

**THE COHERENCE OF EU POLICIES:  
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH**

**COMMISSIONED STUDY:  
REF: RO2CS007**

(EUROPEAN UNION'S POVERTY REDUCTION EFFECTIVENESS PROGRAMME)

**PAUL HOEBINK  
(CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ISSUES NIJMEGEN)**

**WITH COLLABORATION OF:  
MARLEEN DEUSS  
HEIN DE HAAS  
GERTRUD WAGEMANS**

**BRUSSELS  
MARCH 2005**

This research project is one of 23 projects funded by EC-PREP, a programme of research sponsored by the UK Department for International Development. All EC-PREP research studies relate to one or more of the six focal areas of EC's development policy in the context of their link to poverty eradication. EC-PREP produces findings and policy recommendations which aim to contribute to improving the effectiveness of the EC's development assistance. For more information about EC-PREP and any of the other research studies produced under the programme, please visit the website [www.ec-prep.org](http://www.ec-prep.org).

## CONTENT

<b>CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>PREFACE</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1: POLICY COHERENCE: DEFINITIONS, TYPOLOGIES, CAUSES FOR INCOHERENCE</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>CHAPTER 2: GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION</b>	<b>22</b>
<b>CHAPTER 3: POLICY COHERENCE IN THE COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPERS</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY MOROCCO</b>	<b>41</b>
<b>CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY SENEGAL</b>	<b>62</b>
<b>CHAPTER 6: TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF POLICY COHERENCE</b>	<b>79</b>
<b>ANNEXES</b>	
<b>1: PEOPLE INTERVIEWED BRUSSELS</b>	<b>86</b>
<b>2: PEOPLE INTERVIEWED MOROCCO</b>	<b>87</b>
<b>3: PEOPLE INTERVIEWED SENEGAL</b>	<b>89</b>
<b>4: TABLE: COHERENCE IN COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPERS</b>	<b>91</b>
<b>5: LIST OF REFERENCES</b>	<b>103</b>

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMENDATIONS

### CONCLUSIONS

1. The concept of policy coherence was introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht. It took quite some time until it got a place in European development policies. Outside pressure from the side of NGOs and some Member States, on the basis of some obviously clear cut cases, stood at the beginning of the acceptance of the concept of policy coherence as an important objective as well as analytical tool.
2. In recent years policy coherence in development cooperation gained new importance due to the Doha round of trade negotiations, in which developed countries policies not only in trade but as well in agriculture stood under accusation.
3. Policy coherence is a relative new concept both in political science as well as in the formulation and implementation) policy itself. It is defined in this report as ‘the non-occurrence of policies or the results of policies that are contrary to the objectives of a given policy’. We use three types of incoherence in this study: internal (1) incoherence, internal (2) incoherence and external incoherence. *Internal (1) coherence* is then coherence within development policy itself. *Internal (2) coherence* is coherence between foreign policy and development policy. *External coherence* is coherence between development policy and other policies of the European Union (e.g. trade, agriculture, fisheries, and immigration).
4. There are many causes for incoherencies to exist. One of the most important ones is that the interests of important producer groups or consumers are at stake and that these have a heavier weight in the formulation and implementation of policies than the interests of producers in developing countries.
5. The goals and objectives of EU development cooperation were broadly formulated in the Treaty of Maastricht and the Horizon 2000 document and more strictly in the Statement of the Commission and the Council of 2000. They found their way in a series of goals and objectives in the regional programmes and the Cotonou Convention that also offer a wide scope for activities.
6. The wide scope that the goals and objectives of the regional programmes offer also give space for the creation of Internal (1) incoherencies or incoherencies within development cooperation itself. This holds in particular for incoherence between the broad socio-economic development goals and objectives and the poverty focus of the programme.
7. Analysing and comparing the goals and objectives of European development cooperation as stated in the Treaty of Maastricht/Amsterdam/Nice, in the Horizon 2000 document, in the Statement of the Council and the Commission on European development Cooperation of 2000 and in the Cotonou Convention and the regional programmes (ALA, MEDA, TACIS) it is obvious that in general the goals and objectives of the overall policy but also of the regional programmes are still very broadly formulated. They are not very articulated and thus leave quite some room for interpretation.
8. Poverty reduction, placed in the centre by the Statement of the Council and the Commission is not that prominent in most of the regional programmes. MEDA, ALA and TACIS more clearly represent a mix of European economic and strategic interests and

humanitarian motives. It makes that the goals and objectives of these programmes lean more towards general social and economic development and political development with instruments that also will foster a deepening of the European relations with those regions.

9. Of those goals and objectives of European development cooperation which could be conflicting and cause incoherence, the reduction of poverty is the most important one. Poverty reduction is the Achilles heel of European development cooperation. This is probably most true in ALA, MEDA and TACIS countries. The European Union still lacks the instruments to have a poverty screening on the activities which it finances under its aid-programmes.

10. In the present generation of Country Strategy Papers the section on policy coherence receives on average a bit more than half a page, at least five lines and at best a bit more than two pages. The section gets more lines in the Central and South America CSPs, and less in the Mediterranean CSPs. The Sub Sahara Africa average is low because of the large number (11) of CSPs without any section on policy coherence.

11. Most emphasis in the paragraphs on policy coherence is laid on Internal (1) coherence issues. In most cases it remains with the statement that the proposed programme is totally coherent with EU development policy goals and objectives. Under Internal (2) coherence issues several subjects are presented. In Africa there is an emphasis on conflict and conflict prevention, in other regions human rights and democratisation are in the focus. Under External coherence issues we find fisheries mentioned several times, but also, in particular in the Latin America CSPs phyto-sanitary regulations.

12. In general it means that in the present CSPs most sections are rather short, that they don't go very deep and that at best they only point at certain incoherencies in EU policies without any analysis. Overall the tone is very positive, indicating that programmes are coherent and that policies are well monitored.

13. Even if one could conclude that in most CSPs the section on policy coherence is short, obligatory and non-analytical, it is remarkable that also in those few CSPs in which there is attention for External coherence issues, no urgency or no follow-up is indicated. It leads to a conclusion that an 'alarm-system' or 'indicator-system' to monitor policy coherence is needed.

14. In Morocco incoherencies that were presented by the respondents dealt in particular with External coherence issues. Incoherencies that were put forward in most obstinate form were in the fields of migration, market access and fisheries.

15. In its relations with the EEC/EU Morocco has in the last 48 years been a victim of a lack of complementarity in production structures with Southern European member states. Morocco had to try to get access for a series of the same products (citrus fruits, vegetables, textiles and clothing) for which old and new member states were looking for protection in Brussels. From this perspective European policies vis-à-vis Southern Mediterranean countries like Morocco and Tunisia have not been very coherent giving priority first to member states' interest at cost of old trade links and the development of these with Morocco and Tunisia.

16. In particular Europe's agricultural policies did hamper the development of the agricultural sector in Morocco, giving all the chances to citrus production in Spain, not leaving any space for Morocco's production to develop and extend its export.

17. Since Morocco stayed most of the time in the midst of Europe's trade preferences pyramid, clearly behind the ACP countries, the EU was also not very coherent in its own stated goals with regard to Article 138 of the Treaty of Rome, safeguarding old trade relationships, neither to its regularly stated objectives of creating a zone of peace and prosperity in the Mediterranean.

18. Fisheries is one of the most sensitive dossiers in the European-Morocco relationship. The Moroccan side sees a clear incoherence here between the stated objectives of Europe's Mediterranean policy and the way the EU gave preference to Spanish interests.

19. A second hotly debated theme is immigration. It is generally felt in Morocco that the EU connects immigration too much with security and ignores the development issues that are at stake also. The emphasis on security and the way in which the burden is laid on the Moroccan side is even felt to lead to the wrong policies, overemphasising border control even at costs of human lives.

20. A second sensitive dossier through the years has been human rights, in which Europe was seen as being reluctant to use conditionality in older times and using conditionality in the wrong way at the beginning of the 1990s. In recent years the EU's attitude is described by some as being too optimistic about democratic progress in Morocco and ignoring fears for regression.

21. In Senegal respondents put forward a mix of Internal (1) and External coherence issues. Again fisheries and migration issues, but also 'calendar incoherence' (long time delays) and problems with dumping of agricultural produce.

22. The Senegalese fisheries sector is very complex with a large number of actors on the stage. The depletion of fisheries resources, of some species, is clearly at stake. Since Senegal is one of the few African states with a huge fishermen population and an important position of fish in the daily diet, the EU should not have allowed – an in this sense its policy is incoherent - that under the Fisheries Agreement European ships again got access to fishing grounds close to the coast.

23. Senegalese producers clearly suffer from import surges of agricultural products from Europe, leftovers of a 'spoilt' market and dumped in Africa. Most cited examples are onions, potatoes, and chicken legs. The latter are sold in Dakar's supermarkets in plastic bags, frozen without any specification of country of origin and limit of consumption dates. If the EU at the same time tends to foster agricultural development in Senegal, its policies could be considered as incoherent when it subsidizes these exports in direct or indirect ways.

24. Senegalese employers complain about immigration policies in Europe. They see the EU as much more illiberal than the US in immigration policies and in this sense blocking trade relations between Senegal and Europe.

## **RECOMENDATIONS**

25. To enhance a deeper type of analysis of EU's policy coherence with regard to development cooperation, as well as on internal as on external coherence, and to arrive at

better structured paragraph in the next generation of Country Strategy papers DG Relex and DG Development should offer the Delegations involved a framework for the analysis of policy coherence.

26. Such a framework should not only point at potential and actual coherence issues, but also offer questions and indicate methodologies to analyse these. Also a system to indicate the urgency of incoherence problems should be developed. A first draft of such a framework is presented in Chapter 6 of this report.

27. To offer a framework for the analysis of policy coherence is not sufficient. Staff of DG Relex, DG Development and the Delegations should be trained in working with such a framework. It is suggested that workshops for these training should be offered on a regional basis. A first test workshop could be organised in April or May 2005.

## PREFACE

This report is a result of a Commissioned Study executed within the European Union's Poverty Reduction Effectiveness Programme, financed by the UK's Department for International Development (DFID). The study is meant to contribute to an improvement of the Country Strategy Papers, as developed and formulated in the different regional cooperation programmes of the EU. Although the landscape of international cooperation is quickly changing, coordination and harmonisation of procedures quickly reaching new levels, the authors hope that the conclusions of this report, its recommendations and the framework for analysing coherence issues as presented in Chapter 6 will play a role in future debates on country strategies of the EU and its Member States.

To analyse policy coherence and coherence issues as brought forwards in Country Strategy Papers and to identify coherence issues has been the major objective of this report. The authors of this report have chosen not to do this analysis and identification on basis of discourse analysis alone. It has been our strategy to interview also a large number of the actors involved, not only those in Brussels but also those from developing countries. To give voice to opinions, hopes and frustrations of developing countries' partners has been an important part of this exercise.

To make this all possible we not only got the help of all those interviewed (see the lists in the Annexes), but also of staff in the two DGs involved in this study and of the EU Delegations in Rabat and Dakar. In Morocco Sean Doyle (Head of the Delegation) and his team, in particular Olivier Ruyssen and Valérie Rossell, organised an excellent programme for us in Rabat and Casablanca, giving us the opportunity to meet with top officials of ministries and civil society organisations. In Senegal Jozias Blok (Acting Head of the Delegation) provided us with the same service. Due to the efforts of both delegations our programmes went smoothly and without any frictions.

From the EU staff in Brussels we got valuable advice from Michael Greene and Anders Berlin of DG Relex and from Françoise Moreau and Rob Rozenburg of DG Development at the start of this study. Comments on a first draft came from Annika Palo of DG Relex and from Piera Calcinaghi of DG Development.

It is without any doubt that without the support of the people named and those we gave us (sometimes a lot of) time during the interviews, this report could not have been produced. Paul Hoebink had the overall responsibility of the study and is the main author of this report. Hein de Haas and Marleen Deuss gave considerable contribution to respectively the Morocco and the Senegal studies. Gertrud Wagemans assisted in bringing information together and compiling part of the tables.

Brussels/Nijmegen, March 2005

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACP	= Africa, Caribbean, Pacific (countries)
ASEM	= Asia-Europe Meeting
AAMS	= Associated African and Malagasy States
ALA	= Asia and Latin America (Programme)
CAP	= Common Agricultural Policy
CARDS	= Community Assistance to Reconstruction, Development and Stability in the Balkans
CFP	= Common Fisheries Policy
DG	= Directorate General
DG Dev	= Directorate General Development
DG Relex	= Directorate General for External Affairs
GSP	= General System of Preferences
EEC	= European Economic Community
EU	= European Union
Med	= Mediterranean (Programme)
NAFTA	= North American Free Trade Association
NIP	= National Indicative Programme
OCTs	= Overseas Countries and Territories
PHARE	= Poland and Hungary Aid for the Restructuring of Economies
TACIS	= Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States



## INTRODUCTION

Coherence of European development policy with other European policies has been in the debate for a series of years. At the end of April 1993 for example European NGOs started lobbying against the meat exports to West Africa (or rather the subsidies on such exports). They maintained that these exports could be regarded as dumping and that they therefore disrupted the local meat markets. In the decision on beef export subsidies of May 1994 the Commission stated as follows: *'It is therefore necessary to take measures to end the serious incoherence that exists between the agricultural policy and the development policy of the Community. Such measures are all the more urgent because this harmonisation is a duty imposed by the Treaty on European Union (Article 130V'*. There are more documents that stress the importance of coherence.

In the Communication to the Commission of 16 May, 2000 on the 'Reform of the Management of External Assistance' it is stated: *'The principle of coherence or consistency with other EU policies requires attention. The linkages between external assistance and other Community policies in such fields as fishery, agriculture, commerce, conflict prevention, food security and migration should, as appropriate be examined and dealt with in this section'*. In the eyes of the European Commission the Country Strategy Papers are important documents to detect and analyse incoherencies in policies and to foster coherence.

Until now it has been rather difficult to develop instruments and mechanisms to identify at an early stage those policies that have a potential to conflict with the development objectives of the European Union. The 'coherence dossier' seems to stumble from case to case without proper instruments and mechanisms being developed.<sup>1</sup> Country Strategy Papers might be an important instrument, but haven't been developed to their full potential for this specific policy concern. Some 'early warning systems' exist and there is a lot of internal debate inside the Commission on coherence issues, but more and more precise instruments should be developed. It is the purpose of this study to present a framework or map or plan for the presentation of coherence issues in the paragraph on coherence in the Country Strategy Papers.

### PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study is to identify, and exemplify, EU policies that are incoherent with EC's development policy objectives, and to suggest ways of addressing this. The study shall also look at potential incoherence amongst EC's various development policy objectives.

### SCOPE OF THE STUDY

With regard to internal (1) coherence, potential and actual incoherencies within European development cooperation itself, the study:

1. Presents a review of all the objectives of all the geographical and thematic cooperation programmes of the EU (Cotonou, ALA, Med, Tacis and Phare), compare them and analyse them from a 'coherence point of view', and in relation also with the Treaty of Maastricht (Amsterdam, Nice).

---

1. See P.Hoebink (2003, 2004).

2. Presents an analysis of the paragraphs on coherence in the present Country Strategy Papers, compare them and analyse them in relation to the objectives of the programmes mentioned under 1.

With regard to internal (2) coherence, potential and actual incoherencies between European development policies and other external European policies:

4. Makes an overview of goals and objectives of the external policies of the EU with regard to developing countries as to be found in the Treaties, official statements of the European Council and Commission and other important documents and analyses them on basis of potential contradictions with European development policy.
5. Analyses in particular EU human rights and EU trade policy from the perspective of potential incoherencies with development policy.
6. Analyses the paragraphs of the present Country Strategy Papers in relation to the objectives mentioned under 4 and 5.

With regard to external coherence, potential and actual incoherencies between European development policies and other EU policies:

7. Makes an overview of relevant policy goals and objectives of policy fields in which potential conflicts or contradictions with EU development policy might occur, in particular the CAP, the CFP, consumer and environmental policies.
8. Analyses the ‘coherence paragraphs’ in the present Country Strategy Papers in relation to the objectives mentioned under 7.

The final end of this study then is:

9. To make recommendations about how to improve the overall coherence of EU policies, keeping the development policies as the point of reference and to suggest possible methods and mechanisms that could be applied in the EU context,
10. To provide a framework or map/plan for analysis of coherence issues to be used for the analysis of coherence issues for the next generation of Country Strategy Papers, with a checklist of potential conflicting policy objectives, and suggestions for the measurement of their potential impact.

## **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

This research project has three main methodologies or research lines. First, the analysis of treaties, policy documents and guidelines was done on basis of text and discourse analysis, but this analysis was supplemented with a series of interviews with staff of the Commission, staff of the European Council, and members of the European Parliament and some NGO umbrellas to broaden the scope of the analysis, to get necessary background information and to collect additional material. People to be interviewed were identified by DG Relex and DG Dev and by the researchers, and in a second round by snowball sampling. Interviews took place on basis of an Interview Guide which allowed for snowballing information.

Second, an analysis was made of the ‘coherence paragraphs’ of all the Country Strategy Papers of countries under Cotonou and in the ALA, Med, Tacis and Phare programmes. The analysis tried first to detect all the ‘coherence issues’ that were brought forward in these strategy papers and classify them. And, secondly, it tried to assess the urgency that is attached to the incoherencies which were identified.

Third, two case studies were carried out. The aim of these case studies was not to make a ‘coherence assessment’ but to develop a framework for ‘coherence assessment’. This means

that it was more a stock-taking exercise in which *all* potential areas of incoherence were identified and covered by short interviews with major stakeholders. One case study was to be in a developing country with an intermediate level of development, with close relations with the EU in a series of fields and also in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU. The country chosen was Morocco. Potential areas of incoherence identified before were: human rights, security, trade, CFP, CAP, immigration, consumer and environmental policies. Stakeholders to be interviewed were: Ministries of Finance and Economic Affairs, Trade, Foreign Affairs, Emigration, Fisheries, Agriculture, Industry, Chambers of Commerce, exporters and industry associations, fishers' and trade unions, as well as Human Rights NGOs. The second case study was to be with an ACP country with important aid and trade relations with the EU and a lower level of development. The proposed country was Senegal, in which aid, trade as well as relations in the field of fisheries and immigration are important. A same number of stakeholders were identified to be interviewed. It was the intention to make in a short period of time a large number (20-25) of interviews in both countries to detect as many 'coherence issues' as possible. Most interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes. Nearly all interviews were characterised by an open atmosphere in which positive and negative remarks were easily made. Lists of people interviewed can be found in the annexes. Apart from the interviews large piles of documentation were collected and analysed on the above mentioned issues. Also searches for press articles were made at local newspapers. In Senegal also two fishermen's harbours were visited. The case studies were done during the month of May, June and July. Interviews in Brussels took place in April, May and June.

## CHAPTER 1: POLICY COHERENCE: DEFINITIONS, TYPOLOGIES, CAUSES FOR INCOHERENCE

### 1.1 POLICY COHERENCE: DEFINITIONS AND BACKGROUND<sup>2</sup>

Policy coherence is a relatively new concept both in politics and in the political sciences. There is in fact no mention of it in the standard textbooks on the social sciences.<sup>3</sup> Even in dictionaries on European politics it is absent.<sup>4</sup> To consistency there is a single reference, but then to social psychology theorising, referring to the unity and oneness of personal characteristics, e.g. political convictions or view of society.<sup>5</sup> In this definition it is thus an individualistic construct, not a collective one.

In the political science literature on policy evaluation though it is noted that a causal link between policy and policy results is often hard to determine. But this literature in general does not deal with the way in which other parts of government policy may interfere with the relevant results or even frustrate the policy altogether.<sup>6</sup> For example, the unintended results of government policy are disposed of in a few standard sentences. The literature on economic policy is an exception in this respect since here the credibility of government action is linked to its ability to ensure that policy fluctuates as little as possible.

To arrive at a definition we must therefore first consult the dictionaries. As said these suggest that (in common parlance or philosophy) coherence is synonymous with consistency.<sup>7</sup> Consistency and coherence of thought and statement therefore mean 'free from self-

---

2. This chapter is based partly on a paper written for Phase I of the Evaluation of 'Maastricht's Triple C' and on earlier articles by the author on the same subject:

P.Hoebink, Coherentie en ontwikkelingsbeleid: het geval van de Europese Unie. In: *Derde Wereld, Themanummer De Europese Ontwikkelingssamenwerking*, Jrg.16, nr.1, april 1997, pp.61-79;

idem, Coherencia y política de desarrollo en la Unión Europea. In: *Revista Española de Desarrollo y Cooperación*, 1998, no.2, pp.19-40;

idem, Coerenza e politica dello sviluppo. In: *Politica Internazionale*, Anno 28, n.6, novembre-dicembre 1998, pp.73-86

idem, Coherence and development policy: the Case of the European Union. In: J.Forster/O.Stokke (eds.), *Policy Coherence in Development Co-operation*. London, Frank Cass, 1999, ch.10, pp.323-345;

idem, Aid and trade coherence and development policies in the Netherlands. In: J.Forster/O.Stokke (eds.), *Policy Coherence in Development Co-operation*. London, Frank Cass, 1999, ch.6, pp.180-212.

3. See, for example, *Blackwell Encyclopedia of Political Thought* (1987), *International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences* (1968, first and later editions), *Political Science Dictionary* (1973), *Handlexicon zur Politikwissenschaften* (1970, first and later editions) and *Piper's Wörterbuch zur Politik* (1985). The same is also true of similar terms such as consistency and inconsistency. Even a search for the rather older term 'unity of policy' fails to produce any workable definitions or references.

5. *Piper's Wörterbuch zur Politik* (1985), p. 463.

6. One example of this is Blommenstein et al.,[1984]. Nor is this point dealt with in recent literature on political science. See for example Van Deth, ed., [1993].

7. The *Van Dale Dutch dictionary* in fact regards coherence as synonymous with cohesion, which is itself defined as intrinsic harmony, this being in turn the definition of consistency. If consistency is regarded as more or less synonymous with coherence, one of the few definitions to be found in academic literature can be seen to be tautological: 'Consistency connotes the need to maintain a coherent policy course over time and across multiple measures' [Weatherford, 1994:135-64]. The definitions of 'inconsistency' in the economic literature are concerned in particular with the way in which economic actors respond to a given policy. See for example: [Kydland and Prescott, 1977:473-91; Blackburn and Christensen, 1989:1-45].

contradiction' [Concise Oxford Dictionary; The Wordsworth Concise Dictionary; Van Dale, the Dutch Dictionary]. Coherence of policy could therefore possibly be defined as:

*'The non-occurrence of effects of policy that are contrary to the intended results or aims of policy'.*

For this purpose coherence can be defined either narrowly or broadly. A narrow definition would be that objectives of policy in a particular field may not be undermined or obstructed by actions or activities in this field. And a wide definition would be that objectives of policy in a particular field may not be undermined or obstructed by actions or activities of government in that field or in other policy fields.

Coherence of policy is in principle important to every field of government policy. First of all, because in the case of incoherence it is possible that certain intended results of policy may be partially or completely frustrated. Second, because the attainment of objectives in a particular policy field could also be hampered by action taken in the relevant field or in other fields, which could produce an adverse effect. And third, because government authorities might lose their legitimacy and credibility if they frustrate or hamper the attainment of objectives in a particular field by means of activities in a different field. It follows that incoherence has the effect of undermining the entire administration. Coherence of policy should therefore be a general objective in all action taken by government.

The concept of policy coherence gained influence or, to put it more correctly, was introduced into European policies by the Treaty of Maastricht. The Treaty referred to coherence/consistency in its foreign policy in Article C (see below), but for development cooperation policy Article 130U and 130V were in particular important. Article 130 V of Title XVII of the Treaty on European Union - the Maastricht Treaty - states that [CEC/CEC, 1992:61]:

*The Community shall take account of the objectives referred to in Article 130 U in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.*

This article could be called the Maastricht Treaty's 'coherence article' in the field of development co-operation. It was sustained in the Treaty of Amsterdam under Title XX as Article 178. Article 130V refers to Article 130U. Article 130U (Article 177 in the Treaty of Amsterdam) is the first Article with relation to development co-operation in the Treaty of Maastricht. It sets out the general development objectives for the Community [CEC/CEC, 1992:61]:

*1. Community policy in the sphere of development Co-operation, which shall be complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States, shall foster:*

- the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries and more particularly the most disadvantaged amongst them;*
- the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy;*
- the campaign against poverty in the developing countries.*

*2. Community Policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.*

With regard to this article, according the Commission [1994], a link can also be made between development policy and other policies, particularly foreign policy. In the Common Provisions of the Union Treaty it was set down in Article C:

*The Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for*

*ensuring such consistency. They shall ensure the implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its respective powers.*

The first part of Article C refers to ‘the single institutional framework’ which shall ‘the consistency and the continuity of the activities’ of the Union, respecting and building upon the ‘acquis communautaire’.<sup>8</sup> Therefore this article has been seen as ‘undermining the intergovernmental element of the Union’ by referring to this ‘single institutional framework’, which could be only the Brussels institutions. It would thus mean that these institutions would have an important role (ensuring consistency) also in the second and third (intergovernmental) pillars. On the other hand in the last part of this article the Council is explicitly mentioned as one of these institutions (and in other articles, like Article D, the Council is made the ‘overriding and dynamic’ force of the Union.<sup>9</sup> But what is true that, also through the Maastricht Treaty, the Commission potentially has won increasing responsibilities in foreign policy.<sup>10</sup> It is the main and often sole, negotiator in trade issues, in association agreements, with non-member states on certain issues, and has a long list of tasks with regard to development co-operation. In the last field the Commission had, already from the beginning, a variety of tasks, belonging for the major part to the first pillar, and thus part of the ‘acquis communautaire’.

In the negotiating process on the Treaty the Articles on coherence (and development cooperation) remained throughout the negotiations largely the same, although Article 130 V underwent a small change. In the Luxembourg version<sup>11</sup> tabled in June 1991 the last part of the article still stated:

*The Community and its Member States shall ensure that their development policies are consistent with the common foreign and security policy.*

This meaning that Article 130 V was closely related to Article C of the Common Provisions, but probably also that coherence was originally seen in a restricted way. This sentence though was suppressed quickly, because of its superfluity with regard to Article C in which this consistency was already stated in its general form.<sup>12</sup>

If these articles from the text of the Treaty are put side by side, the following definition of coherence in relation to development policy can be obtained [*Dubois, 1994:11*]:

*The articulation between different policies or actions of the Community which aim to minimise or suppress contradictory or negative effects of these policies on developing countries.*

In its Declaration on development policy for the year 2000, the EC Council of Ministers of Development Co-operation emphasised the importance of coherence of policy at its meeting of November 1992. The Declaration referred among other things to the ‘linkage’ between development co-operation policy and other areas of Community policy [*CEC, 1992:Article 27*]:

‘The Council recognises the linkage between development co-operation policy and other Community policies. It also recognises the need to take account of their impact on

---

8. C.H.Church/D.Phinnemore, *European Union and European Community: A Handbook and Commentary on the 1992 Maastricht Treaties*. London: Prentice Hall/Harvester, 1994, p.56-58.

9. See also: J.Peterson/E.Bomberg, *Decision-making in the European Union*. London: MacMillan, 1999, ch.2.

10. N.Nugent, *The European Commission*. London: MacMillan, 2001, ch. 12. It is remarkable that Nugent in this chapter devotes but a single word to European development policy. Although this has been for a long time, next to trade issues, one of the few fields in which the Commission had a real say.

11. F.Laursen/S.Vanhoonacker (eds.), *The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union. Institutional Reforms, New Policies and International Identity of the European Community*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992, p. 385 and 453.

12. J.Cloos/G.Reinesch/D.Vignes/J.Weyland, *Le Traité de Maastricht: Genèse, Analyses, Commentaires*. Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1994, p. 350.

developing countries. The Council urges the Commission to consider how this impact assessment might be carried out more systematically especially with regard to new proposals. It invites the Commission to report in time for the meeting of the Development Council in November 1993 on how it takes account of the objectives referred to in paragraph 18 in the policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.’  
The relevant report was presented in November 1994.

It should also be noted that there is already some precedent concerning this article in the form of the Commission's decision on beef export subsidies of May 1994. The Commission stated as follows in this decision:

‘It is therefore necessary to take measures to end the serious incoherence that exists between the agricultural policy and the development policy of the Community. Such measures are all the more urgent because this harmonisation is a duty imposed by the Treaty on European Union (Article 130V).’

The Commission also proposed measures such as the collection of data and adjustment of the subsidies ‘for the purpose of ensuring coherence between the Common Agricultural Policy and the development policy’ [*Commission Européenne, 1994*]. As far as coherence relating to the development objectives established in the Union Treaty is concerned, it is possible to draw a certain parallel with Article 130R. This states that [*CEC/CEC, 1992:58*]: ‘Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and the implementation of other Community policies’.

In conclusion, therefore, the term coherence does not appear as such in the Treaty on European Union. Instead the Treaty talks about ‘taking account of’. In Article C the concept ‘consistency’ is used. In a later resolution the Council refers to ‘the linkage that exists’ and to ‘the impact’. It was not until the Commission's decision on beef export subsidies of May 1994 that the terms coherence and incoherence were used.<sup>13</sup>

## 1.2 TYPOLOGIES OF (IN)COHERENCE

There are different ways to classify coherence. We will not go into detail here,<sup>14</sup> but it is important to present a classification to be able to define the different elements of this study and causes for incoherence in the next paragraph. This classification of coherence stems from the perspective of the viewer. Coherence can have a narrow or restricted angle, or a broad one. With regard to policy coherence this means that it can focus on one terrain or field of policy only, or try to make links with other fields or domains of policies. The restricted definition places coherence within one terrain of government policy. We could also call this *internal* coherence, because the assessment of policy coherence stays here within the limits of the domain of a given policy. At a contrast, the broad definition will look at the way the attainment of a given set of goals of government policies in a certain field are stimulated or hampered by government policy or policies in another field or other terrains.

An example of the first type of coherence – that is the *restricted (1)* or *internal (1)* type – is the (in)coherence in European development policy itself. This mainly involves incoherence between the different objectives and/or instruments of development policy. An obvious example is food aid: food aid that is sent late, may arrive just at the moment that the local farmers are getting in the new harvest. In such circumstances the food aid may limit the scope for them to sell the very produce which they have been encouraged to grow by development programmes. It means that all actions and activities which are promoted by the

---

13. As mentioned in the texts of officials of DG VIII quoted below, article 130 V is referred to as the ‘coherence article’.

14. For a more detailed overview see P.Hoebink (1999 and 2004).

goals and objectives of development fall under this type of coherence (like poverty reduction, economic and social development, the promotion of democracy, participation and civil rights). Incoherencies within development policy are often caused, as we will see, later because of conflicting goals and objectives or conflicting relations between goals and objectives at one side and instruments at the other side. In principle all those actions and themes which fall under the goals and objectives of development cooperation belong to the Internal (1) coherence issues. With the broadening agenda of development cooperation this means that not only social and economic development and poverty reduction belong here, but also so called ‘good governance’ issues as support for democratisation and institution building.

**FIGURE 1:  
DIFFERENT TYPES OF (IN)COHERENCE:  
PERSPECTIVES**

<i>Restricted (1)/ Internal</i>		Development Co-operation: Goals Instruments Forms			
<i>Restricted (2)/ Internal (2)</i>		Foreign Policy (Human Rights Policy)	Development Co-operation	Security (alliances, arms trade)	
<i>Broad/ External</i>	Agricultural Policies	Fisheries Policy	Development Co-operation	Industrial Policies	Environmental Policy

The *restricted (2)* or *internal (2)* type is incoherence between different sets of foreign policy and development co-operation policy, e.g. between trade policies and development co-operation, between security policy and development co-operation, between human rights policies and development co-operation.

The third type is the *broad* or *external* one, including incoherence between development co-operation policies and policies in other fields, which can in theory be all parts of European policy making. In principle it will be those policies most likely to affect also developing countries. In effect this will mean the CAP, CFP, certain consumer protection policies, parts of (global) environmental policies, industrial policies.

More typologies of (in)coherence could be presented (like vertical/horizontal coherence), but since we use in this study mainly the internal/external typology of coherence we prefer to elaborate on this typology, in particular also in the following section.

**1.3 CAUSES FOR INCOHERENCIES IN AND BETWEEN POLICIES**

Notwithstanding the efforts to achieve coherence of policy, incoherence is often a given. First, as government has to deal with many parties and pressure groups, it may well be impossible to find optimal solutions that satisfy all parties concerned and achieve all objectives. This is, of course even more so in the European Union, where the number of stakeholders and parties



is much larger than at a national level. Consequently, it is frequently necessary to settle for second-best solutions which may in turn lead to incoherence. Incoherence should therefore not always be regarded as a negative factor and may in some cases be seen instead as a result of clashes and conflicts of interest, in other words as a compromise in which the relative importance of the actions and actors has been duly weighed.

Second, government is not a unitary whole, but generally consists of a large number of departments, institutions and corporations.<sup>15</sup> These departments and institutions take a large number of policy measures, monitor their implementation and are quite often faced with conflicting interests. It is doubtful whether central government is in a position to keep a grip on the policy of all these different bodies. For example, its supervision of the outcome and results of policy is far from complete. Also this has a special dimension in the EU with an extra supra-national level added. Member states are often reluctant or slow to translate European rules or regulations into national ones, and even slower to implement them.

Third, it is difficult to weigh all the factors and parties and their reactions to an initial policy decision. Consequently, it is often unclear what will be the precise effects or side effects of the policy. This is the more true if these effects situate themselves far away from the national and European borders. Finally, administrators and politicians, like academics, tend to be rather short sighted; in other words they focus entirely on the particular policy field for which they are expected to take measures at the time in question. Sometimes they are also required to be short sighted and to remedy short-term negative effects at the expense of optimal policy in the long term. It is clear that under such circumstances undesired effects in other domains of policy are easily produced.

All the factors just mentioned apply perhaps in particular to European policy, because not only is the number of parties much greater but there are also many more different types of party. In addition to the cultural, social and economic interests of particular groups or institutions, national interests, as the sum of all these other interests, also play a role in European policy in these fields. It is less easy in European policy than in national policy to find a single forum in which consensus can be reached. Hellen Wallace [1996:28] noted that there is an 'inherent instability' in European policy. By this she meant that:

'... it is rarely certain that the outcome of the policy dialogue will produce a clear and consistent line of policy amenable to a sustained collective regime. In other words, European policy regimes are conditional rather than definitive, a consequence of the continuing fluidity of the political setting of less than a policy, pulled between the political territories of the member states and the pressures of global and European influences.'

In the same volume Christopher Stevens describes this phenomenon, in an analysis of the EU banana policy, as inherent to the 'crab-like fashion' in which EU policies evolve. As he comments: 'It can easily find itself with mutually incompatible obligations' [Stevens, 1996].

Nigel Nugent singles out two important characteristics of European policy: first, 'the differing degrees of EU policy involvement', and second, 'the patchy and somewhat uncoordinated nature of EU policies'. By the latter he means [Nugent, 1994:291]:

'The EU's overall policy framework can hardly be said to display a clear pattern of overall coherence ... The fact is that the considerable national and political differences which exist in the EU make coordinated and coherent policy development that is based on shared principles and agreed objectives very difficult.'

This is particularly true of European development co-operation. Different forms of incoherence in this field can be found in the policy not only of the EU but also most certainly of the member states. Nugent argues that the member states think of their own interests first.

---

15. Weatherford [1994], emphasises that in the economic literature government is, however, often regarded as a unitary actor.

Whether the relevant policy is politically acceptable is a matter that is considered later. Finally, it is decided whether the EU is the appropriate arena in which to give effect to closer relations between states [Nugent, 1994:295]. At the same time it is necessary to reconcile the differing interests of various national industries or groups. Not surprisingly, development objectives often have to take a back seat. One reason is that the cacophony generated by the member states and pressure groups tends to drown out the arguments of those advocating development objectives, whose voice may therefore be heard only indistinctly or indirectly.

This means that a series of causes for incoherencies exist. They can be grouped together in several categories: intended/unintended, structural/fictive/temporary, institutional/political (Figure 4). Intended incoherence would be a form of incoherence in which an authority consciously accepts that the objectives of policy in a particular field cannot be achieved because the policy involves conflicting interests and to protect the interests of one group of stakeholders might go at cost of another group of actors or stakeholders. An example of this is where a government accepts that developing countries will have restricted market access for their exports because domestic employment in certain sectors would otherwise be unduly affected. Compensation may possibly be provided in the form of limited or regulated market access, of concessions in other fields or of cash. A further distinction can be made here between an intended incoherence to correct adverse effects in the short term while adhering to the longer-term objectives and an incoherence which is intended purely to remedy certain negative effects for particular parties in the short term. To paraphrase Weatherford, one could call the former incoherence a 'dynamic incoherence' [Weatherford, 1994:139], because there is an attempt to establish a balance between two things that are to a certain extent incompatible, between what is good at a given moment and what is good in general.

In the case of unintended incoherence, policies in a particular field frustrate the objectives or results of other policies although this is not noticed because the results of the different policies are never compared. Such an incoherence could frequently occur in the field of development because policy produces results at a great distance, which are therefore less visible or are made less visible. An example of this is the meat export subsidies: the effects of these subsidies on the West African market (negative effects from the development point of view) became apparent only when European NGOs revealed them. If, however, subsidised exports were later to be resumed again because of the growing meat mountain, this would represent a transition from unintended to intended incoherence.

A second set of causes could be described as structural, temporary or fictive. Structural are those causes in which different interest groups stand at both sides of the possible range of policies, in particular when it is difficult to find compromises, where the gain of one might be the loss of the other. Liberalisation of markets might give access to new producers at cost of national producers and at gain for national consumers. These causes might be only temporary if the different parties might only need time to adjust themselves to the new circumstances. They might even be called fictive if they only exist in the ideas or ideologies of some of the parties involved. Liberalisation might go at cost of employment in one sector, but create more jobs or more sustainable employment in other sectors. The loss of employment could, in such a situation, be the only result that people see from liberalisation.

Lastly causes for incoherence can be found in institutional differences or inter-institutional competition or in politico-economic contradictions. Government institutions are differing in organisational culture. Ideologies within these bureaucracies are often one-sided and not very comprehensive. Bureaucracies tend to be inward-looking and to build up arguments from within the institution alone. There is often a lack of coordination between government departments and complementarity is not a given but most often a result from inter-institutional competition. All these factors could lead to incoherencies.

**TABLE 2.1:  
CAUSES FOR INCOHERENCIES**

	<b>Cause</b>	<b>Remedy</b>
<b>Unintended</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* interests of developing countries not weighed/left aside</li> <li>* no clear representation of developing countries' interests</li> <li>* knowledge of effects absent</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* impact study</li> <li>* mechanisms for better weighing</li> </ul>
<b>Intended</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* developing countries' interests set aside</li> <li>* member states' interests of more importance</li> <li>* better lobbying by competing interests</li> <li>* no clear assessment available</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* impact study</li> <li>* mechanisms for better weighing</li> <li>* compensation</li> <li>* accept incoherence</li> </ul>
<b>Structural</b> <b>a. general</b>  <b>b. differentiated</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* consumers versus producers</li> <li>* producers versus environment</li> <li>* producers versus producers</li> <li>* consumers versus consumers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* accept incoherence</li> <li>* compensation</li> </ul>
<b>Temporary</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* producers versus producers</li> <li>* producers versus environment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* compensation for modernisation</li> <li>* additional/flanking policy</li> </ul>
<b>Fictive</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* producers versus producers</li> <li>* consumers versus producers</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* mediation</li> <li>* information</li> </ul>
<b>Institutional</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* cultural differences between institutions</li> <li>* ideological differences between institutions</li> <li>* compartmentalisation of policy departments (horizontal)</li> <li>* lack of co-ordination (vertical)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* transparency/information</li> <li>* co-ordination</li> </ul>
<b>Political/ Economic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* conflicting interests (inside member states, between member states, between EU and others)</li> <li>* complexity of issues</li> <li>* deregulation/liberalisation</li> <li>* internationalisation/globalisation</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* tolerate incoherence</li> <li>* mitigation</li> <li>* compensation</li> <li>* additional/flanking policy</li> </ul>

Finally, to end this list of classifications we could try to discriminate between conflicting themes and conflicting issues with regard to development policy and the different types of (in)coherence (Figure 3). These conflicts could be the root cause for incoherencies. Starting from the *Restricted Type (1)* of coherence (the *Internal (1) Type*) we could see several conflicting themes. Different motives behind development co-operation could be in conflict with each other and thus be the cause of conflicting issues. Aid-tying is probably the most quoted example here, because it makes aid expensive and it leads often to ‘white elephants’. The domination of strategic interests in an aid programme is a second major example. Support for ‘allies’ has often led to misuse of aid funds by authoritarian regimes or leaders. President Mobutu Sese Seko could stand as primary example here. The motives could also conflict with major goals of the programmes. Economic self-interest of a donor often leads to a situation in which certain goals (economic self-reliance) overrule others (poverty reduction).

Looking at the *Restricted Type (2)* we can see the same conflicting themes. Industrial policies could lead to a trade policy of a donor in which protectionism in its different forms dominates. In effect in the last two centuries protectionism has much more ruled trade policies of dominating economic powers than liberalisation. In this sense ‘Fortress Europe’ is not an exception to the rule. In the last fifty years for some donors strategic or political interests have been sometimes so dominant in their decisions on aid allocation that humanitarian goals and objectives were totally out of sight. Another example might be security or accession policies, which could lead to a diversion of aid away from development co-operation or the establishment of new trade relations at the detriment of developing countries. Also economic interests could be so dominant that they overrule humanitarian goals and objectives. An obvious example is here the arms trade.

Lastly, the *Broad Type*, as has been indicated already several times above, has become most probably the most visible form of incoherence. Some domains of internal (European) policies have spill-over effects which harm economic and social development of developing countries. The CAP again, but also environmental policies could be given as examples. Unwillingness to live up to the Climate Treaty and to combat the Greenhouse Effect could even threaten the bear existence of some small islands development states.

## CONCLUSION

Throughout this study we will use coherence of policy under the definition of ‘the non-occurrence of effects of policy that are contrary to the intended results or aims of policy’. We will discriminate between a *Restricted (1)* and *(2)* type of coherence and a *Broad* type, all defined from the perspective of the observer, using a narrow or a wide angle. It should be mentioned that originally in DAC-documents the concept of policy coherence was mostly used under the narrow definition.

There are a series of reasons that incoherence in policy come to exist. We have presented several of them ranging from institutional or bureaucratic reasons to different interests or differences in influence and power of stakeholders playing a role in policy formulation and implementation. It has been stated that policy incoherence is often a given, it being the expected or unexpected outcome of a compromise between different interest groups.

**TABLE 1.2:  
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL COHERENCE  
IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY: CAUSES FOR INCOHERENCIES**

<b>Internal Coherence (1)</b> Conflicting themes	<b>Internal Coherence (1)</b> Conflicting issues
<p>Motives vs. motives</p> <p>Motives vs. goals</p> <p>Goals vs. goals</p> <p>Goals vs. aid instruments/types</p>	<p>Economic interests vs. humanitarian considerations Strategic interests vs. humanitarian considerations</p> <p>Trade promotion vs. poverty alleviation Trade promotion vs. economic self-reliance</p> <p>Economic self-reliance vs. poverty alleviation</p> <p>Economic self-reliance/poverty alleviation vs. aid dependency Economic self-reliance/poverty alleviation vs. charity (NGO goals) Poverty alleviation vs. export-led growth (multilateral organisations' goals/recipient government's goals)</p> <p>Economic self-reliance/poverty alleviation vs. aid intrusion Economic self-reliance vs. conditionality Democratisation vs. conditionality</p>
<b>Internal Coherence (2)</b> Conflicting themes	<b>Internal Coherence (2)</b> Conflicting issues
<p>Development policy vs. foreign policy</p> <p>Development policy vs. trade policy</p>	<p>Humanitarian goals vs. human rights violations Humanitarian goals vs. political or military interests</p> <p>Economic self-reliance vs. protection Humanitarian goals vs. economic interests</p>
<b>External Coherence</b> Conflicting Themes	<b>External Coherence</b> Conflicting issues
<p>Development policy vs. domestic agricultural policy</p> <p>Development policy vs. migration policy</p>	<p>Economic self-reliance vs. protection and subsidies</p> <p>Humanitarian goals vs. immigration restrictions</p>

## CHAPTER 2: GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

In this chapter we will analyse the goals and objectives of EU development policy. We will compare these with the goals and objectives of the EU's regional programmes and then try to identify possible sources for incoherencies. Of importance are in the first place legal texts; these are the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice. We will not yet go into discussion on the new European Convention. It suffices to say here that the main (new) goal of European development policy as defined in this Convention is poverty reduction, making other goals subservient to this objective. The main policy documents of European development cooperation are the Horizon 2000 declaration<sup>16</sup> of 1992 and the Statement by the Council and Commission of November 2000<sup>17</sup>.

### 2.1 GENERAL GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice left the European Union with a series of goals and objectives with regard to development policy. One could order these objectives in three levels or layers:

1. general social and economic development: 'To foster the sustainable economic and social development', to promote 'the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy';
2. political development: 'to contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms';
3. poverty reduction: to foster 'the campaign against poverty in the developing countries'.

One could add that the objective of the third part of Article 130u ('to comply with the commitments and take account of the objectives they have approved in the context of the United Nations and other competent international organizations') in fact is a further elaboration of the objectives and could be placed into the three levels described above. This becomes clear when we look at the Millennium Development Goals which bare elements of general social and economic development as well as of poverty reduction.

It is not necessary so that the three layers of social and economic development, political development and poverty reduction are self-enforcing, that action undertaken at one level will support also the goals at the other levels. This is in particular the case with poverty reduction: economic growth is not by definition pro-poor; political development does not in itself provide more influence and power to the poor. The multidimensional poverty concept that was embraced in *World Development Report 2000/2001* points out that actions on all these levels are important, but there is no evidence that successful action at one level also produces good results at the other levels. Several recent studies have indicated that donors

---

16. European Commission, 1992, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on development co-operation policy in the run-up to 2000. Brussels, SEC (92) 915 , 15 May (Referred to as Horizon 2000).

17. European Commission/European Council, 2000, The European Community's Development Policy - Statement by the Council and the Commission. Brussel: European Commission DE 105, 10 November.

lack clear visions on poverty and on strategies to reduce poverty.<sup>18</sup> Under such circumstances in particular donor actions to support political development and general economic growth do not automatically contribute to the alleviation of poverty.

**TABLE 2.1**  
**GENERAL GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF EU DEVELOPMENT POLICY**

<b>Objectives in the Treaty of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice (1992, 1997, 2001)</b>	<b>Objectives in Horizon 2000 (1992)</b>	<b>Objectives in the Joint Declaration Council/ Commission on EU-Development Policy (2000)</b>
<p><b>ARTICLE 130u (177)</b></p> <p>1. Community policy in the sphere of development cooperation, which shall be complementary to the policies pursued by the Member States, shall foster:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them;</li> <li>• the smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy;</li> <li>• the campaign against poverty in the developing countries.</li> </ul> <p>2. Community policy in this area shall contribute to the general objective of developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.</p> <p>3. The Community and the Member State shall comply with the commitments and take account of the objectives they have approved in the context of the United Nations and other competent international organizations.</p>	<p>Within the limits of its resources, the development cooperation policy will endeavour to encourage the consolidation of democracy in the developing countries, within the framework of political stability.</p> <p>It will also pursue the objectives indicated in Article 130U paragraph (1) of the Maastricht Treaty, namely:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more especially of the least advanced;</li> <li>• the gradual, smooth integration of the developing countries into the world economy;</li> <li>• the campaign against poverty in the developing countries.</li> </ul>	<p>Community development policy is grounded on the principle of sustainable, equitable and participatory human and social development. Promotion of human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance are an integral part of it.</p> <p>The main objective of Community development policy must be to reduce and, eventually, to eradicate poverty. This objective entails support for sustainable economic and social and environmental development, promotion of the gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy and a determination to combat inequality.</p>

If one compares (see Table 2.1) the goals and objectives of the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice with the two main policy documents, the Horizon 2000 declaration of

---

18. A.Cox, J.Healy, P.Hoebink and T.Voipio, European development cooperation and the poor. London, MacMillan, 2000. And also the DAC Scoping Study on Poverty Reduction. Paris 2001. See also: C.Loquai, K.van Hove, J.Bossuyt, The European Community's Approach towards Poverty Reduction in Developing Countries. London: ODI, 1998.

1992 and the Statement by the Council and Commission of November 2000, it is very clear that they were adopted almost word for word in the Horizon 2000 document. The Statement more or less slides away from the text of the Treaties by placing poverty reduction 'and eventually poverty eradication' in the centre as the 'main objective'. The promotion of human rights, democracy and the rule of law is also very prominent in both documents. In the next section we will see how this more general goals and objectives found their way in the regional programmes and the Convention of Cotonou, the follow-up of the Lomé Convention. We will start this section by explaining the ever growing development cooperation programmes of the European Community.

## **2.2 GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE REGIONAL PROGRAMMES OF THE EU**

EU development cooperation has its start directly with the constitution of the European Economic Community (EEC). Part Four of the EEC Treaty, the Treaty of Rome, created 'the association of the overseas countries and territories', meaning that the association of third countries in the development world with the EEC and the EU dates back to 1957. The objectives of this association were laid down in Part IV, in Articles 131 - 135 of the Treaty of Rome, now Articles 182 - 188 of the Treaty establishing the European Community. The purpose of this association, according to Article 131 (182) was 'to promote the economic and social development of the countries and territories and to establish close economic relations between them and the Community as a whole'. The association system would lead to a gradual abolition of tariffs, to the supply of financial aid to the associates via the European Development Fund (EDF), in principle a free circulation of labour and the right of European citizens and enterprises to invest in the associated territories. The two main elements from the beginning of European development cooperation were thus trade and aid.

Looking at the regional perspective the group of Associated African and Malagasy States (AAMS) consisted mainly out of French and Belgian colonies in Africa (in total 18 states in 1963). Next to these there are a number of Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs) that still have a special relation with the EU. The independence of several of the associated territories at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s led to negotiations between the Community and the newly independent states, who wanted to keep their preferential access to the community as well as the aid flow. It resulted in the Convention of Yaoundé of July 1963 (with 18 African states) and six years later to Yaoundé II, which was mainly a copy of Yaoundé I. Mauritius was the only new country to join the Convention. In the mean time the European Community also concluded in 1969 its first trade agreements with Mediterranean countries (Morocco and Tunisia). And in 1971 the Community enacted its General System of Preferences, which gave some, but small preferences to Asian and Latin American countries.

The geographical scope of the Convention changed dramatically in 1975 with the continuation of Yaoundé in Lomé I, when 21 Commonwealth countries plus five other countries were added to the list. 17 of these countries were in Africa, the remaining nine from the Caribbean and the Pacific. French resistance was the reason that no Asian Commonwealth countries could join Lomé with the accession of the UK in the EC. Another important addition in Lomé I was the introduction of Stabex, a fund for compensation for shortfalls in export earnings of some tropical products (mainly cocoa and coffee). In total 46 ACP-countries signed Lomé I. Goals, basic principles and main instruments of Lomé II (1980-1985) and Lomé III (1985-1990) were more or less the same as Lomé I. Only Sysmin was



added as a new instrument, to stimulate mining production. The number of ACP-countries now grew more slowly via 57<sup>19</sup> to 66<sup>20</sup>, undersigning Lomé III.

Over the years the position of ACP countries in the total aid flow from the European Community weakened. The aid flow of 30 billion between 1986 and 1999 accounted for 40 per cent of all aid committed by the EC and 45 per cent of all disbursements. The ACP countries were still the predominant aid receivers in the sixties and seventies. But in the eighties and nineties they have been replaced by in particular Mediterranean and Eastern European countries. At the end of the seventies 10 of the 15 top-receivers of European Aid were still ACPs. Twenty years later only five of them were on this list; seven top-receivers could be found in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.<sup>21</sup>

Yaoundé and its successor the Lomé Convention has been praised in the past for its *acquis*, its unique characteristics.<sup>22</sup> This uniqueness could be found in the combination of aid and trade, the additionality of its aid funds, its supposed political and economic neutrality and the joint management of its aid funds. Again and again Commission officials did emphasize these unique features. In the negotiations on the extension of the Convention of Lomé, finally to become the Convention of Cotonou (2000), however, the European Commission, supported by the Member States, did have the final say in all the important aspects. This was true for: the abolishment of Stabex and Sysmin, the implementation of a more results based aid allocation (based on country strategy papers, policy performance and spending targets), the change in trade preferences and the introduction of 'good governance' paragraphs in the Convention.

The position of the former associated countries and the ACP-countries weakened over the years. This was in particular due to the fact that the European Community/European Union enlarged its cooperation programmes gradually. It started most logically in Europe's southern Periphery, the 'near abroad', with the countries of the Mediterranean which not only had special relations with France (and Italy), but also are heavily dependent on Europe with regard to their trade as well as migrant labour. The enlargement of the Community in the eighties towards the Mediterranean gave a particular stimulus to this process, but at the same time weakened it.<sup>23</sup>

Cooperation with the Mediterranean countries started with a case by case approach, allowing for full association with Greece and Turkey at the beginning of the sixties and limited association with Tunisia, Morocco (end of the sixties), Malta and Cyprus (beginning of the seventies). Other countries (Yugoslavia, Israel, Lebanon) however got non-preferential agreements. Furthermore negotiations were often difficult, in particular with citrus producers, from which Italy (later Spain) feared competition. The Community was thus not able to 'follow a coherent policy vis-à-vis this important neighbouring area'.<sup>24</sup> The general line was that industrial products could freely enter into the Common Market, which was also in line with the reallocation of European textiles, clothing and shoe production to for example Spain, Tunisia and Morocco, but that agricultural products faced high tariffs or quota limitations. This has more or less been the line since then. Political elements weighed heavily in the relations what in particular can be read from European relations with authoritarian regimes in

---

19. Some island states and Suriname and Zimbabwe added to the list.

20. Again some more Caribbean and Pacific islands plus Mozambique and Angola new on the list.

21. OECD (several years).

22. Grilli (1993: ch.3).

23. Agricultural products from these countries have to compete with those of Greece, Portugal and Spain (and Italy and France), which gave the agreements with the Med-countries and the negotiations on them always some duality: a wish to connect and integrate versus a wish to protect and stay apart.

24. Grilli (1993: 181).

Greece, Spain, Morocco and Turkey. Aid was very limited in this period up to 1979, consisting mainly of loans.

A second phase in this relationship with the Mediterranean began, when in Paris in 1972 the European Council adopted the so-called 'Global Mediterranean Policy'. 'Global' only meant in this case that the treatment of the Mediterranean countries should become more systematic, but this new policy also included cooperation agreements that had a bit broader scope, including next to trade issues also aid. Due to the economic crisis of the seventies, it meant modest amounts of aid.<sup>25</sup> Also the trade preferences stayed far from the French proposal at that time of establishing a free trade area in the Mediterranean. In the so-called 'pyramid of privileges' the southern Mediterranean countries were clearly lower than the ACP countries. A series of Cooperation Agreements though and financial protocols attached to them allowed for a modest increase in technical and financial grants and loans.

This situation only changed in 1989. After the second enlargement which brought the 'Mediterraneans' Spain, Portugal and Greece into the Community the focus was clearly more southward. In addition to this the economic crisis of the 1980s did hit countries like Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt heavily. The so-called 'New Mediterranean Policy' initiated in 1989 should address the problems of youth unemployment, growing poverty and immigration. The new policy aimed at introducing market reform (and in this following at a distance IMF policies), stimulating private investment and giving better market access. At the same time when European institutions came with quite substantial criticism on European protectionism vis-à-vis the Mediterranean countries (in particular with regard to agricultural products and textiles) however, very little changed in this respect. Also aid flows did grow only slowly.

This all is said to have changed in 1995. The European summit in Cannes in June 1995 and the following Barcelona Summit with the Mediterranean countries in December in the same year are in the European Union's documents described as a 'watershed', a major change in which issues as: common security, peace and stability, an 'area of shared prosperity', the development of human resources and relations between civil societies are said to be integrated into a broad cooperation.<sup>26</sup> What is clear is that the fear for the upcoming Muslim fundamentalism in particular in Algeria, forced the European Union to take a new position vis-à-vis the southern Mediterranean countries. In the follow-up of the Barcelona Summit, the so-called 'Barcelona Process', negotiations again appeared very difficult. Only small steps were taking into the direction of a free trade area that should be created in 2010. A series of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements are replacing the old cooperation agreements. Each of these agreements contains articles on a gradual elimination of custom duties, but for agricultural products special provisions are made. The agreements are thus more comprehensive and covering all areas of the Barcelona Declaration, but are not going very far or deep.

The European Union has long standing relationships with Latin America, but Latin America is said to lie 'at the outer limits of the Community's development reach'.<sup>27</sup> The Community's relations with Latin America started slowly at the end of the 1960s, urged by Italy, but it took twenty more years, strengthened by the accession of Spain and Portugal to the EU in 1986, till they really did grow. EU relations with Latin American countries have since then developed

---

25. Under the first financial protocol for four years (1978-1981) it was ECU 659 million for eight countries, for a major part EIB loans. Egypt was the main receiver with about ECU 43 million a year; Jordan received ECU 10 million a year. Under the third financial protocol (1987-1991) the total amount grew to ECU 1,5 billion. (Cox/Chapman, 1999: ch.4).

26. The 'global and comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean Partnership' between the EU and twelve Mediterranean Partners. The partners are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia (Maghreb); Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Syria (Mashrek); Turkey, Cyprus and Malta; Libya currently has observer status at certain meetings.

27. Grilli (1993: 225).

simultaneously at the national, regional and sub-continental levels. A full range of political and trade relations as well as co-operation agreements have been concluded at every level. There are regular meetings with the Rio Group since 1987, with a first Summit between the Heads of State and Government of Latin America, the Caribbean and the European Union in Rio de Janeiro in June 1999 and a second EU-LAC Summit in Madrid in May 2002. At a sub-regional level there is since 1984 the San José Dialogue between the EU and Central America, essentially a forum for political discussion. With the Andean Community (established in 1969) the EU has the longest relations (allowing them to make use of the General System of Preferences), which were institutionalised in the Rome declaration of 1996. At the Bilateral Level the EU has a full association agreement with Mexico, establishing a free trade area.<sup>28</sup> The EU signed a second association agreement with Chile in November 2000,<sup>29</sup> accompanied in March 2000 with a cooperation agreement with an indicative financial envelope of € 34.4 million. The definite Association Agreement with Chile was undersigned in November 2002, establishing by gradual and reciprocal liberalisation a free trade area in 2010.<sup>30</sup>

With regard to trade relations the EU is more important for Latin America, than Latin America for the EU. The EU is Latin America's second trading partner, being the first partner for MERCOSUR and Chile. Between 1990 and 2000 EU-LA trade doubled. EU exports of goods to Latin America in 2000 totalled EUR 54.5 million, mostly in machinery and equipment and chemicals. During the same period EU imports from Latin America amounted to EUR 48.8 million, over 20 per cent of which was accounted for by agricultural products. Overall the trade relations are thus not very significant and were even decreasing. Between 1980 and 2000 the EU's share of Latin America's trade went from 20 per cent to 15 per cent.

The agreements the EU has concluded with Latin American countries and regional partners have evolved from being purely concerned with economics, to much more wide-ranging agreements. Each one now includes a democracy clause, enshrining respect for democratic principles and human rights. The agreements now provide also new perspectives for economic, industrial, scientific, technical and environmental co-operation, as well as the fight against drugs. Decentralised co-operation was included in all of the agreements. Cooperation has taken the following forms: AL-Invest tries to provide help to small and medium-sized companies, by encouraging European firms to invest in Latin American enterprises; ALFA focuses on the promotion of co-operation between institutions of higher education out of the two regions; with URB-AL the EU hopes to establish direct links between European and Latin American cities; ALURE encourages the optimal and most rational use of energy; and @LIS should promote the benefits of using information technologies and tries to bridge the so-called digital divide. The total budget for these cooperation programmes is since 1996 around € 500 million. Furthermore some €80 million per year goes to the ACP countries in the region.

The official relations of the EU with Asia started late but evolved considerably in the 1990s. Great Britain tried to bring some of the Commonwealth nations under Lomé, but this was blocked by France and for a decade or more relations stayed at a low level. After a first Summit-level dialogue in 1991 with Japan, comparable summits with India, China and soon with South Korea had been established. In March 1996 the inaugural ASEM Summit was held

---

28. Signed in December 1997, entered into force October 2000, published in: Official Journal of the European Communities, L276, Vol. 43, 28 October 2000.

29. This after earlier cooperation agreements had been concluded in 1990 and 1996. It took ten negotiation rounds and six years to come to a final agreement, undersigned finally in November 2002.

30. One has to acknowledge that this free trade is nearly full for industrial trade, but only up to 80 per cent free for agricultural and 90 per cent for fisheries products (Official Journal of the European Communities, L 352, Volume 45, 30 December 2002)..

in Bangkok. ASEM (the Asia-Europe Meeting) is an informal process of dialogue and cooperation bringing together the fifteen EU Member States and the European Commission, with ten Asian countries (Brunei, China, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam). The first Summit proposed the creation of a new partnership between Asia and Europe, strengthening the relationship between our two regions by means of an enhanced political dialogue, reinforced economic cooperation, as well as cooperation in other areas (social, cultural and intellectual). The second ASEM was held in London in April 1998, the third ASEM in Seoul in October 2000, the fourth ASEM was held in Copenhagen in November 2002. These Summit meetings are accompanied by other high-level and ministerial meetings, but play a larger role as a forum for debate and exchange of ideas more than for negotiations and decision making.

Asia is a very important partner for the EU. Asia as a whole accounts for 21 per cent of the EU's exports, and is Europe's third-largest regional trading partner, after Europe outside the EU (31 per cent) and NAFTA (28 per cent). Asia has a large trade surplus with the EU, which grew recently from €13 billion in 1996 to over €120 billion in 2000. Asia also accounts for a significant share of the EU's foreign investment flows (it is the fourth-largest regional destination for outward investment from the EU, accounting for 6.8 per cent of total EU outward FDI in 1999), while certain Asian countries are important investors in the EU. In September 2001 the European Commission adopted a Communication setting out a new strategic framework for the European Union's relations with Asia in the coming decade. The strategy's core objective is to strengthen the EU's presence in Asia, focussing on six key dimensions: the political and security fields, two-way trade and investment relations, the reduction of poverty, the promotion of democracy, good governance and the rule of law, building global partnerships with key Asian partners, and promoting further the awareness between the two regions. This strategic framework was an update of the first Asia strategy of the EU of 1994. Private sector development and the support for small and medium enterprises is seen as a cornerstone of this framework. The central focus of the aid programmes will be on education and health. New delegations will be opened in a series of Asian countries like Malaysia, Singapore, Cambodia, Laos and Nepal.

EC cooperation programmes with the developing countries of Asia have grown moderately in recent years, averaging some €410 million per year in the period 1996-2000, as against €360 million per year in 1991-95. Some 80 per cent of these aid flows goes to the lowest-income countries in Asia (32 per cent for the least-developed countries, 48 per cent for other low-income countries).<sup>31</sup> In addition, new programmes in mutually-beneficial economic cooperation have been introduced since 1992, with a view to strengthening economic relations between Europe and Asia. Overall, the EU and its Member States account for some 30 per cent of global ODA flows going to Asia - after Japan (50 per cent) but well ahead of the USA (9 per cent).

Apart from this two regional programmes (MEDA and ALA) there are three other regional programmes with development components. PHARE (the Poland and Hungary Aid for the Restructuring of Economies) was originally created to assist Poland and Hungary in 1989. It was later expanded to the ten candidate countries and also the Balkan countries received then aid out of this programme annex budget line. As of 2001 the CARDS programme (Community Assistance to Reconstruction, Development and Stability in the Balkans) provides financial assistance to the Western Balkans. Since 1993, since in Copenhagen the European Council invited the central European countries to apply for membership, PHARE support was reoriented into accession support, including a marked expansion in support to

---

31. Cox/Chapman (1999) and European Commission (2001).

infrastructure investment. The TACIS (Technical Assistance to the Common Wealth of Independent States) provides assistance to the republics of the former Soviet Union. The European Court of Auditors criticized as well PHARE as TACIS severely for lack of financial management. The PHARE programme was restructured in 1997 to become a pre-accession programme. The PHARE programme was worth about € 1 billion in the mid -1990s. It could have grown considerably in the second half of the 1990s, but since disbursements are slow, actual spending stayed at € 730 million per year on average.<sup>32</sup> Between 2000 and 2006, PHARE doubled its budget and could provide some €11 billion of co-financing for institution building through ‘twinning’ and technical assistance and for investment support to help applicant countries in their efforts. The TACIS programme has more or less half this size: €4.2 billion were committed between 1991 and 1999, an additional €1 billion are reserved for the period 2000-2006.

The CARDS programme (and regulation) is aimed at the republics of former Yugoslavia and Albania. Its main goal is to foster peace and stability in the Western Balkans. The EU is by far the single largest assistance donor to the region. Since 1991 and including 2001, through its various aid programmes, the European Union has provided more than € 6.1 billion, while for the year 2001 over € 845 million has been made available. In addition to the significant amounts of EU aid these countries receive, all five (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) benefit from generous trade preferences. Since December 2000, the vast majority of products from South East Europe have enjoyed duty-free and unlimited access to EU markets. These arrangements are said to be even more generous than those enjoyed by the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

In Table 2.2 the main goals of the regional programmes and the Cotonou Convention are presented. They are derived from the main documents like the Convention and Council Regulation ruling the TACIS,<sup>33</sup> MEDA<sup>34</sup> and ALA programmes<sup>35</sup> and regional strategy documents.<sup>36</sup> The objectives and goals of the Cotonou Convention, stipulated in the general provisions of the agreement, appear to be more extensive than those of the three regional programmes. It is clear though that some of the objectives get more emphasis in one region to the other.

All programmes have as a primary goal to foster social and economic development. Sometimes this is formulated as a fostering a transition process, to a market economy in TACIS and to a free trade area in MEDA. The second objective that can be found in all programmes is the promotion of a legislative framework to protect human rights and to foster democracy. It gets some more emphasis in the Convention, and in ALA and TACIS, than in MEDA. The third objective to be found in all programmes is the reduction and eradication of poverty, but again with a different emphasis, most clearly in the centre in the Cotonou Convention. This means that in all programmes the goals and objectives are formulated more

---

32. Figures from the European Commission’s web-site.

33. Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 99/2000 of 29 December 1999).

34. The first legal basis of the MEDA programme was 1996 MEDA Regulation (Council Regulation no1488/96) for the period of 1995-. On November 2000 a new improved regulation (Nr.2698/2000) establishing MEDA II for the period of 2000-2006 was adopted.

35. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament & the Council concerning Community cooperation with Asian and Latin American countries and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2258/96 - Brussels, 2.7.2002 - COM(2002) 340 final. The first legal basis for the ALA Programme was Regulation (EEC) No 443/92.

36. CARDS is not included since it is solely directed at the former republics of Yugoslavia with as main goal to establish peace and security on the Balkans.

or less in line with the overall goals of European development cooperation as formulated in the Treaty of Maastricht, Horizon 2000 and the Statement of the Council and the Commission. But as indicated there are clear differences in emphasis.

**TABLE 2.2: GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE EU'S REGIONAL PROGRAMMES**

Objectives Cotonou (EU-ACP)	Objectives MEDA	Objectives ALA	Objectives TACIS
<p>- to promote and expedite the economic, cultural and social development of the ACP States, with a view to contributing to peace and security and to promoting a stable and democratic political environment.</p> <p>- the partnership shall be centred on the objective of reducing and eventually eradicating poverty consistent with the objectives of sustainable development and the gradual integration of the ACP countries into the world economy.</p> <p>- support shall be given to the respect of the rights of the individual and meeting basic needs, the promotion of social development and an equitable distribution of the fruits of growth;</p> <p>- regional and sub-regional integration processes shall be encouraged and supported;</p> <p>- building the capacity and improving the institutional framework necessary for social cohesion, for the functioning of a democratic society and market economy, and for the emergence of an active and organised civil society;</p> <p>- systematic account shall be taken of the situation of women and gender issues in all areas;</p> <p>- the principles of sustainable management of natural resources and the environment shall be applied and integrated at every level of the partnership.</p>	<p>The European Community's assistance objective is to support the implementation of the Barcelona Process, a multilateral framework of relations establishing a comprehensive partnership (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, EMP) which is the centrepiece of the EU's policy towards the region:</p> <p>- support the economic transition and the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area, the aim is to prepare for the implementation of free trade through increasing competitiveness with a view to achieving sustainable economic growth, in particular through development of the private sector;</p> <p>- strengthening the socio-economic balance: the aim is to alleviate the short-term costs of economic transition through appropriate measures in the field of social policy;</p> <p>- foster regional, subregional and cross-border cooperation;</p> <p>- promote good governance.</p>	<p>The overall objectives of 'strengthening the relationship between the Community and its Asian and Latin American partners, reducing poverty, promoting sustainable development and contributing to prosperity, security and stability' are specified by:</p> <p>- foster the sustainable economic and social development of partner countries and their smooth and gradual integration into the world economy;</p> <p>- strengthen the institutional and legislative framework, in particular the rule of law and protection for human rights and fundamental freedoms;</p> <p>- promote economic and trade cooperation, strengthen investment relations, and foster the integration of Asian and Latin American countries into the multilateral trading system of WTO agreements;</p> <p>- support the fight against organised crime, money-laundering, terrorism, drugs, illegal migration and trafficking in human beings, and measures aiming at confidence building and conflict prevention;</p> <p>- favour regional integration and cooperation in Asia and Latin America and support the development of closer relations between Asian and Latin American partners and the EU;</p> <p>- support rehabilitation, reconstruction and aid to uprooted people, with particular attention to the transition between emergency and development.</p>	<p>Three main objectives:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- maintaining stability and security in Europe;</li> <li>- promote the transition to a market economy;</li> <li>- reinforce democracy and the rule of law;</li> <li>- ensure the observance of democratic principles and human rights;</li> <li>- encouragement of cross-border cooperation</li> </ul> <p>The 2000 Regulation concentrates Tacis activities on fewer areas of cooperation:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Support for institutional, legal and administrative reform;</li> <li>2. Support to the private sector and assistance for economic development;</li> <li>3. Support in addressing the social consequences of transition;</li> <li>4. Development of infrastructure networks;</li> <li>5. Promotion of environmental protection and management of natural resources;</li> <li>6. Development of the rural economy;</li> <li>7. Support for nuclear safety, where applicable.</li> </ol>

**TABLE 2.3: GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE EU'S REGIONAL PROGRAMMES  
ARRANGED IN LAYERS**

<b>Layers</b>	<b>Goals and objectives</b>
<b><i>Layer 1: Social and economic development</i></b>	<p>Cotonou: to promote and expedite the economic, cultural and social development of the ACP States</p> <p>Cotonou: support shall be given to the respect of the rights of the individual and meeting basic needs, the promotion of social development and an equitable distribution of the fruits of growth</p> <p>Cotonou: regional and sub-regional integration processes shall be encouraged and supported</p> <p>MEDA: support the economic transition and the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free-trade area</p> <p>MEDA: strengthening the socio-economic balance: the aim is to alleviate the short-term costs of economic transition</p> <p>ALA: foster the sustainable economic and social development of partner countries and their smooth and gradual integration into the world economy</p> <p>ALA: promote economic and trade cooperation, strengthen investment relations, and foster the integration of Asian and Latin American countries into the multilateral trading system of WTO agreements</p> <p>ALA: favour regional integration and cooperation in Asia and Latin America</p> <p>TACIS: promote the transition to a market economy</p> <p>TACIS: encouragement of cross-border cooperation</p>
<b><i>Layer 2: Political development</i></b>	<p>Cotonou: building the capacity and improving the institutional framework necessary for social cohesion, for the functioning of a democratic society and market economy, and for the emergence of an active and organised civil society</p> <p>MEDA: promote good governance</p> <p>ALA: strengthen the institutional and legislative framework, in particular the rule of law and protection for human rights and fundamental freedoms</p> <p>ALA: support the fight against organised crime, money-laundering, terrorism, drugs, illegal migration and trafficking in human beings, and measures aiming at confidence building and conflict prevention</p> <p>TACIS: maintaining stability and security in Europe</p> <p>TACIS: reinforce democracy and the rule of law;</p> <p>TACIS: ensure the observance of democratic principles and human rights</p> <p>CARDS: to create a region of peace, security, stability, prosperity, freedom</p>
<b><i>Layer 3: Poverty reduction</i></b>	<p>Cotonou: the partnership shall be centred on the objective of reducing and eventually eradicating poverty</p> <p>Cotonou: systematic account shall be taken of the situation of women and gender issues in all areas</p> <p>ALA: support rehabilitation, reconstruction and aid to uprooted people</p>

This will be even more obvious if we look at the further elaboration of the programmes in for example the regional strategy papers. The ALA and TACIS programmes offer good examples. The regional strategy for Asia identifies six objectives for this EC-Asian cooperation: (1) Contribute to peace and security in the region and globally, through a broadening of the engagement of the EU with the region; (2) Further strengthen the mutual trade and investment flows with the region. (3) Promote the development of the less prosperous countries of the region, addressing the root causes of poverty; (4) Contribute to the protection of human rights, spreading of democracy, good governance and the rule of law; (5) Build global partnerships and alliances with Asian countries, in appropriate international forums, to help address both the challenges and the opportunities offered by globalisation and



to strengthen our joint efforts on global environmental and security issues; (6) Help strengthen the awareness of Europe in Asia (and vice versa).

As for the Latin America programme the central objective is: 'to place human development and the civil society at the heart of the relationship between the two regions'. The following three priority areas are identified: the promotion and protection of human rights; the promotion of the information society; and the reduction of social imbalances by means of a global approach to the campaign against poverty.

In the TACIS programme the emphasis is very much on politics (stability and security in Europe, transition to democracy) and on the transition to a market economy. Furthermore some environmental concerns (nuclear safety) play an important role in the programme. The same is (even more) true for CARDS. The fundamental goal for the EU programme in South East Europe is said to be: 'to create a situation where military conflict is unthinkable – expanding to the region the area of peace, stability, prosperity and freedom established over the last 50 years by the EU and its Member States'.

If one arranges the different goals and objectives of the regional programmes into the three layers as described in the first section of this chapter, the differences in emphasis of the programmes become clearly visible (see Table 2.3). One could describe it as a pyramid in which poverty reduction is the top layer and political development and social and economic development are the bottom layers. Then it is very clear that the Cotonou Convention is directed much more at the top of the pyramid in the sense that it centres poverty reduction as its main objective. The other programmes are much more focused on the bottom layers, in particular on social and economic development, on economic transition, on integration in the world economy, on regional integration. TACIS, and to a lesser extent ALA, also has a clear political component.

Furthermore, in MEDA, ALA and TACIS also other financial and economic relations play a prominent role. These countries play a much larger role in investment and trade relations than most of the ACPs and this reflects itself in the goals and objectives. Lastly the containment of environmental risks can be found in the TACIS programme (nuclear safety) and to a lesser extent in the ALA programme.

The conclusion can be that poverty reduction, placed in the centre by the Statement of the Council and the Commission is not that prominent in most of the regional programmes. MEDA, ALA and TACIS more clearly represent a mix of European economic and strategic interests and humanitarian motives. It makes that the goals and objectives of these programmes lean more towards general social and economic development and political development with instruments that also will foster a deepening of the European relations with those regions. A second conclusion might be that in general the goals and objectives of the regional programmes are still very broadly formulated. They are not very articulated and thus leave quite some room for interpretation. How this might lead to incoherencies is explained in the next section.

### **2.3 POTENTIAL INCOHERENCIES BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF EU DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION**

In the handbooks for the - these days so popular - logical model or logical framework it is stipulated that the goals and objectives of a project or programme should be formulated SMART. That is, objectives should be specific, measurable, achievable, realistic and time-bound. It seems obvious that goals and objectives of a cooperation programme that embraces about 130 countries never could follow that principle. Goals and objectives for such a broad programme will thus be rather vague, indistinct and ambiguous. As stated this will leave quite

some room for interpretation of those who have to work with and within the programme on a day-to-day basis. This could lead to incoherencies of which we will present a series of examples below.

Incoherencies could come into existence within the three layers of goals and objectives that we did describe before, but also between the layers, when one of the objectives is promoted at costs of the others (see Table 2.4). If we look for example at the objective of promoting social and economic development there is a set of actions which could lead to incoherencies. One of the well known examples has to do with macro-economic conditionality. Structural adjustment has been criticized to reduce or even negatively influence economic growth and to have had serious negative effects on social development, leading to budget cuts on education and health. It thus has been accused of having a negative effect also on poverty reduction. Strategic considerations of donors have in the past caused backlashes at democratisation and political development. In the 'war against terrorism' similar types of incoherence can be observed. In present days growing political conditionality could be seen as to erode ownership or even go against democratic decision making in the aid receiving country. A European Parliament resolution to force the Commission to spend 20 per cent of its aid on education could thus be seen as incoherent with aid recipient's ownership and the promotion of democratisation.

More examples as these could be given, but in this study it is of course of importance which objectives or actions within a given objective might cause incoherencies in relation to these objectives and other objectives inside *European* development cooperation. Where, looking at European development cooperation, could we have the most obvious opportunities that incoherencies are created? In the present situation in which many aid recipients are implementing PRSPs, where there is a quest for pro-poor economic growth and in which the European Commission under the Cotonou Convention is urged to give (sector) programme assistance, there is a smaller chance in the least developed countries that support for macro-economic change or investments in infrastructure have negative effects on the poor. But it still is clear that poverty reduction is the Achilles heel of European development cooperation. This is most probably more true for ALA, MEDA and TACIS countries. The European Union still lacks the instruments to have a poverty screening on the activities which it finances under its aid-programmes. Evaluations should learn if this holds also for cross-cutting issues as good governance, gender and the environment.

**TABLE 2.4: CONFLICTING GOALS AND OBJECTIVES AS CAUSES FOR POLICY INCOHERENCE**

<b>Conflicting goals and objectives</b>	<b>Incoherencies</b>
<b><i>Within Layers</i></b>	
Social and economic development vs. social and economic development	Macro-economic conditionality refraining growth Macro-economic conditionality impeding social development
Political development vs. political development	Strategic considerations leading to undemocratic processes or more authoritarian regimes Political conditionality at cost of ownership Democratisation leading to severe political tensions
Poverty reduction vs. poverty reduction	Targeting of specific groups of poor leading to exclusion of others
<b><i>Between Layers</i></b>	
Social and economic development vs. political development	Macro-economic conditionality at cost of ownership or against democratic decision making
Social and economic development vs. poverty reduction	Investments in infrastructure causing involuntary resettlement Economic growth leading to loss of assets or exclusion of poor individuals or groups Macro-economic conditionality and liberalisation with negative effects on the poor
Political development vs. social and economic development	Strong emphasis on the state and state institutions at neglect of the market
Political development vs. poverty reduction	Democratisation at cost of minorities or specific social groups
Poverty reduction vs. social and economic development	Promotion of small scale enterprise at cost of other investments
Poverty reduction vs. political development	Favouring specific social or ethnic groups leading to political tension

### CHAPTER 3: POLICY COHERENCE IN THE COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPERS

In this chapter we make a short analysis of the policy coherence paragraphs in the existing Country Strategy Papers. Most of them are written for the period 2002-2006 or 2002-2007. It was the first generation of Country Strategy Papers written along an outline or format which was the same for all countries receiving EU-assistance. It thus could be seen as an experiment to streamline policies via guidelines, formats and directives with a monitoring overview from the side of an Interservice Quality Support Group to take care that all CSPs would more or less go into the same direction.

In general the Country Strategy Papers are quite lengthy documents. They will count 80 pages or more for the larger countries and still some 30 to 40 pages for the island states or smaller countries. They count for 60 pages on average in the Mediterranean and for a bit more than 50 pages in Central and South America. In Asia they are between 50 and 60 pages. Sometimes the largest countries (Brazil) get many pages less than the small ones (Guatemala). The real text, including the National Indicative Programme, is mostly a bit more than half of the document, meaning that the annexes take between a third and half of the volume.

Coherence issues should get one section in these CSPs. It is a section in which one has also to deal with complementarity issues. As we shall see, that is not always the case and the length of the section varies widely (see Table 3.1. and Annexe 4). The instruction of the Council however was very clear:

*'include in each Country strategy paper a coherence paragraph describing the impact of different Community policies and how these could be combined to further the integration of the developing country concerned into the world economy'.<sup>37</sup>*

This was worked out rather shortly in the Commission Staff Working Paper on the Country Strategy Plans. It is important here to give the full instruction as appeared under Point 5 'The EC response strategy, coherence with EU policies, complementarity within the EU and with other donors':

*'The principle of coherence or consistency with other EU policies requires attention. The linkages between external assistance and other Community policies in such fields as fishery, agriculture, commerce, conflict prevention, food security and migration should, as appropriate, be examined and dealt with in this section. Account needs to be taken of any future negotiations on regional economic partnership agreements and the need for trade aspects to be dealt with in appropriate way in this context'.<sup>38</sup>*

So the instruction is thus very clear and it even cites a number of cases/policies that should draw the attention of the writers of the Country Strategy Papers.

If we now look at the Country Strategy Papers in more detail, we observe at first that there is wide variety in length of the sections on coherence issues. In particular in the Sub-Saharan Africa CSPs there are many without any reference to policy coherence. Also in the CSPs of the TACIS countries there is no section on policy coherence. In the CSPs of the CARDS-countries there is a one page section on coherence. On average the section gets a bit more than half a page, at least five lines and at best a bit more than two pages (45 lines is a page). The section gets more lines in the Central and South America CSPs, and less in the

---

37. Standard Framework for Country Strategy Papers: The Council's Conclusions. Brussels, 10 November 2000.

38. Commission Staff Working Paper: Community Co-operation: Framework for Country Strategy Papers. Brussels, SEC (2000)1049, 2000.

Mediterranean CSPs and the Asian ones. The Sub Sahara Africa average is very low because of the large number of CSPs without any section on policy coherence. But still, if we take that into account the average number of lines dedicated to policy coherence remains low with only a few exceptions. It means for all CSPs that most sections are rather short, don't go very deep and at best only point at incoherencies without any deep analysis.

Most CSPs deal first and for all with internal (1) coherence issues. They try to assess the programme on basis of the EU goals and objectives and just confirm that the presented programme is entirely consistent with these goals and objectives. E.g. in the CSPs of the CARDS-countries it is stated that the programme is in conformity with the CARDS regulation and ensures complementarity with the interregional programme. But there is some variety over the regions. In Central and South America CSPs external coherence issues receive much more attention.

A closer look at the analysis learns that very often a set of standard sentences is used. For Internal (1) coherence this is:

'The suggested strategy is fully compatible with other EC policies ... Wherever relevant EC policies/strategies concerning cross-cutting issues such as human rights and democratisation, gender and environment have been taken into consideration' (Jamaica CSP)

Or:

'The choice of the two sectors is in line with the specific areas of co-operation provided for in articles 19 and 20 of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement ... Both sectors address economic development and consequently poverty alleviation, while macro-economic support may include assistance to the social sectors. Institutional development and capacity building are cross-cutting issues addressed in the focal sectors. Sectoral policy dialogue will focus in particular on the coherence between policy and implementation'. (Malawi CSP)

In another version:

'The priorities for EC-Vietnam co-operation identified above are therefore fully consistent with the European Community's Development and Trade Policies. They are also consistent with the Community's specific policies for Vietnam and for ASEAN.' (Vietnam CSP)

And comparable:

'The strategy outlined in this paper is coherent with relevant EU policies ... The priority sectors outlined above take account of these issues, by focusing on human development in the social sectors and trade and economic promotion and development and mainstreaming crosscutting issues as good governance, gender and environment. The strategy is fundamentally compatible with the EU's political objectives and the proposed EU priorities should help to contribute towards sustainable economic development and social justice'. (Bangladesh CSP)

The standard sentence on External coherence is:

'Coherence between development policy and other EC-policies (notably fisheries and trade, but also agriculture and environment) will be permanently assessed'. (Tanzania CSP)

Or:

'Coherence between development cooperation policy and other EC-policies (trade, fisheries, agriculture, environment, etc.) will be assessed on a permanent basis'. (Mauritius CSP)

Or:

‘La cohérence entre la politique de coopération au développement et d’autres politiques de la Commission Européenne (commerce, pêche, agriculture, environnement etc.) sera évaluée de façon permanente’. (Dominican Republic CSP)

This is also true for some specific External coherence issues. On fisheries the standard sentence is:

‘In fisheries the EC will ensure coherence between its commercial interests in harvesting tuna from the Pacific, and the developmental imperatives of equitable returns, promotion of onshore fish processing and coastal fisheries, transparency in providing accurate information on fishing effort and catch, and strict adherence to the principles of resource conservation and sustainability.’ (Cook Islands CSP, as well as the Micronesia CSP, the Niue CSP, Nauru CSP, the Solomon Islands CSP, Tuvalu CSP, Vanuatu CSP)

In several of the Latin America CSPs the phytosanitary and sanitary measures of the EU are quoted as ‘being perceived by Mexico as a non-tariff trade protection measure’. The standard line here is:

‘Measures taken by the EU in the framework of some of its policies, such as its health and consumer protection policy, might be referred to by some as being “protectionist”, however, they relate to an established level of quality required by European consumers. If Uruguay, and the other Mercosur countries wish to maintain their strong presence in the European market, they will have to adapt to the established requirements for food safety of European consumers, thus the importance for these countries of concluding a veterinary and phytosanitary agreement with the EU’. (Uruguay CSP, similar lines in the Brazil and Paraguay CSP)

Also to be found in most of the Latin America CSPs complaints on the protectionist nature of the CAP and in the Central America CSPs on the banana-regime.

A relatively small number of CSPs address other serious External coherence issues, sometimes by only tabling them and in exceptional cases coming with the beginning of an analysis. So there are in a few Central America CSPs complaints on the temporary nature of the concessions on the drugs component of the General System of Preferences which is seen as an impediment for longer-term foreign investment in this sector. In some of the Mercosur CSPs the wines and spirits agreements are discussed and the way they will fit into the bi-regional association agreement. In the Andean CSPs drugs related crime and narco-trafficking figure together with conflict prevention. In particular a better assessment of the export potential of crops used in crop substitution programmes is stressed.

In the Indonesia CSP it is concluded that the coherence between the EU policies still could be further enhanced ‘in terms of making EU trade, economic co-operation and environment policy mutually supportive’. The CSP indicates that the EU opposes conversion of forested land into palm oil plantation for environmental and developmental reasons, but still gives preferential access of palm oil to the European market under the GSP. Shrimp exports and forestry products are quoted as two other examples of incoherence.

The Botswana CSP present a short analysis of the beef sector which, as the livestock sector in Namibia for example, profits from preferential access to the European market under the Lomé and Cotonou Conventions. The ever more stringent health and quality requirements, including a system of traceability of all meat products, tends towards a concentration in fewer and larger units. This again might lead to negative effects on rural livelihoods, the reduction of poverty and on wildlife and biodiversity.<sup>39</sup>

---

39. In the same section of the Botswana CSP there is also an analysis of the diamond trade and measures of the Botswana government to control it and to take into account the policy of the EU ‘on this sensitive and highly political matter.

In the Gambia CSP the subsidies to soya production which are reducing the competitiveness of groundnuts oil are brought forward. The increased standards for aflatoxin are a further barrier for Gambian groundnuts (see the Senegal chapter). In this CSP it is also indicated that some fishing fleets of Member States are active in Gambian national waters but that there is no bilateral fishing protocol at the moment. It should be said that in general analysis on fisheries problems is absent in the CSPs concerned.

In none of the CSPs any urgency is indicated on coherence issues, neither is further action suggested or proposed. This might seem logic if we can conclude that in most CSPs the section on policy coherence is short, obligatory and non-analytical, but also in those few CSPs in which there is attention for External coherence issues no follow-up is indicated. It leads to a second conclusion that an 'alarm-system' or 'indicator-system' is needed.

**TABLE 3.1**  
**INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL COHERENCE IN THE COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPERS**

<b>Region</b>	<b>Number of lines (average)</b>	<b>Internal (1), Internal (2), or External coherence topics</b>	<b>Main Topics</b>	<b>Urgency</b>
South and Central America	35	Mostly external, several internal (2)	Very often: sanitary standards. Also GSP and drugs. Problems with CAP regularly. Narco-trafficking, conflict prevention and fisheries in some. Two CSPs have no coherence section.	none
Caribbean	24	Mostly internal (1). In a few internal (2) and external.	Mostly on objectives (poverty eradication). In a few cases sensitive industries. Tourism and environment in some.	none
Mediterranean	14	Mostly internal (2) coherence, in two cases external coherence.	In nearly all cases a small references to trade issues. In two cases rule of law. In one case migration. One CSP without any reference to coherence	none
Sub-Sahara Africa	24	Mostly internal (1) coherence, small references to internal (2) and external coherence	Consistency with EU goals mostly stated. Description of instruments. Regional integration in several CSPs. Some short remarks on fisheries. In a few: conflict prevention, human rights, good governance. In one or two migration. 11 CSPs without coherence paragraph.	none
Asia	19	Mostly Internal (1), in some External	Consistency with EU goals indicated. Some references to environmental issues and to conflict prevention. Human rights and rule of law mentioned in three cases. Three CSPs without policy coherence section	none
Pacific	20	Mix of all three	Relation with poverty eradication. Description of instruments. Some general remarks on fisheries. Good governance in several CSPs. In some environment.	none



## CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY MOROCCO

### 4.1 MOROCCO AND THE EU: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

#### 4.1.1 MOROCCO AND THE EEC AFTER THE TREATY OF ROME

Morocco has a long standing relationship with the EEC/EU. Morocco's strong historical and cultural links and its economy heavily dependent on the French market, integrated in the Franc zone, should have led to an early association with the Community. Such an early association should also have been in line with the Joint Declaration of Intent to the Treaty of Rome, in which it was promised to start quickly with negotiations with Morocco (and Tunisia) to safeguard traditional trade flows. It nevertheless lasted thirteen years after Morocco's independence before in 1969 the first limited special association agreement (under Article 238) came into force. This could be seen as symbolic for the relationship between Morocco and the EEC/EU, or even for the incoherent policy of the EEC/EU vis-à-vis the Maghreb/Mediterranean countries.

Cooperation with the Mediterranean countries started with a case by case approach, allowing for full association with Greece and Turkey at the beginning of the sixties and limited association with Tunisia, Morocco (end of the sixties), Malta and Cyprus (beginning of the seventies). Other countries (Yugoslavia, Israel, Lebanon) however got non-preferential agreements. Morocco and Tunisia were said to be in the midst of the Pyramid of preferences competing with its citrus and olive oil directly with Italian producers. Negotiations were often difficult, in particular with those wine, citrus and olive oil producers, from which Italy feared competition. The Community was thus not able to 'follow a coherent policy vis-à-vis this important neighbouring area'.<sup>40</sup> The general line was that industrial products could freely enter into the Common Market, which was also in line with the reallocation of European textiles, clothing and shoe production to for example Spain, Tunisia and Morocco, but that agricultural products faced high tariffs or quota limitations. It is clear that production in the Maghreb countries was and is not complementary to (southern) European production as it is with most ACP countries and thus led to a more protectionist policy from the side of the EEC/EU. This was reinforced with the accession of in particular Spain to the EU and has more or less been the line since then. Political elements weighed heavily in the relations what in particular can be read from European reluctance to go into deeper relations with authoritarian regimes in Greece, Spain, Morocco and Turkey. Aid was very limited in this period up to 1979, consisting mainly of loans.

A second phase in this relationship with the Mediterranean began, when in Paris in 1972 the European Council adopted the so-called 'Global Mediterranean Policy'. 'Global' only meant in this case that the treatment of the Mediterranean countries should become more systematic, but this new policy also included cooperation agreements that had a bit broader scope, including next to trade issues also aid. Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria signed more or less identical cooperation agreements in 1976. The negotiations were described as being 'bitter', in which the Northern partners were willing to extend more concessions to industrial products, while Morocco and Tunisia were looking for better prospects for their agricultural products. With Greece, Spain and Portugal as newly coming EC-members, it could not be expected that many concessions with regard to agricultural products could be made. It meant

---

40 Grilli (1993: 181).

that in particular Tunisia and Morocco lost out. It meant also that quantitative restrictions on textiles and clothing imports from Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt were introduced. The trade preferences thus stayed far from the French proposal at that time of establishing a free trade area in the Mediterranean. In the so-called 'pyramid of privileges' the southern Mediterranean countries were clearly lower than the ACP countries. A series of Cooperation Agreements though and financial protocols attached to them allowed for a modest increase in technical and financial grants and loans. But due to the economic crisis of the seventies, it meant also that the amounts of aid stayed modest.<sup>41</sup>

In those years Morocco filed a formal application – after an informal one was rebuffed in 1984 – to become member of the EC in 1987. The Moroccan application was rejected on basis of Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome which is said to reserve membership to European countries.<sup>42</sup> At the positive side of this application was that it gave Morocco a better place at the European agenda with a first visit of Jacques Delors in the autumn of 1987..

Europe's little coherent policy vis-à-vis the southern Mediterranean had a new change in 1989. After the second enlargement which brought the 'Mediterraneans' Spain, Portugal and Greece into the Community the focus of the EU was clearly more southward. Added to this was that the economic crisis of the 1980s did hit countries as Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt heavily. Morocco was hit in particular by a strong reduction in aid from the Gulf States and by low phosphate prices on the world market. Europe's so-called 'New Mediterranean Policy' initiated in 1989 should address the problems of youth unemployment, growing poverty and immigration. The new policy aimed at introducing market reform (and in this following at a distance IMF policies), stimulating private investment and giving better market access. At the same time when European institutions came with quite substantial criticism on European protectionism vis-à-vis the Mediterranean countries (in particular with regard to agricultural products and textiles) however, very little changed in this respect. Aid flows did grow between 1987 and 1991 with 62 per cent, but still clearly lagged behind what was invested in other programmes.

After the Luxembourg Council declaration on human rights (1991) the European Parliament voted in favour of a freeze of development assistance to Morocco on ground of human rights abuses in the Western Sahara and in Moroccan prisons. The discussion was fuelled by international NGOs and by Gilles Perrault's book about human rights violations, *Notre Ami le Roi*, published in 1990. Morocco answered strongly by cutting of the negotiations on a new fishing agreement.<sup>43</sup> It all led to more diplomatic exchange, to more discussions in Europe on its relationship with the southern Mediterranean countries and finally a Spanish proposal to intensify relations with the Maghreb. The Euro-Maghreb Partnership quickly lost momentum but found its way to Cannes and Barcelona. Also at the Moroccan side Hassan II introduced democratic reforms, amongst others creating a Consultative Council of Human Rights.

#### **4.1.2 THE MEDA PROGRAMME**

This all is said to have become part of the past in 1995. The European summit in Cannes in June 1995 and the following Barcelona Summit with the Mediterranean countries in

---

41 Under the first financial protocol for four years (1978-1981) it was ECU 659 million for eight countries, for a major part EIB loans. Egypt was the main receiver with about ECU 43 million a year; Jordan received ECU 10 million a year. Under the third financial protocol (1987-1991) the total amount grew to ECU 1,5 billion. (Cox/Chapman, 1999: ch.4).

42 Haddadi, 2002, pp.151-152.

43 Idem, p.153.

December in the same year are in the European Union's documents described as a 'watershed', a major change in which issues as: common security, peace and stability, an 'area of shared prosperity', the development of human resources and relations between civil societies are said to be integrated into a broad cooperation. What is clear is that the fear for the upcoming Muslim fundamentalism in particular in Algeria, forced the European Union to take a new position vis-à-vis the southern Mediterranean countries. In the follow-up of the Barcelona Summit negotiations again appeared very difficult. Only small steps were taking into the direction of a free trade area that should be created in 2010. A series of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements are replacing the old cooperation agreements. Each of these agreements contains articles on a gradual elimination of custom duties, but for agricultural products special provisions are made. The agreements are thus more comprehensive and covering all areas of the Barcelona Declaration, but are not going very far or deep.

After a Euro-Mediterranean Summit in 1991 and the Barcelona Summit aid commitments and disbursements did gradually grow again in the second half of the 1990s, since the Council in 1995 devoted € 3.4 billion up to 2000 for the special MEDA 1 budget line, created in October 1996 as a follow up of the 4<sup>th</sup> financial protocol. The main aid receiver stayed Egypt, with in a second echelon Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Turkey and the West Bank/Gaza. Water supply was the main sector for European aid, where it was agriculture in earlier years.<sup>44</sup> Morocco signed its European Mediterranean Association Agreement (EMAA) already in 1996 and thus, with Tunisia, was the first to become part of the European-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP).

## 4.2 TRADE

**Table 4.1: EU-Moroccan trade flows**

(in millions €)

	2001	2002
Moroccan exports to the EU	5.783	6.265
Share of EU in total Moroccan exports	72%	67%
Moroccan imports from the EU	6.658	7.624
Share of EU in total Moroccan imports	54%	55%

(Source: EUROSTAT )

The EU is Morocco's biggest trading partner. In particular the export dependency of Morocco is standing out with between 66 and 75per cent of its exports directed at the European market. In terms of imports more than half stems from the EU. The valance of trade is still positive at the EU side. Trade between the EU and Morocco did grow fast in the 1990s. EU imports from Morocco grew with 85per cent between 1993 and 2002 (growing from 3,394 million EUR to

---

<sup>44</sup> Also this is seen as an example that the EU is not willing to allow competition in this sector with its southern Member States.

6,265 million EUR). EU exports to Morocco grew only a bit slower with 80 per cent (from € 4,237 million in 1993 to € 7,624 million in 2002).

Morocco's traditional and main exports to the EU are still food products (citrus fruits, vegetables like tomatoes and fishery products). The export of citrus fruits is more or less stagnant, while fish and crustaceans exports are increasing and vegetable exports are more important than fruits. More recently also flowers became an important agricultural export product, but exports are dwindling. Agricultural products account for a fifth of the EU's total imports from Morocco, and 6 per cent of its total exports. In 2002, the EU imported agricultural products from Morocco for a value of over € 1,318 million, while it exported for a worth of € 428 million. Industrial products exported are mainly textiles and clothing, although recently also automotive parts gained in importance. Textiles and garments represent about the same value as agricultural products (see also Table 4.2-4.4). Main imports are fabrics for the textile and clothing industries, various types of machinery and equipment, chemicals, and wheat. Industrial products enter the EU duty-free. Agricultural export products are bound to quotas, seasons and duties. Under the Association Agreement the EU and Morocco granted each other some trade concessions for certain agricultural products. In Article 18 of the Agreement it is stipulated that discussions should be held with the objective to come to a further reciprocal liberalisation of agricultural trade.

#### **4.2.1 EXPORTS**

According to the entrepreneurs, the Moroccan economy can potentially profit tremendously from trade liberalisation. They esteem that (internal and external) liberalisation that has already taken place over the past decade has boosted the Moroccan economy, created jobs, and decreased poverty. Main opponents of liberalisation are those with stakes in the former economic state monopolies, which produced low quality products for high prices. Since the internal liberalisation, prices have gone down and quality has gone up. SAP has stimulated Moroccans to start own enterprises. Decreased import tariffs and a reduction of corruption have also had positive effects. The association agreement is positively evaluated as such, but on the condition that its functions well. There are severe doubts on the 'equity' principle: Up to now, concrete policies like agrarian protection, the very difficult circulation of business people, and the de facto low support to increase competencies of Morocco's labour force (e.g. through education, internships, etc.).

Tariffary and non-tariffary protection is a problem, but this can eventually be solved through negotiations. EU support for sectors like agriculture is seen as a much bigger problem. However, the most fundamental problem is the lack of competitiveness of the Moroccan economy. Entrepreneurs esteem that it is absolutely necessary to improve competencies of Morocco's enterprises and labour force. This so-called *mise à niveau* operation is not only important to increase efficiency of production, but also – and which is equally important – in the interest of the vital process of standardisation. The latter means that Morocco will be able to comply with EU's quality standards for export commodities (to circumvent non-tariffary protection), that management processes comply with ISO standards, harmonisation of commercial law, juridical procedures, and accountancy standards, and mutual recognition of diplomas. This can only be achieved through support from outside and through education and training of Moroccan professionals.

Entrepreneurs esteem that it is still a very long way to go before compliance to EU and international standards will be achieved, and this threatens to severely impede Moroccan exports under free trade conditions. The large Moroccan companies and industries have less to fear of free trade and competition with Europe. While the latter are rather well-prepared, it

is in particular the small and medium sized enterprises and the rather unspecialised ‘multi-producers’ – who employ many people – whose efficiency, standards and quality is not at a level sufficient to compete with Europe. Competition with new member states of the EU is not seen as the biggest problem, as the other side of the coin is that it also creates enlarged export markets for Morocco, while the new member states do not produce the same agricultural products as Morocco. Competition with China is more perceived as a threat. However, what entrepreneurs see as the vital issue is the *mise à niveau* operation, which will determine competitiveness of the Moroccan economy. Cheap labour only is not sufficient.

The major incoherence felt here is that the EU in practice insufficiently supports *this mise à niveau* operation. The EU fails to live up to its own pretensions to make the Moroccan industry competitive. First, while entrepreneurs describe the *mise à niveau* as a mega-operation, they esteem the scope and budget of MEDA very limited. Second, *mise à niveau* is too narrowly conceived as incidental *formation professionnelle* and TA, whereas it also implies technical and process innovation and juridical harmonisation. Third, the available funds are generally spent in an inefficient way, and the large-scale MEDA projects hardly reach small and medium-sized enterprises.

MEDA programmes in which Moroccan entrepreneurs have been involved were – in the eyes of employers - generally not successful. Current EU training and education programmes (*formation professionnelle*) are evaluated as extremely inefficient and slow by entrepreneurs. Some entrepreneurs describe the execution of the European support to the *mise à niveau* as a ‘drama’. MEDA funds pass through the Moroccan treasury. Consequently, the fungible nature of state finances obscures a proper sight on spending of these funds (lack of transparency), and entrepreneurs esteem that funds are partly utilised to fill gaps in the state’s general budget.

The main complaint is that the EU mainly negotiates these programmes with the Moroccan government and that the institutions created to run these programmes are highly bureaucratic. According to the entrepreneurs, this led to bureaucratic deadlocks and a very low success rate (*taux de réalisation*).

A concrete example cited by entrepreneurs is the MEDA programme for *Formation Professionnelle* (50 M€). The governmental body ( *Office Nationale de la Formation Professionnelle* - ONFP), which manages this project, is evaluated to be a large and slow institution that largely determines its own priorities, thereby largely neglecting the concrete demand for expertise from the entrepreneurial world. Enterprises need flexible procedures to be able react to rapidly shifting market-driven demands. Decisions on how to spend money are taken top-down and reflect the result of complex negotiations between bureaucrats rather than actual demand. Entrepreneurs feel that they are insufficiently implied. The ONFP is described as a ‘monopolist, interested party, and judge’ at once; there are few internal checks and balances on budget spending. Most money is spent on existing *general* programmes for vocational training and not to professional training to support the *mise à niveau*. Consequently, the programmes are generally neither tailored to actual demand and nor flexible enough to quickly respond to the rapid shifts in this demand. For instance, recent demands to train computer scientists have been turned down because ‘they were not on the list of priorities of the ONFP’.

One of the core problems of the *mise à niveau* operation is that many Moroccan (family) enterprises contend with difficult access to credit. Private sectors entrepreneurs describe Moroccan banks as a cartel that is generally unwilling to grant risk capital to small enterprises. An accompanying problem is that banks are involved in almost all *mise à niveau* programmes. Funds are allocated through banks. The difficult access of small and medium-sized enterprises to banks also explains why the budget of the *Fonds de Mise à Niveau*

(FOMAN) is under-utilised. Moreover, criteria to gain access to funds tend to be very stringent. Also the *Conseil National de la Monnaie et Épargne* (CNME) is mostly oriented at large companies. Therefore, small and medium-sized enterprises do generally not profit from the *mise à niveau* programmes.

In general, both entrepreneurs' and civil society actors' experiences with support programmes of institutions like the World Bank and the United National are unanimously more positive than with the EU/MEDA. The main reason mentioned for this difference is that co-operation takes place in a less diplomatic, less formal, and more personal manner, and programmes are continuously monitored. They say that negotiations should take place on basis of a real knowledge and joint analysis of the problems, not as a part of a diplomatic game, which results in 'unworkable' programs that are likely to fail. More direct involvement of the EU on programmatic level is seen as desirable.

The entrepreneurs collectively agree that the US is doing a much better job than the EU with less funding, through a much more targeted and responsive approach, in which specific Moroccan professionals are selected for training and courses in the US. It does not give general budget support, as the EU tends to do, which is evaluated as extremely inefficient. While the EU supports countries or government institutions as a whole, the US chooses targeted sectors that they will support and persons they wish to educate. In this way, they operate much more efficiently than the slow European institutions and create intensive economic bonds throughout Morocco, which are also to their own benefit.

Apart from this, restrictive immigration policies limiting the circulation of students and professionals are also seen as a major impediment on the process of standardisation. Intensive contacts and information exchange between European and Moroccans colleagues through professional associations can greatly enhance the diffusion of up-to-date knowledge on management processes and standardisation. This has for instance greatly helped Moroccan accountants and pharmacists in keeping up with international standards. Therefore, Entrepreneurs esteem that migration is too one-sidedly approached as a threat (to security) and not as a developmental resource.

Through facilitating circulation and social contacts between professionals and through tailored programmes giving rather modest support to enterprises and professional associations, competencies can be enhanced in a much more efficient way. The successful (EU funded) PAAP project that supports professional associations is mentioned as a positive exempla. Importantly, the professional associations are efficient intermediaries for knowledge transfer.

#### **4.2.1.1 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS**

Entrepreneurs all agree that Moroccan agriculture has a very high development potential due to climatic circumstances and cheap labour. On the long term, true agricultural development will have very positive effects on the Moroccan economy and the tendency to emigrate. Nevertheless, past enlargement of the EU (in particular with Spain and Portugal) and its protectionist policies have in fact been very negative for Morocco. This is particularly true for citrus products in which Spain in particular made it impossible for Morocco to expand its exports and production. Besides these external factors, entrepreneurs cite internal factors as an important other reason why the developmental potential of agriculture has not been realised. The following internal obstacles towards agricultural development can be identified:

1. The general failure of technical assistance by Moroccan agricultural extension services (*Centres de Travaux, Centres de Mise en Valeur Agricole*) which malfunction and do

not reach small and medium-sized farmers willing to invest in agriculture – among whom a young generation of migrants;

2. The general inability to come to a necessary land and general agricultural reform, which has been prevented by large landowners ever since Moroccan independence. In other regions, fragmented land holdings need to be redistributed. Smaller farmers are de facto excluded from technical assistance and credit markets are hardly accessible for them. The monopoly of the large farmers and the ensuing lack of open competition partly explain low efficiency and lack of dynamics and innovation in the agricultural sector. However, land reform and deconcentration of ‘feudal’ land possession will directly affect the position of the monarch. This stalemate needs urgently to be overcome.
3. Some entrepreneurs think that the Moroccan government should also allow Europeans to buy agricultural land in Morocco. This should not be interpreted as agricultural ‘re-colonisation’, but can be a gigantic boost for agricultural development. Many Europeans are ready to invest in winegrowing, olive growing, horticulture, and various ‘primeurs’. It is esteemed that Moroccan agriculture has many potentials, but is stagnant and too much wheat-based. Again, this seems related to the disproportionate influence of a small group of farmers possessing most land.

The major incoherence felt here is that notwithstanding the vital importance of development of Moroccan agriculture for trade, economic growth, employment, and overall stability, the EU does hardly support the necessary reform and *mise à niveau* of Moroccan agriculture in practice. According to entrepreneurs, there is a incoherence between the aim to strengthen the competitiveness of the Moroccan economy (*mise à niveau*) and the near-total absence of agriculture in the MEDA programme, since agriculture is one of the sectors where Morocco has a strong comparative advantage in terms of climate and cheap labour. Agricultural development has been severely impeded by protectionism. The difficult access to landed resources and the importance of land reform is mentioned in the *Document de Stratégie*<sup>45</sup>, but subsequently no programmes are identified in the Programme Indicatif National. This is experienced as incoherent with both development and migration policies of the EU. Agricultural reform is only endorsed on member state level. This perceived incoherence is also brought forward by officials of the Ministry of Agriculture.

It should be stated however that the Ministry of Finance, the National Authority, did not present agricultural projects to be financed under the NIP. The statement was: ‘Agricultural projects are in general very difficult projects. You don’t ask for finance for difficult projects with a difficult donor’.

It is said by the employers that the Moroccan government has no real strategies to fundamentally reform agriculture due to the lobby of large farmers. Therefore, the EU should also directly negotiate in order to push the Moroccan government towards such reforms in the interest of the smaller and medium-sized farmers. Also MEDA should give priority to agricultural development, for instance in the form of micro-credit programmes, which are evaluated as very effective. Some entrepreneurs are of the opinion that the EU should also

---

45 L’agriculture est toujours la source principale du développement rural au Maroc. Abstraction faite de son rôle stratégique pour la sécurité alimentaire interne, l’agriculture joue un rôle essentiel dans le secteur productif, l’emploi, l’aménagement du territoire et l’environnement. En raison de l’augmentation prévue des besoins alimentaires, l’adaptation du type de production aux besoins du marché (de plus en plus ouvert) devient impérative’ (p.7); ‘L’accès au foncier est difficile, parfois très limité. Il s’agit d’un grand obstacle à l’investissement surtout dans le secteur agricole. L’absence de cadastre complique d’avantage le problème’ (p.16)

demand access of Europeans to Moroccan land in exchange for full market access of agricultural products.

#### **4.2.1.2 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS**

In general industrial products have a duty-free access to the European market, but the exceptions are in sectors that are of particular importance for Moroccan industries. High tariffs, in comparison with ACP-countries, still prevail on textiles, apparel, and footwear. Duties are double in comparison with ACP-countries. The ‘production-complementarity’ with the southern European states also in these sectors plays a negative role as seen from the Moroccan perspective.

According to the entrepreneurs, the existence of two Spanish enclaves on the northern coast – Melilla and Ceuta –, their special status as zones franches, and the intense smuggling that takes place from there to Morocco, undermines the vitality of the Moroccan industry and economy. It is a form of extremely unfair competition, and no taxes are paid for the product. It also creates unsafe situations and health risks, for instance through illegal imports of dangerous appliances/machines and packages foods and medicines whose storage life has expired. As long as the EU tolerates this situation and the special status of the enclaves, this is incoherent with their official policies to strengthen the competitiveness of the Moroccan economy in preparation of the free trade zone.

#### **4.2.2 IMPORTS**

No cases of unfair competition from European imports were reported. The general fear of ‘rough’ competition from China is much more prevalent among officials and employers, but also from the side of independent economic analysts.

#### **4.3 TRANSPORT**

In the sector of transport incoherence and unfair competition is first and foremost felt in shipping. European shipping lines have an advantage, because they are allowed to load and unload in Moroccan harbours on their way from e.g. the Canary Islands to Europe. Moroccan ship transporters don’t have the same privileges. This is seen by officials and employers as an incoherence in European policies, causing great disadvantages for the development of Moroccan shipping transport. A second issue is the liberalisation of ‘the air’, in which it is felt by the Moroccans that they are forced into a competition with huge airlines having many profitable destinations in a world, in which there are only a few profitable connections for the national company. Seen from a regional development perspective these profit-making connections are necessary to sustain rather unprofitable connections with neighbouring countries, important for this regional cooperation and development.

Responsible functionaries esteem that harmonisation in the transport sector is a sine qua non for equal market access. The EU project ‘Euro-Med Transport’ aims to strengthen institutional capacities in the transport sector. In particular juridical harmonisation (standards, etc.) are at the centre of this. However, a problem is a lack of fine tuning between pan-Mediterranean and regional (Maghreb) parts of the project. The inefficient result is considerable overlap and fragmentation of efforts. For instance, besides a general ‘projet de recherche du développement du transport’ there is another (REGMED) ‘projet de facilitation



de transport'. Moreover, such programmes are evaluated as 'too general', whereas each country has its own specific infrastructural and juridical context. The actual EU support to Morocco to its transport sector is too insufficient to achieve a *mise à niveau*. The northern rocade is cited as an example of a 'good' project tailored to Morocco's specific needs, which deserves to be copied.

According to government functionaries, a new incoherence – and an illustrating example of the importance of harmonisation – is that between the new EU security policies in the maritime sector on the one hand and equal market access on the other. As of July 2004, vessels need to have a special security certification and ports need to have detailed security plans. Non-certified vessels are not allowed to moor at EU ports. Thus, since the EU is not giving sufficient support to Moroccan so that they can comply to the new rules, the security policies can be a factor of unequal market access and threaten the position of the Moroccan transport sector.

**TABLE 4.2: MOROCCO EXPORT/IMPORT**

	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000
Export duties (% of tax revenue)	2	3	1	1	0	0	..
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	18	22	17	25	26	27	31
Exports of goods and services (annual % growth)	3	-17	2	9	18	2	-1
Exports of goods and services (BoP, current US\$ 000)	..	1,998	3,232,786	3,144,813	6,238,559	9,044,364	10,452,620
Exports of goods and services (constant 1995 US\$ 000)	2,570,323	2,670,120	3,401,288	4,812,161	7,321,351	9,044,567	11,141,490
Exports of goods and services (current US\$)	697,776	2,019,149	3,272,621	3,262,378	6,829,989	9,044,567	10,452,240
Import duties (% of tax revenue)	17	17	22	18	20	18	..
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	22	33	28	34	32	34	38
Imports of goods and services (annual % growth)	20	31	-9	1	11	15	-4
Imports of goods and services (BoP, current US\$ 000)	..	2,961,555	5,207,309	4,344,019	7,782,538	11,242,900	12,545,840
Imports of goods and services (constant 1995 US\$ 000)	2,776,750	4,613,615	5,495,036	5,723,993	8,488,760	11,243,200	14,521,790
Imports of goods and services (current US\$ 000)	853,749	2,996,077	5,246,863	4,418,852	8,373,834	11,243,200	12,537,190

**TABLE 4.3: MOROCCO'S AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS AND IMPORTS**

	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000
Agricultural raw materials exports (% of merchandise exports)	6	2	3	2	3	3	2
Agricultural raw materials imports (% of merchandise imports)	8	5	6	5	6	6	3
Food exports (% of merchandise exports)	52	25	28	26	26	31	21
Food imports (% of merchandise imports)	21	30	20	18	10	20	14

**TABLE 4.4: MERCHANDISE EXPORTS OF MOROCCO**

	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000
Merchandise exports (current US\$ 000)	488,000	1,543,000	2,492,000	2,164,000	4,264,000	6,880,000	7,432,000
As % of total exports	..	77.2	77.1	68.8	68.3	76.1	71.1
Merchandise imports (current US\$ 000)	684,000	2,568,000	4,164,000	3,848,000	6,921,000	10,023,000	11,534,000
As % of total imports	80.1	85.7	79.4	87.1	82.6	89.1	92.0

### 4.3 FISHERIES

Most probably the most contested dossier in the relation between Morocco and the EU are the fisheries agreement or, better formulated, the negotiations on the fisheries agreement. It is a general feeling among Moroccan officials as well as Moroccan NGOs and entrepreneurs that during the negotiations 'the door was slapped in the Moroccan' face', because it was more lucrative in the final end for Spain not to come to an agreement. Spain then would be able to look for financial compensation in Brussels. From the other side the general statement is that Moroccan demands were too high to be fulfilled by the Union. But the issue is so sensitive and delicate that for example officials from DG Fisheries hardly dare to touch it. What is clear, is that a compensation of about € 72 million a year was already paid in 2000 to Portuguese and (mainly) Spanish fishermen.

The third Fisheries Agreement between Morocco and the European Community expired on 20 November 1999. Under this agreement nearly 500 vessels in total and more than 400 Portuguese and Spanish vessels were fishing in the Moroccan waters. The financial went to € 500 million over the life of the agreement, making it the most important and most costly fishing agreement. These agreements could be seen as an extension of the agreement Spain had with Morocco before. In discontent with the results of the agreements the Moroccan government tried to get a larger compensation at the same time reducing the number of European (Spanish) vessels in the Moroccan waters. Therefore a first agreement was concluded already in 1988. In the 1990s Morocco 'absorbed about 40 per cent of the EU budget for third countries agreements and accounted for about 54 per cent of the total value of catches. Of the 477 vessels allowed to fish in Moroccan waters 404 were Spanish, coming mainly from Andalusia, Galicia, and the Canaries). With the second agreements of 1992 compensation was already increased with 50 per cent. The negotiations on a new agreement were already very difficult in 1995 and nearly collapsed. In the third fisheries agreement financial compensation took a new height and € 145 million were added for projects of scientific research, training and co-operation.

During 1999 and 2000 continuing negotiations took place in Brussels as well as in Rabat. The Moroccans offered several options to the Union. The first was an agreement at cost of € 90 million a year with increased landings and a reduced number of European vessels. The second contained an agreement with 100 percent landing obligations in Morocco. The third and the fourth offered fishing rights only on non-sensitive species with proportional or no financial compensation at all. It was in particular the high financial compensation that was seen as disproportionate by the Community. It was suggested that on the number of vessels, landing obligations, fishing zones and biological rest periods agreement could be reached. In line with Morocco's discontent on the low level of cooperation and landings in Morocco, it offered the Community a choice between a high compensation and a low level of cooperation or limited and largely reduced access. Finally the negotiations went into a deadlock in March 2001. According to Commissioner Franz Fischler 'the Moroccan expectation went far beyond any reasonable evaluation'. It was stated that the EU was keen to conclude an agreement which would also take account of Moroccan interests and was also willing to accept that most EU vessels would have to land their catches in Moroccan ports.

A main point of divergence was said to be the fishing levels (vessels, biological rest periods, gear) for 'key commercial fisheries, notably cephalopods and shrimps'. Morocco wanted a reduction for these species of 60 to 80 per cent. It was concluded that what Morocco was offering was 'not interesting to major sections of the fleet', e.g. Spanish vessels. Under

the earlier agreement 113 shrimp trawlers and 86 cephalopod vessels did have access to Moroccan waters.

### **Spain and European fisheries**

With accession of Spain to the European Community the European fishing fleet tripled and the catch doubled while the number of fishermen would rise by a third. Furthermore, Spanish fishing activities contribute to important employment in some of its most backward regions, like Galicia and Andalusia.

While at the moment of Spain's accession a European Fisheries Policy was practically non-existent, it grew in a short period to a full Common Policy. This was mainly due to the fact that part of the Spanish fisheries policy was communitarized. Due to the fact that the Spanish fishing fleet catches two-thirds from non-EU waters Spain had before its accession a series of 17 bilateral agreements, including the most important one with Morocco, exchanging mostly fishing rights against access to the Spanish market. These agreements were brought into the *acquis* of the Community, the EU paying since then the financial compensation. The EU pays 83.8 per cent of the costs for the agreements, the vessel owners 17.2 per cent. Spanish vessels form 93.3 per cent of the fleet fishing in African and Indian Ocean countries, with nearly 27.000 Spanish jobs involved.

Two opinions can be heard on the collapse of the negotiations. One states that Morocco negotiated too hard and overplayed its hand. It now lost as well the compensation as well part of the landings. It is said that Morocco misses the economic and technical capabilities to operate a large scale fishing fleet. Now Japanese, Korean and Russian ships are seen fishing in the Moroccan waters. Some state partly illegally because the Moroccan marine is not able to control the Moroccan fishing waters, but at least with little financial compensation to Morocco. Recent figures of the Ministry show that in particular catches of crustaceans and cephalopods have gone down in recent years.

Another observation most heard in Rabat and Casablanca states that it was the EU, in casu Spain, which blocked the negotiation.<sup>46</sup> Moroccan officials all indicate that they were disillusioned with the three earlier agreements in the light of the limited development benefits they brought to Morocco. The agreements were seen as exploitative alone, offering European vessels the richness of the Moroccan waters for just a financial compensation not on a basis of cooperation for development. The fear was underlined that Morocco would sell the riches of its seas and that it would end being overexploited and empty as the Mediterranean.

What struck the Moroccans hardest – and is seen as the ultimate example of the hand of Spain in these negotiations – that as a result of the collapse of the negotiations also fisheries projects were ended. If these projects are part of the development cooperation relation between Morocco and the EU, why then would they be suspended, if negotiations on a commercial agreement can not be concluded, is the question most commonly asked. If the EU is serious about the support of 200.000-250.000 small fishermen<sup>47</sup> why then stop the technical support? Why stop the support for research on fish stocks?

---

46 It has to be noted that Spain received € 170 million (Portugal €24) in 2000 and 2001 alone as compensation for fishermen and vessel owners affected by the non-renewal of the Morocco agreement.

47 One of the sensitive issues at stake here, is of course the fact that most of the artisanal fishermen fish in the coastal waters of the Western Sahara.

## **4.4 MIGRATION**

### **4.4.1 BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW**

Over the past four decades, Morocco has become one of the main source countries of immigrants in Europe. Since the 1960s, Morocco witnessed large-scale migration to France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, and, since the 1980s, Spain and Italy. Following the economic recession and the tightening of immigration policies following the 1973 Oil Crisis, relatively few Moroccan ‘guest worker’ migrants returned. The number of Moroccans abroad has been on an almost constant rise ever since the mid-1960s with a mean increase of 50,000 persons annually due to family reunification, family formation, and legal and undocumented labour migration (De Haas 2003). Increasingly restrictive immigration policies by European countries resulted in a shift of migration strategies towards increasing reliance on family migration and undocumented migration, and a shift towards Spain and Italy as the principal destination countries for labour migrants over the 1990s. Whereas migration used to be predominantly oriented towards France due to their colonial bonds, the number of Moroccan migrants and their descendants in other European countries have increased faster, and represented half of the Moroccan Diaspora in Europe, which counted well over 2 out of 30 million Moroccans in 2000 (De Haas 2003). An increasing proportion of labour migrants is higher educated and/or female.

Throughout the post-independence period, the Moroccan government has stimulated out-migration for both political and economic reasons. International migration was seen as a ‘safety valve’ to decrease poverty and prevent political tensions, in particular in Berber areas like the Rif, the Sous and some southern oases (De Haas 2003; Reniers 1999). The Moroccan government has seen migration as a tool for national economic development. Notwithstanding some relapses, remittances surged from 200 million dirham in 1968 to 34 billion dirham in 2003. Over the 1990s, remittances represented 6.4 percent of Morocco’s GNP, and 20.1 percent of all imports in goods and services on average (Buch et al. 2002). They are higher and also less volatile than FDI and ODA (five times lower than remittances in 2000), receipts from tourism and exports of phosphates and agricultural products. Although remittances contribute to income growth and poverty alleviation both directly and indirectly (cf. Teto 2001), government officials are generally disappointed by the low extent to which migrants seem inclined to start enterprises in Morocco.

### **4.4.2 THE POSITION OF THE EU**

Immigration control from Morocco is a high-ranking issue on the EU agenda. Member states are in particularly worried on mounting illegal immigration. In direct negotiations, the issue of re-admission of undocumented migrants is a pressing issue. According to the Document de Stratégie 2002-2006, ‘the emigration of Moroccans to the EU is a problem which needs to be addressed immediately’. After the terrorist attacks in New York and in particular Madrid (in which several Moroccans were involved), migration is increasingly linked to the issue of security. There is increasing concern on the role of Morocco as transit country for migrants from sub-Saharan Africa.

Migration is one of the priorities in the Programme Indicatif National 2002-2004, which proposed the following programs financed by the European Commission related to migration (control) issues:

(1) Programme d'appui institutionnel à la circulation des personnes (institutional support for creating a channel regulating a legal flow of demand-based emigration towards Europe; 5 M€);

(2) Gestion des Contrôles frontaliers (establishing greater security and control and strengthen investigative capacities at international borders to diminish cross border crime and illegal migration; 40 M€);

(3) Stratégie pour le Développement des Provinces du Nord (70 M€ in 2004 only).

The EU strategy focuses on 'co-development', which links development to migration policies. Development of the marginalised Northern Provinces, which constitute the prime source area of emigrants, is seen as an essential tool to reduce emigration pressures. The Northern Provinces are seen as a source of multiple problems: poverty, drugs, smuggling, and illegal migration. Through infrastructural projects (e.g., road building) and economic development it is aimed to create employment in the short run in order to 'fix populations in the main migrant sending regions'. Almost half of MEDA I (1996-2000) was already destined for the north.

#### **4.4.3 BOTTLENECKS AND POTENTIAL INCOHERENCIES**

There is a common opinion among both economic and civil rights actors, that it will be impossible to halt migration through the MEDA program. Development of the north as such is unanimously applauded. The rocade (a coastal road) and the new port in Tangiers will have positive effects. However, the scope of MEDA and other interventions is too limited to expect results in significantly reducing migration. The general opinion is also that it will be impossible to stop illegal migration through increased border control as long as the causes of this migration persist. Persistent migration over the past decades has shown this.

It is also generally felt that Morocco is not able to play the role of the European 'border patroller'. It can also not stop transmigration from sub-Saharan countries, because more restrictive immigration policies and forced deportations would harm the relations with these countries – which are considered strategic in the context of the unresolved issue of the Western Sahara. From the Moroccan side, the EU's intention to come to a 'common Euro-Mediterranean space' is perceived as hypocritical in the light of the increasing efforts to stop Moroccans from entering Europe, while Europeans have almost unlimited access to Morocco and in fact European entrepreneurs do increasingly settle in Morocco – this is generally seen as a 'lack of reciprocity'. This de facto closing off and increasing inequality in freedom of mobility makes it difficult to believe for many Moroccans discourse on 'mutual integration'. All actors share with the EU the deep concern on migration, though from a different perspective. There is a general lack of a broad, coherent common long-term vision on migration that is integrated with development objectives. They perceive that migration is too one-sidedly conceptualised as a threat and a security issue (especially since the Casablanca attacks in 2003), and that potential positive impacts of freer circulation on economic integration and mutual understanding for both Morocco and the EU remains underexposed. They also stress that Europe will need more immigrants in the future due to population ageing in order to keep its economy vital. Moroccan nurses and engineers, for instance, already emigrate to France. Both economic and civil society actors perceived that migration of the majority of 'benevolent' persons should be facilitated in order to stimulate political, economic, and social development. Visa applications procedures should be made more

transparent and rapid – security should not be an excuse to refuse entry – so that good-willing people can circulate freely to the benefit of all.

In order to prevent security threats posed by a small minority of extremists (a real concern shared by all actors), the approach should not be to curb immigration in general, but to improve communication between security services and politicians on both sides of the Mediterranean – which for instance failed with the Madrid attacks.

The following potential incoherencies in EU policies towards migration were identified:

1. Projects to promote (rural) development are incoherent with European economic and trade policies. As long as Europe persists in protecting agricultural and other economic sectors (economic and external policies), it is no surprise that migration pressures will persist. These policies also stimulate migration on the demand side: Many (often undocumented) Moroccan migrant workers work in these protected sectors, in particular horticulture, which makes the official call to stop immigration even less credible.
2. The EU's approach is focused on control issues and only sees migration as a threat, whereas from the Moroccan perspective migration itself is seen as a vital developmental instrument alleviating poverty and employment, increasing stability and potentially enabling people to invest. In negotiations re-admission and border control are the main issues, the developmental importance of migration for the Morocco is completely ignored. This explains the fear that integration of Eastern Europe will decrease the emigration potential for Morocco. Morocco does not have the ability to stop emigration and also a developmental interest in continued emigration.
3. There is a generally felt incoherence between the official intention to come to a common Euro-Mediterranean space and the factual attempts exclude population mobility from this aim. This will negatively affect the process of social and economic integration. Especially people from the entrepreneurial world (European and Moroccan) stress the negative effects restrictive immigration policies and the difficulty to obtain visas (e.g., for Moroccan entrepreneurs, academics, interns, students etc.) has on Moroccan-EU economic integration. Increased circulation will facilitate the creation of Euro-Moroccan economic co-operation (e.g. joint ventures, commercial and scientific exchange) and strengthening the Moroccan knowledge base in order to make Morocco's economy more competitive. Entrepreneurs do generally not fear a 'brain drain', but instead see migration and circulation of 'transnational' Moroccan professionals as an efficient means to increase competitiveness of the Moroccan economy.
4. Linked to the former point, there is an incoherence between the aim of encouraging commercial exchange, but to largely stop the inflow of undocumented migrants. Increasing commercial exchange (e.g., trucks, boats, tourist passages) increases the possibilities to hide away. In the same context, economic actors stress that infrastructural development in the north can in fact encourage emigration.
5. There is an incoherence between the de facto demand on the European drugs market for Moroccan cannabis (which is partly tolerated) and the EU's efforts to eradicate this crop in the northern provinces and to replace it by other crops, which economic actors judge bound to fail as long as demand persists – and as long as other crops cannot be



exported – and profits remain high: ‘The only way to eradicate cannabis, is to convince the Europeans to smoke carrots’. The official ban has in fact encouraged criminalisation of the growing and trade of cannabis and the creation of mafias in northern Morocco. In pre-colonial times, cannabis was a legal and even taxed commodity in northern Morocco. Legalising cannabis would circumvent mafias and increase farmer’s profits.

6. There is a generally felt incoherence between security policies and restrictive immigration policies, which are too mingled. The analysis less immigrants = more security and less terrorism is too direct and simplistic. The contrary might be the case. Both civil society and entrepreneurial actors stated that attempts to stop immigration stimulate undocumented migration and tend to marginalise migrants. If access to Europe is increasingly difficult in spite of discourse on ‘politics of proximity’, frustrations increase. This may in fact encourage feelings of hostility towards Europeans and boost extremism – while the immigration ban may paradoxically boost people’s urge to go to Europe. The best policies against extremism seem to stimulate development in Morocco; not through stopping immigration.
7. According to civil society actors, there is a one-sided emphasis on Northern Provinces in terms of migration and poverty eradication. In recent decades many other regions (e.g., Tadla) have developed into regions of departure. Most migration from the Rif is chain migration; most ‘primary’ labour migration takes place from other regions. Moreover, nowadays, there are poorer areas than the Rif such as parts of the Atlas mountains and the south. The primary aim seems migration control rather than poverty alleviation.

## **4.5 HUMAN RIGHTS**

### **4.5.1 BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW**

In the 1960s and 1970s, Morocco went through a period of political turmoil, in which democratic, often left wing political movements and the military challenged the position of the monarch. This was generally followed by heavy oppression. During these so-called ‘years of lead’ (1956-1986), torture, murder, and disappearances of political opponents were common and press freedom was extremely curtailed. After two military coups in the early 1970s, government oppression further intensified. The government supported some Islamist movements which were viewed as effective instruments in countering liberal and leftist activism. In 1975 Morocco annexed the Western Sahara, a disputed territory claimed by and the Polisario Front, which calls for an independent state. This went along with heavy oppression and ‘disappearance’ of Sahrawis and other opponents of this annexation.

Since the late 1980s and the end of the Cold War, Morocco’s human rights record came under intensified scrutiny by the international community. After decades of repression, the government took a series of steps that were critical in creating a climate of greater freedom in Morocco (Human Rights Watch, 1995 report). There has been an increase in the freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly and association; and civil society has been reinforced. Especially in the second half of the 1990s and the early 2000s, the human rights situation improved. Political prisoners were released, the Islamist leader Abdeslam Yassine house arrest was lifted, political exiles like Abraham Serfaty were allowed to return, and Morocco’s torture record improved.

The government also reassured to clarify the fate of the 'disappeared' victims of political oppression and to compensate their families through setting up the Arbitration Commission on Compensation in 1999. In 2003, the Equity and Reconciliation Commission was established to look into 'disappearances' and arbitrary detention in previous decades. The fate of hundreds of people, mainly Sahrawis, who 'disappeared' between the 1960s and early 1990s remained unclarified. Although several families were compensated, openness on this issue has only been partial, and there is no official intention to identify or prosecute officials responsible for torture and disappearances (Amnesty International, Annual report 2004).

Political freedom improved significantly over the 1990s. In 1998, King Hassan II appointed a new government with the socialist Youssoufi – a former political opponent – as prime minister. Elections have become more transparent and less corrupted, and moderate Islamist parties were allowed to participate. With the arrival of the new king Mohammed VI in 1999 after the death of Hassan II, things seemed to improve further. Press freedom in particular increased significantly, and the general political climate became undoubtedly far more liberal. Since the mid 1990s, the authorities have increasingly recognised the Amazigh (Berber) culture and language, the latter which will also be integrated in primary education. In 2004, a new personal status law (moudawana) was passed, which implies a major improvement in the juridical position of women except for inheritance rights. These improvements were applauded by the EU and the rest of the international community, contributing to Morocco's image as one of the most liberal societies in North Africa and the Middle East.

However, in recent years there has been a significant backlash. Press freedom was curtailed, through newspaper bans since 2000 and the sentencing and imprisonment of journalists mainly for publishing views of Islamists, Sahrawis or other 'undesirable' information. Since 2002 there has been an upsurge in the number of allegations of torture and ill-treatment. After the bomb attacks in Casablanca on 16 May 2003, Morocco's, the authorities intensified their clampdown on alleged Islamist activists, passing a new 'anti-terrorist' law on 28 May. The law contained a broad and unspecific definition of 'terrorism'. It extended the legal limits for pre-arraignment detention, restricted the suspect's access to legal counsel, and widened the scope of the death penalty (Amnesty International, Annual report 2004).

Judicial proceedings were brought against over 1,500 people suspected of involvement with the attacks or other 'terrorist' activities. Several hundred were sentenced to prison terms ranging from a few months to 30 years, and at least 50 were sentenced to life in prison. At least 16 people were sentenced to death and remained in custody. Dozens of those sentenced said they had been tortured or ill-treated, in some cases in secret detention, to extract confessions or to force them to sign or thumbprint statements they rejected (Amnesty International, Annual report 2004). Curbs on the rights to freedom of association and expression were felt most acutely by Sahrawi human rights activists perceived to advocate the independence of Western Sahara and those perceived to be questioning the authority of the monarchy. Political prisoners sentenced after unfair trials in previous years remained in detention (Amnesty International, Annual report 2004).

Corruption remains a major problem, despite intensified efforts of the authorities to combat the phenomenon. Economic exploitation and abuse of children, such as young girls working as domestic servants, remains widespread (UN Committee on the Rights of the Child). Despite overall improved civil rights and openness, the monarch has not given up any of his essential constitutional powers. He directly appoints the ministers holding key posts, and is centrally involved in literally all major decisions. Furthermore, discussing subjects like the monarch's position as both religious and secular leader or the Western Sahara remain an absolute political taboo.

#### **4.5.2. THE POSITION OF THE EU**

The European Union stresses human rights as a key issue in its relations with Mediterranean third countries and Morocco. One of the three main aims of the Barcelona process is the transformation of the Mediterranean into a 'zone of peace and stability based on common principles and values, including democracy and respect for human rights'. In the context of the association agreement with Morocco, one of the four main objectives of the MEDA program as formulated in the Document de Stratégie 2002-2006 is the 'development of a pluralist democratic society based on the respect of human rights and the constitutional state'. In the PIN (Programme Indicatif National 2002-2004), no programs directly related to human rights financed by the European Commission have been identified. One program indirectly related has been identified: 'Programme intégré d'appui aux associations marocaines de développement' (B7-4100; Budget 4 M€; 0.4 percent of total budget of 940.9 M € for all programs mentioned in the PIN). On a bilateral level, Germany, Italy, and Belgium financed small human rights projects (2000-2001), mainly on women's rights. At the other hand under its EMAA Morocco also got access to the MEDA Democracy Programme, of which Morocco became one of the principal beneficiaries between 1996-1999 receiving about € 2 million a year for mainly (international) NGOs, but also for the Ministries of Human Rights and Education for democracy education.

#### **4.5.3 BOTTLENECKS AND POTENTIAL INCOHERENCIES**

All representatives of the Moroccan civil society interviewed esteem that there have been incontestable and unprecedented improvements in the human and women's rights situation in Morocco over the past ten years. They all agree that direct external political pressure by bodies like the European Union and the international (in particular French) press have played an important and very positive role in this process. Recent reforms would have been impossible without support and pressure from outside. However, there is a generally felt fear that the situation is deteriorating again, especially after the Casablanca attacks. The struggle against terrorism is felt to be abused to justify increased repression in general. Recently, there have been many arbitrary detentions of alleged 'islamists' and press freedom was curbed. Significantly, the Moroccan Ministry of Human Rights has been abolished in June 2004 officially because the problem had been 'settled'. In this context, waning of European's attention can work out very negatively.

The respondents stress that there is still a long way to go before Morocco is a truly democratic society in which civilians enjoy full rights. There is hardly any progress in the process of democratisation. However, they perceive a decreased watchfulness of the EU because of Morocco's very positive image as one of the most democratic and open societies in the region – especially after the recent passing of the new personal status law (moudawana). They doubt to what extent one is aware in 'Brussels' on the many human rights violations that persist. Now Algeria and Tunisia are perceived as the countries with a problematic human rights record, one risks losing Morocco out of sight.

This impression that the human rights issue is 'settled' in Morocco is generally perceived as dangerous. The high priority for human rights of the EU remains a 'profession of faith'; in the concrete terms there is no project related to this theme in MEDA. Human rights groups in particular stress that persistent political pressure on Moroccan authorities is necessary to reverse the current deteriorating trend and to guarantee continuing improvements of the human rights situation. For instance, the change of the moudawana might have

improved the position of women de jure, a de facto change demands awareness among the population and effective implementation of these laws by the judiciary, which may take a long time.

However, some actors in economic and business field emphasise that not too much pressure should be put on the Moroccan authorities, as they perceive human rights reform and democratisation primarily as an internal process. Some also judge that in Morocco it is to 'early' for full democracy. Civil society actors strongly disagree with this.

The following potential incoherencies in EU policies towards human rights were identified:

1. Although human rights are one of the prime aims of EU's official policies towards Morocco, it receives very little attention in practice. In concrete terms human rights do not play a central role in negotiations and very little effective support is given to human rights organisations and women's associations. Such support is highly necessary in order to secure recent progress and the effective implementation of for instance the moudawana. Moreover, financial support of civil rights movements or programmes is not sufficient. Most respondents emphasise that the European Commission should put far more direct and active political pressure on Moroccan authorities; regarding the success of such pressure in the past. However, the EU-Morocco integration project is mainly perceived as an economic process. The MEDA programme is focused on administrative reform and liberalisation, thereby largely neglecting human rights issues. As a side-issue, human rights are perceived as a 'stake' in diplomatic negotiations rather than an issue that is treated with internal coherence and consistency. Respondents from human and women's rights groups think that Europe should put more direct political
2. The stress on security issues in EU's recent external policies may encourage general repression within Morocco in the name of the struggle against terrorism.
3. Although the EU official strongly supports civil society, it is in practice very difficult to gain access to project funding. This seems largely a problem of scale. Most human rights and women's rights organisations are rather small and do not need very large. However, they are generally not capable to comply with the complex EU's procedures and standards for reporting and accounting due to the fact that their staff is small and they often partly rely on volunteers. The European (e.g., MEDA) programmes seem rather tailored for large projects and not for small, short-run projects. Relatively small human and women's rights organisations, which have played a central role in recent reforms, are therefore not effectively integrated as an 'internal Moroccan force of democratisation' into EU human rights policies. It is also said that the EU has a limited capacity to continuously monitor and follow small, often effective programs. Women groups give the example of UNIFEM, who has given very effective support to their struggle for the reform of the moudawana. Also the World Bank seems better able than the EU in giving targeted support to small projects and organisations. The EU disposes over relatively large funds, but is seen as ineffective in delivering 'qualitative' support and counselling. The dialogue with the EU is a very formal one, mostly centred on the Moroccan state, and too much focused on general budgetary support to the Moroccan state. The few NGO's that are directly involved in MEDA programmes are big semi-state organisations.

4. The perceived low de facto priority for women's rights (e.g., in education, work, and marriage) is in conflict with the EU policy aim to promote development in Morocco, as women are major actors in promoting development and combating poverty and inequality. In particular participation of women in primary education should be encouraged.
5. Human rights organisations observe that restrictive immigration policies of EU countries and EU's support for intensified border controls in Morocco conflicts with the human rights of Moroccans. Each year, hundreds or thousands Moroccans and other Africans die in the Strait of Gibraltar. Several respondents emphasised that the rights of (undocumented) Moroccan migrants – among whom an increasing proportion of women living in vulnerable conditions – living in Europe are generally neglected by the EU. The rights and dignity of Moroccans are also violated in the process of visa issuance at European country's embassies: procedures are often costly, take a long time, and visa demands are often rejected without justification. Business people and academics are treated as potential illegal immigrants; and this harms exchange across the Mediterranean. This is perceived as against the main aims of the Barcelona process. There is also a perceived lack of reciprocity. For instance, most European countries have not signed the 1990 UN Convention on Migrants Workers. In particular undocumented migrants, for instance those working in southern Spain, are exploited, maltreated, and suffer from general xenophobia. This might potentially create support for political and religious extremism. Morocco's increasing role as European 'border patroller' may harm the human rights of sub-Saharan Africans using Morocco as a transit country.
6. Improved education is a pendant of progress in human rights. However, in actual EU policies funds go to general programmes for education and professional formation. However, there is little attention for a qualitative change in education (e.g., change of curricula and 'human rights education') and the access of women to education.
7. The way MEDA funds are spent possibly boosts corruption within the state. In its policy of the support of administrative reform, the EU seems primarily interested in total budget control, less in how the money is spent. This coincides with a lack of attention on efficiency. Extreme inequalities in civil servants' salaries – which seem to incite corruption – are neglected.

## **CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY SENEGAL**

### **4.1 SENEGAL AND THE EU: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND**

#### **4.1.1 SENEGAL AND THE TREATY OF ROME**

Senegal has been part of the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions from the beginning. It was already part of the group of Associated African and Malagasy States (AAMS) consisting mainly out of French and Belgian colonies in Africa (in total 18 states in 1963), which together with the OCTs were the negotiating body with the Community after the signing of the Treaty of Rome. With the independence of several African states at the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, Articles 131-136 of the Treaty of Rome were not binding them anymore. Negotiations started on new forms of association with the EC. Senegal became independent in 1959 and is said to be also one of the very active members of the group in these negotiations which finally resulted in the Convention of Yaoundé of July 1963 (with 18 African states) and six years later to Yaoundé II, which was mainly a copy of Yaoundé I. Unilateral association thus became 'negotiated association' (Grilli 1993:19) and Senegal's Leopold Senghor, as one of the more moderate African leaders played an important role in it.

Since the 18 of Yaoundé I, mainly former French and Belgian colonies, did not have to fear the competition of former British colonies yet, aid levels and access to the European market remained more or less unchanged. It did put the AAMS group of countries in a privileged position. In exchange European access to their markets and rights of EC citizens put the EC in a favourable position. Senegal took part in all this, as also in all the structures (Association Council, Parliamentary Conference) that were created alongside

#### **4.1.2 THE LOMÉ CONVENTION**

Senghor also played a pivotal role in the negotiations on Lomé I in the beginning of the 1970s. Under his leadership and that of the Nigerians the AAMS group quickly found themselves in an 'cohesive and aggressive negotiating group' (Grilli 1993:27) of ACP-countries. It led to an inclusion of the export revenue stability instrument Stabex financed by the Community and the abandonment of reciprocity in trade relations between the ACO and the EC. Furthermore the Sugar Protocol, making a first small inroad in European agricultural protectionism was part of these 'aggressive' negotiations.

The privileged position of West-African, Sahel and other Francophone countries however changed little after in 1975, when in Lomé I Eastern and Southern African countries were integrated. Aid per capita, also to Senegal, stayed on average four times higher. Lomé II and Lomé III also brought only minor changes in this position. This became even more obvious in the second half of the 1980s when Senegal (and Ivory Coast) were hit by economic recession. Both countries, which economically did quite well since independence, then suffered from their integration in the Franc zone, weakening their position in the international commodity markets. As a consequence direct EU aid to Senegal in that period increased tenfold, from \$ 6 million tot \$ 65 million in 1988.

### **4.1.3 SENEGAL AND THE COTONOU CONVENTION**

In the line-up for the negotiations on the Cotonou Convention also criticisms on Senegalese economic policies grew. It was indicated that Senegal lost a fifth of its export markets since the 1980s, because its exports made no progress at all.<sup>48</sup> It was one of the signs that trade preferences in the Lomé Conventions only worked for a small number of states. The Economic Partnership Agreements are one of the new instruments of the Cotonou Convention to foster trade between the EU and the ACP-countries and among regional groups themselves. New Country Strategy Papers should also in the case of Senegal in a new format plan for old and new instruments and be a monitoring instrument to follow progress. Several local participants, among which Civil Society organisation should take part in the process of the formulation of the new CSPs.

Several NGOs took part in the discussion on the new Country Strategy Paper under Cotonou. In general they are satisfied with the way the process was organised and with their own participation. In their eyes each participant played its own role and learned during the process how to act and participate. Major differences existed on the question in which domains the EU should become active. The differences more or less converged in the question if agriculture should become a priority sector or not.

There is also quite some discussion on the EPAs. One of the issues put forward is about the necessity of the institution of an EPA, when there is already a WTO which is already covering issues as reciprocity and market access. Some NGOs also indicate that there are two types of countries in the region, Least Developed Countries and others, and that, if the LDCs get a better access to the European Market, this might lead to dislocation of a certain set of activities to these LDCs. Whereas cooperation between these countries is a major goal of the EPAs this could lead to collisions. The situation in West-Africa is seen as even more complicated as one has to deal also with differences between Anglophone and Francophone countries (apart from Arab phone) with all the differences in culture attached to it.

Also the philosophy behind the EPAs is criticised. It suggests that free trade leads to more economic growth and that thus what African countries are going to gain by it will be more than they are going to lose by the termination of the trade preferences. This philosophy is qualified as dubious. What African countries might win on some products, they are certainly going to lose on others. This losses might be compensated within the EPA, but this is at the level of the state and is not a compensation for producers and labourers. In this respect in particular European protectionism in agriculture is under criticism, with which we will deal later.

## **4.2 DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FROM EUROPEAN DONORS**

Aid to Senegal has been criticized on several grounds. On the government's side its dedication to reform has been described as being 'uneven' and a too high level of intervention in the economy by the Senegalese government was seen as causing an erratic economic performance. Donors could hear the criticism that they had no common sector programmes and they often viewed aid as an accumulation of discrete projects. On both sides little

---

48 Statement of the EU-delegate Manuel Lopez Blanco, Le Soleil, 5 June 2004. It is important to note that Lopez Blanco was the main architect of the trade paragraphs of the EU Green Paper containing the EU's proposals for the renegotiation of Lomé.

attention to the development of human capital and poor implementation, in particular poor financial management, were considered to dampen aid effectiveness.

Much of this is said to have changed in recent years. Senegal has a PRSP, policy dialogue and dialogue with civil society has dramatically ameliorated, there is definitely more focus on implementation. Sector wide programmes are still not very well developed, but Senegal's PRSP, although maybe overly optimistic, is considered to be an important assembling point for donors.

After the devaluation and with more rapid economic growth the role of foreign aid in Senegal's economy was slightly reduced. Net foreign aid was about 5% of GDP up till 1997 and went to 3.2% in 2001. Aid's contribution to public investment went down from about 74% to 58% in the same period. This change also occurred, because net aid volumes stagnated and slightly decreased around the millennium. The high aid dependence is said to hamper private domestic savings mobilization and to centralize budget preparation. At the other hand several donors indicate that Senegal's absorption capacity is constantly overestimated.

The major part of foreign assistance is coming from Europe. Nearly 60% of net ODA stems from the EU and its member states. By far the largest donor is France, although the World Bank is coming close to it in recent years. EU aid fell from an all time high of \$ 95.6 million in 1998 to \$ 58.5 in 2002. Sector wise we see growth of aid volumes going to education and, to a minor extent, to health. Aid to agricultural dropped, while programme assistance had strong ups and downs.

The Senegalese economy is characterised by a low level of private investments and low domestic savings, a situation that worsened during the years of structural adjustment in the 1980s.<sup>49</sup> The grade of self-financing in effect diminished over the years. This means that investments largely depend on foreign sources and development assistance. This is in particular true for government investments. Local resources for public investments fell back to only 26% in 1994 to recover a bit in later years, but in general one could state that two thirds of public investments are paid by foreign aid.<sup>50</sup>

European aid in the past has been mainly directed, as in many other African Lomé-countries, at the transport sector. Among other this involves support for the Transport Sector Programmes (PST I and II) with amounts of € 60 million for the second part of PST I and an initial € 40 million for PST II. This means that the EU is the largest contributor to road construction. Road construction is executed by Senegalese, European (French and Italian) firms and by joint-ventures firms. Under the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF road construction remains important, but there are two other concentration sector, apart from budget support (€ 60 million): good governance (with assistance to the judicial system) and groundnut production. The last has been an important sector due to Stabex funds, but disbursements are stagnating awaiting a financial clean-up and privatisation and deregulation by the Senegalese government. It means that funds for agriculture have been largely confined to the groundnut sector. Other sectors within European aid are decentralisation, culture and commerce.

What several actors see as the most important incoherence in European aid of the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF are those between the goals of European development cooperation and of the Senegalese PRSP at the one hand and the sectors selected to receive European development assistance. That agriculture has not been selected as one of the concentration areas for European aid in the latest NIP is seen as major incoherence within European development assistance to Senegal. It is stated that 70% of the population of Senegal live in the rural areas and they are in majority dependent on agricultural production. This is said to coincide with the policies of the Senegalese government, which in the final end is also overlooking the agricultural sector.

---

49 See the articles by Diagne and Cissé/Daffé in: Diagne/Daffé (2002)

50 Diagne in: Diagne/Daffé (2002: 80-84).



It is argued that if the Senegalese government would have seen agriculture also as a priority area and if the Ministry of Agriculture would have had a strong position, agriculture would have been integrated in the domains of the 9<sup>th</sup> EDF. European officials indicate that a large amount of former Stabex funds is still lying idle, because of little action from the side of the Senegalese government and the absence of a policy plan for agriculture

A second internal incoherence is brought forward in particular by NGOs. They are seen to be better integrated in the new EU programme and also played an active role in the formulation of the CSP. However they receive assistance alone for the activities they execute and no institutional support for their organisation. NGOs stress that they need this type of support also to grow and to function as adequate counterparts. In particular the smaller (women's) organisation are said to be in need for institutional assistance.

Rather complicated arguments are developed to demonstrate that the long time that the EU needs for its *décaissements* could also be seen as an incoherence. The procedures of the EU are seen by all actors as heavy and complicated and it is generally stated that organisational changes of the last years only brought limited improvement. What can be concluded is that the situation deteriorated gradually during the 6<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> EDF: 5 years after signing the NIP for the 6<sup>th</sup> EDF (1989) 61.1% of the total allocated funds were disbursed. This was only 47.8% for the 7<sup>th</sup> EDF (1995) and 30.5% for the 8<sup>th</sup> EDF (2001).<sup>51</sup> Also actual payments show this deterioration at the change of the Millennium from an average of € 36 to € 23 million.

## 4.3 TRADE

### 4.3.1 EXPORTS

Senegal's exports are highly concentrated in the primary sector and primary products represent 90% of export income. Its exports consist mainly of groundnut, phosphate and fisheries. Of them fisheries is the most important, contributing between 35 and 40% to export income. Fisheries exports even contributed 56% to total exports in 1995. In the first five 1990s there was only a very slight growth of exports of manufactured goods, concentrated in a very limited number of firms and a negligible impact on employment.<sup>52</sup>

**Table 5.1: EU-Senegal trade flows**

(in millions €)

	1990	1995	2000	2002	2003
Senegalese exports to the EU	410.9	369.7	388.9	407.4	335.0
Senegalese imports from the EU	683.5	715.1	1,017.	1,176.8	1,072.2

(Source: EUROSTAT )

51. These figures are even worse if one looks at the disbursed funds in relation to funds available under the NIP. See; Rapport Annuel Conjoint. Coopération entre la République du Sénégal et la Communauté Européenne, 2001 and 2002.

52. World Bank (1997: 20-25).

Over the years since independence Senegal lost considerably in market share. Its per capita exports are among the lowest in the world. In the 1990s there was even a drop in export incomes of about 2% per year, while at the same time other SSA countries saw a growth of on average 5% per year.<sup>53</sup> This drop was in particular caused by the high and unrealistic exchange rate of the CFA. In money terms exports regained from 1995, after the devaluation of the CFA. But in the second half of the 1990s in particular reduced prices and reduced volumes of phosphate, vegetable oils, shrimps and lobster caused a new slide in exports. Fisheries exports fell dramatically again in 2000 and 2001, good prices however kept income more or less stable. Also the groundnut (oil) exports did relatively well.<sup>54</sup>

40-45% of the Senegalese exports have Europe as destination. Main European importers are France, Italy and Greece. About 30% of the exports are going to African countries, mainly to the 'Hinterland', countries in West-Africa. The market of the Americas is negligible and collects not more than 1% of the exports.

**Table 5.2: Senegal: Main export products**

(in millions \$)

	1981	1991	2000	2001
Total exports (fob)	561	904	959	992
Ground nut products	34	110	112	112
Phosphates	66	67	33	35
Manufactured products	196	213	241	250

(Source: EUROSTAT )

53 Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances (2003 : 133-161). And : Le Soleil, 17 December 2002.

54 Ibidem.

**TABLE 5.3: SENEGAL: EXPORT AND IMPORT**

	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000
Export duties (% of tax revenue)	5	3	2	..	..	..	..
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	26	35	27	29	25	34	30
Exports of goods and services (annual % growth)	9	13	-18	-16	4	3	4
Exports of goods and services (BoP, current US\$)	..	688,152,704	806,893,056	824,372,416	1,452,666,752	1,505,804,672	1,288,652,032
Exports of goods and services (constant 1995 US\$)	1,014,945,216	1,077,099,392	877,614,080	1,023,575,168	1,362,160,128	1,543,594,880	2,285,292,800
Exports of goods and services (current US\$)	229,736,048	674,256,896	803,194,560	737,432,832	1,449,717,120	1,543,594,880	1,306,650,752
Import duties (% of tax revenue)	42	39	38	..	..	..	..
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	30	40	44	42	30	40	40
Imports of goods and services (annual % growth)	11	12	-2	-6	3	19	-2
Imports of goods and services (BoP, current US\$)	..	781,894,144	1,214,977,920	1,162,526,336	1,839,900,032	1,821,101,568	1,741,335,040
Imports of goods and services (constant 1995 US\$)	1,193,970,944	1,306,075,392	1,434,098,048	1,567,965,568	1,786,454,400	1,796,067,968	1,946,798,720
Imports of goods and services (current US\$)	261,063,696	758,713,984	1,301,502,592	1,083,307,520	1,728,127,488	1,796,067,968	1,741,481,472

**TABLE 5.4: SENEGAL'S AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS AND IMPORTS FROM AND TO THE EU**

	1990	1995	2000	2001	2002	2003
Agricultural raw materials exports to the EU (in € mln)	298.8	257.8	324.7	338.7	332.8	289.9
Agricultural raw materials imports (% of total exports to the EU)	73	70	84	75	82	87
Agricultural imports from the EU (in € mln)	133.8	154.3	185.8	230.3	222.0	237,1
Agricultural imports (% of total imports from the EU)	20	22	18	22	19	22

#### 4.3.1.1 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS

Groundnuts are the most important product for cash income for the rural population. Whereas more than half of the Senegalese population is considered to be poor, 75 to 80% of the rural households were poor. Growth in agriculture is stagnating and also is the production of groundnuts, although since the devaluation of the CFA franc (1994) is slight increase occurred from 1997 to 2001. Half of primary sector output comes from agriculture. Since the millennium there was strong growth of agricultural production, but this growth is seen as very fragile and with little effect on rural poverty yet. In 2000 agriculture contributed 21% to exports and 17% to Senegal's GDP, while half of the labour force was employed in agriculture. Senegal is the 6<sup>th</sup> producer on a world scale behind China, India the USA, Nigeria and Indonesia. Its share in world production however was more than halved between 1970 and 2000, from 5.5% of world production to 2.3%.

It is a general feeling under Senegalese producers that European agricultural policies need to be restructured. This holds for the problems Senegalese producers are confronted with when European products are 'dumped' on the Senegalese market (see below), but also with regard to the access for Senegalese (African) products to the European market. Access of agricultural products might be without problem 'off-season', but they are directly confronted with high tariffs at moments that European products are harvested and brought onto the market. Senegalese tomatoes (and Moroccan beans) are quoted as examples.

Phyto-sanitary regulations are a second problem here. The EU-regulation of aflatoxin is quoted as the main example here. The EU regulation allows for much lower levels of aflatoxin than the Codex Alimentarius. It has been argued that maximum levels set in the Codex stem from a deliberate legislative process of weighing by international health experts in the FAO and WHO, while European levels were set as an average of levels set by the Member States.<sup>55</sup> These higher levels cause serious problems for producers of nuts, groundnuts and dried fruits. In the legislative process the EU did not take their interests into account, not in terms of what are reasonable maximum levels, neither in granting developing countries a transitional period. Senegal, as an important producer of ground nuts, is one of the victims. Of course reducing aflatoxin levels is a matter of training and improvement of agricultural practices of Senegalese farmers, but changes in these practices, as has been concluded in the quoted study on this case, take time and a huge effort of extension services. It is suggested that the EU could have been more complaisant. The introduction of the new phyto-sanitary regulation by the General Food Law coming into force from January 2006 show the same lacunae as those observed in the aflatoxin case.

#### 4.3.1.2 INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS

Senegal is not a position (yet) to be able to export industrial products to the European market. Market access in this sector thus plays a limited role with regard to its export position. Complaints or incoherences brought forward with regard to industrial exports are more in the field of migration policies and possibilities to get access to the European market and are thus dealt with in the section on immigration policies.

---

55 I.Moonen (2004:6 and Chapter 4).

### 4.3.2 IMPORTS

There are a series of imports stemming from Europe which are said to be incoherent with European policies. The two main incoherences indicated are: 1 that import hamper or even destroy local Senegalese production; 2. that some imports are bad for the environmental conditions in Senegal. In both cases NGOs and employers federation state that the Senegalese government has not the will or the power to regulate these imports better. It is said to be under pressure of WTO trade-rules or that it does not want to complicate relations with the EU and thus not is able or wants to counteract on these imports.

To the first type of imports belong in particular imports of agricultural products. Some stem from Asia. The liberalisation of the world market also for food products makes competition with rice imports from Asian countries very difficult for producers in the Fleuve region. Import surges from Europe, in particular from the Netherlands, most recently have created serious problems for Senegalese producers. They were reported not only by some NGOs but also in the Senegalese newspapers. Most strongly brought forward is the case of chicken legs. Other cases appearing in the local press in Senegal are onions and potatoes. Other products quoted, but not sustained with case material, are milk powder and wheat.

**Table 5.5 Senegal: Main import products**

(in millions \$)

	1981	1991	2000	2001
Total imports (fob)	1,159	1,347	1,500	1,678
Food products	270	362	305	359
Petroleum and energy	297	148	280	283
Capital goods	120	197	246	283

(Source: EUROSTAT )

In the 1990s food imports in Senegal more than tripled.<sup>56</sup> One of the main reasons is said to be the general reduction of import tariffs by the successive implementation of structural adjustment programmes. Tariffs on poultry meat imports were thus in several steps lowered from 55% to 20%. The Senegalese government requested the WTO for a waiver to maintain a system of reference prices for a series of 20 food products, including poultry and milk powder. This request was partly granted. While imports of poultry meat were negligible at the mid 1990s they grew to more than 11,000 tonnes in 2003,<sup>57</sup> mainly consisting of frozen cuts (legs) from the Netherlands (about two thirds) and Belgium. At the same time local

---

56 FAO, Committee on Commodity Problems, Impact of import surges: country case study results. Rome, April 2004. See also: Agir Ici a.o., Exportations de poulets: l'Europe plume l'Afrique, Paris 2004. Sufa International, Impact des importations de volailles en Afrique de l'Ouest. Bruzelles : InfoSud, Avril 2004. It should be indicated also that Senegal doesn't seem to be self sufficient in poultry production at the moment.

57 According to the FAO study it was 16,600 tonnes. Other figures indicate 11,950 tonnes in 2003. This last figure seems more reliable, looking at the national production of about 25,000 tonnes in 2003.

production declined. Imports thus grew from only 1% of local consumption to 19% in 2002, according to the FAO statistics. A similar pattern can be established with the imports of milk powder (from France), but here local production remained fairly stable. Producer organisations indicate that 70% of broiler farms around the urban areas have closed and that the sector is in a crisis. A spokesman of the Ministry of Agriculture reports a production decline of 30%. Up to mid-2003 small export restitutions were given by the EU on about a third of the total volume exported in the last seven years. The Senegal case, together with similar cases from West-Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Ivory Coast) served as an example in a campaign of French and Belgium NGOs under the title 'L'Europe plume l'Afrique'.

Similar problems are reported on onions and potato imports. Imports of onions have surged to 30.000 tonnes in the last years, 50% more than in 2002. In principle Senegal is self sufficient with a production of 100,000 tonnes and a consumption of 70,000 tonnes. Post-harvest losses however are rather high. Imports of potatoes have increased to more than 10.000 tonnes. In the case of potatoes local production stagnated and there were also problems with conservation. Urban consumers in these cases seem to prefer the quality of imported potatoes and onions, because prices of these are reported to be 25% to 50% higher than those of local products, according to the season.<sup>58</sup> Recent reports indicate that local products show a better resistance to foreign imports.

The second incoherence is addressing the import of second hand cars and computers. Total imports of second hand cars were around 24.000 a year between 2000 and 2004. A decline has been reported in 2004, due to new legislation on imports.<sup>59</sup> Senegalese NGOs indicate that these imports create enormous environmental problems in particular in Dakar. They see it as dumping of European or European garbage in African countries. The Senegalese government is preparing a law which should stop the import of second hand cars that are more than five years old, but at the other side these imports are generating quite some custom revenues for the Senegalese government. Custom revenues on second hand cars were estimated at more than a quarter of total customs income of the Senegalese government in the first three years of the new millennium.<sup>60</sup>

#### **4.4 FISHERIES**

'The Fisheries Agreement is a commercial agreement and those who state that it isn't, is not honest', is the statement one can hear from fisheries officials in Dakar: 'Europe has bought itself access to Senegalese fishing waters for its vessels'. They also stress that there is a total incoherence between the agreement and its goals at the one side, and the goals of conservation of fishing resources and of development at the other side. Senegal has limited possibilities to control foreign vessels. Even the money that the EU offers in return for the access is seen as a danger, since the Ministry of Fisheries now had to fight with the Ministry of Finance for every penny to develop the sector and for conservation. It is then easy to conclude, stresses a

---

58 Pomme de terre et oignon locaux snobés au profit des importations. Le Soleil, 1er mars 2003 ; L'oignon fait pleurer les producteurs. Le Quotidien, 7 juillet 2004 ; Campagne horticole 2003 : les importations menacent la production locale, Le Soleil, 8 mars 2003 ; Echos des marchés : La pomme de terre et l'oignon locaux résistent aux importations, Le Soleil, 3 juillet 2004.

59 Les importations des 'venants' tamisées par la nouvelle réglementation : de 1500 à 300 voitures par moi. Le Soleil, 23 juin 2004.

60 Le Quotidien, 8 April 2003.

spokesmen from the Ministry that there is a total incoherence between the official discourse and the practice.

The situation in the Senegalese fisheries is very complex. To describe it as a competition between Senegalese artisanal fishermen and modern Spanish vessels, as is sometimes done, is a clear simplification. There are several actors involved and a series of species that are not all overexploited. It is important to keep in mind that one out of 6 active Senegalese tries to earn his money in fisheries.

One could categorise the Senegalese fisheries resources in four different groups:

1. Coastal demersal species: these are the most precious species, like sole and thiof (merou), but also shrimps. This category is clearly overexploited and catches are becoming more and sparser.
2. The small coastal pelagics: the most important one of these is the sardinelle, which is on the menu of the Senegalese population for 80% of the catches. The species are still rather easy to catch and not over fished.
3. The large deep sea pelagics like tuna. These travel in large schools and are heavily exploited but most probably not overexploited. They are major target in most fishing agreements and fished mainly by Spanish vessels.
4. The deep sea demersals like merlan and shrimps. There is discussion if they are in the critical zone. Some octopus species are indicated to be in danger of overexploitation. They are also caught mainly by the Portuguese and Spaniards.<sup>61</sup>

The demand from Europe is growing not only for the noble species, but also for other fish to be reproduced into fish meal and to be integrated into cattle feed. All this is said to create heavy pressure on the Senegalese resources. All Senegalese actors indicate that it should be the central goal of Senegalese fisheries policy to enlarge the added value and to have landings and transformation to take place in Senegal as much as possible.

The export conditions for the Senegalese fisheries are rather difficult. The Senegalese position in the international competition is not very strong, since production costs are high, due to the high level of employment and low per capita production. 600.000 people work in the fisheries sector. Production costs are also high because, the Senegalese banks are not fit to finance this sector and thus are loans expensive. Interest rates are high and high bank guarantees are needed to get finance. Furthermore prices of electricity and water make it difficult for the Senegalese fisheries to compete. Also in this sector there is a general feeling that Senegal has much to loose with the institution of an EPA. Now Senegal is in the advantage, since Asian producer have to pay a 24% customs tax and Senegal nil. It is afraid of loosing this advantage.

Phyto-sanitary regulations present another problem. European regulations are rather strict, but clear. They are not tested under the conditions of a tropic country though. Beside that the way the regulations are put into practice in the Member States might differ quite substantially. Member states should comply with the norms and standards of Brussels is the general feeling. The European Commission itself does not have a control bureau in Senegal. France is quoted to have supported projects in this sector to make it easier to comply with norms and standards.

The negotiations on a new agreement in 2001-2002 were depicted as 'very tough'. Nine rounds of negotiations were necessary to come to an agreement. The EU started the negotiations by demanding a 60% increase in tonnage compared with the former agreement. The Senegalese from their side wanted a reduction in tonnage and fishing zones and no

---

61 See also: FAO, Review of the state of world marine fishery resources. Rome: FAO Technical Paper 457, 2005, pp. 43-48.



fishing rights for European vessels for some socially sensitive (sardinelles) or overexploited species. Other sensitive issues in the negotiations were technical matters as duration of the licences, fishing gear, biological rest periods, boarding of fishermen and controllers, and fishing zones. The negotiations were blocked during six months over Senegalese propositions to change the fishing zones. For the first time Civil Society organisations as organisations of fishermen and of the fish industry took part in the negotiations. This strengthened the negotiating position of the Senegalese, forced the EU to several concessions and led to an agreement on several technical matters. But in the last negotiation round as well the negotiator of the Ministry of Fisheries was substituted and the Civil Society organisations were not welcome anymore. There are suggestions that the EU forced the Senegalese government to change negotiators, as happened later, in 2004, also in the negotiations with Mauritania.

The agreement was finally signed in June 2002 for the period July 2003 until 30 June 2006. It gives 68 European vessels, of which 45 tuna trawlers, the right to fish in Senegalese waters. Additionally some 84.000 tonnes per year of demersal species could be fished, of which a small part should be landed in Senegalese ports. Compensation paid for the agreements amount to 16 million per year (from € 12 million in the former agreement) . This was far less than what Senegal originally demanded. € 3 million of that amount is reserved for special activities to foster sustainable fisheries (€ 500,000), for security in artisanal fisheries (€ 500,000), for research (€ 500,000) and for inspection and control (€ 700,000).<sup>62</sup>

Criticisms on the agreement focus on four aspects. The first is that the compensation that the EU pays is only for a small part reserved (€ 3 million) in the fisheries sector in research and training. The 'décaissement' of these projects is very slow, because there are rather strict rules on counterpart funds. The Ministry of Finance is said to use the existence of these special funds to curtail the Ministry of Fisheries organisation complain that two years after the signing of the agreement the Senegalese government did not start any project yet for the development of the fisheries sector. Several organisations indicate that the Senegalese government lacks a strategy for the development of the sector. Organisations of fishermen and industrialists indicate that in their opinion a major part of the compensation that the EU pays, should be invested in the fisheries sector. The EU does finance also, together with the French AFD, the project PAPA Sud which is meant to promote a better quality of fish products.

The second point of critique is that the agreement also gives access to fishing grounds and species which are overexploited, like most wanted species as the thiof. These are species which are of interest in particular for Senegalese fishermen and are in majority exported to France to be consumed by African immigrants. Access to the coastal zone for European vessels is thus seen as incoherent with European development cooperation policy but also with those of sustainable fisheries. These zones should have been left for artisanal fisheries to have these more involved in the export game.

The so-called 'compagnies mixtes' are seen also as a way to transfer overcapacity in Europe to a developing country. But the situation is complex here also, since it are not alone European ship-owners which create this type of companies. Also some Koreans are reported to be involved, in particular in the 'bateaux de rammassage', which go out with a number of pirogues on their deck to fish also in Mauritanian waters.

In general, by all Senegalese actors, the fishing agreement is seen as a commercial agreement, with little to no comprehension for the sustainability of Senegalese fisheries or for development goals. It is indicated however that the 'pauses biologique' in September and October in the Senegalese case are well defined, but at the same time people interviewed pointed at the Mauritania Agreement in which after quite some pressure from the European side the biological rest period is October and November, with the effect that European vessels

---

62 Règlement (CE) No. 2323/2002, Journal Officiel des Communautés européennes, 349/4, 24 Décembre 2002.

can stay in the region to fish. It should be noted that the biological rest period in the former agreement was only optional. The more general comment here is that it is still very difficult for Senegal, with its limited technical capabilities,<sup>63</sup> to control European (and other third countries') vessels.

The general conclusion then is that the European Commission is forced by the European Parliament which follows this dossier quite closely, to use a 'langue du bois', when it present the fisheries agreements. The Commission promotes them as 'partnership agreements' while in effect and on basis of a closer analysis they are purely commercial and negotiated in an intransigent way.

#### **4.5 MIGRATION**

Human Rights organisations criticise the European immigration policies. They are supported in this by employer's federations. These stress that it is very difficult to get visa to enter Europe. It is said to be much easier to get visa under immigration rules of the USA. It is seen as an incoherence that, at the one hand, European development cooperation has as a major goal to foster trade of developing countries, and that at the other hand it is very difficult for businessmen to get access to the European market. The incoherence is said to be even deeper, since European businessmen have all the possibilities they want to discover the Senegalese market and to build business relation in Senegal. Furthermore travellers from Senegal are forced to pay € 40 for life insurance – to repatriate them in case of death, but this fee is not repaid if you decide not to travel or if your visa is refused.

#### **4.6 HUMAN RIGHTS**

##### ***HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION***

In the last decade, the European Commission (EC) has signed a number of communications relating to human rights and democratisation, of which the last one was concluded in 2001<sup>64</sup>. This last communication, called *the European Union's Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratization in Third Countries* is based on the universality and indivisibility of human rights – civil, political, economic, social and cultural – as re-established during the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993. The protection of human rights and the promotion of a pluralistic democracy, together with the fight against poverty, will be the European Union's most essential objectives. According to the EU, poverty reduction can only be achieved where there are functioning participatory democracies and accountable governments in place (COM (2001) 252 final). At the same time, globalisation is recognized as a potential danger for the welfare of the world's poorest and most vulnerable groups as they are at the risk of exclusion.

The communication states further that the policies of the EC concerning external relations have to be in compliance with the rights and principles contained in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights which was officially proclaimed at the Nice Summit in December

---

63 It is said that there is only one plain for surveillance, bujt that this is not functioning.

64 The European Union and the External Dimension of Human Rights Policy, COM (95)567 final; The Inclusion of Respect for Democratic Principles and Human Rights in Agreements between the Community and Third Countries, COM (95) 216 final; Democratisation, the Rule of Law, Respect for Human Rights and Good Governance: the Challenge of the Partnership between the European Union and the ACP States, COM (98) 146 final and Countering Racism, Xenophobia and Anti-Semitism in the Candidate Countries, COM (99) 256 final. Communication on EU Election Observation and Assistance COM (2000) 191 final.

2000, since this will promote coherence between the EU's internal and external approaches. The crosscutting nature of human rights and democratisation asks for the mainstreaming of human rights through development and other official assistance. In order to support this, the communication has recognized three areas where the Commission can operate effectively: Through promoting coherent and consistent policies, prioritizing human rights by using opportunities offered by political dialogue, trade and external assistance and by adopting the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).

In order to promote a more coherent and consistent EU approach, commission delegations are stimulated to execute on-the-spot co-ordination and a regular two-way exchange of information on EC and member states' co-operation programmes and projects relating tot human rights. Also the Country Strategy Papers are used as a framework in which a systematic analysis of the situation in a country relating tot human rights and democratisation is made. The commission says that in addition to the co-operation programmes, it will try to avoid any negative impact in the formulation of other policies, and even tries to rearrange the policies to have a positive impact. The most effective way of integrating human rights in all EU external policies, so is said, is to establish a positive and constructive dialogue with governments, based on partnership and support. Apart from this the importance of dialogue and consultation with civil society is often stressed.

Also in the Cotonou Agreement, (articles 8, 9, 10 and 11) this dialogue with governments and civil society organizations is stressed as utterly important. The dialogue should cover all the aims and objectives laid down in the Agreement, should contribute to peace, security ad stability and promote a stable and democratic political environment. Respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, and good governance, which underpin the ACP-EU Partnership, will be integrated in all the domestic and international policies of the Partied involved.

### ***HUMAN RIGHTS IN SENEGAL***

The Human Rights situation in Senegal is characterized by a proliferating poverty amongst more than half of the population, a government that is regularly accused of instigating attacks on the premises of opposition parties and a conflict in the Casamance that lasts for already 22 years.

Since its independence at 1960 Senegal opted for a democratic pluralistic system but has known a single party system between 1966 and 1981. Although one of the rare African countries that has not experienced a coup d'état and with a reputation of ethnic tolerance, Senegal nevertheless has a weak state structure with recurrent scandals of corruption and incompetence. Even though the current president Abdoulaye Wade was elected in 2000 in a peaceful way with a majority vote of 60 %, he nowadays finds himself in an uncomfortable position amid growing discontent. Scandals like the 'Joola' case<sup>65</sup> and the threats which were received by the journalist Abdoul Coulibaly after the publication of his critical book about the current government, foster this discontent. In November 2003 thousands of people marched in the capital of Dakar to protest against political violence after a brutal attack on opposition leader Talla Sylla (Social Watch, report 2004).

In the Country Strategy Paper of Senegal (Period 2002-2007) the main problematic political and juridical issues are mentioned. These are the shortcomings of the new constitution that was adopted by referendum in 2001, in which the centralization of power in the hands of the president is still legitimate. Although Senegal has adopted the main juridical

---

65 The Joola was a ferry with a capacity for 550 passengers that sank due to overloading. Originally, the government declared that there were 1100 deaths, whereas the press claimed there had been nearly 2000. After a lot of protests and discontent, the government finally decided to pay compensations to the families of the deceased people.

instruments and the international conventions that should guarantee human rights and individual liberties, these texts are not always adhered to by both the majority of the population and by the juridical system of the country. Furthermore, the Senegalese administration is characterized by political lobbies, lack of information for the users of public services, corruption, bureaucratization, formalism and impunity. In the judicial system, the independence of the magistrates is questionable and there is a shortage of good educated judicial personnel. The national parliament is considered to be an ancient institution with insufficiencies that have to do with the weak capacity of the members, the lack of supporting employees, the poor state of the material resources and logistics, and inadequate information and communication systems. The new 'Programme National de Bonne Gouvernance' installed in January 2003, is set up to ameliorate the quality and effectiveness of the Parliament.

The necessary and foreseen implication of civil society organizations in decentralization processes and processes of economic and social development is hampered by their lack of information and weak management capacities. Although the Council of Support for NGO's in Senegal, (CONGAD<sup>66</sup>) has negotiated on behalf of the 316 official Senegalese NGO's an adequate regulation that facilitates their participation in public affairs, this same participation is in most cases limited to formal meetings in an atmosphere of mutual mistrust. The NGO's blame the state for only consulting them in the reflection stage and not involving them in the monitoring and evaluation phase, thereby seriously limiting their civil control. At the same time, the relation between the administration and the civil society actors has improved in the process of drawing up the PRSP and the Country Strategy Paper for the program of the 9<sup>th</sup> FED.

The syndicates have problems because of their diversity. Fourteen different syndicates don not represent all employees in Senegal which hampers their overall negotiating power. The Senegalese television is still in the hands of the state and the written press is until now not well protected with respect to their independence. Last year two women journalists with *Radio Manore FM*, a community radio station for women, were assaulted by riot police force from the groupement mobile d'intervention (GMI) while covering a police operation involving the forcible removal of inhabitants of an illegal settlement in Dakar. Also in July of this year, the publications director of independent newspaper *The Quotidien* was jailed. Another problem concerning the press is that the majority of journalists lack a certain standard of professionalism.

Senegal has known a conflict in the Casamance for more than 20 years, which has a negative effect on the stability of its neighbouring countries. About 50.000 people in Casamance have been forced to flee their homes as a result of this low-level guerrilla war. Despite peace agreements signed by the government and the MFDC (Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance) in 2001, the attacks by armed members of the MFDC continued. Several civilians were killed or arrested during military operations and journalists were beaten or expelled in an attempt to challenge freedom of expression. Although president Abdoulaye Wade made serious attempts to restore peace in the Casamance, the armed wing of the MFDC was not involved and these hardliners have become more unruly and fractious (IRINnews.org). The European Commission (Initiative Européenne pour la Démocratie et les Droits des Hommes) and the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs have supported the *Programme de Coopération Juridique et Judiciaire Casamance* executed by the FIDH (Fédération Intenationale des Ligues des droits de l'Homme) with the objective to ameliorate the human rights situation in Casamance and the rest of the region, especially Guinée-Bissau.

---

66 Conseil des Organisations Non Gouvernementales d'Appui au Développement

According to the human rights organizations interviewed (RADDHO<sup>67</sup> and Forum Civil) there are coherences and incoherences in the human rights approach of the European Commission. In the context of the Cotonou Agreement the enforcement of civil society is stimulated. Many organizations that are set up by the state need time to mature, to grow as an organization, to set up systems and procedures. RADDHO for example, has grown quickly and needed good coordination. The EU supported their programme but because the organisation used money for the employment of a coordinator which was not explicitly mentioned in the programme proposal, RADDHO had to reimburse part of their EU funds. RADDHO thinks it is incoherent that civil organizations are set up in order to participate in public affairs but that there is no money available for the institutional support of these organizations. There are many small grass-root organizations, like women organizations, that are in dire need of this kind of support. On the other hand RADDHO remarks that since the conclusion of the Cotonou Agreement there is a growing interest of the EU for civil society. Their relation with the state and with the EU is developing, and as soon as their performance is strengthened, democracy is reinforced. RADDHO finds it remarkable however that although there were many rural organizations involved in the process of drawing up the PIN (Programme Indicatif National), their interests are not taken into account and agriculture is left out of the programme.

The Forum Civil is satisfied with the negotiation platform that the EU has set up with the ACP countries in order to discuss and write their documents, all non state actors are involved and heard. The problem this organization mentions is the lack of monitoring and impact studies related to the objective that is set, the fight against poverty. At this moment, the NGOs are involved in a process of formulating indicators that are meant to measure the policy impact. According to this organization, the effectiveness of the EU policy is not evident. There is no real choice in development models that is offered by the EU. The only choice there is, is the liberal model. The Forum Civil says the only choice is has is to negotiate about liberalization and access to the world market. They don't think that this is a good choice for Senegal. To privatize the most essential sectors like the water sector and electricity is detrimental for the country: prices will go up whereas services and quality will drop. Also in the agricultural sector the incorporation in the world market means an increasing dependence in many sectors while European subsidies still exist. They give the example of the cotton production. According to the Forum Civil it will take at least another four years before subsidies are really abandoned. In the last ten years West African production has increased with 40 % while income out of cotton production has decreased with 30 % as a result of the subsidies.

Another incoherence according to both RADDHO and the Forum Civil are the European funding procedures, which are complicated and difficult to match. As a result it is questionable if there are many organizations that can make use of the available European funds.

RADDHO thinks that the liberalized global circulation of goods and services as foreseen in the Cotonou Agreement does not apply to the free circulation of people. Whereas European people have the freedom to travel to African countries without any restriction, Senegalese and other African citizens are restricted by strict visa conditions. In order to obtain a visa to travel to Europe, a Senegalese has to effect a life assurance which will cost him 40 €. When the visa is not issued or the person is not travelling for one of the other reason, the money of the life assurance is not reimbursed. RADDHO calls this a '*Liberalisme Sauvage*' because of its discriminating effect on African traders that want to do a market research of want to promote their products on the European market.

---

67 RADDHO: Rencontre Africaine pour la Defence des Droits de l'Homme

Regarding the conditionality of European aid, RADDHO has the opinion that in case of violations of human rights, political dialogue must be the first option. Also the dialogue with social organizations and NGOs must be deepened. The population must be supported in order to be in opposition to their own president, to form a countervailing power. There are however also situations where European aid must be postponed, like in countries as Guinea Conakry and Togo. In those severe situations, the withdrawal of aid will be the only solution to stop the regime.

## **CHAPTER 6: TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF POLICY COHERENCE**

What steps should be taken to use the CSPs as an instrument to foster policy coherence with regard to development cooperation? In principle, the CSPs could be one of the main instruments in this respect: they have the potential to from the ground detect and analyse coherence issues, they can function as an early warning and a monitoring system. For CSPs to function as an important instrument to foster policy coherence, would imply five things:

1. analysis of policy coherence should be considered as a very serious component of European development cooperation policy and thus in a consistent and elaborate way be integrated into the CSPs;
2. out of the analysis of Internal (1) and (2) and External coherence issues a plan of action should follow, with an indication of the urgency of incoherencies presented and an indication of steps that should be taken;
3. CSPs should be 'living documents' to be adapted and changed 'on the road', not documents that are buried in the cabinets and evaluated four years after;
4. staff of the delegations should be trained to be able to make an analysis of coherence issues or to be able to contract and instruct researchers in complex cases;
5. it would mean that DG Relex and DG Dev will not hesitate to put coherence issues on the agenda, not in a confrontational way, but addressing issues, opening the debate, making policy options transparent.

A framework for analysis of policy coherence could be an important tool to promote and help this type of policy coherence analysis. Such a framework should pose some of the main questions and indicate methodologies to analyse policy coherence issues. It should be stated however that such a framework is not an everlasting tool, not a hammer or a pair of pincers. Since problems of incoherence change over the days, months and years, since markets are lively and capricious, problems of incoherence might change by night. It means that also this framework is instrument that should be updated regularly.

What is important is that the framework should embody a conceptual framework that is clear and understandable. The framework that is presented here starts from the three types of coherence presented in the first chapter: Internal (1), Internal (2) and External coherence. These three types of coherence offer the framework to arrange potential problems of incoherence.

A second step is to define the main issues or topics and a third to formulate research questions. Derived from the previous chapters several topics make themselves knowable:

\* Internal (1) coherence:

- conflicts between policy objectives, in particular between general social and economic goals and the goal of poverty reduction
- conflicts between implementation schedules and local necessities
- screening on the transversal themes of gender, environment and good governance

\* Internal (2) coherence:

- conflicts between foreign policy concerns and considerations (security, human rights) and development cooperation objectives

- strategic interests of the EU (Member States) clashing with development objectives
- international trade policies versus development goals and objectives
- political conditionality and good governance principles colliding with local ownership or humanitarian considerations

\* External coherence:

- the CAP in conflict with goals and objectives of development cooperation policy
- the CFP clashing with development cooperation policy's objectives
- the GSP offering preferential treatment without environmental screening
- preferential treatment under the GSP for products which are not screened on labour standards
- migration and entrance policies in collision with development objectives.

It is clear that most of the topics defined are described here in a form of a contradiction, as a collision or a clash. What should be clear from chapter 1, is that in many policy decisions there are conflicting interests and that policy making is often looking for second best solutions and for compensation. It thus might be that certain interests are not properly weighed or valued. The objective of a section in CSPs on policy coherence thus should be to create clarity and transparency on the interests involved by naming them and analysing them.

Most of the topics described above can be found back in the framework offered in Table 6.1. In this table also examples of research questions are given. In principle these research questions should address as correctly as possible the different interests at stake or the potential collision between several topics. The research question should cover also the theme or domain in such a way that different stakeholders could easily be identified.

The research methodologies involved will be at first content analysis of main policy documents, resolutions and other legal texts. They will contain screening of relevant public sources as newspapers, websites and other media. If deeper analysis is needed, then interviews with the main stakeholders will be necessary. In that case interview guides need to be developed to cover the main issues at stake. In some cases research team might need to be engaged and then the conceptualisation of Terms of Reference is important.

It is advised that also an early warning system will be developed to indicate the urgency of incoherencies. A so-called 'traffic light system' could serve as such a system. The colours would have the following meaning:

Red = needs immediate action and reporting; thorough assessment needs to be made; on basis of this assessment actions should be undertaken to solve the problem or to look for compensatory measures

Orange/yellow = must be reported; further analysis needed; close monitoring necessary; if situation develops traffic light needs to turn to red or green

Green = no incoherence, or incoherence well known and addressed; damage of incoherence small; monitoring only at intervals

The 'traffic light system' thus involves steps for further assessment and analysis and implies instructions for reporting.

Staff of the Delegation, involved in writing CSPs, should be trained in analysing and writing about (in)coherence issues. Such a policy coherence workshop could contain the following elements:

- an explanation of the concept of policy coherence, its history and background
- an explanation of the different types of (in)coherence



- an overview of the place of policy coherence within EU development policies, those of the Member States and within the DAC
- a training in making a first inventory of coherence issues
- a training in analysing concrete example of a coherence case
- a review of some topical (future?) coherence questions
- a training in writing a Terms of Reference for an analysis of a coherence issue

Such a workshop would take three days and will be hands on, meaning that an active participation of the staff present will be stimulated.

It is recommended to organise these workshops on a regional basis because comparable coherence issues might arise easier and this would lead to a more common or integrated type of analysis. The workshops should be organised in the region itself, because that would make analysis of real-life local examples easier. It would also limit the number of participants to an advised maximum of ten to twelve.

It is recommended also to start these trainings with two regional workshops in Spring 2005 (MEDA and West-Africa could be the first regions for this test). After an evaluation of these workshops, a more definite outline for the other workshops could be developed.

**TABLE 6.1**  
**DETECTING AND RESEARCHING INCOHERENCE:**  
**A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS**

<b>Internal (1) Coherence</b>			
<i>Topic</i>	<i>Questions</i>	<i>Methodology</i>	<i>Urgency</i>
Relation programme to goals and objectives	Do the proposed activities fit into the goals and objectives of EU development cooperation? Do proposed activities have a (potential) negative effect in relation to one of the objectives?	Precise analysis of programme activities in relation to different objectives.  Screening of projects and programmes on effects on poverty and equity.	Mostly orange
Internal logic of programme	Are the proposed activities in balance with the goals and objectives of EU development policy? Are there any conflicting goals and objectives?	Analyse the weight of the activities in relation to the specific goals. Look at targeting of policies. Analyse the goals and objectives on a more general level (economic development, political development) in relation to the more specific objectives (poverty reduction).	Mostly orange
External logic of programme	Does the programme align with that of the recipient government? Does the programme align with those of other EU member states donors?	Analyse the programme in relation to the PRSP or other government investment plans; analyse the programme in relation to the activities sponsored by the member states	Mostly green
Relation between objectives and implementation	Do the activities take place within the planned time? Are the instruments adequate and efficient?	Analyse the programme activities and instruments in a relation between means and outcomes. Monitor activities in a realistic but also seasonal calendar.	Mostly orange

Transversal themes	Are poverty, gender and environmental considerations taken into account in the programme?	Screening of the programme on the way it addresses 1. poverty; 2. gender; 3. environmental problems	Mostly orange or red
<b>Internal (2) Coherence</b>			
<b><i>Topic</i></b>	<b><i>Questions</i></b>	<b><i>Methodology</i></b>	<b><i>Urgency</i></b>
Democratisation	Are political and civic rights sufficiently protected by the government?	Ongoing contacts with (international) NGOs, like Amnesty International; Follow local media.	From green to red
Human Rights	Are human rights respected by the government?	Ongoing contacts with (international) NGOs, like Amnesty International; Interviews with lawyers and local NGOs. Follow local media. Visits to prisons and courts of justice.	From green to red
International trade: imports	Are European exports disturbing local production?	Market analysis. Interviews with local producers and producers' organisations. Visits to markets, enterprises and shops.	In some cases red; mostly green
International trade: exports	What kind of obstacles or barriers do local products have at entering the European market?	Interviews with exporters, exporting firms and exporters' organisations.	Mostly orange, sometimes red
Security (1)	What are the open or slumbering conflicts and how are they influenced by EU or EU Member States' policies?	Analysis of conflicts and their perpetuation. Interviews with inflicted communities. Analysis of arms trade. Analysis of Member States' positions with regard to conflicts.	Mostly orange, sometimes red.
Security (2)	What security interests of the EU or its member states are prevalent and of influence on the development cooperation relation?		

<b>External Coherence</b>			
<i>Topic</i>	<i>Questions</i>	<i>Methodology</i>	<i>Urgency</i>
Trade: imports / Common Agricultural Policy	Which (agricultural) products do have a disturbing effect on local production?	Interviews with local producers and producers' organisations. Visits to markets, enterprises and shops.	In some cases red
Fisheries	What effects do fishing agreements have on the local fish stock?	Biological research. Interviews with fishermen and fishing enterprises. Visits to markets.	Depending on fish species: red
Migration	What kind of obstacles do people have visiting or migrating to Europe? What effects does migration have on the local economy and labour market?	Interviews with students and businessmen on visa policies. Study of labour market, shortages and underemployment; brain drain; social and economic research on (effects of) remittances	Orange
Environment (external)	What kind of European export products are entering the local market causing a direct environmental threat?	Analyse local market and imports; make an environmental impact assessment.	In some cases red
Environment (internal)	Of which products exported freely or with preferential access to the European market does the production have a negative effect on the environment?	Environmental impact assessment of production of specific goods; interviews with local environmental NGOs.	Several cases or products red

## ANNEXES

**ANNEX 1:**  
**PEOPLE INTERVIEWED IN BRUSSELS**

Anders BERLIN, External Relations Directorate-General  
Gianfranco BOCHICCHIO, Desk Maroc, External Relations Directorate-General  
Peter BOSCH, Unit Immigration and Asylum, Directorate-General Justice and Home Affairs  
Maurizio CALDARONE, Desk Maroc, External Relations Directorate-General  
Fabrizio DONATELLA, Bilateral Agreements Unit, Directorate-General Fisheries  
Leonello GABRICI, Maghreb Unit, External Relations Directorate-General  
Karin GARDES, Interservice Quality Support Group, Development Directorate-General  
Anna JOHANSSON, Bilateral Agreements South Atlantic, Indian Ocean and South Pacific,  
Directorate-General Fisheries  
Walter KENNIS, Trade and Regional Integration Unit, Development Directorate-General  
Paul MALIN, Relations with EU and ACP Institutions, Civil Society and NGOs Unit,  
Development Directorate-General  
Holger STANDERiSKJÖLD, Maghreb Unit, Directorate-General for Trade  
Norbert PROBST, Environment and Rural Development Unit, Development Directorate-  
General  
Christophe RAMES, Co-ordinator Barcelona Process, Directorate-General for Trade  
Rob ROZENBURG, Development Directorate-General  
Philippe VIALATTE, Environment and Rural Development Unit, Development Directorate-  
General

Lars BREDAL, Permanent Representation of Denmark to the European Union  
Peter LANDYMORE, Permanent Representation of the United Kingdom to the European  
Union  
Paul YMKERS, Permanent Representation of the Netherlands to the European Union

**ANNEX 2:**  
**PEOPLE INTERVIEWED MOROCCO**

Sean DOYLE, Chef de Délégation - Délégation de la Commission Européenne  
Olivier RUYSSSEN, Premier Conseiller - Délégation de la Commission Européenne

Jaouad EL HIMDI, Directeur des Affaires Consulaires et Sociales - Ministère des Affaires  
Etrangères et de la Coopération

Mohamed MARGAOUI, Secrétaire Général du Département du Transport – Ministère de  
l'Équipement et du Transport

Najiba BELHADFA, Chargée des Etudes - Ministère du Transport et de la Marine Marchande

Mohamed Najib LAHLOU, Directeur de l'Habitat Social et des Affaires Sociales – Ministère  
Délégué Chargé de l'Habitat et de l'Urbanisme

Hassan BENABDERRAZIK, Secrétaire Général – Ministère de l'Agriculture et du  
Développement Rural

Tijani RHANMI, Secrétaire Général - Ministère des Pêches Maritimes

Jamal Eddine EL JAMALI, Directeur de l'Industrie - Ministère de l'Industrie, du Commerce  
et des Télécommunications

Ahmed BOUHAOULI, Secrétaire Général chargé du Département de l'Environnement –  
Ministère de l'Aménagement du Territoire, de l'Eau et de l'Environnement

Mohamed Tawfik MOULINE, Directeur de la Politique Economique Générale – Ministère  
des Finances et de la Privatisation

Abdeltif LOUDYI, Secrétaire Général – Ministère des Finances et de la Privatisation

Abdelchakour RAÏS, Adjoint au Directeur du Budget – Ministère des Finances et de la  
Privatisation

Driss BENHIMA, Directeur Général - Agence de Développement des Provinces du Nord

Inane BENYAICH, Chef du Département Coopération Internationale - Agence de  
Développement des Provinces du Nord

Hamid FAROUKI, Directeur du Développement - Agence de Développement des Provinces du  
Nord

El Hassan BENMOUSSA, Secrétaire Général, Secrétariat d'État de la Formation  
Professionnelle - Ministère de l'Emploi, des Affaires Sociales et de la Solidarité

Mouhcine AYOUCHE, Directeur délégué - Confédération Générale des Entreprises du Maroc  
(CGEM)

Mohamed LAHLOU, Président de la Commission Compétitivité de l'Entreprise, -  
Confédération Générale des Entreprises au Maroc (CGEM)

Abdelhamid BOUSTA, Secrétaire Général - Association Marocaine des Exportateurs  
(ASMEX)

Ahmed AZIRAR, économiste conseiller - Association Marocaine des Exportateurs (ASMEX)

Taya BENMLIH, Trésorier - Association Marocaine des Exportateurs (ASMEX)

Nadia SALAH, rédacteur en chef - l'Économiste

Larbi JAIDI, Président – Fondation Abderrahim Bouabi

Ali BOUABID, Secrétaire Général – Fondation Abderrahim Bouabi

Rabea NACIRI, présidente - Association Démocratique des Droits au Maroc (ADFM)

Abdelhamid AMINE. Président - Association Marocaine des Droits Humains (AMDH)

Abdelkhalek Benzekri, Association Marocaine des Droits Humains (AMDH)

Abdallah OUALLADIH, Président - Organisation Marocaine des Droits d'Homme (OMDH)

Khalid NACIRI, Organisation Marocaine des Droits d'Homme (OMDH)

Omar AZZIMAN, Président - Conseil Consultatif des Droits de l'Homme

Ali BARGACH, Chef du département de la coopération - Conseil Consultatif des Droits de l'Homme

Habiba ZAHI, Présidente - Association Marocaine des Droits des Femmes (AMDF)

Mme NACICA, Association Marocaine des Droits des Femmes (AMDF)

Abderrahmane ZAHI, Secrétaire Général - Fondation Hassan II pour les marocains résidant à l'étranger

Alain ANDRÉ, Directeur Général de la Chambre Française de Commerce et d'Industrie

Patric COLLIER, Président de la Commission des Relations avec l'UE, Chambre Française de Commerce et d'Industrie

Juan PEÑA, Chef du Bureau de Coopération – Ambassade d'Espagne



**ANNEX 3:**  
**PEOPLE INTERVIEWED SENEGAL**

Jozias BLOK, Conseiller Développement Rural, Délégation de la Commission Européenne  
Olivier BRETECHE, Chargé de Programmes, Délégation de la Commission Européenne  
Boundaw CISSÉ, Chargé de Programmes, Délégation de la Commission Européenne  
Seynabou DIALLO, Chargé de Programmes, Délégation de la Commission Européenne  
Alfonso CABRILLO LOSADA, Chargé de Programmes, Délégation de la Commission Européenne

Marc FRANCK, Chef de Mission, Mission de la Coopération du Grand-Duché de Luxembourg  
Elisabeth LEINER, Chef du Bureau, Ambassade d'Autriche  
Philippe REMY, Conseiller Régional Développement rural – Environnement, Service de Coopération, Ambassade de France  
Ousman SANÉ, Economist, USAID

Marie Joséphine DIALLO, Secrétaire Général de l'Assemblée Nationale  
Daouda DIOP, Directeur de la Direction de la Coopération Economique et Financière, Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances  
Mamadou FAYE, Directeur de la Dette et de l'Investissement, Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances  
Mbaye Ndoumbe GUEYE, Directeur de la Planification de la Réforme de l'Education, Ministère de l'Education  
Ndiaga GUEYE, Directeur des Pêches Maritimes, Ministère des Pêches  
Bssirou GUISSÉ, Directeur des Travaux Publics, Ministère des Infrastructures, de l'Équipement et des Transports  
Abdoulaye Racine KANE, Délégué au Management Public, Présidence de la République  
Aly LÔ, Président de l'Union des Associations d'Élus Locaux  
Eric LE BRUN, Conseiller Technique, Ministère des Pêches  
Déthié NDIAYE, Directeur de l'Administration, Ministère de la Justice  
Ibrahima NDIAYE, Direction du Budget, Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances  
Magatte NDOYE, Coordonnateur CENEX, Ministère du Commerce  
Thierno Seydou NIANE, Coordonnateur du Cellule de Suivi du Programme de Lutte contre la Pauvreté, Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances  
Mamour OUSMANE, Chef de la Division des Commissions Mixtes, Direction de la Coopération Economique et Financière, Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances  
Moustapha TAMBADOU, Conseiller Technique au Cabinet du Ministre de la Culture et de la Communication

Taoufik Ben ABDALLAH, président de ENDA TM SYSPRO 2 (Système et Prospective)  
Dougoutigui COULIBALY, Directeur du Groupement des Armateurs et des Industriels de la Pêche au Sénégal  
Maimouna Isabelle DIENG, Directrice des Programmes, Association Senegalaise pour le Bien-être Familiale  
Mbagnick DIOP, Président du Mouvement des Entreprises du Sénégal  
Moctar FALL, Coordonnateur Général Adjoint du Forum Civil, Section Sénégalaise de Transparency International

Pape Nalla FALL, Président Commission Économique, Conseil National du Patronat  
Samba GUEYE, Fenagie/Pêche (Groupements d'Intérêt Economique de Pêche)/ CNPS  
(Collectif National des Pêcheurs Artisanaux du Sénégal)  
Mor Talla KANE, Directeur Exécutif, Confédération Nationale des Employeurs du Sénégal  
Emmanuel NDIONE, ENDA Sahel et Afrique de l'Ouest (GRAF)  
Mouhamed MBODJI, Coordonnateur Général du FORUM Civil, Section Sénégalaise de  
Transparency International  
M. Abouba MERBOUTI, Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme  
Ebrima Sall, Administrateur Principal de Programme, CODESRIA  
Ibrahima SALL, Directeur Régional, UICN  
Omoy SARR, Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme  
Allasane SECK, Rencontre Africaine pour la Défense des Droits de l'Homme

**ANNEX 4: TABLE: COHERENCE IN COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPERS**

**MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Number of lines on coherence</b>	<b>Internal (1), Internal (2), External coherence topics indicated</b>	<b>Topics</b>	<b>Urgency signalled</b>
Algeria	12	External	Commerce, Transport, Environment, Rule of Law	-
Egypt	0	-	-	-
Jordan	29	Internal (2)	Trade, Development	-
Lebanon	19	Internal (2)	Trade, Development	-
Morocco	8	External	Trade, Transport and Emigration	-
Syria	16	Internal (2)	Economy, Development	-
Tunisia	12	External	Commerce, Transport, Rule of Law	-

## CENTRAL AND LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES

Country	Number of lines on coherence	Internal (1), Internal (2), External coherence topics indicated	Topics	Urgency signalled
Bolivia	41	Internal 2 and External	Development, Environment, Trade, Drugs, Conflict Prevention	-
Argentina	0	-	-	-
Brazil	102	External	Political Dialogue, Trade, Agriculture, Fisheries, Science, Environment, ICT, Transport, Energy (Coherent Policy Mix)	-
Chile	0	0	Development Policy is subordinate, main policies are: Trade, Agriculture, Fisheries, Science, Environment, ICT, Transport, Energy	-
Colombia	69	External	Peace (through social and economic development), decrease in Narco-trafficking (through alternative development), Export (conflicts with sanitary and phytosanitary standards in EU), Agriculture (CAP)	-
Costa Rica	22	Internal 2 and External	Trade, Development, <b>CAP and Sanitary standards (Consumer protection)-are believed to be detrimental</b> , Internal Market, Competition Policy, Research and Development Policy, Environmental Policy, Justice and Home Affairs Policy and Information Society Policy	-
Ecuador	53	Internal 2 and External	Development, Environment, Trade (WTO banana dispute), Justice and Home Affairs/ Immigration, Conflict Prevention	-
El Salvador	15 (consistency)	Internal 2 and External	Trade and Development, CAP, Health and Plant health policy (consumer protection), Internal market, Competition policy, Research and Development policy, Environmental policy, Conflict-prevention, Justice and Home-affairs, Information society	-
Guatemala	15	Internal 2 and	Trade and Development, CAP, Health and Plant health policy (consumer	-

		External	protection), Internal Market, Competition policy, Research and Development policy, Environmental policy, Conflict prevention, Justice and Home affairs, Information Society	
Honduras	12	External	Trade, Agriculture, Health and consumer protection, Internal Market, Competition. <b>Problems with CAP, SPG Drugs and Sanitary and Phytosanitary controls</b>	-
Mexico	18	External	Trade, CAP, Sanitary and Phytosanitary control policy –consumer protection, Internal Market, Competition, Research and Development and Information Society. <b>Problems with CAP and Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures- are believed to be a protection measure.</b>	-
Nicaragua	9	External	Trade, Agriculture, Health and Consumer Safety, Internal Market, Competition, Justice, Information Society, Research, Conflict Prevention. <b>Concerns about: GSP Drugs Component and Consumer Protection Policy</b>	-
Panama	21	Internal 2 and External	Trade and Development, CAP, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Control Policy- consumer protection, Internal Market, Competition Policy, R & D Policy, Environmental Policy, Justice and Home Affairs Policy and Information Society Policy. <b>CAP is believed to be detrimental as are the Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures</b>	-
Paraguay	90	External	Trade, Single Market Policy, <b>Health and Consumer Protection Policy (is believed to be protectionist)</b> , Science, Environment, Information Society, Transport, Energy, Competition	-
Peru	44	Internal 2 and External	Environment, Trade and Development, <b>Consumer Protection (causes difficulties for Peruvian export)</b> , Drugs and Conflict Prevention	-
Uruguay	100	External	Trade, Agriculture, Single Market Policy, Health and Consumer Protection Policy (veterinary and phytosanitary measures), Fisheries, Science, Environment, Transport, Information Society, Energy, Competition <b>(coherent policy mix).</b>	-
Venezuela	75	External	Emergency Aid, Trade, Energy, Environment, Drugs, Conflict Prevention, Technology, Phytosanitary Measures	-

## ACP COUNTRIES

<b>Country</b>	<b>Number of lines on coherence</b>	<b>Internal (1), Internal (2), External coherence topics indicated</b>	<b>Topics</b>	<b>Urgency signalled</b>
Angola	37	Internal 1 and External	Trade, Economy, Good Governance, Migration, Fisheries	-
Antigua and Barbuda	17	Internal 1	Development Cooperation, Trade, Fisheries, Agriculture, Environment	-
The Bahamas	28	Internal 1 and External	Development Cooperation, Human Rights, Gender, Democratisation and Environment, Trade, Fisheries, Agriculture, Research etc.	-
Barbados	19	Internal 1	Health, HIV/AIDS, Population	-
Belize	46	Internal 1 and External	Human Rights, Democratisation, Gender, Environment, Conflict Prevention, Communicable Diseases, Biodiversity, Sustainable Development, Information Society, Trade, Fisheries, Agriculture (Banana-Industry), Research	-
Benin	18	-	-	-
Botswana	39	Internal 1 and External	Development Cooperation, Diamonds, Beef, Health and Quality Requirements, Livestock (Concerns have been expressed concerning the coherence of the EU's agriculture and consumer health policies with its development cooperation in Botswana)	-
Burkina Faso	23	Internal 1 and External	Commerce, Rural Development, Food Security, Infrastructure, Human Rights, Democratisation, Rule of Law	-
Burundi	56	Internal 1 and	Sustainable Economic and Social Development, Poverty Reduction,	-

		External	Democratisation, Conflict-Prevention, Human Rights, Migration, Export of traditional goods (Tea, Coffee and Cotton) and non-traditional goods (Hortofruticoles)	
Cameroon	68	Internal 1 and External	3 types of communal instruments: 1) Budgetary lines: Democratisation, Human Rights, Environment, Co-financing with NGO's, improvement of competitiveness of banana-sector, 2) Interventions of European Investment Bank: Private and Financial Sector Development (energy, water, telecommunications, transport, and agro-industry), 3) Regional Cooperation: movement (circulation) of personnel and merchandise to improve economy and integrate in World-Trade	-
Cape Verde	53	Internal 1 and External	Development, Fisheries, Banana-industry	-
Central African Republic	23	Internal 1 and External	Poverty Reduction and Sustainable Development, Transport, Health, Conflict Prevention, Regional Integration, Good Governance, Rule of Law	-
Chad	-	-	-	-
Comoro Islands	24 (consistency)	Internal and External	Decentralisation, Commercial Policy, Sustainable Development (education and capacity building)	-
Congo Brazzaville	0	-	-	-
Congo Kinshasa	0	-	-	-
Cook Islands	24	Internal 1 and External	Development Cooperation Policy, Trade, Fisheries, Agriculture, Environment, Gender Mainstreaming and Good Governance	-
Djibouti	17	Internal 1 and External	3 types of communal instruments: 1) Budgetary lines: Co-financing with NGO's, Human Rights and Democratisation, HIV-AIDS, Post-Conflict Rehabilitation 2) Interventions of European Investment Bank: Private Sector Development through financial resources, 3) Regional Cooperation: infrastructure, conflict prevention, conservation of natural resources and economic integration	-
Dominica	11 (consistency)	Internal 1 and External	Development, Poverty Reduction, Infrastructure, Agriculture (Banana-industry), Tourism	-
Dominican Republic	41	Internal 1 and External	Health, Institutional Reinforcement, Development Cooperation / Poverty Reduction, Trade, Fisheries, Environment, (Primary) Education	-

Equatorial Guinea	16	Internal 1 and External	3 types of communal instruments: 1) Budgetary lines: Co-financing with NGO's, Human Rights and Democratisation, 2) Interventions of European Investment Bank: Private Sector Development through financial resources, 3) Regional Cooperation: movement (circulation) of personnel and merchandise to improve economy and integrate in World-Trade	-
Eritrea	-	-	-	-
Ethiopia	20	Internal 1 and External	Development Policy, Trade, Agriculture, Environment, Civil Service, Judiciary Reforms, Capacity Building, Civil Society and Private Sector	-
Fiji Islands	43	Internal 1 and External	Sustainable Development, Poverty Alleviation, Education, Health, Gender Mainstreaming, Environment and Good Governance, Democracy and Human Rights,	-
Gabon	28	Internal 1 and External	Private Sector Development, Good Governance, Conservation of natural resources, HIV/AIDS, Infrastructure, Integration, Fisheries, Environment, Culture	-
The Gambia	25	Internal 1 and External	Agriculture, Fishing, Trade and Foreign Policy	-
Ghana	-	-	-	-
Grenada	18	External	Tourism	-
Guinea	26	Internal 1 and External	Development Cooperation, Poverty Alleviation, Fisheries, Human Rights, Democratisation, Rural Development, Private Sector Development, Health and Civil Society	-
Guinea-Bissau	38	Internal 1 and External	Infrastructure, Development, Fisheries, Regional Integration, Conflict-Prevention	-
Guyana	16	Internal 1 and 2 and External	Poverty Eradication, Sustainable Development, Trade, Fisheries, Agriculture and Environment	-
Jamaica	29	Internal 1 and External	Development, Trade, Democratisation, Gender, Environment, Human Rights, <b>Assistance to Sensitive industries: Bananas and Rum</b>	-
Kenya	12	Internal 1	Objectives and goals	
Kiribati	12	Internal 1 and External	Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development, Health, Fisheries	-



Lesotho	17	Internal 1 and External	Development, Garment Manufacture, Gender, Environment, Institution Building, Conflict Prevention	-
Madagascar	38	Internal 1 and External	Rural Development, Agriculture, Fisheries	-
Mali	20	Internal 1	Trade	
Malawi	59	Internal 1	Economic Development, Poverty Alleviation, Institutional Development, Capacity Building	-
Marshall Islands	28	Internal 1 and External	Development Cooperation, Trade, Fisheries, Agriculture, Environment, Gender Mainstreaming, Good Governance	-
Mauritania	30	Internal 1 and External	Development Cooperation, Fisheries	-
Mauritius	12	Internal 1 and External	Development Cooperation, Trade, Fisheries, Agriculture, Environment	-
Micronesia	21	Internal 1 and External	Development Cooperation, Trade, Fisheries, Agriculture, Environment, Gender Mainstreaming, Good Governance	-
Mozambique	(few lines, 5, but no specific paragraph)	-	- (Trade)	-
Namibia	39	Internal 1 and External	Trade, Development, Regional Integration, Agriculture and Fisheries	-
Nauru	18	Internal 1 and External	Development, Trade, Fisheries, Agriculture, Environment, Gender Mainstreaming and Good Governance	-
Niger	28	Internal 1 and External	Development, Trade, Regional Integration, Human Rights, Conflict Prevention	-
Nigeria	0	-	-	-
Niue	14	Internal 1 and External	Development, Trade, Fisheries, Agriculture, Environment, Gender Mainstreaming, Good Governance	-
Palau	24	Internal 1 and External	Development, Trade, Fisheries, Agriculture, Environment, Gender Mainstreaming, Good Governance	-
Papua New Guinea	19	Internal 1 and External	Development, Trade, Fisheries, Agriculture, Environment, Conflict Prevention	-

Rwanda	32	Internal 1 and Internal 2	Development: Civil Society, Human Rights, Conflict resolution and regional Integration	-
Samoa	10	Internal 1 and External	Development, Agriculture, Fisheries, Trade, External Relations	-
Sao Tome e Principe	38	Internal 1 and External	Poverty Reduction, Transport	-
Senegal	71	Internal 1 and External	Development, Infrastructure, Human Rights, Trade, Regional Integration, <b>Fisheries</b>	-
Seychelles	17	Internal 1 and External	Development, Trade, Fisheries, Agriculture	-
Sierra Leone	36	Internal 1	Development, Democracy and Human Rights	-
Solomon Islands	9	Internal 1 and External	Development, Fisheries	-
Somalia	0	-	-	-
South Africa	0	-	-	-
St. Lucia	13	Internal 1	Development: Health	-
St. Kitts and Nevis	15	Internal 1	Development: Education	-
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	20	Internal 1 and External	Development: Education, Trade, Fisheries, Agriculture, Environment, Regional Integration, Human Rights, Democratisation, Gender	-
Sudan	0	-	-	-
Suriname	52	Internal 1 and External	Regional Integration, Private Sector Development, Human Rights and Good Governance	-
Swaziland	14	Internal 1 and External	Development, Trade, Agriculture	-
Tanzania	59	Internal 1 and External	Development, Fisheries, Trade, Agriculture, Environment	-
Tonga	24	Internal 1 and External	Development, Agriculture, Fisheries, Trade, Gender, Environment	-
Trinidad and Tobago	9	Internal 1 and External	Development, Trade, Fisheries, Agriculture, Environment	-
Tuvalu	15	Internal 1 and External	Sustainable development, Poverty Eradication, Fisheries	-

Uganda	0	-	-	-
Vanuatu	16	Internal 1 and External	Development, Trade, Fisheries, Agriculture, Environment	-
Zambia	42	Internal 1 and External	Development, Poverty Alleviation, Trade, Agriculture, Environment	-

## ASIAN COUNTRIES

Country	Number of lines on coherence	Internal (1), Internal (2), External coherence topics indicated	Topics	Urgency signalled
Afghanistan	48	Internal 1	Refugee and IDP return support, Education, Health, Livelihoods, Infrastructure, Trade and Investment	-
Bangladesh	46	Internal 1	Human development in social sectors, Integration in World Economy	-
Bhutan	14	-	-	-
India	32	Internal 1 and External	Elementary Education, Basic health, Environment, Trade and Investment	-
Maldives	-	-	-	-
Nepal	-	-	-	-
Pakistan	43	Internal 1	Human development in social sectors, Trade development, Business facilitation	-
Sri Lanka	21	Internal 2 and External	Support for peace efforts, Post conflict assistance, Economic cooperation	-
Cambodia	-	-	-	-
Indonesia	20	Internal 1 and External	Development Cooperation, Trade, Economic cooperation, Environment policy ( <b>coherence here should be further enhanced, e.g. Palm oil issue</b> )	-

Lao PDR	22	Internal 1	Trade-related technical assistance, Basic education, Health and Government	-
Malaysia	7	External	Trade and Investment, Education and Culture, R&D, Environment, Justice and Home Affairs	-
Philippines	22	Internal 1 and External	Development cooperation, Trade and Agriculture related aspects, Human Rights and Conflict Prevention	-
Thailand	13	External	Trade and Investment, Education and Culture, R&D, Environment, Justice and Home Affairs	-
Vietnam	71	Internal 1 and External	Development Cooperation, Trade (priorities are fully consistent) (also consistent with ASEAN)	-
East Timor	6	Internal 1	Poverty Alleviation, Environment	-
China	18	Internal 1 and External	Poverty, Economic Growth and Trade, Good Governance, Rule of Law	-
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)	36	Internal 1, 2 and External	Technical and Trade cooperation, Humanitarian Assistance, Food Aid, Sustained Political Dialogue	-
Mongolia	-	-	-	-

## EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

<b>Country</b>	<b>Number of lines on coherence</b>	<b>Internal (1), Internal (2), External coherence topics indicated</b>	<b>Topics</b>	<b>Urgency signalled</b>
Armenia	-	-	-	-
Azerbaijan	-	-	-	-
Belarus	-	-	-	-
Georgia	-	-	-	-
Moldova	-	-	-	-
Russian Federation	-	-	-	-
Ukraine	-	-	-	-
Albania	39	Internal 1	Coherence with CARDS and interregional programmes	-
Bosnia and Herzegovina	38	Internal 1 and 2, External	Coherence with CARDS and interregional programmes, highly favourable trade preferences, environment, immigration	-
Croatia	37	Internal 1	Coherence with CARDS and interregional programmes	-
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	55	Internal 1 and 2, External	Coherence with CARDS and interregional programmes Trade policy	-
Serbia and Montenegro*	-	-	-	-

\* No CSP

**ANNEX 5:**  
**LIST OF REFERENCES**

- ADE, 2002, Evaluation of the Relationship between Country Programmes and Fisheries Agreements. Brussels, November.
- Andersen, S./Eliassen, K. (eds.), 1993, *Making policy in Europe: The Europeafication of national policy-making*. London: Sage Publications.
- Arts, K./Dickson, A. (eds.), 2004. *EU Development Cooperation: From model to symbol*. Manschester: Manchester University Press..
- Beraud, P./Perrault, J-L./Sy, O. (dir.), 1999, *Géo-économie de la coopération européenne – De Yaoundé à Barcelone ....* Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose.
- Bossuyt, J. a.o., 2000, *Assessing Trends in EC Development Policy: An Independent Review of the European Commission's Reform Process*. ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 16, Maastricht: ECDPM.
- Blackburn, K. and M. Christensen, 1989, 'Monetary policy and policy credibility. Theories and evidence', *Journal of Economic Literature*, Nashville: American Economic Association, Vol. 27, March, pp. 1-45.
- Blommenstein, H.J. *et al.*, 1984, *Handboek beleidsevaluatie: een multi-disciplinaire benadering* (Policy evaluation handbook: a multidisciplinary approach), Alphen aan den Rijn: Samsom.
- Brandt, H., 1994, *On the effects of EU export refunds on the beef sectors of West African countries*, Berlin: Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik.
- Church, C.H./Phinnemore, D., 1994, *European Union and European Community: A Handbook and Commentary on the 1992 Maastricht Treaties*, London: Prentice Hall/Harvester.
- Cloos, J./Reinesch, G./Vignes, D./Weyland, J., 1994, *Le Traité de Maastricht: Genèse Analyses, Commentaires*. Bruxelles: Bruylant.
- Commission of the European Communities, 1992, 'Declaration on Aspects of Development Co-operation in the Run-up to 2000', Brussels.
- Commission of the European Communities, 1993, 'Common fisheries and marine policy', *Publication of the European Communities*, 16 November 1993, Brussels.
- Commission of the European Communities, 1994, *The Coherence of Community Policies with the Objectives of Development Cooperation Policy*, Brussels.
- Commission of the European Communities, 1994, *The Community and the member states' policy on cooperation with developing countries in the field of health*, Com(94) 77, Brussels.
- Commission of the European Communities, 2000, *The European Community's Development Policy – Statement by the Council and the Commission*, Brussels, DE 105, 10 November.
- Cosgrove-Sacks, C. (ed.), 1999, *The European Union and Developing Countries: The Challenges of Globalization*. London: MacMillan.
- Council of the European Communities/Commission of the European Communities, 1992, *Treaty on European Union*, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities.
- COWI/Netherlands Economic Institute/Andante, 1998, *Evaluation of Aspects of EU Development Aid to the MED Region. Final Synthesis Report*. Brussels: European Commission, November.
- Cox, A./Koning, A., 1997, *Understanding European Community Aid – Aid Policies, Management and Distribution Explained*. London/Brussels: Overseas Development Institute/European Commission.

- Cox, A./Chapman, J., 1999, *The European Community External Cooperation Programmes – Policies, Management and Distribution*. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Cram, L., 1997, *Policy making in the European Union: Conceptual lenses and the integration process*. London: Routledge.
- Department for International Development, 2000, *Eliminating World Poverty: Making Globalisation work for the Poor*, London, December.
- Department for International Development (DFID), 2001, *Working Partnership with the European Community*. London: DFID.
- Deth, J.W. van, ed., 1993, *Handboek Politicologie* (Political Science Handbook), Assen: Van Gorcum.
- Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 1998, *Development Co-Operation Review of the European Community*. Paris: Development Co-operation Review Series, no. 30.
- Development Assistance Committee (DAC), 2002, *Development Co-Operation Review of the European Community*. Paris: The DAC Journal, Vol. 3, no. 3.
- Dhondt, P., 1994, *Die Kohärenzproblematik: Zielkonflikte zwischen Agrarpolitik und der Entwicklungspolitik der Europäischen Union: Probleme und Lösungsversuche*, Aachen: Technische Universität.
- Diagne, A., Daffé, G. (éds.), 2002, *Le Sénégal en quête d'une croissance durable*. Paris : Karthala.
- Diop, M.-C. (Dir.), 2004, *Gouverner le Sénégal: Entre ajustement structurel et développement durable*. Paris : Karthala.
- Dubois, J.-P. (DG VIII), 1994, 'The question of coherence: the impact on developing countries', in *Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung, Towards Coherence in North/South Policy: the Role of the European Union*, Materialien zum GKKE-Dialogprogramm, Heft D7, Bonn.
- Euchner, W., Garrigue, N., Petropoulos, N., 1999, *Evaluation of the MEDA Regulation*. Final Report. Brussels: European Commission, February.
- European Commission, 1992, *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on development co-operation policy in the run-up to 2000*. Brussels, SEC (92) 915 , 15 May (Referred to as Horizon 2000).
- European Commission, 1995, *Trade Relations between the European Union and Developing Countries*. Brussels: European Commission, DE 71, March.
- European Commission, 2000, *Communication to the Commission on the Reform of the Management of External Assistance*. Brussels: European Commission, 16 May.
- European Commission/European Council, 2000, *The European Community's Development Policy - Statement by the Council and the Commission*. Brussel: European Commission DE 105, 10 November.
- European Commission, 2001, *Green Paper on the Future of the Common Fisheries Policy*. Brussels, COM (2001) 135 final.
- European Commission, 2004, *European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper*. Brussels
- European Research Office, 1995a, *An introduction to EU fisheries agreements*, Brussels: Coalition for Fair Fisheries Agreements (CFFA).
- European Research Office, 1995b, *Ensuring coherence in the fisheries sector*, Brussels: CFFA.
- European Research Office, 1995c, *Structure of EU-ACP Fisheries Agreements*, Brussels: CFFA.
- Eurostep, 1993a, *The subsidised exports of EC beef to West Africa: How European beef mountains undermine cattle farming in the Sahel*, Brussels: Eurostep.
- Eurostep, 1993b, *Briefing Paper on the campaign of November 1993*, Brussels: Eurostep
- Eurostep, 1999, *Eurostep dossier on CAP & Coherence*. Brussels: Eurostep, April.



- Faber, N., Policy Incoherence: The case of the European Union's Bilateral Fisheries Agreements with ACP countries versus the Community's Development Policy. Amsterdam: Free University, MA Thesis.
- FAO Fisheries Department, 1995, *The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture*, Rome: FAO.
- Frisch, D., 1994, 'Coherence in North/South policy: the role of the European Union', *Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung, Towards Coherence in North/South Policy: the Role of the European Union. Materialien zum GKKE-Dialogprogramm, Heft D7*, Bonn.
- Gabas, J.J. (dir.), 1999, *L'Union européenne et les pays ACP – Une espace de coopération à construire*. Paris: Karthala.
- GEMDEV, 1998, *La Convention de Lomé en Questions – Les relations entre les pays d'Afrique, des Caraïbes et du Pacifique (ACP) et l'Union européenne après lan 2000*. Paris: Karthala
- Greenpeace, 1993, *It can't go on forever: the implications of the global grab for declining fish stocks*, Amsterdam: Greenpeace.
- Grilli, E., 1993, *The European Community and the developing countries*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993..
- Jadot, Y. and J.P. Rolland, 1996, *Les contradictions des politiques Européennes à l'égard des pays en développement. Diagnostics dans le secteur agricole et propositions d'amélioration de l'efficacité de la coopération internationale*, Montpellier: Solagral.
- Hoebink, P./Koulaïmah-Gabriel, A., 1998, *Policy Formulation in the European Union: An Assessment of the EU's Lomé policy*. Brussels: IDC/Mokoro Ltd, May.
- Hoebink, P., 1999, Coherence and Development Policy: The Case of the European Union. In: O.Stokke/J.Forster (eds.), *Policy Coherence in Development Co-operation*. London: Frank Cass.
- Hoebink, P., 2002, Evaluating Maastricht's Triple C: The C of Coherence. The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- IFREMER, 1999, Evaluation of the Fisheries Agreements concluded by the European Community. Brussels, August.
- Kapteyn, P. and P. Verloren van Themaat, 1995, *Inleiding tot het recht van de Europese Gemeenschappen na Maastricht* (Introduction to the law of the European Communities after Maastricht), Deventer: Kluwer (fifth edition, totally revised).
- Klugkist, J., 1993/1994, *First Report on lobby to stop the dumping of EC beef in West Africa*, 2 June 1993 (Second Report, 17 June 1993; Third Report, February 1994), The Hague/Brussels: NOVIB/Eurostep.
- Kydlandt, F.E. and E.C. Prescott, 1977, 'Rules rather than Discretion', *Journal of Political Economy*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Vol. 85, No. 31, pp. 473-91.
- Koning, A., 1995, *Strengths and weaknesses in the management of the European Development Fund*, ECDPM Working Paper No. 8, Maastricht: ECDPM.
- Koulaïmah-Gabriel, A., 1997, *The Geographical Scope of EC Aid: One or Several Development Policies ?* ECDPM Working Paper No. 42, Maastricht: ECDPM.
- Lutterbeck, B., 1994, 'Towards more coherence in North-South policy: a summary of proceedings', in *Gemeinsame Konferenz Kirche und Entwicklung, Towards Coherence in North/South Policy: the Role of the European Union. Materialien zum GKKE-Dialogprogramm, Heft D7*, Bonn.
- Laursen, F./Vanhoonacker, S. (eds.), 1992, *The Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union. Institutional Reforms, New Policies and International Identity of the European Community*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff
- McDonald, S., 1996, 'Reform of the EU's sugar policies and the ACP countries', *Development Policy Review*, London: Sage Publications, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 131-49.

- Messerlin, P., 2001, *Measuring the Cost of Protection in Europe. European Commercial Policy in the 2000s*. Washington: Institute for International Economics.
- Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances, 2003, *Situation économique et sociale du Sénégal*. Édition 2001. Dakar.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994/1995, *The Netherlands and the future of the European Union: four government memoranda*, The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Danida, 1996, *Plan of Action for Active Multilateralism, Annex Strategies for Individual Organizations*, Copenhagen: Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Danida.
- Moonen, I., 2004, *The Afloxatin Case – Process and impact evaluation of the EU regulation on Aflatoxin*. The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Montes, C./Migliorsi, S., 1998, *Evaluation of European Union Aid to ACP countries. Synthesis Report*. Brussels: IDC/Mokoro Ltd, November.
- NAR (National Advisory Council for Development Co-operation), 1993, *Recommendation on Development Cooperation after the Treaty of Maastricht*, The Hague: National Advisory Council for Development Co-operation.
- NAR (National Advisory Council for Development Co-operation), 1996, *The Dutch Presidency of the European Union and Development Policy*, The Hague: National Advisory Council for Development Co-operation.
- Nugent, N., 1994, *The government and politics of the European Union*, London: MacMillan, third edition.
- Nugent, N., 2001, *The European Commission*, London: MacMillan
- Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation, *Development Cooperation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee*. Paris: OECD, several years
- Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation, 1996, *Building Policy Coherence: Tools and Tensions*. Paris: OECD.
- Oxfam, 2002, *Rigged Rules and Double Standards: trade globalisation and the fight against poverty*. Oxford.
- Page, S., 1994, *How Developing Countries Trade. The Institutional Constraints*. London: Routledge.
- Peterson, J./Bomberg, E., 1999, *Decision-making in the European Union*, London: MacMillan.
- Radtke, K., 1999, *The Record of the Trade Provisions of the Lomé Convention*. In: C.Cosgrove-Sacks (1999: 127-143).
- République du Sénégal, 2002, *Document de Stratégie de Réduction de la Pauvreté*. Dakar : Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances.
- République du Sénégal, 2002, *Rapport sur les Mécanismes de Mise en Œuvre et de Suivi du DSRP*. Dakar : Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances.
- République du Sénégal, 2003, *Programme National de Bonne Gouvernance*. Dakar : Secrétariat de la Présidence de la République.
- République du Sénégal:, 2004, *Rapport d'Avancement et de la Mise en Œuvre du DSRP – Année 2003*. Dakar : Ministère de l'Économie et des Finances.
- Rolland, Jean-Pierre, 1995, *Foreign trade policy and regional trade in meat and livestock*, Paris/Montpellier: Ministère de la Coopération/SOLAGRAL.
- Shihata, I.F.I, 1994, *The World Bank Inspection Panel*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- SOLAGRAL, 1995, *Améliorer la cohérence des politiques communautaires pour renforcer l'efficacité de la politique de coopération au développement*, Paris: SOLAGRAL.
- Stevens, C. and C. Webb, 1983, 'The political economy of sugar: a window on the CAP', in H. Wallace *et al.*, eds., *Policy-making in the European Community*, Chichester: John Wiley and Sons.

- Stevens, C., 1996, 'EU policy for the banana market: the external impact of internal policies', in Wallace and Wallace, eds., 1996.
- Verwer, S., 2000, *Pulverizing Powder: European dairy export subsidies and milk production in Jamaica and Tanzania*. Nijmegen, CIDIN.
- Vries, L. de, 2003, 'La Mer est pour tous nous' - Local dynamics in the Senegalese artisanal fisheries. Wageningen : MSc thesis.
- Wallace, H., 1996, 'Politics and policy in the EU: the challenge of governance', in H. Wallace and W. Wallace, eds., 1996.
- Wallace, H. and W. Wallace, eds., 1996, *Policy making in the European Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Weatherford, M.S., 1994, 'The puzzle of presidential leadership: Persuasion, bargaining and policy consistency', *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 135-64.
- World Bank, 1974, Senegal: Tradition, Diversification, and Economic Development. World Bank: Country Economic Report. November.
- World Bank, 1997, Senegal: The Challenge of International Integration. Washington: World Bank, December.
- World Bank, 2001, Kingdom of Morocco: Poverty Update.
- World Bank, 2002, Global Economic Prospects – Making Trade Work for the World's Poor. Washington.
- World Bank, 2003, Global Economic Prospects – Realizing the Development Promise of the Doha Agenda. Washington.