Global Aspects and Implications of Horizontal Inequalities:
Inequalities Experienced by Muslims Worldwide

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Abstract

Both within and across countries, most attention has been devoted to measuring inequality among individuals (and globally countries). Within countries, increasing evidence shows that inequalities *among groups* (horizontal inequalities, HIs) are important for well-being. However, the global component of HIs is generally neglected. The paper argues that HIs at a global level may also be important for world stability and well-being, in much the same way that HIs are relevant at the national level. With this perspective, the paper reviews Muslim/non-Muslim HIs within developed and developing countries, and between Muslim and non-Muslim countries, finding that Muslims are systematically disadvantaged across many dimensions. It argues that, despite much heterogeneity among the Muslim population, there is evidence of multiple global connections and of shared perceptions, such that inequalities faced by Muslims in one part of the world may become a source of grievance and potential mobilisation in other parts of the world. Consequently, inequalities need to be addressed globally, within countries and between them, and politically as well as with respect to socioeconomic and cultural status.

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By Frances Stewart[1]

> *…it is all one and the same: the struggle in Afghanistan and Iraq and even Britain, … it's all connected.*
> –statement of British Muslim[2].

1. Introduction

Both within and across countries, most attention has been devoted to measuring inequality among individuals (and, globally, between countries). Within countries, increasing evidence shows that inequalities *among groups* (horizontal inequalities, HIs) are important for well-being, effective policies towards poverty and for political stability, and a set of policies to correct such HIs is being identified (Stewart, 2008). However, apart from measurement of inter-country inequality and North-South inequalities, the global component of HIs is generally neglected.[3] This paper argues that HIs at a global level are also important for world stability and well-being, in much the same way that they are at the national level. Like national-level analysis, the inequalities in question are not only socioeconomic in nature, but also political and cultural. The groups to be explored are identity groups – i.e. groups with which 'members' have strong affiliation. The most obvious and formally organised groups of this kind are national ones (i.e. countries), but here I am primarily concerned not with national identity groups but with religious and ethnic identity groups, whose members cross national boundaries. This boundary crossing may stimulate global resentments and even violence, may lead to global flows of support for (and against) the extended group (including finance, arms, propaganda, political manoeuvring) and consequently requires global as well as national solutions.

Identities are fluid and change over time, so that the salient identities with global force also change. Historically, the Jews, the Lebanese and the Chinese have formed global groups with a common identity – though the strength of members' affiliation has clearly

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[2] Quoted in Abbas (2007):436.
[3] See e.g. Wade, R. 2001 'Global inequality: winners and losers', *The Economist* (April 28): 93-97; Berry and Serieux (2004); Bourgignon and Morrisson (2002).

varied between individuals and over time. Christians – particularly Catholics with their common papal hierarchy – have formed another global identity (whose unity has varied over time), with global implications as illustrated, for example, by the Crusades and the worldwide activities of missionaries. The first type, diasporic identities, have clear attachments to a particular place; while it is the common set of beliefs, and sometimes organisational hierarchies, that bind religious identities. Each of these groups remains of significance today, but probably the most dominant contemporary global identity group is that of Muslims, and I shall illustrate my argument with information on this group.

Muslims taken as a whole do not have an organisational hierarchy to unite them, but they have a strong theological basis for global identity, in the form of the *Ummah*, or the indivisible community of the faithful. 'The idea of the *Ummah* … is not a materialised homeland that one may look up on a map. Rather we are dealing with a mythological homeland that is both nowhere and everywhere offering membership across national boundaries' (Schmidt, 2004: 41). Yet it is essential to acknowledge that Muslims are not homogeneous: besides many other differences, there are sharp divisions, often leading to violent conflict, between Shiites and Sunnis; in addition, there are differences between liberals and radicals, in history, economic activity, education, nationality, language. As Sivan notes, 'the movement as a whole … is made up of a plethora of groups, more or less structured, loosely coordinated … often overlapping' (Sivan, 2003: 25). A big question, then, in relation to the approach adopted here, is whether there is nonetheless sufficient unity, or shared identity, to make the discussion of Muslims as a single, albeit non-homogeneous, group, meaningful. Some evidence on this will be presented in the course of the discussion.

To develop this argument the paper is organised as follows. First, I define HIs and illustrate their role in the national arena, emphasising the multidimensionality of HIs. A similar analysis applies to the global stage, through ethnic diasporas and common religious identities. Secondly, I illustrate the presence of such inequalities with an overview of broadly contemporary data on Muslims. Thirdly, I provide some evidence on the international links across Muslim groups, whereby grievance in one place can be felt elsewhere. This shared identity is confirmed by evidence from some perceptions surveys that I summarise in Section 5. Finally, I conclude that since the inequalities (and resultant mobilisation) present themselves both within and across countries, policies to address them need to be correspondingly multilayered, as well as being multidimensional.

2. How, why and when horizontal inequalities raise the risk of conflict within countries [4]

Horizontal inequality is inequality between groups, as distinct from vertical inequality, or inequality among individuals. These groups are generally culturally defined – by ethnicity, religion, race or region, for example. Horizontal inequalities are important because they affect individual well-being, economic efficiency and social stability, while in some circumstances they can lead to serious violent conflict, thereby undermining most development efforts (Langer, 2005; Mancini, 2008; Østby, 2003; Stewart, 2002).

Horizontal inequalities are conceived of as multidimensional, with economic, social, political and cultural dimensions. Each dimension encompasses a number of elements. For example, economic inequalities include inequality in access to or ownership of a variety of assets (financial, natural resources, human and social capital) as well as opportunities for their use (especially employment), and the current resources that flow from these assets (i.e. income); social HIs include access to a variety of services (education, health services, housing) and also outcomes in the form of human indicators (infant and maternal mortality, life expectancy, literacy); political HIs consist in the group distribution of political opportunities, including who controls the presidency, the cabinet, parliamentary assemblies, the bureaucracy, the army, the police, and regional and local government; and inequalities in cultural status include inequalities as to how the practices and beliefs of different groups are treated – e.g. recognition and treatment of language, religious practices, dress and behaviour.   Each of these lists includes both inputs and outputs (e.g. assets and incomes; health services and health outcomes), while some dimensions of HIs influence other dimensions (e.g. political power affects the economic and social dimensions; language use affects access to jobs and incomes). This extensive approach is deliberate because (a) many of the elements are not only inputs but also contribute directly to individual well-being, and (b) inputs are generally easier to affect directly through policy than outcomes. While the broad dimensions are relevant in any context, the actual elements that matter will vary according to the economy and society – for example, land is less important in industrialised countries than in many developing countries.

Horizontal inequalities are important because they affect well-being directly and because they affect other objectives instrumentally. People's well-being is affected not only by their individual circumstances, but also by how well their group is doing. This is partly

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[4] This section draws on Stewart (2008).

because membership of the group is an aspect of a person's identity and hence the group's situation is felt as part of an individual's situation; and partly because relative impoverishment of the group increases perceptions of members that they are likely to be trapped permanently in a poor position, or, if they have managed to do better than many in the group, that they are likely to fall back into poverty. Hence the well-being of Muslims in Western Europe, Catholics in Northern Ireland, Hutus in Rwanda, Afro-Americans in the US, blacks in Apartheid South Africa, to take just a few of many examples, is (was) deeply affected by the relative impoverishment of the group – over and above the position of the individuals themselves. Psychologists have shown, for example, that Afro-Americans suffer from many psychological ills due to the position of their group, or 'Being Black and Feeling Blue' as Brown *et al.* (1999) put it. The direct impact on well-being is not only more powerfully felt, but is also a more important consideration, because HIs often persist over generations – showing more persistence, typically, than individuals' ranking within a group (Stewart and Langer, 2008; Tilly, 1998).

Horizontal inequalities also matter for three instrumental reasons. First, it may not be possible to improve the position of individuals without tackling the position of the group as a whole. For example, programmes to advance credit to poor producers, or to promote universal education, may not be achievable so long as group inequality remains. Secondly, correcting such horizontal inequalities should have a positive effect on efficiency. Any situation in which a group is discriminated against is likely to be less efficient than in the absence of discrimination, since talented people in the group discriminated against will be held back, while too many resources, or too high a position, will go to less talented people in the favoured group.

The third and most critical instrumental reason for trying to moderate HIs – and the one that concerns us most here – is that group inequality can be a source of violent conflict (Stewart, 2000). Group inequality provides powerful grievances which leaders can use to mobilise people to political protest, by calling on cultural markers (a common history or language or religion) and pointing to group exploitation. This type of mobilisation appears especially likely to occur where there is political as well as economic inequality, so that the group leaders are excluded from formal political power while the mass of group members are economically deprived. Examples where group inequalities have been a factor in provoking conflict include Côte d'Ivoire, Rwanda, Northern Ireland, Nepal, Chiapas and Sudan, to mention just a few (see, e.g. Murshed and Gates, 2005; Gurr, 1993; Gurr and Moore, 1997; Langer, 2005; Stewart 2002). Sharp horizontal inequalities within countries (and between them) are an important source of grievance

and potentially of instability, independently of the extent of vertical inequality. There is econometric cross-country and within-country, as well as case study, evidence showing that conflict potential is higher where HIs are more severe (Barrows, 1976; Mancini, 2008; Østby, 2003). It seems that conflict is less likely, however, if economic and political HIs go in opposite directions, when the group that dominates the political system does not also dominate the economic one (e.g. Langer, 2005; Østby, 2008).

To date research on HIs has focussed on HIs *within* countries (Stewart, 2008), looking neither at between-country inequalities which might also generate grievances and mobilisation, nor at links between within-country inequalities that may occur across countries. Where groups have strong international connections – via family, remittances, media, religion – it seems likely that HIs within one country may affect actions elsewhere in the world, as a shared identity leads to shared grievances and may lead to global mobilisation. This paper explores whether this might be the case with inequalities between Muslims and others within a large number of countries and between Muslim countries and others. The next section therefore provides empirical evidence of Muslim/other HIs across the world.

3. An overview of contemporary Muslim/other HIs

This section summarises some Muslim/other inequalities – first within selected developed countries; then within selected developing countries; and finally between Muslim and Western countries.

3.1 HIs faced by Muslims in Europe

With the exception of small historical enclaves such as the Bosniaks, Muslims in developed countries mainly consist of groups who immigrated fairly recently, from North Africa, in the case of France; Turkey, in the case of Germany; Bangladesh and Pakistan in the UK, and some combination in most other European countries. Below I pick out three countries to illustrate the multiple inequalities Muslims face in Europe – the Netherlands, France and the UK. Similar evidence is available for other European countries.

3.1.1 The Netherlands

In the Netherlands, there are socioeconomic HIs disadvantaging Muslims across a number of dimensions – including housing, education, employment and incomes. The Muslim community also suffers from lower cultural status or recognition in terms of national holidays and dress code, for example. Muslims are represented politically,

broadly proportionately, but this still means that they are very much a minority politically and without real power.

Socioeconomic HIs: Muslims in the Netherlands, who are mostly of Moroccan or Turkish and, to a lesser extent, Indonesian origin, form about 6% of the total population and a much higher proportion of the four largest cities. They tend to be concentrated in segregated neighbourhoods, with poor and worsening infrastructure and high crime levels. They retain strong networks among themselves (Kelley and Morgenstern, 2006). Half of Moroccan households (and one in three non-Western immigrant households) are dissatisfied with their residential area, in contrast to one in 12 of native households (CBS, 2004a). A total of 27% of Moroccan-origin and 21% of Turk-origin residents were unemployed in 2006 compared with 9% for *autochthone*[5]. More than half of Turks and more than 60% of Moroccans have an unskilled job, compared with less than 30% of native Dutch (SCP, 2005). Incomes reflect this – the incomes of Moroccan men are 42% below those of the native Dutch, and those of Turkish men, 34% below. After allowing for age and experience, a gap of at least 25% remains (CBS, 2004b). There is evidence of direct and indirect discrimination in the labour market (SCP, 2005). Experimental research has shown that racial minorities were significantly less likely to be offered an interview or job (Riach and Rich, 2002).

Education levels are substantially lower for the Muslim community – 40% of Turks and 45% of Moroccans have had no more than primary education; drop-out rates are higher (Demant *et al.*, 2007). The European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia found discrimination within the educational system (SCP, 2005).

Income levels are lower among Muslims. Whereas 11% of indigenous households had an income below the low-income threshold in 2002, the figure for non-Western ethnic minority households was 33%. Poverty rates among the elderly are 67% for the Turkish population, 86% for the Moroccan population and 11% for the native Dutch elderly (Demant *et al.*, 2007:22).

Political HIs. Within parliament, however, it seems that Muslims are proportionately (or more) represented, with 10 out of 150 members in 2003. In 2003, two Muslim ministers were appointed to the cabinet. Muslims are underrepresented in the police, with only 6%

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[5] The Dutch term for 'white' Dutch.

of the police in major cities having an immigrant background, although they account for about 30% of the population (Demant *et al.*, 2007).

Cultural status inequality. Within schools, there are frequent complaints about dress, especially the wearing of hijabs. Dutch national holidays are all Christian, apart from January 1 and the Queen's birthday. Uneasy Muslim/*autochthone* relations were made worse by Ayaan Hirsi Ali, a Somali-born member of parliament, who attacked the cultural practices of Muslims, particularly those concerning women. The murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004, an *autochthone* film-maker with whom she was collaborating, sparked attacks on mosques and schools. In 2006, the government proposed to ban the public wearing of face veils (*burqa*), although this was not put into effect. But it further exacerbated poor relations between the communities.

A survey in 2003 found that nearly three-quarters of Moroccans felt there was discrimination, although only 37% had been personally discriminated against (Dagevos *et al.*, cited in Demant *et al.*, 2007). It is against this background that one can understand the impact of an Islamic teacher, Suhayb Salam, from Tilburg, son of an Imam in Tilburg, who according to journalist Patrick Pouw (2008) stated that, "We learned that all infidels were enemies of Allah, that everybody who didn't follow Islam is an enemy of Allah. We heard that sincere love for Allah means that we must hate his enemies, and must see them as our enemies. That was nothing less than an obligation." There is evidence also of considerable hostility to the Muslim population among native Dutch: according to a poll conducted in 2006, 63% of Dutch citizens felt that Islam is incompatible with modern European life.[6]

3.1.2 France

The situation in France is similar to that of the Netherlands, though there is much less hard data available because of the conscious decision to deny all difference in data collection.

Socio-economic inequalities. Data is not collected by religion or ethnicity for France so one has to rely on piecemeal evidence. Muslims in France (largely from north Africa) are estimated to number perhaps 4 million, or around 6% of the total population. The Muslim population is concentrated in low-income housing around the major cities, and there is evidence of discrimination in housing allocations (Simon, 1998). Educational attainments are worse for the Muslim population than the native population, with more

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[6] http://www.angus-reid.com/polls/view/12143

repeat years, higher dropout rates, lower attainments in examinations, less attendance at high school and fewer diplomas. According to a report on Muslims in the EU, French Muslims have higher unemployment than native French and more difficulties in finding long-term full-time employment (Viprey, 2002). A study by the University of Paris sending out CVs in response to an advertisement for a salesman found that a person from north Africa had five times less chance of getting a positive reply (EUMC, n.d.).

Cultural inequalities. As in the Netherlands, all national holidays in France are Christian or national. But in the public sector leave of absence may be granted to attend the three major festivals. However, the issue of the headscarf has created periodic controversy, with schools expelling children for wearing them. The current compromise is that conspicuous religious symbols are not allowed – which *de facto* is discriminatory to the extent that the headscarf is increasingly regarded as an essential element of being a Muslim female, whereas for Christians, small crosses are as good as large ones. In addition, one minister stated that the policy would not apply to Jewish *yarmulke*.

Political Inequalities There is no Muslim representation in parliament, though there are a number of Muslim candidates. At the cabinet level, the first Muslim minister was appointed in 2005, and in 2007 French President Nicolas Sarkozy appointed three Muslim cabinet ministers.

The riots of 2005 were widely viewed as being of an ethnic and/or religious nature, a protest against unequal treatment and particularly high unemployment. Despite this, some evidence suggests French Muslims are more 'at home' in France than Muslims elsewhere in Europe. For example, 42% of Muslims regard themselves as French first and Muslim second, whereas in the UK only 7% think of themselves as British first and 81% as Muslim first; in Germany the figures are 13% and 66% respectively (see Figure 9 below). Yet, oddly, more French Muslims report having had a bad personal experience (37%) than in Britain (28%), or Germany (19%) (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006a).

3.1.3 The United Kingdom

The Muslim population in the United Kingdom is largely composed of immigrants, and their descendants, from Bangladesh and Pakistan, who together accounted for only 2% of the total population in 2001, a figure which is estimated to rise to 2.5% by 2010. Like Muslims elsewhere in Europe, the group faces multiple deprivations relative to most of the rest of the population, including immigrants from India.

The Equalities Review (2007a) documents the systematic deprivations of Muslims in Britain. As they state:

'The emergence of British Muslims as a group who are widely recognised to be systematically disadvantaged predates any concern about security. Muslims account for a disproportionate number of people living in areas of multiple deprivation: more than two in three Bangladeshis and more than half of all Pakistanis live in areas in the bottom decile for deprivation' (Equalities Review, 2007a: 35).

In more detail, the Equalities Review reports on *socioeconomic inequalities* that:

- With respect to employment, the net earnings of Bangladeshi males were just half those of white males (Equalities Review, 2006: 25); Pakistanis and Bangladeshis faced 'no serious employment penalty compared to Whites in the 1970s, but by the mid 1990s their employment penalty had risen to 13%[7]'; and this was greater for women (24% to 35%) (Equalities Review, 2006: 54);

- Deprivation is evident in education at every level. For example, Pakistani and Bangladeshi rates of attainments in language and literacy at an early age were 57% of those of whites; their home learning environments were reported as worse than whites for each of three economic status groups; their achievement of 5 GCSEs was three quarters of that of whites for boys and a bit higher for girls; and they were underrepresented in higher education.

- With respect to health, Bangladeshis reported 'not good' health at a rate of 1.74 times that of all England and Wales, and Pakistanis at a rate of 1.81. (Equalities Review, 2007a: 75). The infant mortality rate of Pakistanis has been reported to be 8.6 compared with an overall rate of 4.9.[8] Bangladeshis and Pakistanis with heart diseases are less likely to have undergone bypass or angioplasty procedures than the population on average.[9]

On *political* HIs, it reported that:

- In 2005, less than 2.3% of members of parliament were from ethnic minority groups (who account altogether for about 10% of the population); and ethnic

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[7] The employment penalty is the difference in percentage employment in relation to population of working age between a particular group and that of whites, the most advantaged group.
[8] Frances Harrison, 'Muslim Faith Behind Bars' BBC Report, 12 October, 2007.
[9] Association of Public Health Observatories (2005). Cited in Equalities Review (2007a).

- minorities accounted for less than 4% of local councillors. (Equalities Review, 2007a: 99).
- Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in Britain are 10 times more likely to be victims of crime than whites; and 5% of prisoners are Asian (compared with a share of the total population of just over 3%). Rates of police stop and search are higher for all ethnic minority groups than for whites (ibid: 84).
- Ethnic minorities generally are underrepresented in the judiciary and legal system; over 30% of ethnic minorities surveyed perceive the judiciary as treating minorities less well than whites (ibid: 84) .

As far as *cultural status HIs* are concerned, all official UK holidays are Christian or secular, but Muslims are represented at national events (like Armistice Day or royal weddings). Limited (but growing) concessions are made to the requirements of Islam – such as places for prayer at work. Islamic dress is generally permitted but there is controversy over the *burqa* with Jack Straw, then-leader of the House of Commons, stating that he found the *burqa* "a visible statement of separation and difference" and he preferred his constituents not to wear it when consulting him, causing considerable controversy. [10]

Muslims in Britain also frequently confront prejudice in their daily lives:

> I'm getting bullied at school. People in the neighbourhood are calling my family "terrorists" and say, "Go back to your own country." I'm worried they'll start saying these things at school. Muslim boys are getting beaten up at school.
>
> –Fatima (aged 9) (Equalities Review, 2007b).

A survey conducted by the Equalities Review (2007a) found that 35% of a random sample of the British population surveyed sometimes felt prejudiced. And nearly half reported that media coverage of Muslims was mainly negative.

The Pew Global Attitudes survey found rather similar attitudes towards Muslims, with 63% of the population reporting a generally favourable view in 2006 and 71% of British Muslims having a generally favourable view of British Christians. But nonetheless, nearly half of non-Muslims thought Muslims were fanatical and one third thought they were

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[10] CNN, Veil: British papers back Straw. POSTED: 1312 GMT (2112 HKT), October 7, 2006

violent; however, over half of non-Muslims in Britain thought British Muslims were devout and honest. Turning to Muslim views of non-Muslims, over half British Muslims thought Westerners were violent, 63% felt they were greedy, 57% that they were immoral and 44% that they were fanatical. But over half thought they were generous and 48% thought they were tolerant (Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2006b).

3.2. HIs faced by Muslim communities in Asia

South Asian countries include some where Muslims account for almost the entire population (Bangladesh and Pakistan); some where they form a considerable majority (Indonesia and Malaysia); some where they are a significant minority (India); and some where they form a smallish minority (Philippines, Thailand, China). Where Muslims comprise almost the whole population, the issue of HIs with non-Muslims does not arise and these countries are not considered further here; where they are in a majority, political and cultural status HIs favour them and this can be used to advance their socioeconomic position. The most problematic situation is where they are in a minority and suffer consistent HIs across political, socioeconomic and cultural status dimensions.

3.2.1 Malaysia

In Malaysia, the indigenous Malay community is almost exclusively Muslim; non-Malay indigenous groups are around 50% Muslim, and the remainder are mostly Christian or animist. Together, these indigenous groups (*Bumiputera*) form around two-thirds of the population. The Chinese (24% of the population) are mainly either Christian or Buddhist, and the Indian population (6.5%) are mainly Hindus, with sizeable Muslim and Christian minorities[11]. In 1970, *Bumiputera* incomes were less than half those of the Chinese and about 55% of average Indian incomes (Jomo, 2005; Government of Malaysia, various dates). The gap in capital ownership was even more extreme. There were similar discrepancies in education. In 1970, there were almost no Malay professionals (0.08% of the population, compared with over 2% of the Chinese population), but this gap too has been significantly reduced, although both Chinese and Indians have significantly more professionals in relation to the population than Malays (ibid). With the *Bumiputera* dominating government, there were strong policies to improve the position of the Malays, yet a considerable gap remained even in 2004, as Figures 1 and 2 illustrate.

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[11] The Indian population is notably heterogeneous. Historically, Indians fell into two broad groups – those who staffed the colonial bureaucracy, who were relatively well educated, English speaking and often Christian,and mainly Tamil-speaking, mainly Hindu, plantation workers. Although both groups have diversified their socioeconomic roles in the post-colonial era, this significant stratification of the community has endured. Overall, the Indian community remains significantly richer than the *Bumiputera*, but there remains an underclass of poorer Indians.

Despite this economic gap, the dominant political and cultural position of the Malays mean that it is the other two communities – the Chinese and Indians – that feel threatened and claim discrimination.


Figure 1: Malaysia mean incomes relative to national average
Source: Government of Malaysia (various dates).


Figure 2: Malaysia share ownership by group
Source: Government of Malaysia (various dates).

3.2 2 Indonesia

Muslims account for over 84% of the population in Indonesia, with most of the remainder Christian (Protestant 7.6%, Roman Catholic 4.2%) according to the 2000 census.

Muslim incomes, on average are below all other groups apart from the small Hindu population (see Table 1). Given the political and demographic dominance, these differences are normally not provocative – but there were attacks on the Christian Chinese during economic crisis (in the late 1990s). Moreover, while Muslims have been politically dominant at the national level, in some areas of the archipelago where colonial Christianisation took hold more strongly, Christian groups have also played an important role historically. Amid rapid and extensive decentralisation in the post-Suharto era, competition for political and economic power at the local level fed into extensive religious violence in Ambon, North Maluku, and Central Sulawesi.

Table 1: Income HIs in Indonesia

	Share of population, %	Ratio of income per capita to Muslim income
Muslims	83.6	1 [1.04]
Catholics	7.6	1.58 [1.29]
Protestants	4.2	1.50 [1.25]
Hindus	3.0	0.97 [1.17]
Buddhists	1.3	1.61 [0.93]

Source: Calculated from the 1995 Inter-Censal Survey (SUPAS) data

Bracketed figures = coefficient of variation

3.2.3 India

In 2001, Muslims accounted for 13.4% of the Indian population. This population represents Muslims, and their descendants, who remained in India after 1947 and did not move to Pakistan. They experience multiple HIs:

- *Education*. Educational differences between Muslims and Hindus in India persisted throughout the 20th century (Deolalikar, 2008). Literacy rates among Muslims in 2001 were 59% compared with an all India rate of 65%.[12] A Committee of Enquiry into the condition of Muslims (the Sacher Committee, henceforth Government of India, 2006) concluded: Muslims 'are at a double disadvantage, with low levels of education combined with low quality education' (Government of India, 2006: 50).

- *Employment*. Overall Muslims are more likely to be engaged in self-employment and much less likely to have regular salaried jobs (especially in the government or large public and private-sector enterprises) (Government of India, 2006). Regular workers are considerably less likely to have a written contract or to receive monthly salaries or social security benefits. Muslim regular employees

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[12] Scheduled castes and tribes – among the Hindus – also face multiple deprivations and are generally worse off than Muslims as a group (Government of India, 2006).

receive lower daily salary earnings in both public-sector and private-sector jobs. (Government of India, 2006). They also face worse access to bank credit.

- *Poverty.* Muslim and Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SCs/STs) have been persistently the most disadvantaged groups in terms of headcount poverty from 1987-2005, with respect to both rural and urban poverty. In 2004-5 for example, the Muslim poverty rate was 43% compared with a rate of 27% for all Hindus (Government of India, 2006).

- However, Muslim *infant and child mortality rates* are *better* than Hindus – an unexpected finding given the worse educational and economic situation. This has been attributed to different behavioural patterns, although as Deolalikar comments, the reason why there is this advantage 'is a question that needs further exploration' (Deolalikar, 2008: 6).

- *Political inequalities.* There is abundant evidence of political inequalities between Muslims and Hindus. In the Indian parliament, the Lok Sabha, Muslim representation was 4.7% in 1957, 5.3% in 1991, and 6.6% in 2004 (Ansari, 2006), in comparison with a population share of over 13%. There was also underrepresentation in State Assemblies (Ansari, 2006). One reason for the political inequalities is the very low representation of Muslims on the central committees of the major political parties (Rab, 1998).

Muslims also face cultural inequalities, sometimes coming to a head with physical attacks on mosques. The conflicts between Muslims and Hindus in India (periodically violent) have occurred over the centuries since the Moghul invasion that introduced Islam to India in the 17th century. These are undoubtedly engineered for political purposes, but prevalent HIs make it easy to mobilise popular support for such conflicts.[13]

3.2.4 China

There is very little data on the socioeconomic position of Muslims in China who account for an estimated 1-2% of the total population or around 20 million people, in several ethnic groups, including Hui (largely Mandarin speaking), and Dongxiang and Uigur (Turkic speaking). Their religion is officially recognised, but strictly controlled. Chinese education is moving to the exclusive use of Mandarin, which particularly disadvantages those children who do not speak Mandarin at home. Data on educational performance show relative disadvantage, with the extent varying among ethnic groups. The Mandarin-

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[13] See Brass (2003); Wilkinson (2004).

speaking Hui, accounting for over a third of the total, are least disadvantaged, followed by the Uigur (almost as populous), with the Donxiangs (only 5% of the total Muslims) severely disadvantaged (see Table 2). There are also qualitative educational disadvantages because of the language issue.

Table 2: Enrolment rates by population group in China from 2000 census, % of age group

Muslims in China, ethnic group	No school	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary
Hui	15.6	84.4	44.9	4.1
Dongxiang	58.0	42.0	8.4	0.4
Uigur	8.8	91.2	35.3	2.7
Chinese (Han)	7.3	92.7	53.4	3.9

Source: Fischer (2004).

3.2.5. Philippines and Thailand

Muslims in the Philippines account for about 5% of the total population, but a much larger proportion of Mindanao region – around 20% today, which represents a sharp drop over the last 100 years largely due to immigration, encouraged by the state, from the rest of the Philippines. Similarly, in Thailand, the Muslim population forms a small proportion of the total Thai population (4.6%), but a much larger proportion in the Southern region (28% in 2000) (data from CIA World Factbook[14] and Brown, 2008).

In both these countries, as pointed out by Brown (2008), the Muslim populations are doubly disadvantaged: first, the regions in which they are located have lower per capita incomes (and growth rates) than the rest of the country; and secondly within the region of concentration, the Muslim population does less well than the rest of the population.

In the Philippines, Mindanao as a whole has been consistently below the national average in terms of GDP per capita, and particularly below Luzon (Figure 3). Within Mindanao, socioeconomic performance in the five provinces in the autonomous region of Muslim Mindanao (ARRM) is worst of all the Philippines (Table 3). Within Mindanao the relative educational levels achieved by the Muslim and Christian populations have worsened consistently since the outbreak of conflict. Land registration procedures have also favoured the local Christian population and many Moro were displaced from their traditional lands (Brown, 2008).

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[14] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook

Figure 3: Economic performance of Mindanao relative to national performance

Source: Brown (2008: 269).

Table 3: Philippines, ARMM – Socioeconomic indicators, 2000

	Incidence of poverty (%), 2000	*Per capita* income (PPP US$), 2000	Life expectancy at birth, 1997	Human Development Index	Rank (out of 77)
Maguindanao	36.2	1,306	53.2	0.431	73
Lanao del Sur	48.1	1,250	56.0	0.425	74
Basilan	63.0	1,077	59.8	0.420	75
Tawi-Tawi	75.3	1,218	50.4	0.378	76
Sulu	92.0	1,027	51.9	0.311	77

Source: Brown (2008: 268), from HDN and UNDP (2002)

Within Southern Thailand, Muslims are disadvantaged relative to Buddhists. For example, in 1987 (the only year for which there are data of this kind), Buddhist males had 1.68 times the years education of Muslim males; and the discrepancy in household assets was 1.17 (Brown, 2008: 273).

In Thailand, the Southern region where the Muslim population is concentrated also shows worse economic performance than the rest of the country (Figure 4).


Figure 4: Economic performance of Muslim-majority provinces relative to Thailand as a whole
Source: Brown (2008: 272)

There is quite a strong similarity in the position of Muslims in the Philippines and Thailand relative to the rest of the population. Both form small minorities living in poor regions and facing HIs relative to the rest of the population within their region as well. In

both cases, there has been violent opposition – stronger in the Philippines, more sporadic in Thailand. In both cases, the rebels seek greater political autonomy, and/or complete separatism.

3.3. HIs faced by Muslims in West Africa

In West Africa, like Asia, the demographic position of Muslims varies. In some countries Muslims form a significant minority (Benin, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana), in Nigeria they account for about half the population and in Niger and Mali they dominate the population, as shown in Table 4. In general they are concentrated in the North of each country, so that data on regional inequalities gives some guide to Muslim/other HIs.

Table 4: Muslim population size in West Africa

Country	% Muslim population
Benin	24
Cameroon	20
Chad	53
Côte d'Ivoire	35-40
Ghana	16
Mali	90
Niger	80
Nigeria	50

Source: CIA World Factbook.

In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana[15] and Nigeria, all socioeconomic indicators are worse in the North of the country (Figure 5). For Benin (Table 5), while education indicators (literacy and school attendance) are worse in all four Northern regions than the national average, and income per head is worse in three, life expectancy is as good or better, possibly reflecting lower rates of HIV/AIDs among Muslim populations. Data on height differences show Northern disadvantage in Cameroon, Chad and Côte d'Ivoire (Moradi and Baten, 2005).

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[15] In Ghana, Muslims are a minority in the North.

**Ghana, child mortality (inverse)
(Southern groups/Northen groups)**

**Ghana, years of education (Southern
groups/Northen groups)**

women

men

1993   **1998**   **2003**

**Nigeria, child mortality (inverse)
(Southern groups/Northen groups)**

**Nigeria, years of education (Southern
groups/Northen groups)**

women

men

1990   **1998**   **2003**

1990   **1999**   **2003**

**C. d'Ivoire, child mortality (inverse)
(Southern groups/Northen groups)**

**C. d'Ivoire, years of education (Southern
groups/Northern groups)**

women

men

1994   **1999**

1994   **1999**

Figure 5: Horizontal inequalities between North and South in three West African countries

Source: calculations by Luca Mancini, derived from DHS data.

Table 5: Regional disparities in Benin

Four most Northern regions as a ratio to national average	Literacy	Level of schooling attained	Income per head	Life expectancy
Atacora	0.63	0.78	0.71	1.0
Donga	0.63	0.78	0.76	1.0
Alibora	0.61	0.68	0.85	1.13
Borgou	0.61	0.68	1.13	1.06

Source: UNDP (2003).

While there is generally economic and social disadvantage among Muslims, the situation with respect to political and cultural status varies strongly with demography as well as national attitudes and practices. Thus in the majority states, Muslim cultural and political status is generally good. But in the minority states, there is considerable variation. There is a contrast, for example, between Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire – in Ghana there is a culture of inclusion both politically and in relation to general status; but in Côte d'Ivoire, in recent years Northerners have been excluded politically and culturally – indeed this is thought to be a major reason for the outbreak of civil war in 2002 (Langer 2005).

3.4. Inequalities between countries
For states where Muslims form all or nearly all of the population – which of course includes North Africa and the Middle East – relevant inequalities are those between countries rather than within them.

If we take all countries in which Muslims dominate and contrast them with all countries where other religions (or non-religions) dominate, including Christians, Hindus, Buddhists and secularists, there is a clear and large gap favouring non-Muslims. But there are very large differences within each of these categories: for example, many poor countries are in the non-Muslim group (e.g. Malawi, Nepal and Bolivia); and there are some successful countries within the Muslim group (e.g. Malaysia, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Turkey). Nonetheless, connections among the Muslim group of countries may be sufficiently strong for the more successful countries (like the more successful people within national groups) to feel shared grievance with the less successful ones. This is especially likely where the countries share the same subset of Muslim beliefs – e.g. among Sunni populations and among Shiite populations. Such support may come at the national political level (e.g. via public rhetoric and meetings by political leaders, aid flows and overt military support); or at sub-national level, in a variety of more informal ways (money flows, people and skills, arms and training).

This section provides evidence on two types of international inequality: that between Muslim countries as a group and all others; and that between Israel and Palestine. Each of these divisions appears potentially to generate shared grievances and consequent incentives for mobilisation.

3.4.1 All Muslim countries compared with non-Muslim

Both categories of country are obviously very heterogeneous in terms of the Human Development Index, ranging from Norway to Burundi in the non-Muslim category and United Arab Emirates to Guinea Bissau among the majority Muslim states. The average per capita incomes of the states where a majority of the population is Muslim are just 44% of those of the non-Muslim countries, and under-5 mortality rates are almost twice as high (Table 6). There is great heterogeneity in each group, shown by a high standard deviation. However, the proportion of countries in the high-HD category is much lower for Muslim countries and the proportion in the low-HD category much higher than for non-Muslim (see Figure 6).

There is also a clear imbalance in political power. As indicators of this, Table 6 shows how much greater non-Muslim countries' power is by comparing membership of the Security Council, voting rights at the IMF, and military expenditure. By each measure, the Muslim countries fall well below the non-Muslim, including when calculating these in relation to population shares, or numbers of countries.

Table 6: Comparative performance of Muslim and non-Muslim countries

	Muslim countries[a], average[b] performance	Non-Muslim countries average performance	Ratio of Muslim to non-Muslim
Under 5 mortality, 1970	200 [89.5]	105 [81.5]	1.9
Under 5 mortality, 2005	100 [80.3]	46 [55.5]	2.18
Growth rate, per capita income, 1975-2005	0.1 [2.4]	1.5 [2.3]	0.07
Per capita income, 2005, PPP $	5,470 [6,493]	12,497 12,019]	0.44
Membership of Security Council, total	3/17 (no permanent)	12/17 (including all permanent)	0.25
Representation in relation to share of world population	0.12	0.16	0.75
Representation in relation to no. of countries	0.09	0.18	0.5
% of IMF voting rights	11.8	88.2	0.13
% of IMF voting rights in relation to population share	0.47	1.18	0.4
Share of world military expenditure	7.7%	92.3%	0.08
Share of world military expenditure in relation to share of world population	0.31	1.23	0.25

Sources: UNDP, Human Development Report statistics; IMF:
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm; UN Security Council:
http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp; Wikipedia:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_military_expenditures
a) Defined as any country with 50% or more of population classified as Muslim according to CIA FactBook.
Standard deviations are in square brackets.
b) Country averages, not weighted by population.

Figure 6: Human Development in Muslim and non-Muslim Countries

Source: Data from HDRO Statistics, UNDP.

<u>3.4.2 Israel/Palestine</u>

The large inequalities between Israel and Palestine are well known.[16] Table 7 provides some indicators of socioeconomic HIs. There are also, evidently, political HIs, since Palestine is not internationally recognised as an independent state (and indeed, even if it were, lacks power).

Table 7: Inequalities between Israel and Palestine

	Israel	Palestine	Ratio I/P
GNI per capita, 2006	$18,850	$1,230	15.3
GDP p. capita growth rate, 1990-2006	1.5%	- 2.8%	
Telephones per 1000, 2005	155	39	4.0
Unemployment rate	7.6% (2007)	34.8%(Gaza, 2006) 18.6% (West Bank, 2006)	0.21 (Gaza) 0.41 (West Bank)
Poverty rate	21.6 % (2005) (Poverty line = $7.30 per day or 2.4 times Palestinians average per capita income)	80% [a](2007), Gaza 67%[ab] (2007) , West Bank	n/a since poverty lines differ

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[16] There are also inequalities between Jews and Muslims within Israel – for example, the infant mortality rate among Muslims is double that among Jews. 'Arabs in Israel are a heterogeneous but largely underprivileged minority with a history of disadvantage in several domains, including education and employment' Okun and Friedlander (2005: 163).

Infant mortality rate, per 1000 live births	4	20	0.25

Source: UNICEF (2008).
a) http://palestinemonitor.org
b) CIA estimate is 46%

3.5 Overview of evidence

This section has shown that HIs adverse to Muslims are very widespread – within countries in the North and South; between non-Muslim countries as a group and Muslim countries; and between Israel and Palestine, a particularly politically salient division. In countries where Muslims form a minority, there are generally political and cultural status inequalities too, which, in many cases, have led to violent unrest. In contrast, in countries where Muslims form a majority, the economic inequalities are compensated for by political power and cultural status favouring the Muslim group, which tend to reduce the propensity for socioeconomic HIs to lead to political mobilisation. Internationally, the socioeconomic HIs are accompanied by political inequalities, as indicated by such data as membership of the UN Security Council (and especially permanent membership), voting rights at the IMF and the distribution of military expenditure.

Yet important questions remain unanswered. First, if these inequalities are to lead to any sort of world-wide mobilisation, then Muslims world-wide must have some shared identity and shared perceptions of grievance despite the considerable heterogeneity of Muslim populations and their geographical spread. It is impossible to prove this is the case. All I can do is present some suggestive evidence of two kinds. First, evidence of global connections among Muslims across geographic distance; and secondly, evidence of shared perceptions of identity. The next section briefly describes the many global links that Muslims have; this is followed by some evidence on shared perceptions.

4. Global connections

There is a vast mass of evidence of global connections among different Islamic communities. The directions of some of the major connections are illustrated in the Figure 7. Six types of connection are distinguished: family connections, involving a range of communications, marriages, and remittances; education and training, in which people travel globally to Asia, the Middle East and to Europe to attend a variety of educational institutions; financial connections (outside the family ones), with finance (and aid) crossing borders, much going from the Middle East, notably Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, to developing countries; the Hajj pilgrimage which takes millions to Mecca; global civil (including religious) and political institutions; and, most recently, media and

internet connections. All these connections enhance a shared Muslim identity, yet the connections are multilayered, and the links occur among different groups of people, according to context. Moreover, the connections are greater within religious subsets of Islam – for example, Sunnis, Shia, different *madhabs* within them, Sufism and different Sufi orders, liberals and radicals, and so on[17]; and connections are likely to be more dense within groups which share economic activities and interests, needs and education. The connections are neither unidirectional nor monolithic. Nonetheless, together the links are very large in number, and some of them touch most Muslims in one way or another. It is not possible here to catalogue all these connections, but I will simply provide a few illustrations.


Figure 7: Schematic representation of some connections between Islamic communities

1. *Family connections and remittances.* Most Muslims in industrialised countries are recent-origin migrants and consequently most have family connections, communicating with their families frequently, visiting them periodically, often going home to find a

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[17] See, e.g., Sivan (2003) who discusses the divisions between radical Islam and liberals.

spouse or sending for one, and sending money home. For example, in the Netherlands, over 50% of native Dutch with Turkish or Moroccan backgrounds brought spouses from the country of origin of their parents (CBS, 2005). Consequently, the family at both ends of the chain are aware of the conditions faced at the other end. Some data are available on remittances. For example, Spanish immigrants are estimated to have sent over 8 billion euros home in 2007.[18] Bangladesh received over $600 million in remittances from expatriate workers in November 2007, roughly equivalent to 5% of a whole year's exports. The Deputy Governor of the Bangladesh Bank reported that, "We received all-time high remittances in November as the expatriates have sent more money to their relatives to enjoy Muslim Eid al-Adha festival".[19] In the mid-1980s, Sudan was estimated to receive over $3 billion a year from family remittances.[20]

2. *Education and training*. Muslims travel globally to attend schools (madrassas) in the Middle East and Asia. This, of course, has a long history dating back to the 10th century with the founding of Jami'at al-Qarawiyyin in Fez in Morocco. The first University ever to be established was founded at about the same time in the same city. Al-Azhar, in Cairo, was also established at the end of the 10th century and became a famous centre for education, with flourishing global networks dating back to the 17th century (Azra, 2004). A list of prominent people who attended this University in the 20th century includes senior religious leaders in Egypt, Palestine, Eritrea, the Maldives, Malaysia, Spain and the US[21]. While most of this education and training concerns advancing religious understanding, some have also been trained for violence in camps in Afghanistan; and Afghan veterans have joined Islamic groups in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East: 'These fighters are devout Muslims inspired by Islamic scholars and are willing to sacrifice their lives for Islam'[22]. One of the leaders of a faction of the Moro rebels in the Philippines had received religious training in Saudi Arabia, military training in Libya, fought in Afghanistan 1979-1989, and then went to the Philippines (Buendia, 2005: 13).

3. *Finance and aid*. Institutions include the Islamic Development Bank which is a multilateral development bank established 'to foster the economic development and social progress of its member countries and Muslim communities in non-member countries'. The Bank was founded in 1975, and its headquarters are in Jeddah, Saudi

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[18]'Spain's immigrant remittances soar despite slowdown' 19/03/2008 00:00, March 19, 2008.
http://www.expatica.com/es/articles/news/Spain_s-immigrant-remitt
[19] Reuters, January 1' 2008:
http://in.reuters.com/article/asiaCompanyAndMarkets/idINDHA19219820080101
[20] Prunier and Gisselquist (2003: 121).
[21] According to *Wikipedia.*
[22] Jane's Intelligence Review, August 1, 2001.

Arabia, with branches in Morocco and Malaysia. An offshoot is the International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation established in 2006, aiming to promote trade. Other aid-giving institutions are the Kuwait Fund for Arab and Economic Development, founded in 1961, and the Saudi Fund for Development, established in 1974.

Support has been provided by King Fahd of Saudi Arabia for mosques or Islamic Centres in Europe (six countries), the US and Canada, Australia and New Zealand , sub-Saharan Africa (five countries), Asia (six countries), Latin America (three countries); and for Islamic research centres, academies and academic chairs in 11 countries.[23] Saudi finance has also supported political parties (e.g. the Front Islamique de Salut (FIS) in Algeria 'received a great deal of Saudi funding' (Fuller, 1996) from Saudi Arabia as well as from Iran (Anderson 1998).

There is a growing number of commercial or semi-commercial Islamic Banks – about 300 are listed by the Institute of Islamic Banking. Some of these are national, but many have strong international links.

Financial support for some armed struggles represents another connection – e.g. it is generally accepted that MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front in Mindanao) received funds from Libya that were channelled via the Chief Minister of the State of Sabah[24]; and the FIS in Algeria received Saudi finance, as noted above[25].

4. *The Hajj.* This annual pilgrimage involves as many as 2 million people a year; every Muslim is supposed to go once in a life time. Besides its religious significance, the journey provides an opportunity for confirming a person's religion and identity and for people to meet other Muslims from across the world.

5. *Global civil and political institutions*. Well-known institutions with global connections include the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) which has 57 country members, and aims 'to safeguard and project the interests of the Muslim world'[26], the Muslim Brotherhood, the World Islamic League, the International Islamic Relief Organisation, the World Assembly of Muslim Youth and the Red Crescent. As Sivan notes, religious leaders also sometimes have legal and/or moral authority across

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[23] Information from King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz website:
http://www.kingfahdbinabdulaziz.com/main/m200.htm
[24] McKenna (1998).
[25] Fuller (1996); Lloyd (2006).
[26] Website of the OIC: http://www.oic-oci.org/oicnew/page_detail.asp?p_id=52

borders. Examples are the Sheik Yusuf al-Qardaw who lives in Qatar and is supreme mufti for the Palestinian Hamas, and Sheik Ibn Qatada, who is a Palestinian-Jordanian living in London acting as mufti to the Algerian GIA (the Armed Islamic Group) (Sivan, 2003: 29).

6. *The media and internet.* Media connections occur via global TV channels, such as Al Jazeera and Abu Dhabi TV, radio channels (Radio Islam) and numerous websites and diaspora newspapers. The importance of the internet, here as elsewhere, is growing. Schmidt (2004) discusses its importance in developing Muslim identities among the young in three Western countries. He notes that "the internet can be an effective tool (besides travelling, mobile phones) in the establishment of a transnational Islamic discourse – 'a reimagined umma(h)'" (Schmidt, 2004: 36). Discussing the protests against the Danish cartoons, Faisal Devji (2006) wrote:

> Muslim protesters did not represent some religious tradition that needs to be schooled in the lessons of modern citizenship. Rather their protests brought into being *a hypermodern global community* whose connections occur by way of mass media alone. From the Philippines to Niger, these men and women communicated with each other only indirectly, neither by plan nor organisation, but through the media itself. (italics added)

An example of some of the multiple connections is provided by a recent article by Tahir Abbas, himself a British Muslim, who interviews Moazzam Begg, a second-generation British Muslim with a middle-class background, who had been detained in Guantanamo Bay (Abbas, 2007). Abbas attributes Begg's radicalism to 'exclusion, marginalisation, disempowerment, media bias, political rhetoric, far right hostility, perceptions in relation to British and US foreign policy, a lack of appropriate Muslim leadership in Britain and a regressive interpretation of Islam as a reactive rather than a pro-active experience' (Abbas, 2007: 430).

Inspired by a film, *The Message*, and facing racism in Birmingham, Begg began to look to Islam 'to get rid of the cultural baggage' (Abbas, 2007: 432). He met Bosnian Muslims, blond and blue-eyed and 'felt a great affinity towards them' (ibid: 433). In the 1990s he made eight or nine trips to Bosnia, and made financial donations to the Bosnian army. After his bookshop was raided by MI5, and he married a Pakistani woman (through an arranged marriage), he moved to Afghanistan and financed and built a school, shortly before 9/11. When asked about the London bombings, he felt that, 'The targeting of

individual is wrong and it shouldn't happen…The overriding factor of the occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan was enough to spur them on to do what they did…it was this idea that it is all one and the same: the struggle in Afghanistan and Iraq and even Britain, that it's all connected.' (Abbas, 2007: 436).

5. Some evidence on perceptions

So far this paper has established that Muslims suffer from adverse HIs within and across countries; and that there are manifold global connections linking Muslims across countries. These connections make it likely that grievances in one place will be felt elsewhere – 'it's all connected', as Begg stated.

In this section I try to explore how far this feeling of connectedness goes, by reviewing some data on perceptions. Here I can only do a limited job, relying on several Pew Trust Surveys of Perceptions carried out both in developed countries and Muslim developing countries. Within the developed countries – Britain, Spain, France and Germany – views of local Muslims are often elicited as well as of the general population. What is interesting about the results of these surveys is the *consistency* of views of Muslims in different parts of the world, and the systematic differences in their perceptions as against those of non-Muslims.

This is indicated by the 2006 Pew Survey which showed considerable agreement among Muslims across the world on a range of issues, with quite sharp differences in views between Muslims and others on some questions (Figure 8). This chart presents the *net* views, i.e. the difference in percentage of respondents who attributed issues (bad relations between the West and Muslims, lack of prosperity of Muslim nations, and the cartoon controversy) to features about Muslims or to features about the West. It is worth noting that both groups were quite heterogeneous, the Muslims including Muslims in European countries and in Muslim nations; and the others including Europeans, US citizens and Nigerian Christians. Yet (despite differences in views within each group), there were systematic differences between the two groups. For example, while a majority of respondents agreed that relations between Muslims and the West are bad, a high proportion of Muslims blamed Western people, and the reverse was true of non-Muslims with a considerable proportion blaming Westerners. The difference was most marked among Nigerians: 69% of Christian Nigerians blamed the Muslims and 10% Western people, while in contrast only 1% of Nigerian Muslims blamed Muslims and 83% blamed Western people. When it comes to attributing responsibility for Muslim nations' lack of prosperity there was again a systematic difference in views: a third or

more of Westerners blamed Islamic fundamentalism for Muslim nations' lack of prosperity, while the proportion was much lower among *every category* of Muslims, including Muslims in Europe and in developing countries. Again Muslims were more inclined to blame US and Western policies. But views about government corruption, lack of education and lack of democracy as being responsible were broadly shared across all groups.

On cultural status inequality, over 70% of each of the Muslim populations blamed Western disrespect for the cartoon controversy (rising to over 80% among Spanish Muslims, Nigerian Muslims, and in Jordan, Egypt, Indonesia and Turkey) while less than 30% of Westerners blamed Western disrespect, and a high proportion (59% in Britain, 62% in Germany and 67% in France) blamed Muslim intolerance. High rates of sympathy for Muslims offended by the cartoons were shown by all the European Muslims, much higher than among Westerners generally. However, concern over the rise of Islamic extremism, though highest among European and US populations, was shared by European Muslims as well as Muslims in developing countries. For example, 84% of non-Muslim British were very or somewhat concerned about the rise of Islamic extremism, as were 77% of British Muslims and 71% of Pakistanis.

Figure 8: Differences in perceptions, Muslims versus others

Source: Drawn from The Pew Global Attitudes Project (2006a).

A further indication of a common Muslim identity is the high proportion of Muslims – both in European countries and in Muslim countries – who said they were Muslims first and citizens of a particular nation second (Figure 9). This was true of over half the respondents in 9 of the 16 countries.


Figure 9: Percentage of Muslims saying they were 'Muslims first'

Source: The Pew Global Attitudes Project (2006a; 2006b). This amalgamates information from two surveys with somewhat different country coverage. Where a country was covered in both, and there were different results the average is given above.

6. Conclusions

In this paper I have aimed to show that there are global as well as national dimensions to HIs. And that if a group has a shared identity that crosses nations, mobilisation can occur because of such HIs, in a similar way to the mobilisation that sometimes occurs in reaction to national HIs. As with national HIs, where several dimensions of HIs go in the same direction – i.e. there are political as well as socio-economic inequalities and cultural status ones – mobilisation is more probable. To the extent that a group has strong affiliations with others in the group elsewhere in the world, then horizontal inequalities in one part of the world can be a cause of grievance and of mobilisation elsewhere. I have used the example of Muslims today where there are clear global inequalities and global networks. Other examples are possible. For example, Tamil diaspora who are affected by their own situation in the country in which they reside and also the situation in Sri Lanka, or, especially historically and currently, Jewish

communities who form(ed) a global network. In all these cases, it is not the poorest members of the community who mobilise most easily, but more often the more educated and articulate, as in the case of Begg, cited above. A shared identity sufficient to make common cause on some issues does NOT mean the group is homogeneous – quite obviously this is not the situation in the case of Muslims today (or Jews, or Tamils) – but that when faced with non-Muslims (or non-Jews, or non-Tamils) the Muslim/Jewish/Tamil identity in some circumstances trumps local identities. When and why this happens is, of course, a critical issue. Important determinants include the extent to which each national group faces similar discrimination and inequality, the strength of connections across national groups, how far there appear to be global attacks on the common identity, and the nature of leadership, among other factors. Moreover, as with national HIs, it is never the case that the entire group is mobilised, but rather that a powerful minority is. As noted in the previous section, the vast majority of Muslims view the rise of Islamic extremism with alarm. Yet, as at the national level, systematic HIs do make mobilisation more likely.

If I am right in arguing that these global HIs raise the risk of conflict, just as national ones do, then strong policy implications follows. As with national HIs it becomes important to reduce HIs in each dimension where they are severe. But the requirements in the global case are much greater than in the national case, since reduction in HIs is needed *both within and between* countries. Thus the analysis suggests that inequalities within Western societies are one factor raising the risk of global mobilisation, so that quite apart from the need to reduce inequalities in order to build a just and flourishing society, action needs to be taken within each country to reduce socio-economic, political and cultural status HIs to bring about global political stability. Yet this has not been a significant plank of post 9-11 or 7/7 policy, rather suppression has been the main policy. The same is true of the many inequalities observed within developing countries, which are particularly provocative where there are political as well as socio-economic inequalities, as in many of the cases described earlier.

Policies designed to reduce national inequalities in socio-economic, political and cultural status dimensions are fairly well developed (Stewart, 2008). They have been adopted (with varying degrees of success) in a number of multiethnic or multireligious societies, although rarely with respect to Muslim groups. Few policies have been adopted in developed countries beyond anti-discriminatory laws.

The policy requirements also include reducing international inequalities – the most notable because the most visible is that between Israel and Palestine. Again in relation to this situation, force rather than equalisation has been the main policy stance. But in addition, there is a gross imbalance *in political power* at the global level (including between Palestine and Israel). While power is not something that can be painlessly redistributed as it arises from the intrinsic situation of the parties, some of the symptoms could be alleviated. Most obvious is the systematic use of military power by the West against Muslim nations which powerfully demonstrates the asymmetry of power. In addition, representatives of Muslim states could be incorporated to a much greater extent than at present, and more systematically, into global decision-making – for example, into the Security Council, the decision-making of the IMF and World Bank, and into ad hoc decision-making bodies. But to do this effectively will require including genuine representatives of the various strands of Muslim thinking, and not simply token people with a Western perspective.

The OIC could be a source of greater empowerment – this would require greater recognition from the rest of the world, and also regular meetings, recommendations and action by the OIC itself. As for national empowerment of particular groups, success is likely to require organisation and claims by the groups themselves, and also recognition and respect by the rest of the world. This is a matter not just (or even necessarily at all) of changing formal rules, but also of changing informal norms and behaviour.

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