

CRISE ● Centre for Research on Inequality,
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Social Exclusion and Conflict: Analysis and Policy Implications

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Part I. Social Exclusion and Conflict: Analysis and Policy Implications

By Frances Stewart

1 Introduction

This paper explores the relationship between social exclusion (SE) and violent conflict and considers policies that might be adopted to reduce social exclusion and help to prevent conflict.

Large numbers of people in developing countries are *socially excluded* – excluded by mainstream society from participating fully in the economic, social and political life of the society where they live – often because of their cultural, religious or racial characteristics. These groups are typically also poor according to our normal definitions of poverty¹, but the usual anti-poverty programmes will not reach them unless the discrimination they face is also addressed, i.e. the reasons for their social exclusion. However, social exclusion is also about exclusion from political power, so sometimes groups that have adequate incomes or are even privileged economically may be excluded from this perspective. Females, in many societies, suffer from lack of power, discrimination and relative poverty in economically rich households as well as poor ones. Women may therefore suffer social exclusion even when they are relatively well-off.

There are strong reasons for devising policies to reduce social exclusion not only as part of a poverty reduction agenda, but also from the perspective of the well-being of those who are excluded. Social exclusion also generates conditions in which violent internal conflict can arise. This presents another powerful reason why SE should be part of any development policy concerned with poverty and well-being – since violent conflict is one of the major factors accounting for collapses in economic and social programmes, and leading to low growth and poor human development.²

This paper explores the conditions in which SE may lead to violence. It is organised as follows. The next section briefly considers the definition of SE, and presents some illustrative examples. Section 3 explores how SE may provide fertile conditions for internal conflict, and considers the conditions in which such violence tends to erupt, again illustrating this by a range of examples. Section 4 surveys policy approaches towards SE; section 5 provides two examples where policies have been apparently successful in reducing/avoiding conflict. The concluding section emphasises some political economy issues which can prevent such policies, or even make them counter-productive from the perspective of avoiding conflict. This is illustrated by the case of Sri Lanka.

¹ E.g. the monetary approach to defining poverty commonly adopted and most interpretations of the capability approach to poverty. See Stewart, Ruggeri Laderchi and Saith (2003).

² At least half of the least developed countries have suffered serious internal conflict over the past 25 years and 8/10 of the worst performers on human development (or GNP per capita) have been at war in the past decade or are currently at war. Causal processes work both ways, but studies have shown that conflict leads to serious reductions in growth, human development and poverty reduction (e.g. Azam et al., 1999; Stewart and Fitzgerald, 2001).

2 What is social exclusion: how does it differ from usual definitions of poverty³?

The concept of social exclusion is used to describe a group, or groups, of people who are excluded from the normal activities of their society, in multiple ways. Although the concept was initially developed in Europe, it has increasingly been applied to developing countries. While the precise definition varies, there is broad agreement that social exclusion consists of “Exclusion from social, political and economic institutions resulting from a complex and dynamic set of processes and relationships that prevent individuals or groups from accessing resources, participating in society and asserting their rights”. (Beall & Piron, 2004).

This definition immediately draws our attention to several key aspects of social exclusion which differentiate it from other definitions of poverty:

- It is multidimensional, including political dimensions as well as social and economic.
- Indeed, while there are complex and reinforcing processes, lack of power, or unequal power relations, is at the root of every type of exclusion.
- There is a *process of exclusion* and agency involved – the behaviour of particular agents and institutions leads to the *exclusion* of certain groups. Indeed some include this as part of the definition of SE: “[Social exclusion is] the process through which individuals or groups are wholly or partially excluded from full participation in the society in which they live” (de Haan and Maxwell, 1998); “Social exclusion occurs when the institutions that allocate resources and assign value operate in ways that systematically deny some groups the resources and recognition that would allow them to participate fully in social life” (Zeitlyn, 2004).
- Social exclusion tends to be a feature of *groups*, rather than individuals. These groups may be distinguished from others in society by their culture, religion, colour, gender, nationality or migration status, or caste; or they may be identified by gender, age, physical or mental disabilities or illness, or – in developed countries, particularly – by their housing or lack of it.
- It is relational, which means that its definition depends on what is normal in the particular society where people live.

This characterization of the excluded implies that policies to eliminate social exclusion will need to address a wider range of issues than is normally included in anti-poverty agendas. Thus for reducing social exclusion it becomes essential to devise policies towards multidimensional aspects, especially including political exclusion, which are often ignored in anti-poverty programmes. Moreover, in general reducing social exclusion in a significant way will involve tackling power relations – confronting those institutions that are responsible for the exclusion (i.e. institutions which monopolising political power or economic opportunities and discriminate against particular groups). Social exclusion often results from discriminatory rules and behaviour so that policies must be addressed to sources of group discrimination and not solely the problems of deprived individuals. For example, simply expanding educational opportunities will not reduce social exclusion of scheduled castes or women in some societies unless accompanied by strong anti-discrimination programmes. Finally, there is an unavoidable redistributive element to any policies that address SE. While monetary or capability poverty can often be reduced by economic growth – ‘Growth *is* good for the poor’ is the title of a well known article about reducing monetary poverty (Dollar & Kraay, 2001) – in

³ This is one of the important questions explored in a QEH DFID funded project on ‘Alternative Concepts of Poverty’. See Saith (2001) for an analysis of the concept of SE; and Stewart, Ruggeri Laderchi & Saith (2003) for a comparison of four concepts of poverty, monetary, capability, participatory and SE.

general growth alone will not improve SE but requires an improvement in the relative position of those excluded, including a change in power relations.

As noted the identification and characteristics of excluded groups are necessarily society dependent. Most SE groups are not only deprived in multiple ways but also have different characteristics (other than their deprivations) from others in the society in which they live, which enables them to be identified as a group and discriminated against. These distinguishing characteristics differ across societies. In some cases, the characteristics may be historic/cultural, as in the case of the Roma people in Europe, scheduled tribes in India, the Orang Asli in Malaysia; religious, as is the case of Muslims in Thailand or the Philippines, or Catholics in Northern Ireland; racial as among the black population in Brazil or the US; racial and cultural as among indigenous peoples of Latin America and the US; geographic and cultural as among the Acehnese in Indonesia or the Somali in Kenya, and Northerners in Uganda; mainly geographic as in the case of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and Eritrea (within Ethiopia); caste (India and Nepal); or a matter of immigration and citizen status (again often combined with race/cultural or religious differences), such as non-indigenes in Nigeria, 'foreigners' in Cote d'Ivoire or refugees in Europe; finally, gender is often a source of group discrimination and exclusion. We should note that while these characteristics often provide clear markers of difference, which enable people in the particular society to classify themselves and others, they are not 'objective' nor essential characteristics of people, but are the consequence of a historic process of social construction. Salient markers and group boundaries may change over time, in response to a host of influences, including political and economic objectives and circumstances.

In most cases of social exclusion, multiple deprivations reinforce each other. For example, indigenous people in Peru have worse access to education, poorer land, worse sanitation and health services, which contributes to lower productivity and incomes and reinforces their inability to reduce any of these deprivations, while highly limited political power means that they are unable to use the political system to improve their position (see Figueroa and Barrón 2005). Moreover, because of their weak economic and educational position, they are not in a position – on their own – to organise effectively to overcome their political deprivations. A similar story could be told about many other peoples (e.g. the Roma – see UNDP and ILO 2002). In Europe, refugees' legal status may prevent them getting reasonable jobs, and hence in improving their economic position, which in turn feeds into their educational position.

As noted, those who are socially excluded are usually identified as having multiple deprivations. But there are some groups who are privileged in some respects, yet still excluded from some important aspects of societal activity. The Chinese in many Southeast Asian countries are such a case – economically and educationally privileged, yet lacking access to political power and not fully accepted in society. The Jews in Europe for many centuries have been such a group. These groups are, in a sense, socially excluded, but they do not suffer multiple exclusions like many others. They suffer mainly from political exclusion. The existence of such groups can be a source of serious conflict, and their position should not, therefore be ignored.⁴

⁴ These are the minority/majority groups that Chua (2003) writes about. In this connection, the concept of Horizontal Inequalities is particularly helpful as it extends to the relatively rich as well as the relatively poor, and looks explicitly and independently at the different dimensions of such inequalities.

3 SE and violent conflict

The socially excluded are generally severely economically deprived and lack access to political power. Because of their economic situation, they appear to have little to lose by taking violent action – indeed some might gain by getting some sort of employment in rebellious armies, while they are likely to be sanctioned to loot and make other illicit gains.⁵ But it is easy to exaggerate these gains. Many lose through the insecurity that affects their families and communities, the economic disruptions that occur, the loss of the few services that they did have access to, and so on. Indeed, we know from country studies and econometric work, that on balance society loses from conflict and the poor typically lose proportionately or more than proportionately. In Aceh, Mindanao, Southern Thailand, East Timor, Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone and the Sudan, the aggregate costs of war for the poor and excluded are high in the short run, even though there are well documented gains for some.⁶ But there may be enough individuals, especially among young men, who foresee gains in respect and status as well as material advantage to welcome conflict for this reason alone.⁷

More significantly, to the extent that those who are socially excluded form a cultural or religious group – which they frequently do – this group affinity can act as a powerful source of mobilisation, where there are significant multiple disadvantages for members of the group. While peaceful mobilisation may be the first step – with marches, strikes and demonstrations, if this has no effect – or if governments react violently to such protests – then groups may take to violence. Cultural differences are not enough in themselves to cause conflict, as we can readily see by the many peaceful multicultural societies that exist today and have occurred throughout history. But when combined with strong group deprivation, cultural ties can be a powerful source of mobilisation.⁸ As Cohen has stated:

Men may and do certainly joke about or ridicule the strange and bizarre customs of men from other ethnic groups, because these customs are different from their own. But they do not fight over such differences alone. When men *do*, on the other hand, *fight across ethnic lines it is nearly always the case that they fight over some fundamental issues concerning the distribution and exercise of power, whether economic, political, or both.* (Cohen, 1969)

The socially excluded have major economic and political grievances, as a group, which combined with their cultural affinities make them liable to challenge authority with violence.

This tendency for SE to give rise to group violence is illustrated in many examples:

- by the Muslim rebellions in Philippines and Thailand.
- by the separatist movements of Aceh, East Timor, and Papua in Indonesia; and the separatism of East Pakistan and Eritrea.
- by the Catholic irredentism in Northern Ireland.
- by the Shining Path movement in Peru.

⁵ The greed/grievance dichotomy of Collier and others emphasises such motives (e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 2005).

⁶ For example, Keen (1994; 2001) documents gains for some groups in the Sudan and Sierra Leone.

⁷ Keen (2001) has argued that in Sierra Leone a major motive among young men was search for status.

⁸ According to Fearon and Laitin (1996) in the former USSR, actual conflicts occurred in only 4.5% of potential ethnic conflicts; in Africa, 1960-79, less than 0.01% [% of actual conflicts to total ethnicities living side by side].

- by the Northern rebels in Cote d'Ivoire.
- by the race riots that recur sporadically in developed countries.
- by the rebellion of tribes in North East India;
- by the Tamil rebellion in Sri Lanka.
- by the Intifada among the Palestinians.
- by the Berbers in Algeria.
- by Christians in the South of Sudan
- by Northerners in Uganda
- by the communist rebellion among underprivileged castes and regions in Nepal.

Yet while many of those we would describe as socially excluded do take to violence many do not. The indigenous peoples in Bolivia and Ecuador – also subject to severe deprivation – have not mobilised violently (Caumartin 2004); Northern peoples in Ghana – suffering similar deprivations to those in Northern Cote d'Ivoire – have not either (Seine and Tsikata, 2004); Christian Kadazans in the Malaysian state of Sabah have not rebelled against the government, despite economic deprivation and differences in religion from the majority Muslim Malays; Tibetans in China have not been in overt conflict; the deprived North East Brazilians have lived with their social exclusion without major political protest. We need to consider, therefore, the conditions in which SE translates into violence.

This question can be interpreted as a collective action question, i.e. why and when do people take collective action, in the first instance through peaceful political protest; and in the second stage, using violence – in other words, what conditions make for political mobilisation of the excluded. Analysis of the collective action literature, primarily devised to analyse economic collective action, also helps to understand political action.

Collective or joint action by a group faces what is often called a 'free rider' problem. That is to say, since everyone benefits from action taken by the group, whether they take any action or not, there is no incentive for individuals to put in the effort needed for the group action. Since this argument applies to everyone, no-one bothers to take the action, even when it would be in the interests of the group as a whole (and of the individuals) that such action was taken. Economists have pointed out that one can overcome this problem where the numbers involved are small because people encounter each other repeatedly, learn to trust each other, and informal sanctions develop. But this doesn't work for large numbers. In the case of political protests, small numbers mean powerlessness, so special action is needed to support effective mobilisation and protest by large numbers. One way to achieve this is by the development of sufficiently strong trust among members through strong cultural affinity and identity. In many of the instances just cited where collective action has not emerged despite severe SE, the socially excluded are culturally fragmented despite having some common identity. For example, in Peru there are three major groups and many subgroups. In Northern Ghana there are also numerous different cultural groups. In Malaysia, the geographically and culturally diverse 'Orang Asli' groups have found it useful to adopt a broader identity in order to campaign for their interests.

By emphasising and developing common identities and organising action, leaders may mobilise people, by helping to overcome the problems for collective action arising from weak and fragmented affinities. In the First World War, for example, the German Kaiser effectively 'appealed to "all peoples and tribes of the German Reich...irrespective of party, kinship and confession to hold steadfastly with me through thick and thin, deprivation and death...I no longer know any parties. I know only Germans" at which point the Reichstag broke into a "storm of bravos"' (Elon, 2002: 309). In Rwanda, in Kosova and in the former Yugoslavia, leadership played a critical role in emphasising

and accentuating particular identities (both an 'us' and a 'them'), using mass media and other means.

In extensive analysis of how and why economic groups form among the poor, we found that leadership was an essential ingredient, and that more often than not it came from outside the poor themselves (Heyer, Stewart and Thorp 2002; Thorp, Stewart and Heyer, 2005). In political action too, it seems that leadership is more likely to emerge out of the middle classes rather than the deprived themselves. This is the case in most of the conflicts cited. For example, the Shining Path in Peru had middle class (white) leadership. If all the SE are severely deprived, there is no educated elite, nor any resources to help in such organisation. It is when some of the same cultural group are better educated and with resources (like many of Al-Qaeda leaders) that mobilisation seems more likely to occur. So the question that then arises is how and why such leadership emerges.

Leaders may emerge for ideological reasons – broadly this was the case for socialist movements, and includes some ongoing conflicts, such as in Colombia or Nepal. In the post-socialist era, leadership has tended to change towards more emphasis on shared cultural values (language, history etc.) or religion. Apart from having feelings of group affinity with the more deprived arising from common cultural or religious identities, exclusion from political power presents a powerful incentive for economically and educationally privileged people to assume leadership of deprived groups. Political *exclusion* by the government has been a major instigator of conflict in Cote d'Ivoire and political *inclusion* of the elite from deprived groups hugely important in preventing civil war in Ghana, Nigeria and Bolivia, for example.⁹

Leaders may also be keener where the economic gains seem large. This occurs particularly in natural resource rich regions, though generous aid flows can perform a similar role. Then both personal and group enrichment can be expected if power is obtained. Hence it is the oil rich areas in Nigeria and Indonesia that have seen most violence, while aid seems to have been a powerful incentive in the Sudan. Peaceful Bolivia may change as oil and natural gas becomes important, if the deep social exclusion in economic and social terms remains.

A critical issue is what makes groups take to violence, as against peaceful protest. There seem to be several reasons. But the overwhelmingly most important appears to be government reactions. Most movements that become violent start with peaceful protest but get nowhere – indeed often worse than that, governments take violent and exclusionary action in the face of the peaceful protests, or perhaps in reaction to minor episodes of violence which occur in combination with the more peaceful protests. Government action against groups may have the effect of unifying them and transforming what were mainly peaceful protests into violence. In Aceh for example, the government's extremely harsh military action has led to acceleration of dissent and the increasing use of violence. In Guatemala what started as a mainly peaceful and not very strong protest turned into a twenty year civil war. In Cote d'Ivoire, the government handling of the situation has, in a sense, forced people into violent opposition. In Sri Lanka, violent government reaction with no concessions encouraged the protest movement to take to violence. Recent escalation in Thailand was due to a peaceful protest being met by the police by arrests and abusive handling of those arrested, with 45 people suffocating as a result. In contrast, in countries which have avoided major violence, the government reacts to small violent incidents by trying to sort out the issues. A number of cases in Ghana exemplify this (Seini ad Tsikata, 2004). The justification for

⁹ A recent econometric investigation into causes of conflicts found that political discrimination played a significant role (Goldstone, Gurr, and Marshall, 2004).

Malaysia's ethnic redistribution under the New Economic Policy was to prevent violence, and it seems to have been highly effective in this respect.

Governments can, of course, take repressive action without provoking a violent response: for example, the Burmese government has repressed the democratic opposition in this way; and for decades the Soviet Union effectively repressed all opposition. Hence, how protestors respond can be critical in determining the dynamics of violence. A violent counter-response by protestors may depend on their leadership; in addition access to resources to support violence (including from outside the country) can be important. Clearly, for example, it was external support that accounted for the long violent rebellion by the Renamo in Mozambique. Governments may respond repressively to protests expecting to be effective, and not expecting a violent counteraction. Both sides can miscalculate likely responses, perhaps based on historic experience. Transitional systems are, perhaps, especially prone to violence for this reason – history is then a poor guide to events.

The role of the government is thus critical, both negatively and positively. Negatively, the government may act as a potential instigator of violence by its discriminatory and exclusionary policies and by refusing to concede when there are protests; or positively, governments may take action to counter exclusion – by including members of all groups in government, and by economic and social policies to reduce exclusion; or by making concessions (even to the point of giving up power) in the face of mass protests, as in the People's revolution in the Philippines, or the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia; the current situation in Ukraine may (hopefully) be another example.

Other reasons for switching from peaceful to violent action relates to leaders' own propensities: extremist leaders may believe in violent methods, and may also see that their own position will be strengthened by such methods. Leadership has promoted violence for reasons such as these in the Shining Path movement and in Serbia and Kosovo, for example. In each case, the expected response of outsiders is important. In the Cold War, domestic conflicts were fuelled by both sides encouraging resort to violence. Since then groups have received support from their diasporas (for example, the Catholics in Northern Ireland and the Tamils in Sri Lanka, or from those sharing religious objectives (as in the case of political Islam). Today, there is a danger that the counter-terrorist action of the West will have a similar impact.

This analysis has given the government a central role. Where SE is concerned this is inevitable, since much of SE consists of political exclusion, while social and economic exclusion is heavily affected by government policy. This does not mean that governments always provoke violence, as we have pointed out above. Governments may support peaceful solutions by being politically inclusive and taking action to reduce other types of SE; they may compromise in the face of protests; or they may mediate where there is communal conflict and the government is not directly involved. In situations of communal conflict the situation can get out of control as far as the government is concerned (as the Sudanese government has argued, not altogether convincingly, in the case of Darfur), even to the extent of government disintegration, as might be said of Somalia. Yet even in these cases, government action at an early stage was critical, and as the situation develops, reconstruction of government on inclusive lines seems the only long-lasting solution.

Almost every country in the world has groups suffering from SE. Hence it is clear that SE, like poverty, can endure without leading to violent protests. Therefore the critical question is why it sometimes leads to violence and more often does not. We have sketched above some preliminary conclusions on how and why social exclusion does lead to violence. To summarise, social exclusion provides the grievances that generate

potential support for protest. Leadership which helps transform these grievances into protests is most likely to arise when there is political as well as economic exclusion, and when a potential middle class leadership is denied access to political power. Cultural affinities combined with leadership turn these latent grievances into actual protests, which may become violent. Conflict can occur where some middle classes of a particular group *are* incorporated into the political system – for example, inspired by more radical leaders who want to get power into their own hands, either for ideological or for material reasons, or some combination. When conflict was presented largely in class terms, Marxist leadership of this type was fairly common. It seems to be rarer now, but Islamic fundamentalists or ethnic extremists sometimes appear to play such a role.

A powerful illustration of some of these connections is provided by Langer's (2004) analysis of events in Côte d'Ivoire. President Félix Houphouët-Boigny's government (1960-1993) was characterised by quite significant political inclusion, despite severe SE from an economic and social perspective. Partly because of this, and partly due to authoritarian government which had French support, peace was sustained. Since Houphouët-Boigny's death, and the advent of democracy, Southerners have taken steps to exclude Northerners from political power, and political participation, action which has contributed to Northern rebellion. Exclusion and ethnic favouritism in the armed forces was particularly significant. The precise role of the French is as yet unclear, though it is clear that there was no longer automatic support for the government.

To present and illustrate these arguments in a simplified form Matrix 1 (appended) lists major factors which seem to be associated with conflict in situations with high SE, tracing each factor, in a rough and ready way, for a set of countries which have experienced conflict and contrasting these with some that have not. The matrix has been drawn so that pluses suggest predisposition to conflict. More research would be needed to fill in this table properly, and the time perspective is critical, as country circumstances change over time. Nonetheless, some interesting conclusions can be derived from matrix:

- First, as noted earlier, socio-economic exclusion alone is not enough to lead to conflict. Political exclusion seems to be required as well.
- Secondly, the issue of group fragmentation is a complex one. Groups may be initially fragmented, but become united as a result of attacks from others. Similarly, leadership may emerge when groups are under attack. Hence, while unity and leadership are important for group mobilisation, they may be the consequence as well as a cause of conflict.
- Thirdly, in this small sample, the economic variables (which generally appear to be important in world cross-country regression analysis of conflict) do not seem important. Neither resource riches nor economic stagnation were invariably a feature of conflict prone countries. It may be that SE acts independently of these economic elements, and they show up as important in conflicts where SE is not the dominant factor.
- Fourthly, as is now widely accepted, the introduction of democratic structures does not prevent conflict, and can indeed even make it more likely (Stewart and O'Sullivan, 1999; Snyder, 2000).

The matrix (or some modification of it) could be used to identify countries' conflict potential.

4 Policies to reduce social exclusion

General policies towards poverty reduction will normally make some – if effective, an important – contribution towards reducing SE. These include ‘pro-poor growth’, policies to extend public services to everyone, and policies to raise the productivity or assets of the poor. These form an important element in any policy package towards SE, but I won’t go through them here as they are already a familiar part of DFID’s policy agenda. However, as argued above, these policies alone are unlikely to be sufficient to make substantial inroads into SE because SE stems from discrimination (implicit or explicit) and because it has important political as well as social and economic dimensions. Hence policies towards SE must explicitly address group discrimination; and must include political dimensions.¹⁰

Policies towards reducing SE can be interpreted as a form of affirmative action. This is action taken towards the allocation of political and/or economic entitlements (political representation at many levels; income, assets, specific goods) on the basis of membership of specific groups, for the purpose of increasing the specified groups’ share of entitlements. The action generally covers the public sector and sometimes extends to private sector activity.

In devising policies, the first requirement is careful diagnosis to identify the salient characteristics of SE. It is essential, therefore, to gather data on groups’ position, with respect to the major economic and political dimensions outlined above. In practice, data of this type is relatively rare except in countries where group discrimination is acknowledged and policies are being adopted towards them, such as in Malaysia, or South Africa. In many cases, proxies will have to be used (geographic data is the most obvious proxy is all cases where the groups are geographically located, but this, of course, won’t help where there is geographic mixing). Here I separate economic/social and political action towards HIs.

4.1 Economic and social policies towards HIs

Here the objective is to reduce economic and social SE. To achieve this one has to go beyond ‘equality of opportunities’ since groups with deep disadvantages which have accumulated over time are unable to use opportunities with the same efficiency and outcomes. Without any overt discrimination, the children of long-term privileged groups will do better in any competitive examinations, and so on. Moreover, disadvantage has many aspects, some of which are quite hidden. Social networks and information about education, jobs, economic opportunities are often strongly group related, so what seems like a ‘level playing field’ is not. All sorts of implicit practices and job requirements (e.g. on language, time and place for job applications and so on) may favour one group against another. In addition to eliminating overt discrimination there is much implicit discrimination that must be addressed.

One can distinguish three types of policy which may be adopted to achieve greater group equality in assets or incomes (although the distinctions are not watertight). First, one can change policies towards *processes* which are directly or indirectly discriminatory. Secondly, one can direct assistance to particular groups, e.g. training people for interviews, subsidising basic goods such as food or housing. Thirdly, one can introduce targets and quotas for education, land distribution, financial and physical assets etc. The first type of policy is not so different from any set of policies to promote competition– although it involves a much more careful search for indirectly discriminatory

¹⁰ The policies towards SE are, in many respects, similar to those towards Horizontal Inequalities. This section draws heavily on Stewart (2005).

policies than is usual. It is likely to be the most acceptable type of policy politically and can have a significant impact (this was a major part of the policy set adopted in Northern Ireland, see below). The second type of policy concerns the nature and distribution of public expenditure, often involving a redirection of expenditure across regions, or even neighbourhoods, as well as groups within them; it is in principle in the control of the government, but it may meet resistance from privileged areas or from the government itself representing privileged groups. This type of policy requires careful review of the implications of all public expenditure (and other relevant policies) for group distribution of benefits. It is noteworthy that this does not form an explicit consideration in the public expenditure reviews supported by the international community, nor that of most governments. The third type of policy (quotas etc.) is most controversial and politically provocative. This type is what many people mean when they talk of 'affirmative action', though affirmative action can be interpreted as including all three types of policy.

Where a major source of SE derives from the public sector (education, employment, infrastructure) a good deal can be achieved through direct action by the government. SE arising from private sector allocations is more difficult to tackle, though all three types of policy will make a contribution.

Despite the fact that affirmative action (especially of the third type) smacks of government intervention and would, therefore, be against the spirit of the pro-market liberalisation that dominates policy making, there are many cases where it has been adopted in one way or another. These cases are instructive both for pointing to the variety of policies possible and to some of their effects.¹¹ Such policies have been adopted both in the North (e.g. the United States, New Zealand, Northern Ireland) and the South (e.g. Fiji; India; Malaysia; South Africa, Sri Lanka).

A review of affirmative action – which I would not claim to be comprehensive, but does cover many examples – reveals action of the following types:

- Assets
 - policies to improve the group ownership of land via redistribution of government owned-land; forcible eviction; purchases; restrictions on ownership. Examples are from Malaysia; Zimbabwe; Fiji; Namibia.
 - Policies towards the terms of privatisation (Fiji)
 - Financial assets: bank regulations; subsidisation; restrictions (Malaysia; South Africa)
 - Credit allocation preferences (Fiji; Malaysia)
 - Preferential training (Brazil, New Zealand)
 - Quotas for education (Malaysia, Sri Lanka, United States)
 - Public sector infrastructure (South Africa)
 - Housing (Northern Ireland)
 - In principle one might also have (though no examples were identified) policies to improve social capital (i.e. support for neighbourhoods associations, and networks outside the group)
- Incomes and employment
 - Employment policies, including public sector quotas (Malaysia; Sri Lanka; India and requirement for balanced employment in the private sector (South Africa)
 - Transfer payments (however, although there are many cases of age, disability and gender related transfers, no examples were identified of transfers according to ethnicity or religion or race).

¹¹ Reviewed in Stewart (2005).

The review of affirmative action shows that it often has some success in reducing SE, but has rarely totally eliminated gaps. Moreover, there is no evidence that the policies reduce efficiency, though careful evaluations are rare. In theory, there are reasons for expecting the efficiency impacts to include both negative and positive elements. On the negative side, there is the interference in normal competitive processes which might prevent resources being allocated according to their most efficient use; but on the positive side is the offset (or reduction) in discrimination which itself contributes to inefficient resource allocation, and the policies should allow the greater exploitation of potential. Some studies show positive impact, while none show negative.¹² In Malaysia, for example, the very rapid economic growth that accompanied the policies also suggest that the policies are highly unlikely to have had any substantial negative efficiency impact, and may have had a positive impact.

Another possible negative impact is that policies favour a minority of individuals within a group, but not the mass of people. This is a complaint sometimes voiced about Indian policies towards scheduled castes. This can be avoided by designing comprehensive policies and ones that are most likely to assist lower income groups, such as subsidies towards basic education, or policies to expand unskilled employment or boost basic infrastructure in poor regions.

4.2 Policies towards political exclusion

Political affirmative action consists in introducing structures (formal or informal) which ensure that each group participates in political decision-making and power. In a democratic system, this means structures that ensure that minorities participate in decision-making and power. Full participation and empowerment requires initiation and control over major decisions in each of the arms of government and at each relevant level. It implies an empowering role not only with respect to the overtly political branches of government but also the military, police and civil service.

The socially excluded are discriminated against politically in many different ways and appropriate policies therefore vary accordingly. For example, some groups are completely disenfranchised (immigrant groups; unregistered voters). In other cases, majoritarian democracy effectively disempowers minority groups (Catholics in Northern Ireland; Muslims in India). In practice, as one would expect, political affirmative action rarely achieves full empowerment, but pushes groups somewhat further towards this goal than would occur without it.

Measures that assist include:

- A federal constitution. Where the different groups are geographically located, this automatically leads to power sharing. Examples are Belgium, Ethiopia, Nigeria, India, Switzerland. A federal solution seems to be appropriate in countries where group divisions broadly go along geographic lines (as in Indonesia and Sri Lanka) but does not help where they do not (e.g. Rwanda). There is also a danger that a federal solution may be an interim one, leading to the break-up of the country: the Biafran war in Nigeria is an example, as was the Yugoslavian federation.
- A Proportional Representation voting system makes a contribution by allowing each group some representation, and encouraging coalitions. Belgium and

¹² Most investigations have concerned US affirmative action: 'the preponderance of evidence suggests that activity associated with equal employment and affirmative action policies is associated with small but significant gains in a range of blue-collar and white-collar occupations' (Simms, 1995: p.3, summarising Badgett and Hartmann, 1995).

Switzerland have adopted PR for this reason, as has Bosnia-Herzegovina. In fact none of the countries in the world that have PR have serious conflict, but this may reflect the fact that conflict prone countries won't accept PR, not that PR prevents conflict.

- In a similar way, decentralisation can lead to power-sharing in unitary (and federal) systems. Ghana and Bolivia are examples.
- Provisions for ethnic/religious vetoes. This may be achieved by requiring large majorities (e.g. two-thirds of the assembly) for major decisions, such that no one ethnic group can determine decisions –Belgium's constitution is an example.
- Reserving seats in parliament. This is very common, but the reservations are rarely sufficient to prevent ethnic domination, although they do extend representation to the socially excluded, as for example, in the case of India's backward classes.
- Power-sharing through job reservations/quotas in the government, civil service, military and police. This may be formal (e.g. Belgium; Bosnia-Herzegovina; Nigeria) or informal (Ghana).
- A strong and ethnically balanced judiciary combined with constitutional human rights, which limits the possible abuse of the central government towards any particular group. However, this is more likely to be an outcome of a successful inclusive society than a cause.

Political affirmative action is especially important in relation to conflict, since, as argued above, political exclusion can generate the leadership which mobilises those who are socially and economically excluded to take political (sometimes violent) action. Moreover, political affirmative action might also be expected to be both a necessary and sufficient condition for improving the economic position of deprived groups. Yet the evidence is less clear on this. To date it seems that political affirmative action at best is associated with some rather modest economic affirmative action (e.g. in India, New Zealand), but this does not always follow (e.g. with respect to the seat reservations for Indians in Latin America). And economic affirmative action can happen in such situations without political affirmative action, as in Brazil and the US.

4.3 Political conditions for reducing SE

As noted SE tends to embody and reflect unequal power relations – in particular a lack of power on the part of those excluded. That being so, it might seem naïve simply to list policies which would correct it, since it is not lack of knowledge but the political situation that is fundamentally responsible for non-inclusive policies. External pressure, aid policy, the development of norms of inclusion, support for international human rights, may play some role in gaining support for inclusive policies. But what is really needed is a change in the underlying power situation, which means supporting the empowerment of the excluded. Where the excluded form a numerical majority, a democratic system should facilitate this – and indeed, a comparison between apartheid and post-apartheid S.Africa shows that democracy does make some difference. But there are many 'democracies' where little is done for the excluded, either because they are a small minority, or because they don't use their potential majority power, or because the democracy is manipulated by elite interests. Hence even in democracies, the excluded may need support for empowerment. This is easy to say, but what does it mean?

International discourse has come to favour empowerment of the poor, and interpret this as consultation about decisions. But these consultations generally include the poor only indirectly (via NGOs), briefly, and not with respect to the most important decisions, as in the PRSP process (see Stewart and Wang, 2003). This will not be sufficient to achieve the sort of empowerment required. What is needed is mobilisation of the excluded, either behind political parties, or as an economic group (e.g. associations of the landless; trade

unions, women's associations), which is in a position to make demands and back these up with realistic threats of a political or economic nature. Hence one way of supporting inclusion is to help in the effective mobilisation of the socially excluded.

Outsiders can make a difference here. On a small scale, NGOs have assisted in finance and organisation. For example, in Bengal, a group of sex-workers' lives were transformed by an organisation they developed with the support of an NGO (Gooptu, 2002). External support assisted in the development of the Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA) in India which secured improved conditions for their members. Similarly, external support has supported the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. Of course, many organisations of the excluded fail. But this is certainly an area where support can be helpful. These are all examples of organisations developed to counter economic exclusion. If effective, they may themselves help to correct political exclusion.

It is much more difficult for outside agencies to help support political mobilisation directly without being accused of political interference and arousing government and elite opposition. However, outsiders may perhaps assist to a limited extent by supporting inclusionary democratic processes (e.g. voter registration, political parties, media).

5 Two successful cases of policies to reduce exclusion and conflict

Here I summarise two cases where deliberate action to reduce horizontal inequalities and exclusion seems to have been effective in itself and in promoting peace, while the economic effects have, it seems, been positive.

5.1 Malaysia

As is well known, in 1971, following ethnic riots in 1969, the New Economic Policy was introduced, with the aim of securing national unity by a two prong approach: 'to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty'; and 'to accelerate the process of restructuring Malaysian society to correct economic imbalance so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function' (Malaysia, 1971). A variety of anti-poverty policies were adopted including policies to promote rural development and extend social services. As far as restructuring was concerned, the most significant policies:

- Aimed to expand Bumiputera share of capital ownership to 30%.
- Aimed to settle 95% of new lands on Malays;
- Introduced educational quotas for public institutions, laid down in line with population shares;
- Introduced credit policies which favoured Malays, with credit allocations and more favourable interest rates.

As Figure 1 and Table 1 show, the policies were effective in reducing the differentials, but not in eliminating them. The application of the policies was much weakened from the mid-1980s, and since then there has been little progress in changing HIs, except in professional employment which would reflect earlier educational policies. Efficiency does not seem to have been adversely affected, since economic growth was very high over this period. Evidence suggests that intra-group inequality did not increase during the NEP, but actually lessened, with the Gini for Malay incomes (peninsular) falling from 0.488 in 1979 to 0.428 in 1988, while the Gini for Chinese incomes fell from 0.470 to 0.400 over the same period. The distribution of Indian incomes also became more equal (Shireen Hashim 1997). The political objective does seem to have been achieved, as no serious ethnic riots have occurred since 1969, even in the aftermath of the 1997 financial crisis while there were serious anti-Chinese violence elsewhere (Indonesia and Thailand). From a political perspective, the Chinese have been represented in government via Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), which has been a component

member of the Alliance/*Barisan Nasional* (BN, National Front) coalition that has ruled Malaysia since independence. However, most observers would concur that they had rather limited political power.




Figure 1: Malaysia – Mean household income by ethnic group, 1970-2004

Table 1: Malaysia – Educational enrolment rates by ethnic group and educational level (ratio to national enrolment rate), 1970-1988

	1970	1980	1988
Primary			
Bumiputera	0.86	0.90	1.00
Chinese	1.20	1.07	0.94
Indian	n.a.	0.88	0.88
Secondary			
Bumiputera	0.82	1.03	0.95
Chinese	1.29	0.98	1.10
Indian	n.a.	0.98	0.93
Tertiary (Malaysia)			
Bumiputera	0.70	1.17	1.17
Chinese	1.65	0.76	0.76
Indian	n.a.	0.49	0.55
Tertiary (Malaysia and overseas)			
Bumiputera	n.a.	0.74	0.83
Chinese	n.a.	1.49	1.32
Indian	n.a.	1.61	1.05

Source: Malaysia Yearbook of Statistics (for 1970); Shireen Hashim (1997), Table 8.28; 8.30

Though widely criticised, the policies were accepted by the Chinese community probably because of the considerable economic opportunities they enjoyed, with rapidly growing incomes and continued differentials in their favour. As one prominent critic of the NEP has nonetheless noted, at the time, the NEP proposals were 'widely accepted across ethnic lines' (Jomo, 2004: p.3). The policies have also recently been criticised for leaving out the Indian community – although on average, they retained slightly favourable differentials – and for the fact that the Bumiputera policy (sons of the soil)

really favoured Peninsular Malays and not indigenous people in Sabah and Sarawak, or the Orang Asli in the peninsular. The Malaysian approach has also been criticised for depending on an authoritarian government. Tensions remain between the communities, particularly with growing centrality of Islam to Malay identity. Nonetheless, the NEP did narrow differentials and succeeded in maintaining peace between the communities over a long period.

5.2 Northern Ireland

In Northern Ireland, the Catholic community has suffered from exclusion on all dimensions over a very long time period – since English Protestants first colonised Ireland in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. This exclusion – economic, social and political – was an important factor behind the outbreak of violence in the 1970s. From the late 1970s policies the British government initiated policies to correct these inequalities. The success of these policies was probably one factor explaining why the Catholic community was prepared to stop violent action.

By the end of the nineteenth century Protestants controlled the vast bulk of the economic resources of east Ulster – the best of its land, its industrial and financial capital, commercial and business networks, industrial skills (Ruane and Todd, 1966: p.151). The division of the island in 1922 ensured permanent political control and continued economic dominance by the Protestants in the province of Northern Ireland, where they formed the majority. Assessments indicate no narrowing of the gap between the communities from 1901 to 1951 (Hepburn, 1983; Cormack and Rooney, n.d.). Unemployment rates among Catholics, for example, were consistently more than twice the rate among Protestants; differentials in educational qualifications were substantially worse. In fact, there was some worsening of the Catholic position over the first three-quarters of the twentieth century – for example, relative unemployment ratios appear to have worsened over this period (Ruane et al., 1996).

Political inequalities were also high. For example, the Catholics with roughly 40% of the population accounted for only 8% of the membership of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), while devolution of power to the province meant that the majority Protestants were in permanent control. The consistency of the inequalities across political, economic and social dimensions – with most evidence suggesting little change in the first three-quarters of the twentieth century – provided fertile ground for the outbreak of the ‘troubles’ in the late 1960s.

From the late 1970s, the British government and the EU introduced a series of measures that worked to reduce economic and social HIs. The introduction of two Fair Employment Acts (1976, 1989) greatly reduced employment discrimination; housing and education policy was geared to reduce differentials. The policies had a significant impact (see Figure 2 and Figure 3). Inequality in access to higher education was eliminated by the 1990s; inequality in incomes was reduced; the housing inequality was significantly reduced; and the employment profile and unemployment rates became more equal; even the imbalance in recruitment to the RUC was slowly being reversed. According to one observer ‘It is unusual to find such a rate of social change within a generation. It is quite dramatic. In many areas Catholics have caught up with or surpassed Protestants’. The Good Friday Agreement embodied measures to correct political inequalities, such as power sharing and reform of the police to incorporate more Catholics. Police Acts of 1998, 2000, 2003, had the aim of 50% recruitment among Catholics.

The correction of inequalities appears to have been effective in sustaining the peace process, especially among Catholics. Protestants, who have lost by these corrections, continue to show more opposition to the process. There has been an exodus of young

Protestants to Britain, and a recent report states that Protestants generally regard themselves as disadvantaged by the peace process, with 39% believing they are worse off than six years ago. Whereas in 1996, 44% of Protestants and 47% of Catholics thought inter-community relationships were better than five years previously, in 2003, only 25% of Protestants and 33% of Catholics did.




Figure 2: Northern Ireland – Changes in horizontal inequality, 1970s to 1990s




Figure 3: Northern Ireland – Community differential in unemployment rates (men)

Source: Office of the First Minister 'Measuring Community Differentials and New TSN Report', <http://www.research.ofmdfmi.gov.uk/communitydifferentials/appendixb.htm>

6 Conclusions

Social exclusion is a reflection of unfair, unequal and discriminatory societies, and it also is often at the roots of poverty. Hence it should be tackled as part of development policies aimed at improving societal well-being and reducing poverty. Moreover, social exclusion generates conditions which make countries conflict prone, especially where political exclusion accompanies economic exclusion. This provides a further powerful rationale for including its in analysis and policy in development strategy.

The paper has reviewed policies that might be adopted towards social exclusion. Some of these policies could be supported by the international community, in its distribution of aid expenditure, for example, and its policy dialogues. The PRSPs and public expenditure reviews present opportunities for discussing policies towards SE. Yet group discrimination and policy to correct group inequalities do not form part of the current policy dialogue – it is very rarely a feature in the PRSPs, and group distribution of resources does not seem to be considered in most public expenditure reviews or other forms of policy dialogue. As a result, even in countries which are conflict prone, these considerations are not taken into account. For example, in Rwanda, pre-conflict, aid distribution was highly skewed, while in Mozambique post-conflict, aid as well as government expenditure more generally has favoured the South and neglected the Centre which forms the main support for the opposition Renamo (UNDP, 1998).

Political exclusion is similarly ignored by the international community in most discussions which focus on the need for multiparty democracy – generally on the Western model – rather than for inclusive government.¹³ Support for fulfilment of the Human Rights agenda would probably be of greater help in reducing SE by extending political, economic and social rights to all irrespective of their group affiliation.

Obviously, governments of the countries concerned have greater responsibilities in these areas than the international community. Almost all affirmative action policies reviewed earlier were government led. But here we need to recognise the political obstacles that can impede effective policies.

Strong action towards group discrimination can provoke political reaction. The best known example is that of Sri Lanka. The Sinhalese who acquired political control when Sri Lanka became independent, introduced a series of measures to reduce the prior privileges of the Tamils, including making Sinhalese the official language and imposing quotas on Tamil access to higher education. The employment share of the Tamils in the Civil Services fell from being nearly twice its population share to just over a half, and income and educational differentials fell. High levels of unemployment among young Tamils and development projects that took land away from Tamils provided further grievances among the Tamil population. A long and bitter war ensued. It seems likely that these policies were partly responsible, though there were many other causes.

The Sri Lankan case illustrates the fact that while social exclusion leaves many deprived and ready to respond to calls for political mobilisation, attacks on privilege can also be a powerful source of mobilisation. There is a strange arithmetic here: in any society with unequal distribution of resources, the majority of people have below average (mean) incomes and other resources. Hence one would expect democratic support for redistributionary policies. Yet, in most cases there is very limited redistribution, which seems to be a bi-product of the power of richer political minorities in addition to

¹³ The early period of Museveni's rule in Uganda is an example. Museveni introduced a broadly inclusive government, but was strongly pressed by the international community to introduce multiparty democracy, which he feared would lead to recurrent civil conflict.

international constraints.¹⁴ Indeed, much violence in poor societies is provoked by privileged groups attacking the underprivileged, in reaction to, or fear of, the claims they may make for economic and political inclusion. We can interpret the Guatemalan war, current events in Côte d'Ivoire, reactions of Protestants in Northern Ireland and, perhaps, politics in Venezuela in this way.

These political obstacles and possible reactions must be acknowledged, and should shape the design of any policies adopted. The policies need to be presented in an inclusive way – which they were not in Sri Lanka; and to be gradual; and they are less likely to provoke conflict if they are introduced in a context of economic and employment growth. The international community can help by its own direct contributions and by developing a culture of fairness and inclusiveness in political and economic policy.

This analysis of SE has been presented in relation to internal SE and conflict in particular developing countries. But it also provides a helpful frame for considering the current global situation. Major social, economic and political inequalities between the West and Muslim societies, between Israel and Palestine, and between Muslim populations and the majority within European countries, all feed into resentment of the West which fuels anti-western action. As in the domestic situations, the situation of social exclusion presents fertile conditions for conflict. And as in many developing countries, the translation of deprivation into action is not automatic – for many years nothing much happened. And as in many developing countries, including Guatemala and Sudan, when it happens the strong reactions of the powerful seem to be of greater importance in leading to escalation of violence rather than actions of the weak.

The global situations calls for corrective action too and for similar reasons – that is, to help tackle inequality and poverty which are undesirable in their own right, and also because so long as such inequalities persist, there will be a strong possibility of resumed violence.

¹⁴ Where the socially excluded form a relatively small *minority* (e.g. the Roma; the Maoris and indigenous peoples in some American countries), there is even less reason to expect political action in their favour.

Part II. Case Studies of Social Exclusion

By Frances Stewart, Manuel Barrón, Graham Brown and Marcia Hartwell

7 Kosovo

Of symbolic political significance since the Battle of Kosova Polje in 1389 but geographically peripheral, Kosovo has a long history of ethnic conflict, political contestation, failed integration into larger political entities and subsequent exclusion. This case study focuses on the post-World War Two period and the (second) formation of Yugoslavia. It is divided into two sections. Firstly, it examines Kosovo as part of Yugoslavia, and how varying degrees of exclusionary and inclusionary practices from the Federal government affected the potential for conflict in the province. Secondly, it discusses the more recent dynamics of exclusion in Kosovo as a nebulously defined political entity under UN auspices, where the dynamics of Serb-Albanian exclusion have been turned on their head.

Situated at the southern point of Serbia, bordering Macedonia and Albania, Kosovo's multiethnic population is increasingly dominated by ethnic Albanians. Immediately after World War Two, the population was approximately two-thirds Albanian, and a quarter Serb, the remainder being made up of a number of smaller communities including Macedonians, Romanians, Turks and Bosnian Muslims. Since the 1960s, high Albanian population growth rates and Serb emigration have shifted the ethnic make-up of the province. Latest statistics place the Albanian population at 88 per cent and Serbs at 7 per cent.

Table 2: Kosovo – Population by major ethnic groups (per cent of total), 1948–2003

	1948	1953	1961	1971	1981	1991	2003
Albanian	68	65	67	74	77	82	88
Serb	24	23	24	18	13	10	7
Other	8	11	9	8	10	8	5

Source: Statistical Office of Kosovo (SOK), <http://www.sok-kosovo.org/>

7.1 Kosovo under Yugoslavia

The dynamics of social exclusion and conflict for Kosovo as a part of Yugoslavia fall relatively neatly in to three periods: from the Second World War until the late 1960s; from the late 1960s through the 1970s; and, the 1980s onwards.

From the Second World War until the late 1960s, Kosovo was, in development terms, virtually ignored by the national elite. During this period, Kosovo had the highest illiteracy rate in the country and a cyclical history of political and ethnic violence between Albanians, Serbs and Montenegrins. As political restrictions were eased, Kosovo Albanian frustration at their exclusion from the national economy saw mass protests demanding autonomy or separation for Kosovo.

From the late 1960s throughout the 1970s, the Yugoslav regime changed its stance towards Kosovo, as more significant efforts at national integration and economic and human development saw human development improve and Kosovan separatism decline in influence. As a result of positive discrimination policies, Albanians increase their employment levels. Educational advances saw the literacy rate improve significantly in the early 1970s, although it remained below the national average. In 1969, the University of Pristina was opened in Kosovo, allowing education in the Albanian language and expression of Albanian identity. These developments were reflected in increasing Albanian enrolment in education (see Table 3). Politically, Kosovo was granted provincial autonomy under the new 1974 Constitution, which also provided for

representation in the Yugoslavia Federal Presidency. (Nelles, 2005: p.71). In the first half of the 1970s, 70% of Kosovo's budget and investments was paid out of federal sources; in the latter half of the seventies, its receipts from the main federal fund for regional development was increased by almost a third.

**Table 3: Kosovo - Educational enrolment rates by major ethnic group, 1970-1990
(ratio to national average)**

	1970/71	1978/79	1989/90
PRIMARY ENROLMENT			
Albanians	0.972	1.064	1.065
Serbs	1.506	1.354	1.210
Other	0.125	0.050	0.075
SECONDARY ENROLMENT			
Albanian	0.851	0.961	0.988
Serb	1.944	1.923	1.800
Other	0.150	0.100	0.125

Note: Figures for each group give proportion of enrolment divided by proportion of population. These figures may underestimate Albanian under-representation in the education system, as the high growth rates among Albanians would result in them forming a larger proportion of the relevant age-cohort. Source: Calculated from SOK and UNDP (2002).

Between 1975 and 1980, Yugoslavia as a whole suffered a severe economic contraction which saw unemployment in Kosovo rise to chronic levels of 27.5 %, three times greater than elsewhere in the country. From the 1980s onwards, the exclusion of Kosovo increased once more at the national level which, combined with the new Serbian nationalism associated with the rise of Slobodan Milosevic, led to widespread concern and unrest emerged in Kosovo. In 1981, there were student riots by educated Albanians seeking increased job opportunities. Despite economic investment packages designed to improve the lot of the poorer provinces, including Kosovo, its economic performance continued to decline. Modern development was concentrated in the Northern provinces, whilst federal funds for Kosovo increasingly funded only the lifestyles of the Serbian elite. At the same time, the province was politically marginalised as the new Serbian Nationalists in Belgrade sought to centralise government and exert the political dominance of the Serbs, epitomised by Milosevic's inflammatory 1987 speech, telling the Serbs of Kosovo that 'no-one would be allowed to beat them'.

As tensions worsened, Belgrade reacted to the situation in Kosovo by imposing martial law, incarcerating academics, dismissing professors, reducing student enrolment, eliminating specified university courses, and discouraging educational contacts with Albania. By March 1989, Serbia had ended the existing autonomy of the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, and increased its power at the expense of the other Yugoslav republics. In 1990, amid a harsh campaign of repression from Serbia, the Kosovo assembly declared independence, but this was only recognised by Albania. Belgrade promptly dissolved the assembly.

The following year, events in Kosovo were overshadowed by the outbreak of civil war elsewhere in Yugoslavia. During the first phase of the Balkan Wars, Kosovo adopted a strategy of quiet passive resistance away from the centre of attention. Belgrade, however, continued to view Kosovars (ethnic Albanians) as Serbian due to their 'historical right' which superseded any claim to self determination. (Judah, 2002: pp.59-60) Despite the lack of overt conflict, Kosovo was increasingly perceived as a threat due to the growing presence of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army), an ethnic Albanian paramilitary group, which emerged publicly in 1996. As conflict intensified and allegations of the massacre of Albanians by Serbian police emerged, the international community interceded in 1998 to bring about a ceasefire. After Serbia refused to comply

with the terms of the deal, however, NATO intervened militarily in March 1999. Currently administered by the UN, Kosovo remains officially a part of Serbia, but with promises of self-determination the future status of the province remains unclear.

What is most marked in this brief overview of Kosovo's position within Yugoslavia is the extent to which the all-too-brief middle period, when the Yugoslav regime sought to redress the historical exclusion of Kosovo, met with a good deal of success. Political autonomy and development investment appears to have dulled the claims of separatism and the potential for violent conflict in the province.

7.2 Kosovo under the UN

It is unsurprising that, with Kosovo effectively being administered as an separate political entity from Yugoslavia since 1999, the Albanian population quickly improved its relative position within the province. New evidence, however, suggests that there remain high levels of social exclusion in Kosovo, both along urban-rural lines, but also in relation to the smaller communities in the province, including the Roma.

Table 4: Kosovo - Human development indicators by major ethnic group, 2004

	Life Expectancy Index	Education Index	Income Index	HDI	HDI Relative to National	HPI	HPI Relative to National
Albanian	0.760	0.924	0.393	0.692	1.018	10.14	1.049
Serb	0.765	0.954	0.426	0.715	1.051	6.70	0.694
RAE ¹⁵	0.746	0.758	0.230	0.578	0.850	12.43	1.287
Others	0.766	0.914	0.360	0.680	1.000	5.72	0.592
Rural	0.718	0.758	0.370	0.615	0.904	15.59	1.614
Urban	0.767	0.914	0.418	0.700	1.029	4.39	0.454
Kosovo	0.766	0.914	0.360	0.680	-	9.66	-

Source: UNDP 2004

Table 4 reproduces the main components of the 2004 UNDP Human Development Index in Kosovo. The position of the Kosovo Albanians is ambiguous. Whilst Albanians still lag significantly behind the Serbian population in all component HDI indices, they also score *higher* than the national average (which includes low-achieving groups such as the Roma and Ashkali), in all except the Life Expectancy Index. However, they score worse than the national level in the Human Poverty Index. Most striking here is the level of unemployment among the Albanian population, which stands at a staggering 45.9%, compared to the 30.2% for the Serbian population. Also worth noting is that whilst enrolment in primary schooling is broadly similar between the Serb and Albanian populations, the Albanian secondary enrolment rate, at 75.4%, is significantly lower than the Serb rate of 86.2%.

¹⁵ RAE: Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian.

**Table 5: Kosovo - Educational attainment by major ethnic group and urban-rural strata
(% of relevant age cohort)**

	Literacy Rate	Primary Enrolment	Secondary Enrolment	Combined Enrolment	Mean Years of Schooling
Albanian	94.1	95.9	75.4	88.9	9.3
Serb	97.5	94.0	86.2	91.1	10.6
RAE	83.4	75.6	29.8	60.5	6.9
Others	93.1	95.5	71.4	88.2	8.6
Rural	93.9	95.8	70.8	87.3	9.0
Urban	94.5	95.0	81.0	90.1	9.9
Kosovo	94.2	95.4	75.2	88.5	9.4

Source: UNDP 2004

Given the fact that the Albanian population is now politically dominant and that, if anything, the Serb population may be at risk of exclusion, the continuing poor performance of the Albanian population in relation to the Serbs points to the degree to which the impacts of social exclusion persist even after the process of exclusion itself is halted.

In many ways more disturbing than the continuing exclusion of the Albanian population, however, is the dire performance of the smaller minorities in virtually all development indices. Education, health, and poverty rates are all far worse among the smaller minorities than either the Albanian majority or the larger Serb minority. The processes of social exclusion over the past two decades have clearly resulted in high and durable social-economic horizontal inequalities in Kosovo. As long as the province's future status remains uncertain, the risk remains that these inequalities will lead to renewed violence and, indeed, the International Crisis Group has placed Kosovo on its Crisis Watch list for 2005 (ICG 2005).

8 Nepal

Nepal has experienced an internal conflict of escalating intensity since 1996. The conflict is led by Maoists and has widespread support among the deprived sections of the population, notably in the hills and among the lower castes, which have suffered from a long history of social exclusion.

A landlocked Himalayan country previously ruled by an absolute monarch until a democratic system was introduced in 1991, Nepal is composed of seventy-five districts spread across five 'development zones': Eastern, Central, Western, Mid-Western, and Far Western, and three ecological zones divided among mountains, hills, and plains, or Tarai.

The Maoists evolved from one of Nepal's far left parties, the Samyukta Jana Morcha Nepal (SJMN) or United People's Front Nepal when it splintered into factions in late 1993. The splinter groups led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal, better known as Comrade Prachanda or "the fierce one", called itself CPN-Maoist. Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, the former convenor of the SJMN, emerged as the speaker and ideologist of this new party. They designed their rhetoric in anti imperialist, anti-monarchist, and anti-feudal language designed to attract lower caste and rural families who had long felt that the Kathmandu elite had neglected them. (Nepal Research 2005)

After the downfall of the Adhikari government in September 1995, the government's violent attempts to suppress the first rebel incursions served only to enhance and motivate the organisational strengths of the Maoists and to increase their popularity among the local population dramatically. By 1995 they publicly advocated violence as

the best means of achieving a Maoist doctrine of revolution through a “people’s war”. Similar to Peru’s Shining Path rebel strategy of destroying government institutions and replacing them with revolutionary peasant regimes, they too were characterised by ruthless and violent forms of rough justice (Nepal Research 2005; ICG, 2003).

From 1996 to 2001 fighting took place primarily between the police and Maoists, but following a failed attempt to negotiate peace in 2001 the number of conflict-related deaths increased, as did widespread human rights abuses such as the murder, rape and torture of civilians by the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA) and the use of civilians as human shields by the Maoists. When the conflict resumed after a seven month ceasefire and peace talks in 2003, the Maoists strategy appeared to have evolved. Moving away from mass attacks on district police and army headquarters, they have increasingly focused on attacks executed by smaller cells. This has included increased urban assassinations of army, police and party officials in an effort to tie security forces down in the cities. The Maoists have also expanded their activities into eastern Nepal and the Terai, the flatlands that border India. The RNA, having significantly upgraded its firepower and improved army base defence during the ceasefire has claimed a number of successful military offensives against the insurgents (ICG, 2003b). As of 2004, it was been estimated that the Maoists have increased their numbers to between 10 to 15,000 fighters, are active across the country and have many areas under their control (BBC, 2005).

Social exclusion is entrenched in Nepal and has been a fundamental reason for Maoist support. Exclusion is along overlapping caste, ethnic and geographic lines. Abrupt political transitions and inexperience with democratic processes in general tend to exacerbate entrenched social exclusions within society (Gradstein and Milanovic, 2004). In Nepal this has been demonstrated in areas of both caste and ethnicity. In Nepal, the Bahun, Chetri and Newari groups are the Nepalese equivalent to the upper caste Brahmins, while the ethnic groups in the hills, mountains and the Tarai make up the lower castes. The equivalent untouchable group in Nepal is referred to as the “occupational castes”. Ethnic identities overlap with the caste system, as those who are not members of the elite Bahun-Chetri-Newari groups also belong to different ethnic background from them.

Inter-group inequality with both ethnic and caste dimensions have played major roles in motivating and sustaining the conflict. There are also marked regional dimensions in inequality as evidenced by human development indicators and land holdings, with relative poverty in the mid and far western regions of the country. When broken down by district in 1996, Mid-Western districts such as Rolpa, Jajarkot and Salyan had 25, 19, and 17% of the average income in the capital city of Kathmandu, while the Far-Western district of Achham had an average income of 24% of the Kathmandu level. The human development index (HDI) showed significant regional differences as well with Rolpa, Jajarkot, Salyan, and Achham showing 45%, 44%, 35% and 39% respectively of the HDI indicators achieved in Kathmandu. Nepal improved its overall HDI between 1996 to 2000, primarily because of a rise in adult literacy rates. However, at the same time (1996 to 1999), GDP per capita worsened in Far-Western and Mid-Western regions, which are the areas where the current Maoist struggle originated.

The upper castes of Bahun-Chetri-Newar, comprising 37% of the population, have an HDI indicator of about 50% more than the hill and Tarai ethnic groups and members of the occupational castes. The per capita income of the hill ethnic groups is about 55% of that of the Newaris. (Gates and Murshed, 2005). Rural poverty has been rising from 33% in 1976/7 to 39% in 2001/2, while urban poverty is much lower at around 20%, and has been falling. Income distribution appears to have worsened (Karmacharya and Sharma 2003). Poverty in the areas of the mountains and hills of the mid- and far-west is

estimated to range from 66% to 80%, compared with a national average of 45% (Panday, 2000).

These sharp inequalities reflect both economic and political factors. Nepal's development process has neglected agriculture, and rural poverty is exacerbated by high levels of landlessness, despite some unsuccessful attempts at land reform in the 1950s and 1960s. Loopholes allowed large landowners to continue to control most land. According to the 2001 census 1.2 million, or around one quarter of the total households in Nepal, do not own land. (Gates and Murshed, 2005). Unfair practices associated with landlessness are integral to a rural indentured labour system known as Kamaiya which is widespread in the poorest regions of Tarai and Mid-Western Nepal. Having historical roots in a system of unpaid labour services compulsory to all castes with the exception of Bahuns and Chetris, the modern form of this system is tied to a debt system known as saunki, that forces debtors to fulfil a monetary obligation through allocated labour. Although this system was officially abolished in 2000, rising indebtedness has led to allowed the original landlords again to secure control over the land that had been redistributed to the rural labourers in the land reform. In the past the government of Nepal reinforced this system by using landlords to collect taxes from both peasants and small landholders. But democratic institutions have not materially changed the system.

There is also inequality in access to formal sector jobs. Civil service employment reflects caste differences. Bahun-Chetri-Newar dominate the highest job levels such as the Secretary and Joint Secretary as 87% of all graduates originate in the higher castes. Many jobs are said to be allocated according to connections. Democratisation in 1990 appears to have increased corruption and nepotism, and weakened legal institutions (Panday 2002).

The Maoist insurgency appeals to ethnic liberation movements and promises to right widespread injustices driven by caste, geography and minority status have a strong attraction. Many Nepalese feel that they have been the victims of poor governance, neglect, and systemic inequalities. The Maoist ideology of the insurgent rebels incorporates the politics of class struggle and rejects elite group domination of political and economic processes. The geographic and caste support for the rebellion corresponds to patterns of social exclusion, with the greatest support for Maoist fighters in the rural areas most affected by exclusionary practices.

Despite their violent tactics, for many the Maoists offer the only alternative to a very exclusionary economic system. The elite castes have continued to dominate the government, and have shown little interest in developing inclusive state institutions and practices. In Katmandu, there have been complaints that if one does not belong to the Brahmin or Chetri caste, it is impossible to be given access to, or to do business with, the government. As the President of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) stated: How do you expect social peace and harmony to prevail in a socio-political system which increasingly generated poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and all round underdevelopment for more than ninety percent of the toiling population in mostly rural areas and filthy richness and extravagences for a handful of parasitic class'.

Nepal has been put on the Crisis Watch List for deteriorating trends in conflict situations. It seems likely that neither the rebels nor the government military can achieve a decisive victory, while the government's room for negotiation has been restricted by the king's assumption of executive powers after parliament was suspended in October 2002. This reinforces and extends political exclusion. Recently, the rebels demanded that elections should be held to form a constitutional assembly, which would then draft a new constitution including deciding the fate of the monarchy. The royal-appointed government has said that it does not see any justification for creating an assembly and

that it would allow the existing constitution to be amended but nothing more, i.e. leaving the issue of the monarchy unaddressed. More recently, the king appears to have bowed to intense protests and agreed to reinstate parliamentary democracy, although events are still developing at a fast rate as of writing.

9 Peru¹⁶

Between 1980 and the first half of the 1990s, Peruvian population was immersed in a climate of violence and terror, mainly caused by two terrorist movements (“Sendero Luminoso” - or Shining Path - and the “Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement”) as well as the military¹⁷. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission estimates a total of 70,000 deaths were caused by political violence between 1978 and 2000. According to the TRC, one fourth of the captured terrorists were indigenous¹⁸, 76% had secondary education or higher (48% had tertiary education) and just 22% of them were peasants. However, 80% of the reported victims were indigenous, 50% were peasants, and 68% hadn’t reached secondary education, although the figures for the victims can be considered as lower limits¹⁹. What roles did SE play in these outcomes?

9.1 Social exclusion in Peru: An approach to its magnitude and evolution

SE is a structural characteristic of indigenous people in Peru. This condition was inherited from the colonial times, when the Spaniards established a regime of exploitation and semi slavery throughout the Viceroyalty of Peru. Independence came, but the situation did not change. Whilst indigenous people formed an important part of the troops (on both sides) they were not part of the top ranks. The leaders on both sides were white, with the consequence that Independence did not change the situation of SE for Peruvian indigenous people.

Over the 184 years of life of the Peruvian republic, twelve constitutions have been written, containing different policies towards indigenous people, but most of them remained in the paper. This led the Peruvian historian Jorge Basadre to develop his famous distinction between “Formal Peru” and “Real Peru”. On the one hand, “Formal Peru” is the country embodied and described in the constitutions. It is an inclusive country: everybody is entitled to education and health services; there is no discrimination in the labour market; every adult can participate in the electoral process; and every person is equal before the law.

On the other hand, “Real Peru” is completely different. Table 1 and Graph 1 depict partial images of it. Table 6 shows that the ethnic origin of an individual is a determinant of the years of schooling she will acquire as well as the job she will get. The universe is the occupied economically active population aged 25 or older (OEAP25+). For example,

¹⁶ This section draws heavily on Figueroa and Barron (2005)

¹⁷ Since Sendero Luminoso and the military together account for more than 85% of the victims in the TRC database, the analysis in this section will be centred on these two organisations. The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement was initially inspired in the Cuban revolution, and as such it tried to differentiate from Sendero. Nevertheless, in an effort to become a main actor in the internal conflict, its leaders started subordinating their actions to the logic of war, and ended up committing 1.8% of the human rights violations between 1980 and 2000 (TRC 2001).

¹⁸ Defined as those who had an aboriginal language as mother tongue.

¹⁹ The estimate of 70,000 deaths was reached crossing different databases and measuring the probability of a victim being reported in any of them. The 80% figure refers to reported victims with an aboriginal language as mother tongue, but as stated in Figueroa and Barron (2004), many indigenous people have Spanish as a mother language. So, the real share of indigenous population in the database should be higher. Furthermore, it seems plausible that indigenous population (which highly overlaps with peasantry and low education) have a lower probability of being reported, so the share of indigenous, peasants and undereducated victims should be higher for the unreported victims than for the reported ones. The database contains 23, 149 victims, which leaves around 45,000 unreported victims (two thirds of the total estimate).

the first cell says that 57% of the OEAP25+ born in Lima-core (the white area of Lima) were white collar workers, and had on average almost 16 years of schooling. The most striking fact in Table 6 is the regional ladder of opportunity that appears when human capital is taken into account. Lima-core is on the highest step, followed by the mestizo (Lima-periphery and the main inner cities) and the indigenous regions. Note also that the median Lima-core individual would be in the high class, the median individual from Lima-periphery, the main inner cities and the rest of the Coast would be in the middle class, and for the Amazonian and the Andes, the median person would be in the low class. Another striking fact in this table is that even though all the ethnic groups have *some* people in the white collar category, the share diminishes as the regions start becoming “more indigenous”. Note also that the opposite happens with the share of population in the underclass.

Figuroa and Barron (2005) present further evidence showing that the people born in the Andes (and especially, the Southern Andes²⁰) are the worst affected by SE. Their results suggest that the region of birth, as a proxy to ethnic background, is a strong determinant of the education that a person will acquire during his lifetime, and by this means, the labour category he will reach, even after controlling for other factors such as current place of residence.

Lacking a better indicator, the historical equivalent of Table 6 may be approximated by the evolution of illiteracy rates. Figure 4 shows the illiteracy rates for all the national censuses, comparing the evolution of the national rate and the rate for the Southern Andes between 1876 and 2003²¹. Although there has been progress, it has been biased. Clearly, illiteracy rates have been diminishing both at the national level and in Southern Andes, but the ratio between the Southern Andes and the national rate shows an upward trend, at least from 1876 to 1981. From 1981 onwards, the ratio seems to have flattened and is probably even diminishing. Whether this constitutes a definitive turning point or not is not yet known. However, this graph has a stark message: the gap is certainly nowhere close to disappearing.

9.2 Social exclusion as a generator of violence and insecurity

Two of the most distinguished political leaders of the 1920s, Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, and shortly after, Jose Carlos Mariátegui, made the problem of land concentration a political issue. Thirty years later, some guerrilla movements made the agrarian-question their rallying cry against the system. As a consequence of the political instability generated by these movements, in 1968 Juan Velasco Alvarado led a coup d'état that ended with the establishment of the so-called *Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces*. As part of his program, Velasco implemented a massive land reform program between 1969 and 1975. The program had as slogan “land to the tiller”, benefiting workers of the huge *haciendas*, who were mostly mestizos. However, since most indigenous people worked on their own minifunda and on communal lands, the program did not benefit them.

Another objective of Velasco's government was improvement in the education system. However, like all the preceding attempts to reduce SE in Peru, it was an incomplete programme: the expansion of education did not have any correlate in job opportunities, hence creating a strong feeling of discontent amongst the people that reinforced that generated by the failure of the Land Reform Program. Maybe the most important difference between the failure of Velasco's program and the failure of all the others that

²⁰ “Southern Andes” includes essentially the Andean parts of Apurímac, Ayacucho, Cusco, Huancavelica, and Puno.

²¹ The figures for 2003 are estimates from the 2003 Enaho, a national household survey.

preceded it is that Velasco's program generated what might be called a "critical mass" of educated and socially excluded individuals, who were capable of and had incentives to promote social mobilisation in order to get what they thought they deserved.

Abimael Guzman, the top leader of the Sendero Luminoso (SL), used this climate as a breeding ground to sow his ideas. He recruited his first followers in Ayacucho in the late 1970s, where "Fourth World" conditions of infant mortality and life expectancy prevailed (Starn, 1995). Educated elites of Ayacucho, under his lead, started visiting villages and communities, selling the idea of a new order where everyone would share the same rights. To achieve this new order, a new State was required and the old State had to be destroyed. And the old State was depicted as being constituted by landholders, big enterprises, or even the – relatively – wealthier peasants.

In the early 1980s, SL started to gain supporters with a simple strategy: treating them as equals: that is, with inclusion policies. In each region, SL tried to take advantage of existing conflicts, such as marginality and poverty, the demand for redistribution of land, the absence of the State, the inequities of the judicial system, the absence of government institutions, and the dominance of drug-dealers (TRC, 2002). The relationship between all these issues and SE is straightforward. So, in its first stages SL used SE as a tool to recruit people and to gain public sympathy²². Most of the testimonies gathered by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission describe the first members of SL highlighting their willingness to listen the local problems, and even showing respect towards the local people and local authorities, in contrast with the characteristic disrespect shown by police officials and central government authorities (TRC, 2002). Violent acts, such as public killings, were not used widely at the first stages.

Around the mid 1980s, SL increased its pressure on the population. The killing of local authorities began to be a commonplace. Forced recruitments and administering the death penalty to people showing divergent opinions started to be the norm. On the other hand, on the government side, the military constituted a ladder of social mobility. Although it applied drastic measures against those who didn't participate in the patrols, the military started to adopt an inclusive rhetoric (Starn, 1996). So the military used the same strategy to gain the support of the people as the SL: inclusive policies, though with some degree of coercion. The result of both the disenchantment with SL and the more positive relationship with the military was the emergence of the *rondas campesinas*, or peasant patrols, which were a key factor in the final victory over SL in the first years of the 1990s.

9.3 Conclusion

SE was used at first by SL and afterwards by the military to gain the support of the peasantry. During the first half of the 1980s, SE was used by SL to recruit followers, initially with inclusive policies (promises of a new order) and afterwards with coercive methods. The use of violence against indigenous people was convenient for SL because the state did not respond to violence towards socially excluded individuals in the same way as in relation to "proper" citizens²³. At this stage, the military used violence against

²² Maybe one of the most significant proofs of the initial sympathy towards SL occurred in 1982, when around thirty thousand Ayacuchans went to the funerals of a young female SL militant who had been killed by the police.

²³ In fact, racism in Peru led the public opinion to neglect and underestimate the killings of indigenous people for over a decade (TRC 2002)

peasants who were suspect of being terrorists, especially with non-Spanish speakers²⁴. A turning point was reached in the mid 1980s. By this second stage, the military had become a source of social mobility, and it had started to use inclusive policies to attract and organise the peasantry in the fight against SL, while the latter had largely stopped its inclusive policies and increased its emphasis on violence and the generation of terror.

As may be seen, SE had a role as a generator of violence, because SL was initially formed by socially excluded individuals who wanted to create a new order. Nevertheless, the main role of SE was as a generator of insecurity: both the terrorist groups and the military committed abuses against the socially excluded population over the whole period of violence - they accounted for the great majority of the victims.

Table 6: Peru – Mean years of schooling by ethnic group (place of birth) and occupational category, 2002

		Lima-core	Lima-periphery	Main inner cities	Rest Coast	Amazonian	Northern and Central Andes	Southern Andes
<u>High class</u>								
White collar	Mean yrs.	15.9	14.5	14.9	13.9	14.5	14.2	13.8
	% of pop.	57.6	42.6	31.7	19.4	14.2	11.7	10.2
Self-employed	Mean yrs.	14.0						
	% of pop.	30.4						
<u>Middle class</u>								
Blue collar	Mean yrs.	10.6	11.2	9.8	9.3			
	% of pop.	12.0	21.7	19.1	26.1			
Self-employed	Mean yrs.		11.9	10.1	9.2			
	% of pop.		35.7	41.6	39.8			
<u>Low class</u>								
Blue collar	Mean yrs.					8.1	7.9	7.9
	% of pop.					13.5	15.3	15.0
Self-employed	Mean yrs.					8.4	7.7	7.6
	% of pop.					32.4	30.1	29.8
<u>Underclass</u>								
Self-employed	Mean yrs.			5.5	6.1	6.0	4.5	4.4
	% of pop.			7.6	14.7	39.8	42.9	45.0
<u>All classes</u>	Mean yrs.	14.7	12.8	11.2	9.7	8.3	7.1	6.8
	% of pop.	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Notes:[1] Classes of human capital: High: post high school studies; Middle: senior years of high school; Low: junior years of high school; Underclass: elementary school. [2] Category "Big employer" has been ignored due to its very small size. Categories "other" and "No data" have been ignored. [3] Category "small employer" has been added to "self employed". [4] Categories "Self employed - Urban" and "Self employed - Rural" have been merged in regions A1 and A2 because they represent less than one percent of the population in those regions. Source: Enaho 2002 (Figuerola and Barron 2005, Table 2C)

²⁴ Surprisingly as it may sound, the TRC reports many cases where aboriginal speakers were interrogated by the military in Spanish. The consequences of the lack of answers ranged from several degrees of torture to death or several years in jail




Figure 4: Peru – Evolution of the illiteracy rate, 1876-2003

Notes: [1] Includes departments of Apurimac, Ayacucho, Cusco, Huancavelica and Puno. Source: National Censuses of 1876, 1940, 1961, 1972, 1981, 1993, (Figuerola and Barron 2005, Table 3C) and 2003 Enaho.

10 Sierra Leone

From 1991 to 2002 Sierra Leone suffered a civil war of extreme violence between government forces and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). After a protracted process of negotiations, a peace agreement was followed by national elections in May 2002. Consistently rated as one of the world's poorest countries, both before and after the conflict, it ranks bottom on the 2005 United Nation's Human Development Index of 177 countries, with UNICEF rating Sierra Leone as having the worst infant mortality in the world recorded at 284 deaths per 1000 live births in 2004. (TRC, 2004: p.3; CIA, 2004).

The country is populated by a total seventeen different ethnic groups. With total population of five million (1995) the largest groups are the Temne to the North, the Mende to the South, and the Krios (descendants of freed slaves). (Moyo, 2003: pp.4-7) The predominant religion is Muslim (60%), followed by a minority of Christians (30%) and "indigenous beliefs" (10%). The Mende region includes one of the largest rural Christian populations outside urban areas in Sierra Leone. Peaceful religious coexistence has been cited as a "long-term feature of family and community life in the area". The RUF took special care never to risk religious hostilities, especially within their camps where they required followers to pray daily as "either Muslims or Christians". The RUF leader Foday Sankoh claimed allegiance to both faiths and the Freetown press called him a "Mustian". (Archibald and Richards, 2002: p.354).

Issues of ethnicity in Sierra Leone particularly concern economic and political dominance by members of the Creole community, repatriated freed slaves who represent less than 10% of the population, and immigrants who total about 60,000 Krios, 4,000 Lebanese, 500 Indians, and 2,000 Europeans. These are mainly located in the relatively privileged urban areas.

Approximately two thirds of the population are subsistence farmers relying on rice, cassava, potatoes and cash crops such as cocoa and coffee. The most important natural resource is diamonds found primarily in the Eastern Province. However the widely held perception that the conflict was fought over possession of diamonds is only partly true.

(TRC, 2004: p.5; Gberie, 2004) Rather, the war has been argued to be the result of a breakdown in patrimonial redistribution patterns due to a sharp decline in internal distribution of resources during the 1980s. A long established pattern of political elites securing support by distributing resources generated by international aid and other external sources was severely disrupted by the ending of the Cold War which was accompanied by reductions in aid and increases in requirements of accountability for expenditures by international donors. (Richards, 1996: p.xvii). Lack of economic opportunities for youth, particularly, with poor education and very limited employment opportunities, made joining fighting forces an attractive alternative.

Problems of social exclusion began early in Sierra Leone. Under colonial rule, a pattern of informal market-state relationships evolved based on extraction of mostly unprocessed raw materials. These shadow markets combined with widespread corruption among government politicians and traditional chiefs to “create deep pools of resentment among those excluded from this system of profit and power”. (Reno, 1995: p.3; Keen , 2001: p.157) . Following independence from Britain in 1961, the formal economy was organised on patrimonial lines, with the benefits of aid and other government resources mainly going to government supporters. Moreover, President Siaka Stevens of the All People’s Congress (APC) established a one party repressive dictatorship. A 2005 APC website claimed that Stevens tried to downplay ethnic divisions by keeping his tribal origins ambiguous so that no one really knew to which ethnic group he belonged. (APC 2005) Under his rule, the constitution was amended in 1978 and all political parties, other than the ruling APC, were banned. Both political and economic systems remained unchanged in the subsequent presidency of Joseph Momoh who was appointed by Stevens. (Banat, 2002,942-3). State based control and distribution of these resources was used to strengthen and mobilise socio-economic and political dominance, and have been seen as a key source of ethno-regional inequality. (Moyo, 2003, 19,45) During the 1970s and 1980s formal government institutions began to lose control over economic activity which increasingly fell outside official regulations.

Generous external credit, however, allowed the government to continue using state resources to win political support. Diamond production came under the control of a small group of Lebanese traders who were allies of President Siaka Stevens who himself accumulated a large personal fortune during this time. Around 70% of all exports were estimated to have left the country through unofficial channels leading to a steep decrease in state revenues. By the early 1980s Stevens’ non-budgeted discretionary spending – which could be directed towards his supporters - had reached more than 60% of total expenditure. Development spending accounted for only 3% of the overall budget by 1984. Poor service provision combined with the elite’s exploitation of Sierra Leone’s mineral resources and wealth, and widespread corruption, made it one of the world’s poorest countries. Development was very limited and uneven. (Keen 2001: pp.15, 158-9) In particular, there was sharp rural/urban difference in access to sources of income, social services, and education. (Moyo, 2003: pp.46,71)

In 1989, 76% of the rural population were below the poverty line, compared with 53% of the urban population. The national poverty rate was estimated at 68%. In 1996-1997, only 21% of the rural population had access to safe drinking water, compared to 58% of the urban population. Access to sanitation fell along the same lines with coverage of only 8% of the population in the rural areas. The urban coverage was double that at 17%, still very low. Only 2% of the total population were enrolled overall in both primary and secondary schools. (Moyo, 2003: p.71) The lack of access to educational resources, along with other injustices, has been consistently cited as one of the key motivations for youth supporting the RUF. (Archibald and Richards, 2002).

Overall, it seems the youth in Sierra Leone who experienced the highest degree of marginalisation. Across the board, data gathered from all sides of the conflict – villagers, RUF and Civil Defence Force (CDF- a militia formed in 1996 from earlier village based ant-RUF vigilante groups) fighters – has corroborated the significance of a combination of poverty and injustice as strongly affecting youth and motivating them to fight. This was made worse by a breakdown in patrimonial values that had previously ensured access to education and jobs, and a biased justice system where older rural chiefs manipulated the justice system against male youths (Archibald and Richards, 2002: p.345).

The rebellion began with the 1991 RUF invasion of Sierra Leone from their base in Liberia. Travelling to Libya and Liberia, Sierra Leonean political exiles and economic refugees developed into hardened fighters under the leadership of Foday Sankoh, with many fighting alongside the Liberian revolutionary forces under the command of Charles Taylor. Many of the early RUF rebels had fought in the Liberian war directed against civilians and the earliest RUF force in 1991 was encouraged and supplied by Charles Taylor, leader in the Liberian civil war. At that point, the RUF was made up of no more than one hundred or so rebels that consisted of Sierra Leoneans as well as Burkinabe and Liberian mercenaries. To increase their numbers, they sought to mobilise a “socially excluded youth underclass” to form a “people’s army” to overthrow the regime of President Joseph Momoh. (Peters et al, 1998: p.184).

The RUF forces saw themselves as “fighting for the interests of young men” (TRC, 2004: p.5) which gave them the opportunity to avenge their own and their families’ treatment by politicians arising from their exclusion from state and/or local strongmen patronage networks. They aimed to create a “fair and just society” (TRC, 2004: p.5). An assortment of dissidents who had not benefited from President Momoh’s patronage system also supported the RUF, including “chiefly families” who had been excluded from economic and status benefits of the prevailing government system of patronage. While it sought to portray itself as seeking major political change on a national level, in reality, however, the organisation served as a vehicle for a wide variety of Sierra Leonean groups whose participation and support served varying local and individual political and economic goals. (Keen, 2001a: p.160; Reno, 1998: p.124). It has been suggested that the RUF, by initially presenting the rebellion as an uprising by the Mende ethnic group, was trying to provoke some form of retaliation by the Sierra Leonean government against that group, with hope that this strategy would secure widespread Mende support for the RUF, in imitation of similar tactics used successfully in Liberia (Keen, 2001a: p.160).

The RUF built up its ranks of fighters through a form of conscription of young people amenable to the rebel political ideology, drawing upon youth who were left out of the official patronage system. Building upon a centuries old initiation rite prevalent in the western half of West Africa which separated young people from their immediate family in order to increase adult loyalty to a wider society, the rebels imitated this process by coercing male youths in the early stages of their initiation and then ensuring their loyalty with better treatment (Richards, 1996). They abducted and trained numbers of captured youth from the border areas, some of whom came from the most isolated and impoverished schools in the country.

As the war proceeded, young men were increasingly compelled to join one side or the other. Some were injected with drugs and forced to become combatants. Despite widespread abuse of girls and children, the majority of the war time violations reported to the TRC were against adult males (59.6%, 6816 violations out of 11429). Female victims reported to the Commission comprised 31.9% of adult victims but a higher proportion (44.9%) of the child victims (Gberie, 2004). Such violations were committed

by all the major parties to the conflict. (Gberie, 2004) After a protracted process of negotiations, a peace agreement was followed by national elections in May 2002.

While initially cooperating with the rebels in order to survive some found the aims of the RUF to be meaningful and came to support their cause. (Peters and Richards, 1998). Of the youths who joined the movement voluntarily, many referred to the lack of provision of adequate education as a primary motivation for fighting the government. Economic failure, political corruption, and structural adjustment undermined the already weak educational systems in Sierra Leone and as a result many young people felt they had not been adequately trained for entering a modern workforce. Both the rebel and the government army recruited from “educational drop-outs hustling for a living in border logging and mining camps”. (Peters and Richards, 1998: p.187)

The RUF repeatedly condemned government corruption, and the serious limitations in the health and education services. One anti-RUF militia fighter, while blaming the RUF for the loss of his home and educational prospects, nevertheless pointed out the failure of patrimonial politics as the cause of anger for many youths and their reason for joining rebel forces. (Peters and Richards, 1998: p.187) The patrimonial system offered diminished opportunities with increases in the youth population, a decline in the diamond economy and a sharp cut in aid budgets, post-Cold War. As a result many young people could not find the patronage they needed to pursue an education and to secure a first job (Archibald and Richards, 2002: p.355). Weak education and poor employment prospects and lack of educational opportunities left the young with very few legal economic opportunities.

Another area of social exclusion for male youths was the administration of justice in rural areas where there had never been comprehensive legal reform. Without a codified system, trial and judgements were highly subjective and considered to be “expensive, unpredictable and open to bribery”. Young men claimed they were subject to trumped up charges, “to extract a fine, or to teach them lessons in respect for their elders” (Archibald and Richards, 2002: p.344).

As the fighting continued recruitment became less ideologically driven and economic motives such as looting for food and cash gained prominence. During the war illegal mining and selling of conflict diamonds helped finance fighting by all parties – including the government and the Civil Defence Force (CDF), a pro-government militia better known as the Kamajors, as well as the RUF. (USAID, 2000; Tafirenyika, 2001; Gberie, 2004) A war economy developed with implicit collusion between the rebels and government soldiers as a way of benefiting from the illegal diamond trade, and also looting. The widespread perception that wealth in Sierra Leone had been gained through corruption lent a degree of legitimacy to practices of violence and robbery that might otherwise have been seen as unacceptable. (Keen, 2001a: p.162-3)

While illegal diamond mining and trading exacerbated the situation, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission concluded in 2004 that “exploitation of diamonds was not the cause of the conflict in Sierra Leone”, but rather an element that “fuelled the conflict” (Gberie, 2004). The TRC reported that “bad governance, endemic corruption and poverty, disenfranchised youth, a dictatorship that closed legitimate avenues of political expression, the dubious policies of the former colonial administration, uneven development in the country, capital punishment, a sclerotic elite, autocratic chiefs, a demented gerontocracy, and patrimonial politics” had laid the groundwork for a war that would have taken place “even without the existence of diamonds in the country”. (Gberie, 2004).

Sierra Leone has suffered from several types of exclusion that lie behind the fierce and prolonged conflict. First, is the general high levels of poverty and weak human development, which can be characterised as a type of global exclusion. Secondly, young men were excluded especially, lacking productive and fulfilling occupations. And thirdly, the political system was exclusive, with power enjoyed by a relatively small clique, which used its position to enrich supporters without regard to the well-being of the population. The peace agreements have partially addressed the issue of political exclusion, but poverty and lack of opportunity for young men remain. Although democratic elections have been introduced, the judiciary and law enforcement institutions remain weak, and, according to the International Crisis Group, there is still evidence that “voices from civil society who could catalyse real change tend to be marginalised. While the economy is left vulnerable to criminal capture” (Reuters, 2004). Consequently, the peace must be regarded as highly fragile.

11 Sudan

Sudan has only known one decade of peace since independence in 1956. There have been four military coups d'état since 1956. Two major conflicts are, first, the decades-long war between the government (representing the North) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) representing the South for which a peace agreement has just been concluded. This is sometimes depicted as a Muslim/Christian conflict. Overall, Arabs make up 39% and Africans 61% of the population in Sudan, while the Islamic religion is followed by 70% of the total population. (Macrae et al, 1997; Human Rights Watch, 2004). From 1991, there was increasing fractionalisation in the South with some fighting among southern groups. This had an ethnic dimension deliberately exploited by factions of the main civil war who supplied the splinter rebel and inter-communal fighting groups with weapons and resources to engage in “proxy wars”. A second major conflict recently erupted in Darfur, between two Muslim groups, settled farmers of African origin and nomadic groups of Arabic origin, the latter having government support. While the two conflicts have some things in common – a background of poverty and lack of opportunity, competition for resources and weak, corrupt and complicit government, it is helpful to analyse them separately given their very different histories.

11.1 The North/South divide

While the series of North/South wars internal wars have often been portrayed as resulting from a long standing religious confrontation between a northern Arab Islamic government and a Christian and Animist African minority who practice pastoral and agro-pastoralism in the South, regional social exclusion characterised by relative deprivation in access to political, social and economic resources, has been a primary motivation. Spoils from the war also played a role, with considerable advantages gained through exploitation of war-related aid, from looting etc., and from cheap labour supplied by the displaced.

Northern Sudan has a long history of exploitation and violent competition for resources in southern Sudan, with the Dinka, who live mostly in the south, particularly subject to repeated violence and exploitation. In the nineteenth century there had been widespread raiding for slaves and cattle that became a “major source of tribute for the Turko-Egyptian state” with slaves from the south providing much of the social and commercial infrastructure for large parts of northern Sudan. This took place at a time when a strong aspect of Islamic thought in effect divided the world into the domain of Islam, or Dar al-Islam, and the domain of war or Dar al-Harb, where taking slaves as the prize of war was permitted. Although there were efforts to abolish slavery, these rarely had an impact at the local level where bribes from slave merchants were given a blind eye from officials. This exploitation of the south also benefited the cattle-herding peoples

of western Sudan known as the Baggara who also raided for cattle and slaves over the same period (Keen, 1992).

The roots of the present series of conflicts can be traced back to the colonial era. When the British consolidated their rule over Sudan at the turn of the 20th century southern Sudan, the Dinka in particular, continued to be a target for social exclusion, exploitation, and “man-made famine”. The continued Baggara raiding on the Dinka was also tolerated as a way of defusing their potential as a political threat (Keen, 1992). While the British attempted to reverse this situation in the last decade before independence, they were unsuccessful in instilling the sort of constitutional reform that could have remedied the “acute economic and social disparities” between the regions. (Save The Children et al, 2002)

In the post independence years, “Arabization” of the southern bureaucracy and education had provoked resentment in the south. The continued inability of subsequent post independence administrations “to address critical governance issues and to implement policies necessary for equity, inclusion and decentralisation of power” further exacerbated the economic, social, religious, and political divides between both regions. (Save The Children et al, 2002: p.8) For populations in the South, independence brought about a change in the dominating group rather than true independence and was perceived as a continued policy of cultural and religious subordination and social exclusion carried out through imbalances in government expenditures, the imposition of Sharia law, the abolition of the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement which had instituted safeguards against abuse of government military power, and increased abductions and discrimination experienced by displaced populations.

Imbalances in incomes and in the distribution of government resources and in health and education services continued, made worse by the destruction wreaked by war. In 1976 it was estimated that over 90% of the population of southern Sudan had never attended school. In 1988, per capita GDP in the South was estimated at \$150 compared to \$320 for the country as a whole, while life expectancy was estimated to be just 36 for the South compared with 48 for the country as a whole (House, 1989: p.203; UNICEF, 1985). In 1984, there were 98 doctors per 100,000, but in Bahr-el-Ghazal and Upper Nile the ratios were 0.8 and 0.7 per 100,000. On aggregate, both social service availability and human indicators improved over the war period, partly due to generous aid, but inequalities worsened with the situation in the South deteriorating absolutely as well as relative to the North. The total number of health care facilities in southern Sudan fell from 821 in 1983 to 248 in 1988, then to an all time low of 116 in 1997, rising again to 270 in 2000, and to 500 in 2001. (Save The Children et al, 2002: pp.28-30). While 500 new wells were dug in Kordofan between 1983 and 1987 in the North, in Bahr-el-Ghazal, about 300 were lost over the same period (Twose and Poggrund, 1988: p.49). Very few schools remained in operation in the South by the mid-1990s; the majority had either been destroyed or turned into military barracks. National literacy rates were 43% for men and 12% for women in 1988 but 20% and 10% respectively in the South. A 1996 study for Oxfam suggests literacy in some Southern areas may have fallen to 15% for men and 1% for women (Peters, 1996: p.37). One observer commented in 1988, “although north Sudan (is) not exactly (a model) of development, the cities and towns and villages in the South have deteriorated to the point where they are practically unsuitable for human habitation” (Twose and Poggrund, 1988: p.9).

More recent figures indicate that regional inequality has persisted. In 2000, in the South only 18% of children between ages 5 to 14 were enrolled in school, compared with a national average of 46%. While in the North approximately 38% of the population was literate, the figure was under 15% in the South. Appalling health standards are experienced throughout most of Sudan. In many areas, primary health care is supplied

by privatized dispensaries which the poorest people cannot afford, leaving the 92% of the population below the poverty line unable to afford adequate treatment. Again deprivation is worse in the South. For example, in 2002, an average of 319 women died per 100,000 births in northern Sudan, while in government controlled areas of the south the rate was 763 per 100,000 births. The Northern State is reported to have 63 medical assistants and 126 nurses per 100,000, while South Darfur had 5 medical assistants and 16 nurses for the same population. The number of hospital beds per 100,000 population followed the same trend with the Northern State having 246, and South Darfur having 14. (WHO Sudan, 2003: pp.6-15). Less than 35% of the population in the south had access to adequate sanitation, compared with 62% in Sudan as a whole (Save The Children et al, 2002: pp.26-7). Vaccination rates among children vary dramatically according to region. Almost 90% of children in Khartoum have been inoculated for polio while only 18.1% have been protected in Western Darfur.

Southern areas can thus be represented as excluded relative to the North. But it must be reiterated that Northern standards themselves are very low. By global standards, most of the population could be regarded as excluded. Moreover, females were in a particularly poor situation, with sharp imbalances in education and in employment opportunities. The general lack of opportunities provided incentives for war on the part of both North and South. In each case, with few educational or other opportunities, young men, particularly, found joining fighting forces provided an opportunity for activity and relative enrichment. Perceived cultural and political exclusion further motivated Southerners. (WHO Sudan, 2003)

The decades-long civil war revolved around these issues, with Southern rebels seeking autonomy, to control and benefit from the extraction of their extensive natural resources, which had been historically “dominated by northern political and commercial interests”. (Macrae et al, 1997: p.224) Moreover, in the 1980s, first under President Nimeiri, then continued later, the Khartoum government provided militias, primarily composed of Baggara and the Anyana, with arms, ammunition, intelligence and immunity from prosecution, to raid the Dinka, Shilluk, and some sections of the Nuer areas as a cheap and politically convenient strategy for achieving its military and economic objectives. (Keen, 1992: p.13).

From 1999, the extraction of oil in the western Upper Nile largely financed the war on both the government and rebel side, while increasing the displacement of Nuer populations in the region. The government’s military expenditure doubled within two years due to oil revenues, but there was little evidence of additional investment in providing health and education services, or attempting to address poverty. Contestation for ownership of the oil fields also became a source of increased fighting, including bombing raids, helicopter gunship attacks, and human rights abuses leading to further internal displacement (Save The Children et al, 2002).

11.2 Darfur

Darfur has been home to a complex mix of peoples. There are at least 36 main tribes with estimates up to 90 if sub-divisions and clans are included. This mix is divided into two major groups, almost all Muslims, composed of Arabs and non-Arabs, Muslims described locally as “Zurga” or “blacks”. Centuries of co-existence and intermarriage have reduced physical differences, and group affiliation is according to the distinctions to the cultural identification or non-identification with the Arab world. (ICG, 2004: p.4)

Overall, Darfur is a very poor region depending almost entirely on subsistence agriculture and livestock herding for domestic and export purposes. The Furs and other groups of African ethnicity have farmed the most fertile areas of central Darfur for many

generations. Arab nomads traditionally took their livestock from the north to better water and grazing lands in southern Darfur annually, but for years they have been moving into southern Darfur earlier in the season, bringing them into conflict with the farmers whose crops have been trampled on and consumed by nomad groups' animals. In the 1990s African communities began organising self-defence groups against increasing incursions by armed Arab raiders from Northern Darfur. (Human Rights Watch, 2004)

The armed conflict that began in Darfur in 2003 was initially between an alliance of Sudanese government forces and ethnic Arab "self-defence militias"; and two non-Arab black African rebel groups the Sudanese Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/SLM), and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The rebels, linked to senior opposition politician Hassan al-Turabi, began the war by attacking military installations in the southwestern region of Darfur. They sought an end to the region's chronic economic and political marginalisation and took up arms to protect their community against a twenty year campaign by government militias in Darfur and Chad. This soon escalated and the Arab militias began to target civilians of African origin by militias, thus inflicting possibly irreparable damage on a delicate ethnic balance of seven million people who were all Muslim. The war has grown to embody three conflicts. One is between government-aligned forces and rebels; a second between raiding government militia and civilians; and a third among Darfur communities themselves. At the moment however, formerly warring groups, Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa have united under the rebels.

The Arab militia groups, the Murahaleen and Popular Defence Force (PDF) are mainly composed of armed horsemen from the Baggara pastoral tribes of Darfur and Kordofan. Instead of fighting against the rebels, the Arab militias and government forces have begun waging a systematic campaign against unarmed civilians who share the same ethnic background as the rebel groups – primarily Fur, Masaalit, and Zaghawa. Refugees maintain that after air raids by government aircraft, the Janjaweed ride into Dinka villages on horses and camels, looting, killing men, and raping and kidnapping women for use as sex slaves. (Human Rights Watch, 2004; Save The Children et al, 2002)

The roots of the current Darfur conflict are firmly planted in the first ethnic Fur-Arab conflict of 1987 to 1989. For several decades "traditional" conflicts over resources including livestock occurred within the major Arab and non-Arab groups as well as between them. However, such conflicts were generally sporadic with low levels of violence. But from the late 1980s, the conflicts became sustained and fierce with fighters identifying themselves under the overarching Arab or non-Arab identity. (IGC, 2004). In mid 1988, as raiding opportunities dried up in Bahr el Ghazal, many Baggara Arabs from south Darfur joined increased raids on the Fur of Darfur. The economic benefits, especially in cattle acquired, were significant. (Keen, 2001b)

Prior to this conflict, the Furs had a profitable farm and vegetable based livelihood which nomadic raiders disrupted by destroying fruit trees and burning irrigation pumps and tractors. The Arabs charged that the Fur were attempting to widen the "African Belt" around Jebel Marra by expelling all Arabs and denying them access to water and grazing lands. This claim originated with attempts by farmers to enclose lands that were not actively farmed called Zaraeib al Hawa (Empty Enclosures) in order to protect harvests from roaming herds that had been arriving earlier than had been agreed in previous tribal reconciliation treaties. While Arab extremists failed to produce any evidence of a Fur plan for an "African Belt" they subsequently focused on what they considered as a disproportionate number of appointments of Fur and other people of "African" origins to senior positions in Darfur's government by two earlier government administrations.

The Fur claimed the war against them was genocidal, fuelled by racism, and aimed at destruction of their economic base. While the raids in the 1980s focused on destroying Fur economic and social assets by burning hundreds of villages after evicting the inhabitants, there was no evidence of subsequent resettlement by nomadic groups. In contrast in the ongoing conflict, the indiscriminate attacks on civilians and widespread destruction of schools, clinics, wells, and irrigation pumps by the Janjaweed and the government in the current conflict indicate an intention to permanently displace the original inhabitants. (ICG, 2004).

In a way, social exclusion affects all parties to the conflict. West Darfur is a very impoverished area, and violence in the region has been attributed to the absence of development efforts and the shortcomings of government administration, including a weakening of the "native administration" systems that traditionally helped Darfur tribes regulate their affairs. (ICG, 2004: p.5). In Western Darfur, only 9% of school-age children were enrolled in 2001; the percentage of population with access to safe drinking water in 2001 was 29% in Western Darfur, compared with 93% in Khartoum and 39% in the White Nile. Adult literacy was estimated to be 29% in Western Darfur, compared with 75% in Khartoum. The poor provision of health services in South Darfur relative to the North has already been noted. The people of Ghebeshat in Northern Darfur have no local source of water at all, travelling up to seven hours into Chad to find water. Apart from the Zaghawa, who specialize in herding camels, the indigenous black African groups depend on subsistence farming and animal husbandry, while groups of Arab extraction live on camel herding in northern Darfur and cattle herding in southern Darfur. (ICG, 2004) Ecological decline and a lack of development in the region as a whole have combined to impoverish Darfur people of all ethnic backgrounds. (ICG, 2004). Some of the raiding by Baggera militia groups against the Dinka can be attributed to their own poverty and to ecological factors which have pushed Nomad groups southward in search of grazing lands and water. (Keen, 1992).

The Darfur Arab activists and Khartoum have encouraged a perception of the rebels, and the Zaghawa people in particular, as economically aggressive and politically overambitious. The Zaghawa are accused of harbouring similar ambitions in Chad where as in Sudan, they are only 1 per cent of the population. They are alleged to be pursuing their policies by a revival of a mythical Greater State of the Zaghawa that would straddle the border of the two countries. Violent conflicts between the Zaghawa and groups with Arab background occurred in both 1994 and 1997. The rebel groups currently opposing the government are dominated by Fur, Zaghawa, and Massalit fighters. (ICG, 2004)

The Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa have in turn complained of exclusion by the Sudanese government. The post 1989 administration in Khartoum, especially, has been perceived to favour the political and economic cause of Arab ethnic groups through administrative rules and other measures. (Human Rights Watch, 2004) The frustrations of an emerging elite among the Fur, Darfur's largest ethnic group may account for their disaffection. After World War II, many educated Fur learned Arabic in order to participate in the Arab-dominated political, bureaucratic, and economic structures but they did not succeed in gaining effective participation in government. Additionally, as cash crops were introduced, the Arabs and the Fur competed for scarce resources. The discovery of oil in the late 1970s also added a new resource dimension to the conflict. Opposition by the Nimeiri to Sharia law in 1983, and the later attempts at Islamization of the country, as well as the government's poor handling of the 1990 famine further increased Fur alienation from the national government. (LOC, 2005)

In 1994 the Sudan government redrew administrative boundaries dividing the region into Northern, Southern, Western Darfur effectively splitting the Fur and their centrally

located fertile plains among the three states. Instead of devolving power to the grassroots as the government proclaimed, the new system stretched the state's meagre resources thinly over a much inflated public sector and failed to deliver the anticipated basic social services. It was alleged that the government party, the National Islamic Front (NIF), intended to tighten its control. (ICG, 2004)

Social exclusion is certainly an important aspect of the Darfur conflict, although not in a straightforward way. What is at issue here is generalised deprivation. In a way each of the major parties to the conflict is excluded. Yet the Fur are seen by the Arab groups as relatively economically privileged, while the latter, themselves highly impoverished, are using the conflict to secure resources, and especially land, for themselves. At the root of much of the conflict is competition over fertile land and water, exacerbated by a process of desertification in northern Sudan and the drought that has affected Darfur off and on since the 1970s. (ICG, 2004) A government inspired (and financed) political agenda is also of critical importance in both initiating and sustaining the conflict. But the background of generalised exclusion facilitates an escalation of violence on both sides.

As noted earlier, both the Sudanese conflicts discussed share some common features; use of quite horrendous violence to help one group gain control over resources at the expense of another is common to both, so is the strong complicity of government. In addition, widespread impoverishment, particularly relative impoverishment, makes for willing fighters in each case. The government and the SPLA have agreed on an inclusionary peace deal that will include power-sharing and sharing of oil and non-oil revenues, thus potentially addressing the main causes of the conflict. But as of the end of 2004, the situation in Darfur, which has been described as one of the world's worst humanitarian crises by the United Nations, and has shown no signs of de-escalation. This conflict is not likely to end unless the government restrains the militias, which will only occur when they decide that their political objectives in supporting the conflict are either achieved or are too costly to achieve. The international community might have a role in raising the costs of continued violence. Social and politically inclusionary policies would then need to follow, including addressing the economic problems of the Arab population.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: When does SE lead to conflict

	Country examples: all experience some aspects of serious social exclusion						
	Countries suffering conflict				Countries avoiding conflict		
	Cote d'Ivoire, post Houphouet-Boigny	Sudan	Sri Lanka, past three decades	Guatemala, civil war period	Ghana, last twenty years	Bolivia	Malaysia
1. Dimensions and extent of SE							
Socio-economic	+	+	-	+	+	+	+(but moderated)
Political	+	+	+	+	-	?	?
Size of group excluded relative to total population	+	+(South) -(Darfur)	+	+	+	+	+
2. Nature of group							
United/fragmented	+.	+	+	+?	-	?+	+
Leadership	+	+ North	++	+	-	+	+
External support	?	+(north and South)	+ disapora	+	-	-	-
3. Nature of economy							
Stagnant	+	+	-	-	+/-	+	-
Resource rich	-	- until recently	-	-	-	- until recently	-
4. Nature of political system							
Extent of democracy	democracy introduced recently	?	democratic	democracy introduced recently	democracy introduced recently	democracy introduced recently	authoritarian democracy
5. Nature of government							
Exclusive/Benign and inclusive	- H- B + since then	+	+	+	-	- (but little econ. redistribution)	-

Note: + = factors likely to predispose to conflict, i.e. high SE; stagnant economy; resource riches; exclusive government.

Appendix 2: Examples of economic/social affirmative action

Country	Group categories	Prior group inequality	Nature of action	Consequences			
				HIs	Intra-group inequality	Special Problems	Political
Brazil	Whites (54%) Blacks and mixed race (45% - most mixed race).	Income/education/empl. favoured whites, plus many other inequalities. 1960-1988 worsening HIs	Some measures in 1990s. From 2001, reservation of proportion of govt. job training, govt. employment, university places. mainly favouring blacks.	too soon to tell. But could be at expense of mixed race.	too soon to tell	fuzzy group boundaries	Programmes presented discreetly. Too soon to assess political consequences.
Fiji	Indigenous Fijians (51%) and Indo-Fijians (43%)	Average income of Indo-Fijians above indigenous; but poverty worse among Indo-Fijians. Fijians dominate govt. employment and land ownership. Indo-Fijians dominate private sector.	Measures favour indigenous Fijians, including, restrictions on land ownership, loan schemes, equity schemes, support for small enterprise, reservation of some sectors, privatisation.	Not much evidence. Sharp HIs remain in some areas (e.g. corporate management).	Agreement that have enriched indigenous elite/middle class. Very slow economic growth.		An element behind successive coups whenever Indo-Fijians get power because fear elimination of programmes. Together with political situation, responsible for emigration of Indo-Fijians.

Country	Group categories	Prior group inequality	Nature of action	Consequences			
				His	Intra-group inequality	Special Problems	Political
India	<p>Scheduled castes (SCs) (16%)</p> <p>Scheduled tribes (STs) (8.5%)</p> <p>Other backward castes (OBCs) ??</p>	<p>Backward groups substantially below average in incomes, consumption, land ownership, education, etc.</p>	<p>Variety of educational, land and public sector job reservations.</p>	<p>Evidence of small positive impact on public investment, and incomes. Large improvements in education .</p>	<p>Has permitted a small segment of backward castes to move into middle class, but exclusion and abject poverty remains for most. No evidence of negative efficiency impact.</p>	<p>Difficult to assess how far improvements are due to programmes and how far to 'modernisation' and growth.</p>	<p>Has to be assessed together with strong political programmes. May have entrenched rather than reduced caste differences.</p> <p>Triggered riots in Bihar, 1978; and several times in Gujerat in 1980s. Geberal rise in violence against SCs has been attributed to programmes.</p>

Country	Group categories	Prior group inequality	Nature of action	Consequences			
				HIs	Intra-group inequality	Special Problems	Political
Malaysia	Bumiputeras 63% Chinese 30% Indians 8%	Incomes of Chinese more than 2 times Bumiputeras, 1970; and Indians 75% more.	Range of measures, including education, land ownership, govt. employment, share ownership, to improve bumiputera position	Reduction in HIs in education, incomes, corporate ownership, but quite large HIs remain in incomes/assets. Educ.differences being eliminated.	May have increased intra-Bumiputera inequality – although not much evidence. Inequality overall reduced. Accompanied by v. high growth.		No recurrence of anti-Chinese riots of 1969 including in the 1997 crisis when such riots occurred in Indonesia. May have increased ethnic consciousness and entrenchment.
Namibia	Black Africans (95%) Whites (5%)	Very large HIs on all dimensions at independence (1990)	Action on employment, land, loans, education	Improvements in public employment. Much less elsewhere	Black middle class benefited most.	Market model limits transformation.	

Country	Group categories	Prior group inequality	Nature of action	Consequences			
				HIs	Intra-group inequality	Special Problems	Political
New Zealand	New Zealand European 74.5%, Maori 9.7%	Significant HIs in every dimension	Support for Maori business and skills; and education.	Improvement in HIs in employment and educ. Gaps much lower than in Canada or Australia.			
Northern Ireland	Protestants (53%) Catholics (44%)	Catholics in worse position than Protestants in jobs, education, housing, police	From 1976 successive fair Employment Acts/Orders and other government action applying to private as well as public sector.	Reduction in HIs in all dimensions, although gaps remain. Share of Cs in 'monitored' private sector empl. rose from 35% (1990) to 41% (2002). Bigger improvement in public sector. In education Cs overtaking Ps.	Poverty levels above the UK, worse for Cs. Vertical inequality high.		Narrowing HIs likely to be behind peace process. But P's increasingly resentful; and argue that they are discriminated against which may present problems for political progress.

Country	Group categories	Prior group inequality	Nature of action	Consequences			
				HIs	Intra-group inequality	Special Problems	Political
South Africa	Black Africans(73%) Colored (9%) Whites (14%)	At end of apartheid huge HIs, in incomes, assets, employment, education, land..	Action in employment, assets, education.	Some improvement in HIs, but large differentials remain. Most improvement in public sector employment.	Increased intra-black inequality. Unemployment and poverty levels among blacks v. high.	Dominant market model restricts effectiveness of action, especially on assets.	Black/white political relations appear good. High levels of criminality. Potential political problems possible without faster progress.
Sri Lanka	Sinhalese (74%) Tamils (19%) Moslems (7%).	Colonial power favoured Tamils in education and civil service. Average incomes of Tamils a bit higher than Sinhalese	S. majority action on education and civil service (incl. requiring Sinhalese language to be used). State sponsored settlement of S in land previously occupied by Ts.	HIs changed sharply. In civil service employment now favoured S. Incomes of S rose and T fell, with S exceeding T.		Situation exacerbated by slow growth in employment.	Reaction of Ts to action was major factor behind civil war, and T. demands for independence of North East.

Country	Group categories	Prior group inequality	Nature of action	Consequences			
				His	Intra-group inequality	Special Problems	Political
US	Whites (82%) Blacks (13%)	Large HIs in incomes, education, health, assets etc.	Action in education, employment and housing	Small reduction in His	Increase in intra-black inequality. No evidence of negative efficiency impact, from numerous studies, and some found positive effects		Black riots (high incidence in 1970s) have stopped. Political and legal reaction from whites, challenging action.

Appendix 3: Examples of political action against horizontal inequality/social exclusion

Country	Ethnicity	Official language	Nature of state	Voting	Political parties	Govt.	Veto rights	Civil service	Conflict	Consequences
Belgium	Flemish 58%, Walloon 31%, mixed or other 11%	bilingual	Federal 2 regions, 10 provinces	PR	Mainly ethnic	Fixed ratios	De facto on big issues (2/3 majority)	Fixed ratios	avoided	Entrench ethnic identities
Bosnia-Herzegovina	Serb 37.1%, Bosniak 48%, Croat 14.3%, other 0.6% (2000)	Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian	Federal - two first-order administrative divisions and one internationally supervised district	PR	Some ethnic; some national	Power-sharing	De facto	'equitable representation'	Avoided to date (international military presence)	Entrench identities, plus bureaucratisation
Ethiopia	Oromo 40%, Amhara and Tigre 32%, Sidamo 9%	Amharic?? Right of each group to use own language	Ethnic Federalism (9 ethno-based states). States right to secession.	Majoritarian, boundaries drawn on ethnic lines. Reserved seats for minorities.	Some national; some ethnic	Prop rep. of ethnicities at each level of govt.		Aim for PR in all branches of govt.	1995 constitution designed to avoid conflict after Eritrean war. Border war with Eritrea, 1998-2000	

Country	Ethnicity	Official language	Nature of state	Voting	Political parties	Govt.	Veto rights	Civil service	Conflict	Consequences
Ghana	Akan (fragmented) 49.1% Mole Dagbani, 16.5% Ewe 12.7% Ga 8%	English	Unitary with provisions to curb ethnic polarization ; decentralisation	Majoritarian	Ethnic parties prohibited	No formal arrangements-informal balance	No	Informal sharing	Major conflict avoided	
India	Hindu 81.3% (SCs and STs 24.5%), Muslim 12%	Hindi	Federal - 28 states and 7 union territories	majoritarian	Some national; some ethnic	Quotas for SCs and STs in state legislatures and lower house of parliament, and some reservations for women in villages. Token representation of Moslems. SCs and STs not represented at high levels	No	Quotas for STs and SCs in civil service – but level not specified.	Sporadic of various kinds; especially Hindi/Moslem	Political position of SCs/STs seems to have improved economic position

Country	Ethnicity	Official language	Nature of state	Voting	Political parties	Govt.	Veto rights	Civil service	Conflict	Consequences
Malaysia	Bumiputeras 62% Chinese 27.8% Indians 9.6%	Bahasa Melayu	Federation	Majoritarian, but with informal agreements to assure ethnic representation	Mainly ethnic.	Ethnic corporatism, assured by national coalition (Barisan nasional) with Malays dominating through UMNO (United Malays National Organisation)	No	Malay dominated	Avoided since 1969	
Nigeria	Hausa, 21% Yoruba, 20% Igbo, 17% [aprox]	English	Federation, with increasing no. of states, reducing likelihood of conflict - 36 states	Majoritarian	Ethnic elements, though some national representation required.	Federal character principle requires some representation from across country	Informal only	Federal Character means rep. from over the country, but overrep of Southern and underrep of Northern	Many relatively minor conflicts. No national conflict since Biafran war, 67-70.	

Country	Ethnicity	Official language	Nature of state	Voting	Political parties	Govt.	Veto rights	Civil service	Conflict	Consequences
Switzerland	German speaking, 73.4% French, 20.5% Italian, 4.1%	Three languages	Federation – 26 cantons	PR plus direct democracy (referenda)	Mainly national (ideological)	Power sharing	Veto via referenda	Shared.	No conflict	Women only recently enfranchised

Appendix 4: Other countries with political affirmative action

Country	Ethnicity	Affirmative action	History of violent conflict
Bhutan	Bhote 50%, ethnic Nepalese 35% indigenous or migrant tribes 15%. Lamaistic Buddhist 75%, Indian- and Nepalese-influenced Hinduism 25%	10/150 seats reserved for Buddhists	Some border conflicts with India because Maoist Assam separatists located on border
Colombia	mestizo 58%, white 20%, mulatto 14%, black 4%, mixed black-Amerindian 3%, Amerindian 1%	2 seats for Afro-Colombians; 3 seats for Indians in Senate out of 102 seats	Long-standing conflict over land.
Croatia	Croat 89.6%, Serb 4.5%	Seats reserved for ethnic minorities	Fighting for independence from Yugoslavia, 1991-5.
Cyprus	Greek 85.2%, Turkish 11.6%	Seats reserved for Turks, Maronite, R-C and Goumenian minorities. But only Greek seats filled.	Conflict between Greeks and Turks for control from 1974. Island divided.
Ethiopia	Oromo 40%, Amhara and Tigre 32%. Others 28%	22/117 Seats reserved for minorities	Revolutionary war ended 1991. Eritrea boundary war ended 2000.
Jordan	Sunni Muslim 92%, Christian 6%	12/110 reserved for Christians	None
Lebanon	Muslim 70% (including Shi'a, Sunni, Druze, Isma'ilite, Alawite or Nusayri), Christian 30%	Quotas for particular groups for 101/128.	16 year civil war ended 1991.
Mauritius	Indo-Mauritian 68%, Creole 27%; Hindu 52%, Christian 28.3% (Roman Catholic 26%, Protestant 2.3%), Muslim 16.6	8/70 for minorities.	None

Country	Ethnicity	Affirmative action	History of violent conflict
New Zealand	New Zealand European 74.5%, Maori 9.7%	7/120 for Maoris	None
Niger	Hausa 56%, Djerma 22%, Fula 8.5%, Tuareg 8%	8/83 for minorities	5 year Tuareg insurgency ended 1995. Several coups subsequently.
Pakistan	Punjabi, Sindhi, Pashtun (Pathan), Baloch, Muhajir	10/342 of lower house reserved for minorities	Recurring conflicts
Samoa	Samoaan 92.6%	2/49 seats reserved for part and non-Samoans	none
Venezuela	European and (small) indigenous pop.	3 seats reserved for Indians	none