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2 Entrepreneurship in value chains of non-timber forest products

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13 **Abstract**

14 Entrepreneurship and innovation by actors in the market for non-timber forest products (NTFPs) cannot be fully
 15 understood without a proper understanding of the position and behaviour of actors in the value chain of NTFPs. This
 16 paper places the market for NTFPs in the emerging literature on value chains which has, so far, lacked a detailed
 17 analysis of NTFPs. Our analysis reveals that certain key entrepreneurs are a driving force of success throughout several
 18 NTFP value chains in both Bolivia and Mexico. Where market information is scarce, e.g. where producers are distant
 19 from consumers, key entrepreneurs often govern entire value chains.

20 We argue that certain entrepreneurs are key to spreading success throughout the value chains of selected NTFPs
 21 offsetting potential negative consequences such as exploitation of more upstream actors (e.g. collectors and processors)
 22 in the value chains. Typical examples include the shopkeeper/organisation in Santa Cruz, Bolivia, who sources woven
 23 palm products from and supports several producers, and the entrepreneur in Mexico who established links between
 24 mushroom pickers in rural communities and brokers and consumers in Japan. Rather than criticising the monopolistic
 25 position of individuals, it is important to understand how the activity of key entrepreneurs can be supported in
 26 spreading successful commercialisation further and where necessary control negative impacts of their role. Our analysis
 27 indicates that policies to support commercialisation of the case study NTFPs would also need to be tailored to each
 28 value chain.

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31 1. Introduction

32 The paper presents an analysis of non-timber
33 forest product (NTFP)¹ commercialisation using
34 value chain analysis as used, e.g. by Gereffi (1999).
35 The analysis is useful in determining the importance
36 of key individuals in driving entrepreneurship and
37 innovation in the market for NTFPs. Understanding
38 these issues in turn is required for the design of
39 appropriate policies and development interventions,
40 which are often based on the assumption that poor
41 and politically powerless extractors suffer from high
42 levels of exploitation by intermediaries (Neumann and
43 Hirsch, 2000).

44 Value chain analysis is a methodology which is
45 different from other market chain analysis methodol-
46 ogies such as the chain analysis advanced by Porter
47 (1985). Porter also analysed value chains, the activ-
48 ities within and around a firm, but focused on the
49 analysis of the competitiveness of a particular firm.²
50 Global value chain analysis does not focus on the
51 competitiveness of a particular firm, but rather on
52 how relations amongst firms are governed, i.e. on
53 the efficiency of the chain as a whole.

54 Value chain analysis is emerging as a useful tool
55 that has already led to new practical insights in the
56 markets for textiles and clothing (Gereffi, 1999),
57 fresh fruits and vegetables (Dolan et al., 1999),
58 commodities such as tea and coffee, and wooden
59 furniture in the case of the forestry sector (Kaplinsky
60 et al., 2003). Recent developments in value chain
61 analysis relate to describing a typology of govern-
62 ance in value chains, the factors that explain this
63 typology (Gereffi et al., 2003) and the effects of
64 certain governance forms.

¹ For the purposes of this paper, we define non-timber forest products as natural products (excluding animal or wood-based products) collected from more or less managed forest resources and, in some cases, with a proportion harvested from cultivated sources.

² Porter distinguishes between primary activities concerned with delivering a product (inbound logistics, operations, outbound logistics, marketing and sales, and services) and support activities (procurement, human resource management, technology development, and infrastructure). The costs or competitiveness of the firm depends on its ability to manage linkages between all of these activities.

65 There have to date been few attempts to use value
66 chain analysis to obtain new information about what
67 drives entrepreneurship in markets for NTFPs. This
68 paper tries to fill this gap and is based on the result of
69 a multidisciplinary, multi-year research project on
70 successful commercialisation of NTFPs. It examines
71 value chains some of which are international but do
72 not enter into several countries (as global would
73 imply), but the global value chain literature would
74 apply.

75 The paper is divided into the following sections:

- 76 • Section 2 will discuss issues in global value chain
77 (or GVC, as referred to in the theory) analysis, includ-
78 ing a typology of governance of value chains.
- 79 • Section 3 discusses the research methods used.
- 80 • Section 4 summarises the value chain analysis for
81 the 10 NTFPs studied and presents a more detailed
82 analysis of three NTFPs that show clearly the impor-
83 tance of individual entrepreneurs in development of
84 the entire value chain.
- 85 • Section 5 examines whether certain types of gov-
86 ernance dominate the NTFP value chains we exam-
87 ined in our research.
- 88 • Section 6 examines more closely the relationship
89 between governance and entrepreneurship in the three
90 selected case studies.
- 91 • Section 7 presents the conclusions from the
92 research.

95 2. Issues in global value chain analysis

96 Primary products such as NTFPs are linked to
97 final consumers through so-called value chains. A
98 value chain describes the full range of activities
99 required to bring a product or service from concep-
100 tion, through the intermediary phases of production
101 (transformation and producer services inputs), deliv-
102 ery to final consumers and final disposal after use
103 (Kaplinsky, 2000). A value chain can be called global
104 when it involves different stakeholders at different
105 stages in different countries. A chain consists of a
106 number of different actors each specialising in differ-
107 ent functions, but linked through certain ways of
108 cooperation in a network. A value chain can be
109 distinguished from the ordinary market place by the
110 degree to which firms in a chain cooperate, and value

111 chain analysis describes governance and power-rela-
112 tions in the chain, and how this affects success for
113 various actors in a chain.

114 The analysis of global value chains has emerged
115 over the past 5–10 years. Three issues in value chain
116 analysis are of particular importance to the current
117 paper.

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- 119 • How useful are value chains as a tool for describ-
120 ing the commercialisation of NTFPs?
- 121 • What type of value chain governance should we
122 expect for NTFPs?
- 123 • What is the link between governance and entrepre-
124 neurship in NTFP value chains?

126 2.1. Value chains as a descriptive tool

127 At the most basic level, value chain analysis can
128 be seen as a methodological tool (Kaplinsky and
129 Morris, 2001) for describing markets for NTFPs.
130 The most common way is to draw a map of the
131 different production blocks and the interrelationships
132 amongst them. Another way is to compute profit
133 margins or levels of success at each stage in the
134 value chain. The paper will show that value chain
135 analysis is an important methodology in describing
136 markets for NTFPs and identifying key issues in
137 policy and aid interventions. It can complement the
138 multivariate analysis used by Ruiz Pérez and Byron
139 (1999) and expanded upon by Ruiz Pérez et al.
140 (2004) to describe the role of NTFPs in household
141 livelihood strategies.

142 2.2. Governance of value chains

143 Governance of value chains relates to the *type* of
144 coordination amongst dispersed but linked production
145 systems. Gereffi (1999) introduced two different types
146 of governance in value chains (which he called com-
147 modity chains). Buyers undertake coordination in
148 “buyer-driven” value chains, while producers play a
149 key role in “producer-driven” value chains. Buyer-
150 driven chains refer to industries in which large retail-
151 ers, marketers and branded manufacturers play the
152 pivotal roles in setting up decentralised production
153 networks. The specifications for the production net-
154 works are set by the large retailers or marketers that
155 source the goods.

Gereffi et al. (2003) elaborate further and distin-
guish between five types of governance:

1. *Markets*. There are repeated transactions amongst
different actors but the costs of switching to new
actors are low.
2. *Modular value chains*. Suppliers make products to
a customer’s specifications. Suppliers take respon-
sibility for competencies surrounding process
technology and incur few transaction-specific
investments.
3. *Relational value chains*. There is mutual depen-
dence regulated through reputation, social and spa-
tial proximity, family and ethnic ties, etc.
4. *Captive value chains*. Small suppliers depend on
much larger buyers for their transactions and face
significant switching costs and are, therefore,
“captive”. These networks are frequently charac-
terised by a high degree of monitoring and control
by the lead firm, creating dependence on the
suppliers.
5. *Hierarchy*. This implies vertical integration with
managerial control.

Gereffi et al. (2003) go on to argue that the follow-
ing three factors explain which type of governance
can be expected:

1. Complexity of inter-firm knowledge transfer
required for transactions;
2. The extent to which this information and knowl-
edge can be codified and transmitted efficiently
without transaction specific investment; and
3. Capabilities of actual and potential suppliers to
meet the requirements of the buyer.

Table 1 presents the probability that different forms
of governance will be associated with the three factors
described.

For instance, governance by ordinary market trans-
actions will occur when product specifications are
relatively simple, transactions are simple and easily
codified and suppliers have the capability to make the
relevant products with little input from buyers so that
there is nothing specific about inter-firm relationships.
At the other extreme, we would expect a hierarchical
governance structure (in-house production) when pro-
duct specifications are based on tacit knowledge and

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t1.1 Table 1

t1.2 What type of governance is likely?

	Governance	Complexity of inter-firm knowledge transfer	Ability/Potential of codification of knowledge	Capabilities of suppliers
t1.4	Markets	Low	High	High
t1.5	Modular value chains	High	High	High
t1.6	Relational value chains	High	Low	High
t1.7	Captive value chains	High	High	Low
t1.8	Hierarchy	High	Low	Low

t1.9 Source: Gereffi et al. (2003).

204 cannot be codified, while competent suppliers are
205 absent.

206 In between these extremes, modular value chains
207 arise when the specifications applying to more com-
208 plex products are easily codified. Relational value
209 chains arise when specific knowledge is exchanged,
210 dealing with complex products and/or market infor-
211 mation, and there is a low potential to codify product
212 specifications, while lead firms are motivated to
213 access suppliers with high capabilities. Finally, cap-
214 tive value chains can arise when it is easy to codify
215 product specifications through detailed instructions in
216 the context of complex products and where there are
217 suppliers with lower capabilities. Low capability sup-
218 pliers require instructions from lead firms, fostering
219 dependence and the lock-in of suppliers, while other
220 potential suppliers may be excluded from the benefits
221 of the lead firm's efforts. Suppliers incur significant
222 switching costs and are "captive" as inter-firm rela-
223 tionships contain specific transactional assets. In cap-
224 tive value chains, suppliers are often locked into
225 simple tasks such as production according to specifi-
226 cation, while lead firms are involved in more complex
227 activities such as design, logistics, and process tech-
228 nology upgrading.

229 This framework was developed in the context of
230 bicycles, apparel, fresh vegetables, and electronics
231 (Gereffi et al., 2003). We will examine the value of
232 the framework in the context of explaining govern-
233 ance in NTFP value chains. NTFPs are the subject of
234 great current interest among conservation and devel-
235 opment organisations (Ruiz Pérez and Arnold, 1996;
236 Wollenberg and Ingles, 1998; Neumann and Hirsch,

2000). Not only do they contribute to improving many
237 rural livelihoods but, where they are harvested in a
238 sustainable manner, they may also contribute to con-
239 serving the resource (Belcher and Schreckenberg,
240 2003). As more research is carried out on individual
241 NTFPs, there is growing awareness that the govern-
242 ance structures that dominate NTFP value chains may
243 be highly inequitable, the best-known example being
244 the debt peonage of the wild rubber harvesters in the
245 Brazilian Amazon (Schwartzman, 1992). Intermedi-
246 aries or entrepreneurs are undoubtedly the most mal-
247 igned actors in the value chain (Schreckenberg, 2003).
248 Yet some studies suggest that the role of 'middlemen'
249 has been underestimated (Padoch, 1992) and that it is
250 a mistake to try to bypass them (Corry, 1993, cited in
251 Neumann and Hirsch, 2000). More appropriate inter-
252 ventions in NTFP commercialisation require a better
253 understanding of NTFP value chain governance, par-
254 ticularly relating to the roles of intermediaries and
255 their relationships with other actors (Humphrey,
256 2000; Maynard et al., 2001).
257

258 2.3. Linking governance to success and entrepreneur- 259 ship in value chains

260 Humphrey and Schmitz (2001) found that govern-
261 ance of global value chains matters. For instance, if
262 global value chains are governed by a few lead firms
263 or entrepreneurs, market access for suppliers is depen-
264 dent not only on the efficiency of the supply capabil-
265 ities, but also on how suppliers fit into the strategies of
266 these lead firms. The type of governance also affects
267 the distribution of gains. When lead firms govern a
268 chain they are able to determine where high return
269 activities (often intangible activities such as marketing
270 and R&D) and low-return activities are located along
271 the chain.

272 Value chain governance can contribute to the suc-
273 cess of a value chain by influencing how production
274 capabilities are upgraded. Value chain analysis con-
275 siders four types of upgrading (Kaplinsky and Morris,
276 2001). Process upgrading is associated with increases
277 in the efficiency of production processes within or
278 between stages of the value chain. Product upgrading
279 leads to improvement and introduction of products.
280 Functional upgrading changes the mix of activities
281 and functions conducted within the value chain or
282 firm (for example, taking responsibility for marketing

283 and design, improving transactions, and optimal redis-
284 tribution of activities). Finally, chain upgrading
285 involves moving to a new value chain.

286 Taking the captive value chain as one example,
287 there are both opportunities and barriers to achieving
288 success for suppliers by upgrading in such chains. A
289 classic example (outside NTFP markets) where
290 upgrading helped to raise the level of entrepreneurship
291 of suppliers is the textile and clothing value chain
292 present in several Asian countries (Gereffi, 1999).
293 East Asian countries upgraded production processes
294 and functions (from simple assembly to marketing and
295 design) in the context of ‘triangle manufacturing’,
296 whereby developed country buyers place orders with
297 East Asian countries, who in turn became successful
298 entrepreneurs and outsourced parts of the production
299 to low-wage countries (China, Indonesia, Vietnam).
300 East Asian countries are now much more involved in
301 design and other downstream functions.

302 However, other countries (e.g. Central American
303 countries) are locked into the upstream part of the
304 value chain with few incentives (from lead firms
305 lower down the chain) to upgrade. UNIDO (2002)
306 discusses the global value chain of wooden furniture
307 in South Africa where pine furniture has faced
308 increasing price competition putting pressures on
309 export prices. Products were also considered of low
310 quality and poor delivery reliability. The global buyer
311 in this captive value chain did not consider increasing
312 the efficiency of this manufacturing stage and
313 switched to more competitive East Asian suppliers,
314 while South Africa had to focus on a different value
315 chain using environmentally friendly wood (and
316 upgraded in that way).

317 Understanding the type of governance is important,
318 therefore, when developing policy and directing tech-
319 nical assistance. Policy initiatives may affect a number
320 of firms more intensively when they are closely
321 related. Technical assistance programmes can be
322 made more efficient by targeting lead firms to the
323 benefit of suppliers upstream. Where there are a
324 small number of lead firms or individuals that control
325 a chain, there is a need for monitoring and perhaps
326 regulation to ensure that such firms or individuals are
327 not abusing their position of power within a chain. In
328 many developing countries, where NTFPs are impor-
329 tant to poor families, such monitoring and regulation
330 policies are rarely well implemented.

3. Methods

The project investigated the commercialisation of
NTFPs in Bolivia and Mexico. Data collection and
analysis methods were developed within a framework
provided by six research hypotheses. The first four
examined the impact of NTFP commercialisation on
the poorest producers, processors and traders;
women; the resource; and access to the resource.
The two hypotheses of most relevance to this paper
were:

- The successful commercialisation of an NTFP depends critically on the existence of an accessible market, potential demand, and the access by producers, processors and traders to market information.
- The success of poor producers, collectors, processors and traders in NTFP commercialisation depends critically on the number of suppliers and demanders, capacity to exert market power, barriers to entry, and the degree of vertical and horizontal integration.

In each country the policies relating to NTFP commercialisation were reviewed. Ten products were selected for detailed study from a larger initial group (see Marshall et al., 2003 for full list) based on the criteria that the NTFP was:

- traded beyond the village of collection;
- of interest to the project’s partner NGOs (all of which were development NGOs with a secondary interest in research);
- not a fresh fruit; and
- traded from two similar communities via different marketing networks.

For each product a structured ‘market’ report was written based on a combination of secondary data and key informant interviews. These reports described the main market chains for the product, beginning in the study communities and tracking information as far downstream to the final consumer as possible. As some of the products were marketed in very different ways (e.g. fresh mushrooms for local consumption, dried mushrooms for the national market and fresh mushrooms for export),

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t2.1 Table 2

t2.2 Some key attributes of case study value chains

t2.3	Location	Product	Final consumer	Dominance of individuals in the value chain	Apparent effect of the dominance ^a	Months traded
t2.4	San Antonio	Fresh mushrooms	Local	A few local traders		2
t2.5	Cuajimoloyas Oaxaca, Mexico	Dried mushrooms	National	Community enterprise	Positive for the community	2
t2.6	Santa Martha Latuvi, Oaxaca, Mexico	Fresh matsutake mushrooms	International (Japan)	Entrepreneur	See later	2
t2.7	Arroyo Blanco and Agua Pescadito, Oaxaca, Mexico	Pita fibre sold to artisans for embroidering belts	National and International (North America)	Yes, President of the local producers' association	Positive in that this individual has stimulated and maintained new markets	2
t2.8	La Esperanza and Topiltepec, Guerrero, Mexico	Soyate palm fibres woven into hats	Local, national (international through tourists)	No		12
t2.9	Monte Tinta and Nueva Santa Flor, Oaxaca, Mexico	Camedora palm fronds sold as floral greens	International (North America)	Entrepreneur	See later	5.8
t2.10	Yagavila and Tiltepec, Oaxaca, Mexico	Tepejilote palm inflorescences sold as traditional food	Local	No		3.7
t2.11	La Esperanza and Topiltepec Guerrero, Mexico	Maguey 'heads' distilled to produce mezcal (traditional alcohol)	Local, national and international	Broad involvement in collection of maguey, but only one family distils serious quantities	Not enough information to comment	7
t2.12	Carmen del Emero, La Paz, Bolivia	Organic wild cocoa	National and some international	A small number of traders dominate the purchase of cocoa beans	Potential negative impact as these traders limit access to markets with better prices	5.2
t2.13	San Silvestre, La Paz, Bolivia	Organic wild cocoa paste	Local and some national	No		5.2
t2.14	Tomachi, La Paz, Bolivia	Natural rubber latex for specialised La Paz workshops	National	Dominated by concessionaires from outside the community	Concentration of concessions appears to have encouraged investment in processing facilities. But has increased costs of entry to the chain	6.3
t2.15	Santa Rosa Challana, La Paz, Bolivia	Rubber used to waterporoof bags and ponchos	Local miners	No		11.3
t2.16	Pucasucho, La Paz, Bolivia	Incense and Copal	Copal in Mexico and incense to Argentina	Dominated by an oligopoly	Negative impact on collector prices and on the environment by not passing on price differentials	12
t2.17	Potrero Rafael and Candelaria, Santa Cruz, Bolivia	Jipi Japa palm fibre woven into tourist artefacts	National (international through tourists)	Entrepreneur	See later	11.5
t2.18	Carmen Surutú, Santa Cruz, Bolivia	Jipi Japa palm fibre woven into hats	Local	No		10

t2.19 Source: project research.

378 a total of 15 distinct value chains were examined
379 (see Table 2).

380 For each of the 18 communities in the study a struc-
381 tured ‘community’ report was also written, based on
382 secondary information and data collected by partner
383 NGOs using participatory techniques (such as time-
384 lines, resource mapping, wealth-ranking, Venn dia-
385 grams) and key informant interviews. The data
386 collected covered a wide range of topics necessary
387 for the understanding of current patterns of resource
388 use and management, with a focus on the collection,
389 cultivation, processing and marketing of the case study
390 NTFP. Both the ‘market’ and ‘community’ reports
391 were written by partner NGOs over a 2-year period
392 and finalised in 2003 after much interaction with the
393 project team, interim data analysis and supplementary
394 data collection.

395 A formal household questionnaire was designed to
396 collect data about the household, its use of the NTFP
397 including any costs and benefits incurred, and the
398 interviewee’s perception of the household’s success
399 and the contribution of NTFPs to their livelihood
400 strategy. During 2002/2003 the project’s partner
401 NGOs applied the questionnaire to as many of the
402 households involved in NTFP activities in each com-
403 munity as agreed to participate. Where more than 20
404 households were involved in NTFP activities, around
405 20 households were sampled on the basis of partici-
406 patory wealth-ranking. In one community (Nueva
407 Santa Flor), trade had ceased as a fungal disease
408 had decimated the resource so no interviews were
409 carried out. In the remaining 17 communities, a total
410 of 289 households were interviewed. A further 117
411 control households not involved in the NTFP activ-
412 ities were also interviewed. In addition 46 national
413 traders were interviewed using a slightly modified
414 version of the questionnaire. In practice this meant
415 that detailed information was not obtainable for
416 elements of the value chain that extended beyond
417 the national boundaries.

418 Data analysis included comparative text analysis of
419 the community reports, statistical representation and
420 regression analysis of the household data, and con-
421 struction of value chains (on the basis of the house-
422 hold data and the market reports) for each product. A
423 detailed presentation of the data collection and analy-
424 sis methodology is provided in Schreckenberg et al.
425 (2005).

4. Description of NTFP value chains

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Table 2 provides an overview of the NTFPs
included in our research, describing some of the
more salient points for each value chain. Key factors
that vary between value chains include the distance
between producer and consumer, the presence of
dominant individuals in the value chain and the
number of months the product is traded. The latter
also has an effect on the total value added (see
te Velde et al., 2004) which varies greatly between
different value chains as well as between households
in one community trading the same product. For
further quantitative information, see Rushton et al.
(2004) and te Velde et al. (2004).

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4.1. Value chain maps

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NTFPs differ markedly in ease of collection,
required technology and skills for processing,
strength of demand, etc. So it is not easy to group
them together. There is insufficient space to present
all our NTFP value chain maps, so we have focussed
on three products: mushrooms, Jipi Japa palm and
Camedora palm (for other products see Rushton
et al., 2004). These products have been chosen, because
they best illustrate the important influences of entre-
preneurs in the development of NTFP value chains.
There is no standard approach to mapping value
chains. In the maps presented here (1 Charts 2
Charts 3) the solid boxes indicate individuals, com-
munities, companies or institutions and the dotted
lines indicate an alliance. The arrows represent the
flow of products in exchange for money or goods
hence the name value chain. Going beyond what is
usually presented in value chain maps, these charts
show not only the types of activities carried out by
different actors (collectors, processors or traders), but
also provide information on where each activity
takes place.

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4.2. Mushrooms (Oaxaca, Mexico)

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Chart 1 describes the main value chains for four
types of mushrooms all collected from the wild in
three communities in the state of Oaxaca, Mexico. San
Antonio Cuajimoloyas collects three types of mush-
rooms. Some of these enter a short fresh mushroom

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


Chart 1. Value chain maps for mushrooms collected in communities close to Oaxaca, Mexico. Source: Rushton et al. (2004).

469 chain ending with local consumers in Oaxaca, while
 470 the remainder are dried and enter longer national
 471 chains ending with consumers in various large Mex-
 472 ican cities. The community of Santa Martha Latuvi
 473 collects only Matsutake mushrooms, which enter the
 474 value chain that ends with Japanese consumers in
 475 Chart 1. This value chain is “global” and was initiated
 476 by a Korean entrepreneur based in Mexico who had
 477 an alliance with two Japanese firms, which provided
 478 him with capital to collect, purchase, pack and send
 479 Matsutake mushrooms to Japan. This entrepreneur
 480 was a critical influence in the development of this
 481 value chain but has since retired, being replaced by a
 482 Mexican of Japanese descent.

483 4.3. Jipi Japa palm (Santa Cruz region, Bolivia)

484 Jipi Japa is a palm (*Carludovica palmata*), the
 485 leaves of which are woven into products such as
 486 hats, placemats and bags. During the study of the

commercialisation of Jipi Japa products two value 487
 chains were identified (see Chart 2). The value 488
 chain that links collectors and processors of Jipi 489
 Japa from the community El Carmen Surutú with 490
 consumers through local shops is the least important 491
 in terms of value. The other value chain is dominated 492
 by one company, which buys products from 493
 ‘associate’ weavers (all women) in the communities 494
 of Potrero San Rafael and Candelaria. This company 495
 then sells these products through shops that can reach 496
 consumers in various locations including tourists in 497
 international airports. The company was established 498
 by a dynamic woman who has a strong interest in 499
 supporting indigenous ethnic groups, and has played a 500
 crucial role in the development of this value chain. 501

502 4.4. Camedora palm (Monte Tinta, Mexico)

Camedora palm (*Chamaedorea* spp.) fronds 503
 (Chart 3) are a floral product used by European 504




Chart 2. Value chains for Jipi Japa palm (*Carludovica palmate*), Bolivia. Source: Rushton et al. (2004).




Chart 3. Value chains of Camedora palm (*Chamaedorea* spp.). Source: Rushton et al. (2004).

Table 3				
Profits for Matsutake mushrooms (US\$, annual)				
	Collectors	Community firm	Mexican exporter	
t3.4	Total	193	7294	39,000
t3.5	Per kg	12.9	4.3	25.5

t3.6 Source: Rushton et al. (2004).

505 and North American consumers. The value chain in
 506 Mexico is dominated by one person, who is a repre-
 507 sentative of a North American importing company
 508 and owner of a regional collection centre responsible
 509 for collecting, selecting and exporting. In addition to
 510 purchasing fronds from collectors of the wild palm
 511 in the Monte Tinta community, the one-man com-
 512 pany cultivates and supplies half of the required
 513 palm. This man has been important in developing
 514 other markets for this NTFP in Europe and Japan
 515 and his entrepreneurial activities have been key in
 516 the general development of the Camedora palm
 517 value chain in Mexico.

518 4.5. Profits along the chain

519 An alternative way to present a value chain is by
 520 analysing the distribution of gains along the chain.
 521 Without the objective of being representative or
 522 complete for all NTFPs analysed, we computed
 523 profits (revenues-costs) for three different actors in
 524 the Matsutake mushroom chain as one example.
 525 Information for collectors was obtained from the
 526 household questionnaires, while data for the com-
 527 munity firm and entrepreneur came from discussions
 528 with key informants. Table 3 shows that collectors,
 529 the community firm and the exporter earn very
 530 different profits. It was not possible to make esti-
 531 mates of the profits for Jipi Japa and Camedora
 532 palm value chains. In the case of Jipi Japa, the
 533 processing of the product into a large range of
 534 differently valued items was such that calculating
 535 a unit value of profit was not possible. In both
 536 cases the strong position in the value chain of one
 537 trader who, as pointed out by Padoch (1992) in her
 538 seminal study of NTFP marketing in the Peruvian
 539 Amazon, are notoriously difficult to interview, made
 540 the collection of data to develop enterprise budgets
 541 extremely difficult.

5. Governance of NTFP value chains

This section examines in more detail the govern-
 543 ance type of the different NTFP value chains and the
 544 extent to which they are likely or predicted to be
 545 governed by key entrepreneurs downstream from the
 546 producer. Section 2 argued that three factors are
 547

Table 4
 Knowledge characteristics and governance types of case study value chains

Value chain	Complexity of interfirm knowledge transfer	Potential to codify knowledge	Capabilities of suppliers	Market governance type ^a	
Fresh local mushrooms	Low	High	High	Market	t4.4
Dried mushrooms	Low	High	High	Market	t4.5
Fresh exported mushrooms	High	High	Low	Captive	t4.6
Pita	Low	High	High	Market	t4.7
Soyate palm	Low	High	High	Market	t4.8
Camedora palm	High	High	Low	Captive	t4.9
Tepejilote palm	Low	High	High	Market	t4.10
Maguey ^b	High	Low	High	Relational	t4.11
	High	Low	Low	Hierarchy	t4.12
Organic wild cocoa	High	Low	High	Relational	t4.13
Organic cocoa paste	Low	High	High	Market	t4.14
Natural rubber latex ^c	Low	High	High	Market	t4.15
	High	Low	Low	Hierarchy	t4.16
Rubberised products	Low	High	High	Market	t4.17
Incense and copal	Low	High	Low	?? ^d	t4.18
Jipi Japa palm (tourist artefacts)	High	High	Low	Captive	t4.19
Jipi Japa palm (hats)	Low	High	High	Market	t4.20

^a As predicted by Gereffi et al. (2003).

^b The maguey value chain is relational at the collector and community-based distilling level; but beyond this it becomes hierarchical in nature.

^c The latex rubber chain begins as a 'market' type with many labourers available for hire by many rubber concessionaires. Once the latex is collected and moved to the La Paz workshops, the chain becomes more hierarchical.

^d Gereffi has no model for this combination of knowledge transfer characteristics.

548 important in explaining the type of governance of
549 value chains:

550

551 • Complexity of inter-firm information and knowl-
552 edge transfer.

553 • Potential of codifying information without incur-
554 ring transaction specific costs.

555 • Capabilities of suppliers.

556

557 Below we explain how we interpreted these factors
558 for the case study value chains, basing our decisions
559 on a combination of quantitative and qualitative data
560 collected for the project. Table 4 then summarises the
561 knowledge transfer characteristics and governance
562 types of all the value chains.

563 5.1. Complexity of inter-firm information

564 While it would seem that NTFPs are fairly simple
565 products (although clearly that is not the case for some
566 of the products we researched, e.g. Jipi Japa woven
567 tourist artefacts), this misses an important point. The
568 complexity of products in the eyes of local collectors
569 and processors is not necessarily in the product itself,

570 but in the information required to successfully market
571 the NTFPs, i.e. complexity of inter-firm relationships.
572 Market information is often not readily available to
573 local collectors and they have few contacts further
574 downstream (e.g. how can local collectors establish
575 links with Japanese or American markets?). Hence,
576 selling NTFP products (to actors/consumers down-
577 stream) is extremely complex for local collectors
578 and processors.

579 Evidence that this is so is provided by Chart 4,
580 based on analysis of household questionnaires, which
581 shows that market contacts and market information
582 were considered to be the most important barriers to
583 households selling NTFPs. Market knowledge and
584 contacts are important barriers for most products but
585 detailed project data show that this is particularly so
586 for Camedora palm and Matsutake mushrooms (in
587 Santa Maria Latuvi), so that the score in the first
588 column of Table 4 for most of these products is
589 “high”.

590 Another type of complexity is found in the cocoa
591 and maguey market chains, both of which have very
592 complex social webs close to the production end of
593 the chain. In the cocoa value chain, traders have




Chart 4. Barriers to selling NTFPs, % of NTFP households answering yes. Source: te Velde et al. (2004).

594 intricate relationships with community members,
595 maintaining good relations by being godparents to
596 the children of the community in return for having
597 the right to purchase quality cocoa beans and dried
598 fish. In the maguery value chain, social networks help
599 to determine access to the resource, and mezcaleros
600 (distillers) keep their labour happy with a constant
601 supply of mezcal (in lieu of wages), which is further
602 exchanged as gifts within the community.

603 A more conventional form of complexity is found
604 in the Jipi Japa palm case, where production of the
605 very varied range of tourist items requires women to
606 be highly skilled in dying and weaving techniques.
607 Finally, in the latex rubber case, while the knowledge
608 required to collect the latex itself is fairly simple, the
609 latex is then transported by the owners to La Paz
610 workshops for processing into a range of highly spe-
611 cialist medical and sporting goods. For the remaining
612 products in Table 4, the complexity of interfirm
613 knowledge transfer is low.

614 5.2. Potential of codifying inter-firm information

615 When the lead firm/entrepreneur has acquired the
616 market information it is relatively straightforward to
617 communicate this to actors upstream. For instance,
618 the Jipi Japa firm knows what it sells and commu-
619 nicates that it wants to purchase this specific range
620 of Jipi Japa products from its suppliers. Nevertheless,
621 given the low capacity of suppliers (see below), the
622 firm has had to invest considerable resources in
623 training to obtain the required quality and in estab-
624 lishing a system of payments to reward that quality.
625 In the case of Camedora palm, after the importing
626 company had established the links between the
627 American and Mexican markets it was straightfor-
628 ward to codify the required amount of products to
629 actors upstream in the value chain. The information
630 for Matsutake mushrooms is slightly more complex,
631 but is more easily transmitted to the collectors than
632 in the Jipi Japa case because the mushrooms are
633 purchased on the basis of weight and quality, with
634 no need for processing. It is only in the ‘relational’
635 cases mentioned above that the codification of social
636 norms and cultural conventions are difficult to codify
637 in such a way that an outsider to the community
638 could easily understand them. So in most cases the
639 second column in Table 4 is high.

5.3. Capabilities of suppliers

641 Gereffi et al. (2003) provide no advice on how to
642 assess the ‘capability’ of suppliers. In the case of the
643 NTFP value chains studied, the key factors determin-
644 ing whether or not a supplier can meet the require-
645 ments of a buyer are their access to the resource,
646 financial capacity and skills base. In some cases,
647 being a member of a producer organisation can help
648 to overcome one or more of these constraints. How-
649 ever, where discussions with communities and key
650 informants suggested that one or more of these
651 remained a serious constraint, the NTFP was graded
652 ‘low’ in the third column of Table 4.

653 With respect to resource access, many of the
654 NTFPs were originally collected from communal
655 land to which everybody has access, but have now
656 made the shift to being either collected from, or
657 planted on, plots assigned for individual use (as
658 predicted by Homma, 1996). This accounts for the
659 ‘low’ rating of incense, for example, where only
660 long-standing members of the community have
661 access to dedicated collecting areas. Furthermore,
662 owners require financial capital to cover the costs
663 of a donkey, hired labour and food for the several-
664 day collecting trips.

665 Financial capacity is lacking in all the case study
666 communities, which are rural and marginalised in
667 terms of access to markets, information and alter-
668 native income-generating activities. Within the com-
669 munities, NTFP producers are usually amongst the
670 poorer segments as categorised in participatory
671 wealth-ranking exercises that reflected a combina-
672 tion of factors such as people’s access to land,
673 remittances, labour and education. In those commu-
674 nities in which only some households were involved
675 in NTFP activities, these households were dispro-
676 portionately concentrated in the bottom well-being
677 ranking in five communities, amongst the middle
678 ranking in two communities, and in the top ranking
679 for only two communities. One of these was the
680 incense community in which, as described above,
681 only people with some capital can afford the collect-
682 ing trips. The other was one of the pita communities
683 in which pita is almost entirely domesticated, pre-
684 dominantly by people with the right kind of land
685 and sufficient funds to cover the costs of establish-
686 ing plantations.

687 Overall, a third of NTFP households felt that they
688 could not meet their basic needs over the course of a
689 year. In Mexico, NTFP households generally felt
690 themselves to be less successful than other households
691 in their communities with only 6% feeling more suc-
692 cessful than their peers. In the Bolivian communities
693 there were few if any alternative income-generating
694 activities and most households relied on the NTFP
695 activity as their only source of cash income. Access to
696 credit is rare in all the case study communities and the
697 provision of credit is one of the most appreciated
698 aspects of the pita producers' cooperative and the
699 Jipi Japa weavers' association.

700 A deficient skills base can also be a serious con-
701 straint for suppliers. Male heads of NTFP collecting
702 households tend to have less years of formal education
703 compared to non-NTFP households. Many house-
704 holds are engaged in NTFP activities out of necessity,
705 although households argue that some do play a very
706 useful gap-filling role in their livelihood strategies (te
707 Velde et al., 2004). This would indicate that very few
708 households can become entrepreneurs capable of
709 playing a more important role (e.g. marketing
710 NTFPs to key markets) in NTFP value chains. The
711 reason is that while there are many opportunities for
712 families to be involved in NTFP collection, which
713 require few capital inputs, trading NTFPs tends to
714 have low returns per unit and reasonable incomes
715 can usually only be achieved on the basis of high
716 volumes traded, for which capital to buy, store and
717 transport products is needed (see Chart 4 on capital as
718 a barrier).

719 In effect, the third column in Table 4 essentially
720 splits the case study products into those with lower
721 or higher thresholds of entry (Arnold and Ruiz
722 Pérez, 1996). For the former group the only
723 'capability' a supplier needs, in addition to resource
724 access, is reasonably good health. The second group
725 require either higher levels of skill (Jipi Japa palm
726 tourist artefacts, the downstream levels of the latex
727 rubber chain and the fresh exported mushrooms)
728 and/or up-front capital (Camedora palm, incense
729 and copal, and the downstream level of the maguey
730 value chain). Pita is a slight exception—although up-
731 front capital is required to establish plantations, the
732 capability of suppliers is generally high as they have
733 relatively easy access to loans for this purpose from
734 the local pita cooperative.

5.4. Governance types

In conclusion, the analysis of the local collectors
and traders for our case study NTFP value chains
suggests we can expect NTFPs to fall predominantly
into three of the governance types described by Gereff
et al. (2003):

- 'Market' types: these include all the products that
are only sold to the local market, often with rela-
tively numerous suppliers and consumers, as well
as those with a fairly simple domestic market. For
pita and dried mushrooms, the more distant mar-
kets are made accessible by the existence of a good
community-based producer association.
- 'Relational' types: these are cases (cocoa beans and
maguey) in which cultural ties and family networks
play a key role in ensuring the success of commer-
cialisation efforts.
- 'Captive' types: these include the three entrepre-
neur dominated chains (Jipi Japa, tourist artefacts),
exported mushrooms and Camedora palm.

The critical factor in determining the governance
type would appear to be the physical distance of the
consumer from the NTFP collector and the need for
specialised skills in processing, marketing and pre-
sentation of the product.

The predictions for governance in value chains
based on the Gereffi typology relate very well to the
type of governance which occurs in practice. For
instance, Jipi Japa palm tourist items, exported mush-
rooms and Camedora palm are characterised by a
"high" complexity of inter-firm information for
which there exists a "high" potential to codify, while
the capabilities of the local communities are consid-
ered "low", so that the Gereffi typology would predict
a "captive value chain" type of governance. This was
indeed what we found when we described these
chains in Section 4.

In spite of this concurrence between predicted and
actual type of governance, the Gereffi et al. (2003)
typology was not always easy to apply to the NTFP
cases. It is difficult to apply, for example, where
governance changes as you progress along the value
chain. This is the case for both maguey and latex
rubber, which become "hierarchical" as they approach
the consumer. The typology is also difficult to apply

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782 where the distinction between “firms” is not clear, as
 783 frequently occurs in NTFPs that are first traded in the
 784 informal sector and only move into the formal sector
 785 when they cross national boundaries. It may also need
 786 to be applied in a more differentiated manner if it is to
 787 help distinguish the different forms of governance that
 788 may be found in producer level organisations (which
 789 are of particular interest to policy-makers). Here we
 790 came across three very different types, all of which,
 791 however, provided benefits to producers and played
 792 an important role in supporting the viability of the
 793 value chain: (i) in the pita case the producer coopera-
 794 tive is run by a pita producer and members have a say
 795 in the management; (ii) in the Jipi Japa palm case, the
 796 association is an institution set up by the trading
 797 company to assure its supply and giving members
 798 no say in decision-making; (iii) in the dried and
 799 exported mushroom cases, the community enterprise
 800 is run by a hired business manager who can be fired
 801 by the community. Finally it should be noted that
 802 governance changes over time (e.g. in the pita case,
 803 dominance by a strong individual has given way to a
 804 much more open market) and a different type may
 805 apply in the early and later stages of value chain
 806 establishment.

807 6. Entrepreneurship and upgrading in value chains

808 As discussed above, captive value chains were
 809 associated with significant upgrading of East Asian
 810 suppliers of textiles and garments, while certain parts
 811 of the furniture value chain in South Africa were
 812 locked out of the captive value chain. This section
 813 discusses whether entrepreneurship and upgrading
 814 was evident in captive value chains of NTFPs.

815 We find that entrepreneurship was indeed impor-
 816 tant in the ‘captive’ value chains (Jipi Japa palm
 817 tourist artefacts, Camedora palm and exported Matsu-
 818 take mushrooms). An important question then is
 819 whether such captive value chains should be pre-
 820 vented or controlled, i.e. do these entrepreneurs
 821 exploit collectors and processors upstream, particu-
 822 larly since given the characteristics of complexity,
 823 codification and capabilities we would expect a cap-
 824 tive value chain anyway?

825 Our research suggests that these entrepreneurs are
 826 actually key actors in driving the whole of the chain

(as did the lead firms in the textiles and garments 827
 value chain in East Asia). Without them, the value 828
 chain might either not have existed or entrepreneur- 829
 ship throughout the chain would be less advanced, 830
 although in some instances there is evidence of a 831
 “lock-in” situation where suppliers are locked into 832
 certain production functions while in other instances 833
 potential suppliers are simply excluded from more 834
 successful value chains (as in the case of pine furni- 835
 ture in South Africa). It is noted that these value 836
 chains are relatively new (all less than 10 years) and 837
 the concern that these individuals are abusing their 838
 powerful position, or may limit future development of 839
 the chain, is best examined product by product. 840

6.1. Jipi Japa 841

In the case of Jipi Japa palm, the dominant firm 842
 is much more than a buyer and seller. It has a 843
 quality control system, markets the products to 844
 nationals and tourists, offers training to local weav- 845
 ers and provides several social functions such as 846
 funds for housing development. This firm maintains 847
 a high-trust relationship with local suppliers (the Jipi 848
 Japa weavers), who have benefited through an 849
 improvement in their production processes and 850
 opportunities to sell their products. However, there 851
 are a few negative aspects of this “captive” value 852
 chain. The Jipi Japa firm demands only products that 853
 fit into its shop (small, colourful and relatively cheap 854
 Jipi Japa products perform an important function of 855
 attracting tourists into the shop where they may go 856
 on to purchase other much higher value artisanal 857
 products) and suppliers are not encouraged to inno- 858
 vate and make higher value added products since the 859
 firm lacks the marketing channels to sell these prod- 860
 ucts. The “switching costs” to alternative buyers by 861
 the Jipi Japa processors would be high as there are 862
 few about and none that could provide the same 863
 level of non-income benefits (health care, training, 864
 status, access to credit) that the association estab- 865
 lished by the Jipi Japa firm provides. Hence, while 866
 the Jipi Japa firm has been essential for *process* 867
 upgrading of existing products in the upstream part 868
 of the value chain, it also stifles *functional* upgrad- 869
 ing upstream (i.e. marketing of higher value added 870
 products). Further there is *exclusion*. The weavers in 871
 one community, who are from a different ethnic 872

873 group, were reported to be excluded from this value
874 chain and the associated marketing channels. This
875 community sells hats to local people, which is a less
876 attractive market.

877 6.2. *Matsutake mushrooms*

878 This case is simple: without the key entrepreneurs
879 there would be no contacts between Mexico and Japan
880 and there would be no niche market for Mexican
881 Matsutake mushrooms. The entrepreneurs have there-
882 fore been responsible for *chain* upgrading. Actors
883 upstream, including local collectors, make a welcome
884 profit (Table 3). The question of whether the traders
885 are making “super” profits is difficult to assess as the
886 time taken to establish a position in the market and the
887 risks incurred (e.g. advancing the costs of air-freight
888 to Japan) were not available. However, during the
889 two-year study period a trader entered and left the
890 market, which indicates that even with high estimated
891 profits at the national trader level, this is not an easy
892 market to capture or maintain.

893 6.3. *Camedora palm*

894 In the Camedora palm value chain a key entre-
895 preneur established the link between Mexico and the
896 North American market. This link and the position
897 of this entrepreneur within the chain are the result of
898 his many years of work in the sector as well as
899 training and financial support received from his
900 American buyer. These have also enabled him to
901 carry out *process* upgrading, including the produc-
902 tion of better and more consistent quality fronds
903 through domestication. This captive value chain
904 also appears to have negative aspects: because the
905 entrepreneur himself cultivates half the Camedora
906 palm required, i.e. he is both a buyer and supplier.
907 To some extent, therefore, he can exert his market
908 power over the other suppliers. The prices paid to
909 the collectors are so low that they only engage in the
910 activity for 6 months of the year, whereas his culti-
911 vated supplies sustain the value chain for the rest of
912 the year. Some evidence for the dissatisfaction this
913 causes can be seen in the fact that all households
914 engaged in collecting Camedora palm wanted to sell
915 their product to the part of the chain above this
916 entrepreneur.

7. Discussion and conclusions

The paper has examined the role of entrepreneur- 918
ship in NTFP commercialisation through the lens of 919
(global) value chains, which is novel in terms of its 920
application to NTFPs. Value chain analysis has 921
emerged as a new way of understanding markets for 922
commodities. We have applied the analysis success- 923
fully to the market for NTFPs by (1) drawing value 924
chain maps; (2) providing an example of distribution 925
of profits along the chain; (3) predicting for NTFP 926
value chains what type of governance we can expect 927
in theory and what type has occurred in practice; and 928
(4) discussing the effects of the type of governance for 929
entrepreneurship in the value chain for three NTFPs. 930
However, there are limits to some aspects of this 931
methodology, particularly quantitative analysis, 932
where the collection of data to develop profit distribu- 933
tions is made difficult by the sensitive nature of the 934
information. To be effective as a methodology that 935
helps to direct policy these data collection issues need 936
to be overcome as one of the critical issues in the 937
chains analysed is the powerful position of key indi- 938
viduals and firms. 939

Our analysis of NTFP commercialisation has 940
shown that entrepreneurs are important in the devel- 941
opment of innovative marketing of NTFPs and are 942
often key to spreading success throughout the value 943
chain. Typical examples include the company in 944
Santa Cruz which supports many producers by mov- 945
ing their woven palm products into the tourist mar- 946
ket, and the entrepreneur in Mexico who established 947
links between mushroom pickers in rural commu- 948
nities and brokers and consumers in Japan. Entrepre- 949
neurship appears to be particularly critical where 950
markets and consumers are physically distant from 951
collectors. 952

Based on these conclusions, we suggest that it 953
can be shortsighted to criticise the monopolistic 954
position of such individuals. Instead, thought should 955
be given to how they might be supported in order to 956
increase the positive impacts of their innovation and 957
entrepreneurship within the value chains. At the 958
same time, it would be unwise not to consider 959
ways of limiting the potential negative aspects of 960
their powerful positions within these chains. As the 961
analysis has shown, the negative effects differ from 962
case to case. Therefore projects to support the com- 963

964 mercialisation of specific NTFPs need to be
 965 designed to take into account the activities and
 966 attitudes of the key individuals. The experience of
 967 the project's partners suggests that some local orga-
 968 nisation now have the capacity to provide the neces-
 969 sary flexible and differentiated support on a case-by-
 970 case basis. More generally, producer communities
 971 can be empowered to understand (and monitor)
 972 the role of downstream intermediaries and improve
 973 their bargaining position through the provision of
 974 organisational support and improved market infor-
 975 mation systems. Better education and access to
 976 credit (especially for NTFP-based enterprises), com-
 977 bined with a simpler and more transparent system of
 978 regulations (for those products for which collection
 979 and/or various export permits are required) can help
 980 existing entrepreneurs as well as opening up the
 981 playing field for new actors to take on the entre-
 982 preneurial role.

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