

**State formation, decentralisation
and East Sulawesi province**
Conflict and the politics of transcending
boundaries in Eastern Indonesia

Riwanto Tirtosudarmo

CRISE WORKING PAPER No. 56
October, 2008



State formation, decentralisation and East Sulawesi province Conflict and the politics of transcending boundaries in Eastern Indonesia

Abstract

This paper analyses the campaign to establish a new administrative territory in Indonesia, East Sulawesi province, in the context of decentralisation and calls for regional autonomy that have arisen following the end of the Suharto regime. The campaign for the new province occurred at the same time as a series of communal conflicts in one of its oldest districts, Poso, which broke out in response to the demographic and territorial changes brought about by decentralisation and the new opportunities it offered. This paper argues, however, that while the campaign to establish the new province may have grown out of these existing ethno-religious tensions in Poso district and Central Sulawesi Province, the new politics emerging with the push for creation of East Sulawesi are primarily political and territorial, with ethnicity and religion taking only peripheral roles. The campaign therefore represents the politics of transcending group boundaries to obtain territorial sovereignty for remote and marginalised districts and illustrates the possibility of enhancing civic nationalism at the local level.

The author

Riwanto Tirtosudarmo is Senior Researcher at the Research Centre for Society and Culture at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) and CRISE partner/coordinator in Indonesia.

Email: tirtosudarmo@yahoo.com

Table of Contents

1. Introduction	3
2. The nation-state format: <i>kesatuan</i> vs <i>persatuan</i> ?.....	4
3. The historical spectre of contestations and conflicts in Sulawesi's middle-belt	8
4. Transcending boundaries: economy not ethnicity, politics not religion.....	13
5. Conclusion	17
6. References	19

State formation, decentralisation and East Sulawesi province ¹

Conflict and the politics of transcending boundaries in Eastern Indonesia

By Riwanto Tirtosudarmo

They are regarded as distant places, fragile ecosystems, poverty stricken villages inhabited by “different” kinds of people and, from a political and military perspective, trouble zones.

Tania Murray Li (1999: 34)

More or less arbitrary borders very often based on natural or historical borders would have to be agreed by politicians, forced to ignore the preferences of many people.

Juan J Linz (1997: 17)

Decentralized structures of government in contemporary states do not only require political choices to be made by political elites and activists. They also require social scientist to make crucial choices of method, approach and underlying assumptions about power and state.

Brian C. Smith (1985: 206).

1. Introduction

Indonesia – an archipelago as large as the whole of Western Europe and the world’s fourth largest country in terms of population – is constantly challenged by problems of political integration and the need to strike a balance between territorial boundaries, ethnicities and religions. Recently, conflicts over territory, ethnicity and religion have intensified as Indonesia enters a transitional period in which decentralisation and regional autonomy have together become one of the country’s most contentious political issues. Regional and local reassertion and reclamation over territorial boundaries in the name of ethnic and other collective cultural identities have emerged in response to the political and economic opportunities arising from the implementation of new decentralisation policies. In the last five years or so ethnic mobilisation by local elites seeking political position and economic benefits has rapidly flourished, in turn creating havoc and stimulating disputes over the boundaries of geographical territories and cultural identities. Social tensions emanating from the mobilisation of ethnic identities by the local elites in their attempt to claim a particular territorial boundary have not always been resolved peacefully.

This paper analyses the campaign to establish a new administrative territory (East Sulawesi province) which intends to break away from the province of Central Sulawesi. The campaign for the new province, interestingly, occurred at the same time as a series of communal conflicts in

¹ Prepared for a CRISE-Oxford University workshop on decentralization, federalism and conflict, Oxford, 6-7 October 2006. The fieldwork conducted in Central Sulawesi is part of a CRISE-Oxford and PMB-LIPI partnership research project in Indonesia. The author would like to thank Graham Brown, Frances Stewart and Rachael Diprose for their comments on the earlier drafts of this paper.

one of its oldest districts, Poso. Poso is also a district that has experienced a rapid process of redistricting which took place during the period of conflict.²

Sulawesi is a remarkable island in the eastern part of Indonesia and home to diverse and complex ethnic groups of peoples that have been constantly influenced by external forces throughout the colonial and post-colonial periods. In the middle part of the island, or the middle-belts, collective identities are generally fragmented, although religion has always been an important source of communal identification, and increasingly vulnerable to political manipulation. This paper argues that the intention to establish a new province advocated by the local elites is primarily political and territorial. The campaign for a new province therefore represents the politics of transcending boundaries to obtain territorial sovereignty in which ethnicity and religion appear to take only peripheral roles. While the paper will focus on Central Sulawesi it will consider the wider context of Indonesia's state formation in the past as well as current political developments.

2. The nation-state format: *kesatuan* vs *persatuan* ?

The Indonesian state was created in an emergency situation. The days prior to the declaration of independence on August 17 1945 were very tense. The abrupt changes after the Japanese military surrendered to the allies created a brief political vacuum that provided the opportunity for a group of young radical nationalists to press their older nationalist leaders to declare independence. Several months before the declaration of independence, under the auspices of the Japanese military general, the nationalist leaders – representing different political factions – conducted a series of meetings to prepare the state constitution of their imagined nation. The meetings were tense and the debate on the state's philosophical foundation was the most contentious issue. As the Japanese surrendered, the meetings ended before reaching their final conclusion. After independence, the content of the first constitution was therefore adopted mostly from the results of the pre-independence meetings.³ Five principles (*Pancasila*) – (1) belief in God, (2) just and civilised humanity, (3) the unity of Indonesia, (4) democracy, and (5) social justice – were agreed on as providing the philosophical foundation of the state. The constitution opens with a preamble that is a slight elaboration of the five principles in which the notion of *persatuan* rather than *kesatuan* is incorporated. Both words derive from the Indonesian *satu*, meaning “one”, but while *persatuan* means, roughly, the process of becoming one, *kesatuan* means the condition of being one. Put another way, *persatuan* emphasises the process of unification from diversity, whereas *kesatuan* emphasises homogeneity. While *persatuan* implies the importance of differences and heterogeneity, *kesatuan* emphasises the concepts of oneness and uniformity. The strong engagement of the first generation of nationalist leaders with civic nationalism rather than ethnic nationalism constitutes their commitment to the enhancement of political diversity rather than just uniformity. Such nationalist feelings imply an appreciation of the “federal idea” as the basis for state formation, despite unitary structures.⁴

The political abruptness surrounding the birth of the Indonesian state heavily influenced the provisional construction of the Indonesian constitution.⁵ Although the Dutch were successful in reclaiming a large part of the territory through military action during the period 1947-49, they

² For more information on this, see Diprose (2007)

³ For concise descriptions of the tense and rapidly changing political situations in the days surrounding the declaration of independence, see Ricklefs (1983), especially Chapters 16 and 17.

⁴ I borrow the term “federal idea” from Rae (2003). Bob Rae argues that the “federal idea” provides more room for discussion while the “ism” in federalism has a way of limiting debate and understanding.

⁵ According to Schiller's (1955: 4) study of the process of formation of Indonesia's federal state, the first constitution of the Republic of Indonesia was based on the federal constitution of the United States of America.

failed to establish a federal state. Their attempts to do so triggered a strong reaction from the masses and stimulated strong opinions about unity and unitarism. This was the beginning of a prevailing perception that Indonesia had to be formed as a unitary state. A fragile political agreement between a strong nationalist group (the Republicans) and those promoting federalism was temporarily formed. The Republicans asserted that the formation of a federal state was only a Dutch strategy to weaken the nationalist movement to explain their rejection of the imposition of a federal state format on the young republic. Sporadic protests against the Dutch in Makassar and Medan around this time led to the collapse of the agreement. On August 17 1950, the deal between the Republicans and the so-called Federalists ended, as the nationalist leaders decided to form a unitary state rather than following the federal idea. The perception among the Indonesian nationalist leaders that the Federal State of Indonesia was only part of hidden Dutch tactics to recolonise the country left a strong negative impression surrounding federalism in Indonesia, presenting major difficulties for those who attempt to advocate the federal idea in Indonesia today.⁶ The idea of *persatuan* implied in the preamble of the constitution subsequently shifted towards the idea of *kesatuan*, in which the notion of unity is advocated and differences should be avoided.⁷ The format of the Indonesian state moved from the Republic of Indonesia (1945-1946) to the Federal State of Indonesia (1947-1949) and finally to the Unitary State of Indonesia (1950-present). August 17 1950 was thus a defining moment in the history of state formation in Indonesia.

In 1955, a decade after its abrupt declaration of independence, Indonesia's first general election was conducted to elect peoples' representatives to the parliament. The first task of the elected parliament was to draft a new constitution. However, the long process of political debate and deliberation among the members of parliament on the one hand, and the increasing regional rebellions on the other, created a feeling of distrust towards the politicians within the military elites. This, in turn, pushed the president to issue a decree on July 5 1959 abolishing parliament and returning to the first constitution of Indonesia.⁸ Indonesia then entered its long period of authoritarian government. Since then, military influence over the nation has been pivotal in Indonesia politics. The tensions between the military and the communist party that resulted in the tragic loss of life of 1965 forced then-President Sukarno into a corner and elevated Suharto to become the new president, enabling the authoritarian regime under the first constitution to continue. The Suharto period of government strongly based on a centralistic bureaucratic polity, economic technocracy and military leadership, intensified the mystification of the unitary state format.⁹ In 1998, almost four decades after the 1959 Presidential Decree reviving the first constitution, a second set of revisions to the constitution began. This followed the end of Suharto's authoritarian regime, which was triggered by economic crisis and a strong political opposition, coinciding with waves of student demonstrations.

One major issue that quickly emerged in the public discourse after Suharto stepped down on May 21 1998 was political demands to reconfigure the structural relationship between the central and regional governments. The longstanding unequal relationship between these divisions of the state is regarded as the root cause of vertical as well as horizontal political and economic inequalities in the country (Lay, 2003). While the need to reconfigure the institutional

⁶ On the rejection of the federal idea, Schiller wrote in 1955 that "Recent writers have rightly recognized that opposition to the federal state in Indonesia was largely due to the fact that it was 'Dutch-inspired' or 'Dutch-imposed', rather than because of any absence of intrinsic merit in the plan" (Schiller, 1955: 9).

⁷ I would like to thank Dr. Edward L. Poelinggomang, a historian at Hasanudin University in Makassar, for his inputs into the discussion of this contentious issue of *persatuan* versus *kesatuan* during a conversation with the author in mid-September 2006 in Makassar.

⁸ See Ricklefs (1983), especially Chapter 18.

⁹ For a discussion on the mystification of the unitary state see Tirtosudarmo (2005a, 2005b).

arrangement between the central and regional governments was thus clear, it could not be accomplished without revising the constitution. The state constitution only made general reference to matters that concerned the role and authority of the local governments vis-à-vis the national government, without specifics. But in the context of rising public expectations and a freer political atmosphere the various political arrangements between the central and regional governments were openly discussed. In the public discussion, interestingly, the long-suppressed idea of federalism and a federalist state – perceived by political elites as a taboo since the early 1950s – emerged as one alternative political format. Competing political ideas were aired mostly through academic seminars and then translated into news in the public mass media and into various print publications such as books and seminar proceedings (Liddle, 2001). At the state level, as a response to the growing demand to reconfigure the structure of the relationship between the central and regional governments, President B. J. Habibie in 1998 established a team consisting mostly of academics (political scientists) to formulate new laws on regional government to provide a legal basis for the restructuring process. The first of these new laws, Law 22 concerning ‘Local Government’, and Law 25, concerning ‘The Fiscal Balance Between the Central Government and the Regions’ were passed in 1999 and implemented from January 2001.

One of the issues arising in the discussion among academics on implementing the idea of federalism concerned whether Indonesia should take the formal structure of a federal state or just adopt its substance.¹⁰ Adopting only the substance of federalism meant that Indonesia would not necessarily change its current unitary state format but the content could be federal. In the discussions, one important element pertained to the fiscal arrangements between the central and regional governments. The debate on federalism could generally therefore be divided into two broad views. The first view emphasised the importance of rearranging the fiscal balance between the national and regional governments, incorporating the substance of the federal idea. The second view believed that a federal state format should be fully adopted to replace the current unitary state format, which was perceived to be the root cause of centralism, political injustice and economic inequalities. Proponents of the second view were clearly more radical in their political aspirations, while those supporting the former were more consensual and gradual in their approach to reforming the nation-state format. The negative images of and the strong opposition to the federal idea quickly led to calls for strengthening the unitary state.¹¹

¹⁰ In August 1998 an international conference under the theme “Toward Structural Reforms for Democratization in Indonesia: Problems and Prospects” was organised by LIPI and the Ford Foundation in Jakarta. The conference, which brought together the most prominent foreign political scientists, such as Juan J. Linz and Donald L. Horowitz, intended to contribute knowledge to the debate among academics and intellectuals prior to first post-Suharto parliamentary election in 1999 (Liddle, 2001). On 2 November 1998, also in Jakarta, a seminar on federalism (Federalisme, Mungkinkah bagi Indonesia? or Federalism, is it possible for Indonesia?) was held. The seminar was sponsored by the national newspaper Kompas and the FES (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung). The proceedings of this seminar were then published as a book in August 1999 by Kompas with the title ‘Federalisme Untuk Indonesia’ (Federalism for Indonesia). In the preface of this book, Daniel Dhakidae argued that federalism was implemented during the short period of the British Interregnum (1811-1816). Under the British, the Dutch territory was divided into four regions: Java, Fort Marlborough (Bengkulu and its dependencies), Penang and its dependencies, and the Molluccas. Among the strong proponents of federalism in contemporary Indonesia is Mangunwijaya, writer and Catholic priest, see Mangunwijaya (1998). The idea of federalism – especially its fiscal arrangements – was also advocated briefly by a newly established but promising political party of the time – PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional). This new party was created by a coalition of pro-democracy intellectuals and activists – led by a political scientist, university professor, and the head of one of Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisations, Muhammadiyah – Amin Rais. At the beginning of the PAN political campaign, federalism was mentioned in their political platform, although it was later revoked as it was deemed likely to trigger public controversy.

¹¹ See Hans Antlov, 1999, “In Indonesia: Disentangling the Confusion about Federalism”. The Jakarta Post, June 3.

The debate on the possibilities of the federal idea seemed then to disappear, but it was given a new momentum surprisingly following the successful peace agreement between the Indonesian government and GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or Free Aceh Movement) signed in Helsinki in August 2005. The much-debated issue of ‘self government’ demanded by the GAM leaders during a series of meetings mediated by Martti Ahtisaari, the former prime minister of Finland, seemingly reached a consensus in the final meeting. In the resulting peace agreement, known as MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) Helsinki, significant emphasis was given to strengthening the role of local government in Aceh. Among the important issues agreed to in the MOU was permission for the Acehnese to establish their own local political party, which to date has not been made possible in any other region of Indonesia. The Acehnese were also given more authority – up to 70 percent – in controlling the management of their rich natural resource base. According to Daniel Dhakidae (1999: xxix) ‘self rule and shared rule’ is the main substance of the federal state political system. Other provinces treated similarly to Aceh include Papua, but most are treated differently – these two regions have been granted special autonomy status in order to ease the separatist threats arising there.¹²

The devolution of power from the national government to autonomous administrative territories in the regions was problematic from the start. While the second highest-level government entity under the national government in Indonesia has traditionally been the province, the national laws concerning regional autonomy designated power to the district level of government, which falls administratively under the provincial government. The reason for designating the sub-provincial level of government as the primary locus of regional autonomy is the traditional perception that national disintegration could occur if too much power were given to larger blocks in the form of provinces. The implementation of the decentralisation laws, Law 22 and 25, 1999, that began in January 2001 under the Abdurrahman Wahid government, gave an unprecedented level of power and authority to the district-level governments. This proved to be very controversial as provincial government authority was drastically reduced in favor of the district governments. On October 15 2004, under the Megawati administration, Law 22, 1999, was removed and replaced by Law 32, 2004, giving some authority back to the provincial governments. It is stated clearly in the consideration (or preamble) that the removal of Law 22, 1999, was effected because “it is not suitable to the state’s development and the demand for the arrangement of regional autonomy”.¹³

Law 32, 2004, was a corrective measure introduced by the Megawati government in response to what was perceived as “governance disorder”, particularly in the arrangement of local government through the uncontrolled execution of Law 22, 1999. The introduction of the new law also reflected Megawati’s personal concern with the primacy of national integration and unity and the need for the central government to regain control over regional affairs. Decentralisation involves both administrative and political processes. In Indonesia, the political aspects, however, are seemingly of greatest importance as the territorial arrangement of government tends to be dominated by the central government in the name of national interest. The strong influence of the military as the guardians of the nation against various centripetal

¹² While the special status granted to Aceh and Papua may not provide significantly more political power to these provinces, these two cases indicate the possibility of an alternative centre–regional relationship as an Indonesian model of asymmetrical federalism.

¹³ The quotation is originally from Law 32, 2004. Although Law 22, 1999, has been replaced by Law 32, 2004, the power and authority that had already been given to the district level governments through Law 22, 1999, has in practice been very difficult to revoke. Under government regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah or PP) No. 129, 2000, district splitting or “pemekaran” seems now to be a continuing process that cannot be restrained. Pemekaran, or the carving out and creation of new districts, is already generating expectations of power and financial benefits.

and disintegrative forces historically has provided the military with a central political role as the defender of Indonesia as a unitary state. The three decades of the Suharto political regime, in which an economist-technocrat group dominated national economic development, further engineered national political construction into a strongly centralised government. It was during the Suharto regime that the structure of local government was defined, constituting the major factor in the creation of the pre-autonomy institutional format. The political shift in 1998 provided opportunities to change the centralised format and to redesign the structure of local government vis-à-vis the central government.

3. The historical spectre of contestations and conflicts in Sulawesi's middle-belt

The current processes and changes in the structural format of local government and its territorial boundaries have elicited an enthusiastic response from the local political elites, particularly at the district level. One emerging phenomenon has been the splitting of administrative boundaries, as local elites push for the creation of new administrative territories. Between 1998 and 2004, seven new provinces were created and 112 new districts were established. The island of Sulawesi provides an interesting case with regard to the emergence of new provinces in the post-Suharto era. In 2003 Gorontalo province, predominantly inhabited by Muslim-Gorontaloese, was created, splitting away from North Sulawesi province, which is now dominated by the Christian-Minahasans. In 2004, Sulawesi Barat (West Sulawesi) was born, separating itself from its mother province, South Sulawesi. The West Sulawesi region is home to the Mandar ethnic group, while South Sulawesi is predominantly Bugis. Both the Mandar and Bugis are predominantly Muslims. While ethnic boundaries seem to be the underlying cause for the creation of Gorontalo and West Sulawesi, ethnicity and religion have apparently not been so prominent in the campaign for the creation of East Sulawesi province, particularly given the multitude of ethnicities of different religions which fall within the boundaries of Central Sulawesi from which it would be carved out. In the campaign for East Sulawesi, territoriality and the feeling of being marginalised by the provincial government are the common arguments put forward. Between 1999 and 2001, widespread violence occurred in Poso as a result of communal conflicts. The coincidence in timing between the communal conflict in Poso and the campaign for the new province suggests that, even though communal identity appears to be absent from the campaign, a connection is plausible between the conflict and the campaign. Poso district is the home of many local elites that have dominated politics in Central Sulawesi province. With the creation of East Sulawesi province, Poso city (the capital of Poso district) would also be a major contender for the capital of the new province.

This paper explores two key themes. The first is this possible connection between the conflict in Poso district and the campaign for the new province. The timing of the campaign to create a new province is closely linked to that of the conflict. The conflict itself reflects some of the broader ethno-religious politics in the district and the province. Furthermore, the demographic change across Central Sulawesi province following the creation of several new districts in the province with decentralisation has changed existing ethno-religious power dynamics, triggering some of the key figures to push for the creation of a new province where they could have greater control. However, while the initial motivations may have stemmed from old power plays and ethno-religious identity groups, the new politics emerging with the push for the creation of the new province are focussed on mobilising district-level identities around those districts which have been marginalised from provincial level politics in the past.

Second, the paper reflects on the wider question of why territorial splitting is proliferating following the end of the Suharto era and what are the broader social and political implications of the current decentralisation movement in Indonesia. Are there any significant impacts from

decentralisation on the existing construction of both the Indonesian nation and the state? The threats to national integration from culturally distinct communities can only be met by a measure of genuine devolution of power which is basically the essence of decentralisation. The distribution of power between the levels of government and the choice of institutions for decentralisation are the outcomes of political conflicts. The political conflicts that have occurred at the centre have originated in group and class interests which sometimes have a territorial identity but which also unite people regardless of region. While communal conflict in Poso is mainly rooted in its own particular historical trajectories, it is important to locate it within the wider contemporary perspectives of communal conflicts in the different regions that are linked to the implementation of decentralisation and regional autonomy under Law No. 22, 1999. For example, in his detailed study on the connection between decentralisation and communal conflict in West Kalimantan, Davidson (2005) strongly rejects the popular explanation that conflict is a result of weakened state control which triggered long-existing hatreds between different ethnic groups. Davidson's argument seems to parallel those of Ishak (2003) and Tomagola (2003) who explain communal conflict in Poso, Central Sulawesi, as political rather than ethnic in nature.

Davidson (2005: 184-185) argues that "...regional power struggles resulting from the decentralizing state are an appropriate context in which to situate Indonesia's recent spate of regional violence". He further states that:

"Historical perspectives that illuminate processes of ethnic categorization as a result of state policy and structural factors like imbalanced in-migration are telling. Notable as well are the politicization of ethno-religious identities and the role of youth militias, acting on their accord or on behalf of the powers that be. In particular, presented as a slight alternative to both the rapid democratization and competitive electoral frameworks, I linked the mechanisms of violence to regional power struggle in the context of decentralization. By doing so, I tried to show how these riots rarely concern settling old scores and similar 'return of the repressed' repercussions. Rather, they are implicated in a swiftly changing political landscape; they invoke an uneasy present and an insecure future. Anxiety over the indeterminacy and fluidity of today's political climate compounds the problem".

(2005: 184-185)

In a similar vein, van Klinken (2005: 99) noticed similar patterns of communal conflict in the post-Suharto era (in Maluku, Central Sulawesi, West and Central Kalimantan) in which the role of actors was very crucial across the regions. According to van Klinken,

"...it has become clear that every episode in the provinces had a strong local middle class careerist element. This is not to discount the importance of less privileged actors such as farmers. Nor is it to deny that there were interests in Jakarta willing and able to support ethnic violence as part of their own anti-democratic agenda. But time and again the pathways that defined the conflict were cleared by the interests of the state-dependent provincial middle class. Upwardly mobile urban middle class entrepreneurs living in the regions brokered all the alliances that caused conflicts to escalate, polarization to deepen, and mobilization to surge. The provincial and district entrepreneurs were actors in their own right".

The question in the case of communal conflict in Poso in Central Sulawesi is whether the primary actors seeking the creation of the new province were acting alone to achieve their own


economic and political goals, or whether this was a concerted effort on the part of a larger coalition. This question leads us to examine the connection between communal conflict in Poso and the local elites who are now campaigning to create the new province.

While communal conflicts in Kalimantan and Maluku – either with religious or ethnic overtones – seem to have died down at present, conflict in Poso in Central Sulawesi is apparently still alive as small violent incidents occur intermittently.¹⁴ Thanks to the continued efforts of various social organisations in Central Sulawesi, these small violent incidents have not provoked larger sectarian conflict. This is despite the fact that the first phase of communal conflict in Poso was triggered by a small quarrel between youths in December 1998 which then spread into sectarian conflict, reaching a peak in mid-2001. The Poso conflict was officially resolved with the Malino Peace Agreement between representatives of the Muslim and Christian communities in December 2001, although tensions continued. The communal conflict has attracted many researchers, who have attempted to explain why such violent conflict took place. In a wider perspective, this conflict may represent the unease and anxieties of the local political elites with regard to the opportunities seemingly brought about by the introduction of new decentralisation policies.

With the ratification of the decentralisation laws, the local elites saw a chance to pursue their political imaginings through the creation of new administrative-territorial boundaries. However, it was imperative that the local elites justify their imagined territory for this objective to be achieved. It would seem self-evident that an area designated for the purpose of government should correspond with a territorial boundary which is recognised by its inhabitants as an integrative natural socio-economic territory. A spatial territory in which local peoples feel some sense of collective attachment will allow a form of government to acquire the necessary socio-cultural legitimacy. The claims by the local elites of a particular region to form an administrative-territorial governmental unit under the national sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia reflects the position of the regions vis-à-vis the national government. As decentralisation is understood as a process of territorial distribution of power, it is only logical that the local political elites have responded quickly to the new opportunities this presents by asserting their claim over the territory. As Smith (1985) has noted, decentralisation is concerned with the extent to which power and authority are dispersed through the geographical hierarchy of the state, and the institutions and processes through which dispersal occurs.

¹⁴ The most recent tensions in Poso resulted from the execution on 17 September 2006 of three Florenese migrants charged with the murder of approximately 100 Muslims during the communal conflict in 2000.

Figure 1. Map of Central Sulawesi



The formation of administrative structures and boundaries in Sulawesi began after the Dutch military conquered the region.¹⁵ In 1729 the Dutch erected a military fort in Gorontalo after a

¹⁵ On the social transformation of Central Sulawesi see Albert Schrauwers (2000)

long dispute with Portugal and Spain over the northern part of Sulawesi. The Dutch expansion aimed to control gold mining and the transportation of gold to Europe. Between 1747 and 1795, the Dutch expanded their territorial control further south and established another military fort in Paige, also with the primary aim of controlling the gold mining opportunities in the Central Sulawesi middle-belt. By the end of the 18th century, despite difficulties, the Dutch had successfully brought the middle-belts under their military control. As Henley (2005:42) has observed: "Most of the region, however, was little affected by the colonial presence until much later in the nineteenth century, and the interior of Central Sulawesi was not brought under Dutch control until a series of military actions in the years 1903-1907". Henley (2005: 30) has described the social situation in the region as follows: "Political organization above the level of the kin group and the village was typically loose. The anthropologist Accioaioli (1989: 66) agrees with his colonial predecessor Albert C. Kruyt (1938, I: 38) that even the 'kingdoms' of the Palu Valley, large and relatively integrated polities by regional standards, were actually 'village clusters' composed of 'independent communities' which 'recognized one of the local village heads as foremost among them'".

Henley (2005:30-31) also explains that:

"The most common type of 'petty kingdom' (*rijke*), as the Dutch called most of the larger indigenous polities, consisted in the first place of a small coastal trading community headed by one or more elected *raja* [kings], but also exercised a certain restricted authority over a larger semi-independent farming population in the adjacent interior. Upland chiefs, for instance, would be chosen by their peers, but receive their formal investiture from the lowland *raja* or his representatives. The sources of this authority (and of much of the income of the coastal elite) were essentially twofold: trade (the supply of valuable imported goods in return for produce of the land), and limited intervention in the conflicts arising among the upland communities, which were exploited either by using (allowing) one group to discipline another (A.C. Kruyt 1938, I: 256; Schrauwens 1997: 371-2), or by offering relatively impartial arbitration between the opposing parties. Such upland/lowland political systems, consisting of an often Islamic or Christian coastal capital and a loosely subordinated pagan hinterland, were found in Minahasa and Bolaang Mongondow until the nineteenth century and in most parts of Central Sulawesi until the early twentieth. Among the lowlanders, and among contemporary European observers, the pagan peoples of the interior were variously known as *alifuru* (in European sources, 'Alfurs') apparently from a Halmahera (Mollucan) word meaning 'wilderness' (*Encyclopaedie* 1917-39, I:30), by the Bugis term *toraja*, 'uplander' (Adriani and Kruyt 1912-14, I:2), or occasionally by its Malay equivalent *dayak*, more commonly used in Kalimantan (Kortleven 1927:17; A.C. Kruyt 1898:10-1)."

From January 1, 1926, Sulawesi, Maluku, Timor and Bali-Lombok were administratively under the control of the Governor of *Grote Oost* (The Great East), who was directly responsible to the Dutch Governor General in Batavia. Under the Governor of *Grote Oost*, Sulawesi was divided into two residencies: the southern part (*Celebes en Onderhorigheden* – Sulawesi and its dependencies) with Makassar as the center, and the northern part (Manado residency) with Manado as the center. Manado residency covered three *afdelings* (districts): *Afdeling* Manado, *Afdeling* Gorontalo, and *Afdeling Midden Celebes* – Central Sulawesi. Under *Afdeling Midden Celebes* there were five *onderafdelings*: Donggala, Paloe, Poso, Toli-Toli and Parigi. On August 8, 1934, Poso was upgraded from *onderafdeling* to become *afdeling*. Poso *afdeling* covered an area that included four *onderafdelings*: Poso, Luwuk (Banggai inland), Banggai Islands and

Kolonodale (Bungku and Mori regions).¹⁶ After independence, between 1950 and 1965, the southern part of Sulawesi island was deeply involved in the regional rebellions led by the military veteran, Kahar Muzakkar, who was disappointed with central government policy. According to Harvey (1989: 18-19) at the peak of this regional unrest, in around 1956, almost all the rural areas in the southern part of Sulawesi were controlled by the rebels, and only the towns were still occupied by the republican government.

Contributing to the dissatisfaction in southern Sulawesi were the tensions between the north and the south of the island. While Sulawesi was a single province up to 1960, there was a great cultural, educational and religious gap between the north and the south. The north had been missionised since the early 19th century and had high literacy and education levels. Malay had become the *lingua franca*, and a regional Malay-language press already expressed a regional, northern Minahasan identity in the late colonial period. In contrast, South Sulawesi was dominated by the aristocracy that had been able to maintain its influence over the largely Islamic population. Western education had had a minimal impact and there was no widely felt sense of a common South Sulawesi identity apart from identification with the traditional kingdoms such as Bone and Goa. During the revolution in Java, men from both the Minahasa and South Sulawesi fought together in the military units that were sent from Java to infiltrate Sulawesi and undermine the Dutch-sponsored government there, an effort for which Kahar Muzakkar was responsible. After the revolution ended, there was no longer a common enemy to fight, and the differences between the north and the south were acutely felt in Makassar, the capital in the south. Because of their higher educational levels, Minahasans from the north soon controlled key positions in the government bureaucracy and the military leadership, and the press and educational institutions were dominated by people from north Sulawesi as well.¹⁷

In 1973 under the Suharto government Sulawesi was designated as one of the destinations for government-sponsored transmigrants. The middle-belts of Sulawesi (comprising Central and Southeast Sulawesi provinces) were perceived by the central government as an empty land with a very low density of population. In order to be able to exploit the natural resources from the middle-belt, the Trans-Sulawesi road began to be constructed. The availability of road networks provided market access for economic investors and attracted a wave of spontaneous migrants mostly from the south of the island – the Bugis. The Sulawesi middle-belt, with its modest people and mountainous terrain, has continuously been a contested region in which different groups of peoples from outside have imposed their economic, political and cultural influences. The Sulawesi middle-belt has obviously become the meeting points of different collective identities, producing a hybrid culture. It has also been the place of emerging new collective identities which have transcended the older and smaller different collective identities. Christianity from the north and Islam from the south were brought to the region and have become important local identities that are spatially reflected in their different locations: Christianity in the uplands and Muslims in the lowlands. As spatial mobility has increased, the upland-lowland dichotomy has slowly blurred and is no longer applicable for contrasting Christian and Muslim communities in the middle-belt.

4. Transcending boundaries: economy not ethnicity, politics not religion

The political opportunities which opened up after the demise of Suharto have not only provided local elites with the chance to pursue their short-term political goals, but they also provide an

¹⁶ See Lukman Nadjamuddin (2002) "Dari Animism ke Monoteisme" (From Animism to Monotheism).

¹⁷ On the tensions between the people in the north and the south of Sulawesi, see Henley (2005), Roth (2005) and Harvey (1989).

opportunity to reconstruct the meaning of regionalism. The new regionalism not only provides political space for the articulation of aspirations at the local level but also to redraw and to renegotiate the existing territorial boundaries. Local politics in the post-Suharto era, therefore, reflect the opening up of opportunities for the local population to imagine their political position with regard to the region in which they live as well as to the center of national power. What have local people imagined as their territorial identity that is different from their neighbors? How have they imagined their territorial sovereignty? Every single territory in Indonesia has been politically designated an administrative boundary, either as province, district, sub-district or village; all located within the boundaries of the nation-state. Every administrative territory has its own political history in which the processes of delineating boundaries are usually crucial as these affect the boundaries of neighboring territories.

The idea of establishing a new province called East Sulawesi can be dated back to the early 1950s and it reappeared in the early 1960s when Central Sulawesi province was created out of North Sulawesi. The creation of Central Sulawesi triggered a dispute among the local elites over the location of the capital city of the new province, with the main contenders at the time being Poso and Palu. The decision to choose Palu as the provincial capital of Central Sulawesi resulted in some local leaders demanding that a new province called East Sulawesi should be established with Poso as the capital. The more recent reemergence of the demands for establishing East Sulawesi by the local elites in Central Sulawesi reflects the rebirth of the old idea. Many of the proponents of the new province have strong emotional connections to their heroic role in defending the republic against the Kahar Muzakkar rebellion in the 1950s and early 1960s. Romanticism about the past seems to be part of the reason for envisaging the new province, particularly among the older proponents pushing for the creation of East Sulawesi.

In January 2000 a handful of local political elites declared their intention to establish a new province, with its territory covering the region from Poso to Luwuk.¹⁸ The core proponents of the new province consist mostly of retired senior local bureaucrats in the Central Sulawesi provincial government: Saleh Sandagung (retired Central Sulawesi provincial government secretary), Basir Nursin (retired Central Sulawesi deputy governor) and F.E. Bungkidapu (secretary and member of the local parliament). In the declaration document it was stated that the leadership format of “The Forum for The Struggle to Establish East Sulawesi Province” is collective. The collective leadership consists of a Supervisory Board (20 people from Poso and Luwuk-Banggai) and an Executive Board.¹⁹ The document also outlines the representatives from four district governments (Poso, Banggai, Banggai-Kepulauan and Morowali) and one district candidate from Tojo Una-Una. The declaration document was signed on January 2, 2000, in Palu by seven well-known local leaders²⁰. Among the important statements these leaders made in the document was the reference to the fact that more than 60 percent of the local revenue created in Central Sulawesi comes from the four districts planned to be included in the new province.²¹

¹⁸ The local newspaper in Palu, *Nuansa Poso*, on February 7, 2001, reported that the new province of East Sulawesi would consist of “The district of Poso, Morowali, Banggai Kepulauan, Luwuk, and the proposed new districts of Parigi-Moutong, Tojo-Una-Una [both of which have already been formed] and Pamona”. It is very clear that the campaign for establishing the new province is running in parallel with the process of creating new districts which in turn will be part of the new province.

¹⁹ Head, Dra Ny. Syamsiar Lasahido; Vice Head, Drs. H. Mohamad Husni Toana; General Secretary, Drs. Ramli Yusuf Lasawedy.

²⁰ Namely: H. Ishak Moro, Drs. FE. Bungkun Dapu, Drs. H.M. Husni Toana, H. Basir Nursin S.H., Dr. Ramli Yusuf Lasawedy, H. Usman Sondeng MD and Ir. Drs. Tigo Kaloan BE

²¹ Mass mobilisation and the campaign for the new province, amongst others, is also reflected in the creation of the East Sulawesi Youth Forum (Forum Generasi Muda Sultim). The forum’s head, Syarifuddin Maksum, is quoted as

A year after the declaration of the intention to form East Sulawesi province, in an interview published in the local newspaper (*Nuansa Pos*, January 29, 2001), the General Secretary of the forum, Drs. Ramly Lasawedy said that "...after Morowali district was successfully established it is now time to establish Pamona as a separate district". At present Pamona is part of the Poso district, and has been deeply embroiled in the conflict in Poso. According to Lasawedy, since the Poso district was established in 1959, there has never been a district head originating from Pamona, even though the population of the Pamona ethnic group is the largest in the region. It is interesting that the comment was made by Lasawedy even though he belongs to the Tojo ethnic group. A similar comment was also made by the head of one of the Islamic parties in Central Sulawesi (PSII – Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesia), K.H. Ishak Moro, who is also one of the declaration signatories. He also pushed for the establishment of Pamona district (*Nuansa Pos*, 7 February 2001) along ethnic lines. Furthermore, another comment in the local press (*Palu Press*, January 3, 2001) stated that "In Central Sulawesi, after the establishment of Morowali and Banggai-Kepulauan districts; further new districts would be for Parigi-Moutong to break away from Donggala district. After the establishment of the new district, the leaders from the new districts will finally be able to establish the new province – East Sulawesi province". Interestingly, Parigi Moutong was formed in the years following this statement.

As mentioned earlier, there is a coincidental territorial overlap between the envisaged province and the Poso *afdelings* that were inaugurated by the Governor of the Dutch Colonial Government on August 8, 1924. Poso, which was formerly only an *onderafdeling*, was then upgraded and became an *afdeling*, with its territory covering a further four *onderafdelings*, namely Poso, Luwuk, Banggai and Kolonodale. The dream of creating the new province runs in parallel with the process of district splitting or redistricting in Poso and Banggai as well as in other districts in Central Sulawesi. The process of district splitting interestingly coincided with the incidence of communal conflict that was triggered by a small quarrel between two young people on December 24 1988. One observer described the incident as follows: "It began as a street fight between hot-headed young men, one Protestant and one Muslim, during a tense political campaign".²² The coincidence of these three events, namely the campaign to create a new province, district splitting and the communal conflict that occurred at the same time, leads to the significant question of whether or not there is a causal relationship between them. Does the ultimate goal of establishing East Sulawesi province constitute a grand scenario in which communal conflict and district splitting are only important parts of a larger whole?

Looking at the chronology of events, before the declaration of East Sulawesi province (January 2 2000), two important events occurred: the beginning of a violent conflict sparked by the youth quarrels in December 1998, and the splitting of Morowali district from Poso district on October 12 1999. The violent conflict escalated after the declaration, in April, May and June 2000. After a long pause, a violent conflict broke out again in July and November 2001. In December 2001, three years after the first conflict broke out, a peace deal between the leaders of the Muslim and Christian communities was signed in Malino, South Sulawesi. In December 2003, Tojo-Una Una was then established, carved out of the Poso district. With the establishment of Tojo-Una Una, the campaigners for the creation of East Sulawesi province faced no further burdens. The requirement of having five districts in order to propose the creation of a new province had been achieved. However, while there are some ethnic overtones in the creation of the new districts,

saying that the people in this region have long wanted to have a separate province from Central Sulawesi (*Nuansa Pos*, February 7 2001).

²² Rohde (2001).

this has not been the case for the creation of the new province, which combines large numbers of Christians and Muslims from different ethnicities.

The communal conflict in Poso is indeed closely related to the increasingly important perceived boundaries between different culturally defined groups. Interestingly, religious identities have been more salient and have submerged the existing ethnic boundaries. The small and scattered indigenous ethnic minority groups that for a long time characterised the middle belt of Sulawesi, in the short period of the conflict, have been twisted into a polarised Christian-Muslim dichotomy. In this context, the spread of rumors and news from the mass media from other conflicts areas, especially Ambon in the Mollucas, has also contributed to the process of religious polarisation of the community in Poso.²³ The local ethnic entrepreneurs in Poso have cleverly redirected the issue of economic marginalisation of the locals by the aggressiveness of the migrant groups, particularly the Bugis, into the issue of religious domination of Muslims vis a vis Christians.²⁴ Local versus migrant social tensions have been increasing in the last five years, especially with regard to the massive land buying activities of the migrant Bugis group. As has been discussed elsewhere (Diprose, 2007) the communal conflicts in Poso have coincided with the process of district splitting in which the new districts (Tojo Una-Una and Morowali) now have more Muslims while the new Poso district is clearly now dominated by the Christian population.²⁵

The current dispute over the the location of the provincial capital of East Sulawesi province in either Poso or Luwuk reflects the rivalry between Poso and Luwuk local political elites. This rivalry represents the tip of the iceberg of the whole political process over the creation of East Sulawesi province. The basic and underlying motivation behind the campaign to have a new province spreading from Poso to Luwuk is primarily to achieve political and economic goals. The advocates and proponents of the new province imagine that creation of the new provincial boundary will be the pathway to economic advantages and political status. The area delineated as the new province is believed to be potentially rich in natural resources such as oil and coal that will attract investors from Jakarta and abroad (Sangaji, 2006). The area also covers a large plantation and fisheries, even apart from the possible tourist industries. The perceived economic advantages from the potential territory will obviously need to be controlled from the new provincial capital and this is the root of the current dispute over the location of the new capital city. In the eyes of the local political elites, the decision over the new capital is crucial for taking advantage of the perceived economic benefits to be controlled and accrued in the near future.

Control over the economy can only be achieved if the political elites manage to dominate the local government bureaucracy. This appears to be what is currently happening in Central Sulawesi, in which the local politicians and the local bureaucrats are negotiating a political solution for the deadlock over the location of the provincial capital. Religion and ethnicity are interestingly missing in the campaign for the creation of East Sulawesi province. Apart from the communal conflicts that occurred in Poso (1999-2001) in which religion has clearly been used in mobilising the combatants of the warring parties, it has not been a mobilising force behind the creation of the new province. The population of the new territory will be predominantly Muslim (70 percent). The Christian population will comprise approximately 24 percent Protestant and

²³ See an interesting observation by Nils Bubandt and Andrea Molnar (2004: v) that news reports on communal conflict in Maluku (which broke out on January 19, 1999) portrayed it as religious conflict which also influenced people in different localities. Also, the return of around 400,000 IDPs to Southeast and South Sulawesi from the conflict in Ambon obviously increased conflict tensions between Muslims and Christians in Poso.

²⁴ See van Klinken (2005).

²⁵ At present a process of carving out Poso Kota (Poso city), where most Muslims reside, from the rest of Poso is underway.

two percent Catholic, and there will be about four percent Hindu, with one percent belonging to other religions. The majority of the Christian-Protestant population will be located in the new Poso district with Tentena as its centre.

The Christian-Protestants in Poso mostly reside in areas out of Poso city, where the inhabitants are mostly Muslims. The communal tensions between the Muslim and Christian populations in Poso district apparently continue to this day as they live in segregated areas. Some Muslim leaders in Poso city have already been campaigning to separate Poso city from Poso district and establish Poso Kota. Such a Muslim campaign obviously creates feelings of insecurity among the Christian population. The continuing communal tensions in Poso weaken the case for the promotion of Poso as the capital province of East Sulawesi. Poso has, however, always been considered as having the legacy as the oldest city in the middle-belts and thus it is considered that it deserves to become the capital of the new province. Apart from the continuing conflict in Poso district, the demand by the political elites for a new provincial territory seems to be purely economic, and does not constitute any kind of ethnic or religious group demand. The campaign for establishing East Sulawesi province represents a politics of transcending boundaries that illustrates the possibility of enhancing civic nationalism at the local level.

5. Conclusion

The creation of the Indonesian constitution has been the outcome of a political process in which the two basic principles of organising the state continue to be contested, namely federalism and centralism. The combination of Indonesia's geographical landscape and its national and regional historical trajectories continue to shape the existing state format and government structure. The dominance of centralism over federalism has significantly influenced the discourse and practice of decentralisation policy design and the structural relationship between national and local governments. The mystification of the unitary state of Indonesia that is most clearly advocated by the military elites has strongly influenced the entrenchment of short-sighted nationalism and the development of a centralistic bureaucratic polity. For too long the discourse over local government has been dominated by the idea that regional development should emphasise administrative functions with the absence of any real devolution of power. The regional development discourse in the past represented the triumph of central government as being identical to national government and designating local government as merely an extension of the central government.

The local government discourse that reemerged after Suharto stepped down in May 1998 reflects the spirit of local autonomy and the emergence of decentralisation ideas as seen in the creation of Law 22, 1999, on regional government and Law 25, 1999. The new regional autonomy laws, while attracting local political elites to voice their long-held resentment toward the central government, also created the space and stimulated the drive to create new territorial boundaries from the provincial level down to village-level governments. In many instances the appearance of new territories, however, reflected the local elites' manipulation of communal identities in the process of crafting new territorial boundaries. The creation of new regions however, is permitted so long as it does not go beyond the unitary state principles. The replacement of Law 22, 1999, with Law 32, 2004, by the Megawati government, and the calls to restrain the drive to establish new provinces and districts by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in his presidential address on the commemoration of Independence Day in mid-August 2006 apparently constitute the state's demand for the return of strong centralism.

The campaign for East Sulawesi province is one example of how local political elites have responded to the post-Suharto decentralisation policy. The violent communal conflict that coincided with the splitting of Poso district could be a sign of the manipulation of communal identities to speed up the process of creation of the new district. Yet, the prolonged communal conflict in Poso has also hampered the approval process for the creation of the new province by the central government.²⁶ Having the required five districts for the creation of the new province is perceived by the proponents of the creation of East Sulawesi as vital to their endeavors. The campaign for East Sulawesi province reflects the politics of transcending boundaries in which the political elites have set aside their ethno-religious identity differences to achieve their political and economic goals. The middle-belts of Sulawesi where the East Sulawesi province will be located are a territory in which fluid cultural boundaries exist among peoples with different collective identities. Pragmatism among the political elites in Palu has seemingly prevailed and submerged the ethnic and religious differences in the region. Locating the campaign to establish East Sulawesi province in a wider national perspective can be seen as a dilemma confronting Indonesia's long-standing unitary state format. The unitary state format has produced a centralistic government in which the province is merely an extension of the central government, which in turn only implements top-down policies. In such a bureaucratic polity environment, it is only an illusion to expect that the province will play a bigger role in improving the people's social and economic welfare. In the context of a heavily centralised state, the crafting of a new province will only expand the control of the central government. The devolution of power as the essence of decentralisation will only materialise, perhaps, if Indonesia is willing to adopt the substance of the federal idea and the principle of civic nationalism.

²⁶ Recently, conflict has flared between the people and the local bureaucrats over the movement of the capital of the new Banggai Kepulauan district, which has presumably also affected the process of central government granting status to East Sulawesi as a new province.

6. References

- Acciaioli, Gregory L., 1989. *Searching For Good Fortune: The making of a Bugis Shore Community at Lake Lindu, Central Sulawesi*. Unpublished PhD thesis, Australian National University.
- Adriani, N. and Kruyt, A.C., 1912-14. *De Bare'e sprekende Toradja's van Midden-Celebes*. Batavia: Landsdrukkerij. Four vols.
- Antlov, Hans, 1999. "In Indonesia: Disentangling the Confusion about Federalism". The Jakarta Post, June 3.
- Bubandt, Nils and Andrea Molnar, 2004. "On the Margins of Conflict: Violence, Politics and Everyday Life in Eastern Indonesia". *Antropologi Indonesia* 28, 74, pp. i-vii.
- Davidson, Jamie, S., 2005. "Decentralization and regional violence in the post-Suharto state". In Maribeth Erb, et al. (eds) *Regionalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia*. London and New York: Routledge Curzon.
- Diprose, Rachael, 2007. "Passing on the Challenges or Prescribing Better Management of Diversity: Decentralization, Power-Sharing, and Conflict Dynamics in Central Sulawesi, Indonesia", *CRISE Working Paper* No. 38.
- Dhakidae, Daniel, ed., 1999. *Federalisme Untuk Indonesia (Federalism For Indonesia)*. Jakarta: Kompas-Gramedia.
- Encyclopaedie, 1917-21. *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië*, Leiden: Brill, 's-Gravenhage: Nijhoff. Eight Vols.
- Harvey, Barbara Sillars, 1989. *Pemberontakan Kahar Muzakkar: Dari Tradisi ke DI/TII (Kahar Muzakkar Rebellion: From Tradition to DI/TII)*. Jakarta: Grafiti Pers.
- Henley, David, 2005. *Fertility, Food and Fever: Population, Economy and Environment in North and Central Sulawesi, 1600-1930*. Leiden: KITLV Press.
- Ishak, Otto Syamsuddin. 2003. "Epilog". In Lasahido, Tahmidy, dkk., 2003, *Suara Dari Poso: Kerusuhan, Konflik dan Resolusi (Voices from Poso: Communal conflicts and Resolution)*. Jakarta: Yappika.
- Klinken, Gerry van, 2005. "New actors, new identities: Post-Suharto ethnic violence in Indonesia". In Dewi Fortuna Anwar, et al. (eds) *Violent Internal Conflicts in Asia Pacific: Histories, Political Economic and Policies*, pp. 79-100. Jakarta: Penerbit Obor.
- Kortleven, K.S., 1927. 'Nota van toelichting betreffende het zelfbesturend landschap Toli-Toli' [NA MvO KIT 1199.]
- Kruyt, A.C., 1898. 'Van Paloppo naar Poso', *Mededeelingen van wege het Nederlandsch Zendelinggenootschap*, 42:1-106

- Kruyt, A. C. 1938. *De West-Toradjas op Midden-Celebes*. Amsterdam : Noord-Hollandsche. 4 vols.
- Lay, Cornelis, 2003. "Otonomi Daerah dan Keindonesiaan", dalam Abdul Gaffar Karim (ed.) *Kompleksitas Persoalan Otonomi Daerah di Indonesia*. hal. 3-32. Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar.
- Liddle, William R. (ed.) 2001. *Crafting Indonesian Democracy*. Jakarta: Pustaka Mizan
- Linz, Juan, J, 1997. "Democracy, Multinationalism and Federalism". Paper presented at the International Political Science Association Meeting in Seoul, South Korea, August 1997, at a session organised jointly with the Society for Comparative Research.
- Mangunwijaya, Y.B., 1998. *Menuju Republik Indonesia Serikat (Toward a Federal Republic of Indonesia)*. Jakarta: PT. Gramedia.
- Murray Li, Tania, 1999. "Marginality, Power and Production: Analysing Upland Transformations". In Tania Murray Li (ed.) *Transforming the Indonesian Uplands*, pp. 1-44. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers.
- Nadjamuddin, Lukman, 2002. *Dari Animisme Ke Monoteisme: Kristenisasi di Poso 1892-1942* (From Atheism to Monotheism: The Christianization in Poso 1892-1942). Yogyakarta: Penerbit Yayasan Untuk Indonesia.
- Rae, Robert, 2003. "Federal Idea and Secession". Paper presented at the Bandaranaike Peace Institute, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 27 July.
- Ricklefs, M. C., 1983. *A History of Modern Indonesia*. London: Macmillan.
- Rohde, David, 2001. "Indonesia Unraveling?" *Foreign Affairs*, 80 (4): 110-124
- Roth, Dik, 2005. "Lebenstraum in Luwu: Emergent identity, migration and access to land", *Bijdragen*, Vol. 161, No. 4, pp. 485-516.
- Sangaji, Arianto, 2006. "Kekerasan Poso dan Ekspansi Modal" (Violence in Poso and Capital Expansion), *Kompas*, 12 September.
- Schrauwers, Albert, 2000. *Colonial 'Reformation' in the Highland of Central Sulawesi, Indonesia 1892-1995*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Schiller, A Arthur, 1955. *The Formation of Federal Indonesia 1945-1949*. Bandung: W. Van Hoeve LTD.
- Smith, Brian C., 1985. *Decentralization: The Territorial Dimension of the State*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Tirtosudarmo, Riwanto, 2005a. "The mystification of the unitary state of Indonesia", *The Jakarta Post*, October 14.
- Tirtosudarmo, Riwanto, 2005b. "Indonesia: Decentralization and Horizontal Inequality", Paper presented at the 50th QEH Anniversary Workshop, Oxford, 4-6 July.

Tomagola, Thamrin, 2003. "Prolog". In Lasahido, Tahmidy, dkk., 2003, *Suara Dari Poso: Kerusuhan, Konflik dan Resolusi* (Voices from Poso: Communal Conflicts and Resolution). Jakarta: Yappika.

Newspapers

Nuansa Pos, 29 January 2001

Nuansa Pos, 7 February 2001

Palu Press, 3 January 2001