EUROPEAN SECURITY: 
THE ROLE OF THE ORGANISATION FOR SECURITY 
AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE 

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Abstract

The paper traces the evolution of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) into the present Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the contribution of both to regional security. The former is found to have played a major role in winding down the Cold War in favour of détente (e.g. via arms control). Had there been the requisite political will, it might even have assumed the role of a regional collective security organisation in the wake of the Cold War, but it was effectively sidelined by the great powers, especially those of the West. Hence, the OSCE’s main contributions to regional security are today found in such fields as conflict prevention and the promotion of democracy and human rights.

Introduction

Europe used to be the world’s bloodiest continent. This was where the Thirty Years’ War, the Napoleonic Wars, and (most of) the two World Wars took place, as well as the most likely place where a nuclear Third World War might have started. Today, however, most of Europe has been transformed into a ‘security community’ or a ‘zone of peace’ within which war has become well nigh inconceivable. Some conflicts remain at the fringes of Europe, as, for example, in the Balkans and the Caucasus, but all of them are relatively small and have little potential to proliferate; and the zone of peace in the heart of Europe seems to be gradually spreading.

There are many possible explanations for this evolution. It may be the result of a learning process, in the course of which European states have learned (the hard way) that war does not pay; or an indirect effect of the high level of interdependence achieved between the states of the region; or of a stable balance of power, underpinned by a US presence with military forces, security guarantees and nuclear deterrence; or it may be the result of institutionalisation – or, of course, a function of all of the above. Even though mono-causality makes for neat and parsimonious hypotheses and theories, in real life developments are often the result of many causes. In the present paper, the claim shall be made that institutionalisation in general helped bring about the transformation of Europe from a conflict formation to a security community and that, in particular, the all-European Conference on

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1 The author holds an MA in History and a PhD in International Relations, both from the University of Copenhagen. Since 1985, he has been (senior) researcher at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI), which in 2003 became part of the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), where he is attached to the Defence and Security research unit. He served as Secretary General of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) from 1997 to 2000, was external lecturer at the Institute of Political Studies, University of Copenhagen from 1994 to 2006 and at the Centre of African Studies since 2002. In addition to being the author of numerous articles and editor of seven anthologies, he is the author of three books.
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which has today become the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), played a significant role.

The main claim is that the former played an important role as facilitator of a transition from a high-tension Cold War between East and West to a détente for which the main parties (i.e. the two superpowers and their respective allies) were now well prepared. When the loosely organised, but surprisingly effective, CSCE was transformed into a permanent organisation in the early nineties, becoming the OSCE, its inherent potential was not exploited. Rather, the organisation was relegated to a second-order institution. It was charged with what the main actors regarded as tasks of secondary importance, such as supervision of elections, promotion of human rights and mediation in conflicts of minor significance to them. This does not mean that the OSCE is insignificant, but rather that the big players – such as NATO, the EU and some of their great power members (not least the United States) – have managed to sideline it, allowing the two western organisations to take over large parts of the CSCE’s and the OSCE’s agendas for themselves.

The paper begins with an outline of the genesis of the CSCE as a result of different, but converging, interests. A brief account of the changes following the end of the Cold War is then provided in as far as they impacted on the CSCE and its transformation into the OSCE. The paper then proceeds to analyse the contributions of both the CSCE and the OSCE to the security of European states in the broad sense of the term: ‘national security’, to which the CSCE particularly contributed in the form of arms control, disarmament, conflict prevention and human security, with the OSCE investing substantial efforts in the latter, both directly in the form of mediation and various field missions and indirectly via the promotion of human rights and democracy. Finally, a brief survey is provided of the new security challenges facing Europe after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the ensuing ‘war on terror.’

From CSCE to OSCE

As indicated by the name, the CSCE was not an organisation, but a process of ‘conference diplomacy’. The CSCE process was launched during the détente phase of the Cold War in the early seventies, this being a time when both East and West had come to realise that they had to co-exist for an indefinite period, and that this co-existence had better be peaceful. The latter was far from inevitable given the huge concentration of weapons, conventional as well as nuclear, on European soil.

A Convergence of Interests

Germany played a central role in the re-orientation by the West, indeed the process as such could be seen as a way of ‘embedding’ a sea-change in German foreign policy within a multilateral framework. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) had previously stuck to the ‘Hallstein doctrine’, according to which there was only one Germany, and accordingly not only refused to establish foreign relations with the de facto government of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), but also insisted that its allies likewise refused recognition to the GDR (Foschepoth 1988). However, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, under the chancellorship of Willy Brandt and masterminded by his advisor Egon Bahr, the FRG embarked on a policy of engagement with the GDR and the rest of the Warsaw Pact, baptising this the new Ostpolitik and aiming for Wandel durch Annäherung (‘transformation through rapprochement’) (Bender 1986; Griffith 1978).

Besides the GDR – where a strong incentive for the FRG government was to facilitate family
reunions – Poland and the USSR were also important targets. As far as the former was concerned, a major bone of contention was the unresolved Oder-Neiße border issue, resulting from Poland’s annexation of formerly German lands after the Second World War as compensation for a Soviet land-grab in eastern Poland. Poland had simply been moved to the west to the benefit of the Soviet Union. Even though the FRG government was not ready to formally accept the new border, by the end of the sixties it seems to have reconciled itself with it as a fact of life (Bingen 1989).

As far as engagement with Moscow was concerned, three objectives were particularly salient: obtaining the consent of the Warsaw Pact hegemon to a German rapprochement with its smaller allies; reducing the general risk of a war, the first battles of which would almost inevitably be fought on German soil with absolutely devastating consequences; and resolving the outstanding border issues of East Prussia and the former Königsberg enclave, both annexed by Russia, the latter under the name of Kaliningrad. The multilateral framework served to allay possible allied concerns over a bilateral understanding between Germany and the USSR, reminiscent of the Rapallo Treaty of 1922 (Nekrich 1997; Zeidler 1993).

While Germany thus played a leading role, it could not have accomplished a transition to détente unless the other great powers, and especially the two superpowers, had shared the interest in a relaxation of tension. For both the United States and the USSR the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis seems to have served as an eye-opener, demonstrating how close to the abyss the arms race had brought them both and how ‘apocalyptic’ the consequences of a similar crisis in the future might be. They had thus by the late 1960s begun seriously exploring various forms of arms control, mainly concerning nuclear weapons, for which a European détente would provide a convenient political framework. (Dean 1994).

Starting in 1972 with the preparatory negotiations leading up to the Helsinki summit of 1975 (Schramm 1972), the CSCE process was set in motion. Membership in this process was far from obvious at the beginning, as it brought into play both identity questions and power politics. Since it was intended to be a European process, it immediately raised the question of what ‘Europe’ should mean. Three alternative conceptualisations were especially prominent:

- The very narrow and exclusive ‘Europe from Poland to Portugal’ might seem attractive to the West, but anathema to the USSR, as it would exclude the latter from Europe. On the other hand, it was perhaps not all that appealing to France as such a Europe would almost inevitably be dominated by Germany; nor was it really appreciated by the United States as it signified a Europe that could stand on its own feet;
- The somewhat more inclusive ‘Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals’ was attractive to the USSR, but unappealing to Western Europe because it was tantamount to Soviet supremacy in Europe;
- The almost all-embracing conceptualisation, ‘Europe from Vancouver to Vladivostok’, was acceptable to both East and West as it included the United States and Canada as well as Turkey as counterweights to what would otherwise have been a Soviet preponderance. This was the format chosen for the CSCE and retained for the OSCE.

These borders have never since been changed, but the membership has nevertheless grown from 35 to 55, due to the dissolution in the early nineties of the USSR, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.
From Conference Diplomacy to Institutionalisation

Even though there was no predefined timetable for the entire process, the CSCE maintained a considerable momentum, proceeding from one conference to the next (see Box 1), without any ‘fixtures’ such as a permanent secretariat. What maintained this momentum was probably the fact that there was ‘something in it’ for everybody. Hence, states were deterred (by soft means) from acting as spoilers, which they could easily have done, given that every agreement presupposed consensus. There was surely some obstruction, procrastination and feet-dragging in the process, but eventually each obstacle was overcome (OSCE 2000: 6-19; Lucas 1993; Bredow 1992; Schlotter 1999; Schlotter et al. 1994; Dean 1994).

Box 1: From CSCE to OSCE: Historical Highlights

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Negotiations begin</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Helsinki Conference: Final Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Belgrade Follow-up Conference (until 1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Madrid Follow-up Conference (until 1983)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>Vienna Follow-up Conference (until 1989)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Stockholm Conference on CSBMs (until 1986)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Paris Summit: Paris Charter for a New Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Helsinki Summit: Institutionalisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Budapest Summit: Change of name to OSCE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The principles that guided the entire process were formulated as early as the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, and are usually referred to as the ‘Helsinki Decalogue’. The rights of states to peace, equality, sovereignty and territorial integrity were accompanied by a set of rights for peoples and citizens, tantamount to obligations for states to respect human rights (see Box 2) (OSCE 2000a: 10). This gave fledgling civil society groups in the East a platform from which to wage their struggles against oppression.

Box 2: The ‘Helsinki Decalogue’

| 1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty |
| 2. Refraining from the threat or use of force |
| 3. Inviolability of frontiers |
| 4. Territorial integrity of states |
| 5. Peaceful settlement of disputes |
| 6. Non-intervention in internal affairs |
| 7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms |
| 8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples |
| 9. Cooperation among states |
| 10. Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law |

The various decisions were arranged in ‘baskets’ (see Box 3), and their combined contents ensured that the product amounted to quite a comprehensive security agenda. Not all parties agreed on the contents of each basket, but the total package was a true compromise between
This comprehensive approach to security was one of the CSCE’s distinguishing features. Since then, however, both NATO and the EU have similarly embraced broader concepts of security, thus arguably making the CSCE and the present OSCE redundant, as ‘the uniqueness of the OSCE’s involvement in the internal affairs of its participating states no longer holds,’ as aptly put by Pal Dunay (Dunay 2006: 29).

The Soviet Union was, from the very beginning, primarily interested in Basket One, as its contents would legalise its territorial gains from World War II, and Poland had an interest in securing its new border (the Oder-Neisse) with Germany. Besides Basket One, the Eastern bloc was also interested in Basket Two, hoping that economic collaboration would provide it with access to Western technologies. The West was not particularly interested in Baskets One or Two, but mainly in the contents of Basket Three, which it hoped would gradually lead to a liberalisation, perhaps even democratisation, of the communist regimes.

With the end of the Cold War, what had begun as a mere process was transformed into a permanent institution. At a summit meeting in 1990, the *Paris Charter for a New Europe* was adopted celebrating ‘a Europe whole and free’ and it was decided to establish the OSCE in 1992 (Shapiro 1995). It was further decided to proclaim the OSCE a ‘regional organisation’ in the sense of the UN Charter, and it was as such that the UN subsequently recognised it. Along with its all-inclusive membership – with the partial exception of Yugoslavia, whose membership was temporarily suspended in 1992 (Perry 1998) – this makes the OSCE the most ‘legitimate’ organisation in Europe. It is thus the OSCE that should serve as the ‘first resort’ regional organisation for the prevention and settlement of disputes as set out in Article 53 of the UN Charter within the defined territory of Europe (Sidhu 2007).
The institutionalisation of the former CSCE has thus proceeded steadily (see Figure 1) even though the organisation still lacks a legal standing (Brander and Martin Estébanez 2007). However, it is far from obvious that this institution building has been accompanied by any real increase in the importance of the organisation – especially not in the field of ‘high politics’, including security and conflict prevention and management. On closer analysis, most of the ‘branches’ of the ‘OSCE tree’ are very weak, understaffed, under-funded and granted competences quite inadequate for their stated objectives. Some analysts have therefore presented rather convincing arguments in favour of ‘pruning the OSCE tree’ (Kemp 2006; Odello 2005; Zellner 2005a).

This lack of real authority was aptly illustrated during the Kosovo conflict, when in October 1998 the OSCE was tasked with providing unarmed observers to monitor the ceasefire negotiated between the Serbian government and the Kosovar rebels (Troebst 1999). Even though the OSCE deployment never reached the envisaged size, the presence of observers seems to have contributed to a decline in violence. Eventually, however, these observers were extracted at the request of NATO, which was by then determined to launch a bombing campaign. This whole affair did little to enhance the OSCE’s authority, even though the failure (if so it was) might also be attributed to NATO’s obstruction. There are few, if any, signs that this attitude of the West to the OSCE will change. Moreover, in recent years Moscow also seems to have lost most of its former enthusiasm for the OSCE, not least because it does not really appreciate the organisation’s involvement in the various conflicts within the Russian Federation or in its ‘near abroad’, including the so-called ‘frozen conflicts’ in Moldova and Georgia (Ghebali 2005a & b; Zellner 2005b).

We shall now proceed to look at the contributions of the CSCE and OSCE to security, first in the more narrow and traditional sense (related to military issues), and then in the somewhat broader sense, with a special focus on ‘soft’ security issues such as domestic stability, human rights and democracy.
The Security Basket

The contents of the CSCE/OSCE’s ‘security basket’ are today usually referred to as ‘the politico-military dimension’ (Bailes 2006). It includes a wide variety of measures and instruments.

Arms control has all along occupied a central position. It may be subdivided into ‘functional’ and ‘structural arms control’, the former referring to the activities of the armed forces and the latter to their size, composition and deployment. See Table 1 for a rough listing-cum-categorisation of the most important categories.

Table 1: The Military/Security Basket of the CSCE and OSCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Functional</th>
<th>Structural</th>
<th>Conflict Prevention</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>CSBMs</td>
<td>CFE Treaty (1, 1A, 2)</td>
<td>Field Missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Codes of Conduct</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
<td></td>
<td>Counter-Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transp</td>
<td>CBMs</td>
<td>Small Arms Management</td>
<td>Centre for Conflict Prevention</td>
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<td>arency</td>
<td>Seminars on Military Doctrine</td>
<td>Verification</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Open Skies Treaty</td>
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</table>

Functional Arms Control and Transparency-Enhancing Measures

Most of the initial arms control measures of the CSCE were intended to further transparency. They were labelled ‘confidence-building measures’ (CBMs) and intended to reduce the risk of an inadvertent war based on misunderstandings.

To this end, the parties committed themselves to such CBMs – first in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and subsequently in the Stockholm document of 1986 and the Vienna documents of 1990 and 1999 (OSCE 1975: 10-13; OSCE 1986) – as obligations to invite each other’s representatives to observe military exercises above a certain size; to announce exercises well in advance; and to provide a calendar of such manoeuvres combined with a ban on non-scheduled exercises or other re-deployments of forces. The latter set of measures is sometimes referred to as ‘confidence- and security-building measures’ (CSBMs), but the distinction between the two is rather blurred (Borawski 1988 & 1992; Freeman 1991).

Other CSBMs have been debated under the auspices of the CSCE (as well as in academic and political circles) but very few were ever implemented. Intended to hamper surprise attack they would have included constraints on manoeuvres and/or deployment, for instance with a view to lowering the overall state of readiness and/or reduce forces stationed close to the border (Lachowski 1993). In the Vienna Documents of 1990 and 1999 certain obligations were instituted on the provision of information concerning military holdings and deployments, and a mechanism for consultation was established for ‘unusual and unscheduled activities’ (OSCE 1990, 1994a & 1999a).

Certain structural arms-control measures also promote transparency, for example measures to ensure compliance, usually referred to as ‘verification’. This used to be a serious stumbling
block in almost all arms-control and disarmament negotiations due to the Soviet reluctance to be inspected and the US insistence on very elaborate and intrusive on-site inspection regimes. However, with the INF Treaty (on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) in 1987 Moscow rather unexpectedly gave in to most of the Western demands, and verification has never since presented much of a problem. Since then the growing extent and intrusiveness of inspections has significantly promoted transparency (Kokoski and Koulik 1990; Kokoyev and Androsov 1990; Koulik and Kokoski 1994). In 1992, a Treaty on Open Skies was signed that entered into force ten years later (OSCE 1992a), allowing for over-flights by states of other states’ territories and with a special consultative commission established under the auspices of the OSCE’s Forum for Security Cooperation to oversee it (Hartmann and Heydrich 2000; Koulik and Kokoski 1994: 156-190).

An addition to the panoply of transparency-enhancing measures, albeit not formally labelled CBM, were the seminars on military doctrine conducted under the auspices of the CSCE in 1990 and 1991 (Krohn 1991; Lachowski 1992), and subsequently the OSCE’s Forum for Security Cooperation in 1998, 2001 and 2006.² They were probably especially important in the transition period, when the USSR was abandoning its offensive military doctrine in the attempt to wind down the Cold War (Hamm and Pohlman 1990), but they were also possibly significant when a number of new states emerged on the scene, faced with the need to develop military (or national security) doctrines.

The relevance and importance of transparency-enhancing measures and provisions have all along been a matter of some academic controversy. The assumption that they enhance security is based on hypotheses on ‘inadvertent wars’, i.e. either preventive wars or preemptive attacks (Schelling 1960: 207-229), but some analysts regard such scenarios as unrealistic and far-fetched (Gray 1992). They are surely right that it requires very high levels of tension and mutual suspicion for a war to result from misunderstandings. In post-Cold War Europe these preconditions no longer apply – and all countries have (to varying degrees) opened up for internal opposition and scrutiny, thereby automatically also becoming more transparent to foreign observers. Observations of military manoeuvres and related activities may thus have become redundant, except perhaps for exceptional cases where the all-European ‘transparency regime’ may be useful for building or maintaining a modicum of confidence between states politically at loggerheads with each other. The regime may also serve as a template for subregional or bilateral agreements, as was the case with the 1995 Dayton Agreement on Bosnia, which stipulated various CSCE-type CBMs (SIPRI 1996: 232-250).

**Structural Arms Control**

By far the most significant structural arms control agreement was the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty of 1990, covering the member states of NATO and the Warsaw Pact (Falkenrath 1994; Sharp 2006). Its preamble formulated its objectives of establishing a secure and stable balance of conventional armed forces in Europe at lower levels than previously, of eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and security, and of eliminating (as a matter of high priority) the capability for launching surprise attacks and for initiating large-scale offensive action in Europe. Arguably it was thus inspired by the ideas of ‘non-offensive defence’ developed by European academics and others, which had around 1987 been adopted by the new leadership of the USSR as an element of its ‘new thinking’

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² The seminars of 1998, 2001 and 2006 are only mentioned on the website of the Forum (www.osce.org/fsc/13011.html), which provides no details.
The 1990 treaty entailed reductions in the holdings of such major weapon systems as were deemed to embody the most offensive potential. Reductions were both general – stipulating total numbers within the entire Atlantic to the Urals area – and specific (i.e. applied to geographical zones) – intended to thin out forward-deployed forces particularly suitable for surprise attacks. The CFE Treaty entailed a build-down by around one quarter to lower ceilings for each alliance (Sharp 1993). This was by far the most substantial disarmament agreement ever, and in 1992 it was supplemented by a second treaty (CFE-1A) on manpower limits (OSCE 1992b; Sharp 2006: 70-81).

With the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1989 the balance established between it and NATO ceased to make much sense. All non-Soviet members swiftly changed sides, de facto aligning themselves with NATO, even though formal membership was only granted later. Whereas the CFE ceilings had been intended to eliminate a Soviet military superiority, in actual fact it thus created an overwhelming western superiority (Peters 2000; Dunay 2004; McCausland 1999). The subsequent dissolution of the USSR in 1991 further exacerbated the inferiority of Russia as the rump successor to the mighty Soviet Union, inheriting the rights and obligations of its predecessor (Sharp 2006: 98-117; Lachowski 2002). It also left some of the other former constituent parts of the USSR unconstrained by treaty limits, just as it made the fact that the neutral states were unconstrained appear increasingly bizarre, especially as this group included the now rapidly dissolving Yugoslavia. Hence the obvious need to revise the treaty, which was finally accomplished in 1999. However, the amended treaty did not enter into force for lack of the requisite number of ratifications (OSCE 1999b; Sharp 2006: 153-189), and in November 2007 the Russian Federation Council decided to unilaterally suspend participation in the treaty regime. It is doubtful whether it will ever come into force.

It is possible to view the CFE both as an astounding success and as a complete failure. On the one hand, a significant degree of actual disarmament was entailed by its various provisions which clearly set it apart from most previous arms control negotiations and agreements, which had, at best, established rather generous ceilings rather than aiming for reductions. On the other hand, the CFE may well have simply codified what was anyhow bound to happen with the end of the Cold War, when most European states would surely have undertaken substantial reductions of their military expenditures anyhow and, by implication, reduced both their arsenals and military personnel. This does not automatically mean that the CFE regime is completely redundant as it does provide some assurances against a deteriorating security situation in the future. Arguably, the CFE as well as the CSBM regimes have also served as templates for the Dayton Agreement for Bosnia, in the implementation of which the OSCE is also deeply involved. The Agreement’s provisions might be seen as a subregional application of the general principles, stipulating maximum numbers of the same categories of weapon systems and similar CSBMs (Borden and Caplan 1996).

Besides dealing with holdings of major weapons systems, the OSCE has also ventured into the field of arms sales with a set of ‘Principles Governing Conventional Arms Transfers’ adopted in 1993, in which participants pledged their intention to ‘promote the establishment of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of human and economic resources,’ and to ‘further their aim of a new co-operative and common approach to security.’ Unfortunately, however, the document contained very little, if anything, in terms of actually implementable or enforceable constraints on arms sales (OSCE 1993), and it seems to have had absolutely no influence on the actual behaviour of the signatory states. More
recently, the OSCE (through its Forum for Security Cooperation) has also sought to limit the proliferation of SALW (small arms and light weapons), *inter alia* with a *Handbook of Best Practices* for managing them, especially in post-conflict settings, but again without any enforcement mechanisms (OSCE 2000b & 2003a).

**Conflict Prevention and Societal and Human Security**

The immediate aftermath of the Cold War saw a considerable optimism about the possibility of creating a functioning collective security system for Europe on the basis of the CSCE/OSCE (Jaberg 1998). This would have entailed a replacement of the opposing alliances (NATO and the former Warsaw Pact) with a single system based on the twin principles of non-aggression and mutual assistance to any attacked party in the case of aggression. Whether the OSCE would have been able to perform this role if the requisite political will had been there is impossible to determine. As the West did not show the slightest interest it was never attempted. While it was also initially envisaged that the OSCE would become engaged in peacekeeping, this has never been implemented, but UN peacekeeping operations have rather been outsourced to NATO as the latter preferred it (Milinkovic 2004).

As it happened, the initial enthusiasm and optimism soon gave way to an ‘OSCE pessimism’. Because the West refused to grant the OSCE the requisite authority, its role was quickly reduced to tasks such as oversight of democratisation, the sending out of election observers and mediation teams. However important they may well be, they were clearly regarded as secondary as far security was concerned, where NATO claimed pre-eminence. The best the CSCE/OSCE could do under these circumstances was to seek to carve out a niche for itself where it could develop comparative advantages.

A Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) was created at the 1992 Helsinki summit, which meets on a weekly basis in Vienna, dealing mainly with arms control, disarmament and CSBMs in the broad sense of the term, including the exchange of military information (OSCE 2000: 116-131; Kuglitsch 1992; Ghébali 1993). In 1994 it adopted a ‘Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security’, which might be seen as a CSBM in its own right. It is tantamount to a set of norms such as not to assist aggressors militarily, to maintain only military forces commensurate with legitimate (individual or collective) defence needs, and to ensure civilian and democratic control of the military (OSCE 1994b). All of these provisions were, however, left without any underpinning in the form of enforcement means and they seem to have been completely disregarded not only by Russia and the states of the former Yugoslavia, but also by the West.

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The Forum has also ventured into the increasingly fashionable – but therefore also quite crowded – field of security sector reform (OECD 2007), with a set of guidelines (Law 2006) and by including SSR measures in the agenda of the various field missions, to which we shall turn shortly. The OSCE secretariat further operates a Strategic Police Matters Unit that has, among other things, published a *Guidebook on Democratic Policing* (OSCE 2006), just as several of its missions include police training. In both cases, however, it is quite difficult to determine the OSCE’s actual significance, as its contributions are often entangled with those of other organisations and agencies and, perhaps even more importantly, because the developments it is supporting are such as one would in any case expect from democratising states such as those at which most OSCE efforts are directed.

A Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) was also established under the Secretary General and the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, tasked with implementation of early warning, crisis
management and the like. Among other things it maintains contacts with the various OSCE missions, plans future missions, stores all information exchanged between member states and maintains a computer network intended to facilitate communication between governments during crises (OSCE 2004). It may have some capacity to help prevent a crisis between member states from spinning out of control, but this capacity has not yet been tested.

The OSCE has further developed a number of ‘mechanisms’ (i.e. procedures) for dealing with issues such as ‘unusual military activities’ and ‘hazardous incidents of a military nature’, as well as one for ‘early warning and preventative action’. The latter allows countries involved in disputes, as well as third parties and the OSCE institutions themselves, to raise matters of concern with a view to action by, for example, the Permanent Council. At an experts’ meeting in Valletta followed by a Summit in Berlin in 1991 it was further decided to establish a mechanism for the peaceful settlement of disputes (‘Valetta mechanism’), consisting of persons, selected among a slate of candidates, able and willing to engage in mediation efforts (Schneider and Müller-Wolf 2007; OSCE 2000a: 86-91).

By far the most comprehensive and resource-consuming activity of the OSCE has been its various field missions, especially in the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia, summarised in Table 2. Some of these missions may well have been quite successful in preventing an outbreak of violence (Huber 2003; Ghebali 2004; Zellner et al. 2004; Zellner et al. 2005; Evers 2002), but such ‘preventive diplomacy’ tends to be ignored by both the media and politicians, especially when it is undertaken with a deliberately low profile as is usually the case for OSCE missions. Moreover, if the missions are successful, no violence will occur, but then it is often difficult (and always counterfactual) to prove just why it did not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: OSCE Field Missions</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Name/Time</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Albania</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE Presence in Albania (March 1997-present)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Armenia</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE Office in Yeravan (July 1999-present)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Azerbaijan</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE Office in Baku (Nov. 1999-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Belarus</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE Office in</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country</td>
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<td>--------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minsk</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazakhstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE Mission in Kosovo (Part of UNMIK) (July 1999-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int. staff: 296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int. staff: 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE Mission to Latvia (Nov. 1993-Dec. 2001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-7 staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int. staff: Up to 92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int. staff: 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int. staff: 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
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<td>Turkmenistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Security by Indirect Means

The contents of the OSCE’s ‘security basket’ or its politico-military dimension do not exhaust the organisation’s potential contributions to security.

Societal and Human Security

It has now become commonplace to acknowledge that security is more than an absence of military threats to states or regimes, involving also such issues as human rights, democracy and the protection of national or other minorities as contributions to human and societal security – that is, the security of human collectives and individuals (see Table 3).

Table 3: Concepts of Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Referent object</th>
<th>Value at risk</th>
<th>Sources of threat</th>
<th>Form of Threat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Security</td>
<td>The State (Regime)</td>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td>Other states (Sub-state actors)</td>
<td>Military Attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal security</td>
<td>Nations Societal groups</td>
<td>National unity</td>
<td>(States), Migrants Cultures</td>
<td>Genocide, ethnic cleansing, discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Security</td>
<td>Individuals, Mankind</td>
<td>Survival, quality of life</td>
<td>The State Globalisation</td>
<td>Crime, under-development, terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Security</td>
<td>Ecosystem, Species, planet</td>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Mankind</td>
<td>Pollution, warming, destruction of habitats</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As far as the societal security of ethnic or other human collectives is concerned, the OSCE’s High Commissioner on National Minorities has a potentially important role to play (Wright 1996; Cronin 2002; Petrova 2006; Brenninkmeijer 2006; Wæver 1993), for example with the recently prepared recommendations for how to police multi-ethnic societies (Drzewicki 2006), and the same may be the case of the locally appointed ‘OSCE Representatives on Tolerance and Non-Discrimination’ (Hazewinkel 2007).

To the extent that the OSCE is successful in eliminating or reducing discrimination, it will not only improve the societal security of ethnic and other minorities. It may also help prevent (at least some forms of) civil war –such as those caused by the ‘societal security dilemma’ where
one group seeks political power or resorts to violence out of fear of other groups, but thereby provokes other groups to do the same (Posen 1993; Walter and Snyder 1999; Roe 1999). To the extent that minority protection pertains to religious minorities, these activities may also help prevent such localised ‘clashes of civilisations’ as might otherwise be conceivable, for example in the Central Asian member states (Seifert 2001; Abadijan 2006). It may even help prevent such international (or, more accurately, ‘internationalised intra-state’ or ‘transnational’) wars as might be caused by one state coming to the rescue of its persecuted ethnic kin in a neighbouring state – for example, if Russia were to intervene militarily in one of the Baltic states in an attempt to protect its diaspora population, i.e. the Russian national minority (Smith 1999; Költsø 2000; Ziegler 2006).

As far as human rights in general are concerned, a very large part of the OSCE’s activities are devoted to their promotion and protection, which is, for instance, an integral part of all the aforementioned OSCE missions. To the extent that they are successful, this will surely improve the human security of the citizens of the member states – and it may even help prevent terrorism, to which we shall return shortly.

**Liberal Peace?**

The furtherance of democratisation may also be a contribution to security in the sense of preventing conflict and war, as entailed by the increasingly fashionable ‘democratic peace theory’ (Russett 1993; Elman 1997; MacMillan 1998; Brown et al. 1996; Gowa 1999; Gaubatz 1999; Ray 1995; Weart 1998). It comes in three variants (Gleditsch and Håvard 1997), which may be labelled the monadic, dyadic and systemic versions:

- **The monadic version** claims that democratic states are simply more peaceful than non-democracies, *inter alia* because decisions to go to war will be taken by the entire population, i.e. those who would be most affected by the consequences of war. However plausible this thesis may appear, there is absolutely no empirical evidence to support it, and international wars are just as often started by democracies as by non-democracies. On the other hand, there is strong empirical support for the thesis that democracy may prevent intra-state conflicts, or at least make the resort to violent means in such conflicts less likely (Newman 1996).

- **According to the dyadic version**, democratic states are very reluctant to go to war against each other, *inter alia* because they understand each other better due to their more transparent mode of decision-making. Even though it is often claimed that there is strong empirical evidence to support this thesis, the evidence is actually much more ambiguous and the theory may actually be either trivial or dubious. Either it rests on a solid empirical foundation, the relevance of which is questionable (as with the numerous analyses based on the behaviour of the Greek city states during the Pelloponesian War in the 5th Century BC) (Russett and Antholis 1992; Bachteler 1997), or it rests on the very narrow empirical basis of stable modern democracies, which have plenty of other reasons not to go to war with each other. If the empirical basis is extended to include partial democracies such as the German Empire prior to the First World War in 1914, or Serbia prior to the Kosovo War of 1999, the hypothesis simply seems to be falsified. According to what we may call the ‘generalised dyadic version’, viewing the world as composed of dyads of states the total likelihood of war is a simple multipluim of dyadic probabilities, and it may thus presumably be reduced by making as many states as possible democratic.

- **The genuinely systemic variant** of the democratic peace theory claims that war may be prevented by means of democracy at the systemic level, i.e. some form of global or ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ (Archibugi and Held 1995; Archibugi et al. 1998), a term that
is hard to define and undoubtedly even harder to realise.

Even though the theory is thus somewhat questionable, it is pretty obvious that many governments, including some of the most influential ones, believe in it and act on those beliefs in the sense of furthering democracy in other states, partly in the hope of thereby enhancing their own security. This may, however, be a vain hope, at least in the short and medium term, as there is plentiful evidence that democratising states (as opposed to mature democracies) are far from peaceful (Mansfield 2005). If the OSCE can help democratise states – and there are good grounds for assuming that it can – it may thus not really further peace and security, but democracy has other appealing qualities which make the endeavour worthwhile. What is really called for may thus be ways to reduce the conflict propensity of states in transition from dictatorship to democracy, to which the aforementioned OSCE missions and its various human rights and minority protection instruments may surely contribute.

Other species of the genus ‘liberal peace theories’ hold that ‘trading states’ are inherently peaceful and that economic interdependence and integration are peace-promoting, which is where the main strength of the European Union may be found. Both the CSCE and the OSCE were also partly influenced by this theory, which may help explain the presence of the aforementioned ‘economic cooperation basket’. This was not merely a *quid pro quo* granted by the West to compensate the USSR for its concessions with regard to human rights. It was also motivated by the western belief that economic development and modernisation in the East would further a modernisation and economic liberalisation that would, in due course, also promote political liberalisation and perhaps even democratisation. These views were more widespread in Europe than in the United States where such optimistic assumptions were trumped by the fear that the USSR might abuse international trade to gain access to western technologies and to improve its general economic performance, at the end of the day using this to boost its military power (Gilpin 1992; Mastanduno 1993; Becker 1986; Stent 1987). Regardless of who was right in this controversy, there was never much substance in the economic baskets or dimensions of the CSCE or the OSCE (Price 2001), and what trade liberalisation and economic interdendency was achieved was mainly due to the workings of other international regimes and organisations.

**New Security Threats and Challenges – post 9/11**

Building on the ‘Charter for European Security’ adopted by the Istanbul Summit of 1999 (OSCE 1999c: 1-13), the OSCE at a ministerial council in Maastricht in December 2003 adopted the *OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century* (OSCE 2003b: 1-12). In this document the organisation underlined its continued commitment to its ‘multidimensional concept of common, comprehensive, co-operative and indivisible security.’ Among the new threats it unsurprisingly mentioned terrorism, organised crime and weapons proliferation.

As far as terrorism was concerned, the document also contained few surprises. Needless to say, the OSCE condemned the phenomenon and underlined the need to prevent it. There was not really much new in this, as this was not the first time the OSCE addressed the issue of terrorism. In December 2001 it had passed the ‘Bucharest Plan of Action’, which was followed in 2002 by an ‘OSCE Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism’ (OSCE 2007; Zaagman 2002; Woo 2001; Raquel Freire 2005; Gargiulo 2006). What is, however, noteworthy is the OSCE’s principled stance on counter-terrorism, emphasizing that it should be ‘in full accordance with the rule of law and international law, including human rights law.’ Seeking to ensure this the
OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights has conducted a series of training sessions for senior public officials, underlining, among other things, the unconditional prohibition of any use of torture (OSCE 2005). The indisputable merits of these norms notwithstanding, several OSCE member states seem to have grossly violated them, either directly (e.g. Russia in Chechnya) or indirectly by making use of the ‘services’ other states that are less constrained – as with the infamous ‘torture taxi flights’ organised by the CIA for suspected terrorists to secret prisons in countries with more ‘liberal’ attitudes (Grey 2006).

The OSCE Secretariat in 2001 created an Action Against Terrorism Unit. As far as the concrete steps to prevent and defeat terrorism are concerned, the OSCE has given priority to such issues as ensuring ratification of the various international conventions on terrorism by all its member states as well as to improving coordination and harmonising legislation. More targeted initiatives have been taken with regard to border security, suppression of terrorist financing, container security, urban transport security, and the control of such weapons (mainly SALW) as might be used by terrorists. Whether, or to which extent these measures have been successful is impossible to determine.

Conclusion

The paper has, hopefully, shown that institutionalisation as represented by the CSCE mattered, even though it was merely an institutionalised form of conference diplomacy. It was not the only factor that ensured that the Cold War did not lead to a shooting war with utterly devastating consequences, but it did make a difference, for example by promoting quite substantial arms control and by making military activities more predictable, thereby creating a modicum of confidence among mortal enemies.

A convincing explanation for this accomplishment was that ‘there was something in it for both sides’ to the confrontation. The broad scope of the CSCE with its three ‘baskets’ allowed for asymmetrical reciprocation, for example in the form of Soviet human rights concessions in return for western concessions in terms of arms control. The norms, principles and procedures created through the CSCE process, as well as the generally improved level of mutual trust, also facilitated the rather swift and unproblematic dismantling of the Cold War and its transformation into an entirely new kind of international system.

The CSCE’s metamorphosis into a formal organisation might have been helpful in this respect, but it is impossible to verify this assumption, as the organisation was effectively sidelined by the two western organisations, NATO and the European Union. They not only took over large parts of what had been the CSCE’s and the fledgling OSCE’s agenda, but they also denied the OSCE the authority and resources that would have allowed it to play a role commensurate with its official mandate as the supreme regional security organisation in and for Europe. The OSCE was thus effectively sidelined and relegated to tasks regarded by the two organisations and their dominant member states as being of only secondary importance – such as the observation of elections and the promotion of human rights. However secondary such tasks may appear to the western powers, they are fortunately of considerable importance for the beneficiaries – mainly the European countries undergoing the difficult transition to democracy.

If there are any lessons to be drawn from the CSCE/OSCE experience for other regions it may be that the process nature of the CSCE may be worth emulating, as it tends not to raise hopes so high that they are likely to be frustrated. The same may be the case of the ‘basket format’ and the comprehensive scope of both the CSCE and the OSCE that are well suited to
‘asymmetrical setting’ where strengths and weaknesses are unevenly distributed, say with one state being militarily strong but economically weak whereas others are in the opposite position. Moreover, as opposed to military alliances such as NATO, it does not invite militarisation; and contrary to the multidimensional integration organisations such as the EU, it presupposes neither strong and prosperous states as components nor any high degree of economic interdependence (Møller 2004).
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