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Annex J

Political Capacity and its Effects on Natural Resource Management

Katharine Thoday

Summary

Development and management of Natural Resources is increasingly being promoted at the community level. However an uncritical acceptance of community does not take into account differences in power, both within defined communities and in relation to the structures within which communities are situated. Ignoring power, risks undermining intervention objectives. To address this difficulty this study examines the concept of political capacity as a way of integrating the political sphere into studies of common property, collective action and Natural Resource Management (NRM). The study makes a comparison between two villages, one under urban governance (Kelageri) and one under rural governance (Mugad) in order to explore how decisions regarding local management are made and which groups benefit the most. The structural factors of government and the levels of livelihood dependency within the villages are seen as important variables in this examination.

Introduction

The DFID NRSP project aims to gain an improved understanding of the process of participatory action planning formulation by, in part, answering the question "How can plans of action for management for natural resources which benefit the poor, best be developed in the context of the peri-urban interface?" The previous project (R7959) established the importance of community mobilisation as a pre-requisite to any planning process and conflicts were seen as an inevitable but resolvable part of such a process. However little research had been done to understand the causes of such conflict, with much being blamed on "politics".

In general conversation some of the project team expressed the fear that community mobilisation might contribute to increasing political capacity but that too much political capacity might become self-defeating by leading to intractable conflict. It was also expressed that "political conflicts are usually among competing elites and powerful party factions led by upper caste elites." This has led to a view that empowerment of the poorest needed to occur without interaction with more powerful groups. "If there is a way sanghas can work quietly around these groups that is the best way." However to view sanghas made up of the powerless as apolitical or neutral is misleading. One Community worker highlighted the fact that not involving those above the poverty line in sanghas risked the sanghas being taken over or undermined. As Chambers has commented (1983:163): " The ignoring of power and interests of local elites, more perhaps than any other factor has been responsible for failures to benefit the poor."

Work was already being carried out on how to involve target institutions in the project and so link area specific interventions to the wider institutional framework. Using the web of institutionalisation (developed by UCL) the project team investigated ways of institutionalising the action plans they had developed with stakeholders. However little had been done to explore the views of stakeholders themselves. What were their existing patterns of participation in the public sphere and how did they perceive change could be brought about? This study investigates the concept of political capacity as an analytical tool in order to understand the role of power and hence how decisions regarding local management are made and which groups benefit the most. It aims to examine the alliances that exist in peri-urban areas and the factors that contribute to the formation of these.

In general, community traditions are not seen to change or evolve but instead only decay. (Mosse, 1997) However there is a recognition that urbanisation (or any similar change process) can bring with it both opportunities and difficulties that will affect the formation of social capital and consequently community.

Table 1.1: Opportunities and Barriers to the Formation of Social Capital in Urban and Rural Areas

Opportunities for the formation of Social Capital	Barriers to the formation of Social Capital
Richness of social contacts	Heterogeneity of population
Links with rural areas	Mobility of population
New networks needed for survival	Breakdown of traditional networks
Social change can increase inclusion of minority groups	Increased crime and violence can be a result of social change
Common struggles and adversity	Relative poverty
Resisting exploitation	Exploitation

Source: Adapted from Phillips "Factors known to influence the formation of social capital in urban areas " in Rakodi, 2002

1.0 Definitions and Methodology

The concept of political capacity is presented as a useful concept to link social capital (and other capitals) with institutions. For the purposes of this study political capacity is defined as the scope that an individual or group has to exert influence on decision making that affects them (both formally and informally) and so improve their livelihoods (Devas in Rakodi, 1997; Baumann and Sinha, 2001). A distinction is made between structural and instrumental capacity.

Structural political capital is defined in the public perspective and refers to, "variables of the political system which influence the possibilities of diverse actors to accumulate instrumental political capital and condition the effectiveness of different types of instrumental political capital." (Birner and Wittmer, 2000, p.6) It refers to formal and informal institutions of governance; different levels of decision making and the nature of civil society.

Instrumental political capital is defined in the actors perspective and consists of the resources which, "actors i.e. an individual or a group can dispose of and use to influence policy formation processes and realise outcomes which are in their perceived interest." (ibid, p.6) This involves examining the role of education, money, status and social capital.

The concept of community is also central to understanding political capacity. The study examines the interaction between people's experience and interpretation of their reality and how this links to the pressure of political constituencies and representative political structures.

The study was carried in the two villages of Mugad and Kelageri, that were similar in composition but different in location and forms of governance – one was under rural governance and the other urban governance. This allowed for differences between structural and instrumental factors to be examined.

Twenty-four semi-structured interviews were carried out with village inhabitants. The aim of these interviews was to assess personal perceptions of power, choices, conflict and community and individual participation in social networks, groups and formal political processes.

Table 2.1: Individual Sampling Frame

		Lingayats and Muslims Rich wealth ranking	Jains Medium wealth ranking	Lingayats and Muslims Very Poor wealth ranking	Scheduled Castes/ Tribes	Total
Mugad	Male	2	1	2	1	6
	Female	2	1	2	1	6
Kelageri	Male	2	1	1	2	6
	Female	2	1[1]	2	1	6
						24

In addition to the individual questionnaires five focus groups were organised with approximately seven participants each time (none of whom had been interviewed individually). The focus groups were chosen to obtain differing viewpoints on water conflict.

Table 2.2: Focus Groups

	Female SHGs (2 mixed groups)	Fishermens' Sangha	Water Users Executive Committee	Watershed Executive Committee
Mugad	8 members	6 members (Representing 120)	8 members (Representing 200)	
Kelageri	12 members			6 members

In order to understand how villagers' views and options were shaped by those in power twenty-five guided interviews were carried out with opportunistically selected officials, elected representatives and NGO workers at the local, district and state levels.

Figure 2.1: Institutional Interviewees

Institutional Interviewees:	**No.**
State level officials and NGOs	**9**
District level Elected representatives	**6**
District level officials and NGOs	**10**

[1] This was a Muslim in Kelageri

2.0 Managing Water Resources

The issue of water arose in all the action plans (although it was acknowledged that water for irrigation was mainly a landed issue and drinking water a particular concern to women) and water is acknowledged as "India's most serious crisis." (India Today, 2003, p.3). Mismanagement of storage and supply has resulted in increasing exploitation of ground water leading to water shortages.

With Karnataka facing its third year of drought in 2003, the issue of water is highly politicised both in terms of drinking water and irrigation. 54% of the state is drought prone compared to a National average of 16%. However while the National average of irrigated areas is 32%, in Karnataka only 20% of the net cropped area is under irrigation (Renjit, 2002). Much water funding comes from the Drought Relief Fund[2] – a reactive rather than proactive measure to address water shortages.

Table 3.1: Frequency of Water Supply in Mugad and Kelageri

	Frequency of Water Supply in June/July 2003	**Water Rates**
Mugad (Rural)	Alternate days for half an hour	Rs 2 per head per year
Kelageri (Urban)	Used to be alternate days, now every 8-10 days for 45 minutes	Rs 5.8 per kilolitre

The overall lack of planning for peri-urban areas has been well documented in the PUI project (Purushothamen and Purohit, 2002; Allen and Nunan, 2002). Although in 1963 the Rural-Urban Relationship Committee made the recommendation that rural-urban areas should be treated as a continuum, the 73rd and 74th Amendments passed in 1992, have resulted in "a needless and artificial dichotomy in the minds of many, particularly Departments and Ministries of State and the Union Government." (NCRWC, 2001 p.22). Management is split at the State level between the Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board responsible for urban water supply; the Rural Engineering Department responsible in rural areas (in addition to the Department for Mines and Geology) for harnessing groundwater resources and the Water Resources Department (split into Major and Minor Irrigation) responsible for harnessing surface water in both rural and urban areas.

Without a proper understanding of linkages between urban and rural, a diversity of organisations converge in the decision making process but lack clearly established institutional arrangements to articulate interventions. This dual system has led to gaps in policy and programmes. Although there is a watershed programme in Kelageri, there is a lack of policy for such transition areas (p.comm. Mr.Agarwal and Mr.Bhaskar). The Watershed Department claims this because rapid changes in these areas mean their efforts there might be wasted.

[2] This is reactive funding provided by the Centre and State and distributed through MLAs

In terms of irrigation, tank systems have been an important decentralised form of irrigation in semi-dry areas of southern India. A tank (called a Kere in Kannada) is a man-made reservoir which impounds surface runoff behind earth bunds and embankments. The number of tanks in Karnataka is estimated at 36,672 (Renjit, 2002). The current irrigation area of these tanks is 240,000 ha – only 35% of a potential 685,000 ha command area. In addition to capturing and holding water for irrigation, they enable percolation and recharge of groundwater and provide mechanisms for coping with water scarcity and for flood control. They also act as a resource for fishing and provide silt which can be used as fertilizer by farmers or clay for potters and brick makers.

The decline of tank management is explained by several broad changes. The first is the decline of dependence on the tank for livelihood needs and related changes in village social structures. The second is the state's involvement in tank management (from 1966) which was seen to undermine local capacity while having inadequate funds and staff to do the job itself. In addition the tank catchment areas have been neglected. The catchment is under the control of the Revenue Department if cultivated and the Forest Department if forested. Neither monitors change in the catchment area and the impact on tanks. Finally the privatisation of water resources and the provision of subsidies and loans for pump sets and tube wells has meant less people use the tank or see water as a community issue.

However tanks have recently been promoted as a more appropriate answer to problems of water management by a diversity of actors. Tanks are advocated as more cost effective and more sustainable as well as being put forward by proponents of community based action. "The financial requirement to desilt tanks does not appear as heavy when compared to what is planned to be spent on drought relief in the region."(Reddy, 1989 p.139). However it is somewhat of a myth that tanks have ever been well maintained purely at a decentralised level. As systems they are not static; breaches and new water courses generate competing claims to title that require constant arbitration.

In Mugad maintenance of the tank has been under the control of the Minor Irrigation Department but with lack of resources, they are trying to shift management to users. In Kelageri the tank was given to the University of Agricultural Sciences (UAS) in the 1960's and the villagers lost both control and access. Due to decreasing water levels for the last three years, UAS has leased the tank to a private owner for Pisciculture.

In the last two years Karnataka has implemented three major water management schemes that aim to increase decentralised management of water (See Appendix for comparison of programmes). All rely on approximately 80% development assistance from the World Bank, the State government contribution varies from between 11%-16% and the community contribution from 4%-10%.

Jala Samvardhane Yojana Sangha (JSYS) is concerned with tank development and management; the Karnataka Watershed Development Project (KWDP) with the improvement of the productive potential of selected watersheds and their associated natural resource base and Jal NirmalYojana with improving the quality of rural water supply and sanitation service delivery. Ideally tank management should be looked at in relation to watershed management. The division of the World Bank schemes which focus on them separately creates a potential problem for integrated water management.

Both the Karnataka Watershed Development Project and Jal Nirmal Yojana are operational in the Dharwad district. Kelageri has just become involved with the Karnataka Watershed Development Project.

The focus on community management has become pervasive. All three water programmes are interesting because of their focus on "community". Their main objectives incorporate exhortations to "restore community involvement"; "strengthen community" and "empower the community in general and the poor and women in particular." JSYS and KWDP both aim to improve water management in conjunction with improving livelihoods while Jal Nirmal has a twin focus on water management and poverty reduction.

4.0 The Situation in Mugad

In Mugad there are differing opinions as to whether the tank is still a useful water source. Richer people are able to develop their own water supply by sinking bores; therefore reducing the number of people relying on the tank.

After two years of drought the tank is for the first time in living memory completely dry. Conflict also exists in terms of sharing the scarce water supply. Farmers from the neighbouring village of Chikkamalaguarda have put a bund to allow water to irrigate their fields before it flows into the tank. Mugad farmers with land nearer the tank are also taking water before those further away.

There is also overt conflict regarding tank management. A Water Users Group has been established but is lacking support from the Minor Irrigation Department who have withdrawn support from all groups due to the drought situation. The group has formal rules and is supposed to be made up of Water Users (the A group) and Non-water users (the B group). A committee is formed with a majority of A members. When the committee attempted to register the group other villagers opposed its establishment on the grounds it was not representative. The Water User's Group claim that this charge is misplaced and that local party leaders want to dominate the group in order to channel funds for corrupt purposes.

Conflict over tank management has also been manifest in misuse of tank desiltation money. Due to the Drought Relief Fundand with the intervention of the PUI action project, money was given for the desiltation of Mugad tank. However initially no action was taken. This appeared to be because not all powerful groups in the village had been consulted and therefore disbursement of funds was prevented by the opposing group who wanted to be connected with any tank developments. Under the Drought Relief Fund the Member of the state Legislative Assembly (MLA) sanctioned Rs 1.56 lakh (approximately £2,200) for desiltation work and the Zilla Panchayat (ZP) donated between 2 lakh (It is unclear whether this was from Zilla funds or personal funds). This was to provide money for mechanical diggers for which villagers were supposed to provide their own diesel. Desiltation began but work was terminated under allegations from the BJP party that money had been misused.

The following table outlines some of the main stakeholders in Mugad regarding the water conflict and their views on the situation.

Table 4.1 : Water Conflict in Mugad

Stakeholders	Situation of Stakeholder	View on Mismanagement of tank	View on Who Should Manage Tank
Fishermans' Sangha	▪ 120 fisher families (Bhovi caste) Lack of water severely affects livelihood. Have not caught fish in tank for 8 months. Some (4-5)jobs fishing in other tanks ▪ No educated people or political representatives/ government officials from Bhovi castes. Difficult for them to come together as group as do not have knowledge of advocacy, time or money.	▪ District level officials took money "When we are in trouble – how can we ask what did you do with the money ? We don't have any rights." ▪ Money originally given for desiltation not because people approached Govt. but because of top-down decision	▪ Can't do improvements alone - need Govt. funds. Centre and State argue over who should give money. Must look together to solve such problems. ▪ Kalappa Hatti– Village elder would be best person to disburse funds.
Formal Executive Committee of Water Users	▪ Lack of water for land. Currently no money to invest in solutions. ▪ Problem with registering Water Users Group because village level party leaders supported by MLA said that will not sanction unless members join the Congress Party. Some members did join the Congress party for this reason. ▪ Won't work with fishermen "Don't have knowledge; Don't suit us"	▪ Management of work not correct as district level officials took money. ▪ Know that under each Taluka minimum of 4 tanks must be desilted from Drought Fund. MLA only helped one tank out of a potential 8.	▪ Funds should be given to GP or Water Users Ctee If either become focus of conflict they are more answerable to the people and Elders will help solve disputes ▪ In general villagers won't work on tank because they think it is only of benefit to water users. ▪ Political problems only exist regarding tank

Stakeholders	Situation of Stakeholder	View on Mismanagement of tank	View on Who Should Manage Tank
Other Water Users	▪ Due to drought conditions do not have work in fields therefore must go to work in city and take whatever wages they can. Poorest people are affected.	▪ Whatever amount given to GP will keep 75% and only 25% will be distributed. ▪ Villagers claimed wages for work they hadn't done.[3] Work was therefore not completed properly. ▪ Bullock race conducted in tank – Rs 40 000 collected but confusion as to where money went.	▪ Money should be sent to Sanghas. Wages will be given fairly and work will be done properly. Money should not be given to GP ▪ Kalappa Hatti– Village elder would be best person to disburse funds. ▪ Should be more village bores
Minor Irrigation (District)	▪ Lack of money ▪ Take opinions of MLA as to which tanks to desilt	▪ Claimed work done to available funds	▪ Water depends on rains! ▪ Reason for departmental divisions to distribute workload. No-one will listen to his opinion – can only do job as prescribed.
Minor Irrigation (State)	▪ Lack of money. Department been reactive. Not collecting enough revenue. Currently 190 tanks being maintained through Drought Relief Fund.	N/A	▪ Need a more holistic approach looking at watersheds etc if tanks to be rejuvenated properly. Best if maintained at taluka level ▪ Ultimately want to hand over operation and maintenance of tanks to users
Zilla Panchayat	▪ Gave 2 lakh for tank desilting in Mugad (Vice President claimed personal money ?)	▪ Claimed withdrew money as villagers not working properly. Villagers self-centred and not looking to the community.	▪ Villagers should work together.

This highlights how important it is not to see resource management as separate from other social interactions. "Water has always been a political as well as a natural resource and the operation of tank systems regulating its flow have been influenced by changing configurations of power at both village and state level."(Mosse , 1995 p.146). The more the State provides, the less empowerment is tolerated or sought by communities. Ironically as local communities gain awareness of their new rights and responsibilities in resource management, demands for legal, financial, technical and logistical support from the public sector tend to increase (Turton, 1998).

[3] Tank desiltation money was chanelled through Jawahar Gram Samridhi Yojana – a scheme that employs local people on public works.

5.0 Constructing Community

The view of the Indian village as typifying traditional society has for a long time created a dichotomy between the village and modern society. Rural communities are constructed as simple, harmonious and characterized by intimate relations – a sociological opposite to the urban. As one community officer explained, when describing Mugad "there is a lot of trust and that makes it more rural in character" (Purushothamen and Purohoit, 2002). In contrast Kelageri is seen as more urban and consequently it is claimed "We cannot call Kelageri a village at all." (ibid)

Perceptions of Change

Two thirds of villagers in Kelageri saw change as something that required formal political or governmental intervention (See Fig.5.1below). There were no differences regarding gender, education or economic status in this view. In comparison in Mugad villagers were divided between seeing change as something that would happen through economic means and believing it was not possible and out of their control. All scheduled caste villagers focussed on economic change while those who felt change was out of their control or had no idea about how to make changes were uneducated women.

Figure 5.1 : Perceptions of How Change Can be Brought About in Mugad and Kelageri

Mugad (rural)



Kelageri (urban)



Means of Change		
Economic Bank Loan / Save Borrow from Friends Bribe Start own Business Through Government Scheme	**Political** Make Government Aware Responsibility of Elected Members Change Policy	**Social** Form/Work through SHG Through Self Help Scheme

Villagers in Kelageri appear to put a higher emphasis on their children's education and consequently development was seen as something in the future, that could only be achieved through the next generation (See Fig. below). This emphasis on education may be an effect of needing more formal skills in an urban environment in order to get a good job. In contrast in Mugad seven people mentioned that they desired change in livelihood terms (no-one mentioned this in Kelageri). Change was desired more on an individual than community basis,

In contrast villagers in Kelageri seemed to view development more in terms of the community and desired individual change less. Tarring of roads was the most important change followed by housing and water supply.

Figure 5.2: Type of Individual and Community Change Desired in Mugad and Kelageri

Individual Change Relating to:	**Community Changes Relating to:**
Children i.e. Educate children and get them jobs	**Education** Encourage more children to go to school
House/Land i.e. Get a Government Plot/ Extend House	**Housing** Provide toilets; Improve houses for poorest
Livelihood i.e. Get a regular job; Grow vegetables; Change crops to those that use less water; Keep livestock; Learn stiching; Buy vegetables wholesale to make profit	**Livelihood** Provide employment for poorest Improve opportunities/ markets for womens' work
Improved Irrigation/Water Supply i.e. Dig boreholes in fields	**Improved Irrigation/Water Supply** Desilt/clean tank Improve rainfall Improve water supply Provide individual taps
Infrastructure Electricity	**Infrastructure** Roads tarred
Transport i.e. Have own vehicle; Another vehicle	**Health** Develop Vetinary Hospital/ More staff at health centre Training in Health and Sanitation

Other Stand for Election to HDMC	**Other** Marriage Hall Sanghas should support each other if failing More support for farmers Improve ration cards Get loans more easily

Figure 5.2 ctd/ : Type of Individual and Community Change Desired in Mugad and Kelageri



The view of Mugad villagers focussing on the individual rather than the community is something that was also expressed by officials (Interviews with GP Secretary and ZP Vice President). The ZP Vice President claimed that the villagers were increasingly self-centred, working only for their own interests and not that of the community. It was for this reason that he withdrew the tank desiltation money that had been sanctioned.

Levels of Neighbourhood Trust

Levels of trust were much lower in Mugad than expected. It is commonly perceived among community workers that rural villages have a better sense of community than villages in more urban areas which are perceived as fragmented. In contrast three quarters of those in Mugad claimed that they only trusted their neighbours a small or very small amount. While in Kelageri more than half claimed to trust their neighbours to a great or very great extent. Interestingly in Kelageri a couple of people mentioned that "they had to trust others or nothing would happen." In contrast several of the poor people in Mugad were vehement in their lack of trust:

"I never trust anyone. If someone does something for me I will always be obliged to give something back."
"I don't trust anyone. People may turn on me and laugh at me."

Figure 5.3: Levels of Neighbourhood Trust in Mugad and Kelageri



These differences were further borne out when discussing individual's contributions to community projects that might not benefit them directly. In Mugad everyone (with the exception of one person) said that they would give their time and resources to such a project, however when asked to estimate others contributions they were less positive. Nearly all the women claimed that less than half the villagers would contribute. In interesting contrast villagers in Kelageri seemed more honest in appraising their contribution to such a project but had better expectations of others. Although half said they would contribute time and resources, the others qualified their answers – saying they might not have time but would give resources or vice versa. However the majority of people said they thought that everyone would contribute to such a project with most others saying that at least more than half would contribute.

Institutional Trust

Three quarters of those interviewed in Mugad said that the Gram Panchayat was the best organisation to bring about community improvements (See Fig. below). This could be seen as identification with the local body. However people mentioned in some cases that "they had to trust the Gram Panchayat" as this was the only body mandated to help them. As one man said "The Gram Panchayat has to come to us, everyone else we have to approach." In a couple of cases people claimed that the " Gram Panchayat has its own agenda" and correspondingly community leaders (outside of the PRI system) were seen as the most responsible agents of change.

Figure 5.4: Who Villagers in Mugad and Kelageri Trust the Most to Make Community Improvements



Traditionally employment was bought with political loyalty to the employer. This Patron-Client relationship is still evident in Mugad, where although numbers of people working outside the village are increasing, employee links remain stronger than in Kelageri. This has created an interesting situation in Mugad between "selected"

(traditional leaders) and elected leaders. In terms of resolving the water conflict in Mugad two groups claimed that they trusted a particular Pancheru to take charge of the situation more than any elected leader. This same Pancheru claimed also to act as an advisor to the Gram Panchayat. The existence of simultaneous forms of representation highlights a confusion as to where decisions should be made as well creating a potential area of power struggle.

In comparison, Kelageri villagers saw several loci of change agents. It is difficult to ascertain whether this puts them in a stronger or weaker position to make this change happen. More trust was put in political parties/representatives as these will be the people that can make change happen within the Municipal Corporation or at higher district levels. Interestingly community leaders (Pancheru) were seen as equally important and the Pancheru retained a greater role than might have been expected. Their role particularly in settling intra-village disputes and arranging village feasts etc. seemed well defined and respected. The Pancheru in Mugad seemed to have less ability to resolve disputes as their motives were more politicised. In addition two people saw the village people themselves as the main agents of change (no-one mentioned this in Mugad).

Citizen leverage and resources

Villagers in Kelageri showed a greater awareness of their voting rights and a better understanding of the control they exercised over elected candidates than those in Mugad (See Fig.5.5 below).

Figure 5.5: Reasons for Voting Decisions



Group Decision – Refers to those who select candidates in conjunction with others
Uneducated Vote- Refers to those who vote not knowing who they are voting for

Two particular incidents were highlighted unprompted by a number of people during the interviews. One incident seemed to have happened about 10 years ago when Kelageri was experiencing severe water supply problems. With no HDMC candidate taking up this issue the villagers boycotted the elections (at least 3000 votes were claimed to be wasted). Consequently Congress and the BJP, the two main contending parties competed to win the disillusioned voters with one party digging channels and the other putting in pipelines. The second incident also related to problems of water supply when in June 2003 a number of villages had blocked the Goa highway (which runs through the village) in protest at the poor service.

Participation of Different Groups

In both villagers those who didn't feel represented in elected bodies were those with the least education and wealth.

In Mugad the same people claimed to feel most excluded in the village in terms of being able to make decisions about their livelihoods and having their views represented. The basis of the Gram Panchayat system is the Gram Sabha or village assembly. Attendance at the Gram Sabha is dominated by those who have high status or are Scheduled Caste members. Poor women are least likely to attend.

Those who felt they were well represented in formal decision making bodies claimed that no-one in the village was excluded. The positive discrimination for Scheduled Castes and the stronger group identity meant they felt that they were able to influence decision making. Overall those most isolated from participating in decision making were poorer members of traditionally dominant castes.

In Kelageri no-one felt they could influence decision making at the government level (See Fig. 5.6 below) and views were more mixed on exclusion at the village level. Those with lower wealth ranking claimed no-one was excluded and other villagers mentioned groups that they did not belong to i.e. a government job holder said farmers were most excluded. This highlights a greater out-group awareness. Also of interest was that poorer village inhabitants said that no-one in the village was excluded.

Females tend to be particularly excluded in the public sphere. This was highlighted by their inability to offer opinions on some aspects of public life and the fact they were less likely to belong to groups and more likely to make uneducated votes. The situation was worse for women in Kelageri.

Table 5.6 : Extent to Which Villagers in Mugad and Kelageri Feel Elected Bodies Represent Them



Nature of Associational Participation – What Social Coalitions are Important?

In Mugad the majority of people claimed that those they associated with closely were different in terms of religion, caste, education and economic status. Where similarity was greatest was in terms of occupation. In Kelageri occupation did not arise but caste groupings appeared to continue to play a part in those people were closest to. In Kelageri casteism had been a crucial social division. Today when villagers in Kelageri claimed that conflict in Kelageri had reduced, part of this was put down to decreased casteism. However in comparison to Mugad caste networks were more politicised. This seemed to link lower castes to networks outside Kelageri and so improve their position in the village.

6.0 Summary

The Gram Panchayat has much more power to determine local level changes than a Muncipal Councillor. At a village level, Mugad therefore has greater political capacity than Kelageri to attract and collect funds and make local changes itself. However this political capacity may be diminished by the internalization of conflict that occurs.

In Mugad the patron-client relationship still exists to a stronger degree than in Kelageri. Although more people are beginning to work outside of the village, traditional work links still exist. In addition, the formal institutional arrangements of government allows patron-client relationships to be strengthened. "In villages everything is a package deal." (Reddy and Seshadri, 1972 in Pinto, 2001). Interactions with the Gram Panchayat cannot be separated from other village interactions and it becomes hard to disassociate politics from everyday life. The decision over who should control resources takes place within the village (bounded location) with different groups fighting for supremacy. Conflict is therefore internalised.

In contrast to Mugad formal political processes are external to the village of Kelageri. Villagers appear to have a greater understanding of the political process as it is not influenced by local social structures in the same way. In fact the externalisation of formal political processes has created a space in which Kelageri would appear to have developed a renewed sense of community. Both the spatial and institutional blurring of Kelageri's boundaries have made villagers more aware of their community than villagers who are not threatened in this way and the need to compete for resources against other city areas has made the community as a spatial unit a useful unit to do this.

In a comparison of two villages in Karnataka, Epstein (1998) characterises these differences in terms of what she calls "village introversion" and "village extroversion." With the introduction of irrigation Wangela farmers were able to concentrate on agricultural activities and consequently Epstein claims "economic, political and ritual relations were concentrated within the boundaries of the village."(p.109) In contrast in Dalena, diversification of livelihoods has meant that dependence on fellow villagers has diminished, leading to a break down of hereditary patron-client relationships

7.0 Conclusion

How groups organise to manage change in the sites studied is affected by the structure of local government and the nature of livelihood dependency. As explained the structure of local government in India is significantly different between areas defined as rural and urban. The PUI therefore faces specific barriers for citizens to voice their concerns and form alliances as they are interacting with different public institutions. The different spaces mean that actors are less likely to meet to share concerns and issues are unlikely to result in collective action, as, as Wade (1987) illustrated in his study of village republics, norms solidify more easily against common adversaries.

The type of decision is also important and a distinction should be made between decisions involving management and decisions involving plans for change. In periods of rapid change, co-operation can become much more risky (Aggarwal, 2000) and this can partly explain why change is conceived in much more individual terms in Mugad.

Situating the Action Plans

The mode of development of the three plans of action was by participatory action planning with the intended primary beneficiaries in three villages. It was decided not to work in Kelageri for the purposes of the DFID project as the village was described as being in "uncomfortable transition, from being a peri-urban settlement to being urban with some remaining rural characteristics." It was also documented that the NGO found it difficult to work there as people had no time for them. This perpetuated the dominant discourse referred to earlier, of rural characteristics being idealised while the urban is typified in negative terms. This study has shown that although there might have been practical reasons for not working in Kelageri, assumptions regarding the nature of social and political capacity in the village has become distorted and misrepresented. IDS is now working in Kelageri on a World Bank Micro Watershed programme

The poorest in the peri-urban interface seem to be those migrants who are not situated in one place but move with work and are situated in temporary settlements. This highlights the fact that the project is potentially falling into the same trap as government departments in addressing the peri-urban interface and shying away from areas which are seen to be undergoing the greatest transition. The migrants are difficult to work with in terms of the project team's remit as they are not situated in one place and consequently are unable to invest time and energy in developing area based action plans.

This highlights an issue that has not been defended by the project. Although the project describes the peri-urban interface as a series of processes rather than a spatial area the action plans are based on the spatial unit of a village. This presumes an idea of community coterminous with locality. It is crucial to make a distinction between communities of locality and communities of interest and understand which are prioritised under which circumstances.

Much of the debate on the study of Indian villages is centred around the role of caste and can be characterised in terms of either prioritising community or hierarchy.[4] The project has taken the hierarchial view but used poor groups to develop community plans. To listen to the poor and advocate their views to target institutions is vital but to concentrate only on the demands of the poor is too isolationist. The action plans need to be integrated, or at least looked at in relation to the interests of other groups. Benjamin (2001) in his study of pro-poor urban process in Bangalore states that "pro-poor governance emerges from interdependent coalitions between local elites and poor groups, which are shaped by common links in the local economy and political alliances especially

[4] See in particular Dumont and Pocock (1957) arguing for caste and Srinivas (1976) prioritising village community.

on issues of land regularisation."[5] In Mugad desiltation of the tank was advocated without examining the needs of other groups.

What Does This Mean For Water Management?

Management of water resources should be comprehensively integrated into all aspects of planning and is not an issue which can be devolved to small geographic units alone. The current fragmentation of departments dealing with water and the establishment of multiple schemes does not bode well for sustainable management. Instead it provides opportunities for groups and individuals to play off different institutional bodies to their advantage, which is not necessarily in the interests of the wider public or the resource. In addition the fragmentation of higher institutional bodies means that success in terms of tank management may not be complemented in terms of watershed development/ rehabilitation or appropriate livelihood decisions e.g. choice of crop grown, therefore invalidating the effectiveness of having a well maintained tank.

It will be interesting to see how many water resource management groups continue to exist when the three major schemes come to an end. Currently the watershed model, which is dependent on the co-ordination of individual farmers' plans, seems the most robust, as it is less disrupted if sub-groups do not want to get involved or if they generate conflict. In comparison, as illustrated in Mugad, tank maintenance can rarely be carried out unless there is greater participation. This makes such management groups more vulnerable to the loss of members, while conflict has much greater capacity to prevent work altogether.

The Executive Officer of the JSYS scheme said that if the community in question does not present a united front they will miss out on project funding. This may well be expedient in terms of getting projects established but means that communities like Mugad are likely to be sidelined. Consequently the subordinated in such villages are at risk of being further marginalized and the opportunities for CBNRM fragmenting altogether.

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Appendix 1

	Jala Samvardhane Yojana Sangha	**Karnataka Watershed Development Project (KWDP)**	**Jal Nirmal Yojana (Karnataka Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project – KRWSSP)**
Organisational Type	World Bank assisted Quango	World Bank assisted Government Department	World Bank assisted Quango
Geographical Area	9 Districts Bagalkote, Bellary, Bidar, Chitradurga, Haveri, Kolar, Koppal, Raichur, Tumkur	5 Rain fed Districts Chitradurga, Dharwad, Haveri, Kolar, Tumkur	11 Districts in North Karnataka Bagalkot, Belgaum, Bidar, Bijapur, Dharwad, Gadag, Gulbarga, Haveri, Koppal, Raichur, Uttra Kannada
Programme Scope	Approx. 2000 irrigation tanks (400 to have command area over 40 ha and 1600 to have command area 4- 40 ha)	77 sub-watersheds	Approx. 30 % of Gram Panchayats in above area
Main Objectives	To support a broader and more holistic approach to tank development and management aimed at restoring community involvement.	To improve the productive potential of selected watersheds, and their associated natural resource base, and, strengthen community, and institutional arrangements for natural resource management.	To improve the quality of rural water supply and sanitation service delivery. To strengthen the democratic decentralisation process and empower the community in general and poor and women in particular.
Additional Objectives	To improve the operational performance of tank systems through physical interventions. To facilitate technical training and on-farm demonstrations in water management, agriculture and horticultural development,	Participatory farmer-driven research, and extension processes will be financed, to introduce improved practices for agriculture, horticulture and silvi-pastoral treatments. The formation of beneficiary	To contribute to poverty reduction.

	fisheries, forestry and fodder production to help ensure that improved water storage is translated into increased household incomes.		groups for additional income generation will be supported, through craft industries, carpentry, and other related enterprising.			
Project Cost	Total = Rs 671 crore		Total = Rs 5, 524 crore		Total = Rs 1035 crore	
	IDA	80 %	IDA	79 %	IDA	78 %
	State Govt.	16 %	State Govt.	11 %	State Govt.	11 %
	Community	4 %	Community	10 %	Community	6 %
					GP	5 %
Project Period	6 years – 2003 -2009		6 years June 2001- May 2007		6 years – Jan. 2002 – Dec. 2007	
Selection Criteria	Demand Responsive In reality NGO logistical considerations have influenced selection.		Selected dry land rain fed areas Necessary that wasteland available and target group of small, marginal farmers below the poverty line.		Demand Responsive Gram Panchayats must pay Rs 10,000 to apply. Must have population above 1000. Ranked in terms water availability and ability for tax collection.	
Participation	Gram Sabha will agree for tank to be responsibility of Tank User Group (TUG). This is expected to be majority of village and may be agreed to be coterminous with Gram Sabha. Must pay membership decided themselves - normally between 50-100 Rs TUG will collect 90% of water rates and pass on 10%. Can also raise revenue through projects i.e./ fisherman; brick making etc Tank User Committee will then		Department, NGO and farmers will develop plan. Each individual farmer will develop own plan. Executive committee will meet once a month to review work plan and share information. Establishment of Watershed Executive Committees. 11 members appointed from Watershed participants. If GP should be 2 representatives. Women – some confusion		GPs and Village Water and Sanitation Committees will decide on type/choice of scheme and technology/service level which demand and are willing to finance. GPs will be responsible for planning, procurement, construction, management and maintenance.	

	be selected with representatives from all village groups (ceiling 21 members) to manage plans.	numbers. At least 2 SC/ST representatives.	
Support and Linkages	Cluster Facilitation Teams (CFT) will be formed – each responsible 30-40 tanks. Will comprise of (1) Social Scientist (2) Engineer (3) Agricultural/Watershed Specialist (4) Gender/HRD Specialist (5) Tribal Development Specialist. CFTs will be supported by Anchor NGOs. A JSYS District Social Organiser has been appointed in each distict (District Project Unit – DPU). Zilla Panchayat Joint Committees will be established with elected representatives from TUGs; line department representatives; representatives of CFTs and Anchor NGOs and members of DPU. CFT members will also attend existing TP Production Committee meetings.	NGOs will facilitate whole process. Responsible for organising training etc. District Watershed Offices will be established to supply technical expertise.	GPs will be strengthened "as necessary" to carry out project and will be supported by NGOs/Consultants. Technical support from Zilla Panchayat and ZP Engineering Department. Dedicated multi-disciplinary District Support Unit (DSU) will be established under the ZPs to assist ZPs.