LOCAL OWNERSHIP OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM: A GUIDE FOR DONORS

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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Aim of this Document

Experience shows that reform processes will not succeed in the absence of commitment and ownership on the part of those undertaking reforms. Assistance should be designed to support partner governments and stakeholders as they move down a path of reform, rather than determining that path and leading them down it. A major problem in the area of security system reform in some regions, particularly in Africa, has been a lack of local input to and ownership of the emerging reform agenda. This issue is most significant in ‘difficult partnership’ countries. OECD DAC Policy Statement on Security System Reform and Governance

In policy statements on security sector reform (SSR), the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), DFID and other donors have embraced the principle of local ownership. In practice, however, the principle is often very difficult to apply, it is frequently breached by donor governments and it has not been translated into a set of donor strategies and methods of working in the field. As currently conceived, local ownership is more of a rhetorical device than a guide to donor officials engaged in SSR.

The aim of this paper is to contribute to operationalising the donors’ policy commitment to local ownership of SSR. The emphasis is on political and practical guidance to donors rather than on analytical depth or a comprehensive review of SSR. The document includes planning and diagnostic tools that could be used by external actors supporting SSR as well as by local actors engaged in security sector reform. The tools and

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2 On DFID’s programmatic focus on SSR, see DFID, Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform, Department for International Development, London, 2004.
4 For rich collections of SSR material, see the websites of the Bonn International Centre for Conversion (www.bicc.de); the Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College London (http://eds.ipi.kcl.ac.uk); the Centre for International and Security Studies, York University (http://ssr.yciss.yorku.ca); the Centre for Security Sector Management, Cranfield University (www.ssronline.org); the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (www.dcaf.ch); and the UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (www.un-instraw.org).
recommendations are based on my experience as an SSR and conflict resolution practitioner over the past fifteen years, principally in South Africa.5

The document was commissioned by the SSR Strategy of the British Government’s Global Conflict Prevention Pool to assist SSR programme managers and practitioners and contribute to the development of the OECD DAC’s Implementation Framework for Security System Reform (forthcoming). The Implementation Framework covers SSR principles, assessment, design, implementation, management, monitoring and evaluation.

The current paper is work-in-progress. The final version will include case studies by different authors on security sector reform in Liberia, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Guatemala and Ethiopia.

SSR takes place in a wide range of countries, with diverse political conditions, security services, security threats and levels of development and stability. The diversity necessarily limits the applicability of generalisations made in this document. Perhaps the strongest general recommendation is that donors should avoid a mechanical or formulaic approach to SSR and instead develop programmes that are flexible, responsive to local actors and finely tuned to local conditions.

1.2 Problem Statement and Motivation for Local Ownership

South Africa’s transition to democracy highlights the significance of local ownership. To a large extent the success of that transition was due to the process that was followed. The process was inclusive horizontally in the sense that all political parties were invited and urged to participate in the negotiations. The process was also inclusive vertically as numerous civil society bodies engaged in debate on all aspects of the settlement. Most importantly, the process was driven by local actors without dictates from external actors. In every sector, policies and models were designed by South Africans and not imposed on them by outsiders (see further section 5). As a result, the system of governance enjoys substantial legitimacy and this has contributed greatly to political stability.

In other emerging democracies and post-conflict societies, external actors often flout the principle of local ownership and impose their models and programmes on local actors. There are several reasons for this, some of which are demand-side problems. Unlike South Africa, many developing countries have weak

5 This experience is summarised in the Author’s Bio at the end of the document. I am grateful to the following people who provided extremely useful feedback on earlier versions of this paper: Bernado Arévalo de León, Nicole Ball, Alan Bryden, Mark Downes, Adedeji Ebo and Graham Thompson. I also benefited from the discussion that followed presentations of the paper at in-house seminars at DFID on 18 January and 14 June 2006.
states and weak civil societies. Particularly in the aftermath of war and state collapse, the government might lack legitimacy; local actors might lack the expertise to prepare sound policies and plans; and they might be too divided and disorganised to reach consensus on policies and priorities.

Donor governments also impose their models and programmes for a variety of supply-side reasons that reflect a mixture of arrogance and naivety:

- The donors are imbued with a sense of superiority and believe that Western models of governance are applicable everywhere.
- They lack respect for local actors and regard them as incompetent.
- They underestimate the difficulties of state building and transformation, and become overly frustrated with the slow pace or lack of reform.
- Their financial and other internal systems require programmes with a high level of detail, inhibiting responsiveness and flexibility.
- Their short funding cycles require deliverables within unrealistic time frames.
- They are sometimes intent on pursuing their own political agendas at the expense of local interests.

Donor governments tend to worry a great deal about the demand-side problems and very little about the supply-side problems, but it is the latter and not the former that lie substantially within their power to address.

Whatever the reasons for the absence of local ownership, it is inimical to development and democracy: domination and paternalism by external actors generate resentment, resistance and inertia among local actors; local actors have little commitment to externally imposed products; these products do not adequately reflect local needs, dynamics and resources; and democracy cannot take root other than by democratic means.

The imperative of local ownership is both a matter of respect and a pragmatic necessity. The bottom line is that reforms that are not shaped and driven by local actors are unlikely to be implemented properly and sustained. In the absence of local ownership, SSR is bound to fail. Local ownership is therefore more than an important theme. It should be the fundamental framework and point of departure for security reform. It should be a primary objective and outcome of all donor programmes to support SSR.

The underlying assumption is not that local actors will necessarily develop good policies. Rather, the assumption is that a process-oriented approach that
respects and empowers local actors is more likely to yield good results in the long-term than a product-oriented approach that undermines local actors and is not sustainable.

Throughout this document a distinction is drawn between content and process issues. Proper consideration of the latter is neglected by donors but it is no less important than the former. However good the content of an SSR initiative, a poor process that treats people as objects rather than subjects will lead to flawed outcomes.

Donor officials tend to justify the absence of local ownership of SSR in post-war countries and new democracies on the grounds that local actors lack capacity, legitimacy or both. Yet these are exactly the problems that SSR is meant to address. They do not constitute valid grounds for bypassing local actors. If the security of citizens in a given country is to be enhanced, and if the provision of security is to conform to democratic norms, then it is essential to build the capacity and legitimacy of the institutions and actors that comprise the security sector in that country.

The applicability of the principle of local ownership is not confined to relatively strong developing states like South Africa. The principle has been validated both by the presence of local ownership, leading to positive security reforms, and by its absence, leading to dysfunctional outcomes and little or no sustained reform, in a variety of places, including Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guatemala, East Timor, Kosovo, Bougainville and Afghanistan.6

Nor is the principle of local ownership limited to the security sector. It has broad applicability to development and post-conflict peacebuilding, as illustrated by a major study on aid and reform in ten African countries that was published by the World Bank in 2001. In the foreword to the publication, James Wolfensohn, then the President of the World Bank, writes as follows:

The ten case studies that make up this volume also show that country ownership is the way to make assistance effective. These studies of aid and reform in Africa confirm that when aid supports a country-owned development strategy, it can lead to sustained growth and poverty alleviation. The case studies also show that when reform is imposed from abroad, even as a quid pro quo for aid, it is not sustainable.7

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1.3 Defining Local Ownership

The principle of local ownership of SSR will have little import if it is treated simply as a romantic and woolly concept. In practical terms, it means that the reform of security policies, institutions and activities in a given country must be designed, managed and implemented by local actors rather than external actors.

The principle is misconstrued if it is understood to mean that there must be a high level of domestic support for donor activities. What is required is not local support for donor programmes and projects but rather donor support for programmes and projects initiated by local actors. The question for donor governments is not “how can we undertake SSR in partner countries?” but “how can we support local actors who want to undertake SSR in partner countries?”.

The principle does not preclude donors seeking to stimulate and encourage local interest in SSR. Nor does it preclude international actors putting pressure on governments whose security forces violate human rights. Nevertheless, the actual reform of the security sector must be shaped and driven by local actors.

It has been argued that local ownership is a vague and ambiguous concept because public policies have a range of disparate local owners that are unlikely to agree on any single approach or desired outcome. This argument is mistaken for two reasons. First, free and open contestation of politics and interests is integral to democracy and entirely consistent with local ownership.

Second, the argument fails to recognise that the disparate local actors have different functions, responsibility and authority in relation to governance. Put crudely, the principle of local ownership of SSR does not mean that the minister for police affairs, police constables, community leaders and gangsters have similar responsibility for policing reforms. From the perspective of the OECD DAC, SSR is a democratic project (see section 2.2). One of its objectives is precisely to ensure that domestic decision-making and governance in the security sector conform to democratic norms (see section 2.3).

A further goal of SSR as a democratic project is to make sure that local ownership is not confined to the executive but broadened to include parliament and civil society. The overarching goal is national ownership rather than government ownership of security reforms (see sections 4 and 5).

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1.4 Scope of this Document

This document covers the following ground:

Section 2 discusses the political nature of security sector reform and highlights some of the key aspects of SSR politics in relation to local ownership and donor activities. It provides an overview of the objectives, orientation, beneficiaries and context of SSR.

Section 3 is concerned with the content of SSR. It motivates the importance of developing a democratic security vision; offers an example of such a vision; and covers the complementary issues of security legislation and SSR objectives.

Section 4 focuses on the attainment of broad local ownership through inclusive and consultative SSR design. It presents guidelines to ensure that various categories of local actor are properly engaged in designing security policies and reforms. It distinguishes between the decision-makers; the implementing agencies; the technical designers of reforms; the advisers; and the interested parties, which include governmental and non-governmental bodies.

Section 5 describes the drafting of the South African White Paper on Defence as an example of inclusive SSR design, and identifies some lessons that might be relevant to other situations.

Section 6 focuses on the beneficiaries of SSR. It summarises the strategies for meeting the security needs of citizens and vulnerable groups; presents a local security survey for identifying the needs of poor communities; and indicates the types of support that donors could provide to enhance the security of vulnerable groups.

Section 7 examines the major obstacles to security sector reform and presents a diagnostic framework for analysing the obstacles in a given country. It identifies the main obstacles as complexity; lack of capacity; resistance to change; and instability and insecurity.

Section 8 presents five capacity-building proposals that donors could support in the interests of local ownership. The proposals cover research support for parliamentary committees that deal with security; security policy and planning units in government; a small grants scheme for civil society activities that focus on security reform; drafting security legislation; and comparative SSR exchange and study.

Section 9 proposes that the principle of local ownership be institutionalised in donor governments through inclusion in their funding, evaluation, reporting and other bureaucratic procedures.
1.5 Beyond the Scope of this Document

This document does not examine local ownership in relation to the following SSR topics: demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration; peace agreements; peace support operations; and small arms proliferation. Nor does the document look at the downsizing of security services, and the consequent impact on stability and the security of citizens, as a result of structural adjustment programmes prescribed by donors.

The term ‘security sector’ is used to cover the police, the military, the intelligence agencies, the prison services, other official security organisations and the civilian authorities that are meant to control and oversee these bodies. The document does not deal with private security companies and non-state armed groups such as bandits and rebels. Nor does it focus on the judiciary. Although the security of citizens is intimately linked to the system of justice, the institutional terrain is distinct. Whereas the security services in a democracy should function strictly under the control of the executive, the judiciary should be entirely independent of the executive.

Donor governments view SSR as a critical need exclusively in developing countries. Yet the need for security reform is just as great in many industrialised countries, including many donor countries. The development of an agenda for ‘SSR in the North’ lies outside the scope of this document but would include the following issues:

- the violation of international law prohibiting the use and threat of force;
- the limited role of parliament when governments decide to embark on war;
- the manipulation of intelligence and public opinion in these decisions;
- the failure to abide by the Geneva conventions and the prohibitions against torture;
- arms sales and other forms of security support to repressive regimes;
- secret funding of security services in developing countries, fuelling corruption and conflict;
- infringements of civil liberties in industrialised countries and encouragement of repressive measures in developing countries as part of the ‘war on terror’;
- double standards in relation to weapons of mass destruction; and
2. THE POLITICS OF SSR

This section highlights the deeply political nature of security sector reform and outlines some of the key aspects of the politics of SSR in relation to local ownership and donor activities.

2.1 The Primacy of the Political

SSR is profoundly political. It focuses on the most sensitive sector of the state; it challenges power relations, vested interests and dominant paradigms; it can provoke significant contestation within the state and between the state and other actors; and it is influenced by, and can exacerbate, broader political struggles. Donor supported SSR inevitably reflects the political goals and orientation of the donor institution and entails a complicated political relationship between external and local actors with unequal strength.

It is consequently not possible for donors to adopt an apolitical humanitarian, development or technical approach to SSR. Donors have to recognise that the politics of security reform are its most important dimensions. They have to grasp the peculiarities of these politics wherever they wish to support SSR and they have to gauge the risks and dangers of their interventions.

There is always a risk that local actors will view donor involvement in security reform as political interference in domestic affairs and resist it for that reason. This risk can only be mitigated if donors are sensitive, respectful and supportive of local actors. The highly political nature of security strongly reinforces the need for local ownership of SSR.

2.2 SSR as a Democratic Project

According to the DAC Policy Statement on Security System Reform and Governance, donor support for SSR "seeks to increase the ability of partner countries to meet the range of security needs within their societies in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of governance and the rule of law".9 The DAC donors are committed to SSR that is “people-centred, locally owned and based on democratic norms and human rights principles and the rule of law, seeking to provide freedom from fear".10

SSR is thus a democratic project and a democratising project. It has technical components but it is not a technical endeavour and it is not simply concerned

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9 OECD DAC, Security System Reform and Governance, pg.11.
with making the security services more efficient and effective. The democratic and democratising character of SSR is a theme that pervades this document.

Where donor governments and other external actors provide security support to repressive regimes, or support in any fashion security activities that entail human rights abuses, they are not engaged in SSR and they undermine the potential for SSR. Their behaviour is reprehensible and warrants radical political and security reform.

2.3 Democratic Governance Arrangements

The term ‘local actors’ covers a range of different types of domestic actor. In a democracy, these actors have different functions, responsibility and authority in relation to the system of governance. One of the primary objectives of SSR is to ensure that governance of the security sector corresponds to democratic arrangements. These arrangements can be summarised broadly as follows:

- The executive determines security policy and exercises control over the security services. It is accountable to citizens, chiefly through parliament and regular elections but also through media scrutiny and public consultation and debate.

- Parliament approves security legislation and budgets, performs oversight functions in respect of the security services and provides a forum for political parties to deliberate on security policy and practices.

- The security services execute government policy and carry out their mandates as prescribed by law.

- Independent courts perform judicial functions and various statutory bodies may have watchdog functions in relation to the security services.

- Individuals, the media and civil society organisations are free to engage in research, debate, advocacy and other activities that might be critical or supportive of the security services and government’s security policy.

Within this general framework, each of the security services requires appropriate governance arrangements (e.g. community policing; democratic civil-military relations; etc). These arrangements will have common features, like executive control and accountability to parliament, as well as different features. For example, the President might have direct authority over the armed forces as the commander-in-chief but have no similar authority over the police; and the police, unlike the military, might in certain respects be accountable to community organisations.
Countries undergoing SSR invariably face multiple obstacles to the attainment of democratic and effective governance of the security sector. The obstacles include resistance from political and security figures; the dominance of informal political and security actors; the absence of a democratic tradition; the weakness of the state; and a lack of capacity on the part of the executive, parliament and civil society (see further section 7). Even in the best of situations, forging democratic governance arrangements for the security sector is likely to entail intense and protracted political and organisational struggles.

An emphasis on democratic governance does not mean that Western models should be replicated elsewhere. The Western models are themselves varied as each of them is a response to particular historical and constitutional developments. So too in the case of countries undergoing SSR, the details of the systems should be determined by local actors according to their circumstances and donors should avoid promoting assiduously the models of their own countries.

It cannot be argued that any one of the executive, parliament, civil society and the judiciary is more important than the others. Nevertheless, it needs to be stressed that the executive is responsible for SSR design and for crafting security policies and laws. The orientation and capacity of ministers, civil servants and security officers are therefore crucial determinants of the character and success of SSR. Section 8.2 focuses on enhancing the executive’s capacity to design and implement security reforms.

### 2.4 The Beneficiaries of SSR

SSR aims to ensure that the state fulfils its responsibility to provide for the security of its people and that it does so in a manner consistent with human rights and other democratic norms. In general terms the primary beneficiaries of SSR are thus the citizens of the country undertaking the reforms. Specific reform initiatives might have specific beneficiaries and the security services might be among these beneficiaries (e.g. prison reforms might be intended to benefit inmates, warders, prison managers and local communities).

In most countries the determination of beneficiaries is a political affair. Among other things, it depends on the ideology, policy priorities and responsiveness of government; the distribution of power in society; the extent to which particular groups are marginalised; and the ability of political parties and civil society organisations to advance the interests of their constituencies through the political system.

In developing countries with acute insecurity and limited resources, governments have to make far-reaching political decisions on the prioritisation of security threats and the allocation of resources to address those threats.
From development and humanitarian perspectives, particular attention should be paid to the security of groups that are most vulnerable and least able to ensure that their safety needs are met. These groups typically include the poor, minorities, women, children, and communities where militia or gangs are rife (see further section 6).

Donor governments that promote security reform are not motivated necessarily or exclusively by humanitarian and altruistic concerns. They might stimulate and support SSR because it serves their own political, strategic and commercial interests. In this sense they can be counted as beneficiaries of SSR. This is not intrinsically problematic but it is completely unacceptable for donor governments to pursue their interests at the expense, and to the detriment, of local communities and citizens.

### 2.5 Women and Security

In many countries the security of women warrants special attention for one or more of the following reasons:

- Women are subject to a high level of general violence and insecurity, and also to pernicious gender-based violence and fear.
- Women are marginalised in political decision-making and the determination of security threats, priorities and allocation of resources.
- Public discussion of sexual and domestic violence is taboo.
- The security services, headed and predominantly staffed by men, neglect gender-based violence; are themselves guilty of this form of violence; discriminate against their female members; and are insensitive to women who have been subjected to gender trauma.

Donors can use their funds productively by supporting groups that address these issues (see further section 6.4). Such groups include local women’s organisations and human rights bodies; government departments and security services that have programmes aimed at enhancing the security of women and children; and international organisations like UNIFEM and the UN International Research and Training Institute for the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW). The website of INSTRAW, [www.un-instraw.org](http://www.un-instraw.org), has a special focus on gender and SSR.
2.6 Contextual Factors

The degree to which security reform is possible in a given country depends on three main factors. The first is the nature of the political system. SSR requires a context of democracy or democratisation. Authoritarian regimes do not undertake democratic reform of their security sector. The democratisation of the political system, which typically occurs after the end of a civil war or the collapse of an authoritarian regime, creates the space for SSR. The extent of democratisation is a key determinant of the potential for security reform.

The second critical factor is political leadership. In the context of democratisation, SSR is feasible but not inevitable. There is invariably resistance from political and security groupings. At least some members of the executive must want to reform the security community. If none of them want reform in this area, it will not happen. In many instances the executive is ambivalent, divided and constrained by conservative elements in the security services.

The third critical factor is capacity. If the executive wants to undertake SSR, it needs the capacity to design, manage and implement reforms. Capacity here and elsewhere in this document refers both to people with the requisite knowledge, expertise and skills and to the required material resources, including funds and equipment. Governments in low income countries, fragile states and war-torn societies usually lack the necessary capacity.

Other contextual factors that have a strong bearing on the potential for SSR include the strength of the state; the strength of civil society; the level of development; the nature and intensity of conflict and threats to security; and, in post-war societies, the period that has elapsed since the termination of hostilities.

A recurring theme throughout this document is that the context matters greatly when designing security reforms and that a formulaic approach to SSR is completely inappropriate.

2.7 Donor Strategies

In light of the contextual factors outlined above, the main donor strategies can be summarised as follows:

- If a state is fully authoritarian, there is little potential for SSR. Instead, as often occurs, the international community should focus on the broader challenge of political democratisation by supporting pro-democracy groups, engaging in diplomacy and advocacy, and applying punitive measures in extreme cases.
If a state is democratic or undergoing a process of democratisation, donor strategies should be geared to supporting local actors that wish to pursue SSR. The nature of that support will depend on whether these actors are located in the executive, the security services, parliament or civil society. It will also depend on their activities and requests for donor support. Where there is no will on the part of the executive, there might be civil society groups that advocate SSR and require support (see further sections 6.3 and 8.3).

Where local actors want to engage in SSR but lack the capacity to do this, donors can provide valuable assistance. There is no possibility of sustainable reforms unless domestic actors have the capacity to ensure sustainability; and without sufficient capacity, the state cannot provide adequately for the security of citizens. Long-term support for capacity-building on terms acceptable to local actors is probably the most useful contribution that donors can make to SSR (see further section 8).

2.8 SSR as the Art of the Possible

SSR initiatives have to be grounded in the circumstances of each country. They will fail if they are undertaken in a mechanical fashion according to a how-to-do-it manual or on the basis of some other country’s experience. They are only likely to succeed if they are flexible, creative, responsive and finely tuned to local conditions. There are no formula applicable to all situations; there are no general remedies for the problems that so frustrate donors, such as corruption, spoilers and inertia; and there are no quick fix options for donor governments with unrealistic time frames.

SSR is a complex and uncertain business that entails protracted organisational and political struggles. It demands not only security expertise but also political adroitness on the part of local actors and their international partners. It requires an ability to identify and seize opportunities, develop appropriate strategies, build alliances and win over or outmanoeuvre opponents. SSR is quintessentially a process of struggle and a matter of politics as the art of the possible.

This perspective is relevant to the question of whether the goal of SSR is limited reform, radical transformation or something in between; it also relevant to the question of whether the reforms should be sector-wide or limited to some of the institutions (e.g. military, police, etc). How these questions are resolved in practice depends on the circumstances. Far-reaching sector-wide change might be eminently desirable in a given situation but it might be too demanding in terms of available capacity and it might be politically unfeasible. Change should be sought where change is possible.
The maxim of 'politics as the art of the possible' highlights the need to analyse accurately in each situation the potential for reform, the risks and structural constraints, the proponents and allies of progressive change, the opponents of change and the reasons for their opposition. Donors that simply attribute the slow pace or lack of reform to incompetence or resistance among local actors have an incomplete understanding. For analytical and strategic purposes it is necessary to have a more comprehensive and nuanced diagnosis (see further section 7).

2.9 Problems of Legitimacy

Some donors are understandably loathe to provide SSR support to governments that lack legitimacy. Decisions in this regard have to be made on a case-by-case basis, but three general considerations should be borne in mind. First, SSR cannot be undertaken by the amorphous category of 'local actors'; nor can it be undertaken by civil society organisations, which can support and lobby for reforms but do not have the authority to implement them. SSR can only be carried out by an executive authority that controls or seeks to control the security services.

Second, it is in the nature of SSR that it frequently takes place in the ambiguous and complicated grey zone between a full democracy and a wholly authoritarian state. It is a democratising project, which is to say that it is part of the struggle to construct and entrench democracy. It does not assume the existence of legitimate actors but endeavours to establish legitimate institutions, processes and policies.

Consequently, the critical criteria for donors should have less to do with the legitimacy of governmental actors than with the nature of SSR initiatives in a given country. The primary question is whether these initiatives are orientated towards strengthening repressive machinery and methods or towards enhancing democratic norms and governance. Where this is unclear in practice, donors should err on the side of caution and refrain from providing security support.

Third, the local legitimacy of security reforms depends very much on the process by which they are designed. The more consultative and inclusive the process, and the more the outputs reflect the views raised during the consultations, the more likely it is that the results will enjoy public credibility and acceptance (see section 5). When donor governments manipulate the process – because they do not like certain local actors, seek to advance their own interests or insist that the recipients of their funds meet their short-term timeframes – they compromise the legitimacy of SSR.
2.10 The Burden of Time

In the relatively favourable circumstances of post-apartheid South Africa, it took eight years to prepare and finalise a White Paper on Defence, a Defence Review and a new Defence Act. In less favourable conditions, the duration might be longer still. Donors, on the other hand, operate on a short time scale, with a project funding cycle of one to three years. This puts considerable pressure on the donor officials responsible for projects and grants, and the pressure for results is transferred to the local recipients with negative consequences. It leads to short-cuts, haste and frustration, generates inappropriate and unsustainable solutions, undermines local ownership and damages partnerships between domestic actors and donors.

Donors also compromise the democratic process when local dialogue, debate and consensus-building are by-passed or cut short in order to satisfy external time frames.

There is a great need to overcome the donor preoccupation with short-term objectives and results. Short- and long-term objectives are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Short-term objectives in the absence of a long-term programme do not lead to systemic and sustainable change, and any long-term programmatic endeavour requires short- and medium-term objectives.

Security sector reform is usually a slow, protracted and intermittent enterprise, with many difficulties and obstacles and with no certain results. Donor officials who appreciate this point have to find ways of developing within their governments an institutional culture in which expectations are realistic, patience is considered a virtue and SSR processes are regarded as no less significant than SSR outcomes.

More concretely, donor governments should institutionalise the principle of local ownership in their funding, evaluation, reporting and other bureaucratic procedures. Given the donor pressure for results, these procedures should make local ownership of SSR a key objective and result area in its own right. Local capacity-building should similarly be included as a key objective and result area (see further section 9).
3. SECURITY VISIONS, LAWS AND OBJECTIVES

The development of democratic security visions and laws is arguably the most significant of all SSR ventures since these higher-order instruments determine the paradigm, agenda and plan for reforming the doctrine, operations, conduct, structure, culture, training and other features of the security services. This section motivates the importance of a democratic security vision; provides an example of such a vision; and covers the complementary issues of security legislation and SSR objectives.

3.1 Motivation for a Democratic Security Vision

Ideally, countries that embark on SSR programmes should have an overarching, democratic vision of security. Without an overarching vision, the reforms are likely to lack coherent long-term objectives and there is risk that they will be piecemeal, superficial, inconclusive and unsustainable. Without a democratic vision, progress in a democratic direction cannot be expected. Against a background of conflict, militarism and authoritarianism, moreover, new concepts of security and governance of the security sector are every bit as important as new operational methods.

A democratic security vision is not a ‘magic bullet’ that will cure all ills. Indeed, there is no guarantee that politicians and the security services will adhere to it. Nevertheless, for the following reasons it has the potential to be a very powerful tool, especially if it is incorporated into the constitution and legislation:

- It can provide a normative framework for determining security threats, priorities and allocation of resources in the interests of citizens and vulnerable groups.
- It can help to shift the locus of power away from informal security networks towards the official security organisations and oversight bodies.
- It can provide an authoritative mandate and guidance to the officials who are tasked with designing and implementing SSR programmes.
- It can provide a basis for evaluating the effectiveness of SSR programmes and projects.
- It can provide benchmarks for civil society organisations and opposition parties to hold government to account for the conduct of the security services.
It can provide government and the judiciary with a basis for dealing with human rights abuses and other misconduct by the security services.

It can consequently help to ensure that the security services do not pose a threat to citizens.

Democratic visions are required both in relation to national security and the security sector as a whole, and in relation to each of the security institutions. Section 3.2 presents a national security vision and section 5 looks at a process of crafting a democratic vision for defence. If such visions are to be more than idle philosophy, they have to be translated into legislation (section 3.3) and into SSR programmes and projects (section 3.4).

The construction of democratic security visions and laws is likely to be fiercely contested since they challenge power relations, vested interests and conservative ideologies. To the greatest extent possible, the struggles should be played out in open forums and the process of preparing the visions and legislation should be inclusive and consultative (see sections 4 and 5). Open and inclusive processes help to establish the legitimacy of the outcomes, contribute to a sense of national ownership and create space for progressive voices that would not be heard in an environment of secrecy.

The development of security visions and legislation through a consultative process can be a protracted undertaking even in conditions that are favourable to reform (see section 5). Donors that rush the process because of their own short-term funding and political deadlines compromise the process and the legitimacy of the outputs.

There are many reasons for the slow pace of reform, including a lack of local capacity and expertise (section 7). Donors can make a significant contribution to alleviating these problems. For example, they can support the establishment and functioning of policy and planning units in the security departments of partner governments (section 8.2). They can also support comparative exchange and study that enable local actors to learn about security models and legislation in other countries (section 8.5).

3.2 Example of a Democratic Security Vision

Set out below is a national security vision based on the precepts of democracy and human security. Drawn from the South African experience, its first version was prepared by an anti-militarist advocacy group in the early 1990s in anticipation of the advent of democracy. A revised version was adopted by the African National Congress at its policy conference in 1992. It was thereafter adapted for inclusion in the White Paper on Intelligence of 1994 and the White
Paper on Defence of 1996. A number of its provisions were incorporated into the new Constitution.¹²

The vision is presented for illustrative purposes. It is not intended to be reproduced in other countries. National security visions must necessarily take account of local values and aspirations, historical circumstances and domestic and regional security dynamics. They must also, in the interests of national ownership, be prepared by local actors in an inclusive fashion.

- National security shall be sought primarily through efforts to meet the political, economic, social and cultural rights and needs of our people. The stability and security of our country depend on the well-being and security of its inhabitants.

- Security is an all-encompassing condition in which citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being.

- Security policy must therefore contribute to the consolidation of democracy; the achievement of social justice, economic development and a safe environment; and a substantial reduction in the level of crime, violence and political instability.

- At the international level the objectives of security policy shall include the achievement of regional security and the maintenance of national sovereignty, territory and independence.

- We will pursue peaceful relations with other states and seek a high level of political, economic and security co-operation with neighbouring states in particular.

- We will adhere to international law on armed conflict, to all international treaties to which our country is party, and to decisions of the United Nations Security Council.

- We will participate in, and seek to strengthen, international and regional efforts to contain and prevent the proliferation of small arms, conventional armaments and weapons of mass destruction.

The mandates and functions of the security services are determined and regulated by the Constitution and legislation. The security services must operate strictly within these parameters.

The security services will be subordinate and fully accountable to Parliament and the Executive.

The security services will respect the democratic political process and the rights and dignity of citizens. They will provide education and instruction to their members on the Constitution and the law.

Members of the security services must disobey a manifestly illegal order.

Security policy and activities will be sufficiently transparent to ensure meaningful parliamentary and public scrutiny and debate, without endangering the lives of security personnel or jeopardizing security operations.

The security services will not further or prejudice party political interests.

The security services will develop a non-discriminatory and gender sensitive institutional culture.

The composition of the security services will broadly reflect the demographic composition of our country. To this end, affirmative action and equal opportunity programmes will be introduced where required.

The security services will respect the rights and dignity of their members within the normal constraints of discipline, training and operations.

The government will consult parliament, political parties and citizens in the formulation of security policies.

The government will endeavour to provide the security services with the resources required to perform their functions adequately, build and maintain their professionalism, and ensure satisfactory service conditions for their members.

The government will not misuse the security services for partisan purposes.

3.3 Security Legislation

One of the fundamental components of SSR is the promulgation of laws that govern and regulate security according to democratic norms. In some situations the security services or elements thereof might ignore the laws, but without the
legislation it is not possible to entrench the rule of law and establish democratic accountability in the security sector.\textsuperscript{13}

Sound security legislation is an essential tool in efforts to diminish the influence of informal security actors and establish the primacy of the official security institutions; build a culture of respect for human rights; and ensure that the durability of reforms is not dependent on a few individuals.

The issues that should be covered in the laws include the following:

- The functions, powers and authority of the executive, parliament and other oversight bodies in relation to the security sector.
- The mandates, functions and powers of each of the security services.
- The powers, responsibilities and accountability of key officials (e.g. minister for policing; chief of defence force; director-general for correctional services; inspector-general for intelligence; etc).
- The rights and duties of members of the security services.
- Adherence to human rights standards and constitutional principles.
- Criminal offences and penalties.
- Internal disciplinary and grievance procedures.
- Authority and procedures for the use of force.
- Authority and procedures for expenditure of funds and procurement of assets.

In addition to these general issues, the problems relating to sexual violence and domestic violence should be addressed in legislation. The legislation should define and criminalise these forms of violence; ensure that the victims have access to justice; protect and preserve the victims' dignity in the course of police investigations and criminal trials; specify the responsibilities of the police, the prosecuting authority and medical services; and tackle specific types of abuse that are prevalent in the country concerned.

Section 8.4 focuses on donor support for building the capacity of local actors to draft security legislation.

3.4 Cascading Objectives for SSR

The formulation of objectives for SSR in a given country and in relation to specific programmes and projects is critical. If the objectives are not defined clearly and appropriately, there is likely to be much wasted effort, the programmes and projects will lack direction and cohesion, and the results will be sub-optimal.

It may be helpful in this regard to develop cascading objectives that flow logically from higher to lower levels. At the highest level there are overarching national goals and priorities (e.g. consolidation of democracy; poverty reduction; reconstruction and development; etc). At the intermediate level the objectives relate to the security sector as a whole or to a particular institution (e.g. police; intelligence; etc). At the lowest level the objectives relate to specific SSR programmes and projects.

This idea of cascading objectives can be illustrated with the following example from the process of defence transformation in post-apartheid South Africa.

**National priority:** the state must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights, which binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state [sections 7(2) and 8(1) of the Constitution of 1996].

→ **National security injunction:** the security services must act, and must teach and require their members to act, in accordance with the Constitution and the law [section 199(5) of the Constitution of 1996].

→ **Legislative provision:** the Chief of the Defence Force must ensure that all members of the Defence Force are trained in law, including international law, to the required level, and will be responsible to the Minister of Defence for the performance of this function [section 7 of the Defence Amendment Act, no. 4 of 1997].

→ **Departmental objective:** design and implement a civic education programme that promotes throughout the Defence Force an understanding of, and respect for, the Constitution, the Geneva Conventions and the precepts of democratic civil-military relations and military professionalism [ministerial directive].

→ **Programme objectives:** establish a civic education monitoring and advisory committee comprising military officers, civilians and parliamentarians; identify key themes and topics for the curricula; develop the curricula for application in the Defence Force; train trainers to deliver the curricula; develop a monitoring and evaluation system; prepare reports for the Minister and the parliamentary defence committee; etc [terms of reference of the civic education committee].
Project objectives: develop a code of conduct based on the civic education curricula; devise ways of disseminating and promoting the code within the Defence Force; include the code in the Defence Act; etc [terms of reference for the code of conduct project of the civic education committee].

This example of cascading objectives highlights the constitutional, legislative, policy and organisational dimensions of a reform endeavour. It suggests that national goals and priorities should be translated into actionable programme and project objectives; that SSR programme and project objectives should be based on national objectives and priorities; and that there should be a logical political and organisational flow from the national level down to the programme and project levels.
4. GUIDELINES FOR ACHIEVING OWNERSHIP THROUGH INCLUSIVE SSR DESIGN

This section focuses on the attainment of broad local ownership through inclusive and consultative SSR design. It presents planning guidelines to ensure that various categories of local actor are properly engaged in the process of designing security policies and reforms.

4.1 Planning for Inclusive SSR Design

SSR initiatives should have clearly defined objectives, outputs and desired outcomes. It is also important at the outset to prepare a process plan that identifies the actors that will be involved in the design, consultation and decision-making components of the process; the main stages of the process; and the estimated timeframe.

A plan of this kind would be useful when preparing, for example, a national security review, new security legislation or a new security doctrine such as community policing. It would help to ensure that key officials and bodies are not excluded from the design process; that political mistakes which could undermine or scupper the reforms are avoided; that the outputs are technically sound; and that the outcome is optimal and legitimate. The plan would also be helpful to donors that fund the initiative and to prospective donors.

The plan should cover the following categories of actor, each of which is discussed below:

- the decision-makers;
- the implementing agencies;
- the designers of the reforms;
- the advisers; and
- the interested parties, which include official bodies as well as non-governmental bodies and beneficiaries.

4.2 The Decision-Makers

The decision-makers are the individuals and bodies that have the authority to accept or reject the proposed reforms. There may be several functional and political decision-makers in respect of a given SSR initiative (e.g. the chief of police; the responsible minister; cabinet; and the parliamentary committee for policing).

All reform initiatives should have a principal decision-maker. This person should formally initiate the process; appoint the technical designers of the reforms;
approve their terms of reference; review their reports and work-in-progress; provide political direction and leadership; and take responsibility for the final product. In major SSR reforms this person is typically a minister but in some cases it could be a national security adviser, a director-general or the chairperson of a parliamentary committee.

As a general rule, any official or body that has the authority to approve or reject the proposed reforms should be consulted by the technical designers prior to the formal submission of their final proposals. This enables the timely incorporation of the decision-makers’ views; allows for the early identification and fixing of problems; prevents perceptions of exclusion; reduces the incidence and intensity of conflict; and for all these reasons minimises resistance to the formal submission.

Even if parliamentary approval is not required for a particular initiative, it is advisable for the technical designers or their principals to consult the relevant parliamentary committees. Parliaments tend to be weak in new democracies but nothing is gained by ignoring them and thereby reinforcing the problem. Consultations with parliament are vital if the institution is representative and robust; if not, the consultations might at least serve to highlight the formal role and expectations of parliament (see further section 8.1).

4.3 The Implementing Agencies

The implementing agencies are the security services, government departments and other official bodies that are responsible for implementing reforms that have been approved by the political decision-makers. These agencies are often steeped in conservative thinking on security and very protective of tradition and vested interests; in some instances they may include or be led by criminal and malevolent elements. If they are strongly opposed to democratic reform, it might seem obvious that they should be excluded from the design process or assigned only a marginal role.

This will almost certainly be a mistake. The security services are much more likely to resist reforms that have been imposed on them than reforms that they have helped to design. Precisely because they have the bureaucratic and informal means to prevent the proper implementation of approved reforms, their views have to be both challenged and accommodated within the design process.

Involving the security services fully in the design process allows them to raise their concerns, contribute their professional input and protect their institutional interests in an open and legitimate manner. It also creates the possibility of a positive reorientation of their perspectives, which is hardly likely to occur if they
are excluded from the process. Reforms that are not owned by the security services are most likely to be dead in the water.

This document does not explore all the methods of addressing the problems of conservatism and criminality in the security services. These methods include education and training programmes; exposure to good practice internationally; and disciplinary measures and punitive action (which might entail some risk of hostile reaction). For present purposes in relation to SSR design, the following strategies are relevant:

- The top political leadership must want to reform the security sector, and the principal decision-maker must provide strong direction and support to the technical design team. If these conditions are absent, there may be little prospect of reform.

- The principal decision-maker can balance the security officers on a design team with his/her political advisers, members of civil society, parliamentarians and/or foreign experts. He/she can also endeavour to ensure that reform-minded officers serve on the team.

- The security services should be regarded as beneficiaries of SSR and this should be explicit when designing the reforms. The institutional benefits that can make SSR less threatening to the services include greater professionalism and operational effectiveness; heightened legitimacy and public respect and co-operation; greater international acceptability and security co-operation; and additional resources, including equipment to improve operations and funds to improve service conditions.

### 4.4 The Designers

Security reforms can be designed by a team of people from a single government department (e.g. for a programme to demilitarise prisons) or from several departments (e.g. for a national security review). It may be beneficial to include civil society experts who offer a different perspective from that of government officials and it may be worthwhile politically to include parliamentarians.

The design team could be an existing or embryonic security policy and planning unit that comprises a mix of civilian officials and security officers. Such units are crucial mechanisms for designing and driving major SSR endeavours (see section 8.2). They can benefit greatly from exposure to security models and SSR experience in other countries (see section 8.5).

It is essential that the design team has a clear written mandate and terms of reference approved by the principal decision-maker; that the appointment of its
members is confirmed in writing by this person; that its reporting relationships are unambiguous; that it prepares regular reports on its progress; and that it receives feedback and guidance from the principal decision-maker.

Ideally, the main criteria in selecting the members of the team should be technical skills and knowledge; representivity in relation to the implementing agencies and key decision-makers; and commitment to democratic reform.

4.5 The Advisers

As with the reform of other sectors of government, SSR design should be based on knowledge and expertise. The design teams should have the requisite expertise but there will invariably be gaps and the teams should be willing to seek advice from other specialists. The technical advisers might be members of a governmental body (e.g. the department of finance); a civil society organisation (e.g. specialists on change management); or an international body (e.g. the International Committee of the Red Cross).

Technical advisers should be distinguished from political advisers to the president and ministers. The political advisers might not be experts on security but they have an intimate knowledge of the goals and policy orientation of their principals. They have direct access to the principals and it therefore makes sense for the design teams to liaise closely with them.

SSR design teams might be willing to accept assistance from foreign experts who play a facilitative or advisory role but they resent foreigners who are overbearing, condescending or try to take control. They also resent foreign advisers being thrust on them by donors. It is inappropriate for a donor to contract foreign advisers to support local actors without the consent of these actors and it is inappropriate for foreign advisers to have no accountability to the local actors they are meant to support.

Some donor governments have dedicated SSR posts. The officials who fill these posts occupy pivotal positions in relation to local ownership. They liaise with domestic actors, are able to build trust over time, acquire knowledge of local dynamics and play advisory and facilitating roles. They also help to shape the SSR policies and strategies of their own government, give advice to their colleagues and might be influential in the allocation of funds for SSR projects. Their sensitivity to the need for local ownership is paramount.

4.6 The Interested Parties

The interested parties are bodies that should be consulted during the design process because of their interest in the security issues under consideration.
They can be divided into two categories: official entities and civil society groups. The former should be consulted for the sake of efficient and effective government and the latter should be consulted for the sake of democratic governance and broad local ownership. Vertical and horizontal inclusivity of this kind can also help to ensure that reforms survive turnovers of political leadership and the vicissitudes of transitional politics.

The official bodies that constitute interested parties are those that have a direct interest in an SSR initiative because of their statutory function and responsibility. For example, the department of finance has an interest in security reforms with significant budgetary implications; the department of public administration has an interest in reforms with significant implications for the service conditions of state employees; and the office of the state law adviser has an interest in the drafting of all legislation. The SSR design team should consult these bodies and afford them an opportunity to comment on early drafts of its work.

The interested parties in civil society can cover a wide range of entities, including professional associations; trade unions; private sector organisations; universities and policy institutes; community groups; religious groups; women’s organisations; human rights campaigners; etc. Their interest in an SSR initiative might be ethical, political, financial, professional or associational (i.e. acting on behalf of their members). Their involvement in SSR design is a prerequisite for broad local ownership and the legitimacy of the outputs.

Civil society can be consulted in various ways. Government or parliament can invite the public to make written submissions on the security issues in question or on the outputs of the design team; invite oral presentations at public hearings; and convene public debates and consultative workshops (see section 5).

Political parties as well as civil society organisations that represent a particular constituency – such as trade unions, women’s organisations and veterans associations – can use these consultation opportunities to advance the interests of their constituency. In this fashion the actual and potential beneficiaries of SSR seek to shape the emerging reforms to their advantage. However, those categories of people who are most vulnerable and insecure tend to be least organised and least equipped to articulate their concerns and needs. This problem is addressed in section 6.

The following section illustrates the guidelines presented above with an example of SSR design from South Africa. It indicates the different stages of the design process and highlights the benefits and limitations of a consultative process.
5. INCLUSIVE SSR DESIGN: THE SOUTH AFRICAN WHITE PAPER ON DEFENCE

The South African White Paper on Defence is an example of a well-designed and consultative SSR initiative. The following account focuses on the drafting, consultation and decision-making components of the design process. It comments briefly on the Defence Review that followed the White Paper and concludes by identifying some lessons that might be relevant to other situations.14

5.1 Phase 1: Mandate, Principles and Aims

Shortly after South Africa’s first democratic election in 1994, the Deputy Minister of Defence initiated the process of developing a White Paper. He appointed a chief drafter, established a drafting committee and approved its terms of reference. The terms of reference included the design and management of the consultation and decision-making processes.

The drafting committee comprised senior members of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the newly formed civilian Defence Secretariat. The chief drafter was a researcher and policy activist who enjoyed the confidence of the Deputy Minister. For the purpose of the White Paper, he reported directly to the Deputy Minister.

The drafter began by preparing a set of principles on ‘defence in a democracy’, an earlier version of which had already been approved by the new ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC). Once endorsed by the Deputy Minister, the principles constituted the overarching vision and political mandate for the White Paper. The Deputy Minister also approved the chapter and section breakdown of the document.

The aims of the White Paper were defined as follows:

- to bring defence policy into line with the new Constitution and democratic dispensation, the post-apartheid security environment and the priorities of the Mandela government;
- to provide a high level policy platform for a Defence Review, a new Defence Act and departmental programmes for transforming the Defence Force;
- to forge a national consensus on defence policy and thereby confer legitimacy on the policy and the SANDF;
- to inform citizens and other governments of Pretoria’s new defence policy; and
- to serve as a confidence-building measure in Southern Africa.

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5.2 Phase 2: First Draft and Internal Consultations

Following the Deputy Minister’s approval of the principles and chapter breakdown, the chief drafter wrote the first version of the White Paper. The drafting committee comprising senior officers and civil servants discussed the document on the basis of their functional positions, technical expertise and mandates. They obtained their mandates and instructions from their immediate principals (e.g. chief of the navy, chief of the army, chief of operations, etc).

The committee maintained a detailed record of its meetings, decisions, consultations and feedback. It paid particular attention to recording its reasons for rejecting proposals from senior officials and, later, from the parliamentary defence committee. The Deputy Minister received regular reports from the committee and provided guidance to the chief drafter on contentious issues.

In the nature of South Africa’s negotiated settlement, the drafting process was characterised by strong differences of opinion on many topics (e.g. transparency, regional security, military doctrine, affirmative action, arms exports, etc). The drafting committee was expected to resolve these disputes on the basis of the Constitution, the principles of ‘defence in a democracy’, and speeches by the Minister of Defence and the President. Where the committee was unable to reach consensus, the matter was referred to the Deputy Minister or the Minister for a decision.

In this fashion the first version of the White Paper went through several iterations before being approved by the Chief of Defence Force, the Secretary for Defence and the Deputy Minister.

5.3 Phase 3: Public Consultation

In June 1995 the Minister tabled the draft White Paper in Parliament and called for public comment. He published adverts in daily newspapers inviting feedback from interested parties. Responses were received from soldiers, officers, veterans, the defence industry, defence analysts, environmental groups, political parties, religious bodies and anti-militarist and human rights organisations. The consultation was intended to enhance the quality of the White Paper and contribute to building a national consensus on defence.

On the basis of the submissions, the drafting committee amended and added to the White Paper. Here too major disagreements were referred to the Deputy Minister and the Minister. The ministers dealt with the disputes in various ways: they solicited the opinion of experts (e.g. constitutional lawyers and the International Committee of the Red Cross); presided over departmental
debates; convened public seminars; referred matters to the parliamentary defence committee; and issued rulings.

The drafting committee benefited greatly from its own discussions with governmental and non-governmental experts. By way of example, international experts on non-offensive defence influenced the South African position on military doctrine and posture; local and foreign human rights organisations influenced the policy on arms exports; US military officers provided useful guidance on affirmative action and equal opportunity; the ICRC provided advice on international humanitarian law; and local NGOs shaped the White Paper’s chapter on land and the environment.

The consultation process culminated in the next draft of the White Paper, which was approved by the Deputy Minister, the Chief of the SANDF and the Secretary for Defence.

5.4 Phase 4: The Parliamentary Defence Committee

In late 1995 the Minister presented the revised White Paper to the parliamentary defence committee. Over a period of several weeks, the chief drafter took the committee through the document section by section, explaining the rationale for its provisions, answering questions and recording the amendments proposed by the MPs. Some of the political parties asked technical experts to brief and assist their parliamentary caucuses.

Given the ruling party’s commitment to national reconciliation, the ANC chairperson of the defence committee consistently behaved in a non-partisan fashion. Whenever contentious issues arose, he sought to forge a multi-party consensus rather than rely on the ANC’s majority in the committee. There were numerous angry exchanges but the committee failed to reach consensus and was obliged to go to a vote in only one instance (relating to the official language of the Defence Force).

5.5 Phase 5: Final Approvals

In January 1996 the Minister published the next version of the White Paper, which incorporated the views of the parliamentary committee. The draft released in March included the Minister’s response to these views as well as new submissions from the Department of Defence. The April draft included further comments from the parliamentary committee. In May the penultimate version was presented to Cabinet, which made several amendments to the document.
In the political struggles around these and earlier drafts of the White Paper, the ministers sought to maintain a balance between different and sometimes conflicting imperatives. They had to ensure that the document was technically sound from a military perspective; conformed to constitutional principles; captured the values and priorities of the new government; honoured the government’s commitment to national reconciliation; and enjoyed the support of senior officers, the majority of whom were apartheid-era officials.

In May 1996 the Minister tabled the final version of the White Paper for debate and approval by Parliament. As a result of the extensive consultation and the non-partisan approach of the Minister and the chairperson of the parliamentary defence committee, all the political parties in Parliament voted to approve the White Paper without amendment. Every party stated that the Minister had attained a national consensus on defence.

5.6 Phase 6: The Defence Review

The transformation agenda contained in the White Paper was so far-reaching in its scope and orientation that it required more detailed planning and a comprehensive review of the SANDF. In June 1996 the Minister launched the Defence Review, which aimed to determine, in sufficient detail for operational and budgetary purposes, South Africa’s military doctrine, posture, structure and materiel requirements over the next decade.

During the drafting of the White Paper, the Minister had not been fully convinced of the utility of public consultation, believing it to be something of a waste of time and money. Yet the consultations had proven to be extremely beneficial and had earned the Minister much praise in Parliament. He therefore set up Defence Review working committees that comprised MPs and civil society analysts as well as senior officers and civil servants. He also convened provincial workshops and two national consultative conferences that drew interested parties ranging from the defence industry to pacifists.

Parliamentarians and civil society groups were again influential on many issues but their limitations were cruelly exposed during the critical discussion on force design. This topic was technically too abstruse for laypeople without military expertise. There was consequently little informed debate around the offensive force design recommended by the SANDF. Parliamentary approval of this force design led to a controversial arms acquisition programme that included the purchase of warships and combat aircraft at a cost of over US$5 billion. The acquisition programme was inconsistent with the White Paper’s emphasis on a non-offensive defence posture and pledge to contain military spending in favour of socio-economic development.
5.7 Lessons

The preparation and finalisation of the White Paper were time-consuming, complicated and frequently adversarial because of the number of actors involved in the consultation and decision-making processes and because the interests and values of these actors were often diametrically opposed. Nevertheless, the effort bore dividends: the White Paper enjoyed public acclaim; it marked a decisive break with apartheid-era defence policy; it conferred legitimacy on the SANDF; it was supported by all political parties; and it provided the platform for transforming the armed forces and civil-military relations over the next decade.

The positive results were partly due to a favourable environment that included a relatively strong state, democratic system and civil society. In the same environment, however, the White Paper on Intelligence of 1994 had no significant short- or long-term impact. It contains a fine set of principles, emphasising human security and democratic norms, but it has not contributed to the transformation of the intelligence services.

The different impacts of the defence and intelligence white papers in the same context highlight the importance of leadership, good process and public engagement. Five differences stand out in this regard:

- Whereas the defence paper contains viable policies, the intelligence paper does not progress much beyond principles, values and norms. It does not provide sufficient guidance on objectives and strategies and is thus too abstract for implementation.

- The defence paper was drafted by a team of officials, involved numerous decision-makers at departmental level and resulted in a collectively acceptable resolution of conflicting interests and values. The intelligence paper, on the other hand, was prepared by a single drafter with little departmental debate, and the intelligence services consequently had no sense of ownership.

- The drafting and subsequent implementation of the defence paper were championed and overseen by the Deputy Minister for Defence. At that time there was no post of Minister for Intelligence, the portfolio being held by the Minister for Justice who paid little attention to the intelligence community. The Deputy Minister for Intelligence was preoccupied with the integration of apartheid and ANC intelligence services at the expense of developing an agenda for transformation.

- Whereas the defence paper was subject to extensive public and parliamentary scrutiny and debate, the intelligence paper was published without any public and parliamentary engagement.
In the 1990s a range of progressive civil society organisations, many of them with specialist expertise, were involved in policy research and advocacy on defence matters. By contrast, civil society was largely silent on intelligence, tacitly viewing it as lying outside the realm of public debate. In early 2006 South Africa was rocked by an intelligence crisis that finally provoked a public and parliamentary debate on methods, control and oversight.

The experience of defence transformation in South Africa also illustrates the point that major SSR is a protracted endeavour. In the relatively favourable circumstances of South Africa, the official pillars of defence transformation – the Defence White Paper (1996), the Defence Review (1998) and the Defence Act (2002) – took eight years to erect. In the less favourable conditions of other post-conflict countries, the construction of the transformation edifice could take much longer. Donors that push for rapid results compromise the quality and legitimacy of the outcomes and undermine the democratic process.
6. THE BENEFICIARIES OF SSR: CITIZENS AND VULNERABLE GROUPS

This section focuses on citizens and vulnerable groups as the primary beneficiaries of SSR. It presents an overview of the strategies for meeting their security needs; offers a local security survey for identifying and addressing the needs of poor communities; and indicates the areas in which donor funding could improve the security of vulnerable groups.

6.1 Overview

SSR should serve the interests of citizens in four ways. First, it should ensure that the security services respect human rights and are not themselves a threat to citizens. Second, it should lead to the government and the security services becoming more responsive to the security concerns of citizens. Third, it should enhance public safety by raising the efficiency and effectiveness of the security services and related institutions. Fourth, it should attend to the needs of the most vulnerable groups in society.

In many respects the extent to which a state provides for the security of citizens and vulnerable groups lies outside the realm of SSR. It depends primarily on macro factors like the constitutional dispensation; the level of development; the strength of the state; the government’s ideological orientation and overall policy priorities; the strength of civil society; and the nature and intensity of security threats.

Security and SSR are constrained by these macro factors. For example, weak states may lack the means to provide adequate security to people in rural areas; governments that represent the interests of big business are unlikely to devote substantial resources to the security of working class communities; and it is hardly conceivable that the security sector will be more democratic and people-centred than the wider political system.

On the other hand, because the security sector tends to be conservative and requires some secrecy, it is often much less accountable, responsive and people-centred than other sectors of the state. This is the challenge that SSR is intended to address.

In the best of political circumstances, citizens and the political parties and other organisations that represent their interests can influence security policy and the allocation of state resources in various ways, including public advocacy; lobbying the executive and parliament; participating in public consultation processes; and mobilising voters during elections. In the worst of circumstances where little or none of this is possible, the potential for people-centred security reform is exceedingly low.
Even in relatively favourable conditions, and certainly in the worst, vulnerable groups might be highly insecure but lack the organisational and other means to influence security policy. Without a strong voice, and often as a consequence of prejudice, they are neglected in government’s security priorities and allocation of security resources. Such groups might include women, children, the elderly, minorities, rural communities and working class people.

The following strategies would help to shape SSR and security policies so that they meet the needs of citizens and vulnerable groups:

- The development of a national security vision that emphasises the principles of human security, respect for human rights, the rule of law and the accountability of the security services and the executive (sections 3.1 and 3.2).
- The inclusion of these principles into the constitution and legislation so that they have a binding status (section 3.4).
- The design of security reforms and policies in an inclusive and consultative manner that takes seriously the issues raised by citizens and vulnerable groups (sections 4 and 5).
- Enhancing the capacity of citizens, vulnerable groups and their organisations to lobby for reforms that serve their interests and to participate in public debates on security (sections 6.3, 8.3 and 8.5).
- The design and administration of local security surveys aimed at identifying and addressing the security needs of poor communities (section 6.2).

All of these strategies are likely to entail political struggles among groups with different interests and ideological perspectives. Donors cannot fight battles on behalf of actual or potential beneficiaries but they can help to build the expertise and organisational capacity of local actors that are committed to progressive reform (section 8).

6.2 Local Security Survey

This sub-section presents a local security survey that could be used to identify and contribute to meeting the security needs of poor communities. An underlying assumption is that security threats vary markedly from one place to another and from one group to another. The government’s security policies, priorities and allocation of resources should reflect these differences and be informed by local as well as national dynamics.
The survey is thus a tool for giving effect to the principle of responsive government. Ideally, it should be commissioned by a governmental authority – such as a provincial government department, city council or district police commissioner – for the purpose of security decision-making, prioritising, deployment and resource allocation at the local level. In countries where government is unresponsive to the needs of the poor, the survey could be initiated by NGOs for the purpose of policy advocacy, public campaigning or programme design.\(^{15}\)

Certain donors have shown an interest in such surveys and are willing to fund them. However, the process must be owned by local actors and must be geared principally to meeting their needs. In addition to funding, local actors might require some assistance in survey design, administration and analysis.

The surveys should be conducted through interviews with individuals, focus groups or community organisations in a manner that allows for a conversation and not simply the completion of a questionnaire.

A representative sample of respondents should be selected and their gender, age, ethnicity and location should be recorded so that the subsequent analysis can identify specific threats and vulnerabilities in relation to different groups.

The survey presented below is an illustrative template. For use in the field it should be adapted to reflect local conditions, concepts and language. It can also be adapted for different purposes. For example, it could focus more closely than at present on policing priorities and conduct; alternatively, the focus could be broadened to cover state institutions other than the security services (e.g. the departments of transport, education and justice). It could have a wide geographic scope or be utilised more narrowly by an enterprising police station commander to cover his/her area of jurisdiction.

The survey would be a worthwhile tool for monitoring the progress of SSR programmes and projects if it initially provided baseline data and were repeated subsequently at suitable intervals.

**Survey template**

- What are your greatest needs in terms of safety and security?
- What are the threats to your safety and security:
  - in your home?

\(^{15}\) For an example of a survey focusing on public perceptions of security organisations, see Riccardo Bocco, Luigi de Martino and Arnold Luethold, *Palestinian Public Perceptions of Security Sector Governance. Summary Report*, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and Graduate Institute for Development Studies, Geneva, 2005
- in the neighbourhood where you live?
- in the place where you work?
- in the fields?
- in the school?
- during the day?
- at night?
- when you travel?

- What can the government and the security services do to improve your security in each of the above places?
- Who are the greatest threats to your security? What do these individuals or groups do to you?
- Do any of the security services protect you and your community from harm? If so, which security services do this and how do they do it? What could they do to provide better protection to you and your community?
- Are there any non-governmental organisations that protect you and your community? If so, which organisations do this and how do they do it? What could they do to provide better protection to you and your community?
- Are any of the security services a threat to your security? If so, which security services and what do they do?
- Which security services do you trust the most, and for what reasons?
- Which security services do you trust the least, and for what reasons?
- Who do you call for help if you are frightened or have been hurt by someone? Does the person/organisation you call respond quickly and to your satisfaction?

6.3 Donor Support for Vulnerable Groups

The ways in which SSR can target and benefit vulnerable groups obviously differ among countries. Given the wide range of situations and the diversity of vulnerable groups and security threats, the most pertinent generalisation is that donor governments should be responsive to local requests and sensitive to local conditions rather than attempt to deliver pre-packaged programmes.

Moreover, if donors are serious about supporting vulnerable groups, it is not sufficient that they contract consultants to do surveys and assessments of local needs. They have to get out and meet representatives of these groups, listen to their concerns and build relationships of trust over time.
Depending on the circumstances, donors can provide financial support to the following:

- **Organisations that represent vulnerable groups.** Such organisations would include, for example, women’s organisations that address rape and sexual abuse of women and children through survivor support programmes or public awareness and advocacy campaigns. Donors are often willing to support the projects but not the core costs of these organisations; this makes no sense where the organisation’s viability depends on core funding.

- **Cross-organisational programmes that address security problems.** For example, in some countries there might be a need for donors to support school programmes that raise awareness among children of the dangers of joining gangs.

- **Special units or projects within the security services.** In countries where the government is sympathetic to the needs of vulnerable groups, donors could support initiatives such as child protection units in the police; gender sensitivity training for security personnel; juvenile rehabilitation programmes in prisons; and child care facilities for women prisoners.

- **Public consultation processes.** These processes are not very expensive but they require funds that might not be available domestically. Donors can support vulnerable groups by, for example, covering the costs of workshops in rural areas or enabling women in rural areas to attend workshops held in cities. Donors could also fund consultation processes that are specifically designed to maximise the participation of vulnerable groups.

- **Capacity-building.** The obstacles to vulnerable groups being assertive about their security needs include lack of power, lack of expertise and lack of confidence. Donors can help to raise the voice of these groups by funding their efforts to acquire expertise in security matters.

- **Local security surveys.** Donors can provide financial support for the design and administration of the security surveys discussed in section 6.2.

- **Meeting security needs.** Donors can provide funding to meet security needs that emerge from public consultations and surveys. Some of these needs can be met through relatively modest amounts of money. For example, proper street lighting around train stations and in the streets of working class communities might make women and other commuters less vulnerable to criminal activity after nightfall.
7. OBSTACLES TO SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Donor strategies for addressing obstacles to SSR must be based on a comprehensive and accurate analysis. Crude and incomplete analyses are misleading and invariably undermine local ownership. This section highlights four obstacles to security sector reform and then presents a diagnostic framework for analysing the obstacles in a given country.

7.1 Overview of Main Obstacles

In post-conflict societies and democratising countries where SSR is on the agenda, donors tend to attribute the slow pace or lack of reform to incompetence and/or political resistance. This is invariably an incomplete and crude perspective. It ignores the inherent difficulties of SSR and fails to distinguish between ideological, personal, organisational and structural obstacles to change. Such distinctions are crucial because different types of obstacle have to be addressed through different strategies.

The dangers of incomplete and crude analyses are that donors apply inappropriate pressure on the partner government; they push the government to move more quickly than is sound; they patronise local actors and try to solve problems on their behalf; and they fail to see opportunities to play a useful role. These problems lead to both a failure to promote local ownership and a direct undermining of local ownership.

The first obstacle is that major SSR is immensely complex. A large number of policies might have to be transformed; many of these policies might have to be changed more or less simultaneously rather than staggered sequentially; the required changes are likely to be substantial and radical given the undemocratic and militarist nature of security policy previously; and the reforms will require significant changes in organisational structure and the expertise, skills, disposition and behaviour of staff.

For example, defence transformation in South Africa entailed the integration of government and guerrilla armies, the establishment of a civilian Defence Secretariat, and the drafting of new legislation on the armed forces, civil-military relations, arms exports, military trade unions and mercenaries. It also entailed a dramatic reorientation of military posture, doctrine and operations; training and education programmes; institutional culture; human resource policies; the system of military justice; defence expenditure and procurement; and the role of the parliamentary defence committee.

Managing such complex transformation would tax the strongest and most experienced of governments. It can be overwhelming to a weak government
that lacks cohesion, has little or no experience in running a state, has limited resources and is buffeted by volatile transitional politics.

The second and related problem is one of capacity. Good governance in the security sector and other spheres is not simply a matter of adhering to democratic principles. It also requires efficiency and effectiveness in performing the functions of the state. Many developing countries lack the skills, expertise, infrastructure and resources to meet the welfare and security needs of citizens. Without the requisite organisational capacity, the principles of democracy cannot be operationalised and insecurity remains pervasive.

By way of example, adherence to the rule of law presupposes the existence of a competent and fair judiciary, police service and criminal justice system; the expectation that police respect human rights is unrealistic if they have not been trained in techniques other than use of force; and illegal trafficking in small arms will not be stemmed through legislative and policy measures if government is unable to control the movement of people and goods across its borders.

A failure to reform the security sector may consequently be due to a lack of capacity rather than a lack of will. This is especially the case in weak states and war-torn societies where the government does not have the expertise to design and implement SSR. The deficit in expertise relates not only to advanced skills such as threat analysis and force design but also to functional skills like planning, management and co-ordination.

Building capacity in these and other areas is a long-term endeavour. It should be treated as a high priority by donors that take local ownership seriously. Without adequate capacity, security reforms cannot be undertaken and the security of citizens cannot be ensured. Section 8 presents proposals for building local capacity for SSR.

The third problem is resistance to change. Democratisation and demilitarisation always generate opposition from conservative groups and others whose values and interests are threatened thereby. In addition, substantial policy and organisational transformation is intrinsically threatening and gives rise to resistance and conflict in all circumstances. Resistance, inertia and confusion are inevitable when security officers are expected to implement (and sometimes design) new policies that are completely at odds with their training, experience and worldview.

For strategic purposes it is necessary to abandon simplistic notions of 'lack of will' and discern more carefully, in each situation, the reasons for resistance to change. By way of illustration, the absence of political leadership for reform is different from explicit political opposition to reform; opposition that is expressed openly is different from surreptitious and conspiratorial efforts to subvert
reforms; and ideological opposition to democratisation is different from a psychological discomfort with change. These different problems clearly require different strategic and tactical responses.

Fourth, demilitarisation and democratisation of the security sector are most difficult to pursue in the conditions of instability and insecurity that characterise many post-conflict countries. In these conditions, political leaders and security chiefs are preoccupied with operational matters and consider transformation a low priority. A context of high insecurity also makes it easier for conservatives to win support for the argument that democratisation and demilitarisation will impair the state’s ability to deal with pressing security threats. The higher the level of instability in the national and regional arenas, the less likely it is that anti-militarist reforms will be introduced.\(^{16}\)

None of the difficulties outlined above is conducive to ‘quick fix’ donor solutions and the simple replication of Western models. The democratic norms that donors take for granted are truly radical in societies emerging from authoritarian rule, and the organisational capacity that is enjoyed by donor governments is largely absent in developing countries. Security reform is a slow, uncertain and painful process that can usefully be supported by donors if they are patient and responsive to local actors. It cannot usefully be pursued by donors who bully local actors or undertake SSR on their behalf.

### 7.2 Obstacles to SSR: A Diagnostic Tool

The table presented on the following pages is intended to facilitate a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the obstacles to SSR in a given country. It identifies different types of problem that require different strategies, distinguishing between internal political obstacles, external political obstacles, capacity problems, and contextual and structural obstacles. The point is not that external actors should tackle every obstacle but that they should have a sophisticated understanding of the blockages and constraints.

The tool should be used as a framework for analysis rather than as a checklist. Each of the problems listed in the table should be considered in terms of the extent to which it exists, and in what forms and with what severity, rather than in terms of a binary ‘yes’ or ‘no’; in many countries undergoing SSR, all the

problems are likely to exist to at least some degree. Equally important is the need to investigate the links between the various problems and to differentiate between causes, symptoms and exacerbating factors.

The framework should be used in conjunction with a broader analytical tool, such as DFID’s *Drivers of Change* or Strategic Conflict Assessment.17

A] Internal political obstacles
- Resistance to reform
  - from different actors
    - political leaders (i.e. president; ministers)
    - senior officials (i.e. civil servants; security officers)
    - non-official actors (e.g. retired politicians and security officers; bosses of organised crime)
  - for different reasons
    - ideological (i.e. political opposition to democracy)
    - personal (i.e. maintaining positions of power, influence, prestige and patronage)
    - financial (e.g. corruption; concern about job losses; opposition to capital budget cuts)
    - patriarchal (e.g. insensitive to gender violence; discriminate against female members)
    - organisational (e.g. fear of change; inertia; conflict)
- Lack of leadership for reform
  - at the political level
    - president / prime minister
    - ministers
    - parliamentarians
  - at the level of civil servants
    - senior civilian officials
    - senior security officers

B] External political obstacles
- Donors and other external actors competitive and working at cross purposes
- Donors and other external actors pursuing partisan political agendas
- External actors promoting counter-terror measures that prevent or weaken democratic reform
- Donors and other external actors imposing solutions and undermining local ownership
- Donors and other external actors fuelling corruption

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- Neighbouring states interfering in domestic politics

C] Capacity problems
- Lack of staff (i.e. too few officials dedicated to SSR design and planning; weak or non-existent civilian departments in the security sector)
- Lack of knowledge (e.g. of comparative SSR experience; democratic security models; methods of operationalising these models)
- Lack of functional skills (e.g. planning; budgeting; financial control)
- Lack of advanced skills (e.g. threat analysis; force design; developing doctrine; drafting legislation; gender security)
- Lack of equipment and financial resources (e.g. computers; communications equipment; vehicles; low salaries)

D] Contextual and structural obstacles
- Weak institutions of democracy and absence of a democratic culture
- Weak state (i.e. lacking authority, power, capacity and resources)
- Underdevelopment (i.e. general lack of skills, funds and infrastructure)
- Weak official security institutions and powerful informal security actors and networks
- Internal security threats (e.g. violent crime; gangs; militia; warlords)
- External security threats (e.g. hostile relations with other states; spill over violence)
- Regional instability and insecurity
8. ENSURING SUSTAINABILITY: DONOR SUPPORT FOR CAPACITY-BUILDING

This section presents five capacity-building proposals that donors could support in the interests of local ownership. Each proposal contains a summary description, statement of purpose, motivation and outline of organisational arrangements. The proposals cover the following topics:

- research support for parliamentary committees that deal with security;
- security policy and planning units in government;
- a small grants scheme for civil society activities that focus on security;
- drafting security legislation; and
- comparative SSR exchange and study.

States cannot provide adequate security to citizens, maintain professional security services and engage in security sector reform unless they have the capacity to do these things. New democracies and post-conflict countries typically lack this capacity. Capacity here refers to both material resources and people with the requisite knowledge and skills.

Where governments lack the expertise to perform certain SSR functions, such as developing doctrine or drafting legislation, external actors might be tempted to fill the breach and assume these functions. This is not an effective strategy. Local actors resent external solutions of this kind, they have little commitment to the resultant product and they remain ill-equipped to perform the functions in question. There is no prospect of sustainable SSR unless domestic actors have the capacity to ensure sustainability.

8.1 Research Support for Parliamentary Committees

Description

Donor support for the provision of research capacity to parliamentary committees that deal with security, principally the committees responsible for defence, policing, intelligence, correctional services and justice.

Purpose

To equip these committees with greater knowledge of technical issues, international norms and comparative international experience so that they are better able to engage in informed debate, perform a critical oversight function and promote a progressive security agenda.
Motivation

Donors working on SSR in new and emerging democracies tend to focus on the executive, the security services and civil society. They neglect parliaments on the grounds that the parliaments in question have little or no influence. Instead of attempting to address this problem, the donors contribute to perpetuating it.

Parliaments in emerging democracies are potentially vital institutions. Even if they do not have decision-making power, they can be forums for transparency, open debate and the provision of information on government policy and state spending, thereby contributing to executive accountability and checks on executive power.18

If there is even a semblance of open debate in parliament, opposition parties and courageous MPs can raise the profile of, and shed light on, security issues that would otherwise lie outside the realm of public knowledge. Parliamentary debate can thus help to create the political space for broader public discussion on security. Parliamentary consideration of security legislation and budgets, and question time in parliament, are key opportunities for this.

It is true that parliaments in many emerging democracies lack influence and coherence. There are at least four reasons for this: there is no tradition of robust parliamentary debate; the executive might want to prevent parliament from becoming an effective institution; parliamentarians might have no commitment to the public good; and parliamentary committees might lack expert knowledge. The current proposal addresses the last of these problems.

To illustrate the problem, a parliamentary defence committee cannot have a fruitful discussion on military doctrine and force design if MPs have no expertise on these topics (section 5.6). Similarly, the committee’s ability to comment meaningfully on military spending is greatly reduced if its members are unable to analyse a defence budget. MPs may end up deferring to military officers and endorsing their proposals uncritically. The net result is that defence policy remains stuck in a militarist paradigm and parliamentary oversight is severely compromised.

Organisational arrangements

Research support for parliamentary committees could take different organisational forms depending on the country circumstances. First, donors could provide funding for two competent researchers to be appointed to each of the committees that deals with security. The researchers would be parliamentary support staff and their appointment, supervision and reporting would follow parliament’s administrative procedures.

The researchers would prepare background papers and distribute useful documents on topics before the committees. They would also meet requests for information and analysis from the committees and individual MPs; refer MPs to relevant academics, institutes and specialist websites; organise seminars; and, if funding permits, commission research from specialists.

Second, if MPs are keen to have research support but the option of creating parliamentary research posts is politically or bureaucratically too difficult, the posts could be established in an NGO. The researchers would perform the same functions as those outlined above but would be employees of the NGO rather than parliament. In this case it would be useful to set up a commissioning and review committee comprising MPs from different political parties.

Third, and more generally, donors should support NGO programmes that provide information and analysis to parliamentarians who serve on security committees or have an interest in security matters.

The organisational options outlined above could be pursued by donors working on SSR in a given country. It would also be worthwhile for a donor, such as the EU or an EU member state, to set up a cross-country programme that provides funding for research support to parliamentary committees dealing with security. This would enable the donor to facilitate the sharing of information and experience among parliamentarians interested in security reform.

Focus of research and information

Parliamentary committees dealing with security should have three types of knowledge that could be provided by capable researchers:

a. An understanding of key concepts, terms and technical issues. For example, a defence committee should have an adequate understanding of doctrine, posture, armaments, collective security, common security, confidence- and security-building measures, etc.

b. Knowledge of comparative experience. For example, a policing committee is better able to review legislation and executive policy on community policing
and public order policing if MPs are aware of the approaches taken in democratic countries elsewhere.

c. Knowledge of relevant international law. Parliamentary committees that deal with security should be aware of the relevant international law and conventions, such as the Geneva Conventions and the prohibitions on torture.

In new democracies, knowledge of international norms and comparative experience can serve to highlight the viability of non-militarist and democratic alternatives to conservative thinking on security. For example, transparency on defence spending and arms transfers might seem inconceivable in an emerging democracy whose military activities were previously steeped in secrecy; yet exposure to the UN Arms Register and the published defence budgets of other countries could make the prospect of greater transparency appear less heretical and alarming.

Caveat

The aim of this endeavour is not to reproduce the parliamentary system or parliamentary research system of donor countries. The aim is to build parliamentary research capacity in a fashion appropriate to the partner country.

8.2 Security Policy and Planning Units

Description

Donor support for the establishment and functioning of security policy and planning units in partner governments.

Purpose

To build the partner government’s capacity to conceptualise, design, plan, manage, co-ordinate and monitor security sector reform, and thereby to enhance the quality and effectiveness of the reforms.

Motivation

In new democracies and post-conflict countries there is often no civilian office and little civilian capacity in government for conceptualising, designing, planning, managing, co-ordinating, monitoring and evaluating SSR programmes and projects. Where political leaders are willing to embark on security reform, there is a need for one or more civilian units that comprise officials with the necessary expertise to do the technical work.
In the absence of such units, there may be insufficient co-ordination, continuity and momentum; in the absence of the requisite expertise, SSR will be sub-optimal; and in the absence of civilian leadership, security policy might remain the preserve of security officers. The establishment of civilian policy and planning units is thus a crucial security sector reform in its own right. It can strengthen civilian governance of the security services and be a crucial vehicle for driving and sustaining SSR.

The staff of the units need two sets of skill and knowledge. The first relates to sectoral expertise on policing, defence or prisons etc. The second set of specialised skills, the importance of which is underestimated by local and external actors alike, relates to the following policy and planning functions:
- strategic analysis;
- policy formulation;
- strategic planning;
- translating strategic plans into operational plans and programmes;
- organisational design;
- human resource management;
- change management;
- monitoring, evaluation and adaptation; and
- budgeting.

Organisational arrangements

A policy and planning unit should exist in each of the departments that deals with security (i.e. police, intelligence, defence, etc). Where a government seeks to affect comprehensive sectoral-wide SSR, a high-level security policy and planning unit may also be required in a central location (e.g. the office of the president, prime minister or national security adviser).

Functions of the policy and planning units

The functions of the policy and planning units would include the following:
- undertake research on SSR and democratic security models in other countries;
- prepare strategic options and plans for SSR;
- prepare draft policies and legislation;
- undertake and support briefings and consultations within the security services, elsewhere in government and with parliament and civil society;
- liaise with local and foreign experts;
- perform an SSR co-ordination and communication function within government; and
- perform a liaison and co-ordination function with donors that want to support SSR.
These functions should be performed under the direction of a senior official (e.g. a director-general, minister or national security adviser).

**Composition**

The units should have a mix of civilian officials and security officers. They should be headed by civilians, not because civilians are necessarily more democratic and anti-militarist than security officers but because of the need in a democracy to assert civilian authority over the security services. The units should include security officers because of their technical expertise and because their involvement would help to ensure acceptance of proposed reforms by the security chiefs. To the greatest extent possible, the staff appointed to the units should be committed to democratic reform.

**Donor support**

The policy and planning units would typically have a range of needs that donors could help to meet:

- Computers, communications equipment and other office equipment.
- Skills training, which could take place through study visits to other countries, attendance at courses available locally and abroad, and short- or long-term secondments. The relevant skills are outlined above.
- Knowledge relating to technical issues and comparative experience. Donor support could be provided for seminars, study visits, a research budget and attendance at local and foreign universities and security academies. It would be especially useful to enable the staff of the units to learn about security policy and planning systems in other countries.

**Caveats**

Security policy and planning units in post-conflict countries and new democracies are likely to be politically weak. Their mandates are not secure and their work is bound to be unsettled by political machinations within and around the state. Even if their establishment is supported by political leaders, the units will encounter resistance and might struggle constantly to win approval for reforms. The units will also be organisationally weak. For some considerable time after their formation, they might be unable to absorb substantial support to build their capacity.

In these circumstances there is a danger that donor governments provide the wrong kind of support and provide too much support. Donors must be patient, refrain from pressurising the units to make hasty progress, and avoid burdening
the units with externally driven proposals and requests. Instead, they should be responsive to the units’ requests and allow the units to set the pace.

8.3 Small Grants Scheme for Civil Society

Description

Establishment of a small grants scheme for civil society activities on security and SSR.

Purpose

To enable greater public participation in debates on security and SSR and to promote civil society perspectives on these topics.

Motivation

Civil society participation in debates on security is a matter of right and an intrinsic aspect of democracy. The point is not that civil society is inherently progressive and supportive of SSR but rather that citizens and their organisations have a basic right to express their views on security.

In established democracies, public engagement with security issues helps to ensure that government is answerable for its security decisions, is held accountable for the actions of the security services and is responsive to the security concerns of citizens. In emerging democracies, civil society’s engagement with security issues is indispensable to progress in this direction. It is vital if security is to be brought out of the dark corridors and become a public good. In addition, progressive academics and activists can be influential in shaping SSR through research, advocacy and support to government.19

Organisational arrangements

In developing countries the majority of civil society organisations are unable to raise large sums of money, and donors tend to favour elite NGOs that are headed by well-educated professionals. In order to broaden civil society involvement, the application and reporting requirements of the small grants scheme should not be onerous.

The application form should be no more than four pages. It simply needs to cover the following:

- The aims and activities of the applicant’s organisation.
- The activity for which funding is sought.
- Possible follow-up activities.
- The expected benefits of the activity in relation to SSR.
- Brief biographical information on the people who will implement the activity.
- A budget with explanatory notes.

Brochures that promote the small grants scheme should provide the OECD DAC’s definition of SSR and an illustrative list of activities that could be funded (see below).

In assessing the applications, donors should not set the bar too high. It is not essential that every successful application has a major or long-lasting impact. In the early stages of a new democracy, it is not even essential that all the applications are of a high quality. **What is important is that there are a multitude of constructive civil society initiatives on security. The cumulative effect is a significant contribution to democracy and SSR.**

Donors should be especially supportive of activities that raise the voice and contribute to addressing the security needs of women, poor communities and other marginalised and vulnerable groups. Section 6.3 provides an indication of these activities.

The small grants scheme could be established by a single donor or a group of donors. It could have a global scope but decision-making on grant applications should be decentralised since donor representatives in-country generally have a better grasp of local organisations and dynamics than their colleagues in foreign capitals.

**Activities**

There is no need to have a fixed list of activities that would be eligible for funding. An illustrative list would include the following:
- Facilitation of dialogue and confidence-building among different actors.
- Public opinion and security needs surveys.
- Research and publications.
- Conferences, workshops and seminars.
- Radio and other media productions.
- Public advocacy.
- Policy support to the executive and the legislature.
- Training for civil society, security personnel and parliamentarians.
- Monitoring the conduct of the security services.
- Establishing local and international SSR networks.
- Attending or developing academic courses or training programmes.
- Specialist resource centres.
Larger grants

This proposal is intended to encourage a multiplicity of civil society activities, hence the emphasis on small grants. Nevertheless, there are many worthwhile civil society programmes – such as the development of a website, a new academic course or a series of training workshops – that might require larger amounts.

8.4 Drafting Security Legislation

Description

Donor support for building domestic capacity to draft security legislation.

Purpose

To develop the skills of local actors involved in preparing security laws and to help ensure that these laws are consistent with democratic norms and the standards of sound legislation.

Motivation

The introduction of security legislation that is consistent with democratic norms is a key component of SSR. It is essential to efforts to entrench the rule of law, establish the primacy and accountability of the official security institutions, and ensure that the durability of reforms is not dependent on a few individuals (section 3.3).

Two types of expertise are needed to draft such legislation. First, the drafters must have an understanding of the ways in which security matters should be addressed in legislation that complies with democratic principles. Second, the drafters must have the technical skill to prepare laws that are comprehensive, precise and unambiguous. In developing countries undergoing SSR, one or both types of expertise might be lacking.

Organisational arrangements and donor support

Donor governments can either provide funding for local actors to acquire the requisite expertise or they can arrange for drafting experts from their own country or elsewhere to assist local actors that want such support.

Specialist training might be very useful for government officials whose functions include drafting legislation; these officials are typically located in the ministry of justice or the legal divisions of other government departments. In addition, basic training could be provided to parliamentarians and members of civil
society groups that focus on SSR. This would enhance their ability and confidence to scrutinise draft security legislation, identify problems and propose solutions.

Caveat

Donors should not attempt to reproduce the security legislation of their own country. The aim of this endeavour is to equip local actors to write legislation that they consider appropriate to their situation.

8.5 Comparative Exchange and Study

Description

Donor support for efforts by local actors involved in security reform to learn about the SSR experience and the security models and laws of democratic and democratising countries elsewhere.

Purpose

To build the knowledge, expertise and confidence of local actors engaged in SSR and contribute to the promotion and adoption of democratic models and processes.

Motivation

Reference has been made throughout this section to the importance of comparative knowledge. Local actors involved in designing and implementing security reforms can find it immensely helpful to study relevant processes, outputs and outcomes from other countries. Comparative exchange and study have three types of benefit:

- There is the technical benefit of learning about the details of progressive security models and methods. There may be strong support in a country for the concept of community policing but little idea on how to operationalise the concept. Similarly, a government might want to establish a civilian defence secretariat but be unclear about its structure and relationship to military headquarters.

- It is politically advantageous for local actors who advocate and design SSR to be aware of democratic security practices elsewhere. This knowledge is useful in their struggles against conservatives and in their efforts to win public and parliamentary support. In countries emerging from authoritarian rule, efforts to establish robust mechanisms of accountability, transparency
and oversight in the security arena might appear less ‘crazy’ and ‘irresponsible’ when viewed in the light of comparative experience.

- There is considerable psychological benefit to local actors in overcoming a lack of knowledge and sense of ignorance about security matters. Feeling ignorant leads to inertia and a lack of knowledge contributes to the domination of domestic actors by external actors. Comparative exchange and study can embolden local actors and enhance both the prospect and the quality of local ownership.

Organisational arrangements and donor support

Comparative exchange and study can be pursued through many types of activity, including:
- seminars, conferences and workshops;
- internships and fellowships;
- networks and associations;
- study visits;
- academic and policy research; and
- attendance at courses offered by foreign universities and security academies.

There is no need for donors to be prescriptive about which activities should be undertaken by local actors or about which local actors should be involved in the activities. The participants could include parliamentarians, academics, civil servants, security officers, women’s groups, human rights organisations, etc. There is utility in having programmes and events with mixed audiences as well as with discreet audiences such as parliamentarians from different countries.

Nor should donors be prescriptive about which countries constitute the focus of comparative study and exchange. People involved in SSR can learn equally from emerging democracies and long-established ones, as well as from colleagues in the same region and those in other regions. South-South exchanges can be particularly productive because of similar structural conditions and because they tend to be conducted on a more equal footing than North-South exchanges.

In addition to providing funding, donors can stimulate local interest in comparative exchange and study and can play a facilitating role where this is required.

Caveat

The emphasis of donor support should be on comparative study and exchange. Donors should avoid promoting assiduously the security models of their own
countries. This provides limited opportunity for learning and leads to resentment among local actors, whereas exposure to a variety of models is empowering.
9. INSTITUTIONALISING LOCAL OWNERSHIP IN DONOR GOVERNMENTS

Much thought has been devoted to the incentives and pressures that might encourage political leaders and security officers in emerging democracies and post-conflict countries to implement security reforms. Little thought has gone into the incentives and pressures that might encourage donor governments and their officials to abide by the principle of local ownership of SSR. The officials are under no pressure to do so and they are not held to account if they ignore the principle.

This section contains proposals to institutionalise the principle of local ownership in donor governments by including the principle in their funding, evaluation, reporting and other bureaucratic procedures. The aim is to make the principle part of the institutional culture and regular practice of these governments. To this end, the proposals present local ownership and capacity-building as key objectives and result areas rather than simply as means to achieving other objectives.

9.1 Internal Funding Procedures

The OECD DAC policy commitment to local ownership of security sector reform should be incorporated into the administrative forms that are used by donor governments to establish and fund SSR programmes and projects. When donor officials apply for inception funding or renewed funding for an SSR programme or project, the application form should include the following requirements:

1. Describe the ways in which this programme/project will promote local ownership of SSR, and provide Objectively Verifiable Indicators (OVIs).

2. Describe the ways in which this programme/project will build local capacity for security or SSR, and provide OVIs.

3. Describe the involvement of local actors in the design of the programme/project. If no local actors were involved in the design, explain the reasons for this.

4. Indicate which local actors support the programme/project. If no local actors support the programme/project, explain the reasons for this.

5. Indicate which local actors will be involved in implementing the programme/project.

6. Describe the ways in which the programme/project will enhance the security of citizens in general or vulnerable groups in particular.
7. If local ownership is impossible because of the circumstances in-country:
   ▪ describe these circumstances and the obstacles to local ownership;
   ▪ describe the ways in which the programme/project will contribute to
     addressing these obstacles; and
   ▪ indicate how local ownership could be built over time.

Including these requirements in a log frame application form or similar
document used by donor governments would help to ensure that local
ownership is not neglected. It would compel government officials to think
seriously about the general imperative of local ownership and its practical
application in specific partner countries.

9.2 Programme and Project Evaluation

The Output to Purpose Review or other evaluation form used by donor
governments when assessing their SSR programmes and projects should have
a section on local ownership. This section should include the following:

1. Describe how this programme/project has promoted local ownership of
   SSR and indicate progress towards the achievement of the designated
   OVI's.

2. Describe the ways in which the programme/project has built local
capacity for security or SSR and indicate progress towards the
achievement of the designated OVI's.

3. Describe the ways in which local actors have been involved in
   implementing the programme/project.

4. If local ownership was impossible because of the circumstances in-
country:
   ▪ describe these circumstances and the obstacles to local ownership;
   and
   ▪ describe the ways in which these obstacles could be addressed in
   the future.

5. Describe the ways in which the programme/project enhanced the
   security of citizens in general and/or vulnerable groups in particular.

6. Describe your learnings in relation to local ownership and highlight any
   lessons that might have general applicability.
If the sixth question were answered in a comprehensive and critical fashion, it would provide excellent material for research and policy development on local ownership of SSR.

9.3 Other Avenues for Institutionalising Local Ownership

Other avenues for institutionalising local ownership of SSR in donor governments include the following:

Criteria for allocating funds. Local ownership and capacity-building should be among the foremost criteria that donor governments use when evaluating in-house funding proposals on SSR. There should be a general presumption against funding programmes and projects that do not meet these criteria.

Policy statements. When donor governments issue policy statements on SSR, they should not merely reiterate their commitment to the principle of local ownership. The statements should include a proper description of the strategies that are being used or will be used to give effect to that commitment.

Pledge to recipients of donor support. The OECD DAC donors should formulate a pledge to support local ownership of SSR, publicise the pledge and include it in their funding contracts and partnership agreements with domestic actors.

Annual reports. All annual reports that cover donor support for SSR – whether prepared for departmental purposes, parliament or the public – should include a proper account of activities undertaken in support of local ownership and capacity-building.

Capacity-building for donor officials. There is a need to educate donor officials on the rationale and strategies for local ownership and capacity-building. Educational events should take place within donor governments, targeting in particular the departments and agencies that are least supportive of local ownership. They could also take place at a more centralised level under the auspices of the OECD DAC.
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In 1994 Laurie was appointed by President Mandela to serve on the Cameron Commission of Inquiry into Arms Trade. In 2001 he was commissioned by the parliamentary defence committee to redraft the National Conventional Arms Control Bill, and commissioned by the Department of Defence to redraft the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines Bill.

He has served on the Editorial Advisory Board of the South African Journal of International Affairs; the Editorial Committee of Strategic Review for Southern Africa; the Carter Centre’s International Council for Conflict Resolution; the Advisory Committee of the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch; the Expert Advisory Group of the UNDP Democratic Governance Practice Network; and the Critical Review Panel of the Implementation Framework for Security System Reform, OECD DAC (forthcoming).

In late 2005 Laurie was an adviser to the Palestinian security services and the Ward Mission on the preparation of a Palestinian White Paper on Safety and Security.

In 1999-2000 Laurie was an adviser to the Foreign Minister of Swaziland in his capacity as the Chair of the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee in Southern Africa. Laurie was the principal drafter of the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation (2001).