"A NOUS FAIRE Y FAIT"
'Together, Let Us Make it Happen"

Research Report and Guidelines for
Collaboration and partnerships among stakeholders
to mainstream sustainable livelihoods policy support for
marginalized ('poor') communities in the Caribbean

Generic Policy Lessons from policy research study by UWI-SEDU on "Policy Relevant Knowledge on Feasible Alternative Natural Resource Based Strategies for Enhancing Livelihoods in the Caribbean (R8325)"

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1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 1: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The project R8325, *Policy Relevant Knowledge on Feasible Alternative Natural Resource Based Strategies for Enhancing Livelihood*, sought to develop, validate and promote mechanisms towards the implementation in the coastal zones of the Caribbean, of integrated pro-poor natural resource management, which supports traditional as well as alternative livelihood strategies that are sustainable.

The project is rooted in research outputs from DFID R8135, *Feasibility of Alternative, Sustainable Coastal Resource-Based Enhanced Livelihood Strategies*, which explored alternative sustainable coastal resources based livelihood strategies in the region. This research set out to identify the ways in which the coastal land water interface environment is used as a source of livelihood for the poor and the extent to which their livelihoods could be improved upon and made sustainable, where it was not.

The findings of R8135 were both specific to the communities studied and, by extrapolation, generic to the experience of poor coastal dwellers making their living from the environment in the Caribbean. Specific gaps, identified in R8135, required changes in the policy environment, including new or altered approaches to enhance the quality of the livelihoods under study.

R8325 took up the challenge of the required changes in the policy environment. The main hypothesis of R8325 was that a significant gap exists between the existing, sustainable livelihoods policy framework and its implementation in the Caribbean coastal areas and further, that this gap can be filled through targeted uptake, by policymakers, policy implementers and the impacted communities, of a collaborative programme of appropriate policy and implementation strategy reforms.

R8325 sought to enhance policy-relevant knowledge on how to fill this gap, by facilitating "buy-in" by policy makers and policy implementers, as well as other stakeholders, to a process of analysis and action; so as to effect sustained change in policies supportive of the livelihood strategies of marginal, natural resource users in Caribbean coastal areas.

In other words, R8325 did not simply seek to communicate to stakeholders that this gap existed and needed to be filled but also to facilitate implementation of pilot activities which actually involved collaboration and partnerships: thereby communicating by doing/learning. The role of the SEDU team was that of participant

observer with the lessons of these pilot experiences then informing Guidelines for the future.

Community based sustainable tourism policy was identified as a frame within which both traditional and alternative sustainable, natural resource based livelihood options – identified in R8135 and including fishing, farming, agro-processing, hospitality related trades, and their inter-relationships – could effectively be considered.

The 'It' which the project has sought to make happen therefore is the actual process of collaboration and partnerships among key stakeholders to implement concrete activities which support poverty eradication through the livelihood practices of the poor. The project has therefore sought to field- test the hypothesis that the gap between policy intent and practice can be filled by actually facilitating activities, which bring together policy makers-in the public and private sector- and communities.

The testing of the hypothesis has been undertaken in three main steps. In the first instance, the project disseminated the research findings of R8135 to policymakers, policy implementers and communities, as a basis for validating the findings of R8135 and achieving sustained buy-in to the closing of policy implementation gaps identified. The main methodology for this was a series of field visits with presentations on the project, workshops and face-to-face meetings.

As a second step, the project team worked with stakeholders to identify specific, prioritised initiatives to be tested during the period of the project.

The third step involved the engagement of these stakeholders in a process of policy analysis and action, focused on specific activities in the initial study communities; with the decision to test the validity and applicability of findings against an identified community in Grenada. This has been affected by Hurricane Ivan in November, 2004 but the project was able to resume activities in Grenada in early 2005[1]. The output of this third step are the Guidelines for similar efforts to make 'It' happen.

This Annex A provides a description of the research activities undertaken during the project and, as well, the actual Guidelines document. Annexes B-D detail country reports for St. Lucia, Belize and Grenada, respectively while Annex E shares the Communication Strategy. Annex F provides a

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[1] Regrettably, Grenada also was hit by hurricane Emily on July 15, 2005 although with less damage being inflicted.

copy of other products not covered in the earlier Annexes and finally Annex G presents the Final Inventory Report (Asset Register).

SECTION 2. INTRODUCTION

In 2001 the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) commissioned the Sustainable Economic Development Unit[2] (UWI-SEDU) to undertake a policy research study on poverty eradication in the Caribbean. This policy research study was commissioned, more particularly, by the Natural Resources System Programme (NRSP) of DFID and was to delimit itself by focusing on livelihoods of poor people garnered predominantly from the surrounding natural resource base in the land-water interface (i.e. coastal regions). A number of natural species which needed to be taken into account also were specified: These were target habitats- including coral reefs, lagoons, mangroves and seagrass beds.

In 2003 DFID commissioned a follow up study (R8325) to communicate and promote the findings of R8135 to both the original case study countries and also the wider Caribbean. The Guidelines which follow detail the generic lessons learnt from the activities which were implemented in R8325 to communicate and promote such findings.

This Report is divided into six Sections. Section 1 is the Executive Summary and Section 2 is the Introduction. Section 3 outlines the research approach used in R8135 while Section 4 provides summary findings of and communication strategy utilized in R8135. Section 5 presents the summary of the findings from R8325. Finally, Section 6 presents the actual Guidelines distilled from R8325 for collaboration and partnerships among stakeholders in order to mainstream sustainable livelihoods policy support for marginalized ('poor') communities in the Caribbean.

As a result of the unavoidable linkage between R8135 and R 8325 it is possible to identify four summary objectives which needed to be fulfilled during the roughly four year life of the project: the first two objectives in R8135 and the third and fourth in R8325. These were as follows:

1. To determine the sustainability of existing, dominant livelihoods of those living in poverty in coastal regions (land-water interface) in the Caribbean and the feasibility of alternative livelihoods;

2. To determine what new knowledge policy makers required in order to contribute to poverty eradication strategies targeted at people living in poverty in coastal regions in the Caribbean in terms of

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[2] Department of Economics, University of the West Indies, St. Augustine campus, Trinidad and Tobago

policy support for existing, sustainable livelihoods and/or a shift to feasible, alternative livelihoods;

3. To establish effective means of communicating the findings of objectives 1 and 2 to policy makers throughout the region such that there would be buy-in by policy makers and hence the embrace of the findings in terms of the implementation of poverty eradication policies in the region;

4. To prepare Guidelines on a sustainable livelihoods approach to poverty eradication which could be used by stakeholders in the policy arena[3] in the Caribbean (and potentially elsewhere) drawing on the findings of the overall study. Such Guidelines to be corroborated by reference to the activities through which they were generated and, further, to be validated through presentation to a range of regional stakeholders and, hence, to take into account their feedback in finalization of the Guidelines.

Details now follow in the remainder of this report to describe how these four objectives were realized during the project.

SECTION 3. RESEARCH APPROACH

The findings of the policy research undertaken under R8135 were to be applicable to the entire Caribbean region: more particularly to communities living in poverty in the coastal regions earning their livelihoods predominantly from the surrounding natural resource base.

However, the research approach was to involve selection of a sample of two Caribbean countries and two communities in each in these two chosen countries which were themselves reflective of the larger Caribbean reality in terms of range of natural resources which existed and were being utilized, the extent/intensity of poverty (inclusive of the gender dimension) and also the presence of indigenous people.

The transferability of the findings of the policy research in these two countries were to be tested in a third Caribbean country and Grenada was selected for this purpose.

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[3] Defined to include public sector policy makers and implementers, private sector organizations and firms including at the community level and NGOs and CBOs.

3.1 *Country Selection*

The two countries selected in R8135 were St. Lucia and Belize. The two communities selected in the former country were Anse-la-Raye on the west Coast and Praslin on the east coast. In the case of Belize the community of Sarteneja in the north was targeted together with Hopkins in the south. The latter community is a Garifuna settlement. While the former (Sarteneja) is a Mayan/mestizo community[4].

Grenada was selected as the third country to test the transfereability of the findings. In turn, the community of Maquis on the east coast of that island was originally selected and later extended to its neighbouring community of Soubise on the request of the policy stakeholders in Grenada a result of Hurricane Ivan in September, 2004.

The research method utilized in R8135 involved sourcing of secondary data on the two countries and communities together with interviews with key informants at the policy and community level. This was buttressed by a series of community meetings and stakeholder workshops which brought together those in the policy and policy support arena together with representatives of the community. The project team returned routinely to the four communities in the two countries to report on progress and seek feedback in terms of next steps. This same approach was used in Grenada to test the transfereability of findings of R8135 and this also was continued in R8325 although to a lesser extent (Hurricane Ivan, for example, resulted in a 6 month hiatus on project field work in that island).

SECTION 4. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS: R8135

4.1 *Main Findings in terms of Objective* 1: *To determine the sustainability of existing, dominant livelihoods of those living in poverty in coastal regions (land-water interface) in the Caribbean and the feasibility of alternative livelihoods;*

Not surprisingly people living in poverty in the coastal regions in the two selected case study countries of St. Lucia and Belize were found to be predominantly dependent for their livelihoods on fishing, sea-moss production, agriculture (bananas and food crops) and to a lesser but growing extent craft and agro-industry and tourism. Table 1 provides a summary profile.

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[4] Details of the process and criteria which led to the selection of these two countries and four communities are contained in Pantin et al(2004).

Table 1: Summary Profile of Communities and their main Livelihoods

	Anse-la-Raye, St. Lucia	Praslin, St. Lucia	Hopkins, Belize	Sarteneja, Belize	Maquis, Grenada	Soubise, Grenada
Population	1877	497	1003	1644	n.a	n.a
Livelihoods a.fishing	Near shore. In decline	Near shore. Sea-moss cultivation	Largely subsistence	major fishing village.	some	more significant
b.Farming	Bananas In decline	bananas and other crops.	several crops including peanuts.	Little farming	Little farming	some farming
c. Agro-Industry	-	Yes.	-	-	-	-
d.Tourism	Fish Fry	Tour guiding	significant growth	Incipient growth of guest-houses, reef tours	Craft based sold in shops	exploring Fish Fry

Moreover, in these communities it was determined that livelihood returns from fishing have been declining. As a result there was a need to identify alternatives: particularly in terms of a community like Sarteneja in Belize where the vast majority of the residents earn their living from fishing off the barrier reef.

The following tabulations, extracted from R8135 Policy Brief on "Environmental Basis for Assessing the Sustainability of Traditional NR-Based Livelihoods" (Appendix VII), summarises the current threats and conditions of the eco-systems of the study communities and as well the livelihoods that are based on these systems.

Praslin:

MARINE ECOSYSTEMS	CONDITIONS	THREATS	LIVELIHOODS
Coral Reefs; Coastal/ marine area	Fair	Siltation from human activities leading to eutrophication poor water quality	Fishing: 21 registered boats; 52 registered fishermen; 25 Sea Moss farmers in Praslin Bay
Sea grass beds	Good viability	Sediment from poor farm practices	Lobster, conch & sea egg harvested
Mangrove: 17.35 hectares	Good mangrove viability; Fair landscape	Siltation due to human activities, impeding circulation of fresh and salt water	Marine Reserve; organic matter for marine & coastal species; protection against erosion and pollution; Wood for charcoal, livestock fodder
Beach: 243m long, adjacent to mangrove;			Community recreation; pot and spear fishing; small craft mooring and landing
Water	Poor	Sewage from pits; solid waste	

Anse La Raye:

MARINE ECOSYSTEMS	CONDITIONS	THREATS	LIVELIHOODS
Coral reef, coastal & marine areas	Rich ecosystem: coral reef; patches of sea grass beds; Unsatisfactory coastal water quality	Extremely high levels of faecal coliform; raw sewage disposed directly into the bay and into the Anse La Raye River; Pollution, sedimentation from agricultural practices	- Fishing: reef fish, lobster & conch; coastal pelagic fish; migratory pelagics. 53 registered vessels; 100 registered Fishers - Tourism: Anse La Raye waterfall; diving; weekly Fish Fry

Sarteneja and Hopkins (Shared access to extensive Belize Barrier Reef System):

MARINE ECOSYSTEMS	CONDITION	THREATS	LIVELIHOODS
Coral reef, coastal & marine areas	Rich ecosystem; Marine Pro-tected Area; Water quality not systematically assessed.	Expansion of fishing and tourism; Natural disasters; Upland pollution and coastal development.	Fishing; recreation
Sea grass beds			Home to Antillean manatee; Fished for conch
Mangroves		Ineffective management though mangroves fall in protected areas	Traditionally mangrove timber used for firewood, charcoal, poles, fish traps, construction

Source: R8135 Policy Brief on "Environmental Basis for Assessing the Sustainability of Traditional NR-Based Livelihoods" (Appendix VII)

The response options proposed in the Policy Brief are presented below.

Response Options:

EXTRACTIVE NR USES- PRASLIN, ANSE LA RAYE, SARTENEJA AND HOPKINS			
Livelihood Practice	Sustainability Evaluation of Livelihood Practices	Drivers, Causal and Impact Factors	New Knowledge to Maintain and/or Convert Practices re Sustainability or Alternatives
Consumptive (or extractive) NR (seas and coasts, coral reefs, man-groves, sea grass beds and coastal lagoons) uses	No	Global and regional issues affecting: Overfishing- resulting in reduced fish stocks	Education on the status of global and regional fisheries and the coastal ecosystems due to overfishing. Loss of important protein source.
		Pollution of sea and coastal waters from land based activi-ties: sewage, industry, agriculture and tourism	Education on effects of pollution on the regional seas and coastal ecosystems; Education in proper disposal practices, infrastructure to reduce wastes at sea, reduction in the use of chemicals. Human health impacts.
		Inappropriate fishing tech-niques; Trawlers (dragging etc)	Impose total ban on industrial fishers-longliners and trawlers
		Nationals harvesting juvenile fish (net mesh sizes)	Devise effective strategy to ensure enforcement of laws in regard to mesh sizes
		Transnationals fishing out of season; undersized catches	Devise effective strategy to ensure enforcement of trans-boundary laws /use of the EEZ etc
		Introduction of license and quota systems	Devise effective strategy to ensure enforcement of laws in regard to these.
		Offshore and pelagic fishing Techniques	Adhering with the license system, training in offshore fishing techniques.
		Sea moss harvesting	Provision poor with credit for harvesting; Educate to reduce over-harvesting by improved techniques.

MARICULTURE- SEA MOSS AT PRASLIN, ST LUCIA AND SUGGESTED FOR BELIZE			
Livelihood Practice	Sustainability Evaluation of Livelihood Practices	Drivers, Causal and Impact Factors	New Knowledge to Maintain and/or Convert Practices re Sustainability or Alternatives
Cultivation of sea moss	Sustainable	Quality of coastal waters affected by pollution of the seas and coastal waters from land- based activities, sewage, industry, agriculture, tourism Unsustainable techniques of Cultivation	Education on effects of pollution on the regional seas and coastal ecosystems; proper disposal practices, Infrastructure to reduce wastes at sea. Reduction in coastal release of toxic chemicals, sewage, industrial pollutants; education on human health impacts. Improved techniques; Capacity building strategies at community (Co-ops); Potential for economies of scale in production; Effective Legislation/Improved Policing; New credit facilities available (public and private).

Livelihood Practice	Sustainability Evaluation of Livelihood Practices	Drivers, Causal and Impact Factors	New Knowledge to Maintain and/or Convert Practices re Sustainability or Alternatives
Sea Moss Processing	Sustainable	Processing techniques Institutional facilitation; Institutional structure (Co-op); Market; Access to Credit; National Policy.	Improvement in techniques to improve/increase production; Information on marketing product standards (labeling etc). Available land for 'housed' drying facility. Price competitiveness of "gel" product; Potential for increased 'gel' market; Use of facilities of the Livestock Development, Company and packaging of drinks. New credit facilities available (public and private) Vision and institutional pro-activity.

Farming also was under threat -particularly bananas -from the ruling of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on the European Union's Banana regime[5].

Agro-industry and tourism were identified as the main alternative, feasible livelihood options available to these communities and, by extension, to the larger Caribbean reality. It is to be noted and emphasized that the conclusion drawn was in terms of the prospect for community based, sustainable tourism (CBST) as opposed to mainstream tourism per se.

4.2 *Main Findings in terms of Objective 2*: To determine what new knowledge policy makers required in order to contribute to poverty eradication strategies targeted at those living in poverty in the coastal region in terms of policy support for existing, sustainable livelihoods and/or a shift to feasible, alternative livelihoods;

The finding here turned out to be counter-intuitive. The Project Team found that the public sector in the three case study countries was generally staffed at Ministerial and support levels with trained individuals who were aware of the need to address poverty concerns. Moreover, the countries all had in place legal and institutional arrangements in support of poverty eradication.

The first substantial conclusion drawn therefore was that the real problem was the gap between policy intent and policy implementation. This is not a unique finding. The 2002 Belize Poverty Assessment Report notes for example, that:

"….it has not been easy to move from the prescription stage to effective operationalization of the policy approach. Examination of the activities of the poverty alleviation and reduction activities in Belize show that as is often the case, the effective translation of that policy approach into actual practice is impeded by at least two problems. (First)…the high levels of programme segregation or disconnection where poverty initiatives and other attempts to reduce social exclusion largely operate in isolation of other social development plans and/or economic programme. The other is that very often there is little specific or careful targeting of the poor and the vulnerable." (Belize, 2002:100).

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[5] For an analysis of the implications of this ruling for the Caribbean Banana industry see Pantin, Sandiford, Henry and Preville (2003)

While the two reasons advanced in the Belize report[6] are valid there are other factors which explain this gap between policy intent and implementation. The first is that the very fact that the national poverty goal is seen as poverty reduction or alleviation rather than eradication contributes to a type of complacency and, also, to the absence of clear, quantitative targets to be achieved in terms of reduction in the incidence of poverty: something that the UN Millenium Development Goal of a halving of poverty by 2015 now seeks to redress.

Second, psychologically, at least some of the more comfortable social classes responsible for anti-poverty policy also tend to have personal values which explained away the poverty (of others) as somehow destined by faith (normally of a God who has simultaneously spared those responsible for poverty eradication policy of any such mis-fortune). This value set exists not merely at policy level but also within communities. While it is difficult to present categorical empirical evidence in support of this conclusion an example from one of the community meetings can illustrate. Here, a key community player (himself extremely entrepreneurial and, on the face of the evidence, doing relatively well materially) insisted that poverty could not be eradicated, invoking biblical inspiration for his conclusion. While no doubt genuinely believed, such a value set militates against determined, persistent and deepened efforts to eradicate poverty.

Third, social, ethnic and class bias and prejudice also were seen to jaundice the perceptions of at least some in the public policy arena. In one of the case study countries, for example, project team members were informed by several public servants at the start of R8135 that one of the communities selected was a lost cause since 'the people were lazy',etc. Actual visits to the community revealed a significantly differing picture in terms of entrepreneurial drive. What is true is that several projects- particularly of a grant nature- has proven to be unsuccessful in that community. This begs the question of whether it was the nature of the support (grants and largely for training rather than support for practical projects) that was the root cause rather than something endemic to the people in the community.

Fourth, the feasibility of poverty reduction/alleviation and even more so eradication did not seem to be considered to be economically feasible by some of the policy players. Again, this fourth factor is difficult to corroborate empirically since this was not explicitly stated for reasons of political correctness. However, the emphasis on grants, training (including youth training) can be interpreted to be the offering of palliatives for a problem which was itself seen as insoluble.

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[6] First, high levels of programme segregation and second, disconnection between poverty initiatives and other attempts to reduce social exclusion

Fifth, the legal, institutional and policy infrastructure established to address poverty issues ironically disserved the goal by letting everyone else off the hook, as it were. In other words, the anti-poverty goal was not mainstreamed but in fact side-lined through the creation of Ministries, sub-Ministries or Departments with the MAIN responsibility for anti-poverty measures. Alternatively, the anti-poverty programmes were diffused in several public sector agencies without any central coordination and certainly link to overall social and economic policy. The 2002 Belize Poverty Assessment Report is worth citing again on this specific score: *"(there exists)....high levels of programme segregation or disconnection where poverty initiatives and other attempts to reduce social exclusion largely operate in isolation of other social development plans and/or economic programme"* (op.cit.:100)

The second substantial conclusion and policy finding of R8135 was that this gap between policy intent and policy implementation could only be filled if there were collaboration and partnerships among all stakeholders in the policy arena. Again, this is not a unique finding. A 1999 study by the Caribbean Policy Development Centre(CPDC) noted repeated *"...calls for greater participation and involvement of primary stakeholders in the design and implementation of programmes focused on poverty reduction."(CPDC,1999).*

The critical question is how to operationalise such collaboration and partnerships?

The third substantial conclusion of this UWI SEDU project, therefore, is that there was need for learning/communication by doing through collaboration and partnerships. Further, such collaboration and partnerships needed to be built around practical, concrete, 'do-able' activities which would impact positively on the livelihoods of those living in poverty.

4.3 *Community Based Sustainable Tourism (CBST) As a Case Model*

Since tourism was identified as a feasible, alternative livelihood option for the four selected communities and, by extension, for the Caribbean as whole, it was decided that Community based sustainable tourism (CBST) would be selected as the overall case model to pilot test the policy conclusion that the policy gap could best be filled through collaboration built around 'do-able' activities.

CBST was conceptualised to include the provision of goods and services required as inputs in the tourist industry as a whole (i.e. hotels, cruise ships, restaurants, craft shops,etc) as well as the direct provision of

these services at the community level in terms of guest-houses, Bed & Breakfast operations, small restaurants, tour guiding, etc. In other words, communities could produce inputs for the tourism industry and garner sustainable benefits and hence livelihoods without themselves being directly involved with the final tourist markets. The distinction is important. One example can illustrate. In Namibia, for example, conservancies have been formed which give communities conditional use rights over wildlife. In one case residents of the Bergis area fomed the Torra Conservancy and become involved with two tourism investors who wanted to set up luxury lodges in the area. The residents selected a small camp-style proposal over a potentially more lucrative lodge development offer because of their community values since the proposed lodge would have impinged on current livestock management strategies, limit access to water sources vital during drought and also required a 30 year lease. Instead the community selected the camp because it was small-scale, required a lease for only 10 years and, importantly, the camp ground operator had established a high level of trust within the community[7].

4.4 Overall seven gaps between policy intent and implementation were identified in terms of policy support for communities either in general or, more particularly, in terms of CBST. These gaps were:

1. Finance and Credit access information and policy limitations;
2. Limited linkages between producers at community level and the mainstream tourism operators;
3. Infrastructural constraints to CBST development;
4. Weak linkage between Tour guide training and business opportunities;
5. Limited practical B&B/Guest House Hospitality Training at community level
6. Sustainable Tourism policy needs to facilitate further development of B&B/Guest Houses;
7. Insufficient integration of Sustainable Livelihoods into the existing Sustainable Tourism Policy.

These gaps were identified through the process of interactive engagement with policy makers, policy implementers and communities as described in more detail in the country reports of Annexes B,C and D and also in the Validation Report (Annex A- Appendix VIII).

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[7] See http://.namibian.org/travel/community/ for further details. Also see two policy briefs prepared as part of this project on the theme of CBST by Mycoo, and Pantin and Francis (Annex A – Appendix iii),

The priority given to community based sustainable tourism and the first gap- finance and credit information and access- were informed by the fact that these were widely identified in community meetings as relevant to all livelihood activities. The Validation Report notes, for example that: *"The field visits, with their workshops, meetings with policy makers and intermediaries, and community meetings, helped the Team to prioritise among the focus areas identified at the start of the project. Feedback from stakeholders clearly identified community-based sustainable tourism and its linkagesto mainstream tourism, as well as credit and finance access and knowledge, as the areas with most resonance."(Section 7.23)*

Moreover, other studies also have highlighted credit: see the Sustainable Tourism and Poverty Elimination Study(STEP) example in the project's Policy Brief on "Community – Based Sustainable Tourism" (Annex A – Appendix III)

4.5 *Communicating and Validating findings of R8135*

The main findings of R8135 were communicated in several ways. In summary this involved[8]:

a. Dissemination of a CD which contained both Volumes 1 and 2 of the R8135 report together with the more summary published version (Pantin et al, 2004)[9];
b. Dissemination of actual hard-copy of Pantin et al(2004)
c. Dissemination of Policy Briefs and Newsletters;
d. Workshops with range of stakeholders to share publications, CD and present findings in Power Point to validate findings and also realise buy-in for approach selected for R8325 of facilitating 'do-able' activities.
e. Meetings at community level with same objectives as (d) immediately above

This communication process was extended to Grenada in order to test the transferability of findings. There was overwhelming resonance expressed by participants in that island in terms of the transferability of the generic findings from St. Lucia and Belize.

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[8] Further details on the communication strategy are provided later under the Guidelines developed to meet the fourth objective of the project

[9] These also are available at www.csednet.org; and www.uwi.tt/sedu

4.6   Validation Report

A Validation report presented at ANNEX A-*Appendix VIII details the process through which the findings of the project were validated in a range of encounters and interfaces.*

SECTION 5. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF R8325

The activities implemented under R8325 set out to test the hypothesis that the policy gap identified in R8135 could best be filled collaboration and partnerships among stakeholders in terms of concrete, practical 'do-able' projects in the case study communities.

There were two main elements of the communication strategy of R8325. First, was to communicate the findings of R8135, The second element took the unusual turn of actual seeking to identify 'do-able' projects and to then seek to facilitate a process of collaboration among relevant stakeholders. In other words, the project team undertook the task of learning/communicating by doing' in terms of   actually initiating a process of implementation to fill the identified gaps.

5.1: Communication Strategy

COMMUNICATION STRATEGY

As noted earlier the role of communication was central to R8325. Key elements included the development and implementation of a communication plan; validation of the steps taken and incorporation of feedback; support of activities undertaken; and development of relevant communication products.

Specific R8325 communication objectives involved:
- Communicating policy-relevant knowledge generated from R8135 research;
- Supporting initiatives to generate collaboration towards filling identified gaps between policy knowledge and implementation);
- Communicating resultant knowledge.

COMMUNICATION PLAN

The Communication Plan set out the background and approach to the project, identified target audiences, including the broad group of

stakeholders and specific target institutions; and identified how specific needs could be addressed, via communication processes and products, during the life of the project.

The plan identified three stages of work:

- Dissemination of research findings to policymakers, policy implementers and communities, as a basis for validating the hypothesis and achieving sustained buy-in to close policy implementation gaps identified. The main methodology for this was a series of field visits with presentations on the project, workshops and face-to-face meetings.
- As a second step, stakeholders were facilitated in identifying and undertaking specific, prioritised initiatives (do-able activities); again with a focus on face-to-face meetings with policy-makers, policy implementers and intermediary organisations, and community members and groups as well as with a broader audience.
- Communication of findings from the action-research, via regional workshops as well as these Guidelines and attached Policy Briefs, formed a third step.

A simplified matrix of communication stakeholders follows as Table 2; and a matrix of products and channels as Table 3:

Table 2: Communication stakeholders and needs identified

COMMUNICATION STAKEHOLDERS	CHARACTERISTICS IDENTIFIED	NEEDS IDENTIFIED	IMPLICATIONS OF BUY-IN
Policy-makers Representative Politicians	-National or constituency focus -Not generally hands-on on a sustained basis	- Basis for broad, philosophical buy-in; - Basis for sanctioning involvement by relevant implementers	Policy change, indicated by positive response to messages through statements; sanctioning implementer level buy-in; readiness to initiate relevant action
Policy makers - senior national public officials (Permanent Secretaries/CEOs/Dept & Agency Heads	Broadly interested and supportive	- Specific benefits; - Specific initiatives for involvement or sanction	Policy change, indicated by sanctioning implementer-level buy-in; readiness to initiate relevant action

Policy Implementers
 - Government departments & Officers with line responsibilities
 - Statutory/Quasi-government agencies
 - Micro-credit providers
   - Government
   - private
   - credit unions
   - NGO channels
	Day-to-day responsibility for policy implementation	-Basis for decision-making, including relevant decision support tools and best practice;
		 -Targeted information;
		 - New knowledge re Best Practices;
		 - Relevant opportunities for interface
		 - Engagement in multi-sector groupings to support action-analysis
			Buy-in to policy change processes; Willingness to incorporate sustainable livelihoods approaches into their agendas and work programmes; Creation of a demand for policy change to facilitate change processes into which they have bought.
			
			 Possibilities of influencing policy and implementation change;

International and regional agencies	Investment and grant programmes and initiatives	Priorities and targeting; funding options; New knowledge re Best Practices; Relevant opportunities for interface; Understanding of local/regional context	Willingness to incorporate sustainable livelihoods approaches into agendas and work programmes Incorporation of their knowledge and experience into policy making; Knowledge and access enhanced; Sustainable livelihoods supported
Community members & groups	Natural resource users; Victims or beneficiaries of policies and programmes	-Sustainable livelihoods; -Links to policymakers and policymaking process; -Creation of trust	

Table 3: Prioritised communication products and channels

PRIORITISED COMMUNICATION PRODUCTS	COMMUNICAT-ION MODE/PATH/ CHANNEL	PRIORITISED COMMUNICATION STAKEHOLDERS	OBJECTIVE
Printed Report	Workshops/ meetings	All stakeholders;	Maintain contact; buy in;
PowerPoint re R8325	Workshops/ meetings	All stakeholders;	Buy in; Feedback;
Update newsletter	Website/Printed	Meeting participants	maintain contacts
Policy Briefs from R8135 Report (thematic):	Web/print 4-page briefs	Policy implementers; Intermediaries	Provide R8135 findings
Background papers – by country	Web/print, 2-page briefs	Policy intermediaries in Belize & St Lucia	Strategies, policies etc
Policy Guideline Briefs: R8325 knowledge (Thematic)	Web/print, 4-6 page briefs	Policy implementers; intermediaries	R8325 findings to policy level
Guidelines for action	Workshop; Website	National/regional level policymakers	Enhance uptake

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SPECIFIC STRATEGIES
Communication for Persuasion:
Face-to-face meetings, workshops and community meetings were key communication strategies to inform stakeholders of research findings, seek validation and persuade Target Institutions to join in project activities.

Communication to Support Project Activities:
Communication strategies were developed to support project activities. Outputs included meeting materials, media strategies for specific events—primarily Credit Fairs and Workshops— and the development of relevant, appropriate collateral materials.

Communication Products/Materials:
Specific communication products were developed to translate knowledge generated by research into forms accessible to stakeholders or to maintain a flow of information on the project. These had specific distribution points but could also be effectively used at face-to-face meetings and workshops as well as in situations such as the credit fairs.

ON-GOING INCORPORATION OF RESEARCH INPUTS

Key elements of research knowledge, fed into various communications products or taken into consideration in planning communications strategies and develop the final project Guidelines, include the following:
Validation Report including output of initial feedback questionnaire;
Feedback from Fairs;
SeaMoss meetings —-Report;
Meeting Reports — analysis — Country Reports.

COMMUNICATION LESSONS LEARNED:

The project experience led to the identification of the following specific lessons:
- The importance of early buy-in by team members and stakeholders (e.g. among credit and finance institutions in run-up and follow-up to credit fair) for overall project as well as for individual 'do-able' activities;
- Within the Caribbean context, the critical importance of face-to-face contact; follow-up; national and regional contacts;
- The importance and limitations of mass media communication for an evolving project;
- The use, benefits and drawbacks of communication technology (e-mail, website etc) in communicating project information;
- The importance of appropriate technology e.g. town crier;

- The importance of effectively incorporating research-driven knowledge (research findings, feedback data, meeting and country reports etc) into communication products;
- The usefulness of a newsletter for on-going information flow, keeping focus, linkages etc;
- The importance of effective distribution networks for communication products;
- The importance of keeping faith with research sources/case study communities, even though they are not identified as key target audiences for project outputs;
- The need to maintain creativity and flexibility in responses to an evolving situation.

5.2: Facilitated Communication/Learning by Doing

The facilitated communication/learning by doing involved the following:

1. The filling of the first identified gap of Finance and Credit information and access gap through the medium of organizing two credit/business Fairs in St. Lucia (one in each community) and a similar, though more modest Fair in Belize (Hopkins). This required bringing together the finance and credit institutions to actually plan these Fairs. It took 10 planning meetings and 4 community meetings to make these Fairs happen in St. Lucia, for example.

2. The filling of the second identified gap in terms of weak linkages between community producers and mainstream community operators was addressed in terms of the concrete, practice 'do-able' case of sea-moss production and processing in Praslin, St. Lucia. Here, the focus was on communicating with the tourist industry to discern its interest in sea-moss products.

3. The filling of the third identified gap in terms of a process of determining the marketing and infrastructural requirements for the transfer of the Fish Fry experience from St. Lucia to the communities of Soubise and Maquis in Grenada. Here, the process involving facilitating meetings of the policy-makers with responsibility for relocation of the people living on the shore-line in Soubise (after Hurricane Ivan) and the members of that community and the neighbouring Maquise.

4. Finally, filling the gap identified in terms of weak linkages between tour guide training and business opportunities with application to fishers in Sarteneja. However, this final 'do-able'

project (in terms of actual facilitated collaboration) only got as far as communicating the findings to the relevant policy stakeholders in Belize.

It is important to stress that the selected 'do-able' activities were intended to illustrate the case for collaboration and partnerships including lessons to be drawn and illustrated in Guidelines. Although these do-able activities were informed, as noted earlier, by the process of prioritization, it is the experience of collaboration and partnership which is being highlighted not the specific nature of the activities themselves.

5.3 SUMMARY FINDINGS OF *COUNTRY REPORTS: (St.Lucia, Belize and Grenada)*

The full individual country reports are presented as Annexes B,C and D (Type 2 annexes) to the Final Technical report on the project.

These reports present the full range of activities conducted in each of the case study countries and evaluate the extent to which these activities have contributed to the achievement of the key objectives of the project as follows:

1. Communication and validation of the findings R8135;
2. Promotion of uptake and "buy- in" by all stakeholders of the alternative strategies recommended;
3. Forging collaborative linkages among the stakeholders in the planning and implementation of demonstrative "do-able" activities;
4. Identification of the outcomes and lessons learnt.

The major generic lessons distilled from the on-ground activities of R8325 as presented in the country reports are summarized as follows.

1. The success of strategies developed to address the gaps identified between policy formulation and implementation can only be ensured if steeped in an approach that embraces meaningful collaboration and participation involving in an ongoing manner, all stakeholders – in particular the target communities.

2. The strategies developed need to be multi-dimensional in nature encompassing relevant community support issues such as linkages with existing formal sectors and capacity building within the target communities

3. The presence of a centrally and strategically placed institution that can promote and facilitate the collaborative and consultative approaches in an ongoing manner is also a necessary ingredient.

4. The institutionalization of the collaborative and consultative approach can provide policy level TIs with a readied mechanism to respond to the derailing effects of disasters, as in the case of Grenada and as well as constraints such as language-barriers, geographical distances and the rapid turnover of key personnel as in the case of Belize.

5.4 *Main Findings in terms of Objective 4* which was to prepare Guidelines on a sustainable livelihoods approach to poverty eradication which could be used by stakeholders in the policy arena[10] in the Caribbean (and potentially elsewhere) drawing on the findings of the overall study. Such Guidelines to be validated through presentation to a range of regional stakeholders and, hence, to take into account feedback from this process.

Draft Guidelines were prepared and have been presented at six (6) regional workshops together with four (4) regional Conferences:

PROJECT-SPECIFIC WORKSHOPS

1.To a range of stakeholders from **St. Lucia** and representatives from **St. Vincent, Grenada and Dominica and Belize** at a two-day end of project workshop in St. Lucia (July 27-28,2005);

(2) To a similar range of stakeholders in **Barbados; Antigua** (with representation from **St. Kitts**), **Jamaica and Belize** at workshops on September 9, 10, 13 and 16,2005, respectively.

(3) October 20, 2005: UWI St. Augustine Symposium, Trinidad and Tobago on poverty research organized by the Department of Behavioral Science.

CONFERENCES

1. Regional Conference on July 29, 2005 organised by the Soufriere, Marine Management Authority (SMMA), St. Lucia to mark its 10th anniversary;

2. October 24-25, 2005 at SEDU Annual Conference in **Trinidad and Tobago** with a range of regional representatives including from **Guyana, Suriname, Grenada, St. Vincent, Barbados, St. Lucia, Dominica, Antigua, St. Kitts, Jamaica and Belize**.

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[10] Defined to include public sector policy makers and implementers, private sector organizations and firms including at the community level and NGOs and CBOs together with regional and international organizations (bilateral and multilateral).

3. 9th Annual Development Conference of the Eastern Caribbean Bank (ECCB), Dec 1-2, 2005 with regional and international participants including from DFID, Barbados, European Commission, International Monetary Fund.

4. 8th Annual Sustainable Tourism Conference of the Caribbean Tourism Organisation (CTO), April 27, 2006, Puerto Rico

Based on the feedback from these workshops the original Guidelines have been modified and are now presented below.

SECTION 6. TOGETHER LET US MAKE IT HAPPEN:

GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATION AND PARTNERSHIPS AMONG STAKEHOLDERS TO MAINSTREAM SUSTAINABLE LIVELIHOODS POLICY SUPPORT FOR MARGINALIZED ('POOR') COMMUNITIES IN THE CARIBBEAN

Eight (8) main Guidelines have been derived from the participatory, action research undertaken during R8325 in which team members facilitated actual collaboration in terms of implementing practical, concrete 'do-able' projects targeted at marginalized ('poor') communities[11]. The proposal is that these Guidelines are to be implemented in four (4) conceptually distinct but related steps:

STEP 1:

GUIDELINE 1: Establish either an institutionalized multi-disciplinary poverty eradication department in the Ministry of Finance/Planning with similar nodes in all ministries and para-statals or, if not immediately feasible through the alternative of either an integrated approach among Government Ministries through a co-ordinating committee or establishment of a mechanism to achieve such coordination.

STEP 2:

GUIDELINE 2: Situation Analysis at national and community level	GUIDELINE 3: Identify and bring on board key stakeholders at national and community level	GUIDELINE 4: Detail Multi-stakeholder Communication Strategy	GUIDELINE 5: Develop and field test Monitoring and Evaluation Indicators in conjunction with stakeholders

STEP 3:

GUIDELINE 6: Identify concrete, practical 'do-able' activities which will benefit communities with at least some such impacts being direct and others indirect in terms, for eg., of relaxing bottlenecks	GUIDELINE 7: Keep Faith with the communities. Do not initiate a process of dialogue with communities and then fail to return and report even if news is not as good as was expected. Also, seek to address unrealistic expectations from the onset

STEP 4:

GUIDELINE 8: (DO SOMETHING!). MAKE IT HAPPEN! Facilitate activities identified in Guideline 6 with sensitivity to Guideline 7 and with continuous refining Communication Strategies and Monitoring & Evaluation Indicators (Guidelines 4 and 5, respectively)

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[11] Insights gained from R8135 also informed the Guidelines

ELABORATION ON GUIDELINES

GUIDELINE 1: **Establish either an institutionalized multi-disciplinary poverty eradication department in the Ministry of Finance/Planning with similar nodes in all ministries and para-statals or, if not immediately feasible through the alternative of either an integrated approach among Government Ministries through a co-ordinating committee or establishment of a mechanism to achieve such coordination. Suggested name of Department or Coordinating Unit would be "Mainstreaming policy support for Marginalised Communities"**

As noted earlier the first finding of R8135 was that there was a gap between policy intent and implementation. The follow-up hypothesis of R8325 was that this gap could best be filled through collaboration and partnerships among key stakeholders. As also conceded earlier this is not the first time that such conclusions have been drawn in reviewing poverty eradication programmes in the region and elsewhere.

The difference that this UWI-SEDU project sought to make was not merely to stop at the recognition of this gap and proposing that it be filled but to actually go out and seek to demonstrate how it can be filled through facilitating collaboration built around 'do-able' activities described earlier. No ready evidence was found of similar efforts to realize implementation in the Caribbean including any documentation of such experiences in terms of lessons and guidelines for the future.

In the case of this project, team members therefore served effectively as participant/observers simultaneously facilitating collaboration and partnerships and recording/learning lessons from this experience. As the St. Lucia country report details further: "The strategy of forging collaborative linkages among all stakeholders was effected ..through the project's facilitation of a standing group of policy implementers, small enterprises support institutions, micro-credit and finance providers(public and private) and community based representatives to conceptualize, plan, design and implement the 'Fairs."(pp.8)

By definition the reach of the project's facilitation could only be modest for several reasons. First, resource constraints of time, people and money. Second, in terms of the actual ability to realise collaboration without any locus standi, as it were, in terms of the formal policy arena in the case study countries. As a result, the project team could only draw on persuasion as opposed to the policy remit which a formal Unit would have.

Yet, the relative success achieved within these constraints provides the evidence and points to the greater possibility which could be realised if these findings and Guidelines were embraced by national stakeholders and became institutionalized. As the St. Lucia Country Report notes the Fairs also revealed collaboration among the participating institutions in terms of "...the number of referrals to more relevant sources present based on the needs articulated. Sixty three (63) such inter-institutional referrals were recorded."(pp.10)

In the case of Grenada, as the Validation Report details, the project team also was able to bring together seven quasi-governmental agencies providing micro-finance who had NEVER EVER sat down collectively to discuss collaboration among themselves. The Grenada Country Report also identifies as one of the lessons of the limited project engagement in that island that: "Inter-ministerial collaboration is sometimes weak and it takes external partners to provide the basis for renewing collaboration and including communities as stakeholders in policy and implementation."(pp.8)

In other words, the project team in effect mirrored, in this pilot experiment, the proposed central coordination Unit. Other evidence in support of the case for such a Unit includes three conclusions drawn by the micro credit and business facilitation organizations which participated in the 'do-able'activities of the Business/credit facilitation fairs in St. Lucia. The first was that the Fairs were successful. Second, it would make sense to repeat these in other communities in St. Lucia but third, this was unlikely to happen in the absence of some institution taking responsibility for coordination.(See Finance/Credit Availability and Access Policy Brief(W.Rennie) for further details on this score: especially page 3 where it is noted that: " There was also general agreement that continued discussions and collaborative activities among micro-credit and business support institutions should be actively pursued; but there was a clear need to identify a co-ordinating agency that can 'make it happen'.) As the Validation Report also notes the representative of the Ministry of Tourism in Grenada also saw the need for "...a multi-institutional intervention towards embedding sustainable tourism at the community level-integrated collaborative approach."

The St. Lucia Country Report also lists three benefits from the collaborative approach to the planning and implementation of the Fairs:
"First, Government policy institutions have gained a clearer understanding of the existing supporting 'environment' for the development of small and micro business;

Second, institutions providing micro credit and other business support have benefited from a better understanding of the activities of the various

types and roles of organizations within their sub-sector, and how each fit into the bigger picture;

Third, beneficiary communities have gained a better understanding of supporting government policy and the activities of the various players in the arena of small and micro enterprise development. A greater appreciation of the use and management of natural resources for sustainable development is also a noted benefit to the communities. This provides a more receptive socio-cultural environment for relevant government policy implementation."(p.11)

In other words, these three benefits noted above are illustrative of generic gains from collaboration. (See Section 5.3 above)

As another example, the end of project workshop in Belmopan, Belize led to the revelation (to representatives from Sarteneja) that a $25 million road development project was planned for their area by the Ministry of Works official present. As the Belize Country Report notes, on pp.33, this official then agreed, as a result of the Workshop, to take his design team to visit the community in the following week. If a formal multi-institutional Unit involving communities existed such happenstance would become the norm.

Further evidence includes the endorsement of the proposal for such a Unit in a combined Ministry of Finance and Planning during the end of project workshops. See, for example, pp.14 of the St. Lucia Country Report for quote from deputy PS, Finance, Grenada in this regard.

One of the participants in the July, 2005 end of project workshop in St. Lucia from Dominica also sent an email subsequently indicating, as noted in Attachment 5, pp.77 of St. Lucia Country Report, that " I found the experience to be particularly interesting and rewarding, especially for the project that I am currently engaged in....and hope we can collaborate on developing a particular exercise and activity for improving coastal livelihoods in Dominica." The participant from St. Vincent at this Workshop also saw the Guidelines as useful for a project on poverty eradication on which he was engaged in that island with " the project used to put meat on the Guidelines presented at the Workshop."(pp.81)

The most generic lesson learnt from our testing of the hypothesis is that for the function which the project team performed of facilitating collaboration to be sustained poverty eradication needs to be mainstreamed in the public policy framework. This implies moving away from establishing Ministries (or departments within other Ministries) with the sole public policy responsibility for poverty alleviation/eradication. The limitation of this apparently focused policy approach to poverty eradication is that it lets other Ministries and Stated related agencies off

the hook, as it were, in terms of the implications of their own policies, programmes and projects on poverty eradication. As in the case of gender, and HIV-AIDS policy/education, poverty eradication needs to be mainstreamed.

The reason for proposing –as an ideal option- the combining of both Ministries (which actually already is operational in some CARICOM countries) is that Planning without Finance is 'dreaming' while Finance without planning is institutionalized 'adhocracy' since there have to be some criteria which inform the unavoidable and inevitable prioritization of expenditure in a Finance Ministry. In other words in the absence of an over-arching planning framework and planning priorities programmes and projects the Finance Ministry will create same: on the evidence, many times without consultation or engagement with a titled Ministry of Planning

The proposal for a multi-disciplinary department in a combined Ministry of Planning and Finance will also make it more likely that poverty eradication projects are included in the budget lines not only of this Ministry but also in all line Ministries and other Ministries whose budgets require approval by the Ministry of Finance.

The function of this poverty eradication department would be to perform on a continued, multi-year basis what this project has attempted – obviously on a much more modest scale. No doubt, such a department would be able to build and refine the Guidelines detailed below which have been derived from this project's engagement with stakeholders around concrete activities.

In instances where combined Ministries of Finance and Planning do not exist or where there may be some need for further persuasion this first Guideline also recommends alternative or transitional arrangements involving a Coordinating committee across Ministries or establishment of a mechanism for such coordination.

GUIDELINE 2: Conduct Situation Analysis at National and Community Levels

As always, a situational analysis is necessary to locate the context within which the other Guidelines are to be implemented. Such an analysis would involve at least three (3) key issues:

- Conducting an asset profile at the level of the community within which to locate poverty measurement;

- Reviewing planning laws, policies and institutions within the concrete context of communities, and their poverty, livelihoods realities and natural resource/environmental dependence;

- Locating poverty eradication at the level of the community in terms of the Macro-economic policy framework. The R8135 Policy Brief on Poverty & Sustainable Livelihoods noted, for example, that "The absence of point-in-time, absolute measures of poverty at the community level, makes poverty evaluations done on the basis of existing data sources virtually impossible[12].

- Asset profile

A point which became increasingly emphasized throughout the end of project workshops was a healthy skepticism over the use of, and sometimes outright rejection of the term poverty to describe the conditions under which people live. It was repeatedly pointed out that the case study communities studied were rich:
- In natural resources;
- In history and many times heritage and culture;
- In the dynamism and entrepreneurial drive of at least significant minorities of individuals and groups;
- Moreover, the term 'poverty' was not something which people in communities were comfortable since it seems to imply a negative, moral value judgement about something inherent to people living in such communities. The generalizability of this point can be indicated in a newspaper report from Trinidad and Tobago where the residents of a so-called community indicated, as headlined "It is insulting to call residents poor.[13]

It was repeatedly pointed out in our workshops that poverty studies were inadequate for policy formulation in that they used either income or expenditure to measure conditions but did not evaluate the assets: natural, built or human within such communities.

The real problem it was argued (and the project findings supports this conclusion) is the fact that such communities were marginalized from control of their assets and were therefore unable to internalize the benefits which were actually – or potentially- realizable from the use of these assets. The question of the sustainability of the use of such assets would then be a derivative, linked concern from the perspective of policy.

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[12] Dennis Brown Policy Brief, page 3: ANNEX A- Appendix VII
[13] Article from Trinidad Guardian entitled: *"Its insulting to call residents poor",* dated 30th May 2004

The Belize Country Report notes in its Appendix 3, for example, that the people of Sarteneja strongly expressed the view that the community needed to be involved in tourism planning and policy for the area with participants pointing to several tourist assets in the area including Maya ruins, bird watching.

The second and third issues identified immediately above as necessary in the situation analysis are largely self-explanatory. Planning laws, policies and institutions provide the context within which one could locate the asset capture paradigm which is being proposed to inform and initiate the situation analysis. This includes, for example, how to treat with commonly owned land.

Similarly, the macro-economic policy framework needs to be analyzed in terms of the extent to which it mainstreams poverty eradication including the very vexing question of asset capture and investment of returns earned within the communities where such assets are located.

GUIDELINE 3. Identification and bringing on board of stakeholders within the initial situational analysis process

The process of identifying key stakeholders is critical. A first step here is to identify key institutions/organizations. However, in addition, particularly in terms of communities, a series of engagements are necessary in order to discern the real pattern of power, influence and communication within each of the stakeholder communities, as it were. This latter point deserves emphasis since a process of collaboration is unlikely to be successful unless it has on board the real players and hence gatekeepers of access to a community. In the case of one of the communities in St. Lucia, for example, an initial community meeting indicated that there was no association of fishers. Subsequent investigation discovered that there was a group but members were unlikely to come to open community meetings; one had to go to them.

GUIDELINE 4. Detailing of Multi-stakeholder Communication Strategy

The process of implementation will reveal a range of stakeholders who 'dance to differing drumbeats' in terms of how they effectively receive and digest information and disseminate to others. One concrete example is a project meeting in Anse-la-Raye, St. Lucia where we found, on arrival, arrangements had fallen through in terms of people in the community knowing of the event. On advice, we employed the Town Crier who went around the community ringing a bell and within half an hour some 30

people quickly assembled. Of course, we learnt quickly, and always utilized the service of the town crier for future meetings.

In Belize, as detailed in the Country Report, it was reported that initial tour guide training was constrained by the fact that it coincided with open lobster season with many of the target group occupied in earning their livelihoods at this very time. This suggests that the target community was not involved effectively in the communication strategy and planning for the tour guide training. The UWI SEDU project also had a similar experience in terms of planned meetings in Belize as the Validation Report details.

Communication strategies therefore need to be targeted at specific activities and communities rather than being pre-determined in a 'one size fits all' mode. Further details have been outlined earlier in the Communication Strategy of Section 5.1.

GUIDELINE 5. Development and implementation of Indicators for Monitoring and Evaluating process of collaboration

This can be an extremely challenging task since projects of this nature, by definition, have an unavoidable component of action learning. However, the more generic guideline is that M&E needs to be linked to the identified stakeholders and the related communication strategies to reach these groups and linked, as well, to the concrete 'do-able' implementation activities. As such, M& E indicators need to be continuously refined as the process of collaboration is deepened and, also, in the context of specific communities and 'do-able' activities. The process of developing and field testing needs to be centrally integrated from the very onset of identified, concrete 'do-able' activities. In July, 2004, for example, a workshop of key participants from St. Lucia and Grenada, held in Trinidad, came up with 'mini-logframes' linked to identified 'do-able' activities. It was through this process that the suggestion was made, for example, to have as an explicit indicator whether a line item had been included in the actual budget for the next fiscal year for specific do-able activities. (See Validation Report for further details on Trinidad Workshop).

GUIDELINE 6: Identification of specific, concrete, practical 'do-able' activities to bridge gap between policy intent and implementation

A process of constructive engagement is required with the key, identified stakeholders in the policy (public and private) and community arena to finalize identification and implementation of specific activities. In the first instance, there is need for achieving consensus on the 'do-able' activities and how they were to be realised. In the case of Belize this was

more like pushing an open door as key policy stakeholders themselves made an early case for practical projects in communities if only on a pilot case. At a stakeholders' workshop convened by the Project Team as early as June 2004, participants expressed the view that "pilot projects with specific objectives and funding would have been more appropriate" in the case study communities (See Belize Country Report –Page 7)

In the case of the first credit fair in Anse-la-Raye, St. Lucia eight(8) preparatory meetings were held as detailed in the St. Lucia Country Report(Annex B). The second Fair, in Praslin, took much fewer meetings. The reason is that the process of achieving buy-in to both the Fairs and the modalities for their realization took some time and effort. Once achieved, the second time around, in Praslin, was easier.

As the Policy Brief on Sustainable Tourism Linkages (CMcDermott) also illustrates, greater focus on market driven do-able activities in sea-moss would reveal new product possibilities for sea-moss producers in St. Lucia.

GUIDELINE 7. Keeping faith with communities engaged

Many communities throughout the region have moved from being completely ignored to being over-studied, over-invited to participate in meetings and then…..nothing happens in terms of any follow-up if only to report on findings, far less to actually seek to have concrete activities implemented. To keep faith with communities, therefore, projects of this kind need to build-in at least 1-2 concrete, 'do-able' activities based on the priorities identified by the communities themselves which would actually be implemented. Feedback from participating institutions in the St. Lucia credit fairs revealed, inter alia, that the failure of an EU-funded Rural Credit Facility which was run for one 'term' and then cancelled had a hugely negative impact. (See St. Lucia Country Report for further details).

The UWI-SEDU project is evidence of the value of this Guideline. The project team returned to all four study communities in St. Lucia and Belize hosting Business/Credit Fairs in three (two in St. Lucia and one in Hopkins, Belize) and simply reported to the 4th community(Sarteneja). In fact, the end of project Workshop in Belmopan, as detailed in the Belize Country Report, put the Sarteneja representatives in contact with two key Government Ministries: Works and Local Government. Moroever, there have been follow up activities in Belize where it is reported that UNDP- whose representative participated in project meetings- has implemented projects in 2006 in both the study communities[14].

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[14] Personal email communication from Dennis Jones, BEST), Belize Country Coordinator, April, 2006

GUIDELINE 8: Do something! make it happen

At the end of the day the first seven (7) Guidelines are but stepping stones to this final one. Timelines are therefore necessary to ensure that stakeholders collaborate in terms of implementing 'do-able' activities. At the end of the day, by such and such a date, some concrete deliverable must be achieved within the community itself. The evidence of the demand for this came during the project when several stakeholders called for practical projects. As the Validation report notes, for example, there was a call in Belize for 'bankable information'.

RELAXING KEY CONSTRAINTS IDENTIFIED IN TERMS OF IMPLEMENTING ALL OF THE GUIDELINES

Nine (9) main constraints were encountered in the process of seeking to facilitate the process of collaboration within R8325), among stakeholders, and built around the four (4) concrete, 'do-able', CBST activities.

CONSTRAINT 1: Persuading policy makers and policy implementers- and, as well, sometimes actual persons living in poverty- that poverty eradication is feasible and perhaps, even sometimes, desirable.

CONSTRAINT 2: Skepticism if not cynicism as to the economical feasibility of poverty eradication.

CONSTRAINT 3: Persuading policy makers and implementers that policy frameworks: laws, policies, institutions are a necessary but not sufficient condition for poverty eradication.

CONSTRAINT 4: The reality of 'multi-tasking' in policy institutions in small islands/countries including the need to meet international obligations.

CONSTRAINT 5: The frequent related travel of key policy staff to international meetings.

CONSTRAINT 6: The impact of movement of staff across policy institutions (particularly Ministries) and the loss of institutional memory.

CONSTRAINT 7: Tradition of suspicion-if not hostility- between public and private sector.
CONSTRAINT 8: Lack of appreciation/suspicion/hostility to involving NGOs, CBOs and poor in communities in devising strategies and implementing policies which will impact on them.

CONSTRAINT 9: Lack of experience in terms of sustained collaboration and partnerships among all relevant stakeholders.

Further details now follow on each of these constraints.

CONSTRAINT 1: Persuading policy makers and policy implementers- and, as well, sometimes actual persons living in poverty- that poverty eradication is feasible and perhaps, even sometimes, desirable given value sets (including the use of the bible (perhaps other religious books) to justify complacency on poverty: e.g. " the poor we will always have with us"). Other, related dysfunctional values which need to be addressed frontally include that of gaining comfort and 'psychic' pleasure from the fact of being 'better than' others. Such values are sometimes shared, ironically, by those who have been successful/lucky in extricating themselves from poverty whether through education or political/ business opportunities. Chionesu has hypothesized recently, for example, on a related theme, that a major explanation of the persistent of poverty in the plantation economies of the Caribbean is the retention of an anti-egalitarianism defined as " *..an index of the actual valuation of individual human life by a community and, therefore, connoting a denial of the equal intrinsic worth of persons[15]."*
This turns out to be the most difficult constraint since, as noted earlier, there are deep-seated, sometimes religious, values which inform attitudes of at least some policy makers. Moreover, they are unlikely to express such values openly but rather to reflect it in their approach to poverty eradication policies.

CONSTRAINT 2: Skepticism if not cynicism as to the economical feasibility of poverty eradication.

Although it tends to remain unstated both policy makers and many times those living in poverty themselves tend to have pre-concluded (without any analysis or debate) that poverty cannot be eradicated or even significantly reduced or eliminated. When such persons are centrally involved in policy making (including economic policy) such views become self-fulfilling. This is a somewhat easier constraint to relax since it is open to change through persuasive analysis[16]. In this project, for example, community based sustainable tourism (CBST) was used as case model of the feasibility of poverty eradication through sustainable livelihoods to persuade stakeholders inter alia since tourism is an evident economic activity. However, other product markets can be used as well in countries where tourism may not be as significant.

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[15] Kamau Chionesu: Anti-egalitarianism and Plantation Economics. New World Conference, Jamaica. June 17-18,2005

[16] See paper by Pantin on mainstreaming poverty eradication into macro-econ analysis (forthcoming, 2006) for further discussion on feasibility of poverty eradication

CONSTRAINT 3. Persuading policy makers and implementers that policy frameworks: laws, policies, institutions are a necessary but not sufficient condition for poverty eradication.

Policy makers and implementers can many times become lost in the maze of the legal, policy and institutional pre-requisites for implementation and, wittingly or otherwise, see these as ends in themselves.

Moreover, many countries have started with development of policy frameworks and institutions for poverty reduction based, many times on the prompting/coercion from multilateral and bilateral agencies linked, explicitly or implicitly, to assess to the resources of these foreign institutions for other purposes. The failure of such foreign agencies to recognize the importance of the first two constraints noted above and, as well, the other seven noted below -and allocate resources for addressing same –risks the cynical conclusion that such agencies are simply seeking to address criticisms by academics and NGOs by claiming to be incorporating poverty concerns but only in a symbolic manner. The Validation Report cites the representative of the Credit Union League in Belize as lamenting for example that " some experts go down there (to the communities) like they are god. Maybe we need to change too. People need to change their mindset and perceptions."

CONSTRAINT 4:   **The reality of   'multi-tasking'   in policy institutions in small islands/countries including the need to meet international obligations**.
Small countries have small public services but most of the same obligations-even if in minute terms- as large countries including, increasing in terms of international obligations. This reality makes it extremely difficult for those employed in public policy to allocate sufficient time to specific issues. Hence, the case for an oversight Poverty eradication team in the Ministry of Finance/Planning with nodes with similar, dedicated responsibilities in all Ministries and para-statal organisations;

CONSTRAINT 5: The frequent related travel of key policy staff to international meetings.
There tends to be therefore multiple demands placed on key staff including that of travel to international meetings since small countries have many of the same international obligations as large countries including participating in international meetings. Such frequent travel-particularly by senior staff tends to be disruptive of continuity in programme implementation and monitoring;

CONSTRAINT 6: The impact of movement of staff across policy institutions (particularly Ministries) and the loss of institutional memory. Small policy institutions can suffer policy discontinuities from movement of key staff either to other ministries or agencies including in other countries. During the time period of this project two officials each in St. Lucia and Belize moved on from a key target institution in each country. As a result, the institutions concerned suffered some loss of momentum while the project itself had to re-establish contact with their replacements.

CONSTRAINT 7: Tradition of suspicion-if not hostility- between public and private sector. This is self-explanatory. For historic reasons there is an underlying perspective of many in both sectors which consider the other to be hostile or subversive of their own mission and objectives. However, this constraint appears to be growing less significant on the evidence from the end of project Workshops.

CONSTRAINT 8: Lack of appreciation/suspicion/hostility to involving NGOs, CBOs and poor in communities in devising strategies and implementating policies, which will impact on them.

However, as also noted in the workshops, there continues to be a more persistent problem in terms of civil society participation. Again, those in the formal sector-whether public or private- have largely not accepted the legitimacy of civil society.

CONSTRAINT 9: Lack of experience in terms of sustained collaboration and partnerships among all relevant stakeholders.

There is limited experience on which to draw in terms of an historical record of collaboration among stakeholders in the region. As noted, the UWI-SEDU found no ready, documented evidence of collaboration and partnerships among stakeholders built around a sustainable livelihoods approach to poverty eradication along the lines of concrete, do-able projects as pilot-tested/facilitated during the project. This, in itself, becomes a constraint since it is cited by some as a basis for a pessimism on the prospects for such sustained collaboration.

Interventions to relax constraints to implementation of all Guidelines and related Communication Strategies

These nine identified constraints encountered during the project team's facilitation of the 'do-able' activities are seen to be generic to the larger challenge of filling the policy implementation gap in terms of poverty eradication policies. The following matrix therefore seeks to link these constraints to measures and communication strategies for relaxing/eliminating them.

CONSTRAINTS	INTERVENTIONS TO RELAX CONSTRAINTS	Communication Strategies to Implement Identified Interventions
1. Persuading policy makers and policy implementers- and, as well, sometimes actual persons living in poverty- that poverty eradication is feasible and perhaps, even sometimes, desirable given value sets	*Establish poverty eradication dedicated Unit in the Ministry of Finance and Planning with smaller nodes in all Ministries and relevant para-statals which would then:. *Meet with key policy-makers on an individual and group basis(e.g. Cabinet meeting briefing); *Similar type meetings with top public servants and representatives of business and community organizations and also communities as a whole; *conduct critical analysis and review of actual role of multilateral and bilateral agencies in national poverty eradication/alleviation policies; *Request information from multilaterals and bilaterals on how their poverty programmes are integrated into national support systems; *Interface with representatives of multilateral and bilateral agencies. *Engaging faith-based organizations in a dialogue on this issue. 1.	*Establish personal contact with keypolicy-makers weeks if not months before desired meetings given their multiple commitments; *Similar to above for key policy implementers; *Make informal visits to communities and establish personal contacts; *Share findings with multilaterals; *Use mass media to communicate objectivesof policy implementation.
2.Economic persuasion in terms of the economic feasibility of poverty eradication through sustainable livelihoods and with the use, in this case, of CBST as case model for poverty eradication through sustainable livelihoods	*Preparation of economic analysis to detail linkages between identified markets (need not necessarily be tourism) and community livelihoods; *Identify capacity constraints in communities and interventions to address these.	*Share reports with policy makers and other stakeholders in terms of actual reports; policy briefs and face to face workshops/ meetings/conferences. *Also use mass media to disseminate reports.

CONSTRAINTS	INTERVENTIONS TO RELAX CONSTRAINTS	Communication Strategies to Implement Identified Interventions
3. Persuading policy makers and implementers that policy frameworks: laws, policies, institutions are a necessary but not sufficient condition for poverty eradication.	*Share results of review of legal, policy- and institutional framework for poverty eradication and nat resource management in target country together with actual empirical trends in poverty and natural resource quality and stock; * share results of other studies from elsewhere including this particular study;	*The communication modes for such sharing to include Newsletters, policy briefs, Videos as well as actual full reports on websites and hardcopy as necessary. *This should be complemented by actual meetings including getting key actors to participate in overnight meeting off-country Or certainly office. *Preparation of 'Map' of complementary or overlapping responsibilities of differing Ministries, etc for the same objectives.
4. The reality of 'multi-tasking' in policy institutions in small islands/countries including the need to meet international obligations	* Need for policy implementation unit in combined Ministry of Finance and Planning together with nodes of same in virtually all Ministries and para-statals with the explicit remit of addressing poverty eradication;	*Meet with policy makers to persuade as to importance of propose poverty eradication implementation policy unit in Min of Finance and ideally combined Planning Ministry); together with similar nodes in most Ministries and relevant para-statals (e.g. Tourism Board).

CONSTRAINTS	INTERVENTIONS TO RELAX CONSTRAINTS	Communication Strategies to Implement Identified Interventions
5. The frequent related travel of key policy staff to international meetings including the role of such travel in augmenting personal remuneration	*Policies limiting frequency and length of travel of key officials: certainly at the same time; *review of remuneration packages of key officials to ensure relative competitiveness with peers in non-public sector.	*Identification of such policies on travel and also remuneration in more successful SIDS (e.g. Singapore, Hong Kong)

CONSTRAINTS	INTERVENTIONS TO RELAX CONSTRAINTS	Communication Strategies to Implement Identified Interventions
6. Staff Movement across Ministries or out of the public sector	*Ensure proper records are kept of meetings and that demitting staff are debriefed properly before leaving; *Establishing advisory committees particularly for continued access to experienced staff retiring or moving to other institutions	*prepare briefing template and disseminate widely.
7. Tradition of suspicion-if not hostility- between public and private sector	Building of trust through frank, open but private discussions and collaboration and partnerships on areas of practical benefit to all participants.	*Invite public and private stakeholders to informal meetings at appropriate times and places and ensure good facilitators (perhaps someone 'neutral' in the sense of not from institutional perhaps country environment but with appreciation of objectives; *actual visits to offices of key stakeholders to buttress formal invitation with face to face contact.
8. Lack of appreciation / suspicion/ hostility to involving NGOs, CBOs and poor in communities in devising strategies and implementating policies which will impact on them and sometimes similar attitudes among NGOs/CBOs and poor in communities	Building of trust through frank, open but private discussions and collaboration and partnerships on areas of practical benefit to all participants	*ditto as for above
9. Lack of experience in terms of practical strategies to realise sustained collaboration and partnerships among all relevant stakeholders	*Initiation of collaboration around practical projects linked to suggestions above with objective of realizing more formal partnerships overtime.	*Pick 'doable', practical market-oriented project(s) and provide background brief on feasibility building linked to the collaborative processes suggested above.

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