Sudan: Displacement and eventual inclusion?

Introduction

The recent urban growth and the decaying rural economies in Sudan are becoming a real challenge for those concerned with poverty reduction. Vulnerability, destitution and poverty are growing at an increasing rate in major urban centres. This occurs despite various interventions from international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), community-based organizations (CBOs) and local programmes. The sustainability of INGO approaches has been questioned in relation to their efficiency, effectiveness and wider impact.

Improving the impact of urban development interventions, therefore, is an increasingly important issue. This study aims to review project experiences and draw concrete lessons to inform future approaches in urban development. It compares results between settlements with and without NGO programme interventions in both Greater Khartoum and Kassala in eastern Sudan. The studies, carried out in 2003 with DFID funding, adopted a livelihoods framework for assessing the impacts of work with displaced populations. They compare emergency-oriented interventions in Khartoum, with integrated, development-oriented approaches in Kassala. Additional information for Kassala comes from project documentation materials from Practical Action.

The case of Sudan addresses communities of extreme vulnerability and in a widely diverse context (ethnicity, cultures, religions). Internally displaced people (IDPs) around urban and rural centres will continue to be a focus for NGO interventions for many years to come.

National context

Sudan, like many African countries, has been prone to internal conflicts, ethnic strife and socio-political and economic crisis. Both political and economic power is, predominately, centralized in the hands of urban Islamic elites, sectarian and tribal chiefs. Sudanese society is very diverse, with 132 tribes and sub-tribes. The country is vast – the largest in Africa – and incorporates an enormous range of climatic and ecological conditions.

Irrespective of the nature of regime, the policies of the Sudanese State and the dominant political groups have been characterized by a lack of strategic vision and low commitment to the essential needs of the population. Access to basic entitlements of security, food, shelter, health, water, education etc, continues to be a serious problem facing the majority of urban and rural populations. The sufferings of people stricken by recurrent wars and natural calamities are enormous.

Social differentiation, population mobility and family dislocation, and difficult access to means of subsistence, have been apparent socio-economic characteristics since late 1983. Women's destitution and their marginalization have accelerated. At the same time, there have been problems of degradation of the natural environment including soil erosion, deforestation, overgrazing and desertification.

Good information on levels of poverty in Sudan is hard to find. The last full census was carried out in 1983. Surveys since then have been patchy and information from formerly rebel-controlled areas tended to be left out of official government statistics. In the latest Human Development Report for 2003 (UNDP, 2005), Sudan was ranked 141st out of 177 countries, with a human development index value of 0.512. This has increased over time from 0.376 in 1980 and 0.428 in 1990. This reflects the growth of the Sudanese economy, with the start-up of oil production in the 1990s and relatively favourable agricultural conditions. However, the overall evidence suggests huge levels of inequality between and within the North and the South of the country. The mortality rate among children under 5 years in the 1990s was is 105 per 1,000 live births in the North and 145 in the South. Official figures suggest access to clean water and sanitation is just about the average for sub-Saharan Africa at 62 per cent, some estimates suggest only 30 per cent coverage in southern Sudan, and in some areas as low as 5-10 per cent (DFID, 2005).

Sudan has one of the highest rates of urbanization of the African Sahelian countries. The last census (1993) indicated a total population of 25.6 million people. Current UN estimates are that the population was around 35 million in 2005. The proportion of the population living in urban areas has been growing rapidly from just 20 per cent in 1980 to 40 per cent in 2005. The rate of growth of urban areas was around 5.7 per cent during the first half of the 1990s, but has reduced a little to 4.6 per cent between 2000 and 2005. Khartoum was home to 35 per cent of the country's urban population in 2000 (United Nations 2004).

There are an estimated 5.4 million internally displaced people in Sudan, more than any other country in the world (Global IDP Project, 2004). Migration and displacement lie on a continuum, but displacement is defined as involving dispossession from basic objects, values, norms and means of subsistence on which people used to survive and which are central to their identity and existence (El Bathani 1997). Displacement is traumatic, painful, and causes hopelessness and helplessness, compared with migration, which is more or less prepared, hopeful and full of wishful thinking for a better life.

The structural causes of the vicious cycle of civil war, displacement, and destitution are mainly poor and unjust governance. Sudan has been for decades a country at civil war that negatively impacted livelihoods of millions. Since

the 1980s 2 million lost their lives and 4 million fled their homes due to war in south Sudan joined drought displaced in urban areas. While negotiating peace to put an end to the war in the South, another conflict flared up in Western Sudan in 2003. Approximately 50,000 were killed and over a million left their homes and became displaced to escape indiscriminate killing in Darfur. The rural exodus has been exacerbated by macro economic polices (liberalization, privatization and lifting subsidies from basic services) and political instability, poor programming and lack of accountability.

NGOs operations and approaches

NGOs have responded to the emergency needs of displaced people on the fringes of the country's urban areas. These have included needs to access social infrastructure (education, health, water etc.) and basic skills for improving incomes. NGOs have been active since the mid-eighties in a very hostile policy environment with many government restrictions on movement and security-related problems that hinder access to the needy. Their programmes focus mainly on emergency operations, concentrating primarily on official IDP camps rather than squatter areas, or neighbouring urban slums.

Many projects implemented by NGOs provide a lifeline, and some open up new avenues of opportunity. In early interventions, the primary focus was on basic needs to ensure the bare survival of the community and the individual. NGO interventions that have remained in the basic-needs phase now face the challenge of changing of becoming more development-oriented. This would include working on enhancing people's livelihood capacities, credit, skill upgrading and improving the service infrastructure requires efforts towards engaging government local authorities and working on IDPs citizenship rights. However, in the context of a hugely unequal politics and economy of Sudan dominated by the ruling elites, it has been difficult for NGOs to work towards empowering internally displaced communities. In particular, it has been difficult to encourage local governance structures to become more responsive to people's needs and interests.

The case study of settlements

The study was conducted in Greater Khartoum and Kassala town, the state capital of Kassala. In each place, two slums were studied: one with and the other without NGO interventions.

Greater Khartoum slums

The profile for Khartoum population as obtained from national censuses shows that the highest increase in the population of Greater Khartoum took place in the period 1983-1993. This period coincided with the climax of ongoing civil war and the famous Sahelian drought, which are the major causes of displacement. Currently there are between 1.8 and 2 million IDPs in Greater Khartoum, which is around 40 per cent of the total population. Only around 270,000 live in four official camps, with the rest in squatter camps (Global IDP Database, 2005). IDP camps form a circle around the capital with the largest camps located in Jebel Aulia 60km to the south of Khartoum (population of 45,000) and in El Salam (120,000 people) and Shiekan south of Omdurman.

El Salam

El Salam camp is located south west of Omdurman about 8km west of Souk Libya and falls under El Salam locality administration unit. It is one of four official camps established by the government in 1991, and has a population currently estimated at 120,000 (Global IDP Project 2005). Before the establishment of the camp, people lived in Khartoum North industrial area and Shambat in carton shelters. In January 1991 about 600 soldiers surrounded the slum of Shambat and ordered all the families to move to trucks, which had been prepared to transport them to a new place. When the trucks reached the place, the people refused to stay there as it lacked water, was far from town and was without any transport to connect them to places they could find work as daily labourers, or buy food. After consultation with the authorities in Khartoum the trucks returned to Libya market. The government provided food and water during that night and the following morning. Immediately, various NGOs reached the site (CARE, Red Crescent, Islamic Relief & SCC), and then the government authorities chose the current El Salam area to be the IDP's reception camp. During the first two days of settlement the eviction of these families had been widely publicized by the international media and had drawn the attention of the international community. As a result, both INGOs and the government devoted much effort to supplying the basic needs for the camp. The camp continued to attract many families from other slums as result of improvement of provision of services. The peak growth of the camp occurred around 1997.

The camp has developed gradually and is now a planned area with plots of land distributed to IDPs through a land demarcation committee. Houses were demolished to open roads and for planning purposes. However fees imposed for land were considered high for IDPs. In addition the requirements of a citizenship certificate and other personal documents were beyond many IDPs who had lost, or lost contact with, all their relatives.

The survey of 105 residents carried out for this research in 2003, showed that the majority of residents of El Salam come from the south, from Bahr El Ghazal (46 per cent) and Equatoria (17 per cent). A quarter (25 per cent) comes from Kordofan, and in particular the Nuba Mountains in central Sudan. Around two-thirds are Christians (64 per cent).

Over a third of household heads (36 per cent) were female. Many of these women (60 per cent of them) were widows, and others (13 per cent) had been divorced or abandoned. The camp has a very high number of children, with those under 15 years making up nearly half (48 per cent) of the population. Among the adults, there are slightly more women (56 per cent) than men.

The administration of the camp is composed mainly of the administration committee formed by the government that consists of three sectors, the government Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), the security forces, and the traditional structures such as Salatin and Omad. The main role of administrative committee is to implement the government policies. The main function of HAC and the security forces as governmental agencies is to coordinate and supervise NGOs activities in the camp. The traditional leaders are assigned the role of conflict resolution in the camp.

Sheikan displaced neighbourhood

The research aimed to compare the situation for residents of the official IDP camp (El Salam) with that of an unplanned area. Sheikan was chosen, and a survey of 30 residents was carried out. This settlement is located west of Omdurman, on the boundary of Karari locality. Sheikan is an unplanned area established in 1993, and demolished three times by the government authorities between 1993 and 1997. Since 2000 Sheikan's dwellers have been allocated plots in a planned area where it seems they will be allowed to stay.

The current population size of Sheikan is estimated at 8,000 persons. As in El Salam, nearly half (47 per cent) are from the Dinka tribe, and another quarter (27 per cent) are Nuba. A higher proportion than in El Salaam comes from the South (60 per cent) from Equatoria, Bahr El Ghazal or Upper Nile. A third (33 per cent) comes from the central area of Kordofan / Nuba Mountains. The majority (80 per cent) are Christians.

Household heads were interviewed, of which nearly half (47 per cent) were female. Half of these women were widows, and others (36 per cent) had been divorced or abandoned. Half the population of the settlement is under 15 years of age. Of the adults, there is a very high proportion of women (61 per cent).

[Photograph 1: Caption: Women carrying water in camp for internally displaced people, Khartoum] Date: April 2003

Photo credit: Practical Action / Lucy Stevens

Kassala slum areas

Over the past years (1960s-1990s) the town of Kassala was a host for refugees from Eritrea due to the protracted Eritrea-Ethiopian regional war. The conflict situation built up and government forces in Kassala State came under attack from rebels over the Eritrean border. This was coupled with the occurrences of natural disasters including drought, flooding of the seasonal Gash River and the collapse of the Gash Agricultural scheme. The nomadic cross border trading with Eritrea also deteriorated dramatically. Displaced people therefore moved to the town both from south and central Sudan, and from rural areas of Kassala State.

According to UN figures, there are currently an estimated 76,000 internally displaced people in Kassala (Global IDP Database, 2005). The influx of displaced people caused serious stress on the already fragile service infrastructure of Kassala Town. Problems included dwindling employment opportunities; deficiency in food, sky-rocketing food prices and deteriorating basic health and education services. Despite the efforts of international humanitarian organizations to provide services in the reception camps, IDPs and refugees suffered from scarcity of potable water, poor sanitation, rise of sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS, poor Mother and Child Care services and high malnutrition among children.

Wau Nur displaced neighbourhood

The settlement of Wau Nur started during the drought of 1984. Around 1988 the civil war brought more IDPs from the Nuba Mountains (central Sudan) and southern Sudan. A third phase of growth started in 1995 as result of the intensification of the war around oil-rich locations in the south. The last increase of population of the camp was in 2001 as result of expansion of the war from the south to eastern Sudan. The town itself was attacked in mid-2000. This development affected many from Kassala State itself who migrated from their traditional rural areas to Kassala town and Wau Nur. By the time Practical Action was carrying out a baseline study in 2002, the population had reached an estimated 1,600 households. Just over half the camp's population are Christians (54 per cent), with the rest being Muslims. The largest proportion are from Southern tribes (60 per cent), followed by around 30 per cent Nuba. A smaller number (10 per cent) are Arabs, mostly from Kassala State.

For many years the area was unplanned, and residents did not have secure tenure. Houses are built of perishable local materials, and there was no access to electricity or water. Water was brought in by donkey cart from other areas of the town, and residents paid a high price for it.

[Photograph 2: Caption: Typical housing with mud brick walls and thatched roofs in Wau Nur]

Date: January 2005. Photo credit: Practical Action / Lucy Stevens

Atla Bara slum

The establishment of the slum started in 1988 when about 100 pastoralist families who had lost their herds settled on the outskirts of Kassala town. Following that many IDPs who did not find space in Wau Nur, particularly those from the Nuba Mountains, joined the camp. At that time the houses were constructed from perishable materials and tents. The maximum growth for the camp occurred in 1993 when considerable numbers of IDPs reached Kassala as a result of the intensification of the civil war in the South and Nuba Mountains. In 2001 the population of camp reached 500 households (2800 people) following the arrival of more IDPs from Kassala state. The slum is located on flood-prone land and it has been destroyed three times (1996, 1998 and 2003). The worst flood destruction was of 2003 and destroyed about 300 plots (75 per cent of the total house plots). There was no social organization within the camp until 1992 when the residents formed a committee.

Impact of interventions on livelihoods in Khartoum

The main source of information for the findings presented here is the DFID funded research study carried out in 2003. This involved questionnaires of 105 residents in El Salam in 30 in Sheikan. These were supplemented with focus groups using PRA methods, and interviews with representatives from NGOs and CBOs. Together, these give us an indication of the differences in livelihood outcomes and assets owned which can be compared between the two settlements.

NGOs interventions in El Salam camp

Since the camp was first established NGOs started significant interventions particularly in the areas of health, nutrition, provision of potable water and sanitation. Five national and ten international NGOs have worked at the camp in varying capacities at different times (Table 1, Table 2). Health problems were an obvious starting point, with the most prevalent diseases in the camp including dysentery, giardia, diarrhoea and cholera, respiratory infections, malaria, anaemia, skin and sexually transmitted diseases. Lack of fresh food and inadequate protein sources resulted in malnutrition-associated diseases such as anaemia, tuberculosis, and diarrhoea. Currently there are five centres providing primary health care, established and managed by NGOs (Sudanese Red Crescent, MSF France, FAR, SCF, and Dawa).

Other INGOs such as Peace and Love and SOLO have concentrated their activities in the field of education. There are eight basic schools in the camp. All are co-education and work on two shifts. They were constructed by NGOs and are managed by the basic education administration at Albuga'a locality. There are no secondary schools in the area. Beyond

these basic services, a few NGOs have worked in broader, livelihoods-focused issues. ACORD for example concentrated on shelter and income generation.

Table 1: International NGOs in El Salam in 2003

Name of NGO	Years	Type of intervention
CARE	1991-2003	• Health (Drug-provision) • Water
ACORD	1995-1998 2002-2004	• Capacity Building • Income-Generation Activities • Micro-finance • Roofing • HIV/AIDS awareness
ADRA (Adventist Development and Relief Agency International)	1998-2003	• Health • Nutrition
FAR (Fellowship for African Relief)	1999-2003	• Health • Nutrition
SCF (Save the Children Fund) UK	1998-2001	• Health: Drug-provision
FAIR	2001-2003	• Micro-finance • Training
MSF (Médecins Sans Frontièrs) France	2000	• Health
MSF Holland	2000	• Sanitation
MedAir		• Health
Global Health		• Health

Table 2: National NGOs in El Salam in 2003

Name of NGO	Years	Type of intervention
Sudanese Red Crescent	1991-present	• Health • Water (boreholes and management committees)
Peace and Love	1995-present	• Health • Education
SOLO (Sudan Open Learning Organization)	1995-2003	• Education
Gender Centre	2000-2003	• Income-generating activities

ANA Sudan	1996-1999	• Nutrition

Food consumption

Measures of livelihood outcome can be difficult to establish in urban poor settlements where poverty is multi-dimensional. However, among the extremely poor, one useful proxy is around food consumption (Table 3). In this case, residents of El Salam had benefited from food aid, as well as education programmes on nutrition. Around a third of children under five years in both camps do not regularly drink milk. Egg consumption was lower in Shiekan than El Salam. Most families cited low incomes as a reason. Also in Shiekan, a significant minority (18 per cent) compared with only 9 per cent in El Salam were only able to give their under-fives one meal per day.

Table 3: Food consumption for children under 5 years, Khartoum camps

	El Salam		Shiekan	
	No.	%	No.	%
Children <5 yrs who do not drink milk regularly?	16	30%	6	35%
Children <5 years who do not eat eggs regularly?	29	55%	13	76%
Children <5 years who eat only 1 meal per day	5	9%	3	18%

For adults, households in Shiekan could afford fewer types of food. For example, only 67 per cent of households bought bread regularly compared to 87 per cent in El Salam. Only a third bought groundnuts regularly, compared with over half (56 per cent) in El Salam, and only 73 per cent bought tea or coffee regularly compared with 93 per cent in El Salam.

Incomes and sources of income

In El Salam, the majority of both men (69 per cent) and women (68 per cent) worked as labourers. In Shiekan, there was an even higher reliance on labouring jobs, as this was the occupation for 75 per cent of men and 71 per cent of women. Similar proportions of women in both camps said they were housewives or unemployed (16 per cent in El Salam and 21 per cent in Shiekan). One important difference between the two camps is the proportion of households who rely on informal sources of income only, which is over three quarters in Shiekan (77 per cent) and just 36 per cent in El Salam (Table 4). Households in El Salam were also more likely to receive remittances from relatives (9 per cent of households compared to none in Shiekan).

Despite these differences, however, there are no significant differences between levels of household income between the two camps. Median income[1] for both was SD15,000 per month. Taking the whole picture of incomes and food

consumption together, it is clear that the residents of both camps remain very poor. Many are not able to regularly afford what others would regard as essential items.

Table 4: Levels and sources of income, Khartoum camps

	El Salam		Shiekan	
	No.	Avg. (median) total income	No.	Avg. (median) total income
No source of income reported	5	0	1	0
Informal income only	38 (36%)	15,000	23 (77%)	15,000
Formal income only	48 (46%)	15,000	3 (10%)	15,000
Both formal and informal incomes	12 (11%)	29,000	3 (10%)	30,000
Other source of income	9 (9%)	15,000	0	
All cases with some income	100	15,000	29	15,000
Total cases	105		30	

Human capital

For many of the NGOs working in El Salam, health and nutrition were priority areas of intervention. The survey highlighted the impacts of that work.

Health services

The difference in health provision serving the two camps is striking. There are no facilities within Sheikan, and residents walk an average of 15km to reach a clinic, while El Salam has clinics within the camp. This affects the extent to which residents can access different kinds of service (Table 5).

Table 5: Access to health services and information, Khartoum camps

	Elsalam		Shiekan	
Immunization of <5 yrs (of those with children)				
Complete	57	97%	18	82%
Partial	2	3%	2	9%

Not immunized	0		2	9%
Visit to pregnancy unit (of mothers)	59	98%	17	77%
Last delivery supervised by trained midwife	54	90%	20	91%
Are you aware of AIDS?	90	86%	23	77%
From media	59	66%	23	100%
From local campaign	13	14%		
From organizations	10	11%		
From written material	7	8%		

Levels of immunization of children under five years are relatively high in both camps. However, the coverage is better in El Salam where 97 per cent of children had completed their course of vaccinations, compared with 82 per cent in Shiekan. The immunization programme was organized by both NGOs and the Government. Most women were also able to ensure that their babies were delivered by trained midwives. However, in Shiekan, women found it harder to reach a pregnancy unit before birth. Cost was a worry for women in Sheikan, fearing that the services of a midwife, or pre-natal care, would prove beyond their means. Indeed, of those who spent money on health care, those in Shiekan tended to spend more (SD2,000 per month on average) than those in El Salam (SD1,700). NGOs in El Salam had also been active in promoting messages around HIV/AIDS. Awareness levels were therefore fairly high. In Shiekan, three quarters of the residents (77 per cent) were aware of HIV/AIDS, but all had heard of it from the media rather than from any campaigns in their neighbourhood.

Education and Knowledge

Rates of illiteracy were high in both camps. Of all the adults (those over 15 years of age), 56 per cent were illiterate in El Salam, and 64 per cent at Shiekan. There is a huge gender difference in rates of literacy, with around three quarters of women in both camps being illiterate (75 per cent in Shiekan and 71 per cent in El Salam).

Only some of the NGOs operating in El Salam had training programmes in income-generating activities and micro-finance. Only 16 per cent of those interviewed had received any kind of training. Of these, most (71 per cent) were men. Most of the training was in apprenticeships or on vocational training courses. The value of this training was seen in

differences incomes. Those that had been trained earned on average twice as much as others. Observation in the camps suggested that there were at least a few in El Salam who could afford to purchase more expensive goods such as donkey carts, bicycles or radios. In Shiekan, around a quarter (23 per cent) had received some form of training, and again the majority (71 per cent) were men. The lack of NGO intervention in the area is evident in that little of this training was in the form of apprenticeships or vocational training.

It seems, then, that training opportunities have been limited, especially for women. The problems of illiteracy and a lack of skills useful to the urban labour market make it difficult for families do more than scrape by. However, where people have been trained, it can make a significance difference to their livelihoods.

Physical capital

Access to water in both camps was quite good, through access to good quality piped water from boreholes. The sanitation situation the camps, on the other hand, is desperate as large numbers are crowded together in settlements which are deemed 'temporary' by the authorities. The NGO involvement in El Salam has ensured that some sanitation is provided. Twenty per cent have access to ventilated pit latrines, and 43 per cent use communal toilet facilities. In contrast, the situation in Shiekan is dire, as 70 per cent of households have no access to any sanitation facilities, and the rest rely on limited communal latrines.

There is no refuse collection system in either camps, and in Shiekan, the majority (83 per cent) dispose of their refuse at an open space. In contrast in El Salam, around half (53 per cent) burn their rubbish. This is likely to be the product of environmental health campaigns run by some of the NGOs in El Salam. A tenth of households in El Salam have participated in one of these campaigns. There have been no similar activities in Shiekan.

Most houses in both El Salam (91 per cent) and Sheikan (73 per cent) are built of mud bricks. Thatched houses are typically all that the most destitute can afford. These were only found in Sheikan, where 13 per cent of houses were built of this material. Most of the houses are small, with around half in both camps having just one room.

Financial capital

Savings and credit activities often go together with skills training as part of a package of assistance from NGOs. In El Salam, only one NGO (ACORD) was involved in this kind of work, and only 16 per cent of respondents had been involved in any kind of training. Involvement in savings and credit activities was similarly low. Only 7 per cent of residents said they

had access to credit, and only 3 per cent were a member of a savings group. None of those interviewed in Sheikan were involved in savings or credit. The absence of any kind of savings activities including even traditional *sundoq* systems is an indicator of the huge dislocation of displacement. People were thrown together in these camps, and coming from many different areas and villages they have found it hard to revive the kinds of activities that used to hold them together as a community with their friends and neighbours. The lack of savings and credit schemes is as much about the collapse of any sense of social cohesion, as it is about the extreme poverty people find themselves in.

Natural capital

The government both nationally and at the state level has never considered IDP camps as permanent, and continues to plan and rezone areas of the city without considering the rights of the residents. Even when El Salam camp was established, the government was not happy with its location, and would have preferred it to be located much further away from the city. Planning regulations do not give any consideration to the situation in which displaced people find themselves. Before anyone can be allocated secure tenure over land, they need to prove that they have settled in an area for at least ten years, and must possess a nationality certificate, and birth certificate. The effect of upholding these regulations is to prevent displaced people who fled their homes with nothing, from being able to access land in the cities. A pattern develops where displaced people begin life in a camp in a shelter made of cardboard or sticks and thatch. They manage to build a mud-brick hut, and over five years or so they add other rooms and a kitchen. By this time, the government planning process has decided that the land is required for other purposes, and the houses are demolished, taking the displaced people back to square one. In March 2005 Al Salam camp was completely demolished even though some had been given plots and completed the official registration process. They have been moved deep into the desert, about 100km from the old location.

NGOs such as ACORD have been able to help by donating building materials, and providing training which gives people more chance to accumulate financial assets needed to help them survive in the urban economy. But when the risk of eviction is always present, it is difficult for people to settle and feel confident about investing in their future.

Social capital

When people fled their villages because of war, or were forced to leave because drought robbed them of their last means of survival, they were dispersed and their social networks were broken. In the camps, however, people naturally gravitate towards others from the same tribal or kinship backgrounds. A degree of authority remains with traditional structures of *sultans*. This mix becomes the basis of new networks which are inevitably weaker and more fragile than

the ones they replace. Both new and old conflicts can easily emerge in this environment. Conflicts between traditional *sultan* leadership and new generations of youth were evident in both camps. And in Sheikan there were tribal disputes between the Nuba people, and the dominant Dinka tribe. Government institutions and officials need to engage with representatives from the camps, but sometimes this serves to empower particular chiefs or tribes over others. In general the judiciary, police and security forces are perceived as systems of aggression rather than support by IDPs. The experience of CBOs, especially those which find it difficult to register officially, is that they are harassed rather than supported by government authorities.

Impact of interventions on livelihoods in Kassala

The study carried out in 2003 interviewed residents of Wau Nur and Atla Bara. A second source of information is documents prepared under the projects carried out by Practical Action in Wau Nur. These include a mid-term evaluation carried out in June 2004, and an Impact Study carried out in December 2005.

NGOs interventions in Wau Nur

Significant NGOs intervention in Wau Nur started in 1992. Many were short-term and focused on emergency relief (for example IRC, GOAL and Sudanese Red Crescent, see Table 6). From 2002 Practical Action has been working in Wau Nur and neighbouring Kadugli. Their work was a departure from emergency-oriented projects, adopting a more holistic livelihoods-based approach. A first group of activities focused on capacity building and income-generation. The assumption was that this would enable residents to afford investments in housing and services. A second group of interventions was around reducing the costs and improving the decentralized management of infrastructure.

Key interventions have included mobilizing and building the capacity of key community-based organizations. These have included the Community Development Committee (CDC), and the Women Development Association (WDA). A community centre was built in Wau Nur to provide a central point and meeting place for these organizations. This was supplemented by work to support new small enterprises. Trainees (265 in total: 134 men and 131 women) were selected by the CDC, and were offered a wide range of different activities. One of the main activities was food processing which involved many women. Others were trained in carpentry, electronics, metal work, pottery, photography, handicrafts, and running small diesel generators, distributing the electricity to neighbouring households. All the trainees received business and credit management training. The CDC and WDA ran a micro-finance facility allowing beneficiaries to borrow money for start-up capital and materials. They were supported in this by ACORD (micro-credit) and Ockenden International (skills training). Exchange visits took some trainees to Port Sudan and others to Gedarif to share experiences with others involved in small enterprise and micro-credit, and to gain encouragement and inspiration.

A second group of activities in Wau Nur have focused on improving shelter and access to services. A major success was in persuading the authorities to give the residents secure tenure over the land, by allocating them 1,212 plots. This has been the foundation for other work including the construction of two demonstration houses, around 30 latrines (in partnership with 'Water and Environmental Sanitation' (WES) – a joint Water Corporation-UNICEF initiative), and one water point. Two demonstration houses using vaulted roof technology were built. All of these initiatives have had to deal with the challenges of expansive black cotton soils and the threats of occasional flooding from the Gash River.

Table 6: National and International NGOs in Wau Nur, Kassala

Name of NGO	Objectives	Type of intervention
Practical Action	Poverty alleviation	• Capacity building • Micro-finance • Income-generating activities • Demonstration housing • Latrines
Ockenden International	To encourage and help people affected by displacement to achieve self-reliance	• Vocational training • Capacity building of CBOs
ACORD	To reduce poverty, marginalization and exclusion of poor communities	• Micro-finance (credit & training) • Food security • Capacity building
GOAL	To provide emergency health and sanitation assistance to affected populations	• Emergency health care & sanitation • Training volunteers for health awareness • Shelter package
Sudanese Red Crescent	To provide assistance and relief. To introduce health services	• Health (training course on primary health care)
IRC (International Rescue Committee)	To address immediate emergency relief needs and lay foundations for longer-term recovery from conflict and disaster	• Shelter • Water and sanitation • Health • Education

Incomes and sources of income

An impact study carried out in December 2003 found that in the three IDP camps where Practical Action had worked (including Wau Nur) the unemployment rate was estimated at around only 12 per cent. This is in contrast to a national unemployment rate of 20-30 per cent. It is clear that opportunities have opened up for people, and training in skills has helped them to grab them. The impact study suggests that a key motivation for residents in finding work and improving their skills is to try to regain the sort of social status that was stripped from them through the process of displacement.

Many of the displaced had come to the town with very few possessions, and very little skills or experience that could be of use in an urban economy. Before moving, 43 per cent of men and 73 per cent of women had been farmers. The impact study found that in the three IDP camps where Practical Action had worked (including Wau Nur), 31 per cent of working age men were now skilled labourers (Table 7). This is a major shift from 2001 when the major occupations for men in Wau Nur were casual unskilled labourers (43 per cent) or soldiers (29 per cent). Among the women interviewed in 2005, many were involved in either tea and coffee making (38 per cent) or food processing and selling (29 per cent). Again this has changed significantly since 2001 when women in Wau Nur were hired labourers (40 per cent), sold tea and coffee (24 per cent) or brewed alcohol (16 per cent). Alcohol-making brought them into conflict with Sharia law, which prohibits and jails alcohol promoters. This indicates that the skills training carried out by Practical Action has opened new opportunities for many people to get involved in new kinds of businesses.

Table 7: Sources of income for men and women in three Kassala IDP camps, 2005

Source of income for Men	No.	%
Skilled labour (incl. carpentry, welding, building, painting, mechanics)	14	31
Hired labour	12	27
Trading	9	20
Wage labour (government and private sector)	6	13
Services (butchers, vegetable sellers, water sellers)	4	9
TOTAL	45	100

Source of income for women	No.	%
Tea and coffee making	17	38
Food making / processing	13	29
Trading (home utensils, furniture, other goods)	8	18
Homemade handcrafts	5	11
Wage labour	2	4
TOTAL	45	100

The survey in 2005 interviewed a sample of those who had been trained by the project. It found a very wide range of incomes per month, from a minimum of SD9,000 for some of the women interviewed, up to SD90,000 earned by one of the men. This suggests that, as in El Salam, some families are still struggling to make a living, while the incomes of others who have taken advantage of opportunities have risen rapidly. On average, household incomes have risen from SD17,350 per month in Wau Nur in 2001, to SD25,700 in December 2005 (across the three camps sampled). This is nearly a 50 per cent increase. It is above the minimum wages paid in the public sector, of SD11,300 including allowances in 2004.

The pattern for expenditure was similar to that of income, backing up the argument that on average the situation among those who were trained has improved. As with incomes, there was a wide range of household spending per month ranging from SD18,500 up to SD105,000. On average, spending was around SD35,700 in the three camps surveyed in 2005, compared with SD26,500 in Wau Nur in 2001.

Human capital

Impact of training

A total of 265 men and women were trained by the project. Interviews were held with 45 of them (20 men and 25 women) who had been trained by the project in various types of food processing, vocational skills and handicrafts. A high proportion (80 per cent) said they had put their training to use, and 70 per cent said that they now had a steady business. One of the most important benefits mentioned by trainees was the increase in self-confidence (mentioned by 85 per cent). For women, particular impacts included the greater respect they now had in their family and the community, and the sharing of family expenses with their husband.

Box 1: Food processing business success

A'amna was born in South Kordofan in a village called *Lagawa*. When the war came to her area in the early 1980s, she moved with her family to El Obied, the state capital. She married in 1984, but things only got worse as the drought began to bite, and the same year she and her husband made the journey to Kassala. They found a place in a new settlement called Wau Nur. Her husband found casual labouring work in a welding workshop and the family grew with the birth of two sons and a daughter. Life was still hard, though. Their income was not enough to cover their daily expenses, and despite living there for 15 years they were still living in a very basic mud house.

One day in 2002, A'amna attended a meeting organized by Practical Action in Wau Nur. She took up the opportunity to join a training course run by the WDA in food processing where she learned how to make a kind of spaghetti called

shearia. She began to make *shearia* at home and sell it in the nearby Wau Nur marketplace. After a bit of patience, trial and error, the business began to take off and she could bring income into the family. The *shearia* proved popular among

When A'amna wanted to expand her business a little she applied for credit through the WDA. She made more *shearia* and started selling vegetables too. Helped by the advice of the WDA and Practical Action, she repaid her loan. The worst times seemed over for her family. Her children started school and they were able to put a fence around their home. She was able to make a contribution and get help from Practical Action to build a flood-resistant room, and since then they have added a kitchen. The WDA taught her about the dangers of smoke from cooking fires too, and she took another loan to buy a gas cylinder and stove. She put these to business use too, adding *kisra* (local flat bread) to her products. The family have even managed to buy a TV and small diesel generator. Her next plan is to build a new latrine following the model Practical Action and WES have introduced.

She hasn't forgotten the help she got from the WDAs either, and she spares time to help other women too. She has risen to be elected head of her local branch, and her confidence has grown to speak about her experiences to large gatherings.

[Photograph 3: Caption: Members of the Women Development Association] Date: Jan 2003.

Photo credit: Practical Action / Annie Bungeroth

Health

Despite the emergency relief efforts in Wau Nur, health conditions were reported as very poor in 2001 at the time of the baseline survey. There were no health facilities and children suffered from malnutrition and water-related diseases including diarrhoea, malaria and eye infections. There is now a health centre built by GOAL and residents have been exposed to various health-related campaigns. These include information on vaccination, HIV/AIDS, hygiene and sanitation, and the dangers to health of smoke from cooking fires. These campaigns have been run by various NGOs including Practical Action, with close involvement of the CDC and WDA.

There is no health centre or dispensary in Atla Bara. In comparison with Wau Nur, far fewer children have been immunized (Table 8). There is a fear of not being able to afford the costs, so many in this settlement rely on cheaper traditional medicines.

Table 8: Levels of child immunization, Kassala camps, 2003

	Atla Bara	Wau Nur
Not immunized	57%	5%
Partial immunization	22%	25%
Complete immunization	21%	70%

Education and Knowledge

Wau Nur has a primary school for boys and girls. This was built with local materials of straw and wood by UNICEF in 1993. The government built 4 classrooms using permanent materials in around 2000. More recently GOAL has built additional classrooms using the woodless, vaulted roof technology promoted by Practical Action. There were still complaints, however, about the costs of education and the lack of qualified teachers, problems which are common across the country. The impact study in 2005, reported that despite this many families had students at secondary and even university levels. During the 1990s there were also literacy classes in Wau Nur which had helped three batches of students (135) to learn to read and write. These had stopped by the time of the baseline survey in 2001 because funding dried up. In comparison with Atla Bara, levels of literacy and education are higher in Wau Nur (Table 9).

Table 9: Levels of education among adults, Kassala camps, 2003

	Atla Bara	Wau Nur
Illiterate	46%	28%
Khalwa (religious Quranic school)	6%	5%
Basic education	40%	37%
Secondary education	7%	28%
University level	1%	2%

Physical capital

Water infrastructure

In 2001 there was no access to water within Wau Nur. People bought water from vendors who brought it to the settlement using donkey carts, at a price of up to SD200 for two 20-litre cans. During the summer, there were water shortages. The community listed improving access to water as their second most important priority during consultations for the baseline study after securing land tenure. Although water pipes passed quite near the settlement, the local authority would not extend them to the area while it was still a temporary camp. This situation still exists in Atla Bara.

In Wau Nur, the land has now been allocated to residents. This paved the way for an agreement with the Water Corporation to install a water point, which opened in May 2004. This serves at least 200 households. The cost of water for residents has reduced by over 80 per cent to SD35 for two 20-litre cans. The water point is run by a group from the community development committee, and after the attendants have been paid, profits are saved towards maintenance and other services in the neighbourhood. The water is clean, and more young men have found employment as water vendors delivering to homes in the neighbourhood. The water point serves as a good meeting place too, and people come to sell snacks and tea there.

Sanitation and environmental services

At the time of the baseline survey in 2001, 85 per cent of the households in Wau Nur did not have any kind of sanitation facilities. This contributed to poor health conditions. Practical Action joined forces with WES to train residents and, with residents contributing their labour, construct around 30 latrines in Wau Nur and another 35 in neighbouring Kadugli. By the end of 2005 there were 173 latrines in these two settlements with the others having been built by residents using their own resources. This represents around 7 per cent of households in the two settlements. Around 22 people were trained and have found work building latrines for their neighbours. These need to be carefully dug and lined because of the difficult soil conditions, so their construction represents an important investment for householders. The cost of one latrine was SD35,000 (£86).

Box 2: A piece of peace. Story of the latrines by a CDC member

When we reached Kassala as displaced people I joined the community development committee. One of my ideas was to try to help us do something about the latrines. At that time the few we had didn't offer any privacy, and people just wanted to get out quickly to avoid being disturbed by trespassers, insects, the heat and smells. After lengthy discussions and consultations the project was approved. We've had help to build latrines at our homes, and at the mosque, church and school.

It's a piece of peace, but an important one. We feel the difference between the old days. We feel the better health of our families and the community. We can invite guests over without feeling embarrassed. The public health officer told us that there is a drop in stomach complaints and less malaria. The lesson I learned is that when people work together they can build an everlasting peace that starts from a latrine.

Refuse collection campaigns in Wau Nur are periodic. These are organized by the community development committee and by NGOs, with the community contributing their labour. In Wau Nur two thirds of households had participated in one of these activities. The community has also negotiated with the Department of Environment and Sanitation. They

residents deposit their waste in big containers supplied by Practical Action. The Department then empties these for free once per week.

Energy

There have been two interventions in Wau Nur in relation to energy. Neither of them has been introduced in Atla Bara. The first has been work to reduce the indoor air pollution from cooking fires. This is a major cause of acute respiratory infections especially among women and children. Sudan has plentiful availability of natural gas which is sold cheaply, so the choice was made to encourage people to switch to this fuel. Awareness about the problem and about how to buy the stoves and gas bottles was raised through the WDA, which also provided their members with credit. The project has been hugely successful with 137 families in Wau Nur as of September 2005 (and just under 1,000 in Kassala overall as of early 2006) now using LPG for cooking. Monitoring studies found that exposure to harmful gases had reduced by around 70 per cent (Bates, 2005).

A second intervention was to help families set up small electricity generation and distribution businesses using diesel generators. There are two generators in Wau Nur, each serving 200 households who pay a monthly fee for which they get a couple of lights and one plug, with the electricity switched on for 4-6 hours in the evening. There have been some problems with this as it has been difficult for some residents to pay the monthly fees regularly.

Housing and Shelter

The intervention sites have better housing in terms of construction material. The comparative study in 2003 found that only a third of houses in Atla Bara were made entirely of mud bricks compared with two thirds in Wau Nur (Table 10). The situation has improved since the baseline study when only 47 per cent of houses were made of mud bricks. Houses in both Wau Nur and Atla Bara were damaged and destroyed during severe flooding in the town in July 2003. Estimates for the town as a whole were that over 7,500 homes were destroyed completely and 6,000 were badly damaged. The seasonal river bursts its banks relatively frequently – in recent years in 1988, 1996, 1998 and 2003. Practical Action built two demonstration houses in Wau Nur, focusing on creating woodless, vaulted roofing. However, the costs of making housing flood proof, added to the problems of expansive soils make designing affordable and safe housing a difficult challenge.

Table 10: Building materials used in housing, Kassala camps, 2003

	Atla Bara	Wau Nur
Straw / tents	36%	12%

Both types	28%	20%
Mud bricks	36%	68%

Financial capital

Savings and credit

During last three years many families in Wau Nur have had access to loans. These were supported with some seed capital and training from NGOs (ACORD, Ockenden International & Practical Action). No loans have been available to people in Atla Bara. The credit systems have been managed by the community through the WDA and CDC. As part of an impact study in 2005, interviews were carried out with 30 people who received business training, of whom 80 per cent had received loans. Of these, most (59 per cent) were having no problems with the repayments, suggesting that their businesses are doing well. There were differences across types of business however, with those trained in vocational issues having the most difficulty with only 43 per cent finding it easy. Those (mostly women) trained in handicrafts and food processing were doing better with repayments. The difficulties faced illustrate the problems of identifying and training people in viable businesses.

Box 3: Newly trained carpenter

One could easily mistake the 33 year-old Issa for a man ten years older. He was only a boy when he lost his father in the war, so now his mother, three sisters and five brothers depend on him. With that responsibility weighing on him, he jumped at the chance to learn a new skill when he saw a notice pinned up in Wau Nur about carpentry training. He was lucky to be selected, and spent three months on a training course. After that he applied for a loan to help him buy a basic set of tools.

Since starting, the business has been slow, and Issa has struggled to repay his loan. But he remains optimistic. He just needs to get over the initial hurdle of finding the money for initial materials. He relies on deposits from customers for now, but would like to have more products to display to improve his marketing and reduce the time it takes to complete orders. In the meantime, Issa finds part-time work as a builder. He is working towards operating his carpentry business full-time, and only then can he consider getting married.

Natural capital

The town of Kassala was attacked by rebel forces who entered from across the Eritrean border in 2000. At this time, all the IDP areas were still considered temporary, and had no permanent rights to stay. The attack worsened relations

with the state and military authorities who accused the residents of Wau Nur and neighbouring camps of assisting the rebels to enter the town. However, following the attack the state cabinet changed, and one of the new ministers was a southerner. Negotiations started to try to get the land officially allocated to the residents. In principle this was agreed, but other members of the cabinet wanted to allocate them land elsewhere, because the site of Wau Nur was seen as a valuable resource for the state. Lobbying continued through the community development committees, who spoke to federal ministers from the South, who in turn contacted the Sudanese president. Finally, the president issued a decree that Wau Nur (along with neighbouring Kadugli), in their current locations, should be demarcated as residential areas. The state cabinet remained reluctant to implement this decree, but a year later (2002) there was another cabinet reshuffle and a new southern minister was able push the matter through. A master plan was approved and, after payment of a registration fee, residents received the title deeds to their plots.

This was the result of concerted lobbying by the residents themselves, supported by Practical Action. It was helped by support from sympathetic state ministers. It gives the residents far more security than their counterparts in Khartoum, and has been a foundation from which they can build their lives with more confidence. One remaining problem has been the relatively high fees charged for receiving the title deed. Reluctance to allocate land to IDPs has been based on an assumption that the camps are temporary and that residents will eventually return home once peace returned to the South. However, even after the peace accord was signed in January 2005, only 13 per cent of respondents said they would consider returning, and most of those said they would only go back if there were assurances about safety and availability of work. It is clear that, after 20 years and more in their new location, these displaced people must be considered permanent citizens of their adopted cities, and need to be afforded the same rights as any other resident.

Social capital

In Wau Nur there are two formally registered CBOs: the CDC and the WDA. These have been drawn together and formalized by Practical Action's interventions, but build on existing cultural institutions. In addition, every tribe has its own *sultan*, who represents the tribe at traditional courts dealing with family and personal disputes. Wau Nur has active engagement with the government. There is a popular committee at the camp with 15-17 members, which is the lowest rung in the local government system. In contrast there are no formally registered CBOs in Atla Bara and consequently it lacks services or effective engagement with service providers from government and NGOs.

Members of the CDC and WDA committees have received a range of training in, for example, leadership skills, participatory monitoring and planning, strategic planning, and revolving fund management. There are still weakness in

their capacities. For example a review found that the committees still found it difficult to mobilize widespread participation in their activities. However, their success in lobbying for land tenure demonstrates how far they have come. Another example came in 2003 following the floods. The CDCs came to Practical Action to ask for emergency assistance, which Practical Action staff were not in a position to provide. Committee members then used their networks and communication skills to demand and secure help from various other emergency-oriented organisations.

A second set of activities has focused around cultural activities. A drama group has been started to share messages about health and other issues. A football team has been supported too, which now competes in local competitions. Traditional musical groups have been supported with some training, equipment and outfits. The effect has been to celebrate their differences and restore pride, while at the same time uniting people. The groups perform at community celebrations including the rally held to commemorate the signing of the national peace agreement in January 2005. The celebration was held in Wau Nur and was attended by various dignitaries including the state governor. This is testament to the recognition and acceptance that has now been achieved by the residents of the camp.

Conclusion

The context for work with internally displaced people in Sudan has been based on the assumption that the settlements are temporary and that people will eventually return 'home'. This has shaped both government and NGO responses to their situation. The government has been extremely reluctant to grant secure tenure for the camps. This has left them open to arbitrary eviction and relocation according to the ebb and flow of security concerns, or when the land is needed for other uses. IDPs have often been blamed for causing unrest and favouring factions opposing the government, and their lack of power and voice makes them easy targets. NGO responses have also been shaped by the assumption that the camps are temporary, and by the dire and urgent needs of the residents. They have focused to a great extent on emergency relief where assistance is given in the form of hand-outs. This is obviously justified when people first arrive or after a disaster like a flood. However the practice of giving assistance for free continues for many years after people have first settled, and expands into other areas of activity beyond health and nutrition (the common starting points).

The effects of these approaches are evident in the case studies presented here. The importance of some level of NGO intervention was shown in Khartoum in the comparison between Shiekan and El Salam. The benefits brought by the official recognition of El Salam as an IDP camp were large compared with Shiekan which was largely ignored. The basic needs of residents in terms of health and nutrition were well catered for. There were also some limited attempts to build livelihoods which where successful for the few people they reached. However, even in El Salam, the lack of

effective community-based organizations and of a voice for residents supported by NGOs meant they stood less chance of fighting eviction.

The approach taken by Practical Action in Kassala adopted a more holistic livelihoods-based approach. It challenged the assumption that the residents are only temporary, and that all assistance needs to be based on emergency-oriented hand-outs. The process started with building the capacity of local organizations, and building a greater sense of cohesion and community confidence through cultural and sporting activities. They were able to use their networks to secure assistance for their populations after the floods in 2003. Perhaps the most significant achievement was in securing land tenure after lengthy lobbying. Alongside this, there has been training in income-generation, and improvements in housing and services. Small-scale demonstrations for example of latrines, has spread as others take it up without support.

One of the difficulties faced by the team was to change expectations away from a dependency mentality where people waited for donations, rather than acting themselves. Through giving a consistent message about the need for the community to contribute to its own development, pride and confidence are slowly returning. However, there are still problems as grinding poverty and a dependency mentality holds people back from active participation. Leadership can become a burden for the few in the committees. Some were also not able to keep up with loan repayments, which could be partly to do with remaining attitudes, and partly due to the difficulties of establishing viable businesses. Ironically the holistic approach taken by Practical Action created its own 'dependency' problems as people began to see them as the route to solving all their problems of low incomes, poor housing, lack of services and so on. This was despite the wide range of partnerships formed with other agencies.

Another problem of any kind of NGO approach whether it is emergency-oriented or more integrated and development-focused is that they tend to start with the selection of settlements. This process is often not community-led. If there is any debate at all it is between NGOs to divide a town or a set of settlements between them to avoid overlaps. Communities are not able to choose which NGO works in their area. This can emphasize a dependency mentality. It also produces a divide between those areas which are selected and those which are left out. It can also create jealousy and hostility between the IDP areas and poor parts of the host town. Practical Action does not see itself as a long-term service provider, but it will be a long time before government structures have the capacity to take up similar activities. The question of how this work will be replicated and scaled up remains an open one.

Sudan has the largest number of internally displaced people of any country in the world. The crisis continues to grow around Khartoum and also in Darfur as hundreds of thousands have relocated to huge settlements on the outskirts of

towns. How long these new people in Darfur will remain in the camps depends on how long the security situation prevents them from returning. Past experience suggests that at least some will decide to stay, and the longer they remain, the more chance they will stay permanently. NGOs need to learn more about when to shift from emergency patterns to approaches requiring more input from the community. For established IDP populations, the approach adopted in Kassala shows how much can be achieved in bringing displaced people out of poverty, to help them enjoy fuller rights and inclusion as citizens which has been denied them for years. The future of Sudanese cities is likely to be a multi-ethnic one, and this approach helps to create greater acceptance and inclusion for all.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED THIS CHAPTER

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

INGO International Non-Governmental Organization

CBO Community-based Organization

DFID Department for International Development

IDP Internally Displaced People

HAC Humanitarian Aid Commission

CDC Community Development Committee

WDA Women Development Association

WES Water and Environmental Sanitation

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[1] In this case, the median is a truer reflection of the 'average' income. In El Salam there were a few cases (8) where incomes were extremely high. When the mean income is calculated, this skews the picture for the majority of cases.