

# **Horizontal Inequalities in Nigeria, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire: Issues and Policies**

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### *Abstract*

Horizontal inequalities (HIs) are inequalities among groups with common felt cultural identities. These identities follow different lines across societies and across time. They include ethnic, religious, racial, or regional affiliations. HIs are multidimensional, including inequalities in access to political, economic and social resources, as well as in cultural recognition and status. Not only does unequal access to political, economic, and social resources and inequalities of cultural status have a serious negative impact on the welfare of members of poorer groups, but the presence of severe HIs, especially where consistent across dimensions and across salient group identities, has also been shown to increase the likelihood of the emergence of violent conflict in multiethnic societies. In this paper, we analyse and discuss the prevailing HIs in the three West African countries in which CRISE has done research for the past four years: Nigeria, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. In addition to discussing the nature and extent of the prevailing HIs, we review a range of country-specific policy recommendations that could contribute to reducing both actual and perceived HIs in the political, economic and cultural status dimensions in each of these countries. Many of the policy suggestions stem from successful experiences in one or other of the countries.

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## Horizontal Inequalities in Nigeria, Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire: Issues and Policies

By Arnim Langer, Abdul Raufu Mustapha and Frances Stewart<sup>1</sup>

### 1. What are horizontal inequalities?

Horizontal inequalities (HIs) are inequalities between culturally defined groups, such as ethnic, religious, racial or caste-base groups. The concept of horizontal inequality differs from the 'normal' definition of inequality (which we term 'vertical inequality') because the latter type lines individuals or households up *vertically* and measures inequality over the range of *individuals* rather than *groups*. HIs are *multidimensional* and encompass economic, social, cultural status and political dimensions:

- Economic HIs include inequalities in ownership of assets – financial, natural resource-based, human and social – and of incomes and employment opportunities that depend on these assets and the general conditions of the economy.
- Social HIs cover inequalities in access to a range of services – education, health and housing – and inequalities in achievements in health and educational outcomes.
- Political HIs consist in inequalities in the group distribution of political opportunities and power, including control over the presidency, the cabinet, parliamentary assemblies, the army, police and regional and local governments.
- Cultural status HIs refer to differences in recognition and (de facto) hierarchical status of different groups' cultural norms, customs and practices.

**Table 1: Sources of differentiation among groups**

Dimensions	Political participation	Economic		Social	Cultural Status
		Assets	Employment & incomes		
Elements of categories	Government ministers	Land	Incomes	Education	Recognition of religious practices
	Parliament	Human capital	Government employment	Health services	Designation of state religion
	Civil service – various levels	Communal resources	Private employment	Safe water	Designation of national languages
	Army	Minerals	Skilled employment	Housing	Language of admin. and education
	Police	Privately owned capital/credit	Unskilled employment	Unemployment	School curricula
	Local government	Govt. infrastructure	Elite employment	Poverty	Recognition of customary law
	Respect for human rights	Security of assets against theft/destruction	Informal sector opportunities	Personal and household security	Recognition and support of ethno-cultural practices

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Some important features of HIs:

- Table 1 illustrates the four dimensions and some major elements within each one.
- Each of the dimensions is important in itself, but most are also instrumental for achieving others. E.g., political power is both an end and a means; control over economic assets is primarily a means to secure income but it is also an end.
- The relevance of any element depends on whether it forms an important source of incomes or well-being in a particular society. E.g., housing is generally more relevant to industrialised countries, while land is of huge importance where agriculture accounts for most output and employment, but becomes less important as development proceeds.

## 2. Why horizontal inequalities matter and how to measure them

HIs matter because:

- High HIs makes violent group mobilisation and ethnic conflicts more likely. Group inequality provides powerful grievances which leaders can use to mobilise people, by calling on cultural markers (a common ethnicity or religion) and pointing to group exploitation. Extreme consequences are civil wars, including attempts to gain independence or more autonomy, such as in Sri Lanka, Aceh and Biafra; or massacres, as occurred in Burundi and Rwanda; or suppression and further exploitation of deprived areas, as has occurred in Sudan. An important conclusion that has emerged from the CRISE research is that countries with large horizontal inequalities, especially where consistent across dimensions, are particularly at risk of experiencing political tensions and violent conflicts.
- Unequal access to political, economic, and social resources and inequalities of cultural status can have a serious negative impact on the welfare of members of poorer groups who mind about their relative position and that of their group.
- Severe horizontal inequalities reduce the growth potential of society, because they mean that some people do not have access to education or jobs on the basis of their potential merit or efficiency because of the group they belong to. Access for the more privileged groups is too easy access for the purposes of efficiency, and too difficult for the deprived groups.
- Horizontal inequalities make it difficult to eliminate poverty because it is often difficult to reach members of deprived groups effectively with programmes of assistance. This is especially so because deprived groups face multiple disadvantages and discrimination and these need to be confronted together.

It is important to monitor HIs so as to identify where they are severe, and in which dimension. Problems of measurement include:


- *Identifying relevant groups.* What is needed is to identify groups which are important to people in society and on the basis of which political mobilisation may occur. Group affiliation matters most where group boundaries are relatively tight, so people cannot move easily from one group to another.

Since people have multiple identities which are socially constructed and to some extent fluid; there are very few groups where boundaries are clear cut. In Guatemala, for example, under certain circumstances an individual can be born indigenous and become Ladino during the course of his or her life. In most African countries, there are many sub-ethnicities and much intermarriage which make boundaries fluid and ill-defined. In-depth knowledge of a particular society is necessary to identify salient groups.

- *Covering all four dimensions of HIs.* Since HIs are multidimensional, measurement must cover each of the four dimensions, and the most important elements within each. To the extent that we are concerned with the political impact of horizontal inequalities, what is important are the elements that seem most significant to the people involved, i.e. what they are concerned about – in the extreme, the kinds of things which people will fight over. Evidence suggests that this differs across societies and groups: in Northern Ireland, for example, it appears that people are particularly concerned about their employment and housing inequality; in Zimbabwe, people's actions suggest they pay attention to land inequality; in Britain, young black people object to being stopped by the police as they go about their business; in Sri Lanka, people's major concerns are employment prospects and access to higher education. From both a well-being and a political perspective, then, these rather concrete variables may be of more importance than outcome variables, like life expectancy or nutrition levels, or incomes, which are less visible on a day-to-day basis.
- *Data issues.* In many countries, most data do not include ethnic or religious variables. Serious monitoring of HIs requires that such variables be included in household surveys or censuses. But in their absence it is often possible to use other data (e.g. using language or region to classify people) which can act as a crude proxy for the group data needed.

Despite these problems it is generally possible to get a fairly good estimate of HIs in any society. It is possible to use a series of alternative measures, and different groupings, to see how robust the results are. Figure 1 illustrates one dimension (child mortality) of North-South HIs for Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria.

**Figure 1: Under-5 Child Mortality: North-South Ratio in Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria**



**Source:** Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) – Ghana (2003), Côte d'Ivoire (1999) and Nigeria (2003)

**Note:** Macro International Inc. provides free of charge access to the DHS-data. For more information visit Macro International's website on: <http://www.measuredhs.com/>.

### 3. Nigeria

#### 3.1 *Ethnic representation and governance*

- HIs are a structural feature of Nigerian society, caused by a variety factors: colonial, cultural, demographic, geographic, economic and political. (See **Appendix 1** for some of the indicators).
- Importantly, HIs have been at the root of some of the challenges of governance facing the country. Since the late 1950s various groups in the country have fought to be represented in government institutions.
- Allegations of nepotism, 'tribalism', 'who-you-know', and 'marginalisation' have fuelled conflict over the composition of governmental institutions.
- Many feel discriminated against on account of their ethnicity, religion, or region.
- The potential for HIs to generate conflict even today can be seen from Table 2, produced by a civil society organisation from one of the ethnic groups in Kogi State. Given the alleged indicators in Table 2, it is not surprising that an acrimonious relationship has been generated between Ebira and Igala politicians and their supporters.

**Table 2: Alleged Discriminatory Tendency in Kogi State under Igala Governors**

	Kogi East (Igala) %	Kogi Central (Ebira) %	Kogi West (Okun Yoruba) %
Population (1991 Census)	44.2	35.1	20.7
Revenue contribution to State	7	71	22
Share in State Expenditure	52.7	17.5	29.8
Local Govts in 1991	37.5	25	37.5
Local Govts in 1996	42.9	23.8	33.3
Share in Civil Service	60	6	34
Share in Top Appointments	67.9	10	22.1

**Source:** 'Ethno-Political Crises in Kogi State: The True Story', Ebira Group for Advancement, nd., pgs. 6, 13 and 14.

- CRISE studies show that Nigeria has adopted a number of imaginative measures to contain the threat to its survival posed by HIs. Federalism, the quota system, Federal Character, and even the building of Abuja are such measures.
- Though Nigeria has managed to escape disintegration, the studies suggest that policy needs to address a number of continuing problems:

##### 3.1.1 Inclusive representation

- Our studies suggest that there are persisting economic, political, social and cultural inequalities in Nigeria.
- Affirmative action programmes like the Federal Character Principle and the Federal Character Commission are necessary instruments for managing these inequalities.

- The experience of affirmative action differs from country to country.
- In Nigeria, the Federal Character Commission (FCC) has been successful in: (a) generating a common data set to guide the discussion of bureaucratic and political HIs and move the discussion away from blatant partisanship; (b) providing a peaceful avenue for aggrieved communities and individuals to protest and seek redress; (c) and monitoring long-term trends and the country's progress in addressing these inequalities.
- However, in our opinion, the FCC has not been able to ensure the adequate representation of small ethnic minority groups in mixed ethnic states. Secondly, the balance between equity and merit continues to be a challenge.

*Policy recommendations:*

- The formula of arithmetic quota for state representation – the 'quota model'- is open to abuse in practice, because the emphasis is often on the state of origin, and not on the qualifications of all those from a state. This often leads to nepotism and claims that merit is being sacrificed. Instead, the 'trumping model', which entails 'preferring a merely qualified candidate to a strongly qualified candidate', should inform the work of the FCC. This shifts the emphasis from quota to merit, meaning that all candidates from each state MUST also be ranked by merit and the suitably qualified ones chosen.
- The FCC should consider including an urban/rural criterion to its selection procedure within each state. Privileging qualified candidates from the rural areas of a state over those from the urban areas of the same state is likely to improve the chances of minority ethnic group and other marginal groups within the state.
- Within each state and zone, efforts must be made to achieve proportionality by disaggregating qualified candidates by ethnicity, religion, and gender. Trends in the representation of these categories should be constantly monitored.
- Transparent and accountable appointing procedures are necessary to allay fears of nepotism and bias.
- Currently, some aggrieved parties go to the Federal Character Committees of the National Assembly, while others go to the FCC. The complaint procedures need to be harmonised and made clear and transparent.
- In the long term, inequalities in bureaucratic appointments will not be overcome until all sections of Nigerian society, including governments and local communities, promote education and skills acquisition.

### 3.1.2 Social Inclusion

- Social inequalities and the associated problems of poverty and deprivation are a significant aspect of HIs in Nigeria. For example, in the Northwest of Nigeria only 25% of pregnant women use clinics, compared with 85% in the Southeast.
- As Table 3 shows, maternal mortality rates in the Northeast are 939% higher than the level in the Southwest:



**Table 3: Maternal Mortality Rates (per 100,000 live births) by Zones/Countries**

Southwest	165
Southeast	286
Northwest	1025
Northeast	1549
<b>All Nigeria</b>	800
<b>South Africa</b>	340
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	610

**Source:** Hadiza S. Galadanchi, 2007, 'Overview of Maternal Mortality in Northern Nigeria', dRPC, Kano.

- While attention is paid to ensuring equity in political and bureaucratic offices which concern the elite, not much is done to promote equity in social indicators across the country.
- In South Africa and Malaysia, efforts are made both to transfer wealth to the disadvantaged (an elite agenda), *and* to improve the social indicators of the majority of the disadvantaged.
- Though political and bureaucratic inequalities are more emotive and draw the attention of the media, social inequalities affect the lives of more people.
- Social inequalities have complex causes and have become entrenched in Nigerian national life. The responsibilities of different tiers of government, communities, civil groups, and families need to be carefully thought out and promoted.

*Policy recommendations:*

- In this regard, the Social Mandate of the Federal Character Commission, long ignored, should be reviewed and those tasks appropriate at the federal level should be identified and programmes of action initiated.
- States, local governments, communities and individuals should be actively encouraged to meet their share of the responsibility of addressing the inequalities in social indicators.
- Emphasis should not just be on the provision of amenities for communities, but also on encouraging communities to take some responsibility for their needs. The qualities of equity, accountability and transparency will be crucial.

### 3.1.3 Cultural Inclusion

- CRISE studies suggest that though there is no cultural oppression in Nigeria, the *wazobia* culture of the three majority ethnic groups is the default template of the Nigerian state.
- Minority ethnic issues are generally not the focus of media attention except when something unusual or negative happens. They are mentioned most often in connection with violence, such as hostage taking and inter-clan clashes.
- CRISE studies suggest that of all the coverage given to ethnic groups in Nigeria, the three major groups account for 95% while the other 385 groups combined share 5%.
- According to a CRISE survey, about 85% of our ethnic minority respondents have never read their language in the newspapers or heard it spoken on radio or television.
- The media do not report the festivals and cultural activities of minority ethnic groups. This is also true even of state government-owned media in the states where these groups are located.

- Though not subject to explicit oppression, members of minority ethnic groups have a deep sense of cultural marginalisation. Many of them believe that their languages and culture could soon become extinct.
- We note the differential capabilities of the different ethnic groups to promote and project their cultures. Whereas about ten Yoruba home videos are released weekly, not a single home video has been released in the Tiv language. Yet Tiv is spoken by about 4 million people.
- Of the three majority ethnic groups, the Igbo seem to have the least tendency to develop their language, though the situation is nowhere near as precarious as it is for minority ethnic groups.
- For about ten years now, the Community Radio Coalition in Nigeria, led by the Institute for Media and Society (IMS) in Lagos, has been lobbying for the recognition and establishment of community radio stations. These stations need a separate legislation and licensing regime. They are not profit-making and so should not be expected to pay what commercial stations pay for licensing.

*Policy recommendations:*

- Government should expedite action on the establishment of community radio stations. These stations will be located in, owned and run by the community. They therefore will be in the best position to perform the functions of cultural preservation, promotion, transmission and transformation.
- These community radio stations can also have a governance-enhancing function since they will act as the voice of the community to itself and to the outside world.
- University Departments of Theatre Arts or Dramatic Arts, and Departments of Communication Studies in states where minority groups are concentrated should embark on practical projects in the languages of the minority groups. Linguists should work to evolve orthographies for minority languages.
- The National Universities Commission should encourage institutions responsible for the training of media personnel to review their curricula to reflect diversity reporting and exposure and sensitivity to minority issues and groups.

#### 3.1.4 Economic Inequalities

- Economic inequalities in Nigeria are severe. For example, core poverty is twice as high in the Northwest of the country as in the Southeast.
- Some of the economic inequalities can be traced to discriminatory allocation of government projects and grants, and differential access to key sectors of the economy, such as oil and gas, and telecommunications.
- Others are the unintended consequences of macro economic policies. This is the polarisation effect through which dynamic areas accumulate advantages, while deprived areas do the opposite.
- The polarisation effect can be seen in Table 4, which shows that bank loans in Lagos are being financed by deposits from other parts of the country.

**Table 4: Inequalities in Banking Functions (2006)**

	<b>% of Deposits</b>	<b>% of Loans</b>
Lagos State	48	69.96
FCT Abuja	16.86	4.6
All 3 Northern Zones	10.75	8.5

**Source:** 'Preserving Stability and Accelerating Growth', C. Soludo, Central Bank of Nigeria, Speech by the Governor, 16<sup>th</sup> January, 2007.

### *Policy recommendations*

- Social and economic inequalities are as dangerous as political and bureaucratic inequalities and deserve greater attention than they are currently getting.
- The Federal Character Commission should monitor the allocation of government projects to ensure fairness and equity.
- The Central Bank, the Federal Character Commission and the National Assembly should actively monitor the unequal effects of economic policy and recommend necessary remedial or compensatory measures to offset the inequalities.

## **3.2 Citizenship rights and ethnicity**

### **3.2.1 The nature of citizenship**

- Many CRISE studies show that the daily experience of Nigerian citizenship is circumscribed by peculiar considerations of ethnicity and religion such that citizenship rights and opportunities are denied in many parts of the country.
- The cases of violence in Jos North, Lanagtang/Wase, and Yelwa/Shendam in Plateau State, as well as the Tiv/Aloga conflict in Nasarawa state, originated in and underscore the nature of citizenship and how it is limited for some groups.
- Despite the very large numbers of Igbos in Lagos and Kano, or of Hausas in Shagamu, or of Yorubas in Funtua, their absence from modern governance structures in their respective areas of abode is a testimony to their circumscribed citizenship.

### **3.2.2 Indigenes against settlers**

- In many part of the country, such as Plateau, Nassarawa, and Taraba states, some Nigerians are labeled indigenes and others are called settlers. The former claim to be the natives and owners of the land while all others are regarded as tenants. In daily existence, the indigenes contend that all opportunities must go to them to the exclusion of the settlers. These exclusionary politics sow the seeds of violence.
- A study of Sokoto city established that Sokoto state is peaceful in comparison with other states in Nigeria and the relationship between the indigenes and settlers is harmonious as no incidence of conflict was recorded. However, the study also revealed the existence of inequalities between indigenes and settlers in the study area, with discriminatory practices mainly based on ethnic and religious divides. The study found evidence of discrimination in terms of job opportunities, conditions of work, educational opportunities and in preference in places residence. The research also revealed that basic amenities are not equitably distributed: the settler settlements are neglected

in terms of the provision of such amenities, lacking access roads and good schools.

- The non-indigenes in Sokoto city, as in many other parts of Nigeria, are only allowed to vote but not to be voted for. Except for a few token appointments, political appointments are exclusively reserved for the sons of the soil. The non-indigenes are employed on contract and they pay higher schools fees than the indigenes.

### 3.2.3 Gender and citizenship

- Across the country, there is the widespread practice of disenfranchising women married outside their natal state of origin. Such women suffer a double jeopardy as they are discriminated against both in their natal states of origin and in their states of marriage.

### 3.2.4 Religion and citizenship

- Our findings suggest that the widespread belief on the part of the Christian community in Plateau State that there is a systematic programme of Islamisation of ethnic minorities on the Plateau is more of perception than reality. It would appear from our research findings that intense elite competition for power and resources is at the core of the spate of ethno-religious conflicts that have pitched the 'indigenous' ethnic minorities in Plateau State in deadly confrontation with the 'settler' Hausa/Fulani community. Among the general population, on the other hand, competition for land, both for farming and grazing purposes, has been a source of festering ethno-religious conflict and violence.
- Similarly, much of what is described as 'religious' violence in Kano are attacks by socially marginalised sections of society against innocent ethno-religious 'others', whose relative prosperity is galling to the dispossessed.
- The recent conflict over Sharia in Nigeria has involved substantive, mass-based, Muslim grievances over the relatively marginal status of Islamic law within the Western-oriented constitutional architecture of the Nigerian state, as well as the strategic manipulation and mobilisation of these grievances by political elites for partisan advantage.

#### *Policy recommendations:*

- Residency rights need to be recognised. The section of the constitution sanctioning indigeneity must be reviewed if Nigerians are to enjoy equal citizenship. This does not mean that the rights of current 'indigenes' will be sacrificed. It simply means that the residency rights of those who have: (a) lived in a place for a specified period of time; (b) paid their taxes in that community; (c) are willing to swear allegiance to their place of residence and foreswear previous allegiances, should also be respected. This is more in keeping with Nigerian history and culture.
- Women married outside their natal states of origin should have the right to choose which state they want to belong to.
- Residents of a state or local government, even when they are not 'indigenes', contribute to economic and social development and should be recognised and respected for their contributions.

- Management of the Sharia conflict should move beyond the popular 'elite manipulation' framework to a more holistic paradigm that responds to both the strategic and substantive dimensions of the conflict.
- The Nigerian federal democratic system, as it has unfolded since the restoration of civilian rule in 1999, has created space not only for the articulation and expansion of Muslims' demands for Islamic law implementation, but also for the sublimation and mediation of those demands. Thus, while it can unleash long-suppressed group identity conflicts, democratisation can also contribute to the management of those conflicts and the constructive governance of diversity.
- Given the radically contradictory Muslim-Christian perspectives on the appropriate constitutional status of Sharia law in the country, constitutional reform or change is not an immediately viable path to the resolution of the Sharia conflict in Nigeria. Rather, the best prospects for the management of the conflict lie in strategies of non-constitutional renewal like the continuing support for judicial conflict mediation, the promotion of inter-faith consultation and cooperation, and most crucially, public investment in pro-poor policies that reduce the vulnerability of mass constituencies to violent sectarian manipulation and mobilisation.
- A key element in the federal democratic governance of the Sharia conflict has involved the role of appellate Islamic courts in overturning some of the more sensational or stringent verdicts of subordinate Sharia courts. A further illustration of this role will be the upcoming (February 2007) pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the legality of Sharia vigilante bodies (*Hisbah*). This role clearly underscores the desirability, from a conflict-resolution perspective, of continuing official and civil society support for capacity-building in the justice sector, including the training and retraining of Sharia court judges.
- The elaborate mechanism of inter-faith consultation and reconciliation that was put in place after the 2000 Kaduna mayhem has been remarkably effective in promoting and sustaining ethno-religious conflict management in this volatile state. Yet inter-faith dialogue is underdeveloped and weakly institutionalised in other actual and potential ethno-religious flashpoints across the country. This organisational deficiency can be redressed by transforming the existing National Inter-Religious Council (NIREC) from an *ad hoc* agency for inter-faith mediation into a more institutionally entrenched body, with active branches in all states of the federation.
- There is a need to promote both formal and informal channels of religious dialogue at different levels of Nigerian society. Governments, the media, youth and professional groups, and even religious bodies should be encouraged to reach out across the religious divides in the country by creating platforms for communication and the cultivation of mutual respect.
- State and local governments need to provide the socio-economic conditions that are necessary for peaceful coexistence by providing basic amenities equitably to all residents irrespective of their ethnic and religious background.

### 3.3 *Federalism, natural resources and fiscal federalism*

- Despite vocal and broad (if often contradictory) demands for federal constitutional reform in the country, our studies suggest that Nigeria's current federalism exhibits several structural features that many analysts or constitutional designers would consider judicious, and that help explain the country's resilience in the midst of considerable turbulence.
- These design features include: (a) the fragmentation of potentially hegemonic core ethnic regions into two or more constituent states; (b) the demarcation of the federation into multiple, symmetrically configured, units; (c) electoral incentives for the formation of polity-wide parties; (d) formal and informal power-sharing formulas for the inclusion of all segments in government; (e) and the creation of a strong central government as a counterpoise to the centrifugal tendencies inherent in Nigeria's enormous diversity.
- An acknowledgement of Nigeria's comparatively well-crafted federal institutional architecture does not detract from the imperative of constitutional reform in the country. However, it may imply that the range of truly necessary or potentially effective reforms may be more limited than is currently canvassed.
- Current proposals for the wholesale restructuring of the federation into a union of ethno-regional bastions, for instance, are not only politically somewhat infeasible, but are also unlikely to advance the viability and stability of the federation.
- A relatively more viable federal reform strategy in Nigeria would be to seek to reduce the gap between the country's comparatively remarkable federal structures and its weak or dysfunctional federal democratic processes, which include the absence of a truly competitive and credible electoral party system.
- Fiscal federalism and revenue allocation (derivation principle; environmental restoration; location of government projects) are still contentious issues. Because debates about them are often clouded by partisan interests, there has been the generation of more heat than light.

#### *Policy recommendations:*

- Thus, proposals for a more transparent electoral process and the effective political insulation of the electoral administration are especially compelling.
- The formula for revenue allocation between the 36 states should reflect the principles of justice, national integration, and the rewarding of internally generated revenue.
- Available evidence suggests that the challenge of transparency and accountable government is most acute at the state and local levels. This challenge can only partly be met by policing. States and local government must have incentives for improved economic governance.
- Oil companies in the Niger Delta should be sensitive to their social responsibility in the oil-producing areas. As good neighbours, they should be mindful of the consequences of their actions for the local communities. Favouring one community and not the other, or selectively addressing the needs of favoured groups within a single community, will ultimately lead to conflict. They should embark on pragmatic and sustainable development programmes that affect broad sections of the community, especially women.

### 3.4 *Vigilantism and personal security*

#### 3.4.1 Poverty and vigilantism

- CRISE studies of ethnic militia suggest that poverty *per se* is not a direct motive for enlistment in political violence. Feelings of vulnerability and fear are more immediate triggers. Vulnerability is much more multidimensional than strict material deprivation and addressing it politically is thus tricky.
- Vulnerability and marginalisation: Drawing on comments in a CRISE survey, what seem to create the greatest sense of vulnerability are unpredictability of living conditions (joining a militia is seen as an insurance mechanism), threats to a collective sense of belonging and feelings of marginalisation.
- With strategies to fill the void left by the state, or even replace the state by controlling territory, markets and political structures, extra-legal militias provide a modicum of stability, security and identity.
- Importantly, one of the strongest findings of our research is that, although ethnicity is not always the major type of spontaneous self-representation, it is generally recognised as an important channel for the distribution of state privileges.

#### *Policy recommendations:*

- These observations suggest a need for policies at the *national level* designed to improve the protection of life and property, acknowledging cultural diversity and giving each segment of society a fair and adequate chance of achieving its welfare goals.

#### 3.4.2 Militias, politicians and policing

- At the *local level*, the militia's success and its economic sustainability are also guaranteed by its provision of security to ordinary people and the financial support of politicians seeking votes. Politicians clearly contribute to the spread of uncontrolled armed groups by buying their support for self-interested purposes.
- Crisis of Policing: The police force is seen as an inefficient, biased, and corrupt security provider which raises the incentive to hire the services of private/informal vigilantes.
- Our studies suggest that women are active participants in ethnic militias. These women are rational in their relationship with violence. OPC women, at least most of those sampled in our studies, joined of their own free will, motivated by a desire to prevent or slow down threatening vulnerability or regain agency in a situation where such agency is threatened by the state or sections of society. Many of the women joined the OPC 'to try to shield themselves from further violations of their physical and mental integrity by state actors'.

#### *Policy recommendations:*

- Thus the key to breaking the link between women and ethnic militias lies in addressing their special vulnerability in the face of inadequate formal policing.

- Controlling small arms proliferation is an important dimension of improving policing and security.
- Government needs to develop a proactive framework for conflict and conflict management by putting in place an effective Early Warning System (EWS)
- Policy issues that have arisen from the reports of several panels and commissions of inquiry should be addressed. This would include issues of chieftaincy and cultural autonomy demanded by marginalised communities.

#### 4. Ghana<sup>2</sup>

- Like most West African countries that have the Gulf of Guinea as a southern border, Ghana is confronted with a serious developmental divide between its Northern and Southern regions.
- This developmental North-South divide arises from a combination of circumstances and policies: 1) the geographical concentration of most agricultural activities/resources, particularly tree crops such as cocoa, as well as natural resources, notably minerals and forest resources, in the Southern regions; 2) the British colonial policy of investing more heavily in those regions where exploitable resources, such as gold, diamonds, timber, and cocoa, were available or readily produced and cheapest to export; and 3) post-colonial development strategies and investment patterns.
- While the socio-economic differences between the North and South are very severe, there are also serious pockets of extreme poverty in certain Southern regions, particularly in the Eastern and Central regions (See **Appendix 2** for some socio-economic indicators).
- While Ghana has not experienced a large-scale violent conflict at the national level, it has had its share of coup d'états and attempted coup d'états since becoming independent in 1957. However, since the establishment of the Fourth Republic in 1993, a functioning multi-party democracy has developed, with free and fair elections conducted in 1996, 2000 and 2004, the presence of an independent media with a large number of newspapers and radio stations, and the emergence of a vibrant civil society.
- Political tensions between government and opposition flare up from time to time. The current parliamentary boycott by members of the opposition party, National Democratic Congress (NDC), illustrates this. However, it is essential to emphasise that these political tensions do not threaten the state's integrity or risk escalating into violent confrontations and conflicts.
- While Ghana is overall a very peaceful and democratic country, there have been several serious inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflicts and clashes in the Northern regions. These ethnic conflicts and tensions 'arise from several years of relegation of certain ethnic groups, so-called 'minority' groups, to the status of 'second-rate citizens' in the traditional and political administration of the region' (Brukum 1995: 138). The most serious episode of inter-ethnic violence occurred in 1994 between the Nanumba and Kokomba and resulted in approximately 2,000 casualties. It is however important to note that these ethnic conflicts and clashes were only significant at the local level and did not have any far-reaching consequences at the national level (Agyeman 1998).
- Paradoxically, the presence of a considerable number of relatively small ethnic groups, which not only differ considerably regarding their cultural traditions, histories and institutions, but also have been in conflict with one

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<sup>2</sup> This section draws heavily on Langer (2007).



another at different points in time, has contributed to impeding the development of a strong *Northern* identity or consciousness, which in turn has prevented the North-South divide from becoming politically more salient at the national level (Langer 2007).

- The Ghanaian case demonstrates that if severe socio-economic inequalities between different 'cultural' groups or regions are not complemented by serious political exclusion, culture is less likely to become a driver for (violent) political mobilisation.

#### 4.1 *Political inclusion and containing ethnic politics*

- Throughout the post-independence period, most Ghanaian regimes have attempted to maintain certain ethno-regional balances in the political sphere and political HIs have therefore been rather moderate.
- Although the 'Southerners' persistently controlled most of the ministerial positions and were actually, as a group, somewhat overrepresented in proportion to their relative demographic size, each consecutive Ghanaian government (both civilian and military) had a reasonable representation of 'Northerners' (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2 in **Appendix 2**).
- While this ethno-regional 'balancing' has remained a largely informal 'policy' or convention among Ghana's political elites, the members of the Constituent Assembly of the 1992 Constitution nonetheless decided to call explicitly upon the state to take appropriate measures 'to achieve reasonable regional and gender balance in recruitment and appointment to public offices' (Article 35(6) of the 1992 Constitution). However, since Article 35 forms part of Chapter Six of the 1992 Constitution regarding the *Directive Principles of State Policy*, it is not a legally enforceable stipulation, but rather a 'guiding' principle for the state in applying or interpreting the Constitution or any other law and in taking and implementing any policy decisions.
- In recent times, under President John Agyekum Kufuor, the ethnic composition of the government has become somewhat un-balanced. While the Akan constitute about 50% of the population, approximately 67% of all government ministers had an Akan background. Further, Kufuor and his National Patriotic Party's (NPP) poor showing in the Volta region during both the 2000 and 2004 elections was translated into a marginalisation of the Ewes in his governments. In the February 2005 government, only 3.4% of all ministerial positions (including the deputy-ministerial positions) were held by Ewes, even though they constitute about 13% of the population.
- The 'Northerners' have also become somewhat under-represented in proportion to their demographic size among government ministers. However, Kufuor appears to have compensated for this under-representation by appointing a more than proportionate number of *deputy-ministers* from among the northern ethnic groups. In the government of February 2005, for instance, about 17% of all ministers (including the deputy-ministers) had a northern background which corresponds to a relative representation of about 0.75 (the relative representation is obtained by dividing a group's proportion of representation in government by its proportion in the overall population). The fact that the position of vice president, the second most important position in Ghana's 1992 Constitution, has been occupied by a Northerner, Alhaji Aliu Mahama, since January 2001 has further contributed to reducing the political salience of Northern under-representation among government ministers.

- An important measure aimed at containing ethnic, regional and religious mobilisation in Ghanaian politics is the constitutional requirement that political parties have to be *national* in character.
- In addition to the legislative or formal ‘suppression’ of ethnic, regional or religious political parties, the Ghanaian body politic also agreed in more informal ways to avoid using ethnicity as a means of gaining electoral support. For example, as part of the 2004 Political Parties Code of Conduct, which is a legally non-binding document, the political parties agreed to refrain from using ethnicity in their political campaigning.
- However, despite the formal and informal agreements and rules, as well as the existence of strong norms against the use of ethnicity as a means of political action, the ethnic card has nonetheless been repeatedly played by both government and opposition parties/politicians, particularly during elections.
- Furthermore, ethno-regional voting patterns (particularly in the Ashanti and Volta regions) as well as survey research conducted by CRISE suggest that ethnicity remains (or at least is perceived to be) an important factor in the public/political sphere. For instance, in a perceptions survey conducted in 2005 we found that between 35% and 38% of the respondents thought that a person’s ethnic background affected his/her chances of getting government jobs, government contracts, private sector formal jobs and public housing.

*Policy recommendations:*

- Continued balancing of ethno-regional/religious interests and groups in the administrative-political sphere is crucial for Ghana’s long-term stability and should therefore be actively encouraged both by local and international stakeholders.
- Openness and transparency when it comes to government appointments and appointment procedures more generally is another crucial policy area. More transparent procedures can help to reduce perceptions of ethnic and religious favouritism.
- The media and other local stakeholders have an important role to play in this connection. While the media can act as ‘guardian’ against ethnic nepotism and favouritism, reporting on these sensitive issues requires a high degree of professionalism and objectivity on their part.
- The two main political parties, particularly the National Patriotic Party (NPP) and National Democratic Congress (NDC), should do more to dissipate the widely held view that they are respectively Akan and Ewe-based.

#### **4.2 Economic HIs**

- During the 1990s, the developmental North-South divide actually worsened in terms of the incidence of poverty (see Table 2.3 in **Appendix 2**). Some other socio-economic indicators, however, point towards a very moderate improvement.
- Soon after taking over from the Rawlings government in 2001, the new National Patriotic Party (NPP) government, headed by Kufuor, publicly acknowledged in its main development policy document (the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper), the problematic nature of the existing regional developmental disparities, and implicitly criticised previous governments’ investment policies for creating and maintaining Ghana’s regional inequalities.

- In accordance with this policy statement, the Kufuor government introduced several mechanisms to redress the seriously adverse conditions in the Northern regions, especially relating to health, social infrastructure, education and economic infrastructure. For instance, the funds that were freed up as part of the Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative were earmarked to benefit the North disproportionately (Shepherd, et al. 2005).
- Regardless of these and other measures, the developmental North-South divide remains very severe. Not only are the government's interventions too limited to achieve significant positive change, but also, and probably more importantly, the vast majority of economic activities and production takes place in the Southern regions.
- Moreover, CRISE research has shown that improving socio-economic outcomes such as access to education and health services is absolutely necessary, but insufficient to kick-start endogenous and self-sustainable economic growth in relatively deprived areas.

*Policy recommendations:*

- For long-term stability reasons, more must be done to reduce the North-South divide. In addition to social services improvement, government should also aim to promote and support the development of a sustainable Northern economy. Examples of policies in this respect could be increased public investment in Northern regions' economic infrastructure such as roads and telephone lines and tax benefits for companies which are developing economic activities in the Northern regions.
- Another important way of promoting Ghana's Northern economy could be to link it more directly to Ghana's neighbouring countries, particularly Burkina Faso. The much talked-about railway between Ghana and Burkina Faso would most likely have very positive economic consequences for Ghana's Northern regions.
- The international donor community could also do more to develop Ghana's Northern economy. For instance, programmes such as the EU's Export Earnings Stabilisation System (Stabex), which is a compensatory financial scheme to stabilise export earnings derived from primary agricultural commodities, is currently only aimed at the cocoa and timber sectors, which are located in the Southern regions. Suitably redesigned, such a programme could help to reduce HIs by providing price support for commodities cultivated in the more deprived areas. For instance, in the Ghanaian case Stabex-type policies could be applied to support the cultivation of cotton and peanuts, which takes place in the deprived Northern regions.
- Local governments and communities should be actively encouraged to meet their share of the responsibility of addressing the inequalities in social indicators and promote local economic activities. However, in order for them to initiate policy and achieve positive change, more funds need to be put under their control. Moreover, while most districts' main source of revenue is the District Assembly Common Fund, overall only about 3% of total government revenue goes into this fund.

### 4.3 Cultural inclusion and cultural 'neutrality' of the state

- Ghana has taken some positive steps and measures when it comes to maintaining a socio-political 'climate' of cultural status equality and inclusion.
- The basis for the policies aimed at promoting cultural inclusiveness and neutrality goes back to Ghana's first president, Kwame Nkrumah, and his Convention People's Party (CPP).
- Ghana's policy towards language provides an interesting example that might be followed elsewhere. While English – a largely ethnically neutral language – is the official language, successive governments have nonetheless actively promoted the study and teaching of, currently, 12 major Ghanaian languages within the context of, for instance, the Schools of Ghana Languages and Functional Literacy Programme (see Bemile 2000).
- In addition to their 'neutral' language policy, successive Ghanaian regimes have introduced or maintained a range of other measures and policies (both in the legal/institutional, policy-oriented and symbolic spheres) aimed at promoting cultural inclusiveness. Thus, for instance, the largely symbolic practice of the head of state alternating between suits, *kente* cloths and Northern smocks on public occasions, which was introduced by Nkrumah, was subsequently continued by most heads of state, including Rawlings and Kufuor.
- Other measures, practices and customs that illustrate the culturally inclusive and neutral character of the Ghanaian state are, for example: the persistent rejection by consecutive Ghanaian governments of proposals to promote a particular local language (especially Twi/Akan) as Ghana's national language; the incorporation by institutions such as the Ghana Dance Ensemble of songs and dances from all major ethnic groups (Lentz and Nugent 2000); the conscious effort to ensure that radio and television programmes are broadcast in all major languages (*Ibid*); the custom that representatives from the government attend the most important ethnic and/or traditional festivals and events (*durbars*) throughout the country on a regular basis.
- Similarly, some (symbolic) actions and practices which demonstrate the political elites' commitment to promoting and sustaining *religious* status equality and inclusiveness are, for instance: the practice that representatives from all major religions are present at official state functions; the state's active organisational support for the annual Hajj pilgrimage to the Muslim holy sites in Saudi Arabia; and the introduction of a new public holiday on the Muslim festival of *Eid-al-Adha* in 1996.

#### *Policy recommendations:*

- Current culturally inclusive practices and customs should be maintained and, where possible, extended further. For instance, languages of relatively small ethno-linguistic groups which are currently not among the 12 state-supported local languages should get some form of recognition as well.
- Inter-ethnic and inter-religious contact should be encouraged in order to improve different groups' understanding and knowledge of other groups' cultural practices and customs. The practice at some universities that students are expected to take courses in a local language other than their own should be extended.
- Other policies aimed at promoting an overarching 'Ghanaian' identity, based on shared practices, values and customs as well as a common history, should also be encouraged.

## 5. Côte d'Ivoire<sup>3</sup>

- Like Ghana and Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire is also confronted by a serious socio-economic North-South divide. Once more, the origins of this socio-economic North-South divide are diverse and relate to such factors as ecological and climatic differences, the differential impact of colonial policies and post-colonial economic development policies.
- The emergence of the violent conflict in Côte d'Ivoire at the end of the 1990s contrasts sharply with the long-term political stability experienced under President Houphouët-Boigny, who ruled from 1960-1993.
- Côte d'Ivoire's political stability in the period 1960-80 was based upon several factors:
  - a very favourable economic environment with real annual GDP growth rates of more than 7%;
  - Houphouët-Boigny's approach to politics, which is often referred to as 'Le modèle Houphouétiste' or 'Le compromis Houphouétiste', characterised by a culture of dialogue, compromise, rewards, punishment, forgiveness and reintegration (see, for example, Akindes 2003). His approach involved the use of economic incentives to co-opt and appease individuals that might consider challenging the system and a system of ethnic quotas aimed at establishing a balance between regions and ethnic groups within state institutions (see Bakery 1984; Zartman and Delgado 1984); and
  - the regime had France's active support.
- While Côte d'Ivoire's outward-oriented agricultural development strategy produced impressive economic results, the concentration of investment, jobs and wealth in the Southern parts of the country, especially in Abidjan and the cocoa area known as the 'Boucle du Cacao,' exacerbated the (socio-) economic disparities between the North and South.
- Another important feature of the colonial and post-colonial Ivorian economy was its reliance on foreign labour. From the early 1940s, the French colonial administration organised the transfer of forced labour from the Upper Volta, today's Burkina Faso, to the cocoa and coffee plantations in the Southern parts of Côte d'Ivoire. Although forced labour was abolished by the French Assembly in 1946, Côte d'Ivoire continued to attract large numbers of migrants from neighbouring countries. Houphouët-Boigny promoted the influx of foreign workers by introducing liberal landownership laws, under the slogan 'the land belongs to those that develop it' (Gonin 1998).
- In 1998, foreigners accounted for over four million people or roughly 25% of the population, mainly coming from Burkina Faso (57.5%), Mali (20.4%) and Guinea (3.4%). About 50% of these 'foreigners' were born in Côte d'Ivoire.
- Due to a sharp decline in the commodity prices of Côte d'Ivoire's main export products, coffee and cocoa, at the end of the 1970s, Côte d'Ivoire's vulnerability to the international commodity markets was clearly exposed. The resulting economic and financial problems forced the government to take stringent austerity measures.
- The negative economic environment in the 1980s not only reduced the standard of living, it also exacerbated tensions between locals and foreign as well as internal migrants in the Southern economy (Dembélé 2003).

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<sup>3</sup> This section draws heavily on Langer (2004, 2005).

- As a result of the fact that the migrants from the North as well as the foreign migrants from Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea predominantly belonged to the Northern ethnic families, Northern Mandé and Voltaic, the communal tensions were increasingly perceived as a conflict between North and South (*Ibid*).
- The most significant result of the return to multiparty democracy at the beginning of the 1990s was the introduction of ethno-nationalism and xenophobia into Côte d'Ivoire's electoral politics. In particular, during the 1990 elections, Côte d'Ivoire's main opposition party, *Front Populaire Ivoirien* (FPI-Ivorian Popular Front), 'initiated a political campaign around the message that the PDCI was a partial regime which had systematically favoured the interests of particular Ivorian ethnic groups – Baoulé and groups from the North – and of foreigners' (Crook 1997: 222).
- In this context, the appointment of Alassane Ouattara, a 'Northerner' as Prime Minister shifted the tensions from the economic to the political sphere (Dembélé 2003).
- Côte d'Ivoire's socio-political climate became further ethnicised due to President Bédié's policy of Ivorian nationalism, under the slogan of the promotion of *l'Ivoirité* (Ivorian-ness).
- Although Bédié claimed that the concept was solely aimed at creating a sense of cultural unity among all the people living in the territory of the Côte d'Ivoire, it is widely believed that it was introduced for the specific political reason of preventing Ouattara from participating in the presidential elections in 1995. Following the adoption of a new electoral code, Ouattara was effectively excluded from participating in the 1995 presidential elections, which in turn disenfranchised an important part of the Northern population.
- Côte d'Ivoire's violent disintegration at the end of the 1990s demonstrates that the *simultaneous* presence of severe political horizontal inequalities *and* socio-economic horizontal inequalities forms an extremely explosive socio-political situation because under such conditions the excluded political elites not only have strong incentives to mobilise their supporters for violent conflict along ethnic lines, but are also likely to gain support among their ethnic constituencies quite easily.
- The management of political, socio-economic and cultural status HIs in a post-conflict country is more urgent, but also considerably more difficult than in other contexts, because of the high levels of mutual distrust between different political actors and conflict parties, the low levels of economic growth, which mean fewer resources to redistribute to the most disadvantaged regions, and the entrenchment and high salience of ethno-religious identities and differences.

### **5.1 Ethnicisation of politics and political HIs**

- Due to Houphouët-Boigny's informal policy of 'ethnic quotas', political HIs under his rule were rather moderate, which in turn meant that the political elites had few incentives to mobilise their constituents along ethnic lines (See Table 3.1 and 3.2 in Appendix 3).
- In the 1990s, in an electoral environment characterised by new players and 'democratic' rules, the prevailing political and economic horizontal inequalities, injustices and grievances became more and more politicised.
- In sharp contrast to Houphouët-Boigny, Bédié almost completely stopped the balancing process among the different ethno-regional interests and parties, and started a process of *'baoulisation'* of state institutions (Dozon 2000).

- Bédié's successors, Robert Gueï and Laurent Gbagbo, also adopted strategies and policies of political monopolisation and ethnic favouritism towards their own group.
- Political exclusion and inequalities therefore became very severe from the mid- 1990s onwards. The main losers were the Northerners who became increasingly politically excluded and disenfranchised, in addition to being socio-economically disadvantaged. Indeed both Bédié and Gueï manipulated the presidential electoral rules in order to invalidate the candidacy of Alassane Ouattara, the candidate of the most important Northern political party, Rassemblement des républicains (RDR, Republican Rally).
- In addition to the baoulisation of the political-administrative sector, Bédié also aimed to change the ethnic composition of the military forces in favour of his own ethnic group. Moreover, Bédié progressively destroyed the internal balances in the military by appointing Baoulé people predominantly to the higher command positions (Contamin and Losch 2000).
- The ethnic tensions that stemmed from favouritism towards the Baoulé were enhanced by the gradual decline in the status and importance of the military during the 1990s, mainly due to the precarious financial and economic situation (Kieffer 2000).
- Like his two predecessors, Bédié and Gueï, Gbagbo also wanted to change the ethnic composition in the military forces to favour his own group. In order to achieve this, Gbagbo planned to demobilise two contingents – called 'zinzins' and 'bahéfoué' – that predominantly consisted of soldiers who had been recruited during the brief reign of general Gueï (Banégas and Losch 2002).
- In response to their planned demobilisation, however, these soldiers started a mutiny which quickly turned into a more organised rebellion, which in turn resulted in a de facto split of Côte d'Ivoire into a rebel-controlled Northern and a government-controlled Southern part.
- With strong encouragement from France and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the conflicting parties were brought together in Linas-Marcoussis for a roundtable meeting. These negotiations resulted in the signing of the Marcoussis Agreement on 23 January 2003 in Paris. However, the government of national unity, comprised of ministers from all different political parties and rebel organisations, which was established as part of the Marcoussis Agreement, has so far failed to implement the most contentious issues of the agreement and restore a stable socio-political environment in Côte d'Ivoire.
- Although large-scale fighting between the rebel and government forces has not resumed since September 2002, peace has proven elusive, and a succession of political agreements have failed to move beyond a "no peace no war" stalemate (see Human Rights Watch 2003; International Crisis Group 2003; International Crisis Group 2005; International Crisis Group 2006).
- The two most important issues over which the government, the New Forces and other political parties and stakeholders remain deadlocked are the disarmament of the rebel forces and voter identification.
- The latter issue is particularly important for the New Forces rebels because they claim that people from the Northern regions in Côte d'Ivoire are discriminated against and have been prevented from holding national identity papers, work permits and voter cards by successive Southern-dominated governments.
- In April 2006, the conflict parties agreed to the simultaneous implementation of both processes, though President Gbagbo voiced the opinion that disarmament should precede identification. However, the UN-monitored programme of identification which aims to provide 3.5 million Ivorians with

nationality documents through a process of public hearings, has been regularly blocked by riots and demonstrations by pro-Gbagbo youths, known as the Young Patriots, and is still not finished. The disarmament of the New Forces rebels has also been delayed.

- As a result the presidential and parliamentary elections, scheduled for October 2006, had to be postponed once more. The longer the current regime stays in power without being re-elected in free and fair elections, the less legitimate it becomes. The risk of coup d'états and the return of concurrent hostilities increases.
- Furthermore, the International Crisis Group reported in July 2004 that certain government officials, rebels, businessmen and members of the security forces were profiting from the civil war. This further complicates the resolution of the conflict.
- Besides the economic benefits, Gbagbo and his supporters face the likelihood of loss of political power, losing access to state patronage networks, and also facing the possibility of prosecution for human rights abuses by the International Criminal Court (ICC).

#### *Policy recommendations*

- In the short term there are a variety of steps that are essential to restoring peace. But we are not in a position to make recommendations here, as our research is concerned with longer-term policies to prevent conflict.
- Human Rights Watch has put forward a set of policy recommendations which seem reasonable, including the need to:
  - Acknowledge and condemn unlawful killings committed by state security and militia forces since September 2002;
  - Acknowledge the existence of and take concrete measures to put an end to the practice of extortion of civilians who are stopped under the pretext of identity checks;
  - Investigate and punish in accordance with international standards crimes committed by state security forces in violation of international law, including extrajudicial execution, torture, physical abuse, and harassment and extortion of civilians;
  - End incitement of hatred, intolerance, and violence by state-run broadcasters and print journalists, and punish them as appropriate in accordance with international fair trial principles. Create an independent body to monitor hate speech that incites violence;
  - Work with the New Forces to develop modalities for the redeployment of judicial officials, even if on a limited basis, as soon as possible to the territory under New Forces control.
- Moreover, it is clear that in order to restore peace and stability to Côte d'Ivoire, the government and rebel forces need to implement the political agreements they signed, with the conduct of free and fair elections as arguably the most important first step. While raising important legal, political and moral questions, for the larger benefit of Côte d'Ivoire and its people, it might be necessary to explore a political solution whereby Gbagbo and his entourage are offered some immunity from prosecution if they agree to hold free and fair elections.



- A crucial long-term question is how to ensure that future governments have inclusive ethno-regional religious composition. A presidential system with a powerful executive presidency is problematic as it can easily become a winner-takes-all fight for power. Local stakeholders, with the active support of the international community, should promote and encourage the government and opposition parties to look for ways to ensure continued power-sharing once elections have been conducted. This might be achieved by a new power-sharing constitution. Short of adopting a completely different political system, political parties could be encouraged to work out a deal whereby future governments would have representatives of all political parties in parliament. Similarly, political parties could also be encouraged to agree that, in future governments, the president and prime minister should have different regional backgrounds so that one is always a Southerner and one a Northerner.
- Further, as in Ghana, openness and transparency when it comes to government appointments and appointment procedures more generally is another crucial policy area. More transparent procedures can help to reduce perceptions of ethnic and religious favouritism.
- The media and other local stakeholders have an important role to play in this connection. However, in Côte d'Ivoire, some media outlets are part of the problem. Local and international stakeholders should therefore aim to develop a more professional and independent media, for example by offering training, identifying the media outlets that encourage ethnic stereotyping and hatred, and providing financial support for independent journalists.

## **5.2 Socio-economic Hls**

- The civil war has led to a sharp decrease in economic growth and a sharp increase in poverty levels in most areas of Côte d'Ivoire. Most badly affected are the many thousands of internally displaced persons (approximately 750,000) who are largely dependent on international humanitarian assistance for their livelihoods.
- The developmental North-South divide is also likely to have increased significantly due to the civil war. Moreover, in the rebel-controlled Northern regions, government services in the educational and health spheres are no longer provided at all or are at least badly affected due to the conflict. Only recently a small number of schools and some other government services have been opened up again.
- Due to non-payment of debt arrears, cooperation with the World Bank is still suspended. However, negotiations to reschedule debts and reestablish an official working relationship, are ongoing and look promising.
- While cocoa is still the most important export product, over the last five years or so, an increasingly important source of revenue for the Ivorian state is the export of oil. The vast majority of oil is found in Côte d'Ivoire's territorial waters in the Gulf of Guinea.

### *Policy recommendations*

- In the short term, arguably, the policy areas that require the most urgent actions are the return and reintegration of internally displaced persons and the demobilisation of government and rebel soldiers.

When it comes to designing, and particularly funding, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes, the World Bank has an important role to play and it is therefore essential that official relationships are re-established between Côte d'Ivoire and the World Bank.

- Another important group of people that need special attention and targeting are the youth. Due to high youth unemployment, many young people are easily mobilised and have been manipulated by politicians, mainly from the Gbagbo entourage, for political purposes. It is vital to design and implement employment and educational policies aimed at this important group.
- The developmental North-South divide needs to be tackled effectively and constructively. As in Ghana, government should aim to promote and support the development of a sustainable Northern economy, in addition to improving local social services.
- Policies mentioned in the Ghanaian section to improve the socio-economic situation in the Northern regions are likewise applicable to Northern Côte d'Ivoire. These policies include increasing public investment in Northern regions' economic infrastructure, providing tax benefits for companies which are developing economic activities in the North, promoting international economic linkages with neighbouring Burkina Faso and Mali, and introducing a suitably redesigned Stabex programme which can provide price support for products cultivated in the North.
- In order to prevent the increased oil revenues from (re-)creating future tensions and conflicts, it is crucial that the allocation and spending of these revenues is done in a *transparent* manner. An independent oversight committee, with representation from all major stakeholders, including opposition parties, should be established to ensure that the revenue is used in an appropriate and fair way.

### 5.3 Cultural status HIs

- Grievances among 'Northerners' were not limited to the economic and political sphere, but also related to their cultural status.
- While the political exclusion and relative socio-economic deprivation of the Northern ethnic groups were critical factors behind the emergence of the violent conflict, perceptions of the non-recognition and secondary status of the Muslim religion, the predominant religion in the Northern regions, also played an important role in instigating the Northern rebellion. For instance, when the Ivorian President Houphouët-Boigny ordered the construction of the Catholic Basilica in Yamoussoukro in the 1980s for the approximate sum of \$600 million, which he allegedly paid himself, many Muslims perceived this as a clear indication of Christian supremacy in Côte d'Ivoire.
- Arguably more important, however, was the introduction of the concept of '*Ivoirité*' which made Northerners *de facto* secondary citizens not only in terms of political rights, but also, in terms of cultural status. The introduction of the ideology of '*Ivoirité*' had an impact far beyond the political sphere of society and created different categories of Ivorians with different rights, standing and cultural status, which found resonance in the society at large. The ethno-regional and religious similarity between Northerners and most foreign migrants led to a situation where these two different groups of people became increasingly seen as one and the same. The portrayal of

'Northerners' as 'foreigners' not only constituted an extreme lack of recognition *by* the Ivorian state, but it also meant and indeed 'justified' (at least in the view of those propagating the ideology of '*Ivoirité*') the non-recognition of the Northerners *in* the Ivorian state.

#### Policy recommendations

- Government and opposition party politicians have a vital role to play in re-establishing a socio-political situation characterised by cultural status equality, tolerance and mutual respect. While a comprehensive set of legal safeguards should be introduced to better protect individuals and groups' rights and freedoms to practise and uphold their religion and other cultural practices, local and international stakeholders should encourage politicians to undertake meaningful symbolic actions as well. For instance, statements and speeches made by important political leaders denouncing ethnic stereotyping, xenophobia and the idea of *Ivoirité* should be encouraged and applauded by local and international stakeholders.
- The media is another crucial actor and the policy recommendation made above towards this sector is equally important for this context. In particular, the government should implement measures to end incitement of hatred, intolerance, and violence by state-run broadcasters and print journalists, and punish them as appropriate in accordance with international fair trial principles. An independent body to monitor hate speech that incites violence should be established.

## 6. Lessons from across the world

In this section we will review some general findings from CRISE research. These are based on our eight country studies from three regions of the world; and some cross-country analysis of a broader range of countries. The in-depth country studies included:

- Bolivian, Guatemala and Peru in Latin America
- Malaysia and Indonesia in Southeast Asia
- Three West African countries: Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria.

Each country is multicultural and in each region, one country has avoided serious national conflict, while the other(s) has/have had some considerable violent conflict some time in the recent past. Bolivia, Malaysia and Ghana are the countries that have succeeded in remaining broadly peaceful, while Nigeria has not had national-level conflict for several decades. Our intention was to learn from the contrasting situations and policies.

In our research we have come to eleven major findings.

1. The probability of conflict rises where HIs are higher. Cross-country analysis by Østby shows a significant rise in the probability of conflict with higher country socio-economic HIs, in an analysis covering 55 developing countries (Østby 2006). This increase in the probability of conflict occurs when HIs are measured in terms of years of education or of average household assets. Mancini has come to a similar finding for districts across Indonesia, where district conflict appears more likely the worse the difference in infant mortality across groups. We should emphasise that these are probabilities (Mancini

- 2005). Not all countries with high HIs experience conflict. Both Ghana and Bolivia, in our study, have high HIs yet have avoided substantial conflict.
2. Conflict is more likely where political and socio-economic HIs are high and in the same direction, or *consistent*. Where they run in different directions, conflict can be avoided. In both Malaysia and Nigeria, the group that is economically impoverished is politically advantaged, and having political power enables the economically deprived groups to feel that they participate in society.
  3. Inclusive (or power-sharing) government tends to reduce the likelihood of conflict. Bolivia and Ghana have both included deprived groups in government. Côte d'Ivoire did so too under Houphouët-Boigny, but Northerners were subsequently excluded and this was a major cause of the recent conflict. Guatemala, Peru and Indonesia also practised exclusive government during their conflict periods.
  4. In general it appears that political HIs are particularly important triggers of conflict, because it seems they affect elite motives. Socio-economic deprivation tends to affect the mass of the people, mostly. They thus have grievances but are unlikely to take to violent conflict unless their own group leaders are politically excluded. From this perspective, Nigeria's Federal Character principle has been especially important in moderating perceived political exclusion.
  5. Citizenship can be an important source of political and economic exclusion, not only at a national but also at regional and local levels. At a national level, denial of citizenship has been critical in inciting rebellion in the case of Côte d'Ivoire. Similarly, in Nigeria, the settler/indigene distinction has been the source of many local-level conflicts.
  6. Inequality of cultural recognition among groups is an additional motivation for conflict. It adds to people's sense of identity and therefore their willingness to mobilise along cultural lines, while disrespect for particular cultural symbols can be a powerful trigger to conflict. Thus in Northern Ireland, the Orange marches were the trigger that set off the 'troubles' in the 1970s. Similarly, language policy in Sri Lanka, and the desecration of religious buildings and sites in India and Palestine, have acted as triggers for major conflicts.
  7. Perceptions of inequalities are what make people take action. Though broadly related to observed inequalities, perceptions of inequality can be enhanced (as in Côte d'Ivoire) or reduced by political leadership, media treatment and education.
  8. The presence of natural resources can be a significant cause of separatist conflict, as well as of local conflict. Natural resources, such as gas or oil, can be a source of severe (and sometimes sudden) regional inequalities in output – yet they are often not translated into improved conditions for the people living where the resources are found. In Indonesia, for example, the oil-rich regions actually had lower human indicators than elsewhere. Consequently, this becomes a major source of contention and sometimes of demands for separatism. Equally, low inequalities and poor management of oil resources can feed into local-level conflict, as in the Niger Delta region in Nigeria.

9. The nature of the state is of enormous importance to whether serious conflict erupts and persists. An aggressive state can fuel and sustain a conflict – in both Guatemala and Indonesia (with respect to separatist conflicts), the harsh and aggressive state reaction to rebellion sustained conflict for many years, causing deaths on a massive scale, and provoking further rebellion. In contrast, state handling of disputes in Ghana and some local-area conflicts in Indonesia has dampened some conflicts and avoided others.
10. Some HIs are very persistent, lasting centuries even. Many have colonial origins but continue through a cycle of cumulative causation, as privilege generates more privilege, and deprivation is passed down generations. Where there are persistent HIs, they are particularly important to tackle, and particularly intractable to policy.
11. Finally, national and international policies and statistics are too often blind to the issue of HIs.

### *Policy recommendations*

Our intention is to develop policy findings through national and regional consultations. Below we report on some initial findings coming out of our studies to date to stimulate discussion. However, since each situation is unique, policies must reflect the particular circumstances of the country. Hence the first requirement is to understand the local situation; to assess the extent of HIs in different dimensions, and, where possible, perceptions of these inequalities; and to explore the major causes of the inequalities.

The objective of policies in this area is to reduce observed HIs in all relevant dimensions, i.e. political, socio-economic and cultural recognition. But perceptions are relevant too in two ways: on the one hand, it is important to reduce perceptions of inequality along with observed inequalities; on the other hand, it may also be desirable to reduce perceptions of cultural difference and the salience of identities, both because strong consciousness of difference makes ethnic mobilisation more likely and because, as the salience of identity is reduced, people in deprived groups may get better access to resources and employment, and thus this too would reduce HIs. Yet there can be some tension between these two objectives, as some policies towards reducing HIs may actually increase the salience of identity difference, as seems to have happened in Malaysia, which is the country that has gone furthest in tackling HIs. There are policies which are likely to reduce both HIs and salience. But in some contexts more direct policies may be needed which do increase the salience of identity. Where this is the case, it is desirable that the policies be of limited duration.

Policies towards political HIs need to be implemented at a number of levels, including:

- universal citizenship rights
- electoral design (e.g. PR and boundary delineation) that will ensure proportional representation of different groups
- power-sharing in government.
- fair distribution of jobs at all levels in the bureaucracy, police, and army.
- decentralisation of government to regional and local levels.

Policies towards socio-economic HIs include macro, meso and micro policies, as well as policies towards asset distribution.

- at the macro level, structural adjustment policies need to be monitored for their implications for group distribution, and modified where necessary, or compensatory policies introduced.
- at the meso level, tax and expenditure policies need to be devised to contribute to reduced HIs. Progressive taxation will make a contribution here, as well as special tax regimes to favour deprived regions. Regional and district expenditure allocations can make a major contribution.
- anti-discrimination policies may improve group distribution of employment opportunities and contracts (as they have in Northern Ireland).
- educational and employment quotas can change group distribution (such policies have been followed in Malaysia).
- asset redistribution – in land, financial assets, and micro-credit – has been adopted in Fiji, Malaysia and Zimbabwe.
- micro-level projects to enhance the economic prospects of deprived groups have been adopted in many countries, including Ghana and Nigeria.

Some policies are universalistic – i.e. they apply to everyone irrespective of their group, but help the deprived and hence tend to reduce HIs (e.g. general anti-poverty programmes). Some policies use region or industry as a proxy for the group, helping regions/industries with concentrations of deprived groups. And some policies are directly targeted towards particular groups. The first two types of policy have the advantage of not affecting (or even tending to reduce) the salience of identity while contributing to reduced HIs; the third type tends to increase the salience of identity. However, where the first two types of policy are not very effective, the third type may also be needed.

In general, it is easier to put in place policies towards inequalities in access to social services, e.g. education, and more difficult to ensure equality of economic opportunity, especially where economic development is tending to increase HIs. Yet policies only seem to be effective in significantly reducing inequality where both social and economic inequalities are tackled (as in Malaysia and Northern Ireland). Hence it is essential to monitor what is happening and develop policies towards economic inequalities, where needed.

In addition to discontent brought about by (perceptions of) group-based political exclusion and socio-economic deprivation, groups also make claims regarding the status and recognition given to their cultural norms and practices – e.g. religious practices – within the public and private spheres. This is particularly important in relation to the cultural ‘identity’ of the state – whether it embodies cultural exclusivity or subordination of practices associated with certain cultural groups, or whether it reflects a cultural inclusivity which places equal value and visibility on the cultural practices of all groups. While political and socio-economic HI management predominantly involves *redistributive* policies, rectifying cultural status inequalities often involves *recognition* rather than redistribution. The three main areas of cultural status relate to religious practices and observances; language policy, particularly in education and administration; and ethno-cultural practices. Examples of policies to promote a situation of cultural status equality include:

- Policies to guarantee the freedom to pursue one’s religion. This is especially important for minority or non-dominant religions both in secular and non-secular states. Examples of policies aimed at establishing or maintaining cultural equality across religions include ensuring equal opportunity to

construct places of worship and burial grounds; recognition of religious festivals and, where considered appropriate, public holidays to commemorate them; inclusive laws regarding marriage and inheritance; and, in the particularly symbolic sphere, representation from all major religions at official state functions.

- Policies that recognise all widely spoken languages as ‘national’ or ‘official’ languages instead of just one or a few languages. The privileging of one or a few languages over others often signals the dominance of those for whom these languages are the mother tongue. Moreover, recognising a language means more than just the use of that language. It symbolises respect for the people who speak it, their culture and their full inclusion in society
- In addition to formal recognition policies, states can reinforce cultural status equality between languages through more informal mechanisms. Examples here include Belgium, where convention dictates that the prime minister employ both major languages – French and Dutch – in parliament and in dealing with the media, even to the extent of switching language mid-speech.
- Beyond the religious and language domains, the state’s recognition and toleration of and support for other cultural practices is another important dimension of cultural status inequalities. Lack of recognition of different cultural practices by the state can feed into broader informal practices within the society at large, including, for instance, employment discrimination against migratory minorities in many West European countries; frequent police searches of such groups; and assimilationist pressures on indigenous students in Guatemala to avoid wearing indigenous dress.
- An important policy aimed at establishing or maintaining cultural equality across different ethno-regional groups involves recognising customary law practices. Plural legal systems not only increase the access of minorities to the legal system, but also increase their overall sense of being culturally valued within society (e.g. the recognition of Sharia in Nigeria and indigenous law practices in Guatemala).

A Human Rights approach can be generally helpful in reducing HIs. However, this is only the case where HRs are embodied in legal obligations and actively implemented. For example, in Northern Ireland, strong anti-discrimination legislation, actively supported by the authorities, was important in securing substantial improvements in employment, housing and education inequalities. In Peru, a Human Rights Ombudsman has been established, the Defensoria, and is beginning to make a substantial contribution to cultural status equality, and to combating racial discrimination more generally.

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## Appendix 1. Some Indicators of Horizontal Inequalities in Nigeria

**Table 1.1: Nigeria: Location of Ethnic Groups**

Zones	Dominant Ethnic Groups	No. of Minority Ethnic Groups
North West	Hausa	54
North East	Kanuri, Hausa, Fulani	205
North Central	Mixed	123
South West	Yoruba	4
South East	Igbo	1
South South	Mixed	59

**Source:** adapted from Otite, 1990, 44-57.

### Education

**Table 1.2: Post-Primary Institutions in Nigeria by Zones, 1989**

Zone	Percentage Population in 2006 census	Number of Institutions
Northwest	25.56	567 (9.7%)
Northeast	13.55	343 (5.9%)
Northcentral	13.47	1022 (17.5%)
Southwest	19.7	1575 (27.0%)
Southeast	11.7	1208 (20.7%)
Southsouth	15.0	1114 (19.1%)

**Sources:** adapted from Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN), 2001; *Tell*, November 14<sup>th</sup> 1994, p. 15.

**Table 1.3: Admissions to Nigerian Universities by zone of origin, 2000/2001**

Zone	Number of admitted candidates	Percentage of total admissions
Northwest	2341	4.7
Northeast	1979	3.9
Northcentral	5597	11.1
Southwest	8763	17.4
Southeast	19820	39.4
Southsouth	11734	23.3

**Source:** adapted from [www.jambng.com](http://www.jambng.com)

### Social Indicators and Poverty

**Table 1.4: Social Indicators, Zonal Percentages. 1995/6**

Zone	% of Household using stream or pond for water	% of HHold without electricity	% of children 6-11 yrs in school	% of children 12 + in school	% of Literate adults, 15+	% of women using family planning	% of pregnant women using clinics	% of new born children NOT immunised
N/west	13.6	79.8	34.2	35.2	20.7	2.6	25.3	65.9
N/east	26.4	78.3	42.3	47.6	25	1.4	39.4	60.7
N/cent.	44.4	61.2	69.8	73.7	44.7	4.5	66.8	54
S/west	22.6	30.4	94.6	88.9	68.9	12.1	74.7	29.1
S/east	61.4	47.7	88.3	89.6	75.8	14.9	84.8	29
S/south	50.4	55.7	90.9	87.6	77.2	9.1	60.7	56.9

**Source:** adapted from FOS, 1995/6.

**Table 1.5: Maternal Mortality Rates (per 100,000 live births) by Zones/Countries.**

Southwest	165
Southeast	286
Northwest	1025
Northeast	1549

All Nigeria	800
South Africa	340
Zimbabwe	610

Source: Hadiza S. Galadanchi, 2007, 'Overview of Maternal Mortality in Northern Nigeria', dRPC, Kano.

**Table 1.6: Poverty Headcount (in %) by Zone, 1996.**

Zone	Non-Poor	Moderately Poor	Core Poor	All Poor
Northwest	22.8	39.9	37.3	77.2
Northeast	29.9	35.7	34.4	70.1
Northcentral	35.4	36.7	28.0	64.7
Southwest	39.1	33.4	27.5	60.4
Southeast	46.5	35.3	18.2	53.5
Southsouth	41.8	34.8	23.4	58.2
All Nigeria	29.3	36.3	34.4	70.7

Source: FOS, 1999, p. 29.

**Table 1.7: States with Highest & Lowest Shares of Poverty (2006).**

10 States with Highest Incidence of Poverty		10 States with Lowest Incidence of Poverty	
State	%	State	%
Jigawa	95	Bayelsa	20.0
Kebbi	89.7	Anambra	20.1
Kogi	88.6	Abia	22.3
Bauchi	86.3	Oyo	24.1
Kwara	85.2	Imo	27.4
Yobe	83.3	Rivers	29.1
Zamfara	80.9	Enugu	31.1
Gombe	77.0	Ogun	31.7
Sokoto	76.8	Osun	32.4
Adamawa	71.1	Edo	33.1

Source: 'Preserving Stability and Accelerating Growth', C. Soludo, Central Bank of Nigeria, Speech by the Governor, 16<sup>th</sup> January, 2007.

## Politics

**Table 1.8: Composition of the Federal Cabinet, 1951-1966, Total Numbers of ministers by region and ethnic origin.**

Regional/Ethnic Units	1951-1954	1954-1957	1957-1958	1959	1960-1961	1962	1963	1964	1965-1966
<i>Northern Nigeria</i>									
1. All Ministers	3	3	3	4	9	9	9	9	10
2. Hausa/Fulani	2	3	3	4	9	9	8	8	9
3. Minorities	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1
<i>Eastern Nigeria</i>									
1. All Ministers	3	3	3	2	2	3	3	3	3
2. Igbo Ministers	2	2	3	2	2	3	4	3	3
3. Minorities	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<i>Western Nigeria</i>									
1. Yoruba	2	2	4	3	3	5	5	5	8
<i>Mid Western</i>									
1. Minorities	1	1	1		1	1	1	1	1
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>22</b>

Source: adapted from Osaghae, 1989, 158.

**Table 1.9: Zonal Composition of ruling military councils, 1983 to 1998.**

Zone	Buhari's SMC, 1983-85	Babangida's 1 <sup>st</sup> AFRC, 1985	Babangida's 2 <sup>nd</sup> AFRC, 1986	Babangida's 3 <sup>rd</sup> AFRC, 1990	Abacha's PRC, 1993
Northwest	7 (35%)	7 (25%)	9 (29%)	4 (21.1%)	3(27.3%)
Northeast	1 (5%)	3 (10.7%)	3 (9.7%)	1 (5.3%)	1(9.1%)
Northcentral	5 (25%)	6 (21.4%)	7 (22.6%)	8 (42%)	3(27.3%)
Southwest	1 (5%)	6 (21.4%)	6 (19.4%)	3 (15.8%)	2(18.2%)
Southeast	2 (10%)	1 (3.6%)	1 (3.2%)	2 (10.5%)	1(9.1%)
Southsouth	4 (20%)	5 (17.9%)	5 (16.1%)	1 (5.3%)	1(9.1%)

<i>Total</i>	20	28	31	19	11
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**Source:** adapted from Nigerian Army Education Corp & School, 1994, 330-349.

**Table 1.10: Zonal composition of various cabinets, 1983 to 2004**

<b>Zone</b>	<b>1983-85 (Buhari)</b>	<b>1985, (Babangida)</b>	<b>1986, (Babangida)</b>	<b>1990, (Babangida)</b>	<b>1993, (Abacha)</b>	<b>2004 (Obasanjo)</b>
<i>Northwest</i>	6 (30%)	6 (27.3%)	5 (22.7%)	6 (33.3%)	5 (22.7%)	7 (21.2%)
<i>Northeast</i>	2 (10%)	2 (9.1%)	2 (9.1%)	3 (16.7%)	3 (13.6%)	5 (15.1%)
<i>Northcentral</i>	4 (20%)	4 (18.2%)	5 (22.7%)	2 (11.1%)	4 (18.2%)	6 (18.2%)
<i>Southwest</i>	4 (20%)	5 (22.7%)	5 (22.7%)	3 (16.7%)	4 (18.2%)	5 (15.1%)
<i>Southeast</i>	2 (10%)	2 (9.1%)	2 (9.1%)	3 (16.7%)	2 (9.1%)	4 (12.1%)
<i>Southsouth</i>	2 (10%)	3 (13.6%)	3 (13.6%)	1 (5.5%)	4 (18.2%)	6 (18.2%)
<b>Total</b>	20	22	22	18	22	33

**Source:** adapted from Nigerian Army Education Corp & School, 1994, 330-349; list of Obasanjo's ministers in 2004.

**Table 1.11: Ethnic Distribution of very important & less important portfolios, 1960–2004.**

	Hausa- Fulani	Northern Minorities	Igbo	Yoruba	Southern Minorities	<i>Total Numbers</i>
<b>Very Important Portfolio</b>	49 (33%)	37 (25%)	17 (11.6%)	24 (16%)	20 (13.6%)	147
<b>Less Important Portfolios</b>	6 (13%)	5 (11%)	10 (22%)	13 (28.9%)	11 (24%)	45

\* Very Important Portfolio are: Finance, Agric, Internal Affairs, External Affairs, Educ, Fed Capital Territory, Defence, Works, Transport, Communications, Petroleum, & Mines and Power. Less Important Portfolios are Labour & Productivity, Information, Science & Tech, Sports & Social Development, Womens' Affairs, and Culture & Tourism. Due to incomplete data, the second Abacha cabinet, the Abdusalami cabinet and the first (1999) Obasanjo cabinet have not been included. Their inclusion is unlikely to change the picture fundamentally.

Federal Bureaucracy

**Table 1.12: Zonal composition of Federal Bureaucracies**

<b>Zone</b>	<i>Percentage in all the Bureaucracy</i>	<b>Zone</b>	<i>Percentage in all the Bureaucracy</i>
NW	10.4	SW	24.9
NE	8.6	SE	16
NC	18.4	SS	20.7
	<i>Percentage in the Directorate</i>		<i>Percentage in the Directorate</i>
NW	16.8	SW	24.4
NE	12.7	SE	13.4
NC	16.4	SS	15.8
	<i>Percentage in the Technocracy</i>		<i>Percentage in the Technocracy</i>
NW	7.9	SW	30.5
NE	5.3	SE	21.5
NC	12.8	SS	21.6
	<i>Percentage in the Police</i>		<i>Percentage in the Police</i>
NW	12	SW	14
NE	12.7	SE	12.4
NC	22	SS	26.1

**Sources:** adapted from Federal Character Commission, 2000, p.2; Official list of all Directors in the Federal Civil Service as of 1998; Federal Character Commission advertorial in *Weekly Trust*, 1-7 October 1999, p.23; Federal Character Commission, 1999, p.25.

**Table 1.13: Trends in representativeness of Federal bureaucracies (all categories)**

<b>Zone</b>	<b>% of pop. (2006 census)</b>	<b>1996-2004 in %</b>							
		<b>1996</b>	<b>1997</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2003</b>	<b>2004</b>
NW	25.56	12.3	10.4	10.4	10.9	10.4	9.5	10.1	9.5
NE	13.55	8.2	8.3	8.6	9.9	8.6	8.1	8.8	8.6
NC	13.47	18.3	18.3	19.3	21.0	19.3	17.1	17.6	17.6
SW	19.7	24.5	24.9	24.7	20.7	24.9	25.9	24.2	24.4
SE	11.7	16.8	16.1	16.2	14.9	16.0	18.8	18.7	19.4
SS	15.0	20.0	22.1	21.0	22.3	20.8	20.6	20.2	20.6

**Source:** Federal Character Commission.

## Appendix 2. Some Indicators of Horizontal Inequalities in Ghana

### Politics

**Table 2.1: Ethno-regional composition of government, 1952-2005**

	1952	1954	1956	1965	1966	1969	1971
Akan	3 (37.5%)	6 (54.5%)	8 (61.5%)	13 (68.4%)	2 (28.6%)	14 (73.7%)	13 (76.5%)
Ewe	1 (12.5%)	1 (9.1%)	1 (7.7%)	0 (0%)	2 (28.6%)	0 (0%)	0 (0%)
Total South	7 (87.5%)	9 (81.8%)	11 (84.6%)	16 (84.2%)	6 (85.7%)	16 (84.2%)	14 (82.4%)
North	1 (12.5%)	2 (18.2%)	2 (15.4%)	3 (15.8%)	1 (14.3%)	3 (15.8%)	3 (17.6%)
Grand total	8 (100%)	11 (100%)	13 (100%)	19 (100%)	7 (100%)	19 (100%)	17 (100%)

	1972	1979	1981	1993	1997	2002	2005
Akan	7 (50.0%)	8 (57.1%)	3 (42.9%)	19 (51.4%)	14 (51.9%)	27 (65.9%)	26 (66.7%)
Ewe	4 (28.6%)	2 (14.3%)	1 (14.3%)	4 (10.8%)	3 (11.1%)	3 (7.3%)	3 (7.7%)
Total South	12 (85.7%)	12 (85.7%)	5 (71.4%)	26 (70.3%)	20 (74.1%)	34 (82.9%)	33 (84.6%)
North	2 (14.3%)	2 (14.3%)	2 (28.6%)	11 (29.7%)	7 (25.9%)	7 (17.1%)	6 (15.4%)
Grand total	14 (100%)	14 (100%)	7 (100%)	37 (100%)	27 (100%)	41 (100%)	39 (100%)

**Source:** 1952-1965: Danso-Boafo, 1966-1971: Smock and Smock, 1972-1981: Gyimah-Boadi, and 1993-2005: Langer (2007).

**Table 2.2: Ethno-regional composition of government, 1952-2005,  
Representation in proportion to demographic size\***

	1952	1954	1956	1965	1966	1969	1971
Akan	0.85	1.24	1.40	1.55	0.65	1.67	1.73
Ewe	0.96	0.70	0.59	0.0	2.20	0.0	0.0
Total South	1.27	1.18	1.22	1.22	1.24	1.22	1.19
North	0.58	0.84	0.71	0.73	0.66	0.73	0.82

	1972	1979	1981	1993	1997	2002	2005
Akan	1.13	1.30	0.87	1.05	1.06	1.34	1.36
Ewe	2.20	1.10	1.12	0.85	0.87	0.58	0.61
Total South	1.24	1.24	0.96	0.95	1.00	1.12	1.14
North	0.66	0.66	1.23	1.28	1.12	0.74	0.66

**Source:** Langer, Arnim, 2007, The peaceful management of horizontal inequalities in Ghana, CRISE Working Paper No. 25 (available at: [www.crise.ox.ac.uk](http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk)).

\* 1 = proportional representation; figures higher than 1 indicate over-representation of a group; and figures smaller than 1 mean that a group is under-represented in proportion to its demographic size.

Socio-economic**Table 2.3: Socio-economic indicators for different regions (percentages)**

	Incidence of Poverty		Literacy (% literate)		Access to Electricity		Access to health services	Primary school enrolment
	1992	1999	1993	1998	1993	1998	1997	1997
Western	60	27	37	54	21.8	37.8	28	75
Central	44	48	43	55	27.3	48.3	36	72
Greater Accra	26	5	60	76	76.4	86.3	78	70
Volta	57	38	46	58	7.9	21.4	42	70
Eastern	48	44	46	66	25.2	45.2	33	78
Ashanti	41	28	31	64	32.8	50.4	43	72
Brong Ahafo	65	36	30	53	16.1	23.3	32	72
Northern	63	69	8	13	6.3	17.5	18	40
Upper West	88	84	12	20	6.5	7.1	8	45
Upper East	67	88	8	20	8.1	16.7	20	36
National	52	40	34	51	24.4	39.6	37	67

**Source:** Langer, Arnim, 2007, The peaceful management of horizontal inequalities in Ghana, CRISE Working Paper No. 25 (available at: [www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs.shtml](http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs.shtml)).

**Table 2.4: Literacy by location (% of individuals above 15 years of age)**

Classification	National average	Average South	Average North
Ghana:	47.9		
Rural		46.2	12.2
Urban		61.5	52.0
Males:	62.3		
Rural		63.9	17.1
Urban		76.3	64.9
Females:	36.4		
Rural		32.3	7.4
Urban		49.8	40.6

**Source:** Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) Survey 1997, Main Report. Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), Accra, Ghana. March 1998.

**Table 2.5: Use of health facilities (% of respondents)**

Time to reach nearest health facility	National average	Average South	Average North
30 minutes or less:			
Rural	52.9	45.5	15.1
Urban	52.9	79.3	51.4

**Source:** Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) Survey 1997, Main Report. Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), Accra, Ghana. March 1998.

**Table 2.6: Spatial inequality and incidence of poverty**



Location	Incidence of poverty (%)			
	Poor		Extreme poor	
	1991/92	1998/99	1991/92	1998/99
Accra	23.1	3.8	11.3	1.7
Urban Coastal	28.3	24.2	14.2	14.3
Urban Forest	25.8	18.2	12.9	10.9
Urban Savannah	37.8	43.0	27.0	27.1
Rural Coastal	52.5	45.2	32.8	28.2
Rural Forest	61.6	38.0	45.9	21.1
Rural Savannah	73.0	70.0	57.7	59.3
Urban	27.7	19.4	15.1	11.6
Rural	63.6	49.5	47.2	34.4
<b>All Ghana</b>	<b>51.7</b>	<b>39.5</b>	<b>36.5</b>	<b>26.8</b>

**Source:** Poverty Trends in Ghana in the 1990s. Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), Accra, Ghana. October 2000.

**Table 2.7: Access to basic services (% of respondents)**

Classification	National average	Average South	Average North
A. Main Type of Lighting:			
By Kerosene/Oil:	62.2		
Rural		81.0	90.1
Urban		27.1	49.0
By Electricity:	37.0		
Rural		21.1	0.9
Urban		72.4	50.9
B. Main Source of Drinking Water:	14.0		
Pipe in House:			
Rural		1.8	0.8
Urban		28.0	34.6
Protected Well/Outside Tap:	25.9		
Rural		19.7	6.3
Urban		45.8	34.1
Unprotected Well/River/Lake:	34.2		
Rural		50.8	38.0
Urban		11.0	5.3
Borehole:	21.7		
Rural		24.5	54.9
Urban		5.5	15.8

**Source:** Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire (CWIQ) Survey 1997, Main Report. Ghana Statistical Service (GSS), Accra, Ghana. March 1998.

### Appendix 3. Some Indicators of Horizontal Inequalities in Côte d'Ivoire

#### Politics

**Table 3.1: Ethnic composition of political institutions, 1959-1980**

Ethnic Group	Total Political Elite	Minister	Deputy	Economic and Social Councillors	PDCI Politburo	Total Population in 1975
Akan	163 (50.9 %)	39 (53.4%)	100 (50%)	50 (56.1%)	43 (55.1%)	41.4
Kru	33 (19.6 %)	15 (20.5%)	41 (20.5%)	13 (14.6%)	10 (12.8%)	16.7
Malinké	33 (10.3%)	7 (9.5%)	19 (9%)	10 (11.2%)	8 (10.3%)	14.8
S. Mandé	17 (5.3 %)	2 (2.7%)	13 (6.5%)	4 (4.4%)	4 (5.1%)	10.2
Voltaic	29 (9.06%)	6 (8.2%)	9 (4.5%)	4 (4.4%)	7 (8.9%)	15.7
Others	13 (4.06%)	4 (5.4%)	6 (3%)	7 (7.8)	5 (6.4%)	1.2
Unknown	1 (0.3%)	-	1 (0.5%)	-	-	-
Grand total	289 (100%)	73 (100%)	189 (100%)	88 (100%)	77 (100%)	100%

**Source:** Bakary, Tessilimi (1984), "Elite transformation and political succession" in: Zartman, William I. and Christopher Delgado eds., *The political economy of Ivory Coast*, New York, Praeger Publishers

**Table 3.2: Ethnic composition of government, 1980-2003**

Ethnic group	Nov-80	Jul-86	Oct-89	Nov-91	Dec-93	Jan-96
Akan	49%	41%	47%	61%	52%	52%
Krou	19%	20%	20%	17%	24%	21%
S. Mandé	5%	10%	13%	4%	4%	10%
N. Mandé	8%	17%	13%	9%	8%	7%
Voltaic	14%	10%	3%	9%	12%	10%
No.	N=37	N=41	N=30	N=23	N=25	N=29

Ethnic group	Aug-98	Jan-00	May-00	Jan-01	Aug-02	Sep-03
Akan	59%	50%	30%	46%	52%	40%
Krou	16%	13%	22%	29%	19%	23%
S. Mandé	6%	8%	17%	18%	16%	7%
N. Mandé	3%	17%	17%	7%	13%	19%
Voltaic	13%	13%	8%	0%	0%	12%
No.	N=32	N=24	N=23	N=28	N=31	N=43

**Source:** Langer, Arnim, 2005, *Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Group Mobilisation in Côte d'Ivoire*, *Oxford Development Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 1.

**Table 3.3: Ethnic composition of government, 1980-2003,  
Representation in proportion to demographic size\***

<b>Ethnic group</b>	<b>Nov-80</b>	<b>Jul-86</b>	<b>Oct-89</b>	<b>Nov-91</b>	<b>Dec-93</b>	<b>Jan-96</b>
Akan	1.16	0.99	1.12	1.46	1.24	1.23
Krou	1.30	1.34	1.37	1.19	1.89	1.63
S. Mandé	0.51	0.91	1.25	0.41	0.40	1.03
N. Mandé	0.51	1.07	0.84	0.55	0.48	0.42
Voltaic	0.83	0.60	0.20	0.53	0.68	0.59

<b>Ethnic group</b>	<b>Aug-98</b>	<b>Jan-00</b>	<b>May-00</b>	<b>Jan-01</b>	<b>Aug-02</b>	<b>Sep-03</b>
Akan	1.41	1.19	0.72	1.10	1.23	0.94
Krou	1.23	0.98	1.71	2.25	1.52	1.83
S. Mandé	0.63	0.83	1.73	1.79	1.61	0.70
N. Mandé	0.19	1.01	1.05	0.43	0.78	1.13
Voltaic	0.71	0.71	0.47	0.00	0.00	0.66

**Source:** Langer, Arnim, 2005, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Group Mobilisation in Côte d'Ivoire, *Oxford Development Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 1.

\* 1 = proportional representation; figures higher than 1 indicate over-representation of a group; and figures smaller than 1 mean that a group is under-represented in proportion to its demographic size.

Socio-economic

**Table 3.4: Inter-ethnic socio-economic inequalities  
based on the 1994 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) (percentages)**

	Akan	Krou	Northern Mandé	Southern Mandé	Voltaic	Foreigners
Electricity (% yes)	51.4	36.2	61.1	34.6	33.0	42.4
Radio (% yes)	65.6	58.8	67.6	48.0	49.3	59.8
Television (% yes)	33.2	27.0	42.0	22.0	22.1	24.4
Refrigerator (% yes)	23.6	16.9	22.5	11.3	11.3	9.1
Bicycle (% yes)	27.2	8.8	36.0	15.2	49.9	36.4
Motorcycle (% yes)	14.0	8.1	25.4	6.6	29.3	17.9
Car (% yes)	9.1	7.6	9.5	4.2	5.4	3.3
Educational level: at least primary school	27.2	31.2	16.2	19.2	14.4	9.8
Literacy: able to read	45.5	58.4	23.4	35.4	24.5	17.4
Source of drinking water: water piped into the house	36.0	25.0	30.7	16.9	18.8	22.9
Main floor material: ceramic tiles in place of residence	14.4	13.3	10.8	5.6	4.4	5.2
Type of toilet facility: access to flush toilet	24.1	19.4	15.7	8.9	10.1	9

**Source:** Langer, Arnim, 2004, Horizontal inequalities and violent conflict: the case of Côte d'Ivoire, CRISE Working Paper No. 13 (available at: [www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs.shtml](http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs.shtml)).

**Table 3.5: Inter-ethnic socio-economic inequalities  
based on the 1998 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) (percentages)**

	Akan	Krou	Northern Mandé	Southern Mandé	Voltaic	Foreigners
Electricity (% yes)	79.0	73.7	72.5	58.8	60.1	70.0
Radio (% yes)	80.5	75.5	70.7	69.8	70.6	77.1
Television (% yes)	59.0	47.6	48.3	32.8	48.8	48.8
Refrigerator (% yes)	44.2	36.1	32.3	17.2	26.8	21.4
Bicycle (% yes)	16.0	9.1	29.5	11.2	44.0	34.5
Motorcycle (% yes)	9.7	9.1	20.5	4.7	25.2	19.1
Car (% yes)	17.1	12.5	14.4	8.2	8.6	7.7
Educational level: at least primary school	50	60.1	21.4	31	29.1	19.2
Literacy: able to read	62.3	75.9	24.5	45	36.4	25.1
Source of drinking water: water piped into the house	58.9	56.4	52.7	31.8	43.3	38.3
Main floor material: ceramic tiles in place of residence	27.0	21.3	10.6	10.7	12.2	6.0
Type of toilet facility: access to flush toilet	39.0	31.3	18.4	16.4	18.8	12.9

**Source:** Langer, Arnim, 2004, Horizontal inequalities and violent conflict: the case of Côte d'Ivoire, CRISE Working Paper No. 13 (available at: <http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs.shtml>).