

Political Parties in Indonesia from the 1950s to 2004: An Overview

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Abstract

This paper discusses the development of political parties in Indonesia from the 1950s (post-independence) to the general elections of the Reform era (1999 and 2004) following the end of Suharto's New Order regime. Indonesians are divided along religious and cultural lines into different *aliran* (streams) and political parties in some respects have followed these "streams", representing *santri* (pious Muslims), *abangan* (nominal Muslims with beliefs in mysticism) and *priyayi* (those with roots in the aristocracy and beliefs in mysticism). They can further be categorised into two major groups, those that have links to, or espouse ideologies of, Islam and Nationalists.

This paper finds, firstly, that this pattern continued from the 1950s to 1999, but that by 2004, peoples' preferences in local, regional, and national elections for head of government were no longer generally characterised by "streams". Second, it finds that a pattern of nationalist-Islamic or *abangan-santri* coalitions has apparently become an alternative solution for Indonesian integration and democracy. And, third, it shows that it is difficult for Islamic-based parties to gain popular support without coalitions with other parties with secular-nationalist bases of support even though demographically, the majority of Indonesian people are Muslim.

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Political Parties in Indonesia from the 1950s to 2004: An Overview

By Syamsuddin Haris and Tri Ratnawati

1. Introduction

Indonesia is a remarkably diverse country consisting of various islands and communities. The population comprises over 222 million people (2006) living in 36 provinces and more than 483 districts and municipalities. The communal cleavages are complex in that they involve several different but overlapping categories. First, Indonesians are divided along religious and cultural lines into different *aliran* (streams). Second there are ethno-linguistic and racial cleavages. Third, there are identity groupings based on regional and local bases of communalism. This paper discusses the development of political parties in Indonesia from the 1950s (post-independence) to the general elections of the Reform era (1999 and 2004) following the end of Suharto's New Order regime. Political parties have at least three dimensions which are important for consideration in this paper. First, political parties are the main vehicles for political representation. Second, parties are the primary mechanisms for the organisation of governance, and third, parties are key channels for maintaining democratic accountability (Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, 2004:9). Political parties in Indonesia in some respects follow *aliran* patterns of *santri* (pious Muslims), *abangan* (nominal Muslims with beliefs in mysticism) and *priyayi* (those with roots in the aristocracy and beliefs in mysticism). For the purposes of understanding political parties, these can be categorised into two major groups, those which have links to, or espouse ideologies of, Islam and Nationalists. Such patterns have changed, but not significantly, from the 1950s to 2004.

2. Political Parties in General Elections in Indonesia (1955-2004)

The 1955 general elections were the first to be held after Indonesia gained its independence in 1945. More than 100 parties, organisations, and individuals participated in this election, which was based on a system of proportional voting, but only 28 parties obtained seats in the national parliament (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR*). Four of these groups, PNI (National Indonesian Party), Masyumi (*Partai Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia*, the Indonesian Muslim Theologians Party), NU (*Nahdatul Ulama*), and PKI (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, the Indonesian Communist Party), gained the majority of seats in the national parliament (see Table 1) (Feith, 1999). According to Geertz's (1960) categorisation of the religious orientation of the Javanese, these top four parties represented the three streams discussed above, namely the *abangan* (PKI and some parts of PNI), *santri* (Masyumi and NU), and *priyayi* (PNI). Alternatively, using a typology which represents the ideological divisions in the modern politic of Indonesia, the results of the 1955 general election represented two streams: Islamic factions (both traditional and modernist), espousing the culture of the *santri*, and nationalist factions, which are more representative of *abangan* culture.¹

¹ For more on *santri* and *abangan* culture in the context of elite competition in Indonesia, see among others Emmerson (1976).

Table 1: The Top Four Parties in the 1955 General Elections

No	Party	Vote results	%	Seats
1.	Indonesian National Party (PNI)	8,434,653	22.3	57
2.	Masyumi Party	7,903,886	20.9	57
3.	Nahdlatul Ulama Party (NU)	6,955,141	18.4	45
4.	Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)	6,176,914	16.4	39

Source: Feith (1999).

Initially, the 1955 general elections were expected to resolve some of the political crises besetting the country at the time but ultimately the political experiment of parliamentary democracy failed to realise these objectives. Pressure from both then-president Sukarno and the military prevented parliamentary democracy from materialising and Indonesia entered an era of authoritarian rule, first under Sukarno's Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*) and later under Suharto's New Order regime.

As under Sukarno's Guided Democracy, when parties began to be amalgamated, Suharto fused parties together in 1973 (the PKI was prohibited following the events of 1965). The Islamic parties were merged into the United Development Party (PPP, *Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*), nationalist and Christian parties were combined into the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI, *Partai Demokrasi Indonesia*), while the Functional Party (Golkar, *Golongan Karya*)² became a state-supported party as well as Suharto's political machine for maintaining his authoritarian system of rule. This system rested on the power of the military, bureaucracy, and the business patronage networks of the New Order regime. In the early days of New Order rule, an anti-party spirit was not only espoused by the military, but also existed amongst academics and civilian technocrats who saw modernisation through political stability and economic growth – rather than democracy – as the solution to Indonesian instability in the post-Sukarno period (Liddle, 1973; Mas'ood, 1989). Thus, Golkar continued to win the general elections held during the New Order era and functioned as little more than an instrument of Suharto's regime for maintaining and strengthening his control and power. Unfair election processes, massive mobilisation of Golkar forces, domination of government appointees to the election committees, and the selection of candidates by the state at all levels characterised the general elections in the New Order era between 1971 and 1997 (Haris, 2004).

During the Reform era, the monolithic system dominated by Golkar (at the expense of PPP and PDI) during Suharto's era was replaced with a multi-party system. As in the 1950s, the new parties formed during the Reform era were strong in ideological colour and spirit. Islamic parties, as well as nationalist, socialist, and Christian parties formed prior to the 1955 general elections were 'reborn' prior to the 1999 and 2004 general elections. Some 148 parties registered to participate in the 1999 general elections, but only 48 parties were legally eligible to run. By the time of the 2004 general elections, more than 200 parties tried to participate³, but only 24 parties were

² Golkar in the beginning was a common secretariat of mass organisations supported by the military (TNI Angkatan Darat/Army) to stand up to the mass organisations formed by the PKI in the Sukarno era. See Boileau (1983).

³ Some 153 political parties were disbanded as "corporate bodies" according to the prevailing law, 58 parties were declared ineligible, and 26 parties did not pass the verification processes carried out by the General Elections Commission (KPU) and were unable to participate in the 2004 general elections. See the list of these parties in Kompas (2004: 457-497).

eligible. The 2004 legislative elections created a new political map in the DPR, although most of the seven dominating parties were the same parties which had won the 1999 general elections. Golkar won 128 seats out of a total of 500 seats in the DPR, followed by PDI-P (109), PPP (58), PD (55), PAN (53), PKB (52), and PKS (45). The 1999 and 2004 general elections results are outlined in Table 2.

Table 2: Top Ten Parties: Results of the 2004 and 1999 General Elections

No.	Parties	The 2004 general election		The 1999 general election	
		% votes	Seats	% votes	Seats
1.	Partai Golkar (Functional Groups Party)	21.58	128	22.46	120
2.	PDI Perjuangan (Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle)	18.53	109	33.73	153
3.	PKB (National Awakening Party)	10.57	52	12.66	51
4.	PPP (United Development Party)	8.15	58	10.72	58
5.	Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party)	7.45	55	-	-
6.	PKS (Prosperous Justice Party)	7.34	45	1.36	7
7.	PAN (National Mandate Party)	6.44	53	7.12	34
8.	PBB (Crescent Moon Party)	2.62	11	1.94	13
9.	PBR (Morning Star Party)	2.44	14	-	-
10.	PDS (Prosperous Peace Party)	2.13	13	-	-

Source: National Elections Commission (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) Nasional*).

Table 2 above highlights that the PDI-P vote garnered in the 2004 general elections was significantly less than that of the 1999 general elections. In contrast, Golkar increased its number of votes to overtake the PDI-P. The 2004 general elections results also show the emergence of two new political powers with a basis in religious ideology, namely the PKS (Islam) and the PDS (Christian, not shown in the table above).

3. Religion and Ethnicity in Political Parties during the Reform Era

No less than 17 Islamic parties registered to contest the 1999 general election. However, most failed to gain a significant number of votes (Suryadinata, 2002; Haris, 2004). It is interesting to note that most of the Islamic parties presented themselves, both ideologically and symbolically, as the continuation of Islamic parties that participated in the 1955 general election. The National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa/PKB), for example, represents the continuation of Partai Nahdlatul Ulama (NU Party) as it was established formally by the board of NU and used similar party symbols to the NU Party of 1955. The Crescent Star Party (Partai Bulan Bintang/PBB) claimed to be a continuation of Masyumi Party because it espouses a similar ideology and uses similar party symbols. Some of the smaller Islamic parties also follow some of NU's and Masyumi's political streams. At the same time, the National Mandate Party (PAN) which claimed to support an open and pluralist party ideology initially, tended to be entrapped in the umbrella political organization of Islamic modernists, Muhammadiyah by the end of the election. Muhammadiyah formed the main basis of support for the Masyumi Party during the 1950s.

The most interesting phenomenon in the 2004 legislative elections was that the interest of Indonesian Muslims in parties professing Islamic ideologies and symbolism decreased compared to the 1999 elections. Despite forming the majority of the Indonesian population at around 87%, only a fraction of Muslims voted for Muslim parties. This demonstrates the gap between social and political realities in the country.⁴ In the 2004 legislative election, the total vote garnered by Islamic parties (PPP, PBB, PBR, PKS, and PPNU) was only 21% compared to the 43% gained in the 1955 general elections. This once again demonstrates the failure of the “politics of quantity” myth, which asserts that the majority of Indonesian Muslims cast their vote along religious lines in national elections (Romli, 2004: 45). This also demonstrates that during elections Muslims are not bound to Islamic symbols and no longer consider Islamic parties to be the only form of Islamic representation in political life.

In the post-Suharto era of democracy and openness there is no prohibition on the establishment of ethnic identity-based parties – in terms of exclusivity for particular ethnicities. Almost none of the new parties have established themselves along ethnic lines, as was the case in the 1955 general elections. In the 1955 general elections, there were some ethnic and regionally-based parties, but only the United Power Party (Partai Persatuan Daya) with a stronghold in West Kalimantan gained a significant number of votes, coming in second after the Masyumi Party in that region (Feith, 1999: 100). However, voting along ethnic lines is more often associated with the origins of party leadership in the current era. The United Democratic Nationhood Party (PPDK) for example, a new party formed for the 2004 general election by Ryaas Rasyid and Andi A. Mallarangeng, gained a significant number of votes in South Sulawesi where these two figures originate. PPDK is seen as more of a South Sulawesi local party than as a national party, where PPDK is satirically coined in local discourse to mean “Partai Daeng dan Karaeng” – meaning men originating from South Sulawesi. While it is not as popular as the Golkar Party which garnered 128 seats, as a new party, PPDK successfully managed to obtain five seats in the national parliament, not to mention the seats obtained in the local parliaments of the districts/municipalities and provincial governments in South Sulawesi.

The Golkar party has dominated South Sulawesi politics since the 1971 elections. One of the reasons for this is the spirit of “localism” underpinning voter support as some of Partai Golkar’s national elites originate from South Sulawesi, such as ex-president BJ Habibie, current Vice President Jusuf Kalla (the party’s leader), Marwah daud Ibrahim, Nurdin Chalid, etc. Thus, ethnicity and its overlap with support for Islamic identity is one of the important factors explaining the massive support for these two parties in South Sulawesi. In South Sulawesi, Golkar is recognised as a pro-development party, due to its success in developing South Sulawesi’s economy. Furthermore, in Java in the Reform era, voters have kept their distance from Golkar because it is seen as an instrument of power under Suharto which was centred in Jakarta. Given this, it is interesting to observe the dynamics between the political parties in South Sulawesi in the case study below.

3.1 A Case Study: Political Parties in South Sulawesi Province

The majority populations of South Sulawesi Province are based on Muslim associations and ideology. Masyumi and other Islamic parties dominated the vote count in the 1955 election (see table below).

Table 3: The 1955 General Election Results in South Sulawesi

⁴ Further analysis and discussion of these arguments can be found in Romli (2004) and Haris (2004)

No.	Parties	Number of votes
1.	PNI (Indonesian National Party)	46,334
2.	Masyumi (Islamic party)	446,255
3.	NU (Islamic party)	159,193
4.	PKI (Indonesian Communist Party)	17,831
5.	PSII (Islamic party)	114,798
6.	Parkindo (Indonesian Christian party)	118,850
7.	Partai Katolik (Catholic party)	9,024
8.	PSII (Islamic party)	6,770
9.	IPKI (Nationalist party)	1,679
10.	Perti (Islamic party)	-
11.	Baperki (Communist women's movement party)	1,462
12.	Partai Buruh (Labour Party)	15,876
13.	PRN (National People's Party)	13,384
14.	Partai Kedaulatan Rakyat (Nationalist party)	21,512
15.	La Ode Hadi (independent candidate)	33,269
16.	PIR (nationalist party)	12,527
17.	PPP La Ode Idrus Effendi (independant candidate)	46,835

Source: Feith (1999: 102).

However, the domination of religious parties seen in the 1955 elections was not evident in the 1999 and 2004 legislative elections in South Sulawesi. Conversely, Golkar, the secular-nationalist party, won the general elections in 1999 and 2004. Table 4 below reveals the composition of the Provincial Parliament in 1999 (compared to 2004).

Table 4: The Provincial Parliament of South Sulawesi based on the 1999 and 2004 General Elections

Political Parties	Number of Seats (1999)	Number of Seats (2004)
Golkar (secular nationalist)	44	33
PPP (Islamic based)	6	7
PDI-P (secular nationalist)	5	6
PAN (Islamic modernist based)	3	8
PBB (Islamic modernist based)	1	1
PK (Islamic based)	1	8 (PKS)
IPKI (secular nationalist)	1	
PP (Islamic based)	1	
PKB (Islamic traditionalist based)	1	
PDR (nationalist-socialist based)	1	
PKP (secular nationalist)	1	
PBR (Islamic based)		1
PDK (nationalist-democratic based)		8
PD (secular nationalist)		1
PDS (Christian based)		1
PARTAI MERDEKA (secular nationalist)		1
Total	65	75

Source: www.kpu.go.id, Elections Commission website

From Table 4 it is clear that in the 2004 general elections the number of seats won by Golkar decreased significantly compared to the 1999 election. Furthermore, some of the new political parties gained seats – PPK (‘ethnic party’) and PKS (Prosperous Peace Party – Islamic based) each gained eight seats. The total number of seats of Islamic parties (PPP, PAN, PBB, PPP, PK(S), and PBR) garnered was 25. However, this number was still lower than the 33 seats won by Golkar. The Democratic Party (President Yudhoyono’s party) only won one seat, compared to the Vice President’s party. As mentioned earlier, Jusuf Kalla is ‘a Muslim local son’ or *putra daerah*, with a history of being a key player in big business as well as being Golkar’s national

leader. The fact that he is a local son, in addition to his charisma and leadership positions held (both in the party and the bureaucracy), gained him support from local voters. Islamic parties and other parties in South Sulawesi did not enjoy these advantages. Moreover, the PPK's achievement in the 2004 general election in this province is also a sign of the re-emergence of localism and ethnic identity in the Reform era in Indonesia. Under Law No. 22 of 1999 and Law No. 32 of 2004 on decentralisation and local autonomy, the Indonesian government granted wider autonomy for regions in the country. Thus, the multiparty system and the decentralisation policy in the Reform era have allowed for the revival of local identities and a local powerbase in South Sulawesi, which were suppressed under the New Order Regime. This was further enhanced by the new "semi-bicameral" election system which allows the people to choose *Dewan Perwakilan Daerah*, DPD – provincial representatives to the national parliament. Similar voting patterns based on local patriotisms to national level representatives can be found in other provinces in Indonesia.

4. Geographical Mapping of Political Support in General Elections during the Reform Era

With regard to the geographical mapping of voter support for different parties, the sources of support for the major parties in the 2004 general elections were not particularly different compared to the 1999 general elections. The main basis of support for Golkar, which dominated the vote count in the 2004 general elections, came from the islands outside Java, especially in Eastern Indonesia. The next top three parties, i.e. PDI-P, PKB, and PPP, continued to rely on support from the districts in Java. With the exception of Central Java and some parts of East Java which were PNI support bases in the 1955 general elections, PDI-P gained a significant number of votes in PNI's traditional bases located outside Java such as Bali and North Sumatera and also in Christian-majority areas such as East Nusa Tenggara and North Sulawesi.

In the mean time, five other parties, i.e. Partai Demokrat, PKS, PAN, PBB, and PBR, gained political support in and outside of Java, albeit unevenly. PAN as a Muslim modernist party garnered many votes in West Sumatera, Aceh, and Yogyakarta. Despite the votes gained, these parties failed to win in these electoral districts. At the same time, PDS, the only Christian-based party in the 2004 general elections, gained support in some Christian-based areas in Eastern Indonesia, such as Maluku and North Maluku, Papua, North and Central Sulawesi, and East Nusa Tenggara (NTT). With the exception of Papua, these areas were support base regions for the Partai Katolik (Catholic Party) and Parkindo (Protestant based party) in the 1955 general elections.

5. Streams and Political Parties in the 'Reform' Era

In the 1999 and 2004 general elections, some of the basis for support for the political parties were still characterised by Muslim ideological streams, although this was weak compared to the pattern of stream politics (*politik aliran*) in the 1955 general elections. As shown in Table 5 below, the pattern of support characterised by streams was evident mainly in Java, especially Central Java and East Java. In the 1955 general elections, Central Java and some southern parts of East Java were the main basis of PNI support, an area which is dominated by the *abangan* culture and which has translated into support for PDI-P in the 1999 and 2004 general elections. Meanwhile East Java (and some parts of the north coast of Central Java), where the community is made up of mainly traditionalist Muslims with the *santri* culture (the support base of the NU party in the 1955 general elections), provided the support base for PKB in the two legislative elections in the Reform era. PKB is the political

arm of the mass Muslim organisation *Nahdlatul Ulama* (NU), and is mainly supported by Muslim traditional voters in East Java and Central Java. Therefore this party is more like a Javanese local party than a national party.

Table 5: Stream Characterised-Support Base in the 1955, 1999, and 2004 General Elections in Java (in percentage)

Region	The 1955 general elections			The 1999 general elections			The 2004 general elections		
	PNI	NU	Masyumi	PDIP	PKB	PAN & PBB	PDIP	PKB	PAN & PBB
Central Java	33.5	19.7	10.0	42.8	17.1	8.7	29.8	14.6	8.9
East Java	22.8	34.1	11.2	33.8	35.4	6.1	21.0	30.6	6.2
West Java*	22.1	9.6	26.4	32.6	7.03	13.4	17.5	5.1	8.3
DKI Jakarta	19.6	15.6	26.0	38.7	3.5	23.2	14.0	3.5	8.5
D.I. Yogyakarta	15.8	1.7	13.0	35.6	14.4	20.5	14.0	10.1	19.6

*West Java in the 2004 general elections excludes Banten which split off to become a new province.

Source: Feith (1999), Suryadinata (2002), Ananta, et. al (2005), processed.

The continuity of stream-characterised voter preferences is not found in West Java and the outer islands generally. West Java (including Banten), as one of Partai Masyumi's bases of support in the 1955 general elections, failed to be exploited either by PBB or PAN, which are considered the ideological and symbolic heirs of the Masyumi Party. Masyumi Party's support bases outside Java in the 1955 general elections, such as South Sulawesi and West Sumatera, were dominated by Golkar in the 1999 and 2004 general elections. PAN and PBB gained significant votes in West Sumatera, but Golkar still won overall in the region. At the same time PNI's support base in West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) in the 1955 general elections was also taken over by Golkar in the two post-New Order general elections. East Nusa Tenggara (NTT), which was a support base of the Catholic Party and Parkindo in the 1955 general elections, was dominated by Golkar in the 1999 and 2004 general elections (as in the New Order general elections). Aside from the criticism from various quarters of Golkar as a political machine of the New Order regime, Golkar is the only major party with national coverage in terms of cross-cultural and nationalist ideology, although its main support bases comes from the regions outside Java and some parts of West Java and Banten.

6. Party versus Prominent Figures in the Direct Presidential Elections

The presidential elections which were implemented in two rounds in 2004 involved five pairs of candidates: Wiranto-Solahudin Wahid (nominated by Golkar), Megawati Sukarnoputri-Hasyim Muzadi (nominated by PDI-P), Amien Rais-Siswono Yudhohusudo (nominated by PAN), Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono-Jusuf Kalla (nominated by Partai Demokrat), and Hamzah Haz-Agum Gumilar (nominated by PPP). The parties which nominated these candidates expected their vote results in the preceding legislative elections to form the basis of the initial model for their mobilisation strategies for the presidential elections.

However, this turned out to be a false expectation. From the table of results of the IFES (International Federation of Elections Systems) survey below it is evident that in the first round of the presidential elections, only Partai Demokrat's voters (89.5%), PAN's (81.5%), and PDI-P's (71.1%) remained loyal to the candidates nominated for President by each of their parties. Meanwhile, Golkar's voters were split between support for Megawati-Hasyim and Wiranto-Wahid, PKB's voters were split between Yudhoyono-Kalla, Wiranto-Wahid, and Megawati-Hasyim, and PPP votes were spread across all candidates, while PKS's support tended to be given to Amien-Siswono, Wiranto-Wahid, and Yudhoyono-Kalla almost equally. Yudhoyono-Kalla

(33.57 per cent) and Megawati-Hasyim (26.61 per cent) eventually won the first round in the elections and went forward to the second round.⁵

Table 6: Sources of Support for Presidential Candidates in 1st Round (%) (Post-1st Round IFES Survey)⁶

Party preferences (Legislative Election)	Preference for Presidential Candidates (1 st Round)				
	Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono/Jusuf Kalla (nom PD)	Megawati Sukarnoputri /Hasyim Muzadi (nom PDI-P)	Wiranto /Solahudin Wahid (nom Golkar)	Amien Rais/Siswono Yudhohusudo (nom PAN)	Hamzah Haz/Agum Gumelar (nom PPP)
Partai Golkar	40,2	3,0	48,4	4,2	-
PDI-P	23,7	71,1	0,8	0,8	-
PPP	22,7	11,4	11,4	22,7	29,5
PKB	37,5	19,2	30,8	3,8	-
PD	89,5	0,7	0,7	0,7	-
PKS	29,0	9,7	21,0	35,5	-
PAN	9,8	1,1	4,3	81,5	1,1
PBB	40,0	6,7	6,7	33,3	-
PBR	54,5	-	36,4	-	-
PDS	41,7	58,3	-	-	-
Other parties	51,1	21,3	4,2	12,8	2,1

Source: IFES, *Tracking Survey Gelombang XV*, 4 August 2004 (processed).

Note: Data on voters stated they did not vote in both the legislative and presidential elections and kept their choice secret are not written in this table.

Learning from the first round of presidential elections, the party elites worked harder to build cooperation and alliances during the second round. The political parties nominating Yudhoyono-Kalla and Megawati-Hasyim (the pairs who went forward to the second round) built coalitions immediately. Yudhoyono-Kalla was eventually supported by *Koalisi Kerakyatan* (Coalition of the People) which consisted of Partai Demokrat, PKS, PBB, PKPI, PPKD, PP and PPDI, while Megawati-Hasyim was sponsored by *Koalisi Kebangsaan* (Coalition of the Nationalists) consisting of Partai Golkar, PDI-P, PPP, PBR, PDS, PKPB, and PNIM.

Based on the results of the legislative elections, *Koalisi Kebangsaan* was expected to garner 55.75% of votes nationally, while *Koalisi Kerakyatan* was predicted to reach 21.35% of votes. Furthermore, the Yudhoyono-Kalla ticket was also expected to gain the “unofficial” support of PKB and PAN, making it possible that it would reach 38.36% votes (Ananta, et al., 2005:106-110). According to ‘mathematical-theoretical’ predictions, the chances of the Megawati-Hasyim pairing winning were high. However, the populous decided differently: Yudhoyono-Kalla won the second round of elections garnering 69,266,350 votes (60.62%), while the Megawati-Hasyim pairing only achieved 44,990,704 votes (38.39%) (National Elections Commission, <http://www.kpu.go.id>).

As shown in the results of the IFES survey below, the coalition of inter-party elites in the second round of the presidential elections was clearly ineffective, with choice for president being determined by voters on an individual rather than party alliance basis. While the PDI-P’s candidate pairing was fully backed by Golkar, PPP, and PBR through the *Koalisi Kebangsaan*, eventually more than 80% of voters who supported these parties in the legislative elections were reluctant to chose the

⁵ On these arguments see Haris and Syafarani (2005) on “Pola dan Kecenderungan Perilaku Pemilih” (Patterns and Trends in Voter Behaviour)

⁶ The 15th IFES Survey involved 1,250 respondents spread across the 32 provinces in Indonesia.

Megawati-Hasyim pairing, instead supporting Yudhoyono-Kalla. Similarly, 65% of PDS voters chose Yudhoyono-Kalla rather than Megawati-Hasyim.

Table 7: Sources of Support for Presidential Candidates in 2nd Round (%)

Preference for parties (Legislative Election)	Preference for President Candidate (2 nd Round)		
	Yudhoyono-Kalla	Megawati-Hasyim	Secret
Partai Golkar	82	16	2
PDI-P	20	78	2
PPP	84	13	3
PKB	84	16	0
PD	99	1	0
PKS	86	11	3
PAN	87	10	3
PBB	89	8	3
PBR	84	11	5
PDS	65	30	5

Source: IFES, *Tracking Survey Gelombang XVIII*, 15 October 2004 (processed).

From the results of the survey it is evident that there was a shift in constituent's preferences from the first to the second round of the presidential elections where apart from the voters who initially supported Hamzah-Agum (55.6% of whom chose Megawati-Hasyim), most of Wiranto-Wahid and Amien-Siswono voters gave their preference to the Yudhoyono-Kalla pairing. About 84.1% of Wiranto-Wahid voters gave their vote to Yudhoyono-Kalla, as did 83.2% of Amien-Siswono voters, while Megawati-Hasyim and Yudhoyono-Kalla voters relatively consistently maintained their choices from the first to the second round.

Table 8: Shift in Preferences in Two Rounds of Direct Presidential Elections (%)

Candidate preference in 1 st Round	Candidate preference in 2 nd round		Total (%)
	Megawati-Hasyim	Yudhoyono-Kalla	
Wiranto-Wahid	15.9	84.1	100.0
Megawati-Hasyim	91.9	8.1	100.0
Amien-Siswono	16.8	83.2	100.0
Yudhoyono-Kalla	1.2	98.8	100.0
Hamzah-Agum	55.6	44.4	100.0
Golput	31.6	68.4	100.0
Secret	14.0	86.0	100.0

Source: Ananta et al. (2005: 99).

This picture presented above demonstrates that patterns in voter behaviour tend to be different in legislative and presidential elections. In legislative elections peoples' preferences are more oriented toward the cultural identification of parties, whereas in presidential elections the individual candidates and their backgrounds have a greater influence than party identification.⁷ It is interesting to note that the same trends were evident in local elections (direct local head elections) during 2005. The LSI (Lingkaran Survei Indonesia, Indonesian Survey Network) evaluation of 158 local elections found that only 37.7% of the winners of direct local head elections were appointed by the winning party or coalitions relevant to each region (LSI, 2005). These findings clearly show that individual profiles rather than party basis are a strong determinant in direct local head elections compared to the role of the party in legislative elections.

7. A Coalition of Islam and Nationalism?

Another interesting phenomenon emerging from the 2004 presidential elections was that none of the candidates were appointed exclusively by a coalition of nationalist

⁷ For further analysis and comparisons see Liddle and Mujani (2006).

parties or a coalition of Islamic parties. Nationalist party candidates such as Megawati (PDI-P), Wiranto (military/Golkar), and Yudhoyono (military/PD) instead had to find running partners for the vice presidency with Muslim support bases, respectively, Hasyim Muzadi (NU), Solahuddin Wahid (PKB), and Jusuf Kalla – who declared himself an NU follower. At the same time, candidates from Islamic-backed parties such as Hamzah Haz (PPP) and Amien Rais (PAN) also selected vice presidential partners from nationalist-oriented camps – Agum Gumelar (military) and Siswono Yudohusodo (former General Chairman of GMNI/Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Student’s Movement) respectively.

These parties and presidential candidates apparently realised that cooperation between nationalist factions and Islamic factions was an important strategy to garner popular support, and perhaps was one of the solutions for the integration and development of Indonesian democracy. Conflict and/or cooperation between the nationalist and Islamic factions has coloured modern politics in Indonesia. The fluctuation of competition between those two political cultures can be traced back both to the period of the formation of the Republic (1945) in the plenary of the BPUPKI (Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia – the Japanese-organised committee for granting independence to Indonesia), and PPKI (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia – Preparation Committee for Indonesian Independence), and to the parliamentary democracy era of the 1950s, as well as to the plenary sessions of the Konstituante (the council set up to review the Constitution) which failed in the lead-up to the eventual implementation of Guided Democracy under Sukarno.⁸

The emergence of an awareness of Nationalist-Islam cooperation is also evident in the results of the local head local elections, which took place in more than 200 regions in Indonesia from June 2005 and later. According to 2006 data from Network of Voter Education for People (Jaringan Pendidikan Pemilih untuk Rakyat/JPPR), out of the 224 direct elections held for local head positions in the *kabupaten* (district), *kota* (municipalities), and *propinsi* (province) in Indonesia, 37.05% of the winners were candidates nominated by a coalition of Nationalist-Islamic parties; 32.59% was won by candidates nominated by nationalist parties; 22.27% of votes were garnered by candidates nominated by a coalition of nationalist parties; and only 7.48% of candidates garnered support based on their nomination by a coalition of Islamic parties (Rochman, 2006) (see Table 9 below).

Table 9: Coalition Wins in Direct Local Head Elections (Pilkadasung) in 224 Regions in 2005

No.	Election winner	Number of regions	Percentage
1.	Coalition of nationalist-Islamic parties	83	37.05
2.	Nationalist parties	73	32.59
3.	Coalition of nationalist parties	51	22.27
4.	Coalition of Islamic parties	17	7.48

Source: Rochman (2006)

The data above clearly strengthens the argument that, first, peoples’ preferences in local, regional, and national elections for head of government at present are not characterised by “streams” as they once in the 1999 legislative elections and in the 1950s (with the exception of voting trends in Central and East Java in the 2004 election). Second, the pattern of nationalist-Islamic or *abangan-santri* coalitions has

⁸ For analysis of these periods, respectively, see Reid (1974), Feith (1962), and Nasution (1992).

apparently become an alternative solution for Indonesian integration and democracy in the future. And, third, it is difficult for Islamic-based parties to gain popular support even though demographically, the majority of Indonesian people are Muslim.

8. Closing Remarks

From the analysis above it is clear that in some respects there is continuity between the 1955 general election results and the results of the 1999 and 2004 general elections in Indonesia. This main continuity seems clearly in the terms of the persistence of the *aliran* (streams) along which parties, at least in the 1999 elections, differentiated themselves: secular nationalist, traditionalist Islam and modernist Islam; although garnering support along stream lines was no longer effective by 2004. In relation to this Stephen Sherlock states:

“Despite three decades of authoritarianism, the political parties that exist today show a remarkable continuity with the organizations that were thrown up by the circumstances of Indonesian history in the 1950s. The divisions within Indonesian society, particularly along the lines of secular nationalism, traditionalist and modernist Islam, but also religious minorities, regional and class lines in the 1955 election were replicated in the spectrum of competing parties and in trends of voters’ support in 1999. We might also note that even during the New Order, for all Soeharto’s efforts to engineer a party system to his liking, he thought it necessary to allow the option for voters to express an allegiance to a token secular nationalist party and a token Islamic party.”(Sherlock, 2004: 13)

Sherlock’s argument in above is supported by Ananta et al.’s (2004) findings on the results of the 1999 general election. Ananta states that ethnicity and regional loyalties are among the factors affecting Indonesians voting behaviours in that year.

“Using a simple tabulation analysis incorporating data from the 1999 general election and some variables from the 2000 population census, we showed that ethnic and religious loyalties did indeed exist in the 1999 general election. The data show a dichotomy of the major Indonesian political parties along ethnic and religious lines (mostly Javanese versus non-Javanese, and Java-based and Outer Islands-based). The PDI-P and the PKB are often seen as Java- and Javanese-based parties; on the other hand, Golkar, after the fall of Soeharto, and the PPP are frequently viewed as non-Javanese and Outer-Islands based parties. The PDI-P and the PKB, however, are also favoured in the Outer Islands where there are a large number of Javanese migrants. The PPP gained its support mainly, if not solely, from the Islamic community.”(Ananta et al., 2004)

Religious-based parties, particularly Islam, are likely to exist in Indonesian politics in the future. However, the results of the 1955 general election when compared with the two general elections held in the Reform transition era (the 1999 and 2004 elections) show that the level of support for Islamic parties is continuously declining – with the exception of the new party, PKS, which gained a significant number of votes in the 2004 general election. The polarisation of sub-cultures and leadership in Muslim communities is probably an explanation for this phenomenon. It is not surprising then that no initial pairings of candidates with an exclusively Islamic party basis were nominated for the president-vice president slate in the presidential elections. All of the presidential candidate pairings represented a combination of nationalist-Islamic factions, although the levels of ideological commitment amongst the candidates

varied. The JPPR (2006) also finds that in the 224 local elections of district, municipal and provincial heads that followed during and just beyond 2005, nationalist-Islamic based candidates were much more likely to succeed locally than those exclusively backed by a coalition of nationalist parties or a coalition of Islamic parties. Again this indicates the shift away from stream-based politics towards nationalist-Islamic coalitions at both the local and the national level.

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