Donor coordination in an uncoordinated development environment?
The case of education in Pakistan

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Introduction

Pakistan is far from Paris. The elegant phrases of the Paris Declaration on ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability (with their proposed targets and indicators) are in a different world from the realities of negotiating grants and loans in Pakistan. Of course, the Paris Declaration is known by senior officials in government and by local agency representatives. But on the other side, the framers of the Paris Declaration were not primarily thinking about political administrations as complex as Pakistan’s; so words such as ‘federal’, ‘provincial’, and ‘district’ don’t even appear in the Declaration. There are just ‘global level’ and ‘country level’. The sheer complexity of federal, provincial and federally-administered areas in Pakistan, and the history of attempts at devolved government have major implications for any initiatives in improved donor coordination.

There have of course been some activities that sound like movements towards aid coordination, and we shall discuss these briefly below. But in a country where the wider geo-politics since 9/11 have made many donor countries more aware of the range of reasons for their continued or renewed diplomatic presence in Pakistan, it is perhaps not the best moment to hope for reduced visibility and identity for aid agencies, through joint or pooled projects and programmes. Nor is a political situation where there appears a great urgency to get something done in the social sectors the

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1 This is an element of a DFID-funded research project which is concerned with the impact of aid on education policy and outcomes in recipient countries. It is being conducted under the auspices of the Research Consortium on Educational Outcomes and Poverty – a collaborative research partnership between the Universities of Cambridge, Oxford and Edinburgh in UK and research institutions in India, Pakistan, Kenya and Ghana. The views expressed in this briefing note may not be attributed to DFID or to any of the partner institutions. For details of the objectives, composition and work of the consortium see: www.educ.cam.ac.uk/RECOUP.

2 In Islamabad the authors visited, during the period 4th-11th March 2008, the bulk of bilateral and multilateral agencies involved in the Education sector, as well as selective federal government bodies. See list in Annex.

3 See also EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and the Division of Labour in Development Policy, downloaded from http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/r13003.htm

4 Pakistan is a signatory to the Paris Declaration. Riddell claims that the Paris Declaration is not well-known in the sectoral ministries (Riddell, 2007a: 18). By contrast we found it rather widely referred to in our discussions.

5 For a valuable account of the evolution of development assistance in education in Pakistan and its relation of the evolution of national policy, see Malik 2007. See also Bari and Malik 2007 on the role and importance of aid to education in Pakistan.
best climate to be encouraging the much longer processes associated with donor coordination, whether in projects, programmes or technical assistance.

But long before 9th September 2001, there were already some key structural issues in the environment of development assistance in Pakistan that would make it particularly difficult to align with the criteria of the Paris Declaration, such as increasing the proportion of programme aid and reducing the number of delivery mechanisms running parallel to those of government. We shall look at one of these which seems likely to continue strong pressures towards the ‘projectisation of aid’ even when it might appear that there is increasing use of programme based approaches (PBA) and budget support (BS). We shall also look at a cluster of initiatives which illustrate the current climate of donor coordination. These would include the trajectory of the hesitant moves towards an education sector-wide approach (SWAP) and the current status of the Fast Track Initiative (FTI). Both these initiatives are closely related to the presence, absence and influence of the Donor Education Group (DEG). We shall end with a note on the increasing interest of donors in results and in outcomes, and how this may impact on the appropriate modalities to reach there. In particular we shall mention the current debate about the aid modality of budget support and its relations to educational outcomes.

Pakistan’s historical pressures towards the continuing projectisation of aid

In a global situation where there is some considerable rhetoric about the need to move aid more to programme based approaches (PBA) rather than projects, it may be worth considering how this international trend looks through the Pakistan end of the telescope. The Paris Declaration states that the percentage of aid that is provided as ‘programme based approaches’ should reach 66% by 2010 (OECD (DAC) 2005: 10). At the same time, and from the same source, there is pressure to strengthen local capacity by reducing by two-thirds the number of parallel project implementation units (PIUs) linked to donor projects.

Be that as it may, there are some powerful, long-standing pressures within Pakistan, at federal and provincial level, that strongly encourage the projectisation of development. These pressures operate on national initiatives as much as on external, and they relate directly to the sharp division between the regular recurrent budget and the development budget. Our current understanding is that all new projects or programmes if they are not somehow covered by the regular budget, need to become part of the development budget. In both India and Pakistan, historically, this meant that they were part of the Plan expenditure. In Pakistan, such new or additional expenditure needs formally to be made part of the development budget through the use of a proforma named after the Planning Commission, - PC1. This mechanism for development planning goes back to 1952, and was revised in 1961 and again in 1995.

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6 There is also a Donors’ Coordination Working Group (on Skills Development) which has started in late 2007.
7 Both countries still have Planning Commissions, but only India still has the traditional five year planning cycle. Pakistan’s last five year plan ended in 1998; it now has annual plans and Medium Term Development Frameworks (MTDFs).
8 1.49 In Pakistan, the present method for planning, processing and reporting on development projects is based on the "Rules of Procedure for Economic Council", Planning Commission and Planning Sub-Commissions, issued by the former Ministry of Economic Affairs,
It is the route taken by a great deal of external assistance, whether it is notionally called project or programme aid. It does not however cover assistance coming into Pakistan from international NGOs; these are covered by a Memorandum of Understanding.

Once it has been agreed as development expenditure, it is then possible to set up procedures which can take on new staff, build new buildings, develop new curricula, run inservice training programmes etc etc. One of the most important aspects of being in the development budget is of course the possibility of hiring specialist staff, which has, at times, been very difficult to do within the regular recurrent budget because of recruitment bans. Such staff are frequently drawn from line ministries and operate in a whole array of education sector reform units (ERSUs), reform support units (RSUs) and programme or support units (PSUs) which certainly seem not any different from the older PIUs. These staff are often paid significantly more within the project or programme unit than in their former position if they came from line ministries. 9

As we have said, this dispensation of considerable flexibility within the development budget for new arrangements is not confined to donor initiatives. It is equally a window of opportunity for both provincial and federal level to hold moneys that can be utilised outside the staffing and other constraints of the regular budget. But what it means for both Pakistan policy makers and for agency staff is that there is a big challenge in what may be termed the ‘normalisation’ of successful projects. This is of course a very old issue – how to build on something that has worked in one district, or how to scale up from an initiative that is promising. But there seems to be an additional challenge in a situation where the successful project has been associated with the development budget. There are important initiatives such as the National Education Assessment System (NEAS) and the National Education Management Information System (NEMIS) which remain projects when they should really have become part of the regular education budget. 10 Similarly there are large-scale projects like the Primary Education Programme in North West Frontier Province (NWFP), which has been running since 1996, co-financed by Germany, Britain and the Netherlands, with the usual project implementation unit, 11 but now 12 years later, it is still a project. Equally, in-service teacher training in Pakistan continues its long-term project status, almost entirely dependent on donor initiatives.

Doubtless, one challenge is related to personnel: the implementation of these projects was made possible by the commitment of dedicated additional personnel in the project support units. And it may well be that the selective ban on the recruitment of new staff, especially in the education sector, was by-passed simply because this was a

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9 These project allowances range from 20,000 to 50,000 Rupees per month in the senior grades of 17-20 in GOP pay-scales. It should be noted that of all the donors, Japan’s JICA (and presumably also JBIC) are virtually in resisting the additional payments which are associated with being in an agency PIU.

10 NEMIS remained in the project mode for 17 years, and even when taken into the regular recurrent budget as late ad 2007 lost all its non-salary capacity to carry out crucial tasks, such as standardisation, workshops, training, computing support etc.

11 There are thirty positions, including senior positions, in the NWFP Education Sector Reform Unit (NESRU).
PC1 project. But the regularisation of such projects into the ordinary landscape of the ministry is very far from straightforward. What happens to the 30 positions which are associated, for example, with the NWFP Education Sector Reform Unit (NESRU)? And what happens to the salary increments that would have been applicable to some of its positions whilst it was a ‘development project’? As another example, what actually happened to the long-running Pak Holland Metal Project under the NWFP Department of Industries and Labour, for upgrading skills and technology in the informal sector, when it eventually became mainstreamed, and its project implementation unit of some 40 personnel become regularised down to 4?

These support units are not necessarily called PIUs any longer, but their function appears remarkably close to the older mechanism which was so powerfully criticized by Jaycox, World Bank Vice-President for Africa, as long ago as 1993:

> A third thing is to avoid undercutting. It's now forbidden for us to have any project management units on any World Bank-financed projects in Africa. It's going to be run by the Ministry or it's not going to happen. It's going to be designed in a way that it will not use foreign expatriate residents. You can have people come in for a week and come back six months later to see what happened. We'll finance that, but no resident expatriate, without coming to the loan committee, and I'm chairman on the Loan Committee on Africa. Nobody; no exceptions. It's a big change. (Jaycox, 1993: 10)

More work will be needed on how the current raft of project support units in Pakistan differs from Jaycox’s critique, apart from the expatriate element not being really significant in Pakistan. But there are certainly a whole range of critically important tasks allocated to NESRU which we just mentioned above, including the release of funds for development works in each of the districts, carrying out inspection and coordination at the district level, as well as policy development planning, coordination, monitoring & evaluation. What happens to these at the end of the current 3 year contracts for NESRU staff? This same question applies to all the other project support and reform units at provincial and federal levels. And in case this is thought to be just an occasional aberration, it should be noted that there are well over a 100 projects in 2008 at the Federal level, and hundreds upon hundreds if all the provinces and federally-administered areas are counted.

In other words, the Paris Declaration may happily say: ‘Avoid, to the maximum extent possible, creating dedicated structures for day-to-day management and implementation of aid-financed projects and programmes’ (OECD [DAC], 2005: 5), but the reality of budgeting traditions in Pakistan requires that new initiatives start life as development projects. Exactly how many project support units there currently are in the education sector alone at federal, provincial and district levels is not yet known, but what is clear is that a substantial number of PC1 activities are not donor-funded. Hence the reduction by two thirds in ‘parallel project implementation units’ a la Paris is not by any means a donor decision alone.

There may nevertheless be an element of external pressure that contributes towards and even strengthens the long-standing sharp distinction between the two budgets
The sharp distinction between the development and the recurrent budgets is because of the fact that every government wants to show a huge development budget to show its commitment and priority for development activities. To inflate the development budgets, provinces like NWFP are catering to in-service teacher training through development budgets rather than recurrent, where it should actually be placed. This syndrome for projecting heavy development budgets is also because of [external] pressure on the government to increase its development spending. (bilateral donor to King, 10.3.08, Islamabad)

This political economy of projectisation through the development budget would seem to be in conflict with some agencies’ interest in sector or general budget support. Thus, financing may, in the case of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank, increasingly be via budget support, but key aspects of their programme based approaches continue, for the reasons just analysed, to be projectised. Thus, the ADB continues to have both programme support units (PSUs) and local support units (LSUs) tasked with the delivery of the various components of their Devolved Social Services Programmes (DSSP). Its main PSU for a particular DSSP, such as Sindh, is responsible for programme management and for the policy reforms. A senior government officer and an international consultant co-direct the PSU, and there are LSUs in all 16 districts of the province (ADB, 2003b: 25).

The PSU which is arguably a separate project mechanism outside the line sections of the ministry is responsible for a whole series of critical activities: the inception report; quarterly reports throughout the loan period; the completion report; but more important the PSU is the body charged with implementing a huge array of crucial project activities, through PSU responsibility for the Project Performance Management System (PPMS). Using the rather explicit donor-driven phrase ‘The Borrower shall cause Sindh to..’, the agreement specifies:

The Borrower shall cause Sindh to ensure that the PSU shall be responsible for the PMMS, including tracking devolved social services sector financing and policy actions, and programme indicators based on the Policy Matrix. (ADB, 2003b: 27)

It may prove valuable to establish, 15 years after Jaycox, the sheer scale and influence of this project modality in Pakistan, within the education sector. But in view of our concern about the impact of aid on education outcomes, to which we come later in this paper, it seems important to establish whether this key mechanism which lies at the very heart of the development process, both national and external, does continue to have a powerful influence. Much of this projectisation of development aid would seem to fly directly in the face of the rhetoric about the advantages of programme based approaches and even budget support. In other words, it seems possible in Pakistan for an aid modality such as budget support to be adopted, as in the ADB’s

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12 The same appears to be true of the parallel DSSP to Punjab. Indeed the technical assistance components, funded by DFID, include the recruitment of 4 consultants to the PSU (ADB, 2004: 19).
13 The Borrower shall cause Sindh to establish the PPMS … to monitor and evaluate, inter alia, use of Counterpart Funds, financing, policy reforms and recruitment, etc., in the devolved social services sector from various reports, sector output indicators (ADB, 2003: 27)
Sindh and Punjab’s Devolved Social Services Programmes, or the World Bank’s Development Policy Credits (DPCs), but for these financial and budgeting arrangements to co-exist with parallel project management under some form of PMIU.

This conundrum of aligning with one part of the Paris Declaration, in terms of the aid being reported on partners’ national budgets, and being transferred through partners’ financial management systems, on the one hand, but continuing some form of parallel overall planning, monitoring and reporting of the project that is out of alignment with Paris, on the other, does not appear to have been much discussed in the aid literature, though it is of course admitted by local donor agencies and by all the relevant policy bodies in the Government of Pakistan. Indeed, in a classic example of this apparent paradox, there is a DFID/USAID-funded volume dedicated to understanding the Options and recommendations for education sector budget support in Pakistan (UNESCO, 2006), where this co-existence is admitted but, strangely, not analysed:

Projects using parallel systems occur where the donor takes the lead in project design and appraisal and employs disbursement and accountability procedures that by-pass those of the government.

Pakistan has experience of projects using parallel systems (e.g. USAID’s Education Sector Reform Assistance Programme). Given the DBS [direct budget support] focus of this document, however, it is not proposed to go further into such project experience. (UNESCO, 2006: 39)

In terms of our interest in this paper in teasing out some of the differences in perspective and culture between what may be called the headquarters’ vision of aid modalities and effectiveness, and the view of those on the spot in Pakistan who have to deal with the day to day realities of project and programme development, it should not be surprising to find that local donors learn to live with these apparent contradictions. See for example the following comment on the coexistence of budget support with parallel project management:

Having said this, it is correct to aver that irrespective of budget support or otherwise, a PMIU would be a project as long as the PC system prevails (I am not sure whether it is good or bad). In fact all development aid, irrespective of the medium or method for transfer of moneys, would always be operationalised through 'projectisation'. PMIU cannot be an exception. I have not looked at specific documents but will be very surprised if it does not owe its existence to a PC-1 somewhere. (Bilateral donor to King, 10th March 2008)

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14 See items 3 and 5a in the Paris Declaration ‘Indicators of Progress. To be measured nationally and monitored internationally’ (OECD (DAC), 2005 op.cit)
15 It is noteworthy, in view of the perception of USAID as being opposed to direct budget support, that USAID actually co-funded this exercise. See for example Riddell: ‘Whereas other agencies have been more convinced of the long-term value of DBS, the greater US skepticism of government – as opposed to country-wide stakeholders – has meant that many parallel contributions have been made – typically as project assistance, alongside others’ support of governmental systems.’ (Riddell, 2007b: 21). Riddell does not however note that all the DBS donors also use parallel systems for delivery.
We have spent some time on teasing out this engrained projectisation of development initiatives, which cuts across all sectors, and involves both national (federal and provincial) and external actors, because it has potentially some serious consequences for the long term impact of external assistance. If there is to be tangible impact on local institutional capacity within the education system, in our present case, then the crucial issue is whether at the end of the project cycle there is a way of normalising, mainstreaming or simply capturing the contribution of the project in the ordinary landscape of schools, inservice teacher training, curriculum development, inspection and examination. Our present view, to be analysed more fully in the next stage of the research,\(^{16}\) is that many of the crucial activities in education such as in-service teacher training, assessment, information management which should be part of the regular recurrent budgets of the federal or provincial ministries/departments of education are actually running on the development budget. We thus have the anomaly that the ‘projects wing’ of the federal or provincial government is full of activities that are off the recurrent budget, and have no assured future.

**Mechanisms for donor harmonisation in the education sector**
We turn now to sketch much more briefly some of the mechanisms that might be expected to illustrate different dimensions of donor coordination in support of the education sector. These are the sector-wide approach (SWAP), the Fast Track Initiative (FTI), and the role of the Donor Education Group (DEG). All of these in their different ways assume that the external assistance community can organise itself around the main planning instruments of the government, and agree to strengthen local capacity in a coherent way, instead of each donor running its own appraisals, monitoring and implementation, with the inevitable transaction costs for federal and provincial governments.

**Sector wide approach (SWAP) in the Education sector in Pakistan**
The state of play of the moves towards a SWAP are a useful insight into the challenges of working together in a complex federal system. But before we look at the main attempts in Pakistan to develop a SWAP, it may be worth noting that the federal and provincial ministries or departments concerned with education don't necessarily have the whole range of the education sub-sectors within their jurisdictions. There is therefore a challenge in securing from within a single ministry a sectoral approach that encompasses the education spectrum from early childhood, to primary education, secondary, technical & vocational, adult literacy and higher education. The scale of the ambition to secure a sector wide plan does therefore need to start by acknowledging this. Thus, at the federal level, Higher Education, Special Education, Technical and Vocational Education, and regular School Education are housed in four different ministries or commissions. The federal situation of fragmented authorities is then reproduced, but by no means mirrored, at the provincial level:

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\(^{16}\) The next element of this comparative research will be a history of the elaboration of the domestic/national policy agenda in education and training, and its interaction with the international policy agenda. These policy histories will build very directly on the donor sections of the financing and expenditure papers and provide 20+ year historical overviews of domestic education policy and its relations to international and local donor policy in each of the four countries (Pakistan, India, Kenya and Ghana).
At the provincial level, the set up varies from province to province. In Punjab, education is separate from the Department of Literacy & Non-formal Education, [and] the technical and vocational rests with [the] Technical Education & Vocational Training Authority. In Balochistan, the Social Welfare Department looks after literacy and so on (GoP, 2006a: 7).

Within the donor side, there are some parallel discontinuities which would make it difficult to get a truly sector wide approach off the ground. Thus some donors, e.g. USA, Netherlands and the UK, are mandated to earmark a substantial proportion of their education funds for basic education. But basic education is usually much narrower than the Jomtien or Dakar concepts, and comes in fact to mean primary education, even though this is now changing to include lower secondary (or middle school in the Pakistan context). So, there are in fact few donors, with the exception of the Aga Khan Foundation, which can really show that they cover the whole education sector from early childhood to higher education and university development. The implications of this for any so-called SWAP in Pakistan is that it would in reality be a Sub-Sector Wide Approach (SSWAP).

Turning now to the initiatives to get a SWAP (or a SSWAP) off the ground in Pakistan, there are at least two major SWAP-related events, one in November 2006, and one in August 2007. These give some indication of the challenge of developing an education SWAP.

The first of these events was organised by the Planning and Policy Wing of the Federal Ministry of Education in conjunction with CIDA, DFID, UNESCO and UNICEF. Although this might suggest it was a donor initiative, the current evidence indicates that as early as March 2006, at the inter-provincial ministers’ meeting, there was a strong affirmation of the provincial interest in pursuing a SWAP. For that reason, the Federal Ministry ensured that representatives from planning as well as finance would be present at the joint meeting later that year. At the November 2006 meeting itself, however, it is noteworthy that not a single one of the provincial or other administrations mentioned in their presentations the words ‘sector wide’ or ‘SWAP’, with the sole exception of the representative from Azad Jammu and Kashmir, who argued that the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) was a good illustration of pooled funding and that ERRA was utilizing them for developmental activities. ‘He added that this could be considered as one of the best examples of the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) in Pakistan’ (GOP 2006b: 17).

Given that it was the first major event to discuss this modality, and that its purpose was primarily one of familiarising and sensitising officials to the concept, this should not be surprising. However, the key message for both the 28 donor personnel17 and the 32 provincial and other area personnel who were present came at the end of the end of the three-day event, from the organisers in Planning and Policy Wing. It was simple: that changes were required in both the ministry/departments as well as in donor organisations. For the latter the advice was as follows:

Addressing the donors, Dr. Fayyyaz said that he appreciated their invaluable

17 No less than 9 of the donor personnel were from UNICEF, which suggests they had a key role in this initiative.
assistance but added that, however, there was dire need of coordination among the donor community working in Pakistan’s education sector. He requested the donors to work in a more harmonized and coordinated manner so as to avoid duplication of activities, parallel initiatives and geographical overlap.\(^{18}\)

As to the next steps, the Federal Ministry suggested that it was responsibility of the provinces now to move ahead. However, the Economic Affairs Division (EAD), with its proposed Working Group on SWAPs and Capacity Development, suggested to the ADB that it should take over the SWAP baton.\(^{19}\)

The ADB proceeded to convene two meetings, the first with the four sponsors of the November meeting and with Planning and Policy; the Government clarified that they were not asking the donors to develop the sector plan for Pakistan, but just to lay out an agreement to donor coordination. In February 2007, there was a second ADB meeting, but consensus amongst the ADB and other education donors couldn't be reached. So on the initiative of the EAD’s Minister, the baton was transferred to the World Bank.

The Bank in turn held two meetings, but with donors only, and no representatives of federal or provincial government. This may have been sensible since their charge was to develop a donor consensus on the process of coordination around a SWAP. At the more important of these two meetings there were 12 heads of donor missions (or of embassies) and no less that 28 donor personnel present.\(^{20}\)

Although one of the challenges from government to the donors in picking up the SWAP baton had been to reach a consensus on coordination, it is interesting to note that right at the outset of the meeting it was agreed ‘that the workshop would not seek to reach a consensus about the viability of SWAPs for Pakistan’ (World Bank 2007:1). Notwithstanding this hesitation, the workshop outcome was reported to the then Minister of State for Economic Affairs, Hina Khar, as having ‘reached a broad consensus on key underlying principles, issues, constraints and opportunities for SWAPs’.

\(^{18}\) This reinforced at the end of the meeting what the Minister of State for Education, Tahir Kheli, had said at the beginning: ‘SWAp will ensure that: (i) donors align aid with Pakistan’s planning priorities; (ii) local financial and budgeting procedures are adopted, creating uniformity and ease of operation of accounts; (iii) capacity building measures are in accordance with the departmental needs; (iv) the transparency criteria of each development partner are properly harmonized with local criteria; (v) efficient resource allocation for joint missions; joint programming and monitoring; (vi) accountability and monitoring procedures of various development activities are evenly implemented in all areas; (vii) no duplication is made and also that no area of development is left unattended; and (viii) the assistance is channeled to the sector where it is most needed.’ (GOP, 2007: 9).

\(^{19}\) The ADB which had had a successful record in running an informal Donor Poverty Reduction Working Group (DPRG) since 2005, with a sub-group on donor harmonisation and alignment (which had also been called aid effectiveness) was itself planning a meeting on SWAPs in early December 2006, unaware of the Bhurban initiative. Doubtless this was the reason the Minister of EAD asked ADB to take up the SWAP initiative.

\(^{20}\) This time there were no less than 9 World Bank personnel present, including the country director.
The measured principles of this ‘consensus’ as reported to the Minister stressed the crucial role of government leadership; the importance of including in a holistic reform programme all sources of delivery (public, private and NGO); the individual agency barriers to such coordination and harmonisation; the evidence of SWAP-like modalities already existing in provincial reform programmes; and the recognition of different government and aid agency responsibilities at federal, provincial and district levels.

Amongst the salient discussion issues in the meeting, one of the more important for understanding the status, viability and urgency of any new SWAP was the ‘broad consensus that a SWAp-like mode which is promoting donor coordination is evident in varying degrees in the provincial reform programmes’. The more detailed discussions confirmed that this was the case for NWFP, Sindh and Punjab, if not yet for Balochistan. In other words, the World Bank report of the meeting was arguing that the donors already have something close to a SWAP in three key provinces where there is a World Bank investment programme and parallel funding for TA and other elements by different combinations of bilaterals and the EC. All three are already claimed to have budget support from the WB.21

As to next steps, it was agreed that further consultation with concerned federal ministries and provincial departments will be needed to assess the demand for SWAps. ‘The modalities for development assistance would be examined based on the outcome of these consultations’.

On reflection, this sense that SWAP-like modes are already underway in Pakistan must have undermined any great urgency to change from business as usual. Even the Social Action Programme (SAP) which is widely acknowledged to have been an unsuccessful and inconclusive donor-driven project was said, in a World Bank powerpoint, to be ‘the first example of multi-sector SWAp-like mode in the country and in the region’ (World Bank, 2007, powerpoint). Reactions from the bilateral agencies to lack of any subsequent progress are not uniform but would point to the agreements about further consultation with government on SWAps not having been carried forward, about the SWAP-like mode in Pakistan being rather far from a real understanding of SWAps, and about the transaction costs of coordinating around securing a SWAP being too great, especially for the World Bank.

This last comment about the transaction costs of doing SWAps being too high is rather rich, when it is remembered that it is precisely the transaction costs of dealing with all the donors and their separate requirements that is meant to be a trigger for exploring SWAps in the first place.

As to the federal government’s view of this situation, they would be the first to agree that they needed ‘to put their own house in order’ when it came to education sector planning at provincial and federal level. But in this SWAP episode, the government had been wanting the donors to agree that there should be a road-map and agreement about common funding:

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21 In respect of our concern with the PC1 formula in donor agency programming, several donors commented on the need for clarity regarding the requirement of a PC1 when operating in a programmatic mode.
We were throwing down the challenge, and what we were looking for was some pretty basic agreements about common ways of working. They could have come up with pool funding in education; common monitoring (no separate missions); selecting primary education as the first sub-sector; or proposing a single province such as Sindh or NWFP to start with. (MoE to KK and RM, 8th March 2008)

The Fast Track Initiative (FTI) – another potential element in harmonisation?

If this brief check on the pathway towards a possible SWAP in Pakistan provides one lens on donor coordination, the FTI might be another. Though Pakistan is not a low income country, which would allow it automatically to qualify for FTI, the very uncertain state of its progress towards the MDGs in Education, let alone the Dakar EFA Goals would suggest it could well qualify for particular categories of FTI funding. Furthermore, the FTI Compact stresses the very things which we have just been discussing in relation to the SWAP. For donors these are: ‘Help mobilise resources and make them more predictable; align with country development priorities; coordinate support around one education plan; harmonise procedures as much as possible.’ Like the SWAP, there is the same focus on donors coordinating in the spirit of the Paris Declaration.

It may be useful to analyse the pathway towards being Pakistan being included in FTI, along with several other high population countries, such as India, Bangladesh and Nigeria, as part of the strangely termed ‘analytical fast track’ (AFT) group of countries. That agreement for their potential inclusion was reached relatively early in the history of FTI, in 2002, since the then British Minister for International Development answered a Parliamentary Question on 15th March 2003 (almost exactly 5 years ago) to say that Britain had ‘successfully pressed for the inclusion of those countries with the most children out of school—like India (with 30 million children out of school), Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo’ (Benn, PQ, 2003).

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22 Pakistan doesn't appear in the EFA Education Development Index of the Global Monitoring Reports because even the very basic four indicators of access, quality, literacy and gender parity are not available at a national level.
23 Such as the Education Programme Development Fund and Catalytic Fund
24 In 2002 Bangladesh, Democratic Republic of Congo, India, Nigeria and Pakistan were invited to participate in the Education for All - Analytic Fast Track (EFA-AFT) initiative. However, EFA-AFT no longer exists since the Education for All – Fast Track Initiative (EFA-FTI) has evolved from a vertical program and global fund – where participation was on an invitation basis only - to a country-based and country-led process of program development and resource mobilization, with the global partnership providing tools and resources to support, fill gaps and leverage longer term financing. To this end, the FTI partnership has opened up participation to all IDA-eligible countries responding to the EFA-FTI criteria of a Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) and an education sector plan prioritizing Universal Primary School Completion (UPC) and endorsed by the local donor group. Pakistan is likely to be endorsed through the EFA-FTI review process in 2006.
25 The Analytical Fast Track (AFT) was designed to provide interim capacity building support to five high population countries. DFID was the lead donor on the AFT.
If it is correct that Pakistan had already been successfully included as eligible for FTI as early as 2002, it would appear that it was reacting, a full two years later, to a new offer from the FTI Secretariat in the World Bank to be an active participant in the FTI. More work would need to be done to establish just what may have been the problems in ‘fast tracking’ Pakistan’s keen interest in being endorsed for the FTI. But we do know from Rose’s detailed analysis of the FTI process and country selection including for the category of analytical fast track countries in which Pakistan was included that endorsement has not been straightforward (Rose, 2003)\(^{27}\).

There is also the question of who is the lead donor in Pakistan responsible for promoting the process in conjunction with the government. And here it would appear that both DFID and GTZ\(^{28}\) have at different times been thought to be the lead donor, as well as the World Bank. Yet another agency official has argued as recently as February 2007 that with the increased donor aid now coming into Pakistan’s education sector for primary or basic education, it may no longer be as urgent for the country to be included:

Pakistan has been listed for participation in the EFA Fast Track Initiative (FTI) and GTZ has been nominated as the lead donor. The purpose of the FTI is to ensure increased external funding by existing donors in the country, provided Pakistan has a credible sector plan, which meets certain criteria (Indicative Framework). But with the rapidly increasing level of external support to the sector, this instrument for attracting additional resources is no longer necessary, while it is not certain that Pakistan would pass the test of the Indicative Framework at this stage. (Van den Bosch, 2007:2)

This donor comment does not in fact coincide with the GOP position on FTI. The Ministry continues to feel that the grant money associated with the FTI could actually play a key role in the very challenging situation of quality improvement in primary education, and that it would in some ways be preferable to taking substantial loan moneys, as at present, for such purpose.\(^{29}\)

Further analysis, as we have said, will be needed to tease out the extraordinary discontinuities in Pakistan’s candidacy for the FTI, over the period 2002-2008, but it may well prove to be a not dissimilar story to that of the so far failed SWAP pathway. Compared to the readiness of individual donors to make available very substantial amounts of budget support to education in several different provinces (much of which, as we have just said, is loan money), the so-called Fast Track Initiative may

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\(^{27}\) For critical commentary on the early days of the FTI, see ActionAid’s *Fast track or back track? The Education Fast Track Initiative: make or break for the Monterrey Consensus*, April 2003, downloaded 14\(^{th}\) March 2008 from http://www.campaignforeducation.org/resources/Apr2003/AA_Fast0403.pdf

\(^{28}\) In fact GTZ was not formally the lead donor for FTI, but it had been one of the original 5 interested donors, and with DFID’s hesitations, it had continued to support the FTI concept, even sending the Federal Minister to the High Level Meeting on EFA where FTI had been discussed. In addition, GTZ had played one of the most active roles in the leadership of the donor group on education (see DEG below).

\(^{29}\) Much of the loan money is at concessional rates as for example in the Development Policy Credits of the World Bank.
just appear to require too much work on both the lead donor side and also on the government side, to pass the endorsement process. Again, the transaction costs of the new more harmonised modality may be proving greater than the individual initiatives of donors or lenders that wish rapidly to disburse on their commitments. There have also been some very long discontinuities in FTI-GOP communication process, as for example below:

The Government of Pakistan was willing to avail [itself] of the accelerated donors’ assistance for its education sector in general and through Fast Track Initiative (FTI) process in specific. Then Ministry of Education has already requested FTI Secretariat (copy enclosed [2005]) to identify a lead donor to enable us to proceed the case further and to take necessary action to qualify for FTI. This Ministry did not get any response from the FTI Secretariat (MOE copy to KK from 30th November 2007).

The Donor Education Group (DEG)
In many countries with extensive donor involvement and a desire for coordinated working with government there has been a donor group set up. In the case of Pakistan this DEG was set up in 2004/5, and met quarterly with the responsibility for organisation circulating within the donor community. The Planning and Policy Wing of the Ministry of Education was the key link with government. Unlike Uganda, for example, where the Education Funding Agencies Group used to function in relation to government, meeting on a monthly basis, with an agreed memorandum of understanding outlining the roles and responsibilities of the contracting parties (Ward et al. 2006), the DEG in Pakistan has been much less formal. Indeed, it has been characterised by one of the participating donors as much more of a ‘dog and pony show’, with the donors using it not so much for planning, coordination, alignment and policy dialogue, but as a ‘show and tell’. Often this was an opportunity, therefore, not so much to coordinate as to inform others of their individual actions in relation to their provincial or district level funding decisions. One of the only occasions where the donor group was used to any effect was when they engaged at the initiative of the Federal Ministry of Education over the first full draft of the White Paper. Education in Pakistan of 2006. That had provided a real discussion topic, and the donor consensus on the draft was passed back to the Planning and Policy Wing through a single donor representative (USAID).

Since February 2007, the Donor Education Group has not even met. This does not mean that the Federal Government has not continued to engage with donors in relation to the second draft of the White Paper or the emerging National Education Policy. This has continued, but it has been carried out selectively, not for coordination purposes, but rather to get feedback from individual donors who the government judged would make a valuable contribution. In a situation where the donors are, rightly or wrongly, seen by government to be ‘acting according to their own agendas’, there is not seen to be value in coordination meetings just for their own sake. And on the donor side, it is not perceived to be a good use of time if there is nothing tangible to be discussed.

In a situation, as described above in relation to the SWAP, where the donors had not judged it sufficiently important to carry the baton forward in discussion with government, on its side the government has not seen any particular value in
reconvening the Donor Working Group, though doubtless there might be a meeting around the National Education Policy draft.

**Donors’ Coordination Working Group [on Skills Development].**
Before leaving the subject of donor working groups, it is worth contrasting this becalmed DEG with the Donors’ Coordination Working Group [on Skills Development]. This group has only recently been developed, and had its inaugural meeting as recently as 29th January 2008. The purpose of the Working Group was to ensure that all donor assistance to the National Vocational and Technical Education Commission (NAVTEC) was provided ‘in an informed, coordinated and augmentative manner’ (ILO, 2008). In some way parallel to the DEG, the Donors’ Coordination Working Group had been catalysed by the urgent need of NAVTEC to get a coordinated agency response to its *Skilling Pakistan, the National Strategy for Reforming TVET in Pakistan* which had been going through a series of drafts since May 2007. NAVTEC chairs the Group and ILO provides the secretariat, but thus far, unlike the education group, there would seem to have been useful progress and active debate about coordination.\(^30\) Full minutes of the meeting have been circulated and decisions of the Group are recorded. It will meet again very shortly in order to take considered responses from donors to the penultimate draft of *Skilling Pakistan*.

**Other donor coordination initiatives**
It may be worth just signposting other donor coordination activity in Pakistan. We are aware, for example of ‘Road Map on the Implementation of the EU Consensus on Development Cooperation in Pakistan’ (European Commission Delegation, 2007), and of several other donor working groups, such as the Donor Poverty Reduction Working Group (DPRWG) to which we have already referred. These are not concerned specifically with education of course.

One of the potentially more important of these broader initiatives is the ongoing piloting of the ‘One UN’, in which Pakistan is one of eight UN member states exploring the attempt to ‘deliver as one’ rather than as 22 UN specialised agencies. This is certainly long overdue in the view of many other donors. The large group of UN agencies has no less than 2000 staff in Pakistan, with as many as 11 agencies regarding themselves as related to the education sector; and yet the UN proportion of total ODA in Pakistan is as small as 7.9%. World-wide, in the pilot countries, the template for the One UN has meant that the agencies have sought to reorganise their mandates and activities around just five Thematic Working Groups (TWGs), which themselves relate to the Millennium Development Goals. It is still too early to say quite how this attempted coordination of the UN will work out. At the moment, indications are that, perhaps understandably, it is rather demand-led by the UN, with the sub-themes of the new TWGs reflecting most of the existing programmatic priorities of the 22 UN agencies rather than the different sectoral priorities of the Government of Pakistan. Thus there is a sense in which the attempt to consolidate the many fragmented, and often small-scale UN initiatives goes against the grain of ongoing other activities which are organised around single UN specialised agencies, such as UNESCO’s National Education Support Strategy (UNESS) which is also being piloted in Pakistan. This actually reinforces the role of the individual UN

\(^{30}\) This could be illustrated from the minutes. For instance, the important issue of failure to mainstream donor projects at the end of their cycle was brought up in the first meeting.
agency in its relations with the host member state,\textsuperscript{31} and is therefore arguably pulling in a different direction from the One UN.

**Aid modalities and their relation to impact and outcomes: Global issues**

March 2008 was a particularly timely moment to be exploring the complex relationship between the changing modalities of donor aid to Pakistan and their impact on educational outcomes. In general, what the World Bank has termed a ‘results orientation’ in its most recent education policy paper, *Education Sector Strategy Update (ESSU)*, captures a concern that is widespread across the agency world (World Bank 2005). More especially, there is an interest in measuring and monitoring not just the *outputs* of assistance, such as schools built, textbooks delivered, but their *outcomes* on the ultimate intended recipients, the poor. This is well expressed in a very recent impact analysis of Irish Aid:

> Relatedly, a decade or so ago donors focused their attention predominantly on whether the aid they provided succeeded in achieving their immediate goals - building schools, clinics and roads, training teachers and nurses, making credit available to poor people. Nowadays, there is far less interest in the relationship between aid and these *outputs*, and far more interest in broader *outcomes* - namely the difference that aid makes overall to people’s lives, and especially the contribution it makes to reducing extreme poverty. (Riddell, R et al, 2008: iv-v)

But at the same time as these powerful influences are targeting results and impact, there is a third, very contemporary trend that is asking whether the marked trend in several donors away from stand-alone projects to sector and programme based approaches, and towards various forms of sector and general budget support makes it more or less difficult to determine the impact and outcome of development assistance.

Within the last two months in 2008, this concern with ‘the effectiveness of aid instruments (such as budget support, SWAPS, global funds, F7I) in improving educational outcomes’\textsuperscript{32} has been sharpened politically within the UK, whose development ministry, DFID, has been for quite some years strongly identified with the move towards budget support. The National Audit Office (NAO) of the UK just brought out in February 2008 a report entitled: *Department for International Development. Providing budget support to developing countries* (NAO, 2008). And within a month, the House of Commons’ Public Accounts Committee (PAC) had organised a hearing with DFID and the NAO critically to review the findings of the NAO report (PAC, 2008).

The concerns of the NAO and of the PAC were with many dimensions of budget support, including those such as fiduciary risk that are not our principal concern in this paper. But on those dimensions that were related to impact upon, and outcomes for the education systems, the NAO report reached a judgement that through budget

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\textsuperscript{31} See, for example, ‘UNEFF is required for our Organization to play a much more strategic role in supporting national educational needs and priorities and in strengthening its partnership with other development agencies, in conformity with international development goals’ downloaded from http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001480/148002e.pdf

\textsuperscript{32} This particular phrase is taken from one of the proposed terms of reference for the current RECOUP research consortium on outcomes of education.
support ‘service expansion has often been at the expense of service quality’; in addition, it argued that ‘Evidence on the extent to which budget support has yielded better value for money than other ways of delivering aid, or has had an impact on income poverty, is not conclusive’ (NAO, 2008: 4-5).

These are precisely the kinds of issue that are raised very thoughtfully in Riddell et al.’s assessment of Irish Aid:

Managing public expectation of the impact of aid
In common with a growing number of other leading official donors, and consistent with the Paris Declaration signed by all donors, in recent years Ireland has channeled an increasing share of its official aid into joint donor initiatives or given it directly to aid-recipient governments. This pooling of aid funds, which is set to be an increasing feature of aid, makes it even more difficult to trace the relationship between the aid provided by one donor and broad development outcomes. (Riddell et al 2008: viii)

Before turning to the challenges of assessing the impact and outcomes of aid in Pakistan, and particularly in the education sector, we should note that the EFA Global Monitoring Report 2008 has also seriously addressed this ‘impact of aid’ issue for the first time, and has made some measured comments about the pros and cons of quantitative and qualitative assessments (UNESCO GMR 2008: 169-171).

Aid modalities and their relation to impact and outcomes: the view from Pakistan
Within Pakistan, the intention is, in the next phase of this research, to tease out in much more depth the interweaving of the policy histories of the donors and the country (at federal and provincial/district levels). For the moment our intention is merely to give a flavour of some issues for further debate and analysis.

Impact on the national discourse
Donor involvement in the education sector has had ‘mixed results’. 33 Opinions on donors’ contribution vary but the fact that the presence of donors has had a significant impact remains, with a few notable exceptions, undisputed. First of all, this donor influence can be found in the discourse of the policy documents at the national level. The international architecture of MDGs and Dakar is reflected in the priorities and targets in the national education policy plans as well as the development frameworks. While some of this is traceable directly to the government’s own obligation to fulfil its commitment to these international declarations, there is significant evidence of donor influence from within the policy development, framing and drafting of some policy documents. The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers are a case in point. Each country receiving aid from the multilateral lending agencies is obliged to produce these papers that outline the government’s policies to link livelihoods to the process of economic growth, improve public service delivery and reduce poverty. While the papers are the overall responsibility of the governments, there is often donor-supported technical assistance in the drafting of the policy documents due to a lack of

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33 The phrase is taken from the ADB’s comment on what was one of the largest and most donor-driven projects of the last 20 years, the Social Action Programme (ADB 2003b: 4).
capacity within the government’s systems. The result is commonly acknowledged to be a well-drafted and articulated policy document but one that is not necessarily understood or owned by the government.

Furthermore, donors have, in their policy dialogue with federal, provincial and district level, insisted on protection of the social sectors – including, in particular, education.

*Influence on targeting and results orientation*

Second, donor priorities and policy dialogue have helped introduce specific commitments and targets into national policy and these have helped focus resources and direction towards increased concerns for gender parity, retention and quality in education systems. Donor influence on the policy level is also discernible in policy initiatives such the local school committees, the increased assimilation of the private sector schools into partnerships with the public sector to improve social service delivery, and, most recently, the introduction of baseline learning assessment tests in primary and middle schools to assess quality of educational services over time. Interventions such as the national education management information systems (NEMIS), and its provincial parallels, for recording and reporting on outcomes of public schools across the country, are attributed directly to donor influence. In-service teacher training, which we suggested earlier should be a part of the regular recurrent budget, has been funded almost entirely by various members of the donor community, including notably USAID and DFID.

The role of donor involvement in results orientation is evident in the project or programme development process as well. For example, a policy matrix is developed by some donors spelling out specific triggers for loan disbursement which accompany the initial project proposal (PC-1) for each project. These matrices detail specific targets and more general policy reforms (including governance and financial management) that need to be pursued during the length of the project.

Of course, a critical measure of success and of impact on outcomes may be judged by whether an intervention that was introduced as a donor-funded or donor-led project can be sustainably integrated into the regular functioning of the government’s

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34 This is absolutely not the case for key documents such as the *White Paper Education in Pakistan* (December 2006), which was drafted by the Federal Ministry through its own consultants. But as just one example of agency support, the Report of the first SWAP meeting was written up by a consultant paid by UNESCO, as one of the sponsors of the event. But the staff appraisals that lie behind the DPCs and DPLs of the World Bank are written by World Bank teams.

35 The Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILdAT) has recently argued that many leaders of Pakistan’s political parties are not well versed in the basics of their own country’s rights to education, let alone the refinements of the MDGs and EFA Goals.

36 The National Education Assessment System (NEAS) was supported by the World Bank, with technical assistance provided by DFID. Provincial education foundations that are semi autonomous public sector bodies have been set up to work with private sector schools, through the encouragement of the World Bank.

37 The first phase of NEMIS was supported by UNDP, see [http://www.aepam.gov.pk/Nemis.htm](http://www.aepam.gov.pk/Nemis.htm). Subsequent phases have received support from USAID, EC and other donors.
recurrent machinery. Some interventions have been adopted by the governments. But many are still far from being regularised. EMIS and NEAS, like many others, started life as projects and today largely remain donor-funded and propelled initiatives though they may eventually be integrated into recurrent budgets. A UNESCO initiative for teacher accreditation has been successfully adopted by the Allama Iqbal University. Having said that, there is also plentiful evidence of the discontinuation of a number of initiatives after donor money ran out. For instance a number of school buildings constructed under donor-assisted projects remain totally understaffed and underutilised.

At the grassroots level, donor agencies can certainly point to a whole series of specific initiatives, such as the Aga Khan Foundation’s school effectiveness project, or DFID’s Faisalabad experiment, which have secured a measure of success in impacting on school or teacher achievement, and not just by the narrow measure of exam grades, but in generating commitment and enthusiasm at the community level. But it must be recalled that all of these are projects rather than programme based approaches, and each of them needs to be examined in much more depth before confirming long-term sustainability. Meanwhile, these examples of possible project impact coexist with simply hundreds of thousands of schools that continue to be of inferior quality. Despite donor involvement at project, programme and budget support levels, the country is very far from achieving the targets set out in its own national and international policies.

**Issues for further analysis in the ongoing debate about modalities and outcomes**

The choice of modalities for delivering aid has implications for the outcomes at a macro and micro level and vice versa, but we are very far away indeed from being able satisfactorily to theorise these relationships. What follows are a number of suggestions for salient areas of analysis.

*Policy histories of major projects from a modalities-and-outcomes’ lens. e.g. SAP.*

A historical view over the past 20 years reveals patterns of shifts in modalities that more or less mirror the international shifts in policy dialogue on aid. This suggests that it would be valuable to periodise donor aid in conjunction with the changing phases of government within Pakistan. Donors in Pakistan have experimented over time with various modalities of delivering aid, the choices being determined by the objectives as well as a recognition of the larger policy context in the country. The earliest modality to be jointly adopted by the donors in the massive Social Action Plan of the 1990s was that of a type of sector wide policy focus (on primary, secondary higher and all other subsectors of education) implemented through various sub-projects directed at each of the sub-sectors. The structure can be referred to as an umbrella project with sub-projects. This meant 27 projects in all sub-sectors in all provinces. This project was considered a failure because it was considered too large in its scope and too ambitious in what it aimed to achieve. Most important, it coincided with a different kind of SAP, thr structural adjustment programme, that enforced a selective ban on teacher recruitment at the very time that the Social Action Plan required them. The Social Action Plan actually covered a decade when school achievement declined.

SAP is seen now as a donor led initiative. It aimed to increase access to schools and the targets set were predominantly for providing infrastructure (School buildings and
equipment etc became output targets). The plan also had as its triggers increased expenditure allocations, enrolments in primary and basic education and reduction of the gender gap. The programme largely however focused on increasing access. The failure of the SAP to ensure required improvements in quality and that of the government’s capacity to deal with pursuing reforms on such a large scale led to a revaluation of aid modalities by some donors, with several shifting to stand alone project aid in the post SAP era.

*Linking projects to programmes to secure better outcomes*

For donors which have been identified with traditional project support, there is an increasing readiness to see that individual projects need to be linked and networked if there is to be sustained impact. In other words, initiatives in teaching and learning need to be linked creatively, for example through improved teacher training, both pre-service and in-service. A focus merely on the school achievement through assessment in the new grade 4 and 8 tests could just underline the continuing lack of achievement in many public schools. So whether in the World Bank or in USAID, there is a readiness to explore hybrid combinations of project and programme assistance.

*Blue collar versus white collar modalities and their implications for staffing*

There is a sense in which these different aid modalities are actually associated with different kinds of staff. Arguably successful project funding requires agencies to have the professional capacity to understand the international and national debates about teacher training, quality assessment or skills development. They need to have a ‘feel’ for a good school, a lab, or excellence in skills development. In other words, ‘blue collar’. Japan, for instance, has always argued that its experts should be ‘hands-on’, metaphorically or even literally ‘in the paddy field’. By contrast, the expertise associated with steering sector or direct budget support programmes through the system requires an understanding of macro-level issues, and not by any means only in the education sector, but in finance, budgeting, and expenditure frameworks. As one donor put the blue collar-white collar trade-off rather vividly:

> The new approaches do focus at the macro-level; they are based on the assumption that getting these macro financing and policy issues right will fix classrooms, and quality of schooling and teachers, and under-funding. But there is a risk that the focus on getting the macro issues right does mean you are removed from the classrooms and education outcomes. Is there a risk that we are losing our grasp of the realities by the programme level? (local donor to KK/RM, 5.3.08)

The GOP would not regard this as an either-or-situation; they would argue that it could well be worth the delay in transacting sector budget support if the result could be one where particular quality-related deliverables were prioritised.

*Visibility and identity in a highly political context*

In so far as direct project aid very frequently bypasses the often lethargic and convoluted government systems and the power asymmetries between the provinces and the federal level, its results may be more easily attributable to donor interventions. Considerations of visibility and the compulsion to report back clear links to outcomes to headquarters have made stand-alone projects a continuing favourite for many donors in Pakistan. The preference is there also because pursuing
independent projects reduces transaction costs of coordination for donors and yields quicker results.

However, the continual dismal performance of the public education system in Pakistan has led the donors to expand their focus from access (enrolments and provision of infrastructure) to the more complicated issue of improving quality. This change in focus has informed the choice of aid instruments. Several donors have moved on from project to programmatic support with a view to affecting multiple issues of access, quality and governance capacity and have adopted sector budget support as an aid instrument. Issues of continuing corruption and asymmetries between the federal and provincial structures have begun to lead to a recent re-evaluation of this choice. Donors are therefore now considering a mix of aid instruments that combine budgetary support with a policy matrix (with administration and governance reform) and technical assistance for capacity building, design and implementation of policy in social sectors.

**Conclusion**

We shall end this paper where we began. The discourse of Paris and of Rome is very far from the realities of donor behaviour in Islamabad, and in the provincial capitals. We have argued that it is not so simple a question of project versus programme, and of both versus budget support. The very strong influence of history, in over 50 years of the Planning Commission, means that projects continue to be at the very heart of the development process. There are hundreds upon hundreds of them, at national, provincial, district levels as well as agency projects. Thus, the projectisation of development is very much alive and well in 2008, and it is by no means only an agency issue. Equally, and as a consequence of these same historical pressures, the project management unit, so sharply decried by Jaycox, is still in the saddle and riding hard.

Discovering something of the scale and the centrality of the project mode within Pakistan has been one of unintended outcomes of this exploratory research. It is likely to suggest that the desire to identify and track the educational outcomes and impact of aid modalities will certainly be as difficult as the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee have recently found in assessing DFID’s budget support policies for their impact on the poor. But it will be worthwhile.

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1EU Code of Conduct on Complementarity and Division of Labour in Development Policy

**ANNEX**

**List of Meetings**

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<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
<td>T.M Qureshi</td>
<td>Deputy Educational Advisor</td>
<td>Rm. 26, AEPAM Building Taleemi Chowk, G-8/1 Islamabad</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>Anne Sweetser</td>
<td>Social Devt. Specialist</td>
<td>Overseas Pakistanis Foundation Bldg. Shahrah-e-Jamhuriyat G-5/2 Islamabad</td>
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