Although the idea of citizenship is nearly universal today, what it means and how it is experienced are not. Nor have they ever been. As a reading of the literature quickly reveals, the history of citizenship in both North and South has been a history of struggle over how it is to be defined and who it is to include. However, what is also clear is that a great deal of the theoretical debate about citizenship today is taking place in an ‘empirical void’ (Lister and others, in Chapter 7), where the views and perspectives of ‘ordinary’ citizens are largely absent. We do not know what citizenship means to people – particularly people whose status as citizens is either non-existent or extremely precarious – or what these meanings tell us about the goal of building inclusive societies.

The contributions to this volume go some way towards addressing this void. They explore the meanings and experiences of citizenship in different parts of the world, giving particular attention to the perspectives of the poor and socially excluded. Their contributions thus touch on the different mechanics of exclusion which consign certain groups within a society to the status of lesser citizens or of non-citizens, and on the struggles by such groups to redefine, extend and transform ‘given’ ideas about rights, duties and citizenship. They therefore help to shed light on what inclusive citizenship might mean when it is viewed from the standpoint of the excluded. They also touch on some of the important debates in the field of citizenship studies.

These debates have tended to be conducted as a series of binary oppositions, in which one term in the opposition is associated with classical liberal theory, and, by extension, ‘Western’ theory, while the other term reflects a critique of that theory from a variety of different political, cultural and philosophical traditions (see Stammers, in Chapter...
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3). Classical liberal theory claims that all human beings have rights by virtue of their humanity: such rights are consequently universal. One set of debates in the field of citizenship studies challenges this claim to universalism with a counter-claim of the particularity or cultural relativism of rights.

Classical liberal theory takes the individual as conceptually and ontologically prior to society and hence as the ultimate bearer of these rights, regardless of their status in society. A second set of debates challenges the idea of individual rights by pointing to contexts in which it is the rights of groups which are relevant and which should take priority over the rights of individuals.

Classical liberal theory recognizes civil and political rights as the only ‘true’ rights because they promote the freedom of individuals to act. The duty of the state is to defend this freedom. Social and economic rights are seen as entailing excessive state intervention, drawing on public resources and hence constituting an infringement of individual liberty. A third set of debates challenges this view and suggests that economic, social and cultural rights give substance to political and civil rights for the poor and marginalized: these different categories of rights are therefore interdependent and indivisible.

A fourth set of debates touched on in this book concerns the relationship between rights and duties. While liberal theory has always recognized that rights carry correlative duties, classical liberal theory treated rights as unconditional and hence prior to duties. Individuals enjoyed rights by virtue of their citizenship, regardless of whether they owned property, participated in public life, paid taxes or any of the other qualifications associated, for instance, with republican notions of citizenship. This has been challenged in recent times by neo-liberal thinkers for whom citizens must ‘earn’ their rights and for whom, therefore, duties precede rights. A number of contributions in this book consider the implications of this revised emphasis for patterns of inclusion and exclusion in the practice of citizenship.

In the rest of this introductory chapter, I will elaborate on these points in greater detail in order to draw out some of the unifying themes of the book. The next section explores some of the values and meanings associated with the idea of citizenship in the different narratives which appear in the book. The third section considers how key debates about citizenship, rights and duties have been interpreted by the authors in this book in the light of these values and meanings. The fourth section discusses the emergence of an explicit rights-based approach within the development agenda, and the challenges associated with its implementation. The final section draws together various strands of the
discussion to consider what they suggest about the meaning of citizenship from the standpoint of excluded groups.

Values and meanings in the expression of citizenship

The narratives about citizenship in this book offer us certain insights into how excluded groups define themselves in different contexts, how they see themselves in relation to others and what this implies for their understanding of citizenship in the world as they know it. While their experiences clearly vary a great deal both by context and by the nature of their exclusion, their testimonies and actions suggest there are certain values that people associate with the idea of citizenship which cut across the various boundaries that divide them. These values may not be universal but they are widespread enough to suggest that they constitute a significant aspect of the organization of collective life and of the way in which people connect with each other. And because they are being expressed by groups who have experienced exclusion in some form or other, these values also articulate their vision of what a more inclusive society might imply.

Justice

First and foremost, the ideas about citizenship to be found in these chapters express adherence to some notion of justice. This is not the retributive notion of justice – or revenge – which Renfrew (1990), for instance, claims has near-universal status, but rather a notion of justice which revolves around when it is fair for people to be treated the same and when it is fair that they should be treated differently. The villagers who made up the audience for the various scenarios about citizenship enacted by the Theatre for Development in Nigeria prioritized ethnicity as the basis of their identity and their primary affiliation (Abah and Okworii, Chapter 4). Nevertheless they protested at examples where individuals were discriminated against by those in authority on grounds of their ethnicity. Whatever their own particular affiliation, they expected the state and its representatives to act fairly and impartially towards its citizens.

In the state of Tennessee in the United States, the campaign to give undocumented immigrants, or ‘non-citizens’, the right to a driver’s licence was couched for pragmatic reasons as a matter of the health and safety of the citizens of Tennessee, but it was also used to open up a public dialogue in which the very visible labour contributions that undocumented immigrants made to the prosperity of the state could be compared to the lack of rights and recognition accorded to them by that
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state (Ansley, Chapter 12). It was the search for justice which led members of the Wallacedene community in South Africa to seek enforcement of the constitutional right to housing in the highest court of the land (Williams, Chapter 13). For some, their claims were based on the principle of equivalence with others: ‘We want suitable houses to be built for us like it is happening elsewhere’. For others, their claims reflected a more historical sense of equivalence: that they should be restored to their rightful land and place in society now that the apartheid state was gone.

For the landless women and men organized by Nijera Kori in Bangladesh, the knowledge that the constitution of the country recognized their rights to basic food, land, shelter, education and health was the basis of their struggle for equality, for ‘substantive’ rather than formal citizenship (Kabeer, Chapter 11). For Naripokkho, a feminist organization in Bangladesh, the constitution itself was found to be flawed because it allowed religion to dictate the lesser status of women (Huq, Chapter 10). However, while the organization wanted equality before the law for women – a uniform civil code – it also wanted the state to recognize what was ‘different’ about women and what this implied for law, for policy and for their citizenship.

Recognition

This raises a second set of values associated with the idea of citizenship in the narratives in this book. Closely bound up with the demands for justice by many disempowered groups is a demand for recognition: recognition of the intrinsic worth of all human beings, but also recognition of and respect for their differences. There are, as Fraser (1997) points out, forms of injustice which are rooted in hegemonic cultural definitions which deny full personhood to certain groups – definitions which may be formalized in law or built into policy. The search for recognition by such groups often first takes the form of the demand for what Hannah Arendt (1986) called ‘the right to have rights’, to be recognized as full persons, despite their difference, and hence as full citizens. Thus, for members of Naripokkho, as Huq points out: ‘Our experience of discrimination as women led us to demand fair treatment and respect for our dignity as human beings, and only thereafter to claim our rights and entitlements as citizens’.

The ‘right to have rights’ was at the heart of the Zapatista struggle (Cortez, Chapter 8): their demand for the right to difference was encapsulated in the vision of the world they aspired to achieve:

In the world of the powerful there is no space for anyone but themselves
and their servants. In the world we want everyone fits. In the world we want many worlds fit. The nation which we construct is one where all communities and languages fit, where all steps may walk, where all may have laughter, where all may live the dawn.


The agreement they signed with the Mexican government included acceptance of multicultural education which would refashion the nation’s culture and history from the perspective of its Indian citizens because, as a Zapatista memorandum put it, ‘By speaking in its Indian heart, the nation maintains its dignity and its memory’ (Henriquez and Rochas 1995, cited in Yudice 1998, p. 366).

The Zapatistas were able to use their command of some of the most advanced means of representation available today – the news media and the Internet – to speak to the global imagination and to mobilize global support for the historical struggle of the Indian community in Mexico for dignity and respect. Other contributions in this book testify that dignity and respect are also essential to the idea of citizenship in less visible, more quotidian moments of life. When residents of the favelas in Brazil mobilized in the 1980s to demand the right to use the land on which they lived, their first act was to seek to publicize the results of their own survey to show the other citizens of their city that they too were decent, hard-working citizens – in other words, deserving of rights – rather than ‘idle people, marginals or prostitutes’ as the popular stereotypes suggest (Dagnino, Chapter 9).

However, the power of stereotypes derives from their persistence, regardless of evidence: the favela residents interviewed by Wheeler some years later (see Chapter 6) continued to experience their lack of citizenship, not so much as economic deprivation, but as the lack of respect that characterized their everyday interactions with society and state: ‘Dignity is everything for a citizen – and we have no dignity. We are treated like cattle in the clinics, on the buses, and in the shops’.

Self-determination
A third set of values which features in the accounts in this book relates to self-determination, people’s ability to exercise some degree of control over their lives. Where rights are seen to promote the capacity for self-determination, the struggle for rights is expressed in ways that reflect particular experiences of being denied self-determination. In many cases, it is the individual’s right to self-determination that is the object of struggle. As Stammers points out, the right to property was, in the early struggles for citizenship in Europe, as much about the right to
property in oneself’ as it was about ownership and control over resources, and it was claimed as a means of restraining the absolute power of the monarchy over all persons as well as things within its realm. Many of the early political and civil rights, including freedom of movement and religious belief and to dispose of one’s labour and property, all helped to express and uphold the rights of individuals over their own lives in this struggle against absolute power.

The desire for individual self-determination is also evident in the demands of indigenous women in Mexico. As Belaustegui guitoita (2000) notes, the First Declaration of War of the Zapatistas’ National Liberation Army, issued within days of the uprising in January 1994, also contained the Revolutionary Women’s Laws, which spelt out what indigenous women considered to be essential to their dignity as human beings: these included demands about their public participation – the right to be elected to the community’s decision-making positions, to go to meetings and to participate in community councils – as well as demands relating to the private sphere: women’s right to choose whom they would marry, and when (also phrased as the right to go on studying if they wanted), the right not to be beaten within the home and the demand that rape within the family be punished. Not all these demands found their way into the subsequent agenda of the Zapatista movement, but the opportunity to express them brought new hope to women who had hitherto been denied any voice: ‘Yes, the situation has changed a little. I think that there will be a time when we, as young women, at least will have the right to decide what we want to do with our lives, whether we want to study or have different responsibilities’ (Cortez).

In Bangladesh, Naripokkho is concerned with women’s right to self-determination in a context where, along with gender inequalities in access to resources such as education, property, jobs, health care and so on (of the kind which can found in most of the world), patriarchal power is also exercised through various forms of control over women’s bodies: how their bodies are defined, what physical activities they are permitted, what physical space they can occupy and the punitive actions which are taken against them should they fail to comply with these strictures.

Not surprisingly, body politics has played a central role in Naripokkho’s activities in the form of campaigns against violence against women both within the home and in the public domain; solidarity with sex workers, transsexuals and other groups whose marginalization is defined in gendered terms; and advocacy around health and reproductive services. Naripokkho’s body politics is personal as well as public: it has led its members to reflect on how they
experience their own bodies, their own freedom of movement, their own physical deportment and their own attitudes to sexuality.

**Solidarity**
A final set of values which emerges out of the narratives about citizenship in this book is to do with *solidarity*, the capacity to identify with others and to act in unity with them in their claims for justice and recognition. The form that solidarity takes varies, not only according to the ‘included’ or ‘excluded’ status of particular individuals and groups, but also the extent to which they hope to transcend their excluded status. For those who do not have such hope, solidarity can take a very narrow form, limited only to those who experience the same daily struggles or, even more narrowly, to one’s own family and kin.

These differing circles of solidarity are evident in the narratives of the young people interviewed in the British city of Leicester (Lister with others). While for the majority, who did not necessarily regard themselves as ‘outsiders’, the idea of ‘British-ness’ as the basis of citizenship appeared too remote from their everyday lives to have much resonance, they did identify citizenship with ability to make a contribution to society as they understood it. For some, this contribution was defined in very general terms: participation in paid work or payment of tax. For others, it was defined more specifically as some form of involvement with their communities: they defined the ‘good citizen’ in terms of ‘respect’, for themselves, for others and for their environment, and ‘caring’ – looking out for others, helping people in the neighbourhood, giving something back to society. Significantly, however, those groups who constituted ‘outsiders’ tended to define their obligations far more narrowly in terms of looking after themselves or their immediate families.

Similarly, in the *favelas* of Rio de Janeiro, strong feelings of alienation from formal politics and from the idea of ‘Brazilian-ness’ as the basis of their identity had led residents, who saw themselves as ‘lacking citizenship’ in the wider society, to define themselves either in relation to their extended family networks or else in terms of their immediate neighbourhood, those who shared the same habitat and experienced the same frustrations (Wheeler).

The elderly black man in Cape Town who explained to Williams that his neighbourhood wanted support but not welfare from the state also expressed a solidarity with his immediate community and a desire for localized forms of self-determination. He wanted the state to respect the constitutional entitlement of his community to shelter; he wanted
them to be told how things worked and then he wanted that they be left to get on with their own lives.

However, when solidarity takes more overtly political forms, it is expressed as a demand for collective self-determination which extends beyond those who share the frustrations of daily life. Such solidarity may be on the basis of the shared experience of oppression, or it may be in response to perceived injustice to others. The mobilization of dispossessed groups historically (Stammers) and today (Kabeer) to exercise collective power over the terms and conditions on which they sell their labour; the struggles of indigenous people to claim their place in their nation’s history (Cortez); the attempts by women’s organizations to challenge the manifestations of patriarchal power in public and private domains and thereby redefine the boundaries between the two (Huq) are all examples of solidarity based on a shared sense of oppression.

Examples of solidarity based on perceived injustice to others can be found in the role of external catalysts like Nijera Kori in Bangladesh, which organizes landless men and women to claim their rights (Kabeer), and MDS in Rajasthan, working with nomadic groups towards the same end (Pant, Chapter 5). Such external catalysts are often critical, as Pant points out, in situations where disempowerment is manifested as a lack of agency and organizational capacity. The citizens of Tennessee who participated in the campaign to provide undocumented migrants with driving licences were also expressing solidarity in response to perceived injustice with a group of people who were outside their immediate circle of family and friends.

And it is worth noting that while the Zapatistas were fighting for the right to collective self-determination for indigenous communities in Mexico, they also saw themselves as fighting for the rights of all marginalized groups, not just in Mexico but in the rest of the world. As a leading figure put it: ‘Marcos is gay in San Francisco, Black in South Africa, Asian in Europe, Chicano in San Isidro, anarchist in Spain, Palestinian in Israel, Indian in the streets of San Cristobal…’ (EZLN, Documentos y Communicados, 1994, cited in Belausteguiogitia 2000).

Rights and duties in debates around citizenship

The values and meanings of citizenship discussed above are drawn from the narratives of groups who have been assigned a marginal status within their societies. They therefore offer a particular standpoint from which to consider some of the central debates in the field of citizenship studies. However, just as excluded groups are not homogenous either in the
mechanisms by which they are excluded or in their concrete experience of exclusion, so too the standpoints that their narratives offer will not necessarily lead to converging positions on these debates. They may share similar values at the abstract level – the values described above are, after all, particular ways of talking about liberty, equality, fraternity, the ‘meta-values’ which inspired the French Revolution over two centuries ago – but these values will be ranked differently and interpreted differently by different people at different times. In this section, we consider what the contributions to this book have to say about some of the key debates in the field of citizenship studies.

**Universalism versus particularism**

The contributions which touch explicitly on the debate over the universality versus the particularity of human rights acknowledge the tension between the two positions but suggest that the two sets of claims can be treated as the abstract and concrete sides of the same coin, rather than as opposing principles of a dichotomy. In a globally differentiated world, universalism cannot be taken for granted. It has to be worked for in different contexts, and these different contexts will shape the concrete forms that are given to abstract rights. Actor-oriented approaches to the question of rights make this clear. Such an approach is captured, for instance, in Mamdani’s argument that rights are defined by struggle, and that rights-struggles are born of experiences of deprivation and oppression:

> Without the experience of sickness, there can be no idea of health. And without the fact of oppression, there can be no practice of resistance and no notion of rights … Wherever there was (and is) oppression – and Europe had no monopoly over oppression in history – there must come into being a conception of rights.

*Mamdani, 1989, pp. 1–2, cited in Nyamu-Musembi*

As Nyamu-Musembi comments: ‘Viewed from this perspective, human rights are both universal and particular: universal because the experience of resistance to oppression is shared among subjugated groups the world over, but also particular because resistance is shaped in response to the peculiarities of the relevant social context’.

A similar point is made by Stammers. He notes that the universalist construction given to rights in the Western context can be traced to the particularities of the historical struggle of the oppressed against their oppression within that context. The claim for the universality of ‘natural’ rights, premised on the universality of the human condition, served a strategic purpose in challenging prevailing claims to power by
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an absolute monarch: ‘Given that claims to absolutist power were legitimized transcendentally – by monarchs claiming Divine Right – it is not hard to see why oppositional social actors would seek to develop equally strong transcendent claims in efforts to de-legitimize them’. However, despite the universalism claimed for human rights, he suggests that whenever rights are instantiated as the rights of citizens within specific legal, political and state formations, they necessarily take on a ‘particularistic’ form.

Of course, it is widely recognized that the status of human being was often selectively rather than universally applied, so that even within Western society itself, citizenship was not a fully inclusive concept: quite aside from the ‘exclusions from without’ practised on the basis of slavery and empire, there were exclusions from within on grounds of gender, class and ethnicity. Nevertheless, the promise of universality contained in the idea of rights has proved to be a useful resource for groups seeking to pursue their claims for justice and recognition.

It was the promise of universalism contained in the idea of human rights which led to the extension of the political franchise to the previously excluded working class and in turn allowed them to demand the economic and social rights which would guarantee their access to the basic necessities of life, independent of their status in the market. This process of ‘de-commodification’ allowed labour to rescue itself from the status of just a commodity to be bought and sold in the marketplace (which unregulated market forces were threatening to reduce it to) and to gain the status and dignity of human beings and citizens (Marshall 1950). As Mehta points out, the language of universal rights may once again provide an important counter-discourse to the neo-liberal discourse of commodification which dominates current policy agendas across the world and is being used to legitimate the extension of market forces to every area of social life, including the provision of basic needs.

Women’s groups throughout the world, including Naripokkho (although this is not mentioned in Huq’s contribution), have also responded to the promise of universalism, seeking to re-frame women’s rights as human rights as a way to underscore their claims for equality (sameness) and equity (difference). As Bunch with others (2001) notes: ‘Human rights language creates a space in which different accounts of women’s lives and new ways of demanding change can be developed. It provides a set of overarching principles to frame alternative visions of gender justice, without dictating the precise content of those visions’ (p. 223).

By using the large body of international conventions, agreements and
commitments as political leverage, women have been able to gain recognition and ratification for new kinds of rights, rights which reflect an ‘embodied’ rather than a disembodied understanding of what it is to be human, and hence an embodied, rather than an abstract, view of citizenship. Reproductive rights and recognition of human rights violations within the family are examples of these new kinds of rights, whose history is tied up with the emergence of women as collective actors in the public arena and their willingness to challenge pre-defined notions of the boundaries between public and private.

Individual versus collective rights
However, the implications which can be drawn from some of the contributions in this book, as well as the wider literature on debates about group versus individual rights, serve to illustrate the continuing tensions between the universal and the particular (see, for instance, Kabeer 2001). As Parekh (1993) has pointed out, for all its claims to universalism, liberal individualism as philosophical tradition and legal practice is the product of a particular history, the history of industrialization, in a particular context, ‘the West’. Hence its adherence to the idea of the individual as the bearer of rights which are independent of their social relations and place in society does not have universal resonance. Even within the Western tradition, established liberal philosophers such as Isaiah Berlin (1969/1958) have noted the importance of group identity and affiliation as an aspect of citizenship for those who have been marginalized by society.

What oppressed classes or nationalities, as a rule, demand is neither simply unhampered liberty of action for their members, nor, above everything, equality of social and economic opportunity, still less assignment of a place in a frictionless, organic state devised by the national lawgiver. What they want, as often as not, is simply recognition (of their class or nation or colour or race) as an independent source of human activity, as an entity with a will of its own, intending to act in accordance with it ... and not to be ruled, educated, guided ... as being not quite fully human, and therefore not quite fully free.

Historically, struggles for national independence in the ‘Western’ context, including the American war for independence, were struggles for the right to collective self-determination, in this case, by ‘the people’ of the United States. Many of the struggles of workers and socialist activists were also struggles for collective rights: the right to organize and to bargain collectively (Stammers). More recently, the influx of
immigrants from very different cultural backgrounds has given rise to multicultural engagement with the idea of collective rights. In any case, Western societies vary considerably between the more solidaristic cultures which prevail in the Nordic countries and the greater individualism of the Anglo-Saxon countries, particularly the United States (Fraser and Gordon 1994).

Nevertheless, these are all societies in which individual rights are solidly enshrined in their constitutions, institutions and cultural sensibilities and form the backdrop against which much of daily life is conducted. By contrast, as Parekh notes, individualism as a way of being has little or no place in societies which have a strong sense of kin and community ties, where individuals meet their needs on the basis of a shared morality of claims and obligations and define their identities in relation to other members of their community: he suggests a number of Arab and African countries as example. It also runs into problems in societies which are made up of multiple communities, each of which represents affiliations which have greater meaning in the lives of their members than membership of the larger society.

Most of these societies strive after some balance between individual and group rights, but with far greater emphasis on collective rights than in most Western societies. In some cases, the balance is between different spheres of life, so that certain spheres are governed by liberal principles of individual equality before the law while others are governed by religious or tribal principles which may differentiate between individuals on the basis of age, gender or social status or curtail certain individual freedoms in the interests of the collective. Pakistan, for instance, combines primarily individual rights in the economic sphere with religious law in the sphere of the family. Other countries may differentiate between different groups, defining certain rights for all individuals belonging to a particular nation-state but according other rights on the basis of group membership. Group rights may be on the basis of ethnicity or lineage, as in a number of African states, or on the basis of religion or caste, as in South Asia.

The recognition of collective rights reflects the reality that, in many situations, individuals have multiple affiliations, and nationhood may not be the most important; but it can also result in a fragmented and divided polity rather than the ‘imagined unity’ which is the basis of viable nationhood. In Nigeria, for instance, where certain rights of citizenship are associated with ethnic descent, it is possible to have been born and spent one’s entire life in a particular state of Nigeria without qualifying for such rights in that state. Instead, these rights can only be sought in the ancestral home state, irrespective of the weakness
of ties retained with that home. Under these circumstances, individuals who are not indigenes experience various kinds of discrimination: in their children’s access to school, voting rights and so on.

Not surprisingly, it is to their kin and ethnic community that people turn for social, political and economic support. In a context where there is no public social security, such behaviour has allowed politicians from different ethnic communities to make huge capital from poverty and ‘the politics of the belly’, excluding minorities from representation in government and hence from an avenue for material accumulation and the location of economic and social facilities (Alubo 2000). As Abah and Okwori suggest, it is not clear whether the problem that Nigerians face today is that of a state without citizens – because there is no real basis for a common Nigerian identity – or that of citizens without a state, in that the possibility of a common identity is thwarted by powerful sections of the elite who benefit from reinforcing ethnic divisions.

The double-edged nature of group rights is also evident in the matter of reservations of a quota of government jobs for members of ‘untouchable’ castes in the Indian context in recognition of their historically disadvantaged status. Betteille (1983) pointed out that oppressed groups are not necessarily internally homogeneous, and job reservations could simply reinforce these internal inequalities. There are not enough government jobs to benefit more than a minority of lower-caste groups, those who were least disadvantaged, so that a policy which set out to decrease inequalities between different castes may have ended up by increasing inequalities between individuals within these castes. Parry, however, offers a modified ‘two cheers’ for this practice, because ‘for all their barbed jibes about “quota-wallahs” the higher castes have found it far more difficult to dominate and discriminate against a low-caste population, many of whom have secured decent jobs and incomes, than it had been to dominate and discriminate against an impoverished population which was still tied to its traditional, stigmatized occupations’ (Parry 2001, p. 162).

Feminists have also focused on the tensions between group and individual rights which emerge once the ‘groups’ in question are deconstructed to reveal their internal inequalities, of which gender is the most pervasive. As Nyamu-Musembi notes, the demand for individual self-determination by women as subordinate members of their communities is particularly problematic when their communities are themselves positioned as socially subordinate groups. She cites ethnographic work by Khare (1998) among ‘untouchable’ women in India who spoke of the most important right as the ‘right to survive’, which they defined in terms of access to food, clothing, housing, education,
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and secure life, ‘but not at the expense of [their] personal and community honour’. As she observes, ‘when status as a member of a particular group is so central to how one is defined in a particular social context, it leaves little room to speak of such an individual’s rights without addressing the broader issue of the group’s status as a rights-holding community’ (p. 14).

However, this interdependency between individual and group rights can often serve to undermine the capacity of subordinated members of subordinated groups to press for their individual rights when to do so appears to divide the collective struggle for recognition or to play into hegemonic discourses which denigrate such groups. In the context of Mexico, Belaustegui (2000) draws attention to some of the difficulties that indigenous women have had in asserting their rights as individuals within the Zapatista movement. As we noted earlier, the First Declaration of War of the Zapatistas’ National Liberation Army, issued within days of the uprising in January 1994, also contained the Revolutionary Women’s Laws which expressed a range of demands for indigenous women, many relating to their individual rights within the family and the community. Not all of the demands expressed in informal forums by these women – such as ‘the right to rest’ – found their way into these laws, and a further dilution took place in subsequent months. After the first round of negotiations between the Zapatistas and the government, a special communiqué delivered by the official representatives of the Zapatistas contained a very different set of ‘women’s issues’: child care centres, food for their children, kitchens and dining halls, corn mills and tortilla pressing machines for the community, livestock, technical assistance, bakery projects, artisan workshops, fair prices for their crafts and transportation.

This dilution may have been a product of tactical agreement on the part of indigenous women to give priority to the ‘larger’ struggle, or it may have been imposed on them by the leadership in the interests of the larger struggle, but it repeats a familiar pattern. It suggests to Belaustegui that, despite the leadership’s sophisticated command of the interconnections between global, national and local inequalities, it was unable or unwilling to consider patriarchy as being as able as capitalism, racialism and other hierarchies to marginalize and oppress: the specificities of women’s demands were reduced to their roles as food providers, educators and mothers.

It is this experience of women’s interests being constantly subsumed within, or subordinated to, other agendas which helps to explain the rise of ‘autonomous’ women’s organizations in different parts of the world. Deere notes, for instance, in the context of Brazil, that until the
1980s, women agricultural workers did not have the option of joining the trade unions if their husbands were already members, while women who attempted to raise the issue of women's land rights within the Movement for the Landless were told they were being divisive and advised to join the autonomous women's movement (Deere 2003, cited in Meer with Sever 2004). During the transition to democracy, women workers did precisely this, joining an autonomous rural women's movement to organize around their interests as women, including a successful campaign to include women’s rights to land within the new Brazilian constitution.

In the Bangladesh context, Naripokkho allows women activists to explore their own priorities and determine their own trade-offs in an organizational space that is not dominated either by the zero-sum politics of the mainstream parties or by the instrumentalist agendas of the development community. Indeed, the organization’s early experiences of attempting to work with women from political parties (in which their feminist politics was constantly subordinated to partisan politics) has led them to steer clear of coalition politics and opt for a strategy of alliances based on shared stands on particular issues.

Hierarchy versus indivisibility of rights
A third set of debates touched on in some of the contributions to this book concerns the privileged status granted by mainstream liberal theorists to civil and political rights over economic, social and cultural rights. By contrast, the perspectives offered by these contributions support the view that these rights are indivisible: each is essential for the realization of others. The rationale for this is quite simply the multi-dimensionality of power itself. Power may be fused in the person of the absolute monarch, as in the early European context, or it may operate through institutionally differentiated relations of state, market, community and family – in both situations, political disenfranchisement, social marginalization, cultural devaluation and economic dispossession come together in various combinations to define the condition of exclusion and marginalization.

Consequently, as Nyamu-Musembi points out, ‘people do not experience rights – or their deprivation – in a bifurcated manner, distinguishing between rights of a civil-political nature and rights of an economic-social nature’. When they protest, their protests are not confined to one or other of these spheres, but tend to straddle them both. Thus indigenous women in the Chiapas in Mexico framed their demands in terms which subverted conventional demarcations of spheres. The social-economic right to education was intimately linked
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with the political-civil right to decide who and when to marry. The ‘public’ right of voice within their community was merged with the ‘private’ right for voice within the family. Fair returns to their labour in the market-place, a demand that male workers across the world are likely to have recognized, was premised on the right to rest from their labour, a demand that few male workers have felt the need to articulate.

However, the indivisibility of rights does not necessarily imply their simultaneous realization. In some cases, there may be a sequential pattern which reflects the balance of political power in particular contexts. In Britain, the success of the struggles of the working class for political enfranchisement paved the way for a welfare state which ensured the basic economic and social rights necessary to transform workers from ‘commodities’ into citizens. In Germany, on the other hand, modern welfarism was introduced by Bismarck in order to undercut the growing power of the German trades unions and the Social Democratic Party: social and economic rights thus preceded full political enfranchisement.

In other cases, the sequence may reflect a strategic assessment of priorities. Thus while Nijera Kori’s analysis of injustice in Bangladesh defines it in economic, political and social terms, the organization’s strategy has been to begin by mobilizing poor people to claim their economic rights as a way of building their capacity to act in more overtly political ways, including putting up their members for local elections. In Latin America, on the other hand, it has been observed that earlier social movements conducted largely by peasant unions, political parties and church groups seeking to forge class, partisan, religious and other identities failed to politicize indigenous groups, consequently feeding into stereotypes of Indians as submissive and backward (Yashar 1998). However, indigenous groups have mobilized actively in the most recent round of democratization, and it has been demands around cultural rights – territorial autonomy, respect for customary law, multicultural education and new forms of political representation – which have galvanized them. Finally, in some contexts, the sequence of struggle may simply reflect an institutional logic: the need to possess a ration card, a land deed or a driving licence in order to enjoy other, larger rights.

Rights and duties

While most approaches to citizenship recognize that rights imply correlative duties, they diverge on the relationship between rights vis-à-vis duties and on the role of the state in this relationship. Classical liberal notions of citizenship have generally focused on rights, mainly
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civil and political rights (Foweraker and Landman 1997). Such rights are not conditional on the fulfilment of duties: individuals enjoy them by virtue of their status as citizens, regardless of any action or inaction on their part. Within this view, it is the duty of the state to ensure that these rights are protected.

The role of the state was expanded with the emergence of social-democratic welfare regimes and the extension of the definition of citizenship to encompass social and economic rights. It was required to assume a more proactive role which included the promotion of the basic social security of citizens. However, the rise of neo-conservative thinking in the political domain in both the US and the UK in recent years has been associated with a strong attack on the purported dependency bred in individuals when they can rely on the state to meet their basic needs rather than their own efforts in the market-place. It has led to a renewed emphasis on the duties of citizenship. It is argued that since rights are not sustainable without duties, duties have to be regarded as prior to rights and the condition for rights.

The priority given to the duty of individuals to take care of themselves has also led to a re-definition of the role of the state to a protective role, that of maintaining the freedoms necessary for such self-reliance, intervening only to support those who are incapable of meeting their citizenship obligations through the market. Even this latter group must however ‘earn’ their right to state support through participation in various forms of ‘workfare’ programmes. As a result, debates about the relationship between universality and particularism in the sphere of public policy, which earlier took the form of a debate over universalism versus diversity in service provision, are increasingly conducted as a debate between ‘universalism’ of provision and ‘residualism’ (means-testing).

It is in this context that the expressions of citizenship articulated by young adults in Britain have to be understood (Lister and others). Their views appear to echo the growing emphasis on economic self-reliance as the hallmark of citizenship which is being articulated in the country’s policy circles. Indeed, ethnicity and race seem to play less of a role in defining a sense of citizenship than do economic prospects: in other words, regardless of race and ethnicity, those who appear to be on their way to an economically assured future are more likely to identify themselves as full citizens than those who appear destined to experience long periods of unemployment or employment in poorly paid, unskilled work. Citizenship has thus come to be associated with economic respectability, with owning a house and paying taxes.

This new emphasis on self-reliance through individual effort in the
market-place is also evident in the contributions of those writing about the South. It informs the neo-liberal structural adjustment policies which have led to the promotion of market forces in many parts of the Third World and the accompanying transfer of responsibility for social service provision from the state to various versions of the private sector, including various non-profit civil society organizations. In Brazil, Dagnino points out, this has led to the co-optation of many organizations which had been at the forefront of the struggle for citizenship rights during its transition from dictatorship to democracy. It has displaced questions of poverty and inequality from their proper place in the arena of public politics alongside questions of justice and citizenship, and assigned them to the domain of technical management or philanthropic responsibility and (as Wheeler comments) left poor and excluded groups without the capacity to articulate their demands. In Bangladesh, Nijera Kori has consistently refused the role of service delivery which now characterizes most non-governmental organizations in the country, on the grounds that such a role creates relations of dependency between civil society organizations and their marginalized constituencies, diverting the energies of both from the larger goals of transforming society and democratizing the state (Kabeer).

Rights-based approaches within the policy agenda

The rise of neo-liberal versions of citizenship in the international policy agenda has been partly countered by the parallel rise of ‘rights-based’ approaches to development, both within a number of international development agencies as well as within national agendas. This new discourse of rights in the context of development integrates concerns with sustenance (economic and social rights) and freedom (political and civil rights): while these have long been developmental concerns, a rights-based approach adds ‘an element of accountability and culpability; an ethical/moral dimension’ (Nyamu-Musembi).

The new 1994 constitution in South Africa is widely held up as a model for its strong commitment to the universal basic rights of its citizens. It is therefore appropriate that the two chapters on South Africa in this book both grapple with the struggles to implement such an approach in a country whose past history is one of the brutal denial of rights to the majority of its citizens. The challenges of implementation discussed by both Williams and Mehta make it clear that while winning the constitutional recognition of universal rights is an important step in the construction of inclusive citizenship, it is only a first step.
The chapter by Mehta discusses the tensions between the ‘universal’ and the ‘particular’ as they play in the context of a commitment to universalism as the foundation of basic social needs. How, she asks, does one operationalize the commitment to universal provision – in this case of water – as a right, when the needs of different groups are so different. The need for water, for instance, varies considerably in drought-prone areas from areas which are rain-fed or irrigated. And while defining water as a basic need appears to imply use for human consumption rather than commercial purposes, for poor farmers, water for productive purposes may be critical to the means by which they meet their basic needs, so the dichotomy between commercial purposes and human consumption becomes artificial.

One answer, of course, is that universality does not necessarily imply uniformity. It is possible to meet a generic set of basic needs in a variety of different ways – not simply by varying amounts allocated, but also through very different resources. It is also worth noting that liberal theory does not necessarily rule out ‘selectivism’ in policy provision. Titmuss, for instance, one of the key theorists of the British welfare state, rejected negative ‘selectivism’, or the targeting of services on the basis of individual means, because it stigmatized recipients, turned them into clients and treated them as failures (cited in Thompson and Hoggett 1996). However, he favoured ‘positive’ selectivism, or active discrimination in favour of certain groups, because of the specificity or urgency of their needs, because he saw it as a redistributive mechanism.

It is this second approach which was reflected in the constitutional judgement on the right to housing in the Wallacedene case documented by Williams. Aware of the constraints imposed by the country’s socio-economic conditions, the court did not require the state to go beyond its available resources or to realize the right to housing immediately. But it did insist that the state had failed in its duties because it had not addressed the plight of the poorest and most desperate sections of the community: ‘Those whose needs are the most urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights are therefore most in peril must not be ignored by the measures aimed at achieving realization of the right’. It recommended, in other words, a ‘bottom-up’ incrementalist approach to universal coverage rather than an instantaneous one that could be more easily captured by elite groups. And it pointed to some of the practical conditions that would have to be in place to assure even this basic incrementalism, including provisions to plan, to budget and to monitor the meeting of basic needs and the management of crisis.

In Chapter 15 Eyben deals with the somewhat different challenge of operationalizing the rights-based agenda faced by DFID, a bilateral
donor agency, in Peru, a country where its presence was small and whose government’s commitment to such an agenda was uncertain. One key challenge such agencies face, of course, is the issue of national sovereignty. International convention considers interventions by external actors (such as donor agencies) in domestic matters acceptable if such interventions are couched in ‘technical’ terms and requested by recipient governments. As Eyben points out, such requests are most likely to come from governments that are concerned with strengthening democratic processes and the respect for rights in their own countries and are prepared to work with donors within mutually agreed frameworks.

Quite apart from the challenges posed by changes of government and the government officials it was dealing with, the DFID office also had to work out what exactly was implied by a rights-based approach in the context of Peru. The particular interpretation it adopted appears to accord closely with the actor-oriented approaches to rights from the perspective of excluded actors which have featured in this book: strengthening the organizational capacity of poor people to realize their rights and mobilize support from influential allies within government and civil society to promote their voice and presence within policy processes. How this interpretation was then acted on was derived, as Eyben puts it, from learning through practice. Some of this learning was from attempts to build participatory processes within the policy domain which were being carried out elsewhere in the region. As Dagnino’s contribution also notes, some of the most innovative work in this regard has been attempted in Brazil and includes participatory budgeting and monitoring in local government along the lines initiated in Porto Alegre, as well as the establishment of management councils for social policy provision, with membership equally divided between civil society and government at city, state and federal levels.

DFID’s experience in Peru raises an important issue. Like other collectives, nations are not internally homogeneous and many are characterized by extreme inequalities and repressive practices. This is another example of the tension we noted before, where the rights of self-determination of the collective – in this case, of the nation – may come into direct conflict with the rights of groups and individuals within that collective. There is, of course, a great deal of cynicism on the part of many within the Third World – governments as well as civil society – about the rise of rights-based approaches within bilateral and multilateral agencies; they are seen as yet another ‘donor’ fad, or simply old conditionalities repackaged with a new, more human face.
On the other hand, it is also the case that attempts by external actors with a genuine (as opposed to symbolic) commitment to promoting the struggles of poor and excluded groups to fight for their rights are likely to be resisted most vehemently by regimes which have least commitment to the poor in their country and are least accountable to their people. Insistence on the principle of national sovereignty offers a useful alibi for such regimes, while appeals to the international community over the heads of repressive governments are increasingly resorted to by the victims of their repression. One approach that DFID has taken in Peru to reconcile its own agenda with that of the government has been to invoke internationally agreed conventions which embody the principles that it is seeking to act on and to which both Britain and Peru are signatories. To that extent it can argue that it is merely acting within a shared framework of ethics. In the end, however, as Eyben points out, it is the extent to which donors open themselves up to the same principles of transparency, coherence and accountability that they are currently demanding of recipient countries – and the extent to which that accountability extends to the governments and citizens of recipient countries rather than to their own taxpayers alone – that will determine the extent to which their commitment to a right-based approach will be perceived as legitimate and genuine.

**Inclusive citizenship in an interconnected world**

The narratives in this book, taken together, challenge the conventional political science understanding of citizenship in terms of the relationship between individuals and the state from both a sub-national (local) as well as a supra-national (global) perspective. First of all, from a sub-national perspective, it is apparent that membership of the nation-state often means little to its members, compared to other forms of sub-national communities with which they identify and through which they exercise their claims and obligations. This is as true for citizens of countries like Britain, where independent nationhood has a long history, as it is for the various countries of the South who won their independence within the past half century.

In some cases, the communities that people acknowledge, the claims and obligations they recognize, may be very narrowly defined, restricted to their immediate circle of family, kin, lineage and neighbours. In others, the sense of connectedness transcends immediate or primordial identities and coheres around shared experiences of oppression or in solidarity with those who experience such oppression. This is a ‘societal’ understanding of the citizen as someone who belongs to different kinds
of collective associations and defines their identity from participation in activities associated with these different kinds of membership. Their sense of citizenship lies in the terms on which they participate in this collective life and the forms of agency they are able to exercise. And where they are only able to participate on highly unequal terms, or are denied access altogether, citizenship relates to their attempts to challenge these exclusionary processes and bring about change. As a number of contributions to the book make clear, while the capacity to exercise agency at the individual level may be an important pre-condition, it is the collective struggles of excluded groups which have historically driven processes of social transformation.

Ansley’s contribution spells out this societal notion of citizenship very well. Although, as she says, the example of mobilization that she discusses was initiated by, and designed to benefit, a population of non-citizens, and hence could not be described as an expression of their citizenship, we can interpret her own involvement, and that of her fellow citizens in the state of Tennessee, in the campaign to ensure the rights of undocumented immigrants as an expression of their understanding of citizenship. As she points out, a great deal of the social justice work carried out by organizations and citizens’ movements in the US has been concerned with the rights of marginalized or subordinate groups in relation to the state as well as to other members of society:

In good times, they have fought for more expansive understandings about things that all citizens should be able to expect from the state and from each other, and in bad times they have defended what rights they had against incursions by public and private power.

Dagnino is also explicit about the importance of such constructions of ‘citizenship from below’. She points out that in Latin America (and, it could be said, elsewhere), struggles for recognition by those groups who were subject to cultural rules that denied them the right to have rights led to a broadening of the terms in which the struggle for citizenship is conducted: ‘beyond the incorporation into the political system in the restricted sense of the formal-legal acquisition of rights’ and into ‘a project for a new sociability, a more egalitarian framework for social relations at all levels, new rules for living together in society … recognition of “the other” as a subject bearer of valid rights and legitimate interests’. This active engagement in the wider political struggle was seen by many as a central dimension of citizenship: for some, she points out, it constituted the essence of citizenship, even in the absence of formal rights.
What emerges from these narratives is what might be called a ‘horizontal’ view of citizenship, one which stresses that the relationship between citizens is at least as important as the more traditional ‘vertical’ view of citizenship as the relationship between the state and the individual. Indeed, in situations where the state has proved consistently unresponsive to the needs of its citizens, it is through the collective action of citizens, particularly those who have been disenfranchised by the prevailing regime, that a more democratized vertical relationship can be established or restored. The conundrum, of course, is how such collective action for inclusion or transformation can be organized by those whose exclusion is premised precisely on their lack of organizational power. In some cases, support may come from allies within the nation-state who may act on behalf of, or with, excluded groups. In others, it may take on more global forms of solidarity.

This takes me to the second challenge to conventional state-centred views of citizenship presented by some of the contributions in this book, one which is posed by growing interconnections at the global level. These interconnections take a number of different forms. Interconnections which reflect the shared global environment reflect the fact that decisions taken within the boundaries of a nation-state regarding the management of non-renewable resources can have impacts that go well beyond national boundaries (Eyben). The forces of economic globalization are evident in Ansley’s discussion of the flow of undocumented migrants into the United States, and touched on briefly in Kabeer’s discussion of the emergence of export-oriented shrimp production in Bangladesh. A number of chapters deal with the globalization of the neo-liberal economic worldview through the ascendance of these ideas within national governments or their imposition through donor conditionalities.

However, counteracting these processes are various global interconnections of a different kind, interconnections which represent an active solidarity across national boundaries. The phenomenal ability of the Zapatistas to mobilize international support, partly through their mastery of the new forces of technology, not only brought their cause to the attention of the world but served to provide them with some protection in the face of a repressive state. Other examples of such global interconnections discussed in the book include the attempts by the DFID office in Peru to support nascent struggles for citizenship by excluded groups within the country; Nijera Kori’s participation in international networks to oppose the unregulated industrialization of shrimp production and the consequent human rights violations; and the way in which women’s organizations across the world have sought to
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negotiate their way between the customs and laws within their countries and those spelt out in international conventions (Nyamumusembi). Nor is it only women’s organizations in the South that can make strategic use of international conventions. As Calman (1987) points out, US feminists could benefit from pushing the US to ratify many of the key international human rights conventions, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (which it has not yet ratified, although it was signed by Carter in 1980), because many of these are far more favourable to women than US law.

To some extent, it is the construction of global policy/political regimes ‘from above’ to ensure the free flow of international capital which has made an alternative set of global interconnections ‘from below’ necessary. A great deal of the politics of globalization from above as well as below is focused on contestations around the kinds of rights and duties that are appropriate in an increasingly globalized world. One obvious focus concerns the rights of labour to the same kind of unfettered mobility that is currently enjoyed by capital (Ansley). While an apparently logical solution to, on the one hand, the need of richer countries for labour to do the jobs its own citizens are unable or unwilling to do and, on the other, the need of poorer countries to find employment for their citizens, such a right still remains an apparent political impossibility. Contestations also focus on the rights of indigenous groups to their collective knowledge, the rights of labour to some degree of protection from global market forces, the rights of citizens to unpolluted environments and so on.

The other important question concerns the duties associated with globalization. Globalization increasingly means that many policy decisions taken within one country about the environment, about taxation, about social protection, about labour standards – are likely to have repercussions in others. There is clearly a need for greater coordination of responsibility at the global level. However, for nations to buy into the idea of global responsibility comes up against the problem of resources and incentives. Why should individual nations act in globally responsible ways, to take (or refrain from taking) actions in the interests of the global community, if such actions go against their national interests or strain their national capacity?

Clearly there has to be a framework of global citizenship which induces countries to act in globally responsible ways and which ensures that they have the resources necessary to carry out these responsibilities. A framework of global clientelism based on foreign assistance, which is essentially how relations between rich and poor countries are presently
constructed, is unlikely to command the allegiance of client governments or of their citizens. Foreign assistance is exactly that; it is premised on the same dependency relationships at the global level that charity entails at the national, similarly subject to whims and arbitrary decisions, incapable of sustaining a long-term vision of global responsibility.

Despite various controversies, including controversies over its ‘fortress’ mentality, the European Union has received a great deal of attention in this regard because it is one – perhaps the only – attempt in the contemporary era to forge a supranational association which is based on more than trading relationships (Mishra 1998; UNRISD 1997; Linklater 1998). It embodies a vision of political, social and economic integration between member states bound by common rules, including a charter of fundamental human rights, backed by necessary redistributive mechanisms. There is no doubt that the reality falls short of the vision – the Common Agricultural Policy, for instance, penalizes EU taxpayers and consumers as well as Third World farmers – but it nevertheless serves to make an important point. Members of the Union may not exercise the same clout as each other but they are members, nevertheless, not clients. They are required, as the basis of membership, to subscribe to certain common principles and practices, including the principles and practices of citizenship, and there are redistributive mechanisms to ensure that all members are able to fulfil their obligations.

Global citizenship also requires rules which spell out the claims and obligations of membership and ensure redistribution as a matter of right rather than discretion. It requires measures of the kind proposed by the Brandt Commission at the end of the 1970s, and more recently by a number of countries at the Monterey conference on financing for development, namely that countries be taxed on a sliding scale related to national income in order to generate revenue for a global social fund. Ultimately it is only within this framework of a global community based on mutual rights and responsibilities that the idea of a ‘rights-based’ approach to development will make sense. Short of this, attempts to promote the idea of rights in development will continue to appear to many poor countries as simply conditionality with a human face’.

Note
1. It is worth noting as a footnote to Eyben’s chapter on DFID’s activities in Peru that the office has now been closed down as DFID transfers its resources and capacity to waging peace in Iraq.
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