


Religions and Development  
Research Programme

**Contesting Ideologies and  
Struggle for Authority:  
State-Madrassa Engagement  
in Pakistan**

Dr Masooda Bano  
University of Oxford



Working Paper 14 - 2007

**Rad**

# Religions and Development

## Research Programme

The Religions and Development Research Programme Consortium is an international research partnership that is exploring the relationships between several major world religions, development in low-income countries and poverty reduction. The programme is comprised of a series of comparative research projects that are addressing the following questions:

- How do religious values and beliefs drive the actions and interactions of individuals and faith-based organisations?
- How do religious values and beliefs and religious organisations influence the relationships between states and societies?
- In what ways do faith communities interact with development actors and what are the outcomes with respect to the achievement of development goals?

The research aims to provide knowledge and tools to enable dialogue between development partners and contribute to the achievement of development goals. We believe that our role as researchers is not to make judgements about the truth or desirability of particular values or beliefs, nor is it to urge a greater or lesser role for religion in achieving development objectives. Instead, our aim is to produce systematic and reliable knowledge and better understanding of the social world.

The research focuses on four countries (India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania), enabling the research team to study most of the major world religions: Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism and African traditional belief systems. The research projects will compare two or more of the focus countries, regions within the countries, different religious traditions and selected development activities and policies.

The consortium consists of six research partner organisations, each of which is working with other researchers in the four focus countries:

- University of Birmingham, UK: International Development Department, Department of Theology and Religion, Centre for West African Studies, Centre for the Study of Global Ethics.
- University of Bath, UK: Centre for Development Studies.
- Indian Institute of Dalit Studies, New Delhi.
- Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, Ibadan.
- University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
- Lahore University of Management Sciences, Pakistan.

In addition to the research partners, links have been forged with non-academic and non-government bodies, including Islamic Relief.

# Religions and Development Working Paper 14

## **Contesting Ideologies and Struggle for Authority: State-Madrassa Engagement in Pakistan**

**Dr Masooda Bano**

University of Oxford

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## Summary

Though the current Madrasa Reform Programme launched by the government of Pakistan in 2002 has faced resistance from the ulema, being viewed as the USA's brainchild, the fact is that the Pakistani state's aspiration to reform Islam is much older. The state's agenda to reform madrasas, and through that the conservative interpretation of Islam within Pakistan, goes back to the 1960s. From the start the government has pursued a similar objective: to introduce modern subjects to the madrasa curriculum so that the students 'integrate into the mainstream economy and society'. The fate of the various efforts has been the same: madrasas have successfully resisted state pressure to change their curriculum; even the current madrasa reform programme has managed to enroll less than 200 of the 16,000 registered madrasas. This study highlights two main reasons for the madrasas' ability to resist state-led reform: one, weak political will due to close links between political legitimacy and Islam; two, strong madrasa leadership resulting from an alliance between senior ulema and a strong base of domestic patronage. The paper reveals that the involvement of bigger madrasas is critical to reform because it gives legitimacy to the reform programme, which in turn makes it more acceptable to smaller madrasas. The paper therefore argues that winning the trust of the senior ulema and making them active partners in developing a reformed curriculum is the only way to develop a reform programme that will have broad-based acceptance among the madrasas. This requires a major shift in the mindset of the government and the donor agencies supporting the madrasa reform programme. Rather than starting their planning from how to secularize the madrasa, they need to accept the madrasas' primary role as a producer of Islamic knowledge, and then explore how modern interpretations of the religious texts can be included within madrasa education, rather than exclusively focusing on adding modern subjects to the madrasa curriculum.

# Glossary

Alim	Religious teacher
Deeni	Religious
Dora Hadees	Eight-year religious syllabus
Hadith	The Prophet Mohammad's sayings
Hifz	Memorization of the Quran
Jamias	Madrasas teaching to master's level
Khateeb	The one who gives the sermon
Khutba	Sermon
Madrasa/madrassah	Islamic religious seminary
Madrasa/madaris/madrassahs	Plural of madrasa
Mauktab	Small religious school
Mushaik	Advisers
Mustahiqeen	Deserving candidates
Nazra	Reading of the Quran
Takhasus	PhD research
Ulema	Scholars
Wafaq	Umbrella organizations of madrasas
Waqf	Religious endowments



# 1 Introduction

It might be thought that in a country with a high poverty rate and a state schooling system suffering from problems of access as well as quality, the institution of madrasas (Islamic religious seminaries) that impart free education to more than 1.5 million Pakistani children without any support from the state would be considered an asset. Yet, the state in Pakistan has been a reluctant appreciator of the madrasas. The Madrasa Reform Programme of the Government of Pakistan, launched in 2002, with its emphasis on 'Reform' is an indication of the state mindset that there is something amiss with the madrasas. In the post-September 11 context, it is easy to find the reason in the current concerns about madrasas and militancy. However, given that the state aspirations for such reform go back to the late 1950s, there is clearly more to the tension in state-madrasa relationships than the current concern with militancy. Apart from the Zia ul Haq period, all premiers of Pakistan since General Ayub Khan have hoped to reform the madrasas. Yet all have failed: the madrasas to date have been able to resist these state-led reforms. In a context where some donors are arguing for further investing in these reforms and others are arguing for their complete abandonment, this study attempts to provide a more nuanced understanding of state-madrasa relationships in Pakistan. It puts the current state-madrasa engagement into a historical context and then develops a more ethnographic account of state-madrasa relationships on the ground by closely examining selected cases. In the process, the study also reflects on the broader academic concerns around factors that facilitate cooperation between state and non-state providers to provide a public good.

## 1.1 Conceptual concerns

The rise of the New Policy Agenda in the early 1980s led to the realization that the state alone cannot provide social services to all (Edwards and Hulme, 1995, 1996). Development theory and practice have thus moved towards supporting increased interaction between the state and non-state providers in providing services to the poor. Non-State Providers (NSPs), especially, when interpreted to mean non-profit providers, are increasingly being viewed as important partners in development: one, they help generate additional resources through community mobilization, two, there is a normative value placed on this engagement, in which the partnership is valued in itself for being a check on the working of the state. New models of state-NSP interactions are continuing to evolve in which the two parties have clearly defined roles in service delivery.

Cooperation, however, is not the only form of state-NSP interaction. Najam (2000), for one, highlights that there can be four different outcomes of state-NSP engagement: cooperation (similar strategies about means and ends), confrontation (dissimilar strategies about means and ends), cooptation (similar strategies about means with dissimilar ends), and complementarity (dissimilar strategies about means with common ends). A conscious decision to not engage with the other party, even when both claim to be working for the same outcome, also reflects some level of engagement, which makes either one or both parties realize that cooperation is undesirable. This study is concerned with analyzing all these forms of interaction between madrasas and the state in Pakistan. It aims to understand whether the government and faith-based organizations (FBOs), defined here as religiously inspired social service organizations, have institutionally and organizationally conditioned policy agendas that are likely to lead to contention about the purposes and processes of 'public action.'

The reason for focusing on madrasas is twofold. One, there is a general dearth of research on FBOs, especially within the literature on state-NSP interactions (Clarke, 2005). There is thus much scope for contributing to the literature to see if FBOs, despite being confined in their actions by a religious code, are free to strategize and innovate like secular NSPs in their negotiations with the state. Two, since September 11, madrasas, especially in Pakistan, have become the target of state intervention due to their alleged links to forces involved in international militancy. Since 2002, the Government of Pakistan has initiated a madrasa registration drive to better monitor the activities of all madrasas and has also initiated a madrasa reform programme. The implementation of these programmes has faced much resistance from within the madrasas, impeding progress. The study, therefore, attempts to understand the ideological or material sources of these tensions between the state and madrasas in Pakistan. In the process, it aims to decipher the motivation for the actions of both parties. It also attempts to understand the processes and platforms through which the negotiations between the two parties take place. And, finally, by looking at the experiences of those madrasas which have opted to engage with the state reform programme and therefore have entered into interaction with the state, it explores which of the two sides dominate and why.

## 1.2 Methodology<sup>1</sup>

In order to understand where the relationships between the state and madrasas stand in Pakistan today, this study adopts a threefold approach. The first part of the study provides a historical analysis

of state-madrassa relationships, including the factors that have shaped the state's outlook towards religion and the madrasas' ability to defend themselves. This analysis is based on analysis of literature, interviews with leading ulemas and representatives of the five Wafaqs - the umbrella organizations of the madrasas (acting at times as trade unions), which represent the madrasas from a particular school of thought and have degree-issuing authority recognized by the state - to get their views on the issue, and with academics and journalists who have observed the phenomenon over time.

This is followed by a more ethnographic approach, in which an attempt is made to understand the everyday realities of state-madrassa relationships by looking in depth at four madrasas in Rawalpindi, two of which have engaged with the federal government's Madrasa Reform Programme and two of which have not. The purpose of this selection is to understand the factors that lead some madrasas to engage with the state in a context where the majority disapproves of the reform. Of the two selected madrasas in each category, one was a Jamia, the highest level of madrasa, which teaches the complete eight-year course of Dars-e-Nizami and Dora-Hadees starting after matriculation, and the second was an ordinary madrasa, which teaches the same syllabus but only up to higher secondary level<sup>2</sup>. The muktabas, which focus mainly on *nazra*, reading of the Quran in Arabic, and *hifz* (memorization of the Quran) are excluded from the study because they sit on the bottom rank within the religious hierarchy and are often an extension of a mosque rather than having a separate identity as a madrasa. The views and experience of the madrasas that have entered the reform programme are then juxtaposed against the views and concerns of leaders of the two madrasas and the broader ulema community who have refrained from entering the reform programme. By comparing the views and experiences of the madrasas which have started to engage with the reform programme but represent a minority within the religious establishment, and the views and concerns of the majority that is refusing to engage with the reform, the study attempts to highlight both the causes of resistance and the factors that can lead some madrasas to engage irrespective of their concerns.

After analyzing the views and concerns of the pro-reform and anti-reform madrasas, the study then shifts to another question. It attempts to see how the presence in power of Islamic parties shapes state-madrassa relationships. Here the study focuses on the experience of madrasas in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan, the two provinces where currently an alliance of Islamic religious parties, Muttahida-Majlisa-Amal (MMA), is in government. In the first province the MMA forms

the government; in the second it is part of a coalition government. The MMA is the second largest opposition party in the National Assembly. This aspect of the research is set against the common puzzle faced by policy as well as academic circles as to who is most capable of reforming an institution: those on the outside, or those within it. Since the religious political parties draw their votes partially from the madrasas, it was thought a legitimate question to try to assess how the religious parties have dealt with the federally administered Madrasa Reform Programme in the provinces where they form the government. It could be that due to their natural alliance with the madrasas, they have been able to promote the programme more successfully. On the other hand it could be that, due to this alliance, they might be as opposed to the reform programme as are the madrasas themselves. In order to capture the experience of the reform programme within these two provinces, interviews were conducted with the provincial government officials responsible for the reform programme in both provinces, the Minister for Religious Affairs in NWFP, and ulema from two leading madrasas from each of the five Wafaqs within the two provinces. It was thought important to cover madrasas from all five Wafaqs because, given that not all five religious schools of thought are equally represented in the government, they could have had differing experiences with the MMA-led government.

The period since September 11 has seen a very tense relationship between the madrasas and the federal government, whereby government policies to support the 'war on terror' have led to police raids on some madrasas. Points of tension in these interactions provide a good opportunity to analyze the challenges faced by the state in asserting its agenda vis-à-vis the madrasas. Therefore, the study also attempts to understand the alternative agenda and strategies of the two sides over the critical issue of registration of madrasas that dominated the debate about the relationship between madrasas and the state in Pakistan between 2002 and 2005.

The study structure is as follows. Section 2 explains the institutional structures shaping state-madrasa relationships in Pakistan. It explains the complexity of the Pakistani state and the madrasa hierarchy to highlight why, despite a secular mindset for most of its existence, the state has never effectively implemented a reform programme for madrasas. Section 3 then draws out the extent and nature of routine interaction between the state and madrasas in Pakistan to see if madrasas are as independent of the state as they are presented to be. Then, focusing on the Madrasa Reform Programme, the account takes the reader inside two madrasas in Rawalpindi which have entered the state-led reform

programme and juxtaposes their experiences against the two madrasas which have not and the concerns of the ulema community. Section 4 presents an analysis of the Madrasa Reform Programme under government by the religious parties. Section 5 then draws out the key factors shaping madrasa-state relationships in Pakistan before providing a conclusion.

## 2 Shaping of state-madrassa relations in Pakistan: a historical account

The madrassa is one of the oldest institutions of learning in the Islamic world: it is the traditional school of learning in which the Islamic sciences are taught. The nature and specifics of madrassas have, however, been highly shaped by the cultural and political context of their setting. This chapter presents an account of the evolution of state-madrassa relationships in Pakistan and their current peculiarities. In the process it brings out the political, economic and social factors that have enabled the madrassas to stay independent of the state and resist government demands for reforms.

### 2.1 Understanding madrassas and their agenda

The masjid (mosque) was the first institution of learning in Islam. The madrassa tradition grew from here as slowly, mosque-*khankah* complexes (living quarters of the religious scholar) developed around mosques wherein students were housed as well as taught. The madrassa always had an altruistic aim, as neither the institutional nor the running costs were recovered from the beneficiaries (i.e. the students) but from state patronage or public donations. The same tradition continues to date in Pakistan. From the beginning, Islamic jurisprudence and learning of the Quran and Hadith were central to the madrassas' curriculum. However, madrassas in the early period were also the base of modern knowledge and scientific discoveries by Muslim scholars. Even in Muslim India, madrassas were establishments of higher learning that produced civil servants and judicial officials. With the decline of the Islamic empires and displacement of madrassas by western style education institutions, madrassas eventually became exclusively religious education institutions across the Muslim world. The Government of Pakistan's recent Madrassa Reform Ordinance defines a *Deeni* (religious) Madrassa as a "religious institution primarily for religious education and includes Jamia, Dar-ul-uloom, School, College or University, or called by any other name, set up for purposes of primarily imparting religious education and providing boarding and lodging facilities," (GoP 2005a).

The primary role of madrassas today is to produce scholars of Islam. However, implicit in this basic function is a bigger ambition: to shape the state and society in line with Islamic teaching. This has to do with the Islamic emphasis on viewing religion as an all-encompassing phenomenon cutting across private and public spheres. As will be discussed in the section on the case studies, all madrassas view it as part of their duty to guide the state and society in conformity with Islamic principles. This adds an interesting dimension to madrassas as FBOs: by virtue of their attempt to promote a certain vision of a good state and society, they can come into direct confrontation with the state itself, which has its own

vision of what should constitute the societal good and well-being. It is not a surprise then that, not just in Pakistan, but also in India and Bangladesh, governments have attempted to reform madrasas and have tried to bring them in line with what is viewed as the mainstream educational and economic systems.

South Asia has hosted a large number of FBOs from different religious traditions, focusing on different services. The Buddhist tradition has placed great emphasis on developing indigenous medicine, Hinduism inspired missions such as the Rama Krishna Mission have put an emphasis on a holistic life, and Christian missionaries have also played a key role in both health and education provision in South Asia (Bano, 2007a). These FBOs may be grouped into different categories, for example Clarke (2005) suggests a five-level typology of FBOs: faith-based representative organizations or apex bodies, faith-based charitable or development organizations, faith-based social-political organizations, faith-based missionary organizations, and faith-based radical, illegal, or terrorist organizations. As Clarke argues, FBOs differ enormously in the way they deploy faith in their pursuit of development, humanitarian, or broader political objectives.

Some FBOs are explicitly linked to promoting the ideology of their specific religion, i.e., the propagation of religious principles is an integral part of their service. Others maintain a primary emphasis on service delivery – though most FBOs are suspected of promoting a religious agenda by mobilizing conversions among the beneficiaries at some level. Madrasas are an example of an FBO where transferring of Islamic learning and knowledge from one generation to the next is the primary goal. Within Clarke's (2005) typology they overlap between two categories: faith-based representative organizations and faith-based charitable or missionary organizations, as they represent the Islamic worldview and also provide an educational service. The process of learning and imparting Islamic principles also entails an attempt to spread the influence of these principles to society in general. This characteristic of the madrasas has the potential to lead to direct confrontation with the state, unless the state itself is explicitly religiously inclined. Seen in this context, the historic rivalry between madrasas and the state in Pakistan is less of a surprise.

## 2.2 The rise of madrasas

The madrasa tradition inherited by Pakistan has a long history. The next section presents a brief account.

### 2.2.1 *The madrasa tradition in South Asia: 1175-1947*

The madrasa tradition in South Asia goes back to the thirteenth century, with its spread and consolidation being linked to establishment of the Mughal Empire. The Arabs formally entered the sub-continent in the eighth century during the Umayyad Caliphate of Walid I (705-715) by sending a young Arab general, Mohammad Ibn Qasim, to chastise some pirates off the coast of Sind. The real foundation of the Muslim Empire in India, however, was laid during the Sultanate period (1175-1526), and the Islamic Sharia (or code of law) was institutionalized by the end of the fourteenth century (ibid). During the Delhi Sultanate in the early thirteenth century, Sultan Qutubuddin Aibek established a number of mosques to provide religious as well as modern education and the tradition developed into formal madrasas during the Mughal rule.

The displacement of the Mughal Empire by British rule, however, entirely transformed the status of madrasas in Indian society, and played a decisive role in shaping the current madrasa tradition in South Asia. First of all, with the demise of the Mughal Empire the official sources of support to these groups dwindled. The British government changed the policy around *Madad-i-Ma'ash* (revenue free lands), which sustained various institutions of Muslim education and learning. This made the madrasas even more dependent on the voluntary financial contributions of the community. Nizami (1983) and Metcalf (1978) show that madrasas that were unable to secure more public support eventually closed down.

At the same time, with the changes in the administration and economy introduced by the English East India Company, madrasa education lost much of its utility. Whereas earlier, Muslim education had relevance to both religious and secular needs, gradually it became increasingly otherworldly. Hence the Muslim educated classes became divided between the modern educated and the madrasa educated. The economic irrelevance of madrasa education under the new regime led it to attract increasing numbers of children from economically less well resourced families. This made the madrasa system even more dependent on public donations and made it less appealing to the affluent



classes (Metcalf, 1978; Robinson, 2001). Apart from the need for greater public support, British rule also brought other changes to the madrasa system. Some Muslims, who attended modern educational institutions, like the Delhi College, transferred the principles of these western institutional models to religious education in the post-1857 period. The idea of formal classes and a set syllabus, as introduced in Darul Uloom Deoband, as opposed to the old practice of flexible teaching between the Alim (scholar) and the student, were consequences of the western education that some of the initiators of the madrasa had received at Delhi College.

In order to survive in this changed environment, the madrasas were required to dramatically reorganize themselves. This period thus saw the rise of a reformist madrasa tradition that came to be known as Deoband (drawing on the name of the city in which it was based), and which is today at the centre of controversy around militancy in Pakistani madrasas (ICG, 2002; Malik, 1996). Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband was set up 1866 in response to the changed status of madrasas and Islam in general within Indian society following the establishment of the British Raj. The ulema leading this tradition argued that in the changed times, it was important for Muslims to focus on individual reform, and on personal religious responsibility. The focus became more on individual action and purification of Islamic principles. The Deoband school adopted the Dars-i-Nizami that evolved at the Farangi Mahal madrasa during Mullah Nizamuddin's lifetime (in the eighteenth century) and in the years immediately following his death, and this remained the dominant system of Indian Islamic education. Dars-i-Nizami consolidated the rationalist traditions of scholarship derived from Iran. However, the Deobandi ulema placed more emphasis on the Quran and Hadith, known as the traditional sciences, compared to Farangi Mahal's emphasis on logic and jurisprudence, known as the rational sciences (Metcalf, 1978; Robinson, 2001).

Deobandi ulema aimed to train ulema who would be dedicated to reformed Islam and to individual reform. Deoband also established the tradition of setting up sister madrasas. Today Deoband represents the dominant ideological tradition within madrasas in Pakistan as well as Bangladesh. The syllabus, literature and method of instruction developed at Deoband continue to be followed by madrasas with allegiance to the Deoband school of thought. Other important schools of Islamic thought in South Asia include: Berelvi, Ahle Hadith/Salafi and Shia. The Berelvis madrasa tradition, which has the second largest following among South Asian Muslims, was also founded during the

colonial period in 1904. Its followers, known as Berelvis, are spread all over India. The Berelvis tradition is opposed to the puritanical strains of the Deoband movement, allowing for saint and Sufi worship.

### ***2.2.2 The post-independence period: 1947-1977***

Pakistan inherited some Deobandi madrasas at the time of partition. Further, many ulema trained in the Deobandi tradition in India migrated to Pakistan (Bano, 2007b). Given that Pakistan is predominately a Sunni country, the presence of some eminent scholars trained at Deoband resulted in continued expansion of the Deobandi tradition in Pakistan. Deobandi madrasas are the largest in number today (see Table 1). However, the external environment was no more conducive for the madrasas in the newly created Muslim state, which shared the British legacy of modernization. The state did not recognize madrasa education, so much so that established religious scholars from madrasas with books published in their name were not included in the voters list in the country's first elections because they were regarded as illiterate (Bano, 2007b).

This mindset very early on led to aspirations to reform madrasas and to the establishment of many reform committees. One such committee was the Dars-e-Namazi Jaiza (review) Commission, which included prominent ulema, educationists and government officials to review the madrasa syllabus. Another committee asked for "unnecessary nonreligious subjects from the existing syllabus to be removed ... (in order to) ... widen the outlook of Darul Uloom students and to increase their mental horizons"<sup>3</sup>. The New Education Policy in 1970 also asked for the introduction of modern subjects in the madrasa syllabus to produce graduates capable of meeting the demands of modern science and industry. In 1979 a committee named Jaiza Deeni Madrasas (Review of Religious Schools) was formed. Again it asked for the introduction of modern subjects and establishment of a central government board or wafaq to regulate examinations. Similar committees to review the madrasa curriculum were formed under governments led by presidents Nawaz Sharif and Benazir. Yet in practice these reform proposals were never translated into action.

Meanwhile, madrasas have continued to expand in Pakistan at an impressive pace. Today, there are over 16,000 madrasas registered with the five central Wafaqs: Wafaq-ul-Madaris (Deobandis), Tanzeem ul Madaris Ahle-Sunnat-wal-Jamaat (Berelvis), Rabita-ul-Madaris (Jamiat-i-Islami), Wafaq-ul-

Madaris Al-salafiya (Ahla-Hadees), and Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Shia. Deobandis have the largest number of madrasas, followed by Berelvis (See Table 1).

**Table 1: Number of registered madrasas in Pakistan**

Wafaq	Number of madrasas
Deoband	9,500
Berelvis	4,500
Ahla-Hadees	500
Jamiat-e-Islamic	1000
Shia	500

Source: Data accessed from the offices of the five Wafaqs in 2007.

There are no reliable estimates of the number of unregistered madrasas, but it is speculated that there are around 30,000. Including mukhtabs, where the emphasis is only on reading of the Quran and its memorization, there are thought to be more than one hundred thousand. Little work has been done on the classification of madrasas, but a key difference is the level of education provided. The Wafaqs qualify madrasas as shown in Table 2.

**Table 2: Level of madrasa education**

Level of madrasa education	Equivalence to secular degrees <sup>4</sup>
Foogani	MA
Wustani	BA
Thatani	Secondary
Abtadia	Primary

The madrasa hierarchy, like that of the secular educational system, represents a pyramidal structure, with the number of madrasas reducing at each higher level. A census of educational institutions conducted by the Ministry of Education estimates that there are 21,552 students at the Fooqani level, compared with 74,782 students at the Nazra level (reading of the Quran, which is the starting point of madrasa education) (Ministry of Education, 2006).

### 2.3 Why reform? The reasoning of the state

In order to understand why the various governments in Pakistan have failed in their attempts to reform madrasas, it is important to first understand why they aimed to reform the madrasas. Pakistan has

had a complex relationship with religion from its inception. It is a country created in the name of Islam, yet apart from General Zia ul Haq's period, from the very beginning it has had a secular-minded leadership (Ali, 1970, 1983; Jalal, 1990, 1995). This has meant that, starting from Ayub Khan's rule, which had an agenda of the modernization of society, like most leaders of post-colonial states, there was a desire to reform the orthodox religious outlook. The madrasas, due to their puritanical religious interpretations, were seen to be unproductive. Their teaching and their students did not fit the vision of technological advancement and modernity that the post-colonial state was keen to embrace. The concern was of a very economic nature: in some ways it raised the same question that states face in dividing funding between humanities and sciences because the latter are thought to be economically more productive.

However, the madrasa student's inability to be absorbed into a modern economy was not the sole concern. Equally important was the conservative outlook that the madrasas promoted in society through their focus on training religious scholars. With no state-funded university departments of theology that train ulemas, it is the madrasa graduate who leads the Friday prayers, teaches the Quran and basic principles of Islam to the sons and daughters even of the elite, and conducts all the religious rites related to birth and death. Thus, the influence of madrasas extends much beyond their student bodies. This was noted in the Report of the Committee set up in 1962 by the Governor of West Pakistan for Recommending Improved Syllabus for the various Darul Uloom and Arabic Madrasas in West Pakistan. The Report referred to the Green Revolution "the success of which was highly dependent on the mobilization of the masses by 'modern mullahs'", recommending the addition of modern subjects to the madrasa curriculum (Malik, 1997). Among leaders like General Ayub Khan, General Yahya Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who all practised a liberal lifestyle, there was a genuine desire to reform the highly puritanical interpretation of Islam taught within the madrasas. Yet, despite toying with the idea, none of them threw their full weight behind madrasa reform. The question is why?

### ***2.3.1 Failure to reform: Islam and political legitimacy***

The answer to the above question rests in the role of Islam in Pakistani politics. From its very inception Pakistan had problems in establishing democratic government. There were no general elections after independence; rather indirect elections were held through provincial assemblies. Failure of political leadership, combined with a strong alliance of the civil bureaucracy with the military, resulted in the

imposition of martial law in 1958. In order to convert this martial law into some form of democratic government, General Ayub Khan needed a rallying point, which Islam provided. The very creation of Pakistan was proof that Islam was a powerful rallying force among the masses. The leaders of the Pakistan movement, starting with Mohammad Ali Jinnah, were secular, but they used Islamic rhetoric extensively to mobilize the masses. One of Jinnah's speeches, quoted in Haqqani (2005), gives a good sense of this: "Do you want Pakistan or not? (Shouts of Allah-o-Akbar) (God is great). Well if you want Pakistan, vote for the League candidates. If we fail to realize our duty today you will be reduced to the status of Shudars (low caste people) and Islam will be vanquished from India. I shall never allow Muslims to be slaves of Hindus." At the same time, reliance on Islamic ideology helped in the identification of Hindu India as an external threat, allowing for the maintenance of a large army. It also helped bridge the ethnic differences and divides among the five provinces of East and West Pakistan.

Therefore, despite having a secular outlook, the Ayub Khan regime decided to court the religious establishment rather than confronting it. Despite wanting to reform the madrasa curriculum, it did not push the reform agenda, because it did not want to confront the religious establishment head on. Thus, though no major efforts were made to involve the ulema in designing state policies despite the passage of the Objective Resolution in 1949 which asked for democracy, freedom, equality, and social justice 'as enunciated by Islam,' measures were regularly taken to keep them satisfied when their protests became vocal. Within three years of the Objective Resolution, an Ulema Board or a Board of Talimat-e-Islamiyyah was set up. Then, in 1962, an Islamic Advisory Council (or Advisory Council for Islamic Ideology, ACII) was established. Its main aim was to reinterpret Islam according to 'modernist' parameters but it also tried to keep the ulema satisfied. The 1973 constitution gave a new function to the Council: providing for the total Islamization of Pakistan's society by the 1980s; the ACII was renamed the Council for Islamic Ideology.

This dual approach of the state towards religion was also reflected in the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Rules of 1960, which aimed to curb the power of the heirs of the saints by regulating endowments. According to the Rules, the endowments were to become state property. Usually, however, only profitable endowments were nationalized. The Waqf Properties Ordinance 1961 enabled an administrator to take over a waqf. Though done under the pretence of protecting these properties, this move was politically very significant, as it brought most of the madrasas and Sufi shrines under

state control, since most were built on waqf properties. Ewing (1983) has argued that the governments of Ayub Khan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and Zia-ul-Haq each adopted a similar policy towards pirs (saints) and the shrines. They used these shrines as well as the government department responsible for administering them (the Department of Auqaf) as a vehicle for modernization. However, Sherani (1991) counters Ewing's argument and claims that all three leaders wanted to have these institutions nationalized in order to extend their influence over the many people who attach much spiritual and political value to them.

This combination of the secular minded leadership desirous of changing conservative Islam but relying on Islam as a tool of legitimation continued under General Yaha's military government and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's democratically elected government. A political leader of socialist outlook, Bhutto's tilt towards religious conservatism was connected partly to his economic and national security agenda. With the oil boom in the Gulf states, Bhutto wanted Pakistan to benefit from the flow of petrodollars, and this required him to emphasize Pakistan's Islamic identity (Haqqani, 2005). Despite a liberal agenda, Bhutto took many controversial decisions to show his Islamic credentials, including declaring Ahmadis, a particular sect, as non-Muslims in May 1974. Bhutto was a prominent player within the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC), an international organization of Islamic countries.

This reliance on Islam both to gain domestic legitimacy and as a tool for foreign policy led Pakistani leaders of a secular mindset to tread carefully with the reformist agenda. Thus the madrasa reform programme never materialized due to the resistance it generated from the religious establishment. With the imposition of martial law by General Zia ul Haq in 1978, state-madrasa relationships took a turn that was explicitly favourable to the madrasas. Again using the Islamization agenda to legitimize his rule, Zia ul Haq, who in contrast to his predecessor, personally had a religious outlook, paved the way for major concessions to the madrasas. During his government, the highest madrasa degree was given equivalence to MA Arabic and MA Islamiyat. He also established a system for formal collection of zakat (Islamic tax) by the state. A share of the zakat funds was channelled towards madrasas. The total number of madrasas supported with zakat was not huge but it did enhance the capacity of some and provided moral support to others. In the initial period 99 madrasas were approved for funds - 42 were Deobandi, 35 Berelvis, 17 Ahl-e-Hadith and 5 Shia, in accordance with their national representation (Malik, 1996). At the same time, this was the period that marked the birth of the jihad

culture in some of the Deoband madrasas. The Soviet-Afghan war and Zia ul Haq's decision to support the Afghans led to a huge inflow of Afghans into Pakistan. Malik (1996) shows that the Zia government actively encouraged the madrasas that supported jihad. These two factors led to a dramatic rise in the number of madrasas in the early 1980s.

### ***2.3.2 Breaking of the alliance: post-September 11 developments***

The legacy of the Zia period that linked madrasas to the Afghan Jihad, however, faced a major challenge post-September 11. Pakistani madrasas became a major concern of the 'war on terror' and claims about madrasas' role in breeding militancy found increasing space in the policy reports of international think tanks. Interestingly, all these reports acknowledged that madrasas promoting fundamentalism constituted a very small percentage of the total number of madrasas in Pakistan. Nevertheless, they all argued against the whole madrasa system.

The dominant explanation given for the popularity of madrasas in these reports is the state's failure to provide public education. Such views were popular even before September 11. In 2000, Jessica Stern argued in *Foreign Affairs* that the Pakistani government supported militants and their religious schools as a cheap way of fighting India and educating Pakistani youth (Stern, 2000). Peter Singer similarly acknowledged that only 10-15 per cent of the schools were affiliated to extremist religious and political groups, yet he viewed ordinary madrasas' displacement of the public education system as a serious threat to the political and economic stability of Pakistan (Singer, 2001). With no better options, Singer argues, poor parents send their sons to madrasas, where they receive at least some education: "In and of themselves, the schools are not the preferred option of many parents, but rather draw students from general desperation." The 2002 report of the International Crisis Group (ICG) also acknowledges that only a small number of madrasas were radical, arising from state-sponsored exposure to jihad. Yet, like the other reports, it also raises grave concerns about the madrasa system as a whole. It argues that the problems with madrasas go beyond militancy, as even ordinary madrasas were alleged to sow the seeds of extremism in the minds of students. The report maintains that, as a result, madrasas produce graduates who have a narrow worldview, lack modern civic education and, due to living in poverty, become a destabilizing factor in society. It further argues that for these reasons the graduates are susceptible to romantic notions of sectarian and international jihad, which promise instant salvation (ICG, 2002).

Despite the fact that the data gathering methodologies of these studies were very limited, in the absence of much scholarly work on the issue, they got much attention. The policy reports lent support to the growing demands of the US administration on the Pakistani government to cleanse the madrasas of militancy. On January 12, 2002, General Musharraf announced: “No organization will be able to carry out terrorism on the pretext of Kashmir.” From then on, new efforts started to reform the madrasas (Haqqani, 2005). The agenda this time around was more to curb jihadi tendencies among madrasa students rather than the historically more neutral agenda to modernize madrasas so as better to integrate their students into the modern economy. But, despite this apparent commitment, the Madrasa Reform Programme of the Musharraf regime, which was launched with financial aid from the USA, has not gone very far. The reason remains the same. Like General Ayub and other military rulers, General Musharraf has drawn upon an alliance with the religious establishment to gain domestic legitimacy and give his military rule a civilian cover. The MMA, an alliance of religious parties, which apparently sits in the opposition, in practice has always sided with General Musharraf on critical matters: the passage of the Legal Framework Order (LFO) that gave General Musharraf’s regime constitutional cover is one example. In the media, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, the leader of the MMA, has been referred to as ‘Musharraf’s deadliest secret weapon.’

Thus, the lack of legitimacy of repeated military regimes, combined with the pan-Islamic ambitions of Pakistani leaders and geo-political complexities, have produced a paradox. Secular minded leaders have ended up reinforcing the religious establishment in the country and, despite wanting the reform of puritanical Islam, have failed to seriously pursue proposals for madrasa reform.

## **2.4 Why resist? The views and strategies of the madrasas**

In understanding state failure to implement the madrasa reform programme, it is equally important to understand why and how the madrasas resisted the reforms. This is especially important, given that there is a strong tradition of internal reform within the madrasa tradition. As documented above, the birth of Deoband, the most influential school of thought among South Asian madrasas today, was an attempt at reform by some ulema. Nadwat-al-Ulema (the Council of Islamic Scholars), the next most prestigious school within the Deoband tradition, was an attempt at further reform (Malik, 1997; Zaman, 1999). Even present day ulema are vocal about the need for internal reform. The question then is why and how they have resisted state-led reform.



### **2.4.1 Concerns of the ulemas**

The resistance to state-led efforts to reform the madrasas can be grouped into two levels: conceptual and practical. At the conceptual level, there is a difference of opinion between the state and the senior ulema on the very nature of knowledge (Zaman, 1999). Within the madrasa tradition, one group argues for imparting knowledge for the sake of knowing the truth and not for worldly benefits. This spirit is also visible on visiting madrasas. Many have written on their walls or in their brochures that the difference between their knowledge and that imparted in secular schools is that the latter is learnt for employment, while the former is meant for the sake of knowledge and personal growth. While purists are few, and most madrasas want to combine other-worldly and this-worldly benefits for their students, all madrasas emphasize that the primary purpose of the education they give is moral training and the search for truth. This means that the very basic concept of the Madrasa Reform Programme is confrontational: it is based on the premise that religious education in itself is not sufficient but that people have to learn modern subjects for vocational purposes. To the senior ulema, who feel that it is like asking a 'philosopher to become a plumber', this is offensive. Thus at the most fundamental level, resistance to the reform has come from its very conception, which is felt to lack appreciation for religious learning. Rather than aiming to strengthen religious learning or help the ulema gain higher learning of Islam, the reform comes with the agenda of secularizing and commercializing the madrasas. This has been unacceptable to the madrasa leadership.

The resistance, however, is not all at the conceptual level. There are practical issues too. The reform programme being imposed at present demands introduction of secular subjects into the madrasa syllabus, along with religious subjects. The argument of the ulema is that they already require madrasa children to cover secular subjects at least to middle (8<sup>th</sup>) grade or matriculation (10<sup>th</sup> grade) before the child starts a religious degree. The ulema argue that beyond matriculation it is impossible to cover both areas of study with equal weight without diluting the impact of both. Their view is that it is not possible for a child to meet the demands of dense religious texts and also cope with secular reading at the same time. The question, as posed by an ulema in one of the interviews, is: "the state does not expect medical students to produce engineers, so why does it expect madrasas, whose work is to produce scholars of Islam, to produce pupils well-versed in all subjects?"

One additional reason for resistance is that, within the madrasa tradition, especially the Deoband tradition, it is maintained that dependence on the state should be avoided because this can come at the cost of ideological independence. The argument is that over time, dependence on state funds can lead madrasas to shift position according to state dictates and due to the need for survival rather than for intellectual reasons. To support this, the Pakistani ulema often give examples of the fate of madrasas in states where they have accepted state money (Zaman, 1999). While initially madrasas might be able to resist state demands, once they become completely dependent on the state and stop drawing on public donations, they become very vulnerable to state pressure. The ulema claim this is demonstrated by the example of Farangi Mahal, the most prestigious madrasa in Mughal India, which perished with the withdrawal of state funding, while Deoband and the like, which relied on public donations, not only survived but also multiplied.

This issue has become all the more significant for madrasas in the current context, where the Pakistani government's close alliance with the US 'war on terror' has created a strong sense within the religious establishment that Islam is under attack by the West and that the Madrasa Reform Programme is really a western attempt to control Islam. This lack of trust in the intentions of the state is the key reason for the current tension in state-madrasa relationships. The ulema leadership is convinced that the purpose of the reform is to secularize madrasas; not to enable madrasas to produce better scholars of Islam. Their resistance to the reform is thus understandable. However, what has enabled the madrasas to resist the state needs to be explored further.

## **2.5 Power of the ulema**

That the ulema have been able to exert their authority vis à vis both the military and elected regimes in Pakistan is undisputed. The political history of Pakistan gives ample evidence of this. Just one simple example will suffice: when Ayub Khan deleted 'Islamic' from Pakistan's official name in the 1962 constitution and used the term 'Republic of Pakistan', the protests of the religious establishment led to restoration of the original designation of the "Islamic Republic of Pakistan", which continues to date. What then has enabled the ulema to exert this authority and resist repeated state proposals to reform the madrasas?

### **2.5.1 Constitutional recognition of Islam**

The most fundamental strength of the ulema arises from the creation of the country and its constitution. The Constitution of Pakistan draws heavily on the British legal system yet gives all sovereignty to God:

The Objective Resolution, which was later made a substantive part of the Constitution, reads:

“Whereas sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone, and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him in sacred trust...

.....Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah,” (GoP, 2002, p.1).

Similarly, Part 1 of the constitution states:

“(1) Pakistan shall be Federal Republic to be known as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereby referred to as Pakistan....

.....Islam shall be the State religion of Pakistan,” (GoP, 2002, p. 5)

97 per cent of the population is Muslim and the birth of the country in the very name of Islam gives the ulema legitimacy to assert their influence beyond the madrasas and work for the adoption of Islamic principles at the state level. Ironically, however, many ulema - including the famous Maulana Maududi – had resisted the creation of Pakistan on the grounds that it challenged the notion of the Muslim ummah, which views Muslims as one nation irrespective of their geographical location. It was actually the secular leadership of Jinnah that won the independent state of Pakistan. Once established, however, many ulema, including Maulana Maududi, migrated to Pakistan and to date the religious lobby, when making claims on the state, refers to the fact that Pakistan is an Islamic Republic and that Islamic Shariah should be the supreme law.

This has also been a source of strength for the Islamic political parties in post-independence Pakistan. Until the 2002 elections, these had had limited electoral success, but they have always enjoyed much

street power. Some of the leaders of these parties are not themselves trained in madrasas, but Islamic parties are viewed as having sympathizers within the madrasas and some, like Jamiat-I-Ulema Islam and Jamiat-I-Islami, run their own madrasas. Even in the political discourse of these religious parties, the very creation of Pakistan in the name of Islam plays a dominant role in defending their demands for the imposition of Islamic principles.

### ***2.5.2 Strong patronage base***

The other factor that contributed to the strengthening of the madrasas was the existence of a strong patronage base. With 97 per cent of the population belonging to the Islamic faith and the high emphasis placed on the act of giving in Islam, the madrasas have found willing donors among the rich and the poor alike. The alliance between some of the senior ulema who migrated from Deoband and settled in Karachi, the initial capital of Pakistan, and the big industrialist and trader community led to the birth of large madrasa establishments. This strong local patronage base was strengthened by the close proximity of Pakistan to Middle Eastern countries and, as some of the madrasas evolved into large establishments, their links also grew with universities, Jamias and Arab patrons in the Middle East. These sources of patronage took many forms. For example, in one of the leading Jamias of the Deoband school of thought in Karachi, the Mohtimim (head), who is a very learned Islamic scholar, has his salary covered for life by the Libyan university where he gained his higher Islamic education. These networks are extensive and have strengthened the religious establishment both intellectually and financially over time.

### ***2.5.3 Strategic planning: formation of Wafaqs***

Finally, at the heart of the madrasas' success in resisting state reform is the presence of strong ulemas, who were not only able to demonstrate their religious calibre and retain strong popular support among believers but were also very strategic in protecting their collective interests. The formation of government committees soon after the creation of Pakistan to review the madrasa curriculum and recommend reforms led to the organization of the madrasas into Wafaqs, umbrella organizations of different Islamic schools of thought. As noted above, five central Wafaqs were established: Wafaq-ul-Madaris (Deobandis) in 1959, Tanzeem ul Madaris Ahle-Sunnat-wal-Jamaat (Berelvis) in 1959, Rabita-ul-Madaris (Jamiat-i-Islami) in 1982, Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-salafiya (Ahla-Hadees) in 1955, and Wafaq-ul-Madaris Al-Shia (Shia) in 1959. These were voluntary organizations which madrasas joined by choice.

The primary motive of forming these Wafaqs was to standardize the curriculum within the madrasas of each school of thought, develop an examination system to issue degree certificates to madrasa students, and act as a trade union to protect madrasas' interests vis à vis the state. All five Wafaqs developed a clear three-tiered governance structure where the madrasas that provided teaching up to the highest level formed the top two tiers, including the Executive Committee, while the Majlisa Aama (Assembly of the Commons) comprised representatives from all the madrasas associated with that particular Wafaq. These platforms have played a critical role in lobbying the government on pro-madrassa policies and in resisting policies viewed to be opposed to the interest of the madrasas.

Their biggest success was getting the highest madrasa degree recognized as an MA in Islamiyat and MA in Arabic under the government of General Zia ul Haq. During this period, in addition to the Wafaqs, five Jamias were also given the authority to issue their own degree certificates recognized by the government, meaning that indirectly they also have status of a wafaq. These are: Jamia Ashrafia, Feroz Pur Road (Lahore), Darul-Uloom Mohammadia Ghousia, Bhera Sharif (Sargodha), Darul-Uloom Korongi, K-Area (Karachi), Jamia Taleemat-e-Islamia (Faisalabad) and Jamia Islamia Minhaj-ul Quran (Lahore). These Jamias were able to secure this special status due to the prominence of the ulema who headed them within the religious hierarchy. As for the five Wafaqs, they also launched a collective platform called Ittihad al Madaris. In the post-September 11 context, this collective platform has become very active. Thus, the migration of notable ulema from India, a strong patronage base and the supremacy of Islam in the constitution have provided a strong basis from which the ulema can protect their vision of Islamic education.

As opposed to these institutional factors, the remaining part of this study analyzes the real life interactions between the madrasas and state officials, and the implications these have for understanding the dynamics of state-madrassa relations.

### 3 The reality of state-madrassa relations in Pakistan: routine affairs and the reform programme

Against the analysis of the socio-economic and political factors shaping the motives behind state-madrassa relations, this section looks at the actual day-to-day interaction between the state and madrasas in Pakistan. The first section looks at routine relations, and the second at the current madrasa reform programme. Analyzing day-to-day matters gives a good sense of the extent of madrasa dependence on the state and of state awareness about the religious establishment. It also helps check some of the claims of the Pakistani government about how the failure of the state to reform madrasas or to curb the madrasas that are engaged in sectarian violence can be attributed to the difficulty of identifying them. As this section shows, there are many interactions between the state and madrasas through which the state can monitor them if it so desires.

#### 3.1 Routine affairs

On the face of it, a madrasa can survive without seeking to establish any contact with the government. In-depth discussions, however, soon reveal that a madrasa, even when not drawing any direct monetary benefits from the government as part of a reform programme, has to negotiate with the government on a regular basis. To begin with, in principle its very existence requires approval of the state through issuance of a No Objection Certificate (NOC), which can only be acquired after the madrasa is registered with the government. Registration with the government is separate from the process of registration with one of the five Wafaqs. This section explores such routine points of contact between the state and the madrasas to explore the benefits one or both parties gain through such contact.

##### 3.1.1 Registration

Until 2001, madrasas in Pakistan had not made much effort to register with the government. According to officials in charge of the current registration process, prior to 2001, around 6,000 madrasas were registered out of an estimated total of 16,000 madrasas registered with the five Wafaqs. Viewed as part of the voluntary sector, madrasas have historically been required to register under the Societies Act. For the government, the registration process is a means to maintain a check on the activities of a given voluntary organization. For the madrasas or NGOs registered under this Act, the benefits of registration are tax concessions for the organization and its donors, as well as eligibility to apply for state funds made available for madrasas or welfare organizations under any programme. Until 2001, the registration of a madrasa was mainly a matter of choice, with a madrasa free to choose whether

or not to register just like any other voluntary organization. However, since 2001, as the part of the 'war on terror,' the Government of Pakistan has enforced a drive to register all madrasas, thus requiring them to keep the state informed of their activities.

### **3.1.2 Ministry of Religious Affairs, Auqaf Wing**

Within the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the government also maintains a Department of Auqaf, which deals with property that has been registered as a waqf, i.e. an Islamic form of charity in which the revenues from that property are dedicated for life to an Islamic cause. The Department of Auqaf is responsible for maintaining the properties that the government has taken over since its inception. The Department is responsible for administering the properties and also for employing the religious staff needed to undertake religious rituals at the properties. In addition, the Auqaf Department adds a few more properties to its list every year by taking over disputed waqf properties (a problem which is quite common). The Auqaf Department as a matter of policy, however, only takes on properties that are known to be revenue generating. An official explained: "As a policy we only take on self-sustaining properties, as this Department does not get much funds from the state and is expected to be self-sustaining. Therefore, the Department does not take over any madrasa properties any more, as running a madrasa requires constant investment because of the need to feed a large number of students."

However, since many madrasas are established on properties that a patron has donated as a waqf, the department is required to keep records of all of the madrasa properties based on waqf. The department also has the authority to take over a waqf property that is perceived to be mismanaged, even if it hosts a madrasa. In order to protect themselves from state action, the heads of the madrasas established on waqf property thus have to keep the relevant government officials satisfied.

### **3.1.3 Police and District Administration**

Until 2004, the madrasas in Pakistan were allowed to host foreign students, who were required to be registered with the District Commissioner's Office. Due to the current ban on madrasas admitting foreign students, this interaction has come to a halt. However, the local Inspector-General Police and other officials of the district government, including the District Coordinating Officer (DCO) and the Nazim (highest elected official of the district government), are required to pay occasional visits to the

madrasas in their area to keep a tab on their activities and to detect any foreign links. Interviews with the madrasas and the government officials highlight that during these visits the officials inspect the classes, look at the attendance register and also inspect the financial accounts of the madrasa to check the flow of foreign funds. The madrasas have no choice but to engage with these officials and attempt to satisfy them in order to avoid any problems. As an Imam at one of the madrasas argued: 'The government agencies know all about us and our activities. They monitor us closely yet they claim that they don't have enough information about us.'

### **3.1.4 Land acquisition**

Land acquisition is one of the main requirements for development of a madrasa. The land is acquired through donations by the public or a big patron, or is a personal investment of the alim (religious scholar). Often land acquisition also occurs through illegal occupation of or encroachment on vacant public land. One additional way of acquiring land is through the state, as ministers and senior bureaucrats have the authority to approve land for utilization by welfare organizations, including madrasas. However, during the fieldwork both the government and the madrasas officials reported that this provision is currently rarely exercised.

### **3.1.5 Zakat funds**

While the above four types of contact are more to do with state approval to function, since the 1980s the government has also had the ability to facilitate the madrasas by providing financial support. General Zia, one of the military Presidents of Pakistan, promulgated the Zakat and Ushr Ordinance on 20 June 1980. This specifies the rules for collecting zakat and ushr and provides guidelines for disbursement to mustahiqeen (those eligible to receive zakat). At the federal level, the Central Zakat Council is responsible for formulating policies regarding collection and disbursement of zakat and ushr. The chairman of the council is a serving judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan.

The zakat disbursement system has a complex hierarchy. The Central Zakat Council is followed by the Provincial Zakat Councils headed by serving or retired Judges of the High Courts. The provincial councils are responsible for exercising control over the affairs of the District, Tehsil and Local Zakat and Ushr Committees, and nominate the chairmen and members of the district committees for a period of three years. There are 114 District Zakat Committees working in the country. They are



responsible for overseeing the functions of the 39,915 Local Zakat Committees, arranging their election and coordinating disbursement of zakat and ushr in their areas of jurisdiction. The local committees are the most important tier of the zakat system. Their functions include the crucial task of identifying mustahiqeen (deserving candidates) from among the numerous applicants. They are also responsible for the collection of voluntary zakat (attiyat) and maintenance of the records of the local zakat fund and mustahiqeen.

Zakat funds are allocated among the provinces in relation to their population, as shown in Table 3.

**Table 3: Inter-province distribution of zakat funds**

Punjab	57.36%
Sindh	23.71%
NWFP	13.82%
Balochistan	5.11%
Islamabad Capital Territory	0.63 %
Northern Areas	0.75 %

Source: Ministry of Religious Affairs. 2007.

Zakat is collected from savings accounts by banks and financial institutions at the rate of 2.5 per cent on the valuation date of the first day of Ramadan (the fasting month for Muslims). Over the six years until 2006, the total zakat collection in Pakistan was Rs 24,998.49 million (Table 4).

**Table 4: Government zakat collection (2001-2006)**

Year	Amount (million Rs <sup>5</sup> )
2000-2001	4,276.15
2001-2002	3,928.60
2002-2003	3,776.18
2003-2004	4,009.72
2004-2005	4,670.80
2005-2006	4,337.04

Source: Ministry of Religious Affairs. 2007.

Zakat funds are utilized for three types of programme: regular zakat programmes, other programmes and special programmes, in addition to support for national level institutions. Regular programmes include stipends to madrasa students, which account for eight per cent of the total budget for all zakat programmes. The monthly stipend rates, covering subsistence costs, for students of registered madrasas imparting only the *deeni* (religious) education are:

Hifz o Nazira	Rs 150
Mouqoof Aleh	Rs 375
Daura Hadith	Rs 750

The monthly rate of stipends for students of Model Deeni Madaris, which have been established by the government, and those affiliated to the government Pakistan Madrasah Education Board (PMEB) are slightly higher:

Primary to Matriculation	Rs 500
Above Matriculation and up to BA or equivalent	Rs 750
MA or equivalent or above	Rs 1000

During the year 2005-6, Rs. 289.723 million out of the total zakat budget of Rs. 4,337.04 million was spent on stipends for students of madrasas. The amount is small when compared with the education stipend for normal school education, for which Rs. 651.873 million were allocated within the zakat budget for the same year - thereby indicating that the impression that zakat funds are used exclusively to promote religious activities is not correct. In addition, another Rs. 12 million was allocated out of zakat funds for the Model Deeni Madaris, which are government-managed madrasas. The amount of zakat to be given to a madrasa is determined on the basis of the number of students eligible for zakat in that madrasa.

### **3.1.6 Social welfare funds**

In addition, being categorized as a voluntary organization registered under the Societies Act, madrasas are eligible to apply for any state funds made available to NGOs, especially through the Ministry of Social Welfare, if the madrasa's activities meet the project criteria.

Another channel through which the government patronizes senior ulema is through their appointment to senior government committees dealing with religious issues. These include the Roohate-e-Halal committee, which is responsible for sighting the moon for the two Eids that Muslims celebrate. Appointment to a zakat committee is another way of giving recognition to an alim (religious scholar).

In addition to these contacts, which are primarily initiated by the state, the madrasas can choose other platforms to cultivate contacts with the state if they so want. In this respect, a common tradition is to invite government ministers or senior bureaucrats to annual events or award-giving ceremonies at the madrasas. As the head of one of the big madrasas explained, “this helps build contacts within the government and helps them stay informed about our activities. This also helps check undue interference from the lower government officials, who might create unnecessary bureaucratic hurdles in the working of the madrasas just to exert their authority.”

Also, heads of some senior madrasas take on advisory roles for the main political parties. Being a majority Muslim country, most political parties need to have a position on religious issues. Therefore, many maintain ulema advisory boards. For example, the PML (Q), the party in power under General Musharraf and which supports the madrasa reform programme, maintains a Mushaik (ulema) Wing. Maintaining these Mushaik wings enables the party leadership to get support for their political position vis-à-vis issues relating to the interpretation of specific Islamic issues. The controversy over the Hudood Ordinance, when the secular and religious forces differed in their interpretation of specific Islamic laws dealing with punishment for adultery, highlighted the importance of the secular parties having their own ulema advisory boards. In order to justify their liberal position vis-à-vis the Hudood Ordinance to the public, the party in power legitimized its position by referring to the interpretations of the alims sitting on its Mushaik wing.

What this routine contact shows is that madrasas are not as independent of the state and the state is not as ignorant of them as it often argues. Taken seriously, these interactions do lend support to some of the concerns noted by journalists and commentators that, at times, failure to check certain madrasas involved in suspect activity seems to be more a result of unwillingness on the part of the state than merely due to lack of information.

### **3.2 Pushing reform: the government Madrasa Reform Programme**

Due to the concerns about militancy within Pakistani madrasas in the post-September 11 context, the Pakistani government, with the financial assistance of the US government, resolved to reform the madrasas and increase its control over them. The Madrasas Ordinance was passed on June 7, 2002, requiring all madrasas to register. An integral part of this plan was to gather reliable information on the

madrasas: their total number, the nature of their work and their sources of funding. In 2003, a US\$225 million package, to be spent over three years, was committed to madrasa reform (GoP, 2003). The thrust of the reform package is on introducing secular education in all madrasas. The initial aim was to educate 800,000 students of 8,000 madrasas in secular subjects, as taught in government primary and secondary schools. The plan also includes the target of training 28,000 madrasa teachers in teaching those subjects. It also provides financial incentives to the madrasas' management in the form of money for teachers' salaries, textbooks, stationery, computers and furniture. The financial incentives are expected to provide the state with greater authority over the working of madrasas.

The Madrasa Reform Programme (Teaching of Formal Subjects in Deeni Madaris) was developed by the federal government as a five-year programme within which each madrasa approved for the programme would be supported for three years (GoP, 2004). Under the programme, the madrasa would be financed out of the resources allocated to education under the Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP), to implement the President's instructions for teaching of formal subjects in madrasas. The seeds of this programme go back to the late 1980s when the Ministry of Education first proposed it, but the suggestions were not actively pursued until their inclusion in the Education Policy for 1998-2010. In compliance with the President's instructions and the Education Policy, a PC-1 (a term used for government planning documents) was prepared in consultation with the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Planning and Development Division and representatives of Wafaqs and bigger Jamias. The reform package requires english, mathematics, Pakistan studies/social studies and general science to be offered at primary level in 4,000 madrasas, and english, economics, Pakistan studies and computer science at intermediate level in 1,000 madrasas for three years with effect from 2002-03 to 2006-07.

Conscious that the programme was viewed as a US-led initiative, the annual report of the Pakistan Madrasa Education (Establishment and Affiliation of Model Deeni Madaris) Board Ordinance, 2001, issued on 18 August 2002, clearly states that the Ordinance and the madrasa reform efforts are not linked to American influence in any way (GoP, 2002). Under this Ordinance, three model Deeni Madarsas were formed, one each in Karachi, Sukkur, and Islamabad. The other main functions of the Board are to grant affiliation, to lay down regulations and to approve conditions for the affiliation of existing madrasas; to suggest ways and means to bridge the existing gulf between the general

education system and the madrasas by revising and improving the curricula of madrasas and general education programmes; and to approve the curricula, courses of study and conditions for holding examinations in the Deeni Madrasas on the recommendation of the Academic Council.

These reform efforts have, however, not been well-received among the madrasas: by early 2007 less than 150 madrasas had entered the reform programme. The programme required the government to vet all madrasas for their academic activities before approving their entry into the reform programme; further the madrasas approved also have to undergo a security check to ensure that they are not involved in any militancy. In the provinces at the time of the fieldwork, the reform programmes were still mainly at the madrasa review and assessment phase, thus no funds had yet been released to the madrasas.

The next section profiles one Jamia and one madrasa from Punjab that have entered the government reform programme and another pair which have not. Given the sensitivity of the current political environment concerning madrasas, the names of the madrasas under study and the names of the ulema are not mentioned.

### **3.3 Case profiles: varying influence and strategies of Jamias and madrasas**

This study aims to understand whether the type of madrasa makes a difference to its interaction with the state, its ability to influence state policies or resist state action and its experience of engaging with the reform programme. Madrasas represent a complex hierarchy starting from primary education and going all the way up to thakasus (post-graduate research). It was intended that these case studies would help develop a more nuanced and meaningful understanding of the working of madrasas, rather than assuming them to be all the same, an assumption that is quite dominant in the policy reports discussed above.

#### ***3.3.1 Organizational description***

For the purpose of this study, two Jamias and two madrasas were selected in Rawalpindi, one of the main cities in Punjab Province. One Jamia and one madrasa had adopted the reform programme while the other pair had not. The pro-reform Jamia is in Rawalpindi Satellite Town area, and has over

1,200 boarding students in its three residential blocks spread across the city. This Jamia also has over 40 small affiliated male and female madrasas in and around Rawalpindi and NWFP. The head of the Jamia is a senior alim who is also on the ulema advisory committee of the party that forms the government at the centre. The Jamia has been part of the government reform programme since 2004.

The pro-reform madrasa selected in Rawalpindi imparts education up to BA level in religious education. However, its religious education facilities are limited. It only has six teachers for religious education and, out of a total of 50 students enrolled within the madrasas at any given time, only three to four are undertaking studies in Dora-Hadees (degree in study of the Prophet's sayings). The main focus for the madrasa is on teaching hifz (memorization of the Holy Quran) and preparing children for the primary classes in religious education. In addition, the madrasa is linked to a sister school, which teaches regular education up to secondary level. The head of the madrasa is also a khateeb (one who gives the sermon) in a local government owned mosque. The madrasa entered the reform programme in 2004 and saw an expansion in the number of teachers provided by the government from eight to twelve in 2006.

The anti-reform Jamia selected in Rawalpindi is in Saddar area. It hosts over 1,000 boarding students and provides the complete eight year Dora-Hadees course. The Jamia has over time also established a female madrasa, with over 700 students in boarding. The Jamia is headed by a leading religious scholar who is also represented among the top rank of the Wafaq-ul-Madaris. The anti-reform madrasa analyzed in this study was based in Tench Bazar area and currently provides Islamic education only up to bachelor's level. It has a total of 100 students and six teachers. Neither this madrasa nor the Jamia indicated above are part of the government reform programme.

Fieldwork in these four institutions shows a clear difference between the Jamias and the madrasas on the basis of objective indicators as well as subjective observations. First of all, the difference in the education level was clear: heads of both the Jamias were religious scholars of repute, with specialization in fiqh and hadees. The Jamias had a full facility for teaching specialized subjects in the final years of Dora-e-Hadees. The libraries of the Jamias had good collection of Islamic texts. The Jamias also have a larger number of students: over 1,000 in the two Jamias compared with between 50 and 100 in the madrasas. The physical layout was also very different, with the Jamias having very

spacious buildings and good infrastructure facilities. The rooms for teaching and boarding were spacious and well-lit.

The heads of the madrasas were less qualified. The pro-reform madrasa in Rawalpindi had a leader who is mainly a Hafiz (one who remembers the Quran by heart) and is known for his Qirat (recitation of the Quran) rather than for the teaching of the Islamic text. The leader of the anti-reform madrasa had completed his master's degree from the wafaq and had done a specialization. Both madrasas had a small building with small rooms and dim lighting. Both the Jamias also had bigger mosques attached to them than the madrasas. The greater space was reflective of the fact that at prayer times a larger number of people were coming to these mosques than the ones attached to the madrasas. Not surprisingly, this also led to higher levels of donations to the Jamias. Neither of the Jamias raised the issue of finance as a problem but both the madrasas did.

### ***3.3.2 Organizational mission: ideological positioning vis-à-vis the state***

Across the four madrasas, irrespective of the difference in scale, the heads of the madrasas and the Jamias were in agreement about the basic objectives/mission/agenda of their institution. They all viewed their role as to provide good religious education free of any charge. They explained their primary role as being to produce scholars of Islam, who know how to fulfil a religious need in society, for example, an alim to lead prayers, do the wedding ritual, or give a specific interpretation to a religious question posed by a believer. Repeatedly it was stated by the madrasa leadership that “the purpose of this education is not to make a living, it is to seek this knowledge for its own sake.” Also, leaders of all four madrasas were very clear that it is an integral part of their duty to try to share their knowledge with the wider society and to ensure that the state and society are formed in line with religious thinking. One of the most quoted sayings from the Prophet in this respect was that, even if you know only one line from the Quran, you should share it with another. According to the ulema interviewed in the four madrasas, this spreading of knowledge is given high importance within Islamic teaching and it is critical for madrasa leaders to influence general thinking in society.

As the head of the pro-reform madrasa in Rawalpindi said, “Once someone asked the prophet who will guide your nation after you are gone, and his reply was that the ulema would continue to guide this nation.” This to him was the essence of the role of madrasas in society. He was of the view that the

khutba (sermon) and the lecture prior to the Friday prayers are critical platforms whose primary purpose is to provide the ulema with opportunities to guide Muslims on the right track. As he further added, “many madrasas stay clear of any political affiliation but it is inevitable that ulema will end up commenting on any move of the government, which they feel is not in conjunction with the principles of Islam. Therefore, the state is prone to trying to control the madrasas.”

On the other hand, the head of the pro-reform Jamia in Rawalpindi was on the ulema advisory committee of the ruling party, PML(Q). According to him, the motive for this engagement was the same: to use all possible platforms to try to shape the state agenda in line with Islamic principles. The Jamias are also members of the executive committees of their respective wafaqs. They thus also play a role in promoting the collective voice of the madrasas to the state.

There was, thus, a consensus among the leaders of the four madrasas that the role of a madrasa is to produce people who know religion and that the teaching within the madrasa is not to be kept within the madrasa but must be shared with wider society and the state through whatever platform is available. However, here it is important to mention that all four were very clear that there is no compulsion in Islam, and the role of the madrasa and the alim is just to state what is right or wrong; they are not meant to impose this by force either on the public or the state. Thus, the focus is on sharing the message; it is not on imposition of the message by force.

They were also conscious that it is because of this integral mission of the madrasa to shape the society in line with Islamic principles that the state makes a conscious effort to control them. As one of the ulema answered:

“The state is always sending agencies to control us because they are afraid that the ulema will say what they believe is correct even if it goes against the government. The ulema have a very natural way of mobilizing the public around any view. The Friday prayer is the most importantly weekly ritual for the Muslims. Before the prayer, the leader of the prayer gives a khutba, a sermon on any issue. It is here that the madrasa leaders pick on developments within the country or those international policies affecting the Muslims.”



In the past, the ulema were allowed to use loudspeakers so that the voice of the alim went far beyond the confines of the mosque. Under General Musharraf, the use of loudspeakers for the Friday lecture has been banned.

At the same time, interviews with the ulema and government officials within and beyond the four madrasas also show that another clear motive for initiating a madrasa is often to earn a living. As the alim in the pro-reform madrasa in Rawalpindi added,

“if I tell you honestly, then clearly there are two reasons that motivate people to open a madrasa: one, some people are genuinely very committed to spreading the teachings of Islam; two, some people establish it primarily as a means to earn a living. The ones which are established primarily for money are likely also to bargain more and readjust their priorities according to changing state incentives.”

Clearly, many madrasas might also be established for a combination of these factors.

### **3.4 Madrasas’ clout vis-à-vis the government**

This section explores the dynamics of madrasa-state engagement in routine matters and in the reform programme.

#### **3.4.1 *In routine matters***

While the madrasas and the Jamias shared a common vision of their role in society, they narrated different experiences about the exact nature of their interaction with state agencies. As expected, the Jamias had fewer complaints about state agencies. Their high stature and reputation meant that they were well-connected and had respect within the government agencies. Thus, the points of contact with the state were not viewed as being tedious. Neither of the two Jamias mentioned problems with paperwork required by state agencies or having to bribe government officials to get their registration, etc. The head of the anti-reform Jamia was, however, more vocal about the central government’s attempt to control madrasas ‘at the behest of USA.’ He had been on many government committees in the past and was even part of the current negotiations between the ulema and the state about policies towards madrasas. The head of the Jamia in Rawalpindi was less critical of the current government’s role, understandably so because he is also on the advisory panel (Ulema Mushaik wing) of the ruling party. He was of the view that the current government’s efforts to register all the madrasas were

justifiable, as the state should know of the activities of madrasas. He was also quite confident that the autonomy and the authority of the madrasas were not called into question by their taking part in the madrasa reform programme.

The smaller madrasas, on the other hand, were vocal about the difficulties of dealing with state agencies. Interviews with the madrasa leaders show that access to state agencies, as well as protection from exploitation by lower level government officials, were both a big problem for the madrasas. The smaller madrasas are normally more willing to benefit from any government madrasa grant scheme, as they are more in need of financial support; as in contrast to Jamias they have fewer donations, fewer connections with influential members of the society, and are often led by ulema who are not fully trained. The state grants are thus attractive in helping them to expand their programmes. However, these madrasas also face more difficulty in accessing government grants. Further, since the main ambition of any serious madrasa Imam is to see his madrasa move up the religious hierarchy of the Wafaq, there is also self-censorship against taking reform money, even if needed, because this would put the madrasa at the margin of the religious hierarchy.

The practical problems of the interaction were highlighted by the head of the pro-reform madrasa, who is currently engaging with state officials:

“The smaller madrasas are not the priority of the government. It is very difficult to get access to state funds; one has to chase them actively and for a smaller madrasa this is very difficult. In the past, when the zakat scheme was announced, I did not have a motorbike. It was then not possible for me to chase the government officials. Now, I have a bike and a car so I can go and follow up my case”.

On the other hand, the self-censorship element was highlighted by the madrasa refraining from entering the reform process: “Of course, madrasas rely on donations and state support can help. But, the ulema have rightly decided not to accept the government reform programme because it is an attempt to control the independence of the madrasas and to dictate to us which kind of Islam to teach. This is not acceptable.”

Similarly, the issue of corruption within the government implementation system was identified by the madrasas. The madrasa that had entered the reform programme was very explicit in mentioning how

a percentage has to be paid by a madrasa to the government officials to move the file from one step to another. “Even registration is a very difficult process. They keep coming back to you for more papers. You don’t have the time and the energy or the resources to keep chasing them. So the only solution is to pay them a fixed percentage.” The government official within the Department of Auqaf, which was also made responsible for registering the madrasas, confirmed this concern. “There is a lot of corruption within the system. The madrasa is required to submit a lot of paperwork with the registration application. It is very easy for the government officials to keep highlighting problems within that paperwork. Therefore, many madrasas find it easier to pay a bribe to get the madrasa registered.” This highlights that the delay in madrasa registration is not always due to their ideological independence. At times, the delay is due to bureaucratic hurdles in the registration process.

Why do some madrasas bother to register, given that before the current Ordinance requiring all madrasas to register, only 25 per cent of estimated madrasas had registered? The interviews with the Jamias and the madrasas show that registration is sought because it facilitates the working of madrasas at all levels. It is the reference point for any engagement with the state. Even during visits by local area administrators, the registration certificate makes the inception of a madrasa easier, as it is a quick means for claiming that the madrasa is working within the legal framework set by the state. Yet the fact that 75 per cent of madrasas have not bothered to register indicates that often the interaction between the madrasa leadership and state officials is based on informal contacts rather than paperwork. It also shows the resistance of some madrasa leaders to chasing the paperwork needed for registration and the bribery that this often involves, which is against their religious principles. Thus traditionally the Jamias, due to their influential networks, have found it easier to register than the madrasas because their connections with higher government officials facilitate much of the paperwork.

### ***3.4.2 Interaction under the reform programme***

Even in the view of the federal government, which conceived the reform project, there has not been much success in its implementation. According to the information made available by the Ministry, until early 2007 only 70 madrasas had been disbursed money under the reform programme, while another 130 were on the waiting list, which was slowly growing. It is clear from interviews with officials in charge of the programme at the federal level that the main problem in selling the programme to the

madrasas has been their lack of trust in the government due to its close association with the USA and its active role in the 'war on terror.' Here again the impact of the level of educational expertise of a madrasa on its relationship with the state was clear. It is mainly the smaller madrasas that need financial support which have been willing to cooperate. However, paradoxically the smaller madrasas have had to struggle much more to get the funds than the larger ones.

As borne out in interviews with the head of the madrasa reform programme, from the government's standpoint it is important to attract Jamias to the madrasa reform programme because "In the case of controversial programmes, like this reform programme, we are interested in getting at least some big madrasas on board because then we can tell the smaller ones that see the big ones taking the money that they could take it too." He explained how, in his view, some of the bigger madrasas that had joined the programme did not need the funds, as their programmes were very large compared to the financial support the government was offering under the reform programme. But still the programme was funding them because of the legitimacy the government programme gets by their affiliation.

He also maintained that administratively it is much easier to work with the bigger madrasas. The reason, as explained by the government officials, is that the bigger ones have much more reliable systems. As the head of the reform programme explained, "it is easier to fund bigger madrasas because they are better known, so it is easier to judge their performance. They also have detailed account systems. A small madrasa, on the other hand, does not even have the staff to maintain the records properly. They give a lot of trouble when it comes to submitting accounts and receipts." He explained that the reform programme was already having a lot of problems in reporting to the top officials within the accounts department of the Ministry of Education, "who are always complaining that we are not providing detailed accounts. The problem is that when we are not getting them from the madrasas we cannot provide them."

The experiences of the Jamia and the madrasa that had entered the reform programme in Punjab show that their relationships with the state are influenced by the difference between the status of a Jamia versus a madrasa. It is clear that the madrasas, both large and small, are constantly strategizing to protect their interests when engaging with the state. The heads of the pro-reform Jamia and the madrasa were very confident that the state did not have the capacity to control them. The

head of the Jamia was very clear that the programme was just a small contribution to the much larger independent funding of the Jamia and that it could not create any dependency problem. He said that the programme provided books, computers and some teachers, which were all useful inputs, and that he did not fear state domination. The head of the pro-reform madrasa also commented that he did not feel apprehensive about losing control of his own agenda when engaging with the state. He explained that “the government officials come once in a while to assess the programme. They come and talk to us and check our attendance registers. But there is not much interference”. The activities of the madrasas seemed to support his claim.

It was clear that the head of the pro-reform madrasa in Rawalpindi was using the facilities provided by the state in a very strategic manner. The madrasa was also running a regular private school, which benefited from the facilities. In fact, there were more students in the school attached to the madrasa: around 100 as opposed to only 50 in the madrasa itself. This madrasa is an example of a hybrid institution; the head is constantly innovating and adapting to combine his dual objectives of providing religious education and also earning a good living. A board at the entrance of the madrasa lists the name of the madrasa as well as that of the school, and also of a computer training institute. What the head seems to be promising to the parents of the children in the madrasa is that he will provide them with some secular education on top of the religious education. To the children coming to his private school, he promises a secular education which is rooted in religious principles; he promises to familiarize the child with Islamic principles while keeping the main focus on secular education. For him, the madrasa reform programme has been particularly useful, as the teachers provided under this programme are also being used in the primary and secondary school, which is a commercial enterprise. Also, the secular books provided by the government help strengthen his schools’ programmes. Thus, the head of the madrasa in Rawalpindi has used the benefits from the reform programme strategically to impart secular education to the madrasa students and at the same time to use these facilities to strengthen his primary and secondary school. In this case, the madrasa reform programme is actually subsidizing not only a madrasa but indirectly also a low fee-charging private school that mainly benefits children from low income groups.

Due to the unwillingness of the majority of madrasas to cooperate in the programme, it is clear that the federal government and the provincial government project officers had to go out to mobilize

madrasas to join the programme rather than the madrasas coming to them. As the head of the pro-reform madrasa in Rawalpindi explained, in 2000 the government team came to his madrasa. “The project team saw my madrasa when they were out on a madrasa mapping exercise. The director of the programme at that time wrote me a letter and said that they would help us. The discussion went on for two years. Initially, they gave us three teachers, and now they have given twelve. In 2005, we had to run after them quite a bit for extension, which we got.”

Interviews with officials in charge of the Madrasa Reform Project in the federal capital show that there is some basis for the confidence of the heads of the Jamia and the madrasa that they can resist state pressure whilst participating in the project. The project teams at the federal as well as provincial levels (see the next section) have very limited capacity to implement the project. Even at the federal level in Islamabad, a team of just four people is working on this project, and the top official is also responsible for many other projects. So, can it then be argued that the madrasas joining the reform are enjoying a free ride? If so, why do not the majority of madrasas opt for this programme? It is here that the position of the ulema leadership, as also reflected in the interviews in the two anti-reform madrasas in Rawalpindi, is very clear. The argument they offer is that the lesson from history is that, once madrasas take state money and undertake the required reforms, over time this cooperation turns into deep reliance on state funding. Eventually the madrasas become very vulnerable to state policies. The reasoning behind this argument, as explained by many of the ulema, is that entering the reform ensures fixed salaries for teachers, which makes the madrasas leadership very comfortable, as it is easier to get lump sum funds from the state than to mobilize funds from the community. Over time, this reliance leads to complacency, which makes the madrasas less capable of resisting reforms because they don't want to let go of the fixed salaries. Since the concerns noted by the anti-reform ulema are about self-reliance over time, it is difficult to assess whether the claims of continued independence by the pro-reform madrasas will prove justified in the longer term. The relationship is only two to three years old and the government is still in the process of designing a tight management structure.

Based on the experiences and the views of the pro and anti-reform madrasas, it is clear that there is major resistance to the reform programme and that this results from the madrasa leadership's distrust of the sitting government due to its close contacts with the USA. The study, however, also shows that the failure (so far) of the reform programme has much to do with its poor design and

management. The government department responsible for implementation of the programme is under-staffed and lacks technical, human and financial capacity to assess and monitor the madrasas benefiting from the reform package. Finally, the study also shows that reforming the madrasas, even among those which are taking the reform benefits, is going to be a long process. The heads of the madrasas are very strategic in engaging with the state and currently are proving able to take much of the benefit on their own terms without giving up much of their autonomy. But, as the anti-reform madrasas argue, the balance might tip with time as pro-reform madrasas become reliant on government aid. The chances of this occurring, however, might be weakened by the fact that the incentives given under the current reform programme are limited: the programme provides only for the salaries of the new teachers appointed to teach secular subjects and not those of the teachers of religious subjects. This might mean that the utter dependence on state funds that is feared by the anti-reform ulema might never develop.

### 3.5 Madrasa registration drive

Another opportunity to understand the power dynamics between the state and madrasas is to study the government's attempt to enforce a madrasa registration programme. Guided partly by the Bush administration's demands for the control of militancy and the regulation of religious institutions in the country, the government initiated a madrasa registration process in 2002. In 2005, the government finally passed an Ordinance making it mandatory for all madrasas to register. Prior to the passage of the Ordinance, the government had to constantly negotiate with the five wafaqs that represent over 16,000 madrasas. Even after the passage of the Ordinance, the government had to amend it to accommodate the demands put forward by the madrasas through the wafaq leadership (GoP, 2005a, 2005b).

Between the first and the second Ordinance (see Annex 1), the madrasas were able to win two major concessions. First, the bigger madrasas, which had already registered under the Societies Act, were able to avoid having to register under the new Ordinance, thus they do not have to follow the strict financial reporting expected under the new Ordinance. Second, madrasas were able to get the concession that madrasas could print publications comparing the various sects, a right which was denied in the original Ordinance on the basis that madrasas might teach hatred against different sects or religions. Further, the amended Ordinance does not provide for any punishment for those who do

not comply with it. This, according to an official concerned with the registration process, was deliberate, showing that the government was not too keen to add an additional responsibility to its portfolio by committing itself to undertaking compulsory action against madrasas that refused to register.

The fact that it took the government over three years to finalize the Ordinance, and even then that it had to modify the original Ordinance to comply with the madrasas' demands, raises a question about what enabled the madrasas to exert such pressure. Here the role of the wafaqs was very important. The leadership within the five wafaqs built a strategic alliance to negotiate with the state on behalf of the madrasas. Further, they also identified a common spokesman who represented all five wafaqs. The wafaqs acted just like secular advocacy networks to pressure the state. They held a number of meetings with the government to make it clear that the madrasas would not cooperate as long as they believed that the government was attempting to control their activities through the registration process. Their efforts were strengthened further through their links with the Islamic parties within the national assembly.

The Islamic parties, which are represented in the wafaqs, as they also run madrasas, used street demonstrations and the national assembly platform to make it public that the madrasas were unwilling to cooperate with the registration process, given the current mistrust between the two sides. This collective resistance made it clear to the state that the registration process could not be imposed through an Ordinance unless there was some willingness on the part of madrasas to cooperate. The state did not have the infrastructure to forcibly impose the process on the large number of madrasas spread across the country, nor could it afford to risk the political consequences of a large number of madrasa students coming out to resist the government on the streets. This interaction spread over four years thus shows that the number of madrasas in the country and existence of collective platforms (the wafaqs) to channel their voice is a very important basis of authority for the madrasas when defending or asserting their agenda vis-à-vis the state.



## 4 Reforms under a religious provincial government: the context of NWFP and Balochistan

When it comes to initiating any major institutional reform, a common puzzle is who is best suited to initiate it. Is the reform best led from within or from outside? Pakistan's political landscape provides a good mix between both religious and secular minded leadership among the provincial and federal governments. This section of the study therefore assesses whether the experience of the madrasa reform programme has been different in North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan, the two provinces where currently religious parties form the government, as opposed to the experience of Punjab where the party in power also leads the coalition in the federal government under General Musharraf, with his programme of 'enlightened moderation'.

### 4.1 The rise of religious parties

Pakistan's proximity to Afghanistan and its support for the Taliban government led to heightened religious sentiments in the post-September 11 period. Islamic parties have always enjoyed street power, but in terms of actual votes had never been able to secure more than 4 per cent of the seats in parliament. However, they became a major force in Pakistani politics after the 2002 elections (Waseem, 2006).

Two factors explain their success: first, they successfully played on anti-US sentiment, as the attacks on Afghanistan had hurt the feelings of religiously minded people and General Musharraf's government was disliked due to its close association with the USA; second, all the Islamic parties had for the first time united to fight the elections from one party platform as Muttahida-Majlisa-Amal (MMA). Not only did MMA become the second largest party in the opposition at the federal level, winning 45 out of the total of 272 seats, it also ended up forming the government of NWFP (Waseem, 2006). This province shares a border with Afghanistan and thus has the strongest sentiment against the invasion of Afghanistan and General Musharraf's support for it. By contrast, in Punjab, which is the largest province, the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q), a party backed by General Musharraf, forms the government. The NWFP and Balochistan thus provide an interesting opportunity to study whether religious government has helped or hindered the Madrasa Reform Programme.

### 4.2 Experience of the Madrasa Reform Programme

Interviews with government officials running the Madrasa Reform Programme and with madrasa leadership in the two provinces show that whether a state is secular or religious does have an impact

on the working of madrasas. The main difference is in the level of trust between the madrasas and the government and the access government officials have to the madrasas. As expected, a religious state is more conducive to promotion of madrasas but the main factor is not the level of financial contributions. Compared with the total number of madrasas in Pakistan, state support in the form of zakat is marginal. The main contribution is in terms of the moral support and legitimacy given to madrasas. As indicated earlier in the section on the shaping of madrasas in Pakistan, the fact that Pakistan was formed in the name of Islam and that the constitution declares the country to be an Islamic state has been integral to the discourse of the Islamic political parties and madrasas in Pakistan. In the madrasas' view, this gives them legitimacy to advocate a religious vision of the state. The NWFP government has no more funds than the Punjab government to dispense to madrasas, but what it is able to offer is moral support, which includes easy access to government representatives.

Interviews in NWFP show that the provincial government has not tried actively to promote the federal madrasa reform programme, as even among the provincial government ministers the programme is seen as driven by a US-led agenda. The ulema and the government ministers were clear that, while today the Islamic parties are in power, tomorrow someone else could be sitting in this position. Therefore, there was a danger that getting the madrasas used to funding would create a dependence that could eventually subject them to the demands of a secular government. This need to maintain independence was quoted as the main reason for madrasas' decisions to stay away from the current reform programme as well as other government sponsored programmes.

As the head of the federal programme in Peshawar explained, "When asked to implement the project, the minister of religious affairs in Peshawar called a meeting of the prominent ulema. They were all very clear that they did not want this money especially since they saw it is as closely linked to the US 'war on terror' agenda. After that the minister did not actively push the programme forward." However, it is also clear that the MMA government did not actively resist the programme in either of the two provinces. Following the federal government guidelines, letters of interest were invited from the madrasas. The provincial government officials in charge of the reform programme did attempt to mobilize the madrasas. In early 2007, when this research was being undertaken, over 200 applications had been received in NWFP, and 55 of these madrasas were to be allocated funds before the end of June 2007. This would be the first release of funds in the first two years of the programme in NWFP.

Interviews revealed that, despite the resistance of the senior ulema to the reform, as noted in the meeting with the Provincial Minister for Religious Affairs, there was not a complete boycott of the programme and the government officials in charge of it were successful in convincing some of the middle and low ranking madrasas to apply. In this mobilization, the fact that the Islamic parties formed the government actually helped. As the officials in charge of the programme in Peshawar explained: “To begin with, the title of the project was very inappropriate. At a time when government was anyway viewed as promoting a US agenda, to start a programme which talks of reforming madrasas was bound to build suspicion among the madrasas.” He further added: “When we talked to the madrasas about the programme, they asked why the government wanted to reform us, and what it thought was wrong with us.” The official said that expression of sympathy with their concerns was very important in removing this distrust and in convincing the madrasas that the programme was intended to benefit rather than control them. “We reassured them that the sitting government would not allow a programme to go ahead if it was really detrimental to the madrasas”, added this official.

What he and other officials in NWFP as well as Balochistan saw as the main hurdle to the programme was not the religious orientation of the ruling provincial governments but the design of the programme as reflected in the PC-1 (government project planning document) and the slow release of the funds. In both provinces, the officials who ran the reform programme were of the view that the PC-1 was developed in haste without consultation of the provinces, which had resulted in a lot of ambiguities. As one official added, these ambiguities provide a perfect excuse for any official not keen to implement the project to delay its implementation.

With regard to design problems, officials in both the provinces said that the PC-1 did not clearly specify who would purchase books and sports items for the madrasas selected for the programme. Also, there were no detailed guidelines about the appointment of teachers under the programme. The PC-1 requires that teachers be appointed by a committee consisting of the madrasa head, head of another leading madrasa in the area, and a high school principal from a government school in the area. This leaves scope for arbitrary selection of committee members and makes it very difficult to proceed with appointments. Further, one of the officials explained that the programme teachers were inadequate in number and were being paid less than the salary of the teachers in government primary and secondary schools, which made it difficult to keep them motivated. Officials in NWFP as well as

Balochistan explained that the managerial staff appointed at each provincial level to manage the project was inadequate. In addition, the government officials responsible for the projects at the provincial level repeatedly complained in the interviews that they had not been provided with proper office or transportation facilities to implement the project.

Officials interviewed also highlighted that the fact that the programme is only designed to provide funding to a madrasa for three years was a big limitation, as it was clear that the madrasas would not be able to sustain the salaries of these teachers on their own. This left the question as to who would pay the teachers at the end of the three years unresolved. The project managers also noted that the project aims were unrealistic, as madrasas were expected to introduce secular subjects in all five classes at primary level in the first year, take them up to middle level in the second year, and all the way to matric within the third year. In the view of the government officials, this should have been a gradual process, where a long-term commitment is made to the selected madrasas, in which they would have surety of funds for the coming years and every year would be required to gradually upgrade the teaching from one level to the next. As one of the officials stated, “These quick fixes will bring no change.”

Based on these views, it is difficult to argue that the religious parties ruling the two provinces have restricted the Madrasa Reform Programme. They have maintained a neutral position towards the programme, advising madrasas neither to join nor to stay away from it. Their position seems to be that, if some madrasas want to take this money and feel that they can retain their independence, then they can go ahead. However, they know that the majority will not take the funds. While the provincial ministers were neutral about the federal government’s programme, they had much more positively tried to improve the working of the zakat fund to ensure smooth transfer of funds to the madrasas. As the NWFP Minister for Zakat emphasized in an interview, he had dramatically improved the utilization of zakat funds channelled towards madrasas by making the zakat approval process easier. These actions had made the government popular among madrasas. During the interviews, even the Shia and the Berelvis madrasas interviewed in Peshawar, which are less represented in the MMA government and therefore have had less access to funds, were of the view that it was still better to have the religious parties in power rather than the secular ones, “as we all do know each other and this facilitates our access within the government.”

Based on these interviews, the study suggests that a religiously based provincial governments are more sympathetic to madrasas because they constitute its vote base. In NWFP and Balochistan, people within the religious networks have easier access to the ministers of religious parties. On the other hand, as was also seen in the case of the Jamia and madrasa in Rawalpindi in a secular province, access to ministers was only available to the head of the Jamia and that was also due to his political affiliation to the ruling party. Thus, the way the NWFP and Balochi government has been able to support the madrasas so far is not simply by putting more resources at their disposal but by extending moral support. They have respected the desire of the madrasa establishment to stay independent of state control and at the same time facilitated the flow of zakat funds to the madrasas by removing the bureaucratic hurdles to disbursement of these funds. While the Minister for Religious Affairs in NWFP has been seeking to improve the administration of zakat funds, he has been less active in ensuring the disbursement of the federal government's madrasa reform funds.

## 5 Determinants of state-madrassa relationships: lessons from Pakistan

Based on the historical analysis of state-madrassa relationships in Pakistan and the empirical studies, this study identifies a number of factors that shape these relationships.

### 5.1 Alternative visions of knowledge

At the heart of the tension over reforms rests the very idea of knowledge and true learning. There is a basic tension between the reformers and those being reformed as to their perception of real knowledge. For the ulema, the purpose of a good madrassa is to produce refined scholars of Islam. For them reform is about higher learning within the religious tradition and better facilities to access and interpret religious texts. For people constituting the government reform committees, normally bureaucrats, education experts, and some pro-government ulema, religious education in itself has little value. For them the target is to reform the orthodox interpretation of Islam prevalent in the madrassas, with an emphasis on secularizing religious education rather than producing more learned ulema. Thus, government proposed reforms continue to face resistance within the ulema community.

### 5.2 Lack of political will and weak administrative capacity limit reforms

In asserting the authority of the state to reform madrassas, political will and the efficiency of the state machinery are critical determining factors. Thus when the state leaves reform projects under-resourced and ill-planned, it is very difficult even for committed officials to implement a programme successfully. The problem is further compounded by the poor salaries within the state machinery create very strong incentives for corruption across the bureaucratic layers within the ministry. Officials become more inclined to select those madrassas for interaction that are willing to pay a percentage of the total government grant to the concerned official. This corruption within the system further weakens the capacity of the state to implement its agenda.

Bureaucratic incompetence becomes all the more crippling when there is weak political will to implement reform. This has been the fate of the current madrassa reform programme to which, despite much lip service, the federal government has not committed the financial resources or applied pressure to officials to deliver results. The result has been that at the time of the fieldwork in early 2007, neither NWFP and Balochistan had disbursed any funds to the selected madrassas, although the programme had been initiated at federal level in 2003.

The Pakistan case also shows that the incentives promised to the madrasas have to be strong to be effective. When support is only offered for the salaries of teachers of secular subjects and the programme ensures no continuity beyond three years, the incentive to reform is quite weak.

### **5.3 Madrasas' positioning within the religious hierarchy matters**

The study shows that Jamias, due to their higher position within the religious hierarchy, have a greater presence in and influence on the government. They have more dense networks within their surrounding communities than the smaller madrasas and are also represented on the Wafaq boards and on government committees. Therefore they have easier access to the state and they are often also the madrasas that the government wants to woo. As the government official in charge of the madrasa reform project in the federal government explained:

“We are also giving to one of the most well-known Deoband madrasas in NWFP. We know what we contribute is just a very small fraction of the total expenses of the madrasas and in fact we don't make much difference to their work. But, we still give to them because they add to the prestige and increase the acceptance of our programme within smaller madrasas. When small madrasas see that these madrasas are taking our funds they are more willing to enter our programme.”

What this highlights is the moral dimension of the religious hierarchy. All madrasas are independent establishments, so smaller madrasas that are more in need of funds are free to join the government reform programme. However, ideally all madrasas would also like to grow and to command respect within the religious hierarchy as represented in the Wafaqs. Therefore, even smaller madrasas that aim to grow to prominence within the religious establishment want to show that they share the position of the larger madrasas. Thus, having larger madrasas in the programme makes it easier for the smaller madrasas to follow the same path.

The case studies also show that scale is an important indicator of community participation and support for the madrasas. A madrasa can evolve into a Jamia only if it has the continued support of the community, which enables the madrasa management to hire teaching faculty for higher classes and keep expanding its building to accommodate the growing number of students. The scale of a madrasa is thus not just indicative of the level of the educational degrees taught there, but also of the support it enjoys within the community. The bigger madrasas are thus better placed to resist state pressure

because they have a stronger base of community support and funding, which can ensure their survival.

This issue was also raised by the pro-reform madrasa in Rawalpindi:

“Of course, the Jamias sit on the executive committee of the Wafaq because they are more established, have more networks, and are better equipped to take our collective concerns to the government. The access the heads of the bigger Jamias have to the state officials, we smaller madrasas cannot have. So, it is fair that they constitute the overall governing body of the Tanzeems and Wafaqs.”

The Jamia are better equipped to withstand the pressures of government because, on the one hand, they have stronger links with government, and, on the other, they depend less on government for their resources.

## 5.4 State-madrasa boundaries are not fixed

Another factor critical for understanding state-madrasa relationships is that the boundaries between the state and madrasas are not very clear. In a majority Muslim country, at least some politicians and bureaucrats are sympathetic to the madrasas and less inclined to implement the reform agenda, as they themselves might not be convinced of the need for reform.

The porous boundaries between the state and religion were clearly revealed in the case of one of the madrasas in Rawalpindi, which from the beginning was constructed on encroached public land. The concerned government official at that time knew the head of the madrasa and told him that he would turn a blind eye if the head wanted to construct a madrasa. So the head of the madrasa encroached on the land and built the madrasa. Over the years, with changes in government officials, new area officials started to threaten demolition of the madrasa. “It became really difficult during this period to retain the madrasa as I [the head of the madrasa] approached all the officials and was not being given any relief. However, eventually a senior official within the army, who used to come to say prayers in my mosque, helped me out.”

The Imam of the mosque said that the army official used to come to say prayers at the mosque:



“One day he came up to say that he really appreciated the way I recited the Quran and if he could ever be of use, I should let him know. I was really under pressure due to the government threat to demolish the madrasa. So, I explained this to him and he was able to use his influence and connections to convince the relevant government officials to let the madrasa be. The army officer told them that it was a religious institution that was working for a good cause so it should be left. And since then we have had no problem.”

It is therefore important to remember that often officials within the state machinery sharing the same faith are sympathetic to an FBO within their faith and can help protect the FBO's position vis-à-vis the state.

## 5.5 Collective platforms are critical

This study also highlights the importance of internal networks among the madrasas, across the five wafaqs and between the bigger and smaller madrasas of the same wafaq. The ability to put forward their agenda collectively on behalf of all the registered madrasas makes the wafaqs a very powerful platform for advancing and defending the ideology of the madrasas and resisting state pressure for reform. The existence of well-organized and well-coordinated umbrella religious organizations is just as critical in asserting or defending their agenda vis-à-vis the state as NGO federations or other secular umbrella organizations or trade unions are. The role of the wafaqs in defending the position of the madrasas is indicated by the madrasa registration drive discussed above. The collective platform of the five wafaqs was not only able to resist the government demand for registration of madrasas for three years, but was also able to pressurize the government to shape the madrasa registration ordinance in line with their demands.

## 5.6 Religious governments can negotiate better

By focusing on NWFP and Balochistan, the study indicates that a religious government is better able to engage with the religious establishment because it has deeper networks and informal contacts with it and enjoys the trust of the religious community. Interviews with ulema show that there is no resistance to including secular subjects in the madrasa curriculum up to matriculation level. The ideological tension begins when reforms demand that secular subjects be taught beyond that level. The smaller madrasas, which do not have provision for teaching secular subjects, can clearly benefit from the reform programme, but most are not joining due to lack of trust in the federal government.

The same programme, if promoted through a religious government, seems likely to face much less resistance, given that teaching secular subjects up to matriculation level does not clash with the ideological position of the ulema.

## 6 Conclusion

This study shows that a natural tension exists between madrasas that are led by an agenda of promoting religious principles and a state leadership attempting to promote a secular outlook. This tension is particularly pronounced in a country where the state was established in the name of that religion, though the actual running of the state has been in secular hands except for the years of Zia ul Haq's regime. The madrasas in Pakistan have viewed it as part of their responsibility to provide the religious vision to shape the state, which according to the constitution is obliged to follow religious principles. Pakistan has thus seen growing tension between the vision and public agenda of the madrasas and those of a relatively secular state – with the exception of the provincial governments led by Islamic parties.

The study argues that, despite having a modernist agenda, the failure of various governments to reform madrasas is due to their lack of legitimacy. Lacking public support, military governments, which have ruled the country for most of the period, have sought legitimacy by creating fear of Hindu India. The pan-Islamic ambitions of the rulers and the appeal of Islam among the population have also led them to play the Islamic card to legitimize themselves, even when they in person have been of a secular outlook. The study argues that this need for legitimacy has led to a lack of will to reform madrasas under all governments including General Musharraf's apparently liberal regime.

The study also shows that the state has more contact with madrasas than it is often willing to acknowledge. The state routinely monitors madrasas and therefore the argument that it lacks the information to check the madrasas' role in breeding sectarian violence and militancy is weak. Given the multiple levels of interactions that do exist, especially visits by district officials to madrasas, the study lends support to those who argue that the state either deliberately exaggerates the fear of militancy among madrasas or is unwilling to deal with those that are actually involved in jihadi organizations.

As for the reform initiative, the study shows that, due to lack of political will and bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption, the programme has advanced very little. The madrasas that have received funds are not made accountable for their use. However, the ulema note from the experiences of other countries that reliance on state funds leads to increased state control. They see that, while not immediately, over time the madrasa management becomes more and more relaxed in terms of

mobilizing public donations because of the relatively easy flow of state funding. Thus, their opposition to the reform undermines any expectation that the reform programme will immediately enable the state authorities to assert their agenda over the madrasas. Much higher investment for a prolonged period of time is required to bring change to the madrasa system.

The real strength of the madrasas vis-à-vis the state rests in their strong support base within the community. Historically, all rulers have used Islamic symbols to protect their rule even when they have been of a secular mindset, because they are aware of the strong public support for Islam. This community support has also resulted in a strong patronage base for the madrasas, with the result that there is a large pool of madrasas that are financially secure enough to resist the temptation of promised state benefits.

The study shows that madrasas' collective platforms are just as important in defending their agenda as trade unions or coalitions are to secular civil society. Madrasas, like any secular organization, are constantly innovating. They are bound by the religious text, and therefore have less scope for changing their basic ideological position than a secular voluntary organization, but when it comes to defending their agenda they are just as free and capable of strategizing and innovating.

The study concludes that, given the strong madrasa leadership in Pakistan as represented by the five wafaqs, the only way to bring about reform in madrasas is by the willing collaboration of the top ulema and developing a common understanding of what is worthy knowledge. Currently, the reform programme assumes it can impose a secularist agenda rather than supporting the madrasas in their original vision of improving Islamic scholarship or of bringing modern interpretation to the text. This has resulted in resistance. The result is that the two sides are contesting over ideologies or visions of an ideal madrasa. The need is for government officials and donor agencies that want to reform madrasas to develop a better understanding of the basis of the demand for religious education in society. Only then can they propose reforms which meet these demands and, at the same time, better integrate madrasa students into the modern economy.

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> This study does not aim to provide specific guidelines for future madrasa reforms in Pakistan. Instead, the focus here is on understanding the historical trends and present-day socio-economic and political factors that have shaped the current nature of state-madrasa relationships in Pakistan. It has been produced as part of a comparative research project in which similar studies have been conducted in Bangladesh and India. Findings will be shared with policy makers and madrasa leaders in the countries concerned and the final comparative report will attempt to draw out policy recommendations for the future of madrasa reform programmes in the three countries.
- <sup>2</sup> In this paper, the term 'madrasa' is normally used to include both Jamias and madrasas. However, when comparing the case profiles, the word 'madrasa' will be used to indicate a distinction from Jamias.
- <sup>3</sup> Report of the Committee set up by the Governor of West Pakistan for Recommending improved Syllabus for the various Darul Uloom and Arabic Madrasas in West Pakistan, 1962, quoted in Malik (1997).
- <sup>4</sup> The government equivalence certificate is only given for the master's degree. Madrasa students have to take government exams privately if they want to get Matriculation or a Bachelor's degree. Only the MA degree of the madrasas registered with these five wafaqs (Shahaadat-ul-Aalamiya Fil-Uloomil-Arabiya Wal-Islamiya) results in issuance of the equivalence certificate from the government, equating it with MA Islamic Studies or MA Arabic.
- <sup>5</sup> £1 is equal to Rs. 123 (2007).

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## Annex 1: Ordinances Nos. XII and XIV of 2005

### Clauses in the Original Ordinance

Ordinance No. XII promulgated on 18 August 2005 stated that a new section 21 would be added to the Societies Registration Act, 1860, namely:

#### 21. Registration of Deeni Madaris—

- (1) All Deeni Madaris by whatsoever name called shall not be established or operate without being registered under this Act and shall be subject to the provisions of this Act in addition to what is provided in sub-sections (2), (3) and (4).
- (2) Every Deeni Madrassah shall submit annual report of its activities and performance to the Registrar.
- (3) Every registered Deeni Madrassah shall maintain accounts of its actual expenses and receipts and annually submit its report to the Registrar. The Deeni Madrassah shall cause to be carried out audit of its accounts by an Auditor and submit its audited accounts to the Registrar.
- (4) No Deeni Madrassah shall teach or publish any literature, which promotes militancy or spreads sectarianism or religious hatred (GoP 2005a).

### Changes in the revised Ordinance

An amended Presidential Ordinance was promulgated on 1<sup>st</sup> December 2005 (Ordinance No. XIX of 2005) which softened the clauses of the first Ordinance. Titled the Societies Registration (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 2005, the Ordinance led to Amendment of section 21, Act XXI of 1860:

21. Registration of Deeni Madaris. – All Deeni Madaris by whatsoever name called shall not operate without getting themselves registered as under, namely:—

- (i) The Deeni Madaris existing before the commencement of the Societies Registration (Second Amendment Ordinance, 2005), if not already registered, shall get themselves registered under this Act upto the 31<sup>st</sup> December, 2005; and
- (ii) The Deeni Madaris which were established after the commencement of the Societies Registration (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 2005, shall get themselves registered within one year of their establishment.



- (1) Explanation - One Deeni Madrassah having more than one campus shall need only one registration.
- (2) Every Deeni Madrassah shall submit annual report of its educational activities to the Registrar.
- (3) Every Deeni Madrassah shall cause to be carried out audit of its accounts by an Auditor and submit a copy of its audit report to the Registrar.
- (4) No Deeni Madrassah shall teach or publish any literature, which promotes militancy or spreads sectarianism or religious hatred.

Provided that nothing contained herein shall bar the comparative study of various religions or schools of thought or the study of any other subject covered by the Holy Quran, Sunnah or the Islamic Jurisprudence (GoP 2005b).


## Annex 2: List of respondents

The report draws on interviews with thirty key respondents. These include representatives of five Wafaqs, heads of madrasas interviewed for the study, and government officials leading the Madrasa Reform Programme in Islamabad, Peshawar, and Balochistan. The names of the government officials at the provincial level and madrasas studied have to be withheld as anonymity was promised to gain access; researchers interested in pursuing leads from this research are welcome to write to the author to get further details. Names of some of the prominent ulema and senior government officials in Islamabad interviewed for this research are listed below.

<b>Name</b>	<b>Designation</b>	<b>City</b>
Maulana Anwarul Haq	Naib Mohtamim, Jamia Darul Aloom Haqqania	Akkora Khatak
Hafiz Hashmat	Minister for Religious Affairs, NWFP	Peshawar
Dr Haneef	Non-formal Education Ministry of Education Project Wing	Islamabad
Maulana Jalandari	Secretary, Wafaq ul Madaris Al-Arbia	Multan
Yasir Lateef	Senior Clerk, Department of Auqaf Punjab	Rawalpindi
Maulana Abdul Malik	In Charge, Rabatul Madaris	Lahore
Dr Sarfaz Naeemi	Jamia Naimeea	Lahore
Maulana Fazlul Rehman	Jamia Ashrafia	Lahore
Qari Annayat ul Rehman	Jamia Rehmania Naimeea	Peshwar
Syed Irshad Ali Shah	In charge, Madrasa Reform Programme, Federal government	Islamabad

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- 1 Shah, R., Larbi, G. and Batley, R. *Religion and Public Management Literature Review* 2007
- 2 Nkurunziza, E. *An Overview of Development Studies: Background Paper for the Religions and Development Research Programme* 2007
- 3 Jackson, P. and Fleischer, C. *Religion and Economics: A Literature Review* 2007
- 4 Tomalin, E. *Sociology, Religion and Development: Literature Review* 2007
- 5 Bradley, T. *The Relationships Between Religion and Development: Views from Anthropology* 2007
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