mobilisation platforms to be used, rather than gender specific ones.

In contrast, the CMC 2003 study showed that in more affluent (predominantly white) areas, levels of participation are fair, partly due to 'satisfaction' with services and reticulation, and partly due to the existence of ratepayers' associations in these areas, where membership is usually quite low, but where homeowners feel their interests are being represented even in their absence (free riding).  

Overall, according to the service delivery survey done by Nielson (2003), levels of civic responsibility appear to be high, with 96% of middle- and high-income households stating that it is a residential duty to report leaks and 92% of residents in informal settlements agreeing with this statement. There does not seem to be the same level of actual civic involvement around service delivery. Middle- and high-income households were slightly more likely to enquire/complain about leaks, water
restrictions and water quality (around 2-3%), while informal settlements’ dealings with municipalities averaged about 1%. However, poorer communities have a lot more to gain from civic involvement, as the following sections make clear.

The context: Water resource management in the Western Cape and service delivery

The total area of the City of Cape Town (CCT) comprises some 2474 km², with a coastline of approximately 371 km. This area includes not only Cape Town central, but also outlying areas such as Tygerberg, Helderberg and Blaauwberg (WSDP, 2001: 6). However, the CCT also vies for water with outlying agricultural areas, including Berg River end users (in the Langebaan, Vredendal and Saldanha area), as well as Malmesbury, Wellington, Paarl and Franschhoek. The Boland, West Coast and Drakenstein municipalities buy bulk water from the CCT.

According to the Water Services Act of 1997, all water services authorities are obliged to formulate Water Services Development Plans (WSDPs). The Cape Town metropolitan area (CMA), comprising six former metropolitan local councils and the Cape Metropolitan Council (CMC) as the bulk supplier before 2000, have been amalgamated to form the City of Cape Town. The local metropolitan councils now form administrative units, with the CMC still in charge of bulk services. The WSDPs have to be submitted to the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry (DWAF) to show that municipalities are managing their water supply in conjunction with their Integrated Development Plans (IDPs). This is to ensure that historical service backlogs are met and that all sectors of the community benefit from enhanced service delivery (WSDP, 2001: 3-5).

The WSDP characterises the CCT as water scarce area for two main reasons:
• the Cape is a winter rainfall area, placing pressure on water storage to provide sufficient water for the hot summer months;
• Cape Town is expanding rapidly due to an influx of migrants from the Eastern and Northern Cape.¹⁰

One of the major challenges for the newly amalgamated CCT, then, is providing adequate water and sanitation supply to informal growth areas, in addition to formal growth in the Tygerberg, Blaauwberg and Helderberg areas. According the WSDP, part of the problem of adequate supply lies in the illegal occupation of land by migrants, as well as the culture of non-payment for services which forestalls plans to convert sanitation services to more expensive water borne sewerage systems.

In terms of the Water Services Act, the CCT is beholden to supply basic services to all as a fundamental right. It is stipulated in section 11.2 that “everyone has right of access to basic water supply and basic sanitation”. In terms of this the CCT has committed itself to drafting a Service Delivery Strategy which will include the following commitments: “on-site water and water borne sanitation to all formal sites” (this includes formal sites in townships, of course); “free basic level of water to all households within 200m” and “access to communal toilets or some form of shared toilet, depending on local conditions” (WSDP, 2001: 21).

According to the WSDP, service levels in the CCT “generally meet the requirements of the Water Services Act, i.e. communal standpipe within 200m walking distance and at least a ventilated improved pit latrine (VIP) or equivalent (container toilet, formalised black bucket, communal toilet or chemical toilet)” (WSDP, 2001:19). This statement is only partially backed up by the informal settlements survey done by Nielson (2003) for the CCT, as well as the CSAS’s independent fieldwork. Ninety-eight per cent of informal residents did not have access even to bucket-type toilets, and similarly 98% did not find toilet facilities hygienic and safe. Most respondents who did not have access to a toilet used the nearby veldt. As Nielson points out, “…it is alarming
that this happens in the majority of households in informal areas”. A survey conducted in 2001 ascertained that at the time, 10,000 of approximately 92,000 informal households in the Western Cape did not have access to even basic water services and 16,000 did not have access to basic sanitation. The reason given was that these households occupied illegal land. According to Van Niekerk (Interview, 15 June 2004), as of 2004 there were approximately 140 settlements with dwelling units just in excess of 100,000 (based on aerial photographs), where about 400,000 people live. Most of these settlements have been partially serviced. The City Council ruled that by July 2004 all informal settlements, regardless of the legality of their land occupation, would receive at least rudimentary services. Our fieldwork clearly highlights that this has not happened. Just as important, however, is the question of how effective basic services are.

Many informal households share water and toilet facilities in extremely crowded circumstances. In all of the townships the practice of ‘erf sharing’ is the norm, where a formal house is surrounded by shacks. Shacks are also found in public spaces and wherever available land allows (around stations and other public amenities). Thus while water access may not be the issue, service delivery is. Also, the CCT Exco decision on the provision of basic services does not include backyard dwellings in places like Khayelitsha but only applies to informal housing on council or private land. The safety and security of the very marginalised (especially new migrant families) tend to be made more precarious in these living conditions.

One of the central findings of the interviews undertaken by the CSAS in Khayelitsha as part of this research was that safe access to sanitation and to water are two of the highest priorities in terms of improved service delivery to informal residents, in particular women and children. Though access to water may not be so much of an issue, obtaining water may nonetheless require walking some distance, often at night
and in high crime areas. Given the high influx of informal residents, the political necessity of providing adequate water to informal areas, and the culture of non-payment, the CCT has placed fairly limited faith in water demand management (WDM) as a strategy. Solutions to the problem of water scarcity are sought on the supply side of the water technologies continuum. In conjunction with DWAF, the CCT has obtained public approval (though a process of co-opted participation) for the building of the R1.6 billion Skuifraam Dam (the Berg Water Project), the building of which will commence in 2004/5 (Thompson, 2005, forthcoming). This process has included marginalised groups, but mostly according to the principle of ‘affected communities’, through which mostly rural communities affected by the building of the dam have been consulted. Very little urban civil society participation has been forthcoming, with the exception of the environmental movement. However, the effects of tariff increases on poor residents may lead to mobilisation in the future, as is discussed below.

The CCT, national and international environmental management initiatives

Cape Town’s water management strategy has had to evolve against a background of changing national legislation as well as South Africa’s stated commitments to regional and international best practice guidelines on sustainable water usage. South Africa supported the Bonn Declaration and the final report of the World Commission on Dams, entitled Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making, among other international commitments to participatory WRM. However, at both national and regional levels the gap between policy pronouncements and policy practice is high. There is also still an ongoing emphasis on dam building, which emerges again in the government’s new National Water Resource Strategy. Liane Greeff, a representative of the Environmental Monitoring Group (EMG), one of the most vo-
ciferous NGOs on water related issues at the local and national level, said:

We feel very upset that the National Water Resource Strategy had 16 dams identified and the whole WCD approach is saying look at what the needs are, then look at what the options are and then look at what the solutions are. Dam building is only one option. But the NWR strategy is heavily tilted towards dams. (EMG, Interview, 16 July 2004)

There is a discrepancy between stated commitments and policy practice. For example, if we follow the national commitments down to the provincial/local level, according to Cape Town’s WSDP, “all initiatives must conform to...national as well as international law and legislation...such as the International Convention on Biodiversity and the National Environmental Management Act (NEMA)” (WSDP, 2001: 54). The former CMC undertook regular ‘state of the environment’ reports, which the CCT has continued. In addition the Environmental Conservation Act (ECA) makes it mandatory to conduct environmental impact assessments for “certain scheduled construction activities”. In accordance with this, the stated philosophy of CMC administration is Integrated Environmental Management (IEM) and it is initiating IEM systems. Nonetheless, there is not much evidence of IEM in practice, especially in terms of public participation. This is clear both on the demand side (especially but not only in terms of water service delivery to the poor) but also on the supply side, as the Skuifraam Dam (or Berg Water Project, as it is also called), makes clear.

The Skuifraam Dam, the building of which began in 2004, is a good example of how international/national/local linkages may lead to some forms of social mobilisation and not to others (Thompson, 2004). Government has argued that participatory processes make such processes open and transparent, and that the public performs a watchdog function in this regard. However, this is often not possible due to the nature
of the participatory process. Environmental impact assessment reports, similarly, can be used as ‘stamps of scientific approval’ without necessarily addressing the concerns of citizens.12

The broader implications of the Berg Water Project have also been contained by government by setting up participatory structures, such as the Environmental Monitoring Committee (EMC), which have excluded certain groups such as the urban poor, who will arguably feel the effects of the higher services charges for water over the next ten years in spite of the FBW allowance. According to Nielson, 59% of informal residents state they pay for water over and above the FBW allowance. CSAS fieldwork shows that 54% of respondents pay for water. Patrick Dowling of the Wildlife and Environmental Society of Southern Africa (WESSA) makes the following point in the context of the bigger picture within which the question of supply and demand management of water and participation in the Western Cape takes place:

What I find quite extraordinary is that this water is not for Franschhoek (where the dam is being built). Franschhoek is in a different municipality, the water is for the City of Cape Town. Yet all the meetings are in Franschhoek. On the one hand this is understandable as it is on their doorstep, but on the other hand this is an issue that Cape Town should have more involvement in, in terms (of the question of) is this sustainable development? Reaching our ceiling of demand and then going out and finding a new dam site?. Can you keep meeting growth demands at this rate? Certainly not geophysically and nor will it be feasible on ecological grounds. South Africa has a number of very large dams, the product of the last hundred years, but we cannot go on like this for the next three hundred years. Can you keep on meeting water demands like this at this sort of rate? Not just for our children and our grandchildren - it seems to stop at our grandchildren - but what happens after that?
It is not clear that poorer communities are interested in the more ‘green’ issues that Dowling refers to above. As Greeff points out, social mobilisation is more likely to occur when such groups mobilise around an issue or are mobilised by groupings such as the environmental movement in conjunction with ‘old’ social movements, such as labour, around the questions pertaining in particular to the economic consequences of government’s natural resources development plans. Greeff states:

If you have an anti-privatisation march you will have a lot of people out on the streets...if you have an anti-dam march people would come - but if the connection hasn’t been made for community groups, they will not be as interested. But if you say to people here is your water bill and this is what is attributable to the dam, then people would be much more vocal. (Interview, 16 July 2004)

Up until this point, these effects have not yet materialised. In 2004 higher tariffs were introduced along with water restrictions (imposed in November) and punitive measures for flouting restrictions, with fines of R10 000 for using water in restricted times, but these have not led to broad-based mobilisation on water (Cape Times, August 25, 2004). Despite articles by this writer to local papers providing information that the CCT did not impose restrictions in 2003/4 as it was considered ‘politically unfavourable’ during the elections (Van Zyl, interview, May 2004), there has been no resistance in terms of mobilisation around water tariffs. Thus, while poor water management on the part of the CCT is being passed on to urban consumers, rich and poor, mainstream and marginal alike, policies have been unchallenged besides letters to the newspapers by mostly affluent white consumers.

The tariffs for water will increase over the next few years as the ‘step up’ tariffs for funding the BWP are implemented. It will be interesting to observe whether resistance will be the case among both poor and rich communities as well as the degree to which communities need to be
financially squeezed before high levels of mobilisation take place. Arguably there is a ‘political opportunity structure’ in place, as the CCT has stated that public feedback on the 2004 water restrictions will be allowed. However, in the past both poorer and richer communities have accepted water restrictions without much fuss. The 2000/2001 water restrictions were accepted as necessary by 78% of informal settlement respondents, although 33% did not know that water restrictions had been lifted by 2002 and only 59% thought that water restrictions were adhered to. However, 90% of richer communities accepted that water restrictions were necessary with only 52% knowing that water restrictions had been lifted, so lack of knowledge does not seem to be unique to less well-off households.

The cost of water service delivery to poorer communities

As of 2001, the estimated costs of a three year programme to supply basic water and sanitation was R7 million (WSDP, 2001: 88). However, ongoing high levels of migration to both established townships as well as both public and private land resulted in the CCT decision of 2003/4 to provide emergency or rudimentary services to all informal settlements. According to Van Niekerk (interview, 15 June, 2004) this includes settlements on private land where the CCT has tried to negotiate to put in services even though not all private landowners agree to this. Some turn a blind eye, or offer to sell the land to the council, but frequently at very inflated prices. The CCT then puts the services on the perimeters of land, with or without the consent of the landowner. The change from previous policy was an Executive Council decision by the CCT to ensure basic sanitation and water (plus electricity) for health and safety reasons. The decision was justified as a constitutional obligation and for humanitarian reasons, but there is a need to put a bylaw in place to ensure the process’s legality.
However, as mentioned, the provision of services does not include backyard dwellers in places like Khayelitsha, but applies to informal housing on council or private land. Part of the problem is that informal housing in established areas like Khayelitsha continues to grow, placing great strain on existing infrastructure. Even where services are being provided to new informal settlements on the periphery of more established townships, such as Harare settlement in Khayelitsha, the levels of service provided depends on the population density of the settlement. According to Van Niekerk, the principle is “some to all rather than all to some”. In some cases services are thus very rudimentary. The 200m standpipe average is being revised depending on the density of settlement (interview, 15 June 2004). According to the CSAS interviews, while only 35% of respondents did not have a toilet or access to one, most of the remaining 63% had to share facilities. As mentioned earlier, Nielson’s figures for lack of toilet facilities in informal settlements is even higher, with 84% not even having access to bucket-type toilets and 98% not finding that toilet facilities are hygienic and safe.

Cost recovery is not practiced for informal settlements on illegally occupied land, but is practiced in larger townships such as Khayelitsha, regardless of whether the house is a shack or more formal dwelling. If it has a direct water supply, the CCT bills for household consumption over 6 kl per month (Ramsay, 15 June 2004). According to Ramsay, the question remains whether it is worth rendering an account to poorer households:

A house (worth) less than R50 000 get the first 6 kl of water free, they get a rates rebate, sewerage is free, and they get a R20 towards the bill. So is it worth sending a bill? You are not getting anything out of that. You have to weigh up sending the bill against keeping track of the person so that if they start using a lot of water you can actually send them a bill. All those sorts of issues we are trying to deal with.
This statement contrasts with the percentage of households claiming they pay for water in Khayelitsha. According the CSAS interviews, 40% of all households claim they pay for water, and 49% of woman-headed households claim they pay the municipality for water usage (see Appendices 1 and 2). Nielson’s data similarly show that 59% of informal housing dwellers pay for water.

Customer debt is estimated at R460 million and is likely to rise by R50 million a year. Part of the problem, according to the WSDP, is income levels in poor communities. Approximately one third of households in the CMA earn less than R1 100 a month and over 25% of these households earn less than R.612 a month. Their ability to pay for services is thus severely restricted. Calculated on the basis of the income of the poorest 25%, it is estimated that a total bill for services could not be more than R61 a month with about R18 of that allocated to water. However, many households have erratic income and so these projections are acknowledged as very inaccurate.

However, David Ramsay, Director for Water Services for the CCT, states that the extent to which poorer communities subsidise richer ones is minimal due to the introduction of FBW and the indigents grant (Ramsay, Interview, 18 May 2004). The CCT’s approach to water tariffs for urban consumers assumes that most families are able to survive on 6 kl of water per month, an issue which is contested by activists in unions and by some environmental NGOs such as the EMG. Where the 6 kl are exceeded, poor households must still pay for services at the same rate as any other urban domestic consumer (the tariffs are on a sliding scale). The study undertaken by the CSAS in Khayelitsha shows that a large percentage of those whose income is less than R1 000 per month are women. The interviews show that 37% of woman-headed households earn less than between R100 and R550 and 36% earn between R550 and R950. While the random sample is small, it shows the
extent to which some migrant women heads of households are constrained in their ability to pay for basic services, and the potential negative effects of raised tariffs.

How will the building of the Skuifraam Dam affect poor communities? According to the CCT’s figures, the average increase in water tariffs will be around 10% per year for the next five years, almost doubling the cost of water in the next 10 years. This does not take into account punitive water tariffs should water restrictions be introduced. This step up, step down tariffing approach is said to involve the least risk to the CCT in the building of the dam and will mean that future supply schemes can be implemented towards the end of the decade (CCT, 2004; Killick, CCT, interview 15 June 2004). The full impact of the Skuifraam Dam on tariffs will only be felt towards the end of the building process when unforeseen costs will have a knock-on effect on the full amount owing. Before then the higher tariffs, in conjunction with water restrictions, are going to make rich and poor communities alike take notice of their water bills.

As mentioned above, there has been little protest or resistance to water tariff increases up until this point by either affluent or poorer ratepayers. This seems less as a result of apathy than of a lack of knowledge, combined with the effects of the CCT’s ongoing propaganda about how water scarce the Western Cape has become. The provision of information to the public on the cost implications of the Skuifraam Dam has been sorely lacking, and the environmental movement has not been very successful in obtaining figures from government. As Greeff (EMG) and Dowling (WESSA) have pointed out, the motivation of groups like the South African Municipal Workers’ Union (Samwu) to mobilise has usually been linked to the effect which WRM has on poorer communities. The CCT and DWAF thus have reason to be hesitant in divulging the full financial implications of the Skuifraam Dam on tariffs. The
Environmental Monitoring Group (EMG), which is based in Cape Town, has been asking since 1999 what the implications of the building of the Skuifraam Dam would be for the consumer. According to Greeff they were told in 1999/2000 by CCT and DWAF that the costs would be “negligible”. As has been discussed, this is far from the truth, especially if taken in conjunction with the CCT’s rather lackadaisical WDM policies which have led to the imposition of water restrictions in 2004.

The Khayelitsha study

Both nascent and more established community groupings are involved to some extent in service delivery and natural resource management in the townships, through, for example, the Khayelitsha Water Forums (Ramsay, Interview, June 2004) and the Homeless People’s Federation. However, there seems to be a very ad hoc, unorganised approach to participation and mobilisation around service delivery issues, especially water related ones, in spite of the obvious dangers that poor services pose to migrant communities. Mobilisation around water related issues has happened to some extent in connection with the Berg Water Project, mainly through the environmental movement in conjunction with unions such as Samwu. But do the marginalised really participate in any meaningful way in these and related participatory processes? This section aims to briefly outline some of the responses by both male- and female-headed migrant households in Khayelitsha with regard to their qualitative living standards (as well as their perceptions thereof) and their sense of political identity, as well as the degree to which they have mobilised on water service delivery. The discussion is based on the qualitative responses to questions as well as the quantitative information contained in Appendices 1 and 2.
Migrants and water service delivery in Khayelitsha

Living conditions

Almost all the respondents interviewed ‘owned’ the house they live in, although understandings of ownership were not always the classic ownership of the land and house. Many of the houses that 73% of migrants said they owned are informal shacks on land which is not legally theirs, thus limiting ownership to the actual shack (shacks can be bought for between R 1 000 and R 5 000). Most respondents, both men and women, lived in tin shacks (57%) and 40% of households extended beyond the usual nuclear family number of four to include other relatives. It should be borne in mind that the 6 kl free water allocation per household per month is based on a family of eight. This is one of the reasons both environmental groups and unions have protested the basic allocation is too little. In spite of this, it would seem that protest action in Khayelitsha is limited to ad hoc engagements with government, as some 60% of respondents indicated they had never protested, or did not know if they had protested. Of the 40% who had protested, all had joined informal protest actions against the local municipality. This limited participation also extended to political identity and affiliation: not one male or female head of household was a member of any organisation that facilitated resistance or protest. The lack of political participation with regard to basic services is borne out by Nielsen’s (2003) survey of informal settlements which showed that 98-99% of informal settlement dwellers had never been in touch with their municipality to enquire/complain about leaks, burst pipes, water restrictions or the like.

Interview material does show, however, that where community action has taken place, it has yielded results, even if this has been ad hoc forms of resistance. ‘Andiswa’, who has been given her title deed by government, told of how:
We toyi-toyed when there was not enough (water)… We did (protest) a lot because there was not enough (water) and because the cost was very high. I remember in 1996 they put a lawyer in there.\textsuperscript{17} Why did they not come to speak to us first?... So we go to protest... before we write the letter we have a meeting... and the councillors say we must write a letter... so we write, everybody writes, but we get no reply, but after that we get the water. (Interview, August, 2004)

‘Thandi’ corroborated this in a second interview in the same area:

Yes (we did protest), that is why there is now a tap in every section. (Interview, August, 2004)

However, the results of these ad hoc forms of protest were not completely satisfactory. In spite of the informal settlements’ rudimentary water and sanitation project mentioned earlier, by which the Cape Town City Council pledged for reasons of health and safety to provide at least basic water and sanitation to all settlements regardless of the legality of their land occupation, there are clearly many areas where this has not yet taken place, even after the July 2004 deadline. Khayelitsha, for example, is one of the older areas, and yet even here ‘Thandi’ pointed out that as far back as the 1990s, “they talked about temporary toilets... but nothing has happened”. As a result thousands of residents are forced to walk to unoccupied land (the bush) raising issues of safety, hygiene and health. Even where rudimentary toilets are in place it is still often the case that these are far from safe or hygienic.

Follow up protest action has not taken place, despite very inadequate or non-existent sanitation conditions in some areas. Neither ‘Thandi’ nor ‘Nomsa’ have access to toilets either communally or in their yard and both have to use the field or rely on the goodwill of neighbours. Both pointed out that this goodwill could not be stretched too far as there were many in the community who did not have toilets and those who did could become “cross” if asked for access all the time. Most
often, the nearby bush had to serve and both indicated that this was not safe, especially at night. Both had been living in the area for a number of years. In addition, ‘Nomsa’ pointed out that over 500 people use the single tap in her area, making the pressure on that one facility high. In this same area there were no toilets, not even temporary ones.

In terms of the link between political identity, engagement and financial position, only 56% of those interviewed had some form of non-permanent employment, but what is interesting is the relative incomes of the households in general, as opposed to the gender disaggregated figures. Of the total, 18% earned between R100 and R550, 38% earned between R550 and R950 and 35% earned between R950 and R1 500.

In contrast, women heads of households earn significantly less than men. Thirty-seven per cent of women earned between R100 and R550, 36% earned between R550 and R950, and only 9% earned between R950 and R1 500. Interestingly, a larger number of women earned between R1 500 and R4 500 – a gender disaggregated 9% as opposed to the aggregate of 2%, perhaps showing some of the effects of affirmative action.

The ability of households to pay for water services as well as upgrades is thus limited by their income. In spite of this, Nielson’s 2003 survey showed that 39% of informal settlement dwellers are prepared to pay for service upgrades to ablution facilities. It may be that community action demanding services is restricted to absolute essentials, namely the supply of water, and that sanitation facilities, or the lack of them, have not formed a lobbying point for protest action on a continuous basis.

Rights

Another thought-provoking finding was the lack of knowledge among interviewees around the right to FBW. While government has ostensibly tried to ensure education in this regard, 79% of all respondents said they did not understand their rights to water, although 38% did say
they knew they had a right to a daily allowance of water. Lack of clarity around what precisely these rights entail may be one of the factors prohibiting participation here. For example, some respondents reply to the question, “Do you know your rights to water?” would be a blunt “yes”, but asked to explain, or prompted with the question, “Do you know of your right to 25 litres per person per day?” the reply would then be “no”. ‘Andiswa’ also gave voice to a commonly held belief when asked about whether she understood her rights to water. Replying “yes”, she went on to say that “Jesus sends the water...so I have a right to that water”. The belief that water is God-given and should not be something that government should tithe, has occurred in this and other fieldwork in Southern Africa on water and rights to water.

Nielsen’s study showed that “very few residents in informal areas believe that they have access to 25 litres of free water per day (5%) and even fewer (1%) have access to health and hygiene education”. Residents also indicated that in general they were not consulted on decisions taken by the CCT on the provision of basic water and sanitation. According to Nielsen’s survey data, only 27% had been consulted about basic service delivery. This gives some indication of the extent to which government also makes decisions on behalf of communities and then validates these in terms of cultural preferences, for example the CCT’s decision to put toilets and taps of the periphery of informal settlements which many interviewees mentioned as unsafe and too far away to go to at night.

Safety

The vast majority of all respondents were concerned about safety. In the CSAS study, 76% replied that they felt it was not safe to fetch water or go to the toilet at night, as opposed to 98% in Nielsen’s study. High incidences of rape and assault occur in these areas and it is especially unsafe for women and children. Ramsay, Director of Service Delivery for CCT, is somewhat dismissive of this problem, stating:
If you have got a 25 litre can and you fill it in the afternoon it should hold for the evening. The toilet is the problem, rather than the standpipe. There is a mixture of community views on this issue. Some of them don’t like the toilets linked to the house because of the smell. So some of the communities prefer the toilets to be on the extremity even though this poses risks at night. And there are various interpretations of what is acceptable with regard to toilets. Some men prefer to urinate outside the toilet because they don’t like to face the faeces. Whether that is just because the condition of the toilet is poor, or whether this is what people say they prefer is difficult to establish. There are a lot of sensitivities around that. Generally those toilets are not the kind of toilets you would like to have next to your house. Density is also a problem. (Interview, 18 May 2004)

This approach is somewhat insensitive to the fact that heads of households may not have time in the afternoon to “fill a 25 litre can”. It naturalises the carrying of water in townships as normal and presumes there are able bodied members of the household to do this during the day or night. Carrying 25 litres of water in one go is quite a feat, even for the strongest and most capable of men and women. Likewise, it would appear that in many cases putting toilets on the periphery of community settlements is also easier for government. Van Niekerk, coordinator of the informal settlements services delivery upgrade programme, states that community density and illegal land occupation also play a large role in council’s decision to locate toilets on the periphery of housing settlements. It would seem therefore that there is a tendency to fall back on dubious ‘ethnic preference’ hypotheses, rather than an accurate understanding of what communities want. This is borne out by interviewees’ comments on lack of consultation on questions of water and sanitation supply on the part of the local municipality, as indicated above.
Ramsay does point out that there are insufficient channels of communication in this regard between government and township communities:

We would love to have more participation, not only in terms of infrastructural delivery but also in terms of education for WDM. There is a lot of work still to be done in terms of WDM education, i.e. what should go down a toilet and what shouldn’t. But it takes a lot of staff, and council has made a decision not to appoint any new staff so there has been an attrition rate of about 5%. Manpower resources are thus severely constrained. Public participation processes take a lot of hard work...I think it is essential, but at the moment our constraints are very high. So you will find that at the moment this [informal settlement upgrade] project to install these facilities is a high priority – politically it is a high priority – so you can appoint consultants to do the consulting, but it is not sustainable. We should have the staff there so that a relationship is built up and that can sustain it through the difficult times. (Interview, 15 June 2004)

Clearly, ‘spaces’ for participation are somewhat constrained. This may corroborate some of the points made earlier about the political opportunity structures available to poor communities to mobilise and to voice their opinions and exercise their rights.

Political identity and mobilisation

Another important finding of the Khayelitsha fieldwork was the degree to which a large percentage of respondents appeared to lack political affiliation. Of the total of both male and female respondents, 45% said that they had no political affiliation. This percentage is even higher among women, with 55% of women stating that they did not belong to a political party. Given the extent to which the ANC’s organisational structure has provided a platform for political participation (on wom-
en’s issues, among other things), this might indicate a relative lack of absorption into the structures which are in place and either a disaffection or lack of interest in party politics among the very poor.

**Woman-headed households and water service delivery in Khayelitsha**

**Living conditions, rights and mobilisation**

As discussed above, in the sample the majority of women heads of households tended to be financially worse off than male heads of households, although there are signs of a growing percentage of high income earners among women. While only 18% of the aggregate total earned below R 550 a month, 37% of these were women. On the other hand, 15% of women earned more than R 1 500 a month. In woman-headed households 40% of the women were single, 24% were married with husbands living elsewhere and 18% were divorced. Divorced and married women received maintenance from (ex)husbands, but this was generally erratic. In terms of this research, women were not significantly worse or better off than men in terms of housing: 36% owned brick houses (i.e. they legally owned both the house and the land through subsidisation) and 58% lived in tin shacks.

More women than men were not aware of their rights or did not understand them. Only 24% of women respondents answered that they understood their rights to water. Also, as mentioned earlier, a larger percentage of woman-headed households pay for water: 49% as opposed to 40% of the aggregate figure (men and women). Women had also protested less than men: 67% of women respondents said they had never protested about services. All women respondents also said they had no organisational affiliation on services (i.e. did not belong to some form of community grouping, such as water forums).
It may be that the lack of mobilisation is due to the fact that service delivery is about quality of life issues, which many poor heads of households may not have the time to address, as opposed to critical life or death issues. Most respondents indicated that they had enough water for washing and cleaning (58%) and all had some access to water, even if it’s source was relatively far away. A greater percentage did not have access to toilets (35%). It would seem that while basic service delivery is being implemented in townships (at least in terms of FBW), quality of access remains a huge problem, posing health and environmental safety risks for communities as a whole, and in particular women and children. In spite of this, mobilisation on issues of water service delivery among migrant women remains minimal. Given the concern with health and safety that all respondents expressed, it seems unusual that there is not a greater level of mobilisation. This may have something to do with the fragmented political identities of migrant communities, both men and women. These groups do not seem to display a high degree of political involvement and a large percentage of them remain unaware of their rights. The CSAS fieldwork planned for the next phase of this research aims to investigate this aspect more closely.

Conclusion

While the fieldwork sample undertaken by the CSAS was very small, it does highlight some thought-provoking issues with relation to mobilisation in general and the mobilisation of migrants, men and women, in particular. While generalisations based on such a small sample are inevitably only very tentative thoughts on possible community tendencies, it would seem that the conclusions of Leysens (2004) following Cox’s typologies are of some relevance: very marginalised groups tend not to mobilise and a large percentage seem disengaged from the processes of
democratic citizenship, although most do meet their responsibilities with regard to paying for water, where this is applicable. In part this is due to economic marginalisation, although there are indications that there is potential for upward movement on the economic scale. Nonetheless there does also seem to be a tendency to mobilise based on crisis issues relating to water service delivery. This is largely spontaneous and unorganised.

Many of the respondents stated that they did not feel they ‘belonged’ in Cape Town, and wished to return to their homes in the rural areas, or to move elsewhere. ‘Andiswa’ echoes the feelings of other interviewees when she states that Khayelitsha is not home forever, and that she wants her “children to learn and then after that I want to go back to the Ciskei when I get my pension...I know my children want to stay, but my future is there, Ciskei. I love my children to stay...I will come and visit”. Furthermore, social cohesion and trust seem to be patchy, and all respondents were concerned about their general safety in the townships. Political identity appears weak in terms of political affiliation for both men and women; similarly, there seems to be a lack of awareness about community groupings, CBOs, NGOs and the like that take up ‘brown’ environmental issues, such as those related to water. This may partly be to do with the displacement effect which internal migrants feel in the townships, and partly to do with the relative lack of political opportunities. As has been pointed out, government has created small ‘spaces’ for participation, often on its own terms, and these tend to enforce its policies and practices. There remains significant scope for social activism and mobilisation, but much of it appears unutilised, certainly in relation to bigger water related issues such as the effect of the building of the Skuifraam Dam on water tariffs and likewise government’s tendency to fall back on water restrictions rather than comprehensive WDM strategies.
Where grassroots mobilisation occurs, it is also clear that global/local environmental groups do not have the resources to sufficiently galvanise communities. If this small study does highlight one clear tendency, it is for marginalised groups to organise themselves around issues important to their day-to-day survival only when these are deemed critical. It remains to be seen, however, whether the situation in the greater CCT will remain as non-conflictual on water and service delivery in the future, as the effects of supply side management take their toll on rich and poor, migrants, marginalised and the mobilised alike. The ability of the women’s movement, unions and the environmental movement to form alliances on these issues of political and economic rights will play themselves out in the context of issues such as rights to water and other basic services. The extent to which migrants and especially women begin to form stronger community alliances which play themselves into social movements may thus emerge in the years to come. However, it would seem that the processes of social mobilisation among marginalised migrant groups, particularly women, remain ad hoc and unorganised with regard to their rights to water service delivery.

Endnotes

1 The Gender and Migration Project, funded by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad), began in 1998 and ended in 2004.

2 Adequate housing is critical to adequate quality of water services in urban areas. This study looks primarily at water services, due to space constraints, but the type of housing and service quality in water delivery is examined in some detail.
Survey questionnaires and qualitative questions were put to 55 heads of households. This fieldwork was undertaken by Thobani Matheza. This paper is written by Lisa Thompson.

The video is available from the CSAS. The making of it was made possible by funding from the Vlaamse Universitaire Raad (VLIR), Norad and the UK Department for International Development (DFID).

Poverty here is understood to mean erratic and/or low income individuals or households with poor access to housing and basic service infrastructure. Chronic poverty relates to structural and social dynamics including a lack of education and skills, and to nutritional and health status, which prevent individuals or households from improving their living standards. The figures in Appendix 1 and 2 show that not all households in the CSAS were chronically poor and a few may even be described as only relatively poor. Measuring poverty – as attempted by the UNDP and other organisations – does tend to try to quantify its ‘measurable aspects’ to achieve comparative perspective. Of course, disparities of wealth and relative opportunity in a specific context can contribute to the psychological aspects of poverty in ways that are impossible to quantify. It is accepted that measuring poverty is a subjective, context bound process, but at the same time, the concept of poverty does serve to highlight the vast structural and social disparities between communities and households. Nonetheless, in South Africa disparities of wealth and privilege exacerbate the psychological aspects of relative poverty. For a detailed discus-

6 In his seminal work, *Production, power and world order*, Cox has examined the configurations of social forces in relations of production from the 1800s through to the present to establish patterns in the types of state formations and world orders, and so assess the transformatory potential of social forces within and between states. See bibliography.

7 A small percentage (2%) earned more than this amount. See Appendix 1.

8 The dataset is unfortunately not gender disaggregated.

9 There are no ratepayers associations in the traditionally black (African) townships, as houses under R 50 000 are not liable for rates and taxes charges and building costs for 98% of houses are between R 20 000 and R 25 000. Ward councils exist, but none of our respondents were active in them.

10 There is some inconsistency on this point given that HIV/AIDS is mentioned as a major contributor to slower population growth rate figures over the next 10-20 years, while projected growth is based on historical growth trends over the last 10 years (of 4%).

11 One innovative solution in terms of WDM is the CCT's pressure regulation control mechanisms, which regulate water pressure in peak and non-peak user times. Water pressure is lowered in non-peak usage times to conserve water, as the CCT is unable to keep up with service maintenance as a way of preventing water wastage (taps being left open, broken, parts stolen etc.) (Mostert, interview,
11 May 2004). Further schemes such as this pressure management one are being investigated. According to the CCT’s Information Sheet on the scheme, “the savings achieved on the project can be considered as sufficient to fill an Olympic sized swimming pool every two hours, a large concrete reservoir every day and a medium-sized dam/reservoir every year”. The scheme was initiated in 2001 and completed in February 2002. Environmental groups have argued that such WDM strategies could help to shift the CCT’s emphasis away from dam building and supply side measures (CCT Khayelitsha Pressure Management Project Information Sheet, 2002).

12 In the case of the Berg Water Project, approval for building the Skuifraam Dam was sought in the early 1990s, prior to the global environmental movement’s success in lobbying governments towards more progressive policies on dam building. Similarly, local mobilisation was sporadic, and driven by a few environmental organisations with big agendas. The Environmental Monitoring Group (EMG) and the Cape Town branch of the Wildlife and Environmental Society of Southern Africa (WESSA) played a role in questioning government’s motivation for building the dam in the absence of an effective WDM policy. WESSA was also instrumental in the setting up of the Skuifraam Action Group (SAG) which presented its case on the building of the dam to the World Commission on Dams Multi-stakeholder symposium in 2001. Samwu also opposed the building of the dam on the basis of the knock-on effects of higher tariffs on poorer communities. However, government cited the participatory
process which led up to the approval of the EIA as proof that communities had had a chance to feed into government environmental policy and WRM pertaining to the building of the dam. Other community groupings, such as the West Coast User group, only opposed the EIA after it had been approved by government, and after the ‘official’ process of public participation. Government could then legitimately state that it had sought public approval and had conducted the necessary scientific surveys, thereafter refusing to enter into further negotiations with the environmental groups and Samwu on the dam (Thompson, 2005).

13 The step up tariffs will mean a gradual increase in the price of water (around 10% per annum) over the next few years. Thereafter the tariff is, in theory, meant to decrease again – however, the CCT has other water supply schemes in the pipeline. Whether the ‘step down’ tariff ever takes place remains to be seen.

14 2% of respondents’ questionnaires were incomplete.

15 Of the 38 heads of households headed de facto or de jure by women, all were migrants from either the former Ciskei or Transkei.

16 Assuming a low inflation rate of 6.5% the average water tariff is set to rise by 10% between 2003/4 and 2006/7 – or 50% in five years, and thereafter at between 5% and 9%.

17 To the old Stocks and Stocks building, which now houses the municipality in Khayelitsha. Many respondents refer to the municipality as ‘Stocks and Stocks’.
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Interviews

Anthea Bingle, Former National Treasurer to South African National NGO Coalition (SANGOCO), 10 March 2004.
Patrick Dowling, Wildlife and Environment Society of Southern Africa (WESSA), Western Cape Branch, 8 June 2004.
Mike Luger, Engineer and author of the Skuifraam Dam EIA, Ninham Shand, 18 May 2004.
Gareth McConcie, Engineer, DWAF, 17 December 2003.
David Ramsay, Director, Water Services, CTMC, 18 May 2004.
Appendix 1: Migrant interview information

1. Do you rent or own where you are living?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rent or Own</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Own</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenant</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not renting</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Who do you share with?

4. Who helped you find it (if renting) who helped you buy it (if owned)?
5. Where do you get your water for washing, cleaning, cooking and drinking?

6. Do you have a toilet?
7. Do you pay for water?

8. Do you have enough water for washing, cleaning, cooking and drinking?
9. Have you ever got sick from dirty water where you stay?

10. (If they have to fetch water) is it safe to fetch water/go to the toilet at night?
11. Have you ever protested about the cost of water?

12. Do you understand your rights to water?
13. Do you know you are entitled to a daily allowance of free water?

14. Where originally from?
15. Highest level of education

16. Gender balance
17. Income level per month

18. Marital status
19. Employment status

20. Political affiliation
21. **Age group**

![Pie chart showing age group distribution.](image-url)
Appendix 2: Gender disaggregated information

1. Do you rent or own where you are living?

2. What sort of house is it?
3. Do you pay the municipality for water?

4. Have you ever protested about the cost of water?
5. Do you understand your rights to water?

6. Income level per month
7. Marital status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divorced</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widow</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cohabit</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Employment status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. Political affiliation