Conflict Prevention and Peaceful Development:
Policies to Reduce Inequalities and Exclusion
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CRISE Latin America Policy Briefing
Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict in Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru:
What can policy do?
Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict in Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru: What can policy do?

This note introduces a research project based in the University of Oxford and working with partners in eight countries, and the workshop associated with the project to which you are invited. The countries are, in Africa, Ghana, Nigeria and the Ivory Coast; in Asia, Malaysia and Indonesia, and in Latin America, Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru. In Latin America our partners are: for Bolivia, PNUD; for Guatemala FLACSO and for Peru, the Catholic University in Lima.

As we reach the point in our research where we are reflecting comparatively on our findings and developing the analysis, we also want to engage in a debate about policy implications, and this is the focus of the policy workshop to which we are inviting you. We are anxious that such a debate should be rooted in the politics and political economy of the specific context: we can all think of wonderful policies in the abstract, but how can change realistically come about? We need to recognise the centrality of political will: tackling its absence (eg through awareness raising, political representation, communication) may be the first and most crucial policy objective.

The note first describes briefly the conceptual thinking shaping the project across the eight countries. Second, it explains why we think HIs matter, and problems of measurement. Third, it presents a brief review of our general findings and of policies that have worked across the world in different contexts. Fourth, it discusses the complexity of policy in this area. Fifth, it offers a brief summary of our specific findings for Peru, which we hope can be the “spark” for the debate in the policy workshop to which we are inviting you.

1. Horizontal Inequalities

Horizontal inequalities (HIs) are inequalities between groups, mostly defined in cultural terms such as ethnic, religious, caste-based, and in some contexts racial groups. The concept of horizontal inequality differs from the ‘standard’ definition of inequality (which we term ‘vertical inequality’) because the latter lines individuals or households up vertically and measures inequality over the range of *individuals* rather than *groups*. HIs are *multidimensional* and encompass economic, social, cultural status and political dimensions:

- Economic HIs include inequalities in ownership of assets – financial, natural resource-based, human and social – and in incomes and employment opportunities that depend on these assets and the general conditions of the economy.
- Social HIs cover inequalities in access to a range of services – education, health and housing – and inequalities in achievements in health and educational outcomes.
- Political HIs consist in inequalities in the group distribution of political opportunities and power, including control over the presidency, the cabinet,
parliamentary assemblies, the army, police, regional and local governments.
- Cultural status HIs refer to differences in recognition and (de facto) hierarchical status of different groups’ cultural norms, customs and practices.

Table 1 illustrates the four dimensions and some major elements within each one. (We have attempted to make the list rather full, to illustrate the concept: in our empirical work we have not been able to cover all.) Each of the dimensions is important in itself, but most are also instrumental for achieving others. E.g., political power is both an end and a means; control over economic assets is primarily a means to secure income but it is also an end. The relevance of any element depends on whether it forms an important source of incomes or well-being in a particular society. E.g., housing is generally more relevant to industrialised countries, while land is of huge importance where agriculture accounts for most output and employment, but becomes less important as development proceeds.

Table 1: Sources of differentiation among groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions</th>
<th>Political Assets</th>
<th>Economic Employment And income</th>
<th>Social Employment</th>
<th>Cultural Assets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elements of categories</td>
<td>Balance of presence in:</td>
<td>Access to:</td>
<td>Incomes</td>
<td>Access to:</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Govt ministers</td>
<td>- Land</td>
<td>Government employment</td>
<td>- Education</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Civil service- various levels</td>
<td>- Communal resources</td>
<td>Private employment</td>
<td>- Health services</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Armed forces</td>
<td>- Minerals and other natural resources</td>
<td>Skilled employment</td>
<td>- Safe water</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Police forces</td>
<td>- Privately owned capital/credit</td>
<td>Unskilled employment</td>
<td>- Housing</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- regional and municipal govs, Congress</td>
<td>- public infrastructure</td>
<td>Elite employment</td>
<td>Quality of such access</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Why horizontal inequalities matter and how to measure them

HIs matter because:
- High HIs makes violent group mobilisation and conflicts more likely. Group inequality provides powerful grievances which leaders can use to mobilise people, by calling on cultural markers (a common ethnicity or religion) and pointing to group exploitation. Extreme consequences are civil wars, including attempts to gain independence or more autonomy, such as in Sri Lanka, Aceh and Biafra; massacres or even genocide, as in Burundi and Rwanda; or suppression and further exploitation of deprived areas, as has occurred in Sudan. An important conclusion that has emerged from the CRISE research is that countries with large horizontal inequalities, especially where these are consistent across dimensions, are particularly at risk of experiencing severe political upheavals and violent conflicts.

- Unequal access to political, economic, and social resources and inequalities of cultural status can have a serious negative impact on the welfare of members of poorer groups who mind about their relative position and that of their group.

- Severe horizontal inequalities reduce the growth potential of society, because they mean that some people do not have access to education or jobs on the basis of their potential merit or efficiency because of the group they belong to.

- Horizontal inequalities make it difficult to eliminate poverty because it is often difficult to reach members of deprived groups effectively with programmes of assistance. This is especially so because deprived groups face multiple disadvantages and discrimination and these need to be confronted together. This implies that poverty reduction programmes that do not explicitly consider HIs might miss such a contradiction.

- HIs disempower people, reduce their self esteem as a group: this has serious consequences for social cohesion.
It is important to monitor HIs so as to identify where they are severe, and in which dimension. Problems of measurement include:

- **Identifying relevant groups.** What is needed is to identify groups which are important to people in society and on the basis of which political mobilisation may occur. Group affiliation matters most where group boundaries are relatively tight, so people cannot move easily from one group to another. Since people have multiple identities which are socially constructed and to some extent fluid, there are very few groups where boundaries are clear cut. In most African countries, there are many sub-ethnicities and much intermarriage which make boundaries fluid and ill-defined. In-depth knowledge of a particular society is necessary to identify salient groups. In Latin America, understanding mestisaje is particularly relevant to the notion of fluidity of identity. It is important to understand how groups were formed and evolved and the role that the state has played (and often continues to play) in defining groups and group boundaries.

- **Covering all four dimensions of HIs.** Since HIs are multidimensional, measurement must cover each of the four dimensions, and the most important elements within each. To the extent that we are concerned with the political impact of horizontal inequalities, what is important are the elements that seem most significant to the people involved, i.e. what they are concerned about – in the extreme, the kinds of things which people will fight over. Evidence suggests that this differs across societies and groups: in Northern Ireland, for example, it appears that people are particularly concerned about employment and housing inequality; in Zimbabwe, people’s actions suggest they pay attention to land inequality; in Britain, young black people object to being stopped by the police as they go about their business; in Sri Lanka, people’s major concerns are employment prospects and access to higher education. From both a well-being and a political perspective, then, these rather concrete variables may be of more importance than outcome variables, like life expectancy or nutrition levels, or incomes, which are less visible on a day-to-day basis.

- **Data issues.** In many countries, most data do not include ethnic or religious
variables. Serious monitoring of HIs requires that such variables be included in household surveys or censuses. But in their absence it is often possible to use other data (e.g. using language or region to classify people) which can act as a crude proxy for the group data needed.

Despite these problems it is generally possible to get a fairly good estimate of HIs in any society. For an example, see Figueroa (2) on the accompanying disk: returns to education differentiated by ethnicity show for Peru the extent of that dimension of HIs.

3. Key findings of research and lessons from across the world

In this section we will review some general findings from CRISE research. These are based on our eight country studies from three regions of the world; and some cross-country analysis of a broader range of countries.

Each of our eight country is multicultural and in each region, some countries have avoided serious armed conflict, while the other(s) has/have had some considerable violent conflict at some time in the recent past. Bolivia, Malaysia and Ghana are the countries that have succeeded in remaining broadly peaceful, while Nigeria has not had national-level conflict for several decades. Our intention was to learn from the contrasting situations and policies.

At this point in our research we would sketch our preliminary insights and conclusions as follows:

1. Some HIs are very persistent, lasting centuries even. Many have colonial origins but continue through a cycle of cumulative causation, as privilege generates more privilege, and deprivation is passed down generations.

2. The overlap between class and ethnicity which is the common state of affairs in Latin America (as distinct from Africa), makes HIs particularly durable, and can be associated with a denial of the importance of the ethnic factor by the mestizo/white segment of the population. Indeed, class discourse has been so entrenched in Latin America, that indigenous groups also have downplayed the importance of ethnicity behind HIs during long periods in history.

3. Where there are persistent HIs, they are particularly important to tackle, and particularly hard to change, as they tend to reflect discrimination and the denial of such discrimination, and political disempowerment leading to weak political organisation and an inadequate basis for constructing an alternative route.
4. Measurement of HIs is itself subject to problems of bias and preconceptions. In addition, worldwide, it is the case that national and international organisations typically ignore the horizontal dimension in their reporting and construction of statistics.

5. The probability of conflict rises where HIs are higher. Cross-country analysis by Østby shows a significant rise in the probability of conflict with higher country socio-economic HIs, in an analysis covering 55 developing countries.\(^1\) This increase in the probability of conflict occurs when HIs are measured in terms of years of education or of average household assets. Mancini has come to a similar finding for districts across Indonesia, where district conflict appears more likely the worse the difference in infant mortality across groups. We should emphasise that these are probabilities.\(^2\) Not all countries with high HIs experience conflict. Both Ghana and Bolivia, in our study, have high HIs yet have avoided substantial violent conflict.

6. Conflict is more likely where political and socio-economic HIs are high and in the same direction, or consistent. Where they run in different directions, conflict is more likely to be avoided. In Bolivia, political accommodation processes have resulted in lower political HIs, while maintaining high levels of socio-economic HIs. In both Malaysia and Nigeria, the group that is economically impoverished is politically advantaged, and there is some possibility that having political power enables the economically deprived groups to feel that they participate in society.

7. In Latin America, in sharp contrast to Asia and Africa, there is no clear cut evidence of prototypical ethnic violence (pitting members of one group against another).\(^3\) However, there was a mass incorporation of indigenous people in armed groups in the late 1970s in Guatemala and during the 1980s in Peru, where the ethnic dimensions of the conflict include a

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\(^3\) We examine severe violent conflict, usually determined by no less than 1,000 combatant casualty per annum.
disproportionate number of indigenous casualties. Discourses of mobilisation however emphasised class (i.e. poor against rich) rather than religion, race or ethnicity.

8. In analysing why ethnic identity has not so far played a central role in processes of violent mobilisation in Latin America, we have begun to reflect on questions of ‘private’ or ‘public’ notions of ethnic identities (i.e. one may feel particularly strongly about or be proud of belonging to a certain group or religion, a private importance of identity, but this may have little or no repercussions in the public arena in terms of patterns of collective action, organisation, political choice and mobilisation). Of the five countries with substantial indigenous population (Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Guatemala and Mexico), armed conflict and violent mobilisation of indigenous people has occurred in the three countries with the least salient public ethnic identities.

9. While we have little insight to date as to how to compare the salience of private identities across our three case studies prior to the armed conflicts, there are some indications that in Peru, it is not so much salience but the loss or repression of identities that played an important role.

10. The CRISE Latin America research is thus highlighting the complex and at times contradictory nature of the relationship between HIs, the salience of ethnicity and violent conflict. In this complexity, the distinction between the salience of public as opposed to private identity may be a pivotal distinction. Thus, in Guatemala, there appears to have been a strong disconnect between strong enduring private (i.e. salient) ethnic identities and the weakness of public identities prior to the mass repression of the 1980s. However, there has been no return to the status quo ante in Guatemala and indigenous (Mayan) public identity has emerged and consolidated.

11. The nature of the state is of enormous importance in whether serious conflict erupts and persists. An aggressive state can fuel and sustain a conflict – in both Guatemala and Indonesia (with respect to separatist conflicts), the harsh and aggressive state reaction to rebellion sustained conflict for many years, causing deaths on a massive scale, and provoking further rebellion. In Peru, the reaction of the armed forces and the police increased violence, but in a less severe manner, though had their reaction come earlier and had it paid more attention to the underlying causes, much violence could have been avoided. In contrast, state handling of disputes in Ghana and some local-area conflicts in Indonesia has dampened some conflicts and avoided others.

4 “Salient” comes from the verb salire to Latin, “to leap out”. It is that which is prominent, has an incidence.
12. Political HI plays out differently across continents. Whereas indirect rule through local power structures and the political manipulation of ethnic mobilisation and divisions were key aspects of colonial rule in Africa and Asia, direct colonial rule in Latin America emphasised the power of Spanish ruler at the expense of indigenous groups and their elite who remained almost wholly excluded from political power and decision making processes.\(^5\) Thus, historically in Latin America, ethnic group mobilisation and leadership has tended to be severely repressed. Even after independence, indigenous people have tended to have less presence in state and political institutions than their non indigenous counterparts. To this day, while decreasing, some of the highest political HIs estimates amongst our case studies are observable in the region (Peru and Guatemala) and ethnic politics and mobilisation are still inchoate. The depth and severity of political HIs plays an important role in constraining challenges to the other dimensions of HIs (socio economic and cultural). In Asia and Africa by contrast political HIs are identified as particularly important triggers of conflict because it seems they affect elite motives. Socio-economic deprivation tends to affect mostly the mass of the people. These grievances however are unlikely to lead to violence unless group leaders are also politically excluded. This is why inclusive (or power-sharing) government are important: they tend to reduce the likelihood of conflict, as happens in Ghana or as used to happen in Côte d’Ivoire under Houphouët-Boigny.

13. The issue of citizenship also plays out differently in different regions. In Latin America there has been a positive recognition of the importance of this issue. In Bolivia, the expansion of citizenship rights after the National Revolution seems to have played a key role in avoiding large scale violence. However, in Africa, citizenship is still an important source of political and economic exclusion, not only at a national but also at regional and local levels. At a national level, denial of citizenship has been critical in inciting rebellion in the case of Côte d’Ivoire. Similarly, in Nigeria, the settler/indigene distinction has been the source of many local-level conflicts.

14. Inequality of cultural recognition among groups is an additional motivation for conflict in some contexts. It can add to people’s sense of identity and therefore their willingness to mobilise along cultural lines, while disrespect for particular cultural symbols can be a powerful trigger to conflict. Thus in Northern Ireland, the Orange marches were the trigger that set off the ‘troubles’ in the 1970s. Similarly, language policy in Sri Lanka, and the desecration of religious buildings and sites in India and Palestine, have acted as triggers for major conflicts. In Latin America, the fight for cultural recognition has been a key in fuelling the political rise of Evo Morales in Bolivia and other leaders in the region.

15. The presence of natural resources can be a significant cause of conflicts, both separatist and local. In Peru, there are at present some 40 points of

\(^5\) However it is important to distinguish between political power and influence within the colonial political and governing apparatus where indigenous presence and influence was scare, and political power and influence at the local level where indigenous influence remained much stronger.
tension over the exploitation of mineral resources, some of which have resulted in violence, though on a scale modest in comparison with Africa. In some countries, natural resources, such as gas or oil, can be a source of severe (and sometimes sudden) regional inequalities in output – yet they are often not translated into improved conditions for the people living where the resources are found. In Indonesia, for example, the oil-rich regions actually had lower human indicators than elsewhere. Consequently, this becomes a major source of contention and sometimes of demands for separatism. Equally, low inequalities and poor management of oil resources can feed into local-level conflict, as in the Niger Delta region in Nigeria.

4. Policy aspects: how can HIs be addressed?

The appendix lists a range of policies that may be relevant (and some of which are already extensively applied in some of our cases). Our intention is to develop policy findings through national and regional consultations. Since each situation is unique, policies must reflect the particular circumstances of the country. Hence the first requirement is to understand the local situation: to assess the extent of HIs in different dimensions, and, where possible, perceptions of these inequalities; and to explore the major causes of the inequalities.

To lead into our workshop discussions it may be useful here to reflect on the difficulties and internal contradictions of this area of policy. We reflect on four aspects, all of which are highly sensitive: the interface between policies to modify HIs and the salience of ethnic identity; HI policy and tensions both within and between groups; conflicting values; and finally choices, priorities, and related aspects of feasibility.

Salience of identity and HI policy

Some policies are universalistic – i.e. they apply to everyone irrespective of their group, but help the deprived and hence tend to reduce HIs (e.g. general anti-poverty programmes, though as we pointed out above if they do not include explicit consideration of HIs, they may fail to help some of the most marginalised). Some policies use region or industry as a proxy for the group, helping regions/industries with concentrations of deprived groups. By contrast, some policies are directly targeted at particular groups. Such measures or policies may play a negative divisive role in societies, emphasising the salience of difference rather than the common ground (i.e. this relates to the now well established debate between interculturalism and multiculturalism, with most prominent thinkers, policy makers and international agencies now recognising the need to balance the latter with the former). In the context of Latin America, two key models of inter-ethnic relations have dominated: assimilationist (amounting to a denial of the presence, role and importance of indigenous groups) and segregationist (the dominant model during the

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6 Significant increases in the payments of revenues to the regions have been a response to violence, but inadequate capacities and limited infrastructure make it likely that money does not transform into development, with the threat of further violence.
colonial period enforcing separate regimes for indigenous and non indigenous groups). Currently the dominant discourse (at least in Guatemala and Bolivia) is that of multiculturalism that purports to move away from these previous models. Ideally HI policies should refrain from reinforcing either of these two models.

These are likely to be contentious and difficult issues. Even within the CRISE team there are distinct views and positions. Some researchers advocate against measures that emphasize the salience of ethnic identities, on the ground that they are likely to entrench divisions and increase the risk of conflicts. Others emphasize that the salience of identity does not automatically increase the likelihood of conflict. As was noted above, of the five Latin American countries with prominent indigenous populations, the two countries where indigenous identities are the most salient, Ecuador and Bolivia, are precisely those that have not experienced major episodes of armed violence affecting indigenous populations, unlike Mexico, Peru and Guatemala). Elsewhere, in Europe for instance it is notable that both Catalans and Basques have very salient identities but only one group resorts to violence.

*Group relations within and between*

It may be difficult to reduce HIs without increasing tension between or within groups. Thus a ‘better off’ group might react negatively if a previously deprived group begins to catch up, even if there is no actual observable loss in the better off group (as happened in Sri Lanka). There may be contradictions between reconciling the objective of reducing HIs while remaining sensitive to how different group relates to each other. For instance it is clear that Malaysia, the country that has gone the furthest in tackling HIs, has done little to dent the salience of ethnic and religious difference between these groups.

*Conflicting values*

This is an issue in relation to cultural HIs. A straightforward measure to reduce cultural inequalities may be to seek to recognise community/customary law or informal justice systems. These traditional practices can provide a more expedite and, for some groups, more legitimate form of justice. Yet such systems may involve practices such as public floggings (Sieder 2004) that may well be felt to be alien to values of others in the society. If we are looking for a recognition of diversity based on respect, the difficulty such practices present cannot be denied or suppressed without undermining the basic policy itself.

*Choices, priorities and feasibility*

A final set of issues concerns choices, priorities, and feasibility. Policy makers are sometimes attracted to policies to attack cultural inequalities because they are relatively cheap: recognition rather than redistribution. But are they therefore the most appropriate, or all that is necessary? How should we decide in the face of financial
constraints? And cultural recognition itself can be problematic: for instance few object to the notion that indigenous languages should be ‘recognised’ but in countries like Guatemala where 23 major language co-exist, are we in the realm of the ‘feasible’?

Again, should all aspects of HIs be addressed simultaneously? In general, it is easier to put in place policies towards inequalities in access to social services, e.g. education, and more difficult to ensure equality of economic opportunity, Yet policies only seem to be effective in significantly reducing inequality where both social and economic inequalities are tackled together (as in Malaysia and Northern Ireland). So again, are we in the world of the feasible?

5. Specific Latin American and country findings and policy issues (all references are to the papers on the accompanying CD)

General findings/issues on HIs.

1. Extensive, severe and enduring HIs were detected across the 3 countries. By and large Bolivia has a better record than either Peru or Guatemala, and political HIs have reduced notably over the past 10 years, and in some degree also socio-economic HIs. However, Bolivia retains severe problems with poverty and extreme poverty which affects a disproportionate number of indigenous people.

2. There are strong gender aspects to HIs, which should not be omitted at the time of examining how HIs can be addressed.

3. In all countries concerned there are important variations in the meaning of ethnicity, in the nature of groups, on boundaries and in perceptions of groups. In some cases ethno linguistic group identity predominates (Aymara in Bolivia). In Guatemala, ethno linguistic identities are being contested ‘from above’ in favour of pan-Mayan identities, though the extent to which this has (as yet) permeated the wider population is far from clear (Bastos, forthcoming). Both in Bolivia and Guatemala it is notable that there are strong and important countermovements against the historical tendency to ‘menospreciar’ indigenous groups. Pride in being Mayan or Aymara are in evidence in their respective countries. By contrast, in Peru ethnicity remains a difficult topic to approach. While we detected important positive changes amongst perception of self within the cholo population, overall there are few positive attributes attached to non-indigenous identities, and in general strong racial hierarchies where ‘the whiter the better’ remains the norm.
Findings and Issues for the Case of Peru

HIs are high in all dimensions (Figueroa and Barron; Paredes1). There is a slight improvement noticeable in political HIs over the last fifteen years. Socio-economic HIs have probably improved slowly over the last three decades in basic literacy and health measures, but this reflects the limitations of using such measures, where all converge as the ceiling is approached.

The outstanding findings in comparative terms from CRISE research are:

1. Prejudice and discrimination are deep-seated in the case of Peru – more serious than in both Bolivia and Guatemala, and certainly less acknowledged. We found much evidence of denial of the issue of prejudice (Paredes 2).
2. The internalisation of subordinate status and discrimination is a common characteristic, evident in our interviews (Paredes 2).
3. A deep process of mestizaje and high migration have not only altered the way different groups see their ethnic identity today and the degree to which they express it, but have also altered the context in which this ethnic identity change and interrelates with other identities such as peasant, migrant, serrano. Nonetheless, we are finding among Peruvians, especially in Lima, a deep awareness of the importance of racial and cultural characteristics in order to access opportunities for success. (Paredes 2)
4. The education system works to reinforce inequality and discrimination, as was evident in our interviews (Ansion, Paredes 2, Figueroa)
5. The deep-seatedness of the inequality goes back to the colonial period
6. The oppressive nature of the historical record has had consequences for leadership and collective action. The indigenous elite was effectively wiped out and/or deprived of access to education (Thorp, Caumartin, and Gray Molina)
7. As in Bolivia and Guatemala, the degree of overlap between ethnicity, class and region makes the issue especially deep-seated, and actually makes political challenge less likely. This also makes for less change, because the system is not contested.
8. When major political violence does occur, it is instigated by external actors (provincial middleclass university professors and others). It leads to a conflict ethnic in its characteristics (of those killed in the conflict, 73 per cent were indigenous). Both Sendero and the army and police act in ways that aggravate the ethnic characteristics.
9. The inability of Sendero to penetrate into some regions is a function of levels of community trust, identity, organisation and in some cases, work of NGOs and church-based groups to promote a culture of anti-violence (Munoz, Paredes and Thorp)
10. However, significant though levels of community organisation and solidarity may be in some areas, this still translates weakly into effective political action able to challenge HIs and build a sustainable socio-political equilibrium. This has several causes:
- Extreme centralization of politics and the late access to full political rights (Paredes1)
- local political structures which operate in divisive and often corrupt ways
- lack of a vision for regional development capable of providing options for improved quality of life at the local level.
- Lack of structures to mediate appropriately in the growing number of conflicts around natural resources, especially mining.

11. The interface between mining and indigenous communities appears to be the most crucial flashpoint for violence today (?some 40 hotspots). Our research concludes that goodwill from the companies, even where it exists, is not enough. National and regional leadership, infrastructure, and vision are all needed as well as significant investment in the quality of local government. The role for mediation is important, but without the wider structure, is likely to be inadequate and frustrating. (Munoz, Paredes and Thorp)

Policy lessons?: This is what we are anxious to discuss with the Peru policy workshop. It seems to us that decentralisation, regional development and education must form the heart of the Peruvian policy recommendations. We would like to discuss how the issue of strong but unacknowledged prejudice can be usefully surfaced.

Appendix: The Range of HI Policies

Policies can be thought as of two types, generic and specific to particular HIs,

Thus: **Generic policies** can tackle issues of underlying culture and discrimination.
- Here Human Rights policies and associated institutions may be the most effective. For example in Northern Ireland, strong anti-discrimination legislation, actively supported by the authorities, was important in securing substantial improvements in employment, housing and education inequalities. In Peru, a Human Rights Ombudsman has been established, the Defensoria, and through some high profile cases has been able to make a beginning in cultural status equality, and in combating racial discrimination more generally.
- Also leadership from public figures can play a major role
- the role of the media will be important
- Citizenship rights

**Specific Policies:**
- **towards socio-economic HIs**, include macro, meso and micro policies, as well as policies towards asset distribution.
- at the macro level, structural adjustment policies need to be monitored for their implications for group distribution, and modified where necessary, or compensatory policies introduced.
- at the meso level, tax and expenditure policies need to be devised to contribute to reduced HIs. Progressive taxation will make a contribution here, as well as
- micro-level projects to enhance the economic prospects of deprived groups have been adopted in many countries, including Ghana and Nigeria. special tax regimes to favour deprived regions. Regional and district expenditure allocations can make a major contribution.
- anti-discrimination policies may improve group distribution of employment opportunities and contracts (as they have in Northern Ireland).
- educational and employment quotas can change group distribution (such policies have been followed in Malaysia).
- asset redistribution – in land, financial assets, and micro-credit – has been adopted in Fiji, Malaysia and Zimbabwe.

**Policies towards political HIs** may include:
- electoral design (e.g. PR and boundary delineation) that will ensure proportional representation of different groups
- power-sharing in government.
- fair distribution of jobs at all levels in the bureaucracy, police, and army.
- decentralisation of government to regional and local levels.

**Policies towards cultural HIs:**
- recognition of all widely spoken languages as ‘national’ or ‘official’ languages. In Bolivia, the multicultural nature of the country is recognised by the Constitution, providing recognition to the multiple languages used in the country and the right to be taught in different languages.
- use of informal mechanisms to reinforce the formal. In Belgium, convention dictates that the prime minister employ both major languages – French and Dutch – in parliament and in dealing with the media, even to the extent of switching language mid-speech.
- guarantee of freedom to pursue one’s religion.
- recognition and support for diversity of cultural practices
- recognition of customary law practices (but see the discussion above on conflicts of values).