Scoping a long-term research programme on conflict, state fragility and social cohesion

Report prepared for DFID’s Central Research department

Annex C: Literature Review

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# Annex C: Literature Review on Conflict, State Fragility and Social Cohesion

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1. Introduction

This literature review summarises as far as possible the state of knowledge and research gaps in key areas under the broad theme of conflict, state fragility and social cohesion. It is necessarily a limited exercise as only 11 consultancy days were available to conduct a literature review in this very broad area. The structure of the review and the key headings have been informed by the draft project concept note (PCN), consultation process and the mapping of existing research, undertaken during the scoping study. The primary focus is on drawing out key research findings and gaps on the linkages between conflict, state fragility and social cohesion and across the thematic areas identified in the Terms of Reference and draft PCN.

In terms of sources, given the time available, we have relied primarily on the following documents: working papers and synthesis documents from the relevant DFID-funded DRCs (CRISE, Crisis States Research Centre, DRC on Citizenship, Participation and Accountability) and other key academic research programmes in this area (e.g. MICROCON); key reports, policy and research papers from donors such as DFID, the World Bank and OECD DAC; and key reports and research papers from thinktanks and NGOs. We have also included a limited number of individual academic papers and books where these have been recommended or were already known to us through our own work.

The review begins with an overview of key concepts and definitions, including the terms “conflict”, “state fragility” and “social cohesion” (also attached to the main report at annex A). The review then summarizes the state of knowledge and identifies gaps in existing research under the two key themes identified in the draft PCN:

- The drivers and sustainers of conflict and fragility
- Prevention and response
2. Key concepts and definitions

2.1 “Conflict”

The definition given in the 2007 DFID policy paper “Preventing Violent Conflict” is useful:

“Conflict exists in all societies at all times and need not necessarily be negative or destructive. Conflict is the pursuit of contrary or seemingly incompatible interests – whether between individuals, groups or countries. It can be a major force for positive social change. In states with good governance, strong civil society and robust political and social systems where human rights are protected, conflicting interests are managed and ways found for groups to pursue their goals peacefully. Where there is poor governance, however, grievances, disillusionment, competition for resources and disputes are more likely to become violent”. We therefore use the term “violent conflict” to refer to latter type of conflict.

There is agreement in the research community that conflicts are rarely one-off events, and often result from longer-term, structural processes of social and political disintegration. Neither do they typically occur in a linear cycle, but rather coexist in varying degrees of intensity over different time periods.

2.2 “The state”

This is perhaps one of the most contested concepts of all. Although at a broad level, it is agreed that the state is a political organisation which exerts control and authority over a defined territory, its resources and population, there has been a tendency to see the state in narrow terms as the set of formal structures and institutions (e.g. executive, parliament, judiciary, military) that exercise authority and are the visible embodiment of the state. However, recent work by social scientists have stressed the context-specific nature of the state and that the state is embedded in wider society. Thus, it is also important to understand the informal social and political practices, networks, power relations, relationships and cultural meanings that shape formal state institutions and thus also constitute the state in practice.

2.3 “State Fragility”

DFID defines fragile states as occurring where ‘the government cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor’ (DFID 2005) although this definition is quite narrow. The fragility provided by the OCED-DAC (2007) is broader:

“Fragility arises primarily from weaknesses in the dynamic political process through which citizens’ expectations of the state and state expectations of citizens are reconciled and brought into equilibrium with the state's capacity to deliver services. Reaching equilibrium in this negotiation over the social contract is a critical determinant of resilience, and disequilibrium the determinant of fragility”.

We find that this definition is usefully complemented by the definition given by Stewart and Brown (2008) – “states that are failing, or at risk of failing, with respect to authority, comprehensive service entitlements or legitimacy” as this also emphasizes situations where the state is unable to protect its citizens from violence and situations where the state enjoys limited legitimacy in the eyes of the population i.e. it lays stress on whether the population (rather than international donors) think a state is fragile.

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1 Max Weber's classic definition is that a state in an organisation that has a “monopoly on legitimate violence”. In practice and juridically, however, an entity is state in international law if it is recognised as such by other states, even if it does not have the monopoly on the legitimate use of force over a territory. Thus, there are entities that exercise legal order over a territory, but are not recognised as a state by other states (e.g. Somaliland).
2.4 “State building”

DFID defines state building as “the process through which states enhance their ability to function” (DFID 2008) and stress that statebuilding is an iterative process shaped by elite interaction and state-society relations. For this reason, the term “state transformation” is preferred by many, especially in fragile and conflict-affected contexts where the emphasis is on the dynamic change from one type of state (and social contract) to another aimed at building the foundations of a peaceful society. For this reason, the recent OCED-DAC (2008) definition is more widely accepted and is the one that we use to scope out the research programme:

“We define State building as the purposeful action to develop the capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state in relation to an effective political process for negotiating the mutual demands between state and societal groups. While support to state building is thus increasingly seen as a means to assist in responding to and preventing fragility and conflict, it is a relatively recent and as yet loosely defined concept in the context of development assistance. State building needs to be seen in the broader context of state-formation processes and state-society relations. State building is seen as a primarily endogenous development founded on a political process of negotiation and contestation between the state and societal groups. The idea of state-society bargaining as the basis for building more effective, legitimate and resilient states provides a particularly useful lens for thinking about situations of fragility, but also about governance and development more generally. It helps to shift thinking from a focus on transferring institutional models, towards a focus on the local political processes which create public institutions and generate their legitimacy in the eyes of a state’s population”.

2.5 “Political settlement”

DFID defines the “political settlement” as “the forging of a common understanding, usually among elites, that their interests or belief are served by a particular way of organising political power” (Whaites, DFID 2008). DFID stresses that political settlements are not static but evolve. Some political settlements last for centuries, but within that time decision-making power is likely to transfer between different elite groups. Many commentators stress that although political settlements may adopt the structures of the ‘modern’ state and be underpinned by a constitution, in practice the power relations and ethos behind the settlement may be very different.

2.6 “Social contract”

The basic idea of the “social contract” is that people give up some rights to a government in order to receive certain entitlements and jointly preserve the social order. It is related to the notion that legitimate state authority must be derived from the consent of those who are governed. DFID and other donors stress the importance of taxation and service delivery to the social contract.

A helpful definition of the social contract in the context of understanding conflict, fragility and state building is provided by OECD/DAC, which defines the social contract as emerging from the interaction between a) expectations that a given society has of a given state; b) state capacity to provide services, including security, and to secure revenue from its population and territory to provide these services; and c) élite will to direct state resources and capacity to fulfil social expectations

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3 Concepts & Dilemmas of State building in Fragile Situations, OECD/DAC discussion paper 2008

4 The notion of the “social contract” has a long history dating back to Locke and Rousseau.
2.7 “Social cohesion”

There is no one agreed definition of “social cohesion”, but common definitions include the following constituent elements (Beauvais and Jenson 2002):⁵

- **Common values and a civic culture**, i.e. society’s members share common values allowing them to identify common aims, share common moral principles and codes of behaviour.
- **Social order and social control**, i.e. absence of general conflict within a society or any serious challenges to the existing order and system.
- **Social solidarity and reductions in wealth disparities**, i.e. the harmonious development of society and constituent groups towards common economic, social and environmental standards characterised by equal opportunities and a reduction in income inequality, social exclusion and unemployment.
- **Social networks and social capital**, i.e. the institutions, relationships and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society’s interactions.
- **Territorial belonging and identity**, i.e. social cohesion as a sense of belonging to a group or place (although allowing scope for multiple identities).

We find the following definition provided by Colletta and Cullen (2002)⁶ to be the most useful:

“Social cohesion refers to two broader intertwined features of society: (i) the absence of latent conflict whether in the form of income/wealth inequality; racial/ethnic tensions; disparities in political participation; or other forms of polarization; and (ii) the presence of strong social bonds—measured by levels of trust and norms of reciprocity; the abundance of civic society associations and the presence of institutions of conflict management, (i.e. responsive democracy, an independent judiciary, an independent media).”

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⁵ As Beauvais and Jenson (2002) point out the definition employed affects what is analysed or measured and what policy action is recommended.

3. The Drivers and Sustainers of Fragility and Conflict

3.1 Research trends

- A shift from the “Greed and Grievance” approach, which was influential in the late 1990s, to more nuanced work on the linkages between inequality, exclusion and violence focused on the role of “horizontal inequalities” (a group's relative performance across economic, social and political dimensions) in state fragility and conflict and the dynamic linkages between governance and conflict.

- A recognition of the multi-causal nature of conflicts and the need to use political economy analysis to analyse a range of structural causes (poverty, inequality, exclusion, weak or repressive governance, demographic pressures, urbanization, resource abundance/scarcity) and the complex interaction between them in specific contexts as well as the different actors, their incentives and interests.

- A recent interest in examining the “micro” sources of violence as well as the proximate or “trigger” causes of conflict and fragility including economic shocks and political events.

- Recognition that conflict and fragility are dynamic processes and that original grievances may change or be replaced by new sources of tension. Also that conflict and fragility can significantly transform social and political structures, institutions and power relations.

- A recent move to examine the “drivers of peace” as well as the drivers of conflict, seeking to identify the stakeholders and dynamics that can lead to constructive ways of dealing with conflict and social change.

- A renewed focus on group identity and the ways in which identities, ideas and cultural values are constructed and manipulated to mobilise violence and fuel conflict.

- A move to explore the role of non-state actors, and in particular the role of armed groups and private military and security companies, in exacerbating human rights violations and undermining the capacity of the state to secure its citizens, especially in unstable countries.

- New multidisciplinary research on structural factors such as demographic change, urbanisation and youth marginalisation and the conditions under which they provoke conflict and instability as well as the links between climate change, environmental degradation, resource scarcity and conflict.

- Research demonstrating that ‘new wars’, although increasingly intra-state, are embedded within complex military, financial/economic and political transnational networks involving diasporas, dissident groups and cross-border trade in arms, drugs and “conflict commodities”.

- A nascent literature on global security concerns and renewed interest in “new interventionism”, especially unilateral interventionism.

- Renewed interest in more historically and culturally contextualized, in-depth explorations of the root causes of particular conflicts, of their dynamics and transformative potential as opposed to ‘generalized’ meta-theories, which dominated in the late 1990s.
3.2 The state of knowledge

3.2.1 The structural causes of conflict and fragility

The "Greed & Grievance" debate. The ‘greed and grievance’ discourse was highly influential amongst policy makers in the late 1990s and early 2000s but has since come to be widely contested. It identified the key determinants of intra-state conflict as:

i) ethnicity, religious and cultural cleavage, group identity, inequality (a socio-anthropological approach taken by Kaplan 1994, Kaufmann 1996, Huntington 1997, Kaldor 1999); and

ii) economic factors and the role of natural resources (a combination of a socio-economic and political science approach followed by Keen 1998, Collier and Hoeffler 1998).

This was, however, often as applied as a mono-causal theory of conflict, and its limitations soon became evident. A new approach has since been developed, which whilst recognising the importance of ethnicity and economics – and of access to resources in particular - places more emphasis on a nuanced approach to understanding the causes of conflict, including issues of inequality, poverty, and the central role of power and politics; as well as the ‘micro’ sources of violence.

Inequality, exclusion and violence. Research has demonstrated that social exclusion is a leading cause of conflict and insecurity in many parts of the world (DFID 2005). Exclusion is most likely to lead to violence where there is marked and widening inequality between social groups or geographic regions (DFID 2007). When groups feel unequal, they are more likely to resort to violence.

Social exclusion generates conditions in which violent internal conflict can arise, by providing the grievances that can generate violence; but exclusion does not always lead to fragility and conflict. Stewart (2006) explores the question of what conditions make for political mobilisation of the excluded. In extensive analysis, she found that leadership (most often from outside the group) was an essential ingredient. Cultural affinities combined with leadership tend to turn latent grievances into actual protest, which may become violent. The role of the government is also critical, both negatively and positively. Negatively, the government may act as a potential instigator of violence by its discriminatory and exclusionary policies; or positively, governments may take action to counter exclusion, by being more politically inclusive, introducing structures (formal and informal) that ensure that each group participates in political decision-making, and taking action to reduce forms of social exclusion.

Horizontal inequalities (HI). This analysis complements more recent work by CRISE on mapping "horizontal inequalities" (HIs); and examining how a group’s relative performance in economic, social and political dimensions is an important source of individual welfare and can cause serious political instability (Stewart 2008a, 2008b, 2007a). At a superficial level, Stewart argues, cultural difference can be seen to lie behind many current conflicts. But econometric cross-country and within-country data, as well as case study evidence shows that the potential for conflict becomes higher in contexts where there are severe HIs, and where these overlap across the different dimensions.

Stewart (2008c) also highlights the links between horizontal inequalities and fragility. She argues that HIs can contribute to state fragility in various ways:

- Service delivery: when certain groups receive fewer social entitlements than others. As the proportion of the population suffering discrimination increases, the likelihood that this will result in an overall failure of service access also increases. This happens in three ways: by causing failures in services, by provoking conflict and thereby causing loss in authority; and by leading to government repression provoked by protest against HIs. This leads to a loss of legitimacy, which in itself can sometimes provoke further conflict.
• State authority: When the deprived groups resort to violence in protest, thereby impacting the authority of the state.
• Political legitimacy: states that discriminate against significant proportions of their population economically and politically are likely to be perceived as illegitimate by affected groups.

Drawing on nine case studies, she points to actions that can be taken to correct horizontal inequalities. She argues that in order to provide a useful basis for policy, group boundaries need to be relatively clearly defined; and the divisions need to have social significance. Stewart (2006) further explores the relationship between social exclusion (SE) and violent conflict and considers policies that might be adopted to reduce social exclusion and help to prevent conflict.

**Chronic poverty, fragility and conflict.** A significant body of work on the potential impact of poverty and inequality on violent conflict has emerged over the last decade. The evidence suggests the following linkages between conflict, state fragility and chronic poverty:

- Conflict is more likely to occur in poor countries;
- Conflict-affected countries generally have higher levels of poverty and lower growth rates (Collier 1999; Collier et al 2003);
- Low-per capita income is a principal explanatory factor of the risk of violent internal conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Elbadawi 1992; Stewart 2002);
- When income disparities align with other structural cleavages (i.e. caste, religion, ethnicity, race and region) and when economic growth leaves certain groups behind the risk of tension and conflict is higher; and
- Chronic poverty and inequality are often inter-linked and persistent poverty can be a factor in the outbreak of conflict if it leads to increased social discontent, or if organised violence offers some of the poor better livelihood opportunities than peace (Justino, 2006).
- A state can clearly be fragile without, for example, horizontal inequalities being present. But a state with a significant degree of HIs would be counted as fragile with respect to both service entitlements and legitimacy (Stewart 2008).

Nonetheless, not all poor countries are fragile and/or in conflict and vice versa, and not all poor people take up violence. This suggests that the precise nature of the causality between poverty and inequality, and conflict and fragility is more complex. More recent work, such as that undertaken by the International Peace Academy, which explores how poverty and inequality causally interact with various types of conflict and fragility, as well as communal violence in “well functioning states” (Kanbur et al, 2007) may provide further insights.

**Gender inequality.** Moser (2004) highlights that much social violence is gender based, and linked to gendered power relations and constructions of masculinities. Caprioli (2003) explores this further, by looking at the impact of domestic gender equality on intrastate conflict, and suggests that gender equality may have a double impact by reducing societal tolerance for violence; and hindering the ability of groups to mobilise masses in support of insurrection through the use of gendered language and stereotypes. She quotes other studies that have focused on the role of gender equality and interstate conflict to highlight the relationship between international violence and domestic gender equality (Caprioli 2000, 2003; Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Tessler and Warriner 1997). These have found that, in general, countries characterised by gender inequality are more likely to be involved in interstate disputes and more likely to rely on violence to settle those disputes. It may therefore be that states with low per capita income might be more prone to civil war, with gender inequality (measured by fertility rates) and their concomitant societal norms of cultural violence explaining the link between per capita income and civil war.

**The demographic and ‘male youth’ challenge.** The growing numbers of un- or under-employed ‘male youth’ in developing countries has often been linked to violence. It is accepted that countries with high levels of unemployment and low levels of education among young men face a far greater risk of conflict (DFID 2001). In a 2006 study ‘Fearing Africa’s Young Men’ Sommers investigates, through the case study of Rwanda, the pervasive image of male urban youth as a menace to
Africa’s development and its primary source of instability. He suggests that there is a need for a far more nuanced understanding of the situation of young males and the incentives for them to get involved in violence. The literature on the need to work positively with youth is gaining momentum (e.g. Ebata et al. 2005; Kemper 2005), but there are still significant gaps in this area on exactly what the risks are and the policy options to deal with these risks.

**Resource abundance/ scarcity.** Di John (2008) reviews literature on the links between competition for resources and state fragility. There are two main approaches: the first highlights the role of resource scarcity and environmental degradation in producing conflict and challenges to state authority; while the second emphasises the role of resource abundance in similar processes. The first argument is discussed in more detail in section 3.2.3 below. The second approach, which is more influential and is commonly known as the ‘resource curse’ argument, suggests that the abundance of natural resources, and in particular oil increases the incidence, intensity and duration of conflict. This is based on recent influential empirical work on the causes of civil war, which shows that primary commodity exports increase the likelihood of the onset of civil war (Collier and Hoefller 1998). The argument has two variants: one suggests that oil abundant, less developed countries generate valuable rents which in turn generate violent forms of rent-seeking that take the form of ‘greed-based’ insurgencies. The other argues that when states obtain most of their revenues from external sources, this reduces the need to impose domestic taxes and this causes leaders to be less accountable to their citizens. Di John argues however that there is little convincing evidence that oil abundance *per se* causes conflict although there is some evidence that once a conflict is already underway, some types of natural resources may serve to prolong it. He suggests that further research into how mineral/oil abundance leads to conflict by perpetuating growth-restricting governance, Dutch disease and underdevelopment is needed.

**Multiple causality.** Research carried out by the Berghof Centre, amongst others, argues the need to look at the multiples causes of conflict and how they interact. Their work stresses the following combination of factors:

- The erosion of states and the failure of domestic politics, leading to endemic state weakness and collapse (Wulf, Lund 2006). This can be aggravated by external support – embedded as it is in the context of intensifying globalization.
- The availability of weapons, especially the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. These act as accelerators and multipliers of violence.
- The privatisation and outsourcing of traditional police and military functions. While this does not constitute a cause *per se*, it can influence how wars are fought.

**The importance of context-specific research:** Given that analyses of the root causes underlying conflict have been unable to identify a singular root cause or set of explanatory variables that could be applied to all cases of conflict, there is agreement that in-depth and regularly refreshed analyses of contextualised factors are required. Authors such as Mitchell (2002) propose that conflict transformation should address some more straightforward questions, such as: How did the conflict start? What keeps the conflict going? What are changeable/tractable causes and factors in the short, medium and long term?
3.2.2 The proximate causes of conflict and fragility

**Dynamic factors: change as a cause of conflict and violence.** It is now agreed that change, and particularly extensive and sudden change, has the capacity to create conflict. In assessing the impact of a particular transition, it is important to look at the three key aspects - the nature, intensity, and rapidity of the change. In addition, whether any ensuing conflict protracts and turns violent depends upon a range of other variables within a particular context – these can be international, intra-national and/or local, and interact dynamically and not statically.

“Drivers of peace”. There exists a significant strand of research, which looks at the “drivers of peace” as well as the drivers of conflict (Bloomfield and Ropers 2005). This work emphasises that it is critical to identify and understand the stakeholders and dynamics in a conflict setting who/which can promote constructive ways of dealing with conflict and social change (Lederach 2001). This research also suggests that those groups or individuals who have traditionally been regarded as “spoilers” may not necessarily be motivated in their actions by a desire to continue benefiting from violent conflict, but rather by an adherence to values central to their society (e.g. “not giving up the faith”, “carrying the flag”). As Mitchell suggests, it is important to policy, psychological, social and political factors together in order to develop a nuanced understanding of the incentives or disincentives to engaging with constructive change. Such an approach is especially relevant to understanding the role of social movements and faith-based groups, and by new forms of violence such as urban and gang violence. Despite being increasingly important sources of violence, fragility and conflict, these remain fairly under-researched areas.

**Identity.** Identity politics (e.g. based on ethnicity, religion, sect, clan, race, class, sub-national region and nationality) is an important factor and tool for analysing fragility, and identifying opportunities to address perceived exclusions. Luckham et al (2006) argue that violence on the basis of identity is rooted in processes of exclusion or deepening inequality. Identity politics can be used to articulate other forms of exclusion and discontent, including both vertical and horizontal inequalities. Many of the most acute identity conflicts occur in situations where state security organisations become divided along ethnic or religious lines, or where violence is privatised, such as in the hands of non-state ethnic and religious militias. At the same time, states and ruling elites themselves may directly promote identity-based violence.

It is important to remember that national and other identities are rarely gender neutral. Caprioli (2003) shows how feminist literature has identified gender inequality as a factor in group violence and insurrection; where gender-related issues are avoided so as not to undermine national or communal solidarity. Nationalism, for example, is far from gender neutral, and often the sense of ‘us versus them’ that serves to unite the group members, is accompanied by a renewal of a patriarchal familial ideology. The category ‘woman’ becomes a tool for leaders in a call to arms, and women are forced into traditional roles as wives, mothers, and nurturers.

**Culture and identity politics.** The role of culture in conflict is seen as either instrumental; or using Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ hypothesis, a “primordial” factor that causes conflict. How the state, as well as non-state actors such as the media, treat the cultural norms and practices of different groups, can contribute to group mobilisation, independently of political or socioeconomic HIs.

Langer and Brown (CRISE 2007) focus on cultural difference as the third dimension of horizontal inequality (in addition to political and economic difference). They highlight the link between culture and group mobilisation, including violent conflict, particularly where there are perceptions of cultural discrimination or exclusion. Cultural HIs (connected with issues such as official languages, religions, educational issues, recognition of ethno-cultural practices etc.) can be what tips the balance where socio-economic and political inequality has festered, without violence, for years.

Women and girls are often viewed as bearers of cultural identity and specifically targeted during conflict. Gender-based and sexual violence have increasingly become weapons of warfare and constitute some of the defining characteristics of contemporary armed conflict (UN 2002). Equally,
women and girls may also act as active agents, and may choose to carry out acts of violence because they are committed to the political, religious or economic goals of the parties to the conflict. They may also be manipulated into taking up military or violent roles through propaganda, abduction, intimidation and forced recruitment.

**Radicalisation and violent extremism**: Various empirical studies have found that in general there are not strong links between terrorism and income poverty, inequality and poor economic development. Work by economists such as Krueger and Maleckova (2003) has found that Islamist militants often come from economically advantaged backgrounds, and argue that terrorism should instead be seen as a response to political conditions and long-standing feelings of indignity, and frustration at lack of opportunity. Piazza (2006) argues that “social cleavage theory” which hypothesizes social and cultural stratification that is linked to sociopolitical institutions like party systems, is better equipped to explain terrorism than are theories that link terrorism to poor economic development. So, more diverse societies, in terms of ethnic and religious demography, and political systems with large, complex, multiparty systems are more likely to experience terrorism than are more homogeneous states with few or no parties at the national level.

Others argue however, that that while this may explain the motivations of the Islamist leadership or elite, poverty and illiteracy may still be important motivating factors for recruits at the lower levels of extremist organisations. It is also argued that the situation is likely to vary greatly between countries and these hypotheses should be tested at the country and, furthermore, at the sub-national level. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan have historically suffered from important development gaps, some of the poorest social and economic conditions in the country, weak government institutions, grievances with the Frontier Crimes Regulations legal system, frustration at the lack of economic opportunities, and lack of political participation.

**The role of ideology.** It is argued that in many cases Islamic extremism is based not so much on a fully-developed ideology but, rather, a simple narrative which articulates the suffering of the virtual Muslim ummah. This narrative appeals to individuals who are torn between competing identities, and for whom the idea of becoming an ‘avenger’ of the Ummah provides a sense of power, meaning and identity (Roy 2008). Certainly, in Pakistan there is evidence that a perceived threat to Islam is a principal factor underlying radicalisation. It is important to note that this threat is not seen to emanate entirely from the West but from within, i.e. from fellow Muslims who are seen to be pro-West, or come from a different sect (Ladbury and Hussein 2008).

However, a similar study in Bangladesh finds little support for the above hypothesis. However, a major driver there is intolerance and violence against minorities in the name of religion, and in which the state is complicit. The study finds that the desire of the government to stay in power has resulted in a tendency to accommodate nationalist or bigoted ideologies (Ladbury 2008b). In both Pakistan and Bangladesh, the studies found that madrassahs provide a limited education that leaves their students vulnerable to extremist narratives. In both countries, this was most closely related to the presence of teachers with strongly sectarian attitudes.

**The role of religion.** Most of the literature on the role of religion in violent conflict highlights that there exist at least three theoretical approaches. The first is the primordialist approach, which argues that differences in religious traditions should be seen as one of the most important independent factors in explaining violent conflict between nations. This is characterized by Samuel Huntington’s (1996) clash of civilisations’ hypothesis. The second is the instrumentalist approach, which accepts that religion may aggravate conflict, but rarely causes it. Ceris (2008) argues that the main factor underlying conflict remains socioeconomic inequalities between nations. He believes that neo-liberal economic policies, and Western foreign policies have given rise to feelings of victimisation and injustice in Muslim world, fuelling grievances, which have then been then framed in religious terms. In Ceric’s view, religion is rarely the cause of terrorism and political violence but rather provides the narrative and language through which political conflicts are expressed.

Thirdly, there is the constructivist view which holds that it is only by pitting the true believer against
the unbelieving enemy that political entrepreneurs can mobilise their constituencies into violence. The way in which this last is achieved is addressed by the psychological literature, as encapsulated by the work of Juergensmeyer (2003). Much in the same way as ethnicity, he argues that religion acts as the medium through which issues of alienation, marginalisation and social frustration are expressed. However this use of religion brings new aspects to conflicts, which were otherwise not present. These include:

- Personalising the conflict by providing personal rewards;
- Providing vehicles of social mobilisation by involving large numbers of supporters who would not otherwise be mobilised around social or political issues;
- Providing an organisational network of churches, mosques, temples, etc;
- Allowing moral legitimacy for political encounters;
- Providing justification for violence;
- Providing the image of cosmic war as well as an all-encompassing world view;
- Characterising the extremists as religious soldiers fighting back the forces of evil;
- Absolutising the conflict into extreme opposing positions; and
- Demonising the opponent.

Other commentators characterise the rise of religious movements as a backlash against secularism. These groups are able to capitalise on the fear and perception that religion is under threat and are able to use the economic, political and social failures of secular governments as the backdrop to their offer of an ‘alternative’ vision for society.

There is some literature, which discusses separately the processes by which individuals and communities are mobilised into violent action along ethnic and religious lines. However, there appears to be limited comparative analyses of how the processes are different across contexts. How do these movements relate to the state? What are the trigger factors that cause them to turn to violence? If religious mobilisation is to be considered inevitable in societies experiencing religious revitalisation, what alternatives might exist to violent insurgency and state repression?

**The role of the state.** State policies and institutions play a crucial role in either reinforcing or modifying exclusion. Sensitivity to national and local cultural difference is vital here and citizenship laws, language policies, education policies and land legislation offer entry points; as does work with the media and advocacy groups. Identity politics calls for a sound contextual understanding of the local dynamics, in order to guard against policies that stimulate identity conflicts. Recently, some work has also been undertaken on the role of state perpetration of violence in causing fragility and conflict (e.g. Sluka 2000). However, further research on how the state (or particular state actors) instigates and uses violence is needed.

The LSE Crisis States Research Centre has also carried out cutting-edge research on the links between what it calls ‘anti-politics’ and state fragility – i.e. the novel (or recently-acknowledged) ways in which party politics is being undermined (or rather eclipsed) by ‘outsiders’ to the political process, thus increasing its fragility. Research on ‘anti-politics’ in the Andean countries (Di John 2005) the Philippines, Uganda, Russia and Italy has demonstrated how political outsiders (from actors to businessmen) are discarding long-established political organisations under conditions of reduced state and the promotion of ‘participation’ (by NGOs, CBOs and others) outside the political system, facilitated by powerful media and communications technologies and organisations.

**3.2.3 The transnational drivers of conflict and fragility**

While the state is important, it is not the only driving force shaping the political, social and economic environment inside a country. There are various forces and dynamics, which operate beyond the state at national, regional and international levels, and exert a significant influence on the state’s capacity to perform its core and expected functions, as well as on the structure of society, including its resilience to conflict and fragility. These forces include the international trade in arms and “conflict commodities” climate change, resource scarcity, and migration. In addition, the foreign policies of other countries, including development and humanitarian interventions, also
influence state and peace building agendas to a significant degree.

**Conflict and Transnational Networks.** Fragility and social cohesion within a state is often influenced by transnational forces and dynamics originating from outside the boundaries of the state. Research by Mary Kaldor (1999) has shown that ‘new wars’, although increasingly intra-state, are embedded within complex transnational networks: military, financial/economic and political. This includes the role of diasporas in financing and political support; the trading of natural resources through illicit trafficking networks to finance war, etc. It is also argued that state weakness can invite predators from the international arena, in whose interests it is to that insecurity and a state of violent conflict is prolonged. Often, these two factors co-occur. Therefore, it is not enough to focus on the role of the nation-state alone. Regional and global dynamics, as exemplified by the role of foreign interests in continued destabilisation and state weakness in DRC have to be taken into account.

**Managing the effects of climate change.** Much of the extensive literature on the security and conflict implications of climate change emphasises the extent to which climate change will challenge adaptive and response capacities at international, and state and local level. The German Advisory Council on Climate Change’s (WGBU) 2008 report analyses how the impacts of climate change have the potential to overstretch the adaptive capacities of many societies and - without resolute action - may result in destabilisation and violence. WGBU explicitly highlight the importance of reinforcing the capacities of fragile states to manage environmental risks. Others explore the potentially divisive dimensions of global inequality and injustice inherent to the challenges of climate change. Oxfam (2008), for example, highlight the role of richer countries in effectively violating the human rights of people living in poor countries. While this claim has no basis in international law, it is a reflection of the use of human rights framework as a legitimate normative source for addressing climate change equitably.

In particular, the disproportionate impact of climate change on poorer countries is highlighted (Stern Review and others). These countries often suffer from fragility and low social cohesion, which makes the impacts of climate change harder to manage. International Alert (2007) estimates that there are 46 countries - home to 2.7 billion people – where the interplay of the effects of climate change interacting with pre-existing economic, social and political problems will create a high risk of violent conflict. In an additional 56 countries, although the risk of armed conflict might not be immediate, the interaction of climate change and other factors creates a high risk of political instability (e.g. declining water supply due to melting glaciers in Peru), with the potential for violent conflict in the longer term. The increase in migration trends due to climate change has also been emphasised.

International Alert highlights the complex dynamics that will intercede in the causal link between climate change and conflict. Climate change affects conflict indirectly, and in fragile states and/or states with low social cohesion, priority should be given to understanding and addressing the ‘consequences of the consequences’, of climate change. Sudan’s Darfur region is a good example of how increased desertification in the 1980s indirectly affected the escalation of conflict in the region (Srinivasan 2006).

**Migration and the regionalisation of conflict.** The relationship between population movements - both refugee flows and migration - and violent conflict requires careful disaggregation from other causal factors and from each other. In terms of their potential to act as a causal factor in conflict, the effects of refugee flows and migration are significantly different. For example, the presence of large-scale refugee populations fleeing civil war, who have experienced violence and persecution, can increase the potential for political mobilization and violence. Both refugee and migrant population movements may be large scale; for example large-scale displacement following natural disasters. However, in the latter case, receiving states do not usually experience organised violence (Gleditsch, Nordas and Salehyan 2007).

In a study based on analysis of conflict data, Salehyan and Gleditsch (2004) found that civil war in one country increases the likelihood of conflict in neighbouring states. Their findings stemmed from
an examination of the observed geographical clustering of civil wars, which demonstrate how transnational factors and the relationship with neighbouring states shape the risk of civil wars. In examining why wars spread across borders, they concluded that refugee flows could facilitate the transnational spread of arms, ideology and combatants. Refugees may establish political structures in receiving countries or change ethnic composition, and increase economic competition. Nonetheless, the authors stress that refugees themselves are typically victims rather than perpetrators of political violence.

In an era where displaced populations may increasingly be a mix of asylum seekers and economic or environmental migrants, however, such categorisation may become more complex. The policy considerations are significant; both for working effectively in the receiving-country to mitigate conflict risk, and for the implications for asylum and migration policies regionally and internationally. Harsh and restrictive regimes in countries further away may increase the likelihood of conflict diffusing into neighbouring states. Admitting more people to decrease the pressure on neighbouring states may be a policy with conflict prevention implications. The issue of the links between population movements and conflict is becoming an increasing area of focus given predictions of potentially enormous displacements linked to future climate change.

*Global Aspects of Horizontal Inequalities (HIs).* Francis Stewart (2008b) argues that understanding the global dimensions of HIs is as relevant to stability and well-being at the international level as it is at the national level. She suggests that inequalities faced by a group in one part of the world (e.g. Muslims in Western societies) may become a source of grievance and mobilisation elsewhere. She therefore argues that we need to see inequality in a global perspective and explore supra-national mechanisms that can address these challenges.

*The role of the international system and foreign intervention (aid, military, diplomatic).* Various researchers and practitioners argue that there is insufficient knowledge and analysis of the tensions and contradictions intrinsic to externally assisted state building. Call and Cousens (2006), amongst others, in examining the weaknesses of international peace efforts and the complexity of post-conflict transitions, ask if international actors really possess the kind of knowledge that is required, i.e. on what type of state institutions are needed to sustain peace, and what resources and tools can contribute to state and peace building.

In fact, there is evidence that suggests that international ‘state-building’ often serves to weaken the state (Bickerton 2007). The proliferation of NGOs and IOs in a post-conflict setting of ‘reduced’ and struggling state institutions can impede the ability of the state to develop its own capacity and to respond to citizens, hence impacting its legitimacy and accountability in the eyes of the population. Lockhart and Ghani (2008a) suggest that international presence, such as the ‘rushed’ UN presence in Afghanistan, can actually become an instrument of division, resentment, and corruption.

Therefore Ghani and Lockhart (2008b) argue for new forms of intervention - which they call ‘sovereignty strategies’ - the ‘the alignment of internal and external stakeholders to the goals of the sovereign state through the joint formulation, calibration of, and adherence to the rules of the game.’ However, a problem with this approach is that its focus remains on strengthening the state, rather than on strengthening the ‘social contract’ (which is what citizens ultimately need the state for) and taking into account state-society interaction.

*The role of aid in fragile states.* Aid can be a positive factor in conflict prevention – if carefully managed it can support state-building, help reduce state fragility, lower horizontal inequalities through emphasis on a fair distribution of resources across different groups in society, and thus contribute to strengthening social cohesion. As the 2007 CRISE Policy Brief suggests, today this issue is largely ignored in aid policy, and the result is that aid sometimes serves to accentuate HIs. More generally, the literature (Collier and Chauvet 2006; Lockhart and Ghani (2008)) argues that the type of assistance and the sequencing of interventions are also important factors.
However, as Collier and Chauvet (2006) have shown, fragile states are the most difficult contexts within which to create sustainable aid programmes. In fact, the volatility of aid in fragile states is twice as high as in other low-income countries (Dollar and Levin 2004). And unpredictable aid flows can serve to undermine the state-building agenda, by putting an additional strain on already struggling institutions. In this way, volatility of aid flows negatively affects the perceived ability of the government to deliver, and this exacerbates state fragility further.

In addition, international involvement across countries varies, and research has identified what are often called ‘aid orphans’ - poor countries with weak institutions that do not figure on the international community’s agenda. Overall, there is evidence of a widening gap in aid allocations between fragile and other low-income countries.

3.2.4 The diversification of violence and the role of non-state actors

**Non-state actors.** There are a range of actors that operate beyond and outside the power, structures and control of the state. They include traditional leaders; civil society organisations; political and social movements; armed groups; and criminal networks, amongst others.

Holmqvist (2005) in her work with the International Peace Research Institute (PRIo), looks specifically at armed non-state actors (i.e. rebel opposition groups, local militias, vigilantes; warlords; civil defence forces and paramilitary groups; and private companies that provide military and security services) and highlights how the diversification of violence and prevalence of multiple armed groups complicates traditional conflict management and resolution, and poses significant challenges for international security governance more generally. The ambivalence of the relationship between state and non-state actors in conflict or post-conflict settings and the critical importance of establishing effective and democratically accountable security sector governance in the context of post-conflict peace-building is also highlighted. The author argues that when government, tacitly or explicitly, allows other actors to shoulder the burden of its own security responsibilities or failings, including a lack of accountability of its own security forces, this impacts negatively on the legitimacy of the state. The persistent existence of armed non-state actors can thus be seen to provide an entry-point into the process of (re)negotiating the social contract that takes place in the transition from conflict to post-conflict. As such it provides clues as to how accountability and transparency in relations between state and citizen are constructed. Authors such as Williams and Ricigliano (2005) explore the different features of various armed groups, the options for engaging with them effectively, and whether and how this can increase prospects for peace.

There also seems to be increased academic interest in the role of private military and security companies in exacerbating human rights violations and undermining the capacity of the state to secure its citizens, especially in unstable countries (This includes work by Schreier and Caparini, 2005: 44, Singer 2003, Musah & Fayemi 2002, Walker & Whyte 2005; and Gumede 2007, Ndlovu-Gatsheni & Dzinesa 2008: 90-1). The proliferation of private security actors is seen as part of a new ‘networked security governance’ in which the state should no longer be conceived of as the central actor but one whose position within the network varies according to time and space (Johnston & Shearing 2003). The literature also looks at the issue of market failure and the primacy of the state in a globalising neoliberal order which promotes the market as the main mechanism for shaping major social and political decisions, including security decisions. Security is a crucial dimension of social life for the unemployed or underemployed, and an area where the failure of the market needs to be attended to.

**Urban violence and fragile cities.** There is a growing body of work on urbanisation and the increase in urban violence. Though extensive work has been done by some authors, for example Caroline Moser (2004; 2005), to conceptualise urban violence and think about options for response, the challenges remain daunting. The CSRC research theme on Cities and Fragile States aims at reflects a better understanding of the relationship between cities and state transformation. For example, Rodgers (2007) highlights how political violence in Latin America has morphed into new forms of urban violence. In a new spatial context, as cities grow and are shaped by factors
including elite segregation, violence is becoming more intense.

CSRC’s research highlights a number of important findings. Unemployment, urban growth, and the ‘youth bulge’ tend to lead to persistent fragility; and poor welfare is a good predictor of political violence. However, in a context where the perpetrators of violence contribute to asset accumulation and social protection, policy responses are complex. Cities are increasingly vulnerable to war, and are theatres of regional and international conflicts. They are also critically affected by displaced populations. In examining fragile cities, CSRC find that people are opting out of public goods, with policing often taking the form of non-state policing. Cities are vital to reconstruction and peace, and as noted, some urban administrations are finding ways to address urban violence.

Moser (2004) articulates how urban violence functions as a development constraint, noting the complex, dynamic and multilayered nature of violence. Moser references Mo Hume (2004) in highlighting that much social violence is gender based, and linked to gendered power relations and constructions of masculinities. Increasingly, the scale of violence in poor areas or slums becomes routine. In examining the causes of urban violence, Moser finds issues of power and powerlessness fundamental. Poverty and inequality, debated in their significance as causes, overlap. While extensive research on violence in cities in Latin America has already been undertaken, there is less apparent focus on the issue of urban violence in African cities.

**Influencing mechanisms.** In a review of literature on failed states for the Crisis States project, di John (2008) identifies several competing mechanisms through which influencing, or rent-seeking, activities occur: i) legal and institutional influencing activities, more typical of richer countries (lobby groups, political parties, labour unions); ii) informal patron-client networks, which are a central feature of many poor economies; and iii) illegal forms of rent-seeking or corruption. When one or more of these three mechanisms fail to provide influencing opportunities to political actors, political violence represents a fourth path to influence, i.e. capturing or usurping the state altogether. These four influencing mechanisms, di John argues, can be considered as functional substitutes that operate to a greater extent under different stages of development and under different political settlements. An important component of research on fragile states, therefore, should include considering the relationships between alternate forms of influencing (and power) and state capture and the mechanisms through which declines in the first three forms of influencing contribute to the rise of political violence and declines in state legitimacy. In turn, it is central to examine why political violence generates state collapse in some contexts and not others.

### 3.3 Research gaps

Whilst knowledge of the drivers of conflict and fragility is now extensive and stresses the need to examine how multiple factors interact in specific contexts, there are a number of specific areas where research is contested or incomplete:

(i) **The role of non-state actors:** Although there is increasing research in this areas, especially on armed groups and private military and security companies, there appears to be a lack of research on the ways these groups relate to the state (and in some cases capture the state) and to citizens and what the strategies of engagement might be vis-à-vis these actors. This literature review was not able to review the complete literature in this area, but did not come across any research that looks closely at the impacts of the activities of gangs and criminal organisations on conflict and fragility. Equally, it did not uncover much work on the role of traditional authorities, and grassroots social, political and faith-based movements, how they affect state-citizen relations and their role in conflict and fragility or in conflict prevention and peace building.

(ii) **Transnational drivers of conflict and fragility:** There has been a recent increase in research in areas such as international competition over scarce natural resources and trade in arms and conflict commodities. However, the literature review uncovered almost no research on the impacts of international drugs trade as well as other activities of international organised crime networks, such as money laundering and people trafficking – and the ways in which instability
may benefit these groups. Equally, although a few articles have been published on the impacts of the recent economic and global crisis on fragility in developing countries, there is not yet a comprehensive body of literature in this area – especially that takes a longer term view of global economic change and the impacts of changes in international economic, trade and other related policies. Finally, although there are a number of recent articles on current (Western) foreign interventions, there is not yet a comprehensive literature examining the impacts of these interventions on long-term prospects for conflict or instability.

(iii) **The impacts of structural and exogenous factors:** The literature has identified some work on factors such as urbanisation, demographics and migration, but the literature in this area does not appear to be comprehensive – especially in terms of the specific causal relationships between these factors, conflict and fragility or regarding the policy options available to states and other actors to address them.

(iv) **The proximate drivers of conflict and processes of mobilisation into violence:** Although the literature on the structural causes of conflict and fragility is extensive, there is a more limited literature on the proximate or “trigger” causes of conflict and fragility – in particular on what leads groups and organisations to decide to use violence as a means to achieve their objectives. There are recent strands of work on “radicalisation” and “violent extremism”, but this appears quite limited in scope and tied to the counter-terrorism agenda. There seems to be very little comprehensive literature on processes of mobilisation of groups and individuals into violence, the local and transnational dimensions of these processes, and the similarities across contexts (e.g. Muslim vs non-Muslim, ethnic vs religious tensions). Also, (although the literature review did not looks specifically at this area), although there is some recent work on the role of the state (or state actors) in triggering or perpetrating violence, this literature is neither comprehensive nor conclusive.
4. Prevention and response

4.1. Research trends

- An increasing focus on the relationship between conflict, fragility, state building and peace building in both the policy and academic literature.

- A recent strand of research explores the critical steps of the state building process, i.e. political settlements, core and expected state functions, and, through exploring these, tries to identify what characteristics of the process make a state and a society resilient to conflict and fragility.

- A number of more recent publications highlight the need to take account of the perspectives of citizens and re-focus discussions on the negotiation of the social contract.

- Increased focus on the political settlement and processes of political transition and democratisation in fragile and conflict-affected states – including work on the potential effects of processes of democratization on conflict.

- A growing body of literature that is increasingly critical of donor-driven state building approaches, which questions altogether dominant understandings of the state, the use of a state-building framework, the appropriateness of focussing on the State itself in fragile and conflict affected contexts and the impacts of international actors on the state building process.

- A recent literature looking critically at other donor frameworks and approaches such as security sector reform, arguing the need to focus on “security from below” – security from the perspective of citizens.

- A growing literature, which looks at broader society and the different factors that render a society more susceptible or resilient to conflict and fragility. This includes some work on mechanisms to address inequalities and promote social inclusion.

- Some recent work on the management of identity and other differences and reconciliation in divided societies as well as the role of social capital in peacebuilding.

4.2 State of knowledge

4.2.1 State building frameworks and critiques

State building in fragile or post-conflict states: Recent research and practice on models and frameworks for state building has focussed particularly on issues of state strengthening and/or breakdown (Cramer 2006; Menkhaus 2004). Luckham (2008) argues that state building efforts tend to be dictated by donors and international agencies, on the basis of the standard formula of liberal democracy, good governance and economic liberalisation. He argues: “Whilst elements of this formula are desirable in themselves, the entire package, and the manner it is promoted or imposed from the outside, tends to inhibit the fundamental rethinking that post-conflict states require about the nature and purposes of political authority” (p. 15). He argues that this rethinking should encompass four considerations:

- Rethinking and reconstituting the state itself, and particularly re-establishing the legitimacy of state institutions
- Inclusive nation building, i.e. reconstituting national citizenship while respecting religious, ethnic, gender and other societal differences
- Democratisation at all levels of public authority, by promoting greater popular accountability of the government as well as greater citizen voice at all levels of political authority.
- Building a developmental state, which can ensure that external assistance matches national priorities, delivers basic services to its citizens, and facilitates sustainable growth and development.
Critical elements of the state building process: The literature highlights differing understandings of the core and expected functions of the state (Whaites 2008; Lockhart and Ghani 2005); hierarchies of positive state functions; and the relevance of different state functions to conflict and fragility (Rotberg 2002; Di John 2008). A 2008 DFID paper on statebuilding argues that as a minimum, all responsive state-building processes must develop capacity (‘survival capacity’) in relation to the functions of security, revenue raising and the rule of law. Lockhart and Ghani (2005) conceive of the ‘core’ functions of the state more widely. Comparative research by the Crisis States Research Centre places particular emphasis on the importance of security in regard to state fragility.

This idea of the ‘core’ and ‘expected’ functions of the State has been particularly explored in terms of understanding their relevance to preserving or re-establishing stability. There is some evidence that shows that a degree of action on public expectations is necessary if stability is to be maintained, and even repressive states usually deliver against some expectations as a way of controlling dissent. Neera Chandhoke’s (2005) research on Kashmir, for instance, demonstrates that political discontent and violence is mainly connected to repeated infringements of the social contract by the central government of India, which often acts in tandem with the state government.

In addition, the question of how specific functions should be implemented in order to promote responsive and accountable state-building is also the subject of an increasing body of literature (Hesselbein et al. 2006; Ghani and Lockhart, 2005).

Critiques of “state-centric” approaches: There are, however, a number of critiques of these functionalist theories and Weberian “state-centric” approaches. These include:

i) They do not acknowledge that there are many types of states, which function through a diverse set of dynamics. This makes “listing functions” a useless task;

ii) They do not account for the market and other non-state actors and dynamics that play an important role in maintaining stability and cohesion in a society; and

iii) They ignore the need to focus on the bottom-up mechanisms needed to ensure accountability and responsiveness (di John 2008; Paris 2007)

‘One-size fits all approaches’ to state-building have also come under severe critique. Nonetheless, DFID (2008) and writers such as Lockhart and Ghani continue to offer lists of ‘core’ ‘expected’ state functions. Moreover, there is disagreement between authors on what should be included in this list. There are many ‘types’ of states, but there is little acknowledgment of this in the literature, as there is in fact little discussion on the ‘division of responsibilities’ (who should provide what and how). This is partly due to the ‘blindness to the market’ - what is its role in service provision and meeting some of the needs of citizens? More research is needed on contextualized state-building—how and which institutions should be built in a particular context, considering a given history (e.g. massive distrust of state as a result of decades of mismanagement and nepotism/clientelism such as in Somalia before collapse or perhaps DRC under Mobutu).

Alternative perspectives on the state. Dominant approaches to the state emphasise the role of formal institutions such as parliaments, public administration and the executive. However, social analysis offers an alternative perspective that is focussed more on cultural meanings, social networks and the influence of structural relationships of power over these. Ferguson and Gupta (2002) for example examine our understanding of the state vis-à-vis other forms of power and authority. They argue that challenges to the state’s authority come not only from international agencies but also from transnational movements and organisations that are hard to categorise by level (local, national or international) or institution (state, private sector, or civil society). Walby (2003) argues that the territorial nation-state should not be seen as a universal model of polity. In fact, it may be that different kinds of polities may influence different aspects of people’s lives e.g. people may at once feel allegiance to a national government and a global religious movement. It would be helpful therefore to look at the state in context – i.e. the way people and communities in
various countries understand and relate to it. Similarly, De Sardan (1999) highlights the need for detailed ethnographic analysis in understanding issues of good governance. He argues that while corruption is considered reprehensible, in the West African context the social practices of brokerage, gift-giving and solidarity create the conditions for it. Not giving gifts or expressing solidarity with one’s network is deemed culturally unacceptable. De Sardan highlights how, as result, civil servants in this context find it difficult to balance their professional and social legitimacy.

**State-Society Relations: Delivering on the Social Contract.** Thinking on ‘state-building’ has evolved over time, from the initial primary focus on institutions, to a greater emphasis on the interaction between the state and those it should ultimately serve (i.e. citizens). According to a recent DFID (2008) formulation, state-building is the process through which states enhance their ability to function and to deliver on the goals of the government. It is a value neutral term, although the preference is that it leads to effective economic management with political and economic inclusion. States are never ‘finally built,’ they change and adapt over time. State-building as an iterative process is shaped by elite interaction and by state-society relations. State transformation is used more and more, particularly in post-conflict and fragile contexts, to indicate this iterative process and the dynamic change from one type of state (and of social contract) where conflict flourished, to a new type of state (and social contract) that aims at building the foundations of a peaceful society. There are different types of and approaches to state-building processes, but the UK government puts emphasis on ‘responsive’ state-building, which is essential to the process of developing capable, accountable, and responsive (CAR) states bringing benefits to the poor.

According to DFID, responsive state-building requires a dynamic in which efforts to build capacity bring the state into greater contact with society, fuelling pressure for it to respond to expectations. This reciprocity (at times called ‘creative tension’) becomes what defines the ‘social contract’ (DFID 2008). A helpful definition of the social contract in the context of understanding conflict, fragility and state building is provided by OECD/DAC, which defines the social contract as emerging from the interaction between a) expectations that a given society has of a given state; b) state capacity to provide services, including security, and to secure revenue from its population and territory to provide these services; and c) élite will to direct state resources and capacity to fulfil social expectations. This definition highlights the crucial mediation of political processes through which the bargain between state and society is struck, reinforced and institutionalised, and highlights the role of legitimacy in shaping expectations and facilitating political process. Legitimacy is also produced and replenished – or, conversely, eroded – by the interaction among the other four factors. Taken together, the interaction among these factors forms a dynamic agreement between state and society on their mutual roles and responsibilities – a social contract. Informal ‘institutions’, power relations and ‘systems of meaning’, such as caste or ethnicity, have profound impacts on the shape of the social contract.

DFID further argues that state-building processes which are accountable, legitimate and responsive are not only better equipped to bring about social and economic development, they also have greater capacity to avert conflict and fragility, whilst at the same time promoting the building of cohesive societies (DFID 2008). They require stronger connection to citizens by being able to renegotiate political settlements, deliver on survival functions, and understand what their expected functions need to be, i.e. negotiating and implementing a satisfactory social contract. Responsive processes are more democratic, allowing diverse voices to be channelled through the political process, rather than risking that they will be channelled outside of it (through use of force). On the other hand, responsive processes require some level of social cohesion. Formal democratic structures, basic rule of law, periodic elections and strongly-worded constitutions do not in themselves assure that behaviour follows suit—that state-building processes are in fact responsive to the needs of all, able to incorporate all voices and the breadth of opposition. It is certain social dynamics that have to be understood and affected before well-working institutions can be guaranteed.

4.2.2 Statebuilding and peacebuilding

**Which state functions to prioritize?** The literature highlights that, particularly in conflict-affected
and fragile states, there is an intrinsic tension between the competing needs of building an effective state, which is capable of decisive action and able to deliver peace dividends (as, for instance, would be the case in Liberia, Somalia, Iraq, or Eritrea), and providing space for open political and social negotiations. There is also relatively little analysis of how to sequence and prioritise different state functions, and what the trade-offs might be. For example, is it more important to get service delivery up and running rather than rule of law? The key questions are what functions must a state provide to assure its legitimacy and stability? What determines what is perceived as ‘necessary’ state functions and what is considered ‘optional’ functions that could be also handed over to the private sector or other non-state service providers?

As discussed above, there is disagreement among researchers as to what constitutes ‘basic’ functions of state. DFID (2008) argues that as a minimum, all responsive state-building processes must develop capacity (‘survival capacity’) in relation to: a) security (control, if not a monopoly, over the use of violence); b) revenue (ability to raise funds sustainably, particularly through taxation); and c) law (the capacity to rule ‘through’ laws, and to be perceived as doing so). In contrast, Lockhart and Ghani (2005) provide a wider list of the ‘core functions of state:’ a) legitimate monopoly on the means of violence; b) administrative control; c) management of public finances; d) investment in human capital; e) delineation of citizenship rights and duties; f) provision of infrastructure; g) formation of the market; h) management of the state’s assets; i) international relations; j) rule of law.

**Core functions:** An additional problem with this ‘list approach’ to core functions is that it does not justify why all these functions are core to the state. All of them are central to the eventual welfare of the citizens, but it is not only the state that is responsible for this welfare. There seems to be little discussion in the overviewed literature on the ‘alternative’ service providers, such as the private sector. In economics and political economy, there is an ongoing discussion on whether the state or the private sector is in fact a better provider of a given service. Luckham (2008) argues: “reconstruction is more likely to be sustainable if it factors in the multiple layers of political authority above and below the state, and is not excessively preoccupied with rebuilding state and central governance alone. When states start to fall apart during conflicts, other layers of political authority – both above the state at the regional and international levels, and below it in political and civil society – tend to emerge into the open” (p. 7). Hence in ‘state-building’ attempts, one should be careful to acknowledging that a particular vision of the state is being promoted, that there are others, and that there in fact remain grey areas and areas of dispute as to what works best.

**The example of Somalia** is helpful in demonstrating the complexities inherent in the process of deciding ‘what type of state’ is needed in a post-conflict situation. Firstly, due to the severe abuse of state power experienced under the Barre regime, many Somalis distrust the state. How should this consideration guide the international community eager to ‘re-build’, and the elites struggling to reach a political settlement? Secondly, the almost two decades long ‘state absence’ cannot be equated with the complete absence of services. Over the years, there has been some religious provision of education, some private provision of other services (e.g. water supply), and most importantly, certain private sector activities have been thriving (e.g. money transfer, telecommunications, export/import industries). A highly functional financial system called ‘hawala’ has been established, which facilitates the massive remittance inflows vital to the Somali economy. How should those aspects of the private sphere that are functional in Somalia be incorporated into the future ‘state construction’ models?

**Security:** Recent comparative work by the Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC) emphasises the need to prioritise security in state–building approaches and argues that the ability to withstand challenges from non-state forces remains an essential first step in recovering from conflict. Evidence suggests that gaining the loyalty of security forces is essential in diminishing the likelihood of conflict, and this can be addressed to a certain degree through regular pay and adequate welfare (Hesselbein et al. 2006). However, CSRC note that the fragmentation of security forces has marked most processes of state collapse, and in their review of comparative research, find that the security architecture of countries where international actors may be engaged on SSR, policing and rule of law is often not sufficiently understood. In articulating a research agenda for
security, CSRC examines the relationship between the development of policing and state building; and note the need to have a clear analysis of the evolution of the state’s control over its armed forces and the effectiveness of those forces over time. External interventions in support of military or policing institutional development have tended to have a disappointing history and thus CSRC proposes that more research is needed to examine how monopolies of force are established; and the impacts of external interventions.

At the same time, the recent emergence of human security concepts and strategies has been significant in challenging established state centric understandings of security. The shift to a narrative focused on the protection of individual and community, as analysed by Abello and Pearce (2008), is seen as significant in a context where there is a crisis in security provision, and where existing strategies for the provision of security, led either by the market, by communities, or by donors, are not sufficient, and do not address the deeper roots of society, in a context of increasing violence. Abello and Pearce focus on the need for security to be reclaimed as a public good, provided by public institutions, on the basis of shared norms and principles. They highlight the need for academic research to support the rethinking of security from below, and better understanding of the daily experiences of victims of insecurity. Research methodologies, can involve people in the co-production of knowledge; action research can have an impact on society’s capacity, as well as on state willingness to agree norms and values for a more efficient form of security provision.

A critical examination of security as a concept, and its changing and contested meanings is currently being undertaken by the Global Consortium on Security Transformation (see annex E). The Consortium seeks to address the contemporary need for security, in a context of increasing divisions, within and between societies, in a context where some can pay for private security, and others remain trapped by poverty and insecurity. In proposing continued work, the Consortium notes the lack of analytical coherence, understanding of real needs on the ground, and participation of the poor and most vulnerable to insecurity, which undermines effective response.

Revenue generation: Evidence suggests that certain ways of raising revenue have the potential to create more responsive state-building - taxation rather than a ‘rents bonanza’ (from oil or other natural resource) creates closer linkages with society and helps raise expectations of accountability. On the other hand, this does not mean that ‘unearned income’ should be automatically rejected as de-stabilising - much depends on the capacity of institutions to manage it. Taxation can also be destabilising if the resulting expectations are not met (if obtained taxes are misallocated or spent through corruption). Hence responsiveness can lead to conflict if other safeguards are not in place - such as an effective fiduciary system.

Expected functions: In addition to survival functions, DFID highlights the importance of ‘expected functions.’ ‘Expected functionality’ sees responsive governments trying to keep up with demands for better roads, social provision, policing, or other services. With regard to negotiating ‘expected functions’, one of the core problems is that government responsiveness is usually limited to ‘voice’ (voiced dissent), i.e. those areas and constituencies that are best able to protest if survival/expected functions are not delivered. Often those most in need of state attention are those least able to acquire it. It is in these areas that grievances may accumulate and eventually turn into violent confrontations. Addressing such issues entails going beyond the state responsiveness framework, and exploring issues of inequality, access, inclusion, or social capital - issues traditionally dealt with through the separate lens of ‘social cohesion.’

Trade-offs and dilemmas:

(i) Security / Justice: While lack of security and/or justice may constitute a cause of conflict and fragility, re-establishing these functions after a conflict, while taking into account the consequences of the conflict itself, is a project fraught with tensions that could potentially undermine the longer-term state- and peace-building processes. The question of transitional justice is particularly complex. Research by Snyder and Vinjamuri (2003) and the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) (2007) highlights some of the limitations and challenges of different approaches (i.e.
legalist, pragmatic) and mechanisms for transitional justice in fragile and conflict affected countries (i.e. criminal and civil prosecution in domestic; foreign and international courts; traditional justice processes; truth commissions; lustration/ vetting; reparations and amnesties; truth commissions). These studies and others recognise the potential positive contribution of transitional justice mechanisms in combating cultures of impunity and in addressing some of the key injustices that contributed to conflict. The shorter-term realities of using these mechanisms, however, can be somewhat more negative and need to be taken into account. These include having to negotiate settlements with some of the perpetrators of injustice themselves, alienating actors who might be critical for a durable settlement, or failing to fulfil the expectations of the victims and conflict-affected populations.

The challenges that the transitional justice trade-off pose to the international community, particularly in light of the human rights imperative are also captured by a joint ICTJ and DFID paper (2007). This paper suggests that transitional justice should be approached holistically, by fostering a sense of the need for justice for all victims, establishing or renewing civic trust through judicial and non-judicial channels, and preventing future human rights abuses. The paper also suggests that transitional justice should also contribute to conflict prevention and the protection of civilians, for example through a justice sensitive approach to security sector reform (SSR).

Enhancing respect for law and justice will often depend on striking politically expedient bargains that will allow the creation of effective political coalitions, which can contain the power of potential perpetrators of abuses (or so-called spoilers). Once such deals are struck, institutions based on the rule of law become more feasible. Without these, the more sophisticated systems of transitional justice are almost certain to fail.

(ii) Investing in Peace: which groups to target? This is where the nexus between state-building and peace-building lies. States that invest in peace ultimately invest in themselves (i.e. in strengthening their ability to deliver on goals of the government). However, in doing this, they face some difficult trade-offs. Fiscal resources are limited, especially so in fragile states, and investing in peace might mean more money spent on youth and less money spent on the poor, or those most socially excluded.

(iii) Natural Resource Management. Two types of resource-based conflict occur: wars of resource scarcity and wars of abundance (DFID 2001). The most common conflicts of scarcity relate to the control of land and water. In both cases, the crucial element is how competing interests for those resources are managed, at both national and international level. This suggests it is not simply resource-abundant states that are prone to violent conflict, but states with weak capacity to manage those resources equitably and efficiently, or in fact remain in control of them at all (e.g. DRC). Besides state fragility, low social cohesion in resource-abundant states also increases the risk of violent conflict. Political, economic and social exclusion among certain groups might prevent them from sharing equitably in resources controlled and managed by a specific group/groups. Resource-abundance might prop up authoritarian systems (e.g. one party or ‘strongman’ states) such as that of Mobutu in Congo, because it gives the leader an ability to ‘pay off’ its supporters and the opposition International interests in natural resource extraction and the consequent cooperation with corrupt and authoritarian regimes might also counteract pressures for change, and further sustain state fragility and degrade social cohesion. Botswana is one of the few countries in Africa to have managed its mineral wealth in a manner that does not fuel instability (DFID 2001). In part this has been achieved by clear and well-defined state control over diamond income and the exploitation of resources. This has been coupled with a commitment to diversify the economy.

(iv) Equitable Spending. Projects and programs to reduce poverty, for example, are often focused on the areas that are easiest to reach- those around the capital city- and remote areas tend to be neglected, worsening inequalities between groups (CRISE 2007). This is the case in Bolivia, Peru and Guatemala. If particular groups control resource flows and distribution, it is likely that spending will favour the groups they represent, further affecting cleavages within society and increasing risk of conflict.
(v) **Negative state-building.** The experiences of “strong states” such as Rwanda and Russia, suggests that the strengthening of a state, and in particular the strengthening of some of its core functions (i.e. security), may actually aggravate the problem both in contexts “at risk” of instability and in post-conflict environments.

(vi) **International obligations:** Finally, international legal documents bind states to a variety of ‘provisions’, political, civic, social and economic. It has been acknowledged that poor states simply cannot afford this type of complex provision. More importantly though, what states are bound to in IHR treaties is to oversee that basic needs are met (whether by them or private actors, civic society) and prevent their breach, this does not mean though that it is the state that must itself provide each and every one.

(vii) **Resilient vs developmental state?** The Crisis States Research Centre undertook a number of comparative studies of cases of fragility and resilience. The CSRC’s findings show that the difference between fragile and resilient states is a function of elite bargains, coalitional politics, security and production. In examining systematically why it is that some states are able to respond to contestation, and others experience widespread violence or collapse, CSRC have exposed that what makes a developmental state, is not necessarily what makes a resilient state. This finding challenges the orthodoxy that state building is key to development; and suggests an important trade off to be considered between resilience and development. CSRC have also examined the economic foundations of state formation, and found that it is necessary to focus on the detail of economic production. Internal and national economic integration remains critical and neglected, in a context where the emphasis is often in international or regional integration in an era of globalisation.

4.2.3 **The political foundations of peaceful states**

**Political Settlement.** The structures of the state are determined by an underlying political settlement, which is forged on the basis of a common understanding that people’s interests or beliefs are served by a particular way of organising political power (DFID 2008). A growing body of research and expertise looks at political settlements and processes of political transition. Where these processes lead to a legitimate form of representation and to responsive state-building they contribute to preventing or reducing the risk of conflict (OECD 2008b). However, these are delicate projects, especially in fragile or conflict affected environments, and run the risk of fuelling new conflict and violence or creating fragility (Carothers, 1999), particularly if the process is exclusionary and manipulated by elites with little interest for change (CSRC).

For example, in practice, political settlements are often forged among elites, and that is also why the current research on this issue focuses on how to make elites cooperate and reach an understanding. In fact, some researchers prefer the term ‘elite consolidation,’ emphasising the centrality of processes that persuade elites to co-exist peacefully, or to bring about conditions to end conflict. Lindeman (2008) examines the centrality of elite bargains, considered by CSRC to be a key determinant of resilience in sub-Saharan Africa, and finds that the relative inclusivity of elite bargains offers a more compelling explanation for why states in the region have managed to avoid conflict, than structural factors such as horizontal inequality. CSRC find that analysis of political organisation needs to focus on elite bargains and how they evolve, and what gives adaptability and durability. Thinking about post conflict reconstruction also requires appreciation of “institutional multiplicity”; that is the many different rules and institutional systems, which may be present in fragile or post conflict states. However, existing research does not seem to question the legitimacy of elites (parties to settlement) or whether their concerns mirror/represent the concerns of the wider society.

Most political dispensations are formally articulated in a constitution, which lays out the political system, and often incorporates preservation of rights (a ‘magna carta’). Existing literature suggests that a strong constitution can lead to responsive state-building, and go long way to prevent conflict or to prevent its recurrence (OECD 2008b). Carothers (1999), however, raises the problem of short
timelines, which risk encouraging constitutions that fail to reflect the narratives of conflicting parties and thus often fail to be effective. More work would be useful in this area.

Research also suggests that to be able to avert violent conflict, a political settlement cannot be static; rather it must be able to absorb social change (DFID 2008). Leaders have sought to use expansion and adaptation of the political settlement as a means to head off possible conflict and instability. However, without certain degree of social cohesion, and/or without an effort to include all citizens (i.e. women, minorities, indigenous populations, youth) no political settlement can be a ‘stable’ or a ‘responsive’ one, hence a building block of a stable and peaceful society.

**Electoral and political systems:** Electoral processes and governance structures adopted to manage divisions and violent conflict can have unpredictable or negative consequences, at worst even serving to entrench and radicalise group divisions, and contributing to added tension and violence (for example, in Angola and Sierra Leone during the 1990s); or politically entrenching the same individuals who were instrumental to the earlier conflict (for example, in Bosnia and Herzegovina) (Reilly 2008). Elections in some fragile countries have been repeatedly the flashpoints of violence, but they have remained peaceful in other fragile contexts. Luckham (2008) argues that careful attention must be given to issues of process and sequence, i.e. the timing and management of elections relative to the other elements of peacebuilding, such as the restorations of security; the sequencing of constitution making; and ensuring that the democratization process is locally driven and owned, rather than externally imposed.

There is little clarity on which model of electoral and political system is more effective in fragile states in terms of its impact upon sustainable peace (Norris 2008; Jarstad 2008; Reynolds 2006; Soderberg and Ohlson, 2003). Jarstad (2008) finds that the adoption of power sharing arrangements prior to elections reduces the risk of election-related conflict. These findings seem to contradict previous studies that have found that political power sharing specified in peace agreements have no significant effect on the durability of peace. Soderberg and Ohlson (2003) had previously found that holding multi-party elections have contributed to political violence in a number of countries in Africa. They advocate that in order to lessen to chances of conflict, elections in multi-ethnic societies should be scheduled after constitutional engineering and not the other way around.

CSRC findings also call into question, along with others, the primacy of multi-party elections as a means to secure legitimacy. Without the establishment of programmatic political parties, standard templates of democratic political reforms – particularly competitive elections, can be problematic in post war states. Where there is no effective agreement on citizenship, holding elections prematurely may lay the ground for conflict, rather than progress on reconstruction. (Crisis States Research Centre, Development as State Making Theme Summary).

**Coalitional analysis.** Coalitional analysis offers a useful approach to examining why political violence escalates into state collapse, beyond purely structural and actor-based explanations (di John 2008). It looks at the constellations of power that underpin formal and informal institutional arrangements which govern the exercise of different forms of authority within society, and that interact and influence the state. This analysis is concerned with the ways in which shifting coalitions of power contribute to state collapse; are forged in order to prevent state collapse; and emerge as a result of state collapse and war. Future research could analyse which conditions generate coalitions that give rise to political violence and state collapse, and which conditions generate coalitions that give rise to political violence without leading to state collapse.

**Democratisation and political transitions.** The discussion regarding the potential effects of democratisation on conflict is currently ongoing: some academics believe that democratisation may increase the risk of conflict. Others argue that it is the weakness of institutions that causes democratic reform to fail (countries never exit the ‘transition’ stage) and violence to occur. There is a consistent body of research, which examines how democratic competition can exacerbate divisions and increase the risk of conflict and/or renewed violence. The inclusion of rebel groups (potential spoilers) in government as part of peace deals (for instance the SPLM in Sudan in 2004),
while necessary in order to ensure the agreement of warring parties to terminate fighting, may also undermine democratic legitimacy and long-term stability. However, the alternative to excluding potential spoilers in order to promote peaceful democratisation is also not unproblematic (Jarstad, 2006).

Opinions on implementation are also equally divided. Paris (2007) has argued for ‘institutionalization before liberalization’ (IBL), and for reforms to be introduced in sequence: first establish a strong state (especially a strong rule of law), then proceed with democratisation. Thomas Carothers (2007) acknowledges that the timing of elections after a civil war is important, and that democratisation is more successful when certain preconditions are fulfilled, but he also suggests that it can be achieved through a gradual process, starting with the core element of elections now, and thence proceeding in incremental steps rather than in a cumulative manner.

The role of political parties, particularly in post-conflict democratic transitions, is complex (Samuels et al. 2006). Parties might be disguised incarnations of the groups that waged the conflict, and can play a divisive role. Some liberation movements find it difficult to transform themselves into political parties, but may also find it difficult to enter the political arena (Giustozzi 2008). The role of ‘political engineering’ and party politics in conflict-prone societies deserves growing attention (Reilly 2006).

Political Succession. The evidence suggests that transfers of government within a political settlement may be peaceful or violent without fundamentally changing the settlement itself. But more research is needed on how to assure non-violent political succession. Is responsiveness of the system the first stepping stone? Or is work required simultaneously at the level of social cohesion and at the level of institutions?

In Kenya, since the end of authoritarian rule in 1990, elections have been repeatedly accompanied by violence. Evidence suggests that violence (carried out by intermediaries such as youth groups) is often used by those in power as an election tactic to consolidate support and deter opposition (Medard 1996, HRW 2002). As Medard has argued, the violence in Kenya’s 1992 and 1997 elections did not exemplify an ethnic struggle of, for example, Kalenjins and Non-Kalenjins in the Rift Valley over rights to land. Rather, violence was staged by militias coming from outside (strong parallels with the 2007 violence) to consolidate an electorate on behest of the Moi-KANU party. The strategy included harassment of the opposition and ‘cleansing’ of opposition, thus obstructing its participation in elections. The political manipulation of identities (and resulting identity polarisation) during such episodes further decreases social cohesion, and in turn increases the chances of future violent confrontation.

The remedy needs to look at a number of interconnected issues, starting with the problem of ‘lumpen youth’ (Kagwanja 2006, 2005), the electoral system, ‘weak’ legislature (‘winner take-all’ presidential contests), as well as the broader political culture that often transcends different ‘changes of guard,’ and even different political systems. With regard to the ‘youth issue’ for example, gaining votes by staging violence along identity lines in Kenya could not be done without the traditions of placating and thus controlling youth by employing it as ‘youth wings’ in parties or majeshi (militias). Political violence could not be effectively wielded without this possibility of ‘marionette politics’ (Kagwanja 2005), the possibility for the state to hide behind intermediaries, to evade responsibility by employing surrogate agents. Importantly, this dynamic is not unique to the post-1990 politics (e.g. the ‘Kalenjin coterie’ during Moi rule), and neither is it unique to Kenya (e.g. use of lumpen use in militias in Congo-Brazaville as described by Bazequisa-Ganga 1999; use of militias in Rwanda and many other states). The poll violence in Kenya is rooted in a long-standing culture of politics. It cannot be understood outside of this history, which reaches much beyond 1990 and beyond Kenya. In fact, broader study of how violence becomes part of the political system itself is needed. As Cramer (2006) suggests, ‘violence and war are much more important for understanding institutional, political and economic development than is typically acknowledged.’

‘Deliberative democracy’ and participation: There is a recent and rich strand of literature emerging from the DRC on Citizenship, Participation and Accountability regarding the inadequacy of ‘institutional democracy’ and the urgent need to deepen participation. The ‘deliberative’ turn in
democracy has emerged as a global critique of more mainstream democratic models (e.g. Dryzek 2002), but has been recently explored in the context of developing states (and fragile states within that category, for example Cornwall and Coelho edited volume; Newell and Wheeler edited volume. What emerges from various case studies in the Newell and Wheeler volume is the need to push beyond creating ‘spaces of inclusion’ to making sure that all people really are entering them; going beyond ‘participation’ to meaningful participation (e.g. informed discussions and decision-making). Dryzek (2002) unpacks ‘deliberative’ democratisation along three axes: i) increasing franchise (number of people able to participate effectively; ii) increasing scope (more issues under democratic control) and iii) increasing authenticity (i.e. for participation to be real rather than symbolic, involving the effective participation of autonomous and competent actors). The push for not only a more extensive but more authentic democracy is an especially pressing theme in states that are fractured and chronically under-resourced, with low service provision, and a history of chronic clientelism, which leave in their wake fractious, and distrustful relationships between citizens and state.

The expansion of participatory arenas has, in some contexts, facilitated the creation of new political actors and political subjectivities (Baocchi 2001; Heller 2001; Avritzer 2002). Yet for all the institutional innovation of recent years, case studies demonstrate that there remains a gap between the legal and technical apparatus that has been created to institutionalise participation and the reality of the effective inclusion of poorer and more marginalised citizens. The main problem is that the practice and even the theory simply assumes that citizens are ready to participate and share their political agendas with bureaucrats as a long as they are offered appropriate opportunities - and that bureaucrats are willing and ready to respond.

Various analysts argue that one of the challenges is to unpack the term ‘civil society’ (which today is effectively a residual category) and to study who comes to represent citizens in the participatory sphere. Today, there is a conflation between politicised elements within this sphere (who might claim representation on behalf of others while pursuing their own agenda) and the more apolitical or positively reactionary civic organisations. Civil society institutions also increasingly act as providers as well as intermediaries, and this blurs the distinctions between them and the state, and raises questions about their autonomy and accountability.

The issue of power is also highlighted. Power permeates every dimension of the participatory sphere, from the design and framing of the participatory institutions to the selection of people who do actually participate, to the very interaction during the participatory process. Participatory places are infused with power relations and cultures of interaction carried over from other spaces (Cornwall and Coelho 2002). These are spaces of power, in which forms of overt or tacit domination silence certain actors or keep them from entering at all. Those who have some resources, for example links with the party political system or powerful patrons, stand a better chance of access to these fora.

Overall, evidence from case studies suggests that pervasive inequalities in power and knowledge and embedded political culture pose considerable challenges for creating inclusive deliberative fora. In a critique of Habermas’ notion of the public sphere, Fraser (1990) argues that marginalised groups may find greater opportunities for exercising voice in their own spaces, which she terms ‘subaltern counterpublics.’ If carefully crafted though, participatory institutions do have positive value. They can become ‘schools for citizenship,’ in which those who participate learn new meanings and practices of citizenship by working together. Three action points are suggested by authors: i) catalysing and supporting processes of social mobilization through which marginalised groups can nurture leaders, enhance their political agency and seek representation; ii) instituting measures which address exclusionary elements within the participatory sphere; and iii) articulating participatory institutions more effectively with other governance institutions.

4.2.4 The social foundations of peaceful states

Building citizenship, responsiveness and accountability from below: The literature suggests that strong elite cooperation is necessary for stable political settlements. At the same time,
research indicates that ‘responsive’ states are less likely to fall into violent conflict. More research is generally needed to detail how the responsiveness should operate. Typically, research focuses on top-down responsiveness, i.e. how institutions of state should be made more inclusive (e.g. discussion on democratization), representativeness and accountability (e.g. discussion on policy challenges). However, recent research from the Citizenship DRC suggests a need to focus on bottom-up mechanisms to create both accountability and greater inclusion in political participation. In general, there is need to explore how a variety of civil society actors are able to demand and effect change, and in which ways should such social mobilization be supported.

For example, a recent edited volume by Newell and Wheeler (2006) on rights, resources and the politics of accountability shows how, whilst of course state reform is crucial, accountability cannot be achieved through institutional reform alone, and it is often the case that state institutions act as rights violators as well as rights enforcers. The conventional focus on the state, the authors argue, has created an over-reliance on the law as a mechanism for generating positive social change, without looking at the ways in which social mobilisation also changes the law. The book gathers evidence on the various strategies, both formal and informal, legal and non-legal, collaborative and confrontational, that people employ to hold development actors to account. Capturing what they call the ‘new landscape of accountability politics’, it requires us to look at a range of state and non-state actors, going beyond traditional preoccupations with state reform. A grounded empirical assessment of which accountability strategies work, when, and for whom provides an important antidote to the inappropriate export of accountability models from one setting to another without sufficient regard for key political, social, and cultural differences.

The role of civil society organisations: The role of civil society organisations, including NGOs, in preventing and rebuilding failed states is explored within the Woodrow Wilson centre project “What Really Works in Preventing and Rebuilding Failed States.” One of the occasional papers produced for the project by Uvin (2006), whilst recognising the increasing role of civil society organisations and NGOs in post-conflict settings, suggests that proponents of civil society should focus more on the concept of citizenship – i.e. the relationship between people and the state, not between people and local NGO - than on civil society organisations. This will require adapting programmes to be responsive to the local dynamics, needs and pre-existing relationships and social support networks. Building civil society requires the creation of processes that allow people at all levels of society to engage in collective action; to learn to build their own capacities; and ultimately, to act as citizens.

Pearce (2007) argues that civil society organisations can play a vital role in building citizenship and confronting violent actors and acts of violence. Through case studies in Colombia and Guatemala, she explores how CSOs can work effectively on as well as in violence, by focusing on building more meaningful citizenship. Contexts of chronic violence place particular constraints on citizenship, both in terms of state-citizen and inter-citizen relationships. Civil society participation can widen the gap between violence and a dominating power, by creating civil action and civil spirit. CSOs can be most effective in creating this space when they build a citizenship consciousness about rights and enhance the capacity for action.

Identity as a basis for empowerment. Identity politics are not necessarily violent, and can provide the space to explore peaceful solutions. Luckham et al (2006) discuss the importance of identities as the basis of claims, forms of empowerment and supporting citizenship and emphasise the links between social cohesion, identity politics and pathways out of political violence. They suggest that identity politics is not a causal linear process; and there are no set patterns to conflict formation. In this, they dispute the analysis of Ladbury (2005) and others, which suggests that political violence stems from a combination of grievances arising from social exclusion, coupled with political blockages, and ideologies which then legitimise collective action, including use of violence. They emphasise that identity politics can be exercised in ways that do not culminate in violence.

The role of women: Women also have an increasingly recognised role to play in building the foundations for enduring peace. Many are involved in grass-roots efforts to sustain and rebuild the
local economic, political, social and cultural fabric of their societies. However, unless specifically targeted, women tend to be excluded from formal peace processes and negotiations, and even from reconstruction planning. Conflict may create the space for a temporary redefinition of social relations, but often does not change them fundamentally. Pankhurst (2003) also argues for better visibility of women in post-conflict situations; and a greater role for women in peace building. There is often scope to re-negotiate gender inequalities after war, and opportunities should be picked up.

The role of socialisation. In a 2005 World Bank study, Barker and Ricardo highlight a problem complementary to that of marginalisation - the construction of masculinities through socialisation. Throughout the report, the authors make references to alternative, non-violent versions of manhood and to elements of traditional socialisation in Africa that promote non-violence, and to forms of socialisation and social control that reduce the vulnerabilities of young men and reduce violence. They suggest investment and support of the following ‘protective factors’ that promote non-violence: i) a high degree of self-reflection and space to rehearse new behaviours; ii) constructing positive lessons out of witnessing the impacts of violence on family; iii) tapping into sense of responsibility and positive engagement as fathers; iv) rites of passage which serve as positive forms of social control; v) role models of ‘non-violence’ in the family; vi) employment and school enrolment in the cases of some forms of violence; vii) community mobilisation around the vulnerabilities of young men.

4.3 Research gaps

There is a growing literature on state building and peace building, including an increasing body of work on the specific challenges and complexities in fragile and conflict-affected states. Furthermore, although the concept of “social cohesion” is still not clearly defined, there is a significant literature looking at specific elements of social cohesion in conflict-affected and fragile societies including on promoting social inclusion, peaceful identity politics and building social capital. Nonetheless, there remain significant gaps in the literature and areas where existing knowledge and approaches are contested:

(i) A critical re-examination of donor state building approaches; Firstly, there are still a diversity of views on “the state” with a range of critiques of standard models of the state that lay emphasis on the informal power relations and values that underlie formal institutions. A key gap is the synthesis of these diverse perspectives in order to develop a more nuanced and multi-dimensional model of the state. There is also a need to draw together insights from existing literature criticising donor state building approaches – in particular how to acknowledge the roles of and linkages to non-state sources of power and citizen’s perspectives. This should also include work on “contextualized” statebuilding - how and which institutions should be built in a particular context, considering a the particular historical and political context in question.

(ii) How to do state building and peace building in practice; Although there is a new strand of literature focused on practice, this is still weak on areas such as the complementarities, tensions and trade-offs between state building and peace building objectives, and on the sequencing and prioritisation of interventions. There is also a limited amount of work on

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7 The fact that women and girls are impacted differently by conflict and unable to engage as equal citizens in reconstruction, is reflected in the Beijing Platform for Action (paragraph 135); and Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security (mandated October 2000). Both highlight the importance of bringing gender perspectives to the centre of all United Nations conflict prevention and resolution, peace-building, peacekeeping, rehabilitation and reconstruction efforts. UN (2002) provides a review of the impact of armed conflict on women and girls, the role of women in peace-building, and the gender dimensions of peace processes, conflict resolution, and demobilization.

8 The CPR Unit of the World Bank has been encouraging original research on issues of gender and conflict, researching both the conflict dimensions of gender and development, and the gender aspects conflict and development. This has included work on international experiences and a conceptual framework to help think about young men at risk and the interplay between violence, conflict and risky behaviour such as HIV/AIDS transmission (Caprioli 2003)
specific sectors such as service delivery and the justice sector, in areas such as the security sector, there is a growing critical literature, but this still needs to be operationalised in terms of what international, regional and national actors need to do differently. Despite recent work on the impacts of international engagement, there is still more work to be done to draw out definitive lessons from recent experience, particularly on how to tailor interventions to specific political, economic and socio-cultural contexts.

(i) **The political settlement, political institutions and democratisation:** Knowledge in these areas is still contested. For example, the literature is not definitive on what types of political systems and institutions are more resilient effective at preventing and managing conflict peacefully or on how democratic reforms should be managed and paced to reduce the risks of violence. Equally, there still appear to be gaps in understanding of how political settlements evolve and what makes them adapt and endure and allow for non-violent political secession rather than leading to their unravelling and potentially to instability and violence.

(ii) **Social cohesion and resilience to violence:** Literature in this area is fairly scattered and this partly reflects the lack of clarity in terms of defining social cohesion, unpacking its elements and relationships to other variables. A first task would be to unpack these concepts and linkages and then synthesise the disparate literature on identify politics, social inclusion, social capital etc in order to identify areas for further research and analysis. There appear to be particular gaps in terms of developing together knowledge on what makes particular communities and societies resilient to fragility and conflict and examining the linkages between local, regional and national processes of institution building and peace building. Also there still appears to only be limited knowledge on specific interventions to address social exclusion and identity-based divisions and the different means to manage identity differences positively and peacefully – and synthesis in this area would be useful.
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