Decentring poverty, reworking government: movements and states in the government of poverty

Anthony Bebbington
Diana Mitlin
Jan Mogaladi
Martin Scurrah
C. Bielich

Institute for Development Policy and Management
School of Environment and Development
Brooks World Poverty Institute
The University of Manchester
Humanities Bridgeford Street Building
Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL

This working paper is part of the Government of Chronic Poverty series
The Government of Chronic Poverty: from the politics of exclusion to the politics of citizenship?

The papers in this series have been undertaken as part of the ‘Government of Chronic Poverty’ project within the ‘Adverse Incorporation and Social Exclusion’ theme within the Chronic Poverty Research Centre. Amongst other things, this theme is concerned with the politics of efforts to tackle structural forms of chronic poverty. Although each of the papers in this series engages with a different country context and policy issue, they all frame contemporary efforts to reduce chronic poverty as essentially political efforts to (re)govern the relationships between the trustees of development and poor citizens caught within processes of adverse incorporation and social exclusion. From this perspective they ask whether contemporary development interventions and actors, within what critics have termed the era of ‘inclusive liberalism’, necessarily depoliticise the task of reducing structural forms of poverty, or whether they are capable of empowering chronically poor people as rights-bearing citizens. While each paper makes clear that the answers to this question are highly contextualised, the synthesis paper seeks to draw out the comparative and broader implications of these studies for efforts to understand and challenge chronic poverty.

Abstract

We consider how social movements in South Africa and Peru rework poverty as a domain of policy intervention. National 'mappings' of social movements reveal that 'poverty' is rarely central to movement framings challenges they address. This contrasts with government's justification of policy in terms of impacts on 'poverty'. Movements thus seek to change the government of poverty discourses as well as the government of poverty reduction interventions. They do this through direct action, negotiation and co-production. Movements' main challenge is to make such challenges without becoming themselves subject to, or even the subjects of, these same practices of government.

Keywords: social movements; poverty; co-production; poverty discourses; policy; Peru; South Africa

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1 See Hickey and du Toit (2007), 'Adverse incorporation, social exclusion and chronic poverty', CPRC working paper 81.
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Anthony Bebbington is Professor and ESRC Professorial Research Fellow at the Institute of Development Policy and Management at the University of Manchester. He is also Research Associate of the Centro Peruano de Estudios Sociales, Lima Peru.

Diana Mitlin is Senior Lecturer at the Institute of Development Policy and Management at the University of Manchester. She is also Senior Research Associate at the International Institute of Environment and Development, London.

Jan Mogaladi is Researcher at the Institute for Poverty, Land and Agrarian Studies, University of the Western Cape, South Africa.

Martin Scurrah is Researcher at the Centro Peruano de Estudios Sociales, Lima, Peru.

C. Bielich is Research Assistant at the Centro Peruano de Estudios Sociales, Lima, Peru.

Email: anthony.bebbington@manchester.ac.uk
Contents

1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 5

2 Movements, poverty and the state ..................................................................................... 7
   2.1 Movements and their emergence .................................................................................... 7
   2.2 Domains of activism ....................................................................................................... 8
   2.3 Engaging the state ......................................................................................................... 9

3 Methods .......................................................................................................................... 12

4 Struggles for shelter and services in South Africa ......................................................... 13
   4.1 Mapping South African movements: political transition and movement emergence .... 13
   4.2 Movements, poverty and poverty reduction ................................................................. 15
   4.3 Strategies, tactics and approaches to the state ......................................................... 16

5 Extractive industry movements in Peru ....................................................................... 20
   5.1 Mapping Peruvian movements: political economic change and movement emergence 20
   5.2 Movements, poverty and government ................................................................. 23
   5.3 Approaches to the state ............................................................................................ 26

6 Conclusions .................................................................................................................... 27
1 Introduction

Poverty research has said relatively little about social movements and social movement research has said relatively little about poverty.\(^2\) This is not surprising – it reflects the fact that most social movements also say little, directly, about poverty, and very few social movements emerge on the basis of a poverty discourse. Movements rarely assume the mantle of ‘being poor’ as an identity based grievance with which to negotiate, and many movement leaders we have interviewed do not want to think of themselves or their bases in this way. Their emphasis, instead, is on having been denied, excluded or treated unjustly and iniquitably.

This does not mean that movements are irrelevant to debates on poverty. However, tracing the linkages between the two domains requires a conception of poverty as more than income based, of the causes of poverty as rooted in relationships of power, and of poverty reduction policy as determined by political and discursive processes in which movements are embedded. From these starting points, this paper argues that social movements have a great deal to say about the ways in which poverty is understood, governed and acted on in society, and that they can also have significant direct impacts on the cultural and political dimensions of ‘being poor’ as well as on the factors that drive different dimensions of poverty. They can contest how discourses of poverty are governed and by whom, how poverty is produced as both category and material experience, and how government intervenes in the pursuit of poverty reduction (as defined by government).

We make these arguments on the basis of research in South Africa and Peru that asks if and how social movements engage politically, conceptually and tactically with the issue of poverty. We focus on the ways in which social groups representing the poor engage with ‘anti-poverty’ policies and programmes of the state – both those that are intended to address poverty and those considered by the movements to impact on their members’ poverty status. The South African material focuses on the interaction between movements and the state around state-led poverty reduction interventions linked to housing, land tenure and basic service provision. The analysis focuses on the ways in which movements have sought to reshape the design of these programmes. In contrast to these interactions around collective consumption, the Peruvian material focuses on interactions around production, specifically the expansion of extractive industries. Here the emphasis is on ways in which movements have emerged to contest the ways in which the state frames the relationships between extraction, identity and poverty reduction.

\(^2\) For reference to some exceptions see discussion in Bebbington (2007) and CPRC (2008).
This paper proceeds as follows. In the first section we elaborate themes for addressing the relationships between movements, government and poverty, and in the second section we briefly explain the methods used in the research underlying our argument. Section III then describes the ways in which movement organizations in South Africa have engaged with state policy around shelter, land tenure, housing acquisition and access to basic services. Notwithstanding the fact that labour market dynamics continue to be the primary source of poverty and inequality in South Africa (Seekings and Nattrass, 2005; Pauw and McNube, 2007), these areas of collective consumption have drawn most movement activism (Mitlin and Mogaladi, 2009). As the state has rolled out interventions designed to address shelter needs, diverse approaches have been followed by organizations to increase the relevance and effectiveness of such measures for their members. The significance of history resonates through movements’ experiences, influencing not just the perceptions, expectations and actions of their own members but also the way in which groups both within and outside the state frame their opinions of and responses to movements. The discussion considers how, faced with an increasingly difficult labour market and rising levels of income inequality, movements have tried to secure success in their struggles to access and control finance for the collective consumption goods that can make a tangible difference to their quality of life.

If collective consumption has induced the most vibrant movement activity in South Africa, in Peru it has been the economy that has been the centre of movement concerns. The main axis of activity has revolved around the ways in which the economic model pursued since the early 1990s has interacted with questions of environment, ethnicity, human rights and fiscal decentralization (Scurrah, 2008). At the core of this economic model has been the rapid expansion of extractive industries (mining, oil and gas), and the fourth section discusses the emergence of social movement activity related to this sector. We trace how new organizations have emerged and older movement organizations have re-oriented their claims towards the issue of extraction and development. These processes have been highly conflictive – indeed, the Ombudsman’s office reports that by far the majority of all conflicts in Peru are 'socio-environmental' in nature and mostly linked to mining and hydrocarbons (del Pueblo, 2007, 2009). These conflicts hinge partly around a profound disagreement with the Peruvian government’s argument that in many locations extraction offers the only hope for a pathway out of poverty, and that at a national scale poverty will only be reduced through extraction led economic growth and the fiscal resources that it generates. Movements have sought to challenge both this framing of poverty and poverty-extraction linkages, as well as the ways in which the state governs extractive industry and (by implication) its links to poverty.

On the basis of these empirical discussions, the paper closes with conclusions as well as questions for further enquiry.

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3 We use hydrocarbons as a shorthand for 'oil and gas'.
2 Movements, poverty and the state

Lacking the market opportunities open to economic elites, the social networks that upper classes enjoy, or the bureaucratic authority available to state agents, low-income people have to find alternative sources of power if they are to be successful in demanding resources, political inclusion or other changes required for poverty reduction. Particularly in a democratic state, social movements or mass actions are one of the legitimate sources of power that are open to them, helping poor people secure a political response to the problems that they face (Moore, 2003: 303). But what is the nature of such movements, how do they emerge, how do they go about securing success and under what conditions are they able to induce the state to address their needs and interests? Exploring the links between social movements and poverty reduction, this section lays out an approach that then informs the later discussions of South Africa and Peru.

2.1 Movements and their emergence

Both the analysis and realpolitik of social movements are characterised by discrepancies over what constitutes a social movement. Where activists and commentators see a social movement around mining in Ecuador, the country's president Rafael Correa sees only 'cuatro pelagatos' (four nobodies) (Moore, 2009); and where some writers see movements, others see only organisations, networks or mobilisations. These differences are partly political, partly definitional. In this paper we understand movements as a process of mobilisation that is sustained across time and space, rather than as a specific organisation. Thus, while formal organisations can be part of social movements, movements are more than formalised actors and also include the more nebulous, uncoordinated, and cyclical forms of collective action, popular protest and networks that serve to link organised and dispersed actors in processes of social mobilisation. They are more akin to political campaigns (Tilly, 1985), or in the words of Ballard et al. (2005: 617) discussing South Africa, social movements are 'politically and/or socially directed collectives' of usually several networks and organisations aiming to change elements of the political, economic and social system.

A trawl of the literature on both rural and urban contexts would suggest that social movements rarely emerge around poverty per se (Mitlin, 2006; Bebbington, 2007). Rather, they appear to emerge in response to processes implicated in the creation and reproduction of poverty, even when these processes are not necessarily viewed in 'poverty' terms by the movements themselves. In this sense, three broad types of social movement might be identified. The first type is that which emerges in response to dynamics of capital accumulation. A much cited distinction here is that made between accumulation by exploitation and by dispossession (Harvey, 2003). Accumulation through exploitation – hinging around the wage relationship – is more likely to induce union type organisation and movement. Accumulation through dispossession on the other hand, implies expropriation of land, water, natural resources, territory and other assets that previously sustained the
Decentering poverty, reworking government: movements and states in the government of poverty

material and cultural dimensions of livelihood and collective reproduction (c.f. Bebbington, 2000; Escobar, 2008). Such dispossession is more likely to induce emergence of movements around territory, ethnicity, environment, justice or place (c.f. Escobar, 2008).

Movements responding to accumulation dynamics emerge around conflicts in the sphere of production. A second type of movement is that which emerges around the distribution and provision of services and assets that are collectively consumed and provided by the state. These can include shelter, basic services, education, and tenure regulations. While the first type of movement may deal with business as much as the state, this second type articulates more directly with the state as service provider and/or regulator. A third type of movement has roots less in production or collective consumption dynamics, but rather in structured relationships of prejudice based on identity (gender, ethnicity, race etc.). These movements can be understood as challenging the 'terms of recognition' (Appadurai, 2004; Lucero, 2008) under which certain identity based groups are subject to disadvantage as a consequence of the ways in which they are viewed and governed by other, more powerful groups. Most such movements have a basis in shared social identities (e.g. ethnic movements), though some have a basis in shared social convictions (e.g. human rights movements).

2.2 Domains of activism

Comparing these movements in terms of the domains in which they are active, we might say that the first type contests relationships linked to production, the second contests relationships linked to the state and collective consumption, whilst the third contests relationships within society. The boundaries are, however, fluid – for instance, while identity based movements might challenge the ideas and social prejudices that systematically disadvantage particular groups, they may also pursue this end through engaging the state on issues of law and policy; and a movement protesting dispossession of territory may often overlap significantly with ethnic movements themselves committed to the recuperation of territory. However, the distinctions are useful as a means of ordering a discussion of movements, the issues around which they emerge, and the strategies they use. In the empirical sections we focus particularly on the first and second types of movement.

This three-way taxonomy is also useful in drawing attention to themes relating to poverty and movement strategy. While the second and third types of movement might make significant gains within their particular domain, the evidence that such gains translate into material poverty reduction effects is not yet convincing. For example, while over the last twenty years ethnic movements in the Andean countries have secured significant political and cultural gains (Van Cott, 2005, 2008; Andolina, 2003), poverty rates among indigenous people in Latin America have scarcely changed (Hall and Patrinos, 2005). Similar patterns are
reproduced locally. Similarly, while collective consumption movements have helped place water and sanitation in the United Nation’s Millennium Development Goals, actual service provision reforms continue to emphasise corporatisation and cost recovery regardless of the impacts on low-income households (von Weizsäcker et al., 2005). This, perhaps, takes us back to Du Toit’s (2004) insistence that adverse incorporation (and not social exclusion) is the relational base of chronic poverty – for the implication is that even when movements succeed in addressing the conditions of exclusion, they may have little effect on the conditions of adverse incorporation, with the effect that material poverty persists.

2.3 Engaging the state

While we have noted that movements operate in different domains, almost all at some point engage the state as they press for changes in regulation, legislation, constitutional principles, entitlements, service provision, and budget allocation. In each of these ways, they seek to change (albeit not using this language) the way in which the institutions of the state govern, including how they govern poverty both as an idea and as an object of state intervention. How they do this varies, however, and in this section we outline three dimensions of this variation: those around scale, around strategy and around political process.

2.3.1 Scale

Different movements operate at distinct levels, and orient their actions towards different levels of the state. In collective consumption, movements' members often share a strong neighbourhood and district base, and such movements are often urban based (Castells, 1983; Sassen, 2004: 650). The city is the primary sphere of political action because of the significance of local authorities in influencing the rules and regulations that govern access to collective consumption goods and livelihood opportunities and the conditions under which informal enterprise activity takes place. However, the process of building linkages across places in order to reach up to the central state is a challenge that has been overcome by only some urban movements (such as certain national members of Slum and Shackdwellers International, SDI) (Swilling, 2008; Rayos, 2009). It is even less frequent that urban and

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4 In the two Ecuadorian municipalities in which indigenous organisations have had most success in reworking local governance and power relationships, indigenous poverty as measured in more standard income and food consumption terms remains chronic (Ospina et al., 2008).

5 Though of course, many movements and NGOs take issue with an MDG approach to poverty reduction, emphasising instead rights based approaches, not least in the water sector (Nelson, 2007). Nevertheless, in South Africa, there is a long tradition of NGOs working in what is broadly defined as the 'urban sector'.

6 The exception appears to be those cases (e.g. India, South Africa, Brazil) where there is a greater potential to secure state financed subsidies – in such instances, higher levels of government have become a target for movement activities (Mageli, 2004; Ballard et al, 2006).
collective consumption oriented movements succeed in building transnational linkages, though SDI is again an exception.\textsuperscript{7}

Movements operating in production and identity domains can likewise emerge from place based processes (such as conflicts with particular extractive industries, the creation of specific ethnic federations, etc.). However, they appear to be more successful in building linkages across localities, operating at national scales, and engaging both central state and transnational public entities. This may be because their issues are in themselves not locally bound, and are the object of both central state policy and institutions, and international campaigns and treaties. It is therefore not an accident that documented cases of transnational movements and activism have been around issues of the environment, human rights, indigeneity, globalisation and free trade, but very rarely around issues of service provision and the government of urban poverty.\textsuperscript{8}

2.3.2 Strategy

Generalising across movement experience, we can identify three broad strategies that are used in an attempt to shift the state. All involve governance and resource allocation issues, going beyond simple attempts to influence ‘policy’ and engaging the state at more fundamental levels.

The first strategy is one in which the movement seeks to broaden governance practices so that they can monitor government and affect resource allocation in ways that the formal democratic process does not allow either because movement concerns are in the minority or because formal democratic process still allows dominant coalitions to ignore concerns of poor people. Examples here might include movement-led efforts to introduce participatory budgeting (Abers, 1998) or forms of people's assembly that shadow local governments (Andolina, 2003). A second strategy involves the promotion of new ways of thinking about poverty and government intervention with a view to influencing public debate and programme and policy design. That such challenges to dominant discourse are largely what define social movements is not a claim only of post-structural authors (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992; Alvarez et al., 1998; Escobar, 2008); hard headed, in many cases market-minded, leaders of movements might say the same thing if they are comfortable with such an explicit position. For instance, while the agrarian movement in Peru ultimately failed to exercise any influence at all on the design of Peru's Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the US, its leaders declared a success their several years of mobilisation around the FTA precisely because they had made small and medium scale agriculture and its relationship to trade liberalisation a topic of political and public debate – after it having been invisible at the beginning of the trade

\textsuperscript{7} As Perreault (2006: 151) notes, one of the exceptional aspects of the struggle against privatisation in Cochabamba was the fact that it transcended the local.

\textsuperscript{8} For instance, see cases discussed in Keck and Sikkink (1998); Brysk (2000); Waterman (2001)…
Decentering poverty, reworking government: movements and states in the government of poverty

negotiations (Burneo, 2008). A similar example from Peru would be the idea that indigenous peoples have the right of free, prior and informed consent before economic activities can be undertaken on their lands. The idea, practically unheard of ten years ago, is now part of the political debate largely because indigenous and extractive industry movements have placed it there through their discourses and protests.

The third strategy, particularly apparent among urban social movements, has been to challenge bureaucratic modes of service delivery by engaging the state in programmes hatched by movements themselves. For instance, given the massive scale of informality in urban areas, and the chronic resource scarcity faced by governments, the state has been ineffective in addressing poor people's needs for secure tenure and basic services (UN-Habitat, 2003). Hence, some social movements have sought state resources for their own practices as they uncover and validate '…those subaltern knowledges and cultural practices worldwide that modernity itself shunned, suppressed, made invisible and disqualified' (Escobar, 2004: 210). Through strategies of co-production – joint programmes in which state and movement each make resource, design and management contributions – social movements seek to engage the state on the terms of the poor (Mitlin, 2008).

2.3.3 Political process

The third axis around which movement strategies differ relates to their engagement with political processes. One theme here is the recurrent (Ballard et al., 2005) argument over the relative effectiveness of negotiation with authorities as opposed to the use of confrontation and direct action. While some studies and movement leaders suggest that absent direct action, state (and company) policy would not change (Bebbington et al., 2008a), others insist that within-system negotiation is the only sustainable and feasible way of advancing movement interests (MacFarlane, 2004; Patel and Mitlin, 2002). As a compromise argument, some authors show the importance of combining direct action with strategic negotiating capacity – as for example in Racelis’ (2003) discussion of Quezon City and Barbosa et al.’s (1997:28) review of the Goiânia Federation for Tenants and Posseiros in Brazil. Ultimately, movement choice on this issue seems to depend on a combination of strategic calculation of the costs and benefits of each approach, and ideological conviction based on the movement leaders’ own (radical or reformist) theories and experiences of socio-political change.

A second dimension of these calculations is if and how to enter alliances with politicians and formal political groupings, be these party based or not (Crossley, 2002). On balance, the issue here seems to hinge around movement capacity to know how and when to engage in such alliances (Etemadi, 2000). Close to election time, large, active, mobilisations are more likely to induce responses from politicians, meaning that the capacity of a movement to mobilise significant numbers of supporters may matter more than its ability to negotiate alliances. At other times, alliances with politicians and parties might be the more fruitful option – as has arguably been the case (albeit with many nuances and complications) in the more or less structured relationships between movements and parties in Brazil (the PT),
Kerala (the Communist Party) and Bolivia (the Movimiento al Socialismo). The complexity of such alliances, however, is illustrated by the changing and often strained relationships between social movements, the African National Congress and the trade unions in South Africa. Many alliances with formal political parties lead at worst to a political instrumentalisation of the movement (Hickey and Bracking, 2005), or at best to recurrent tensions. Such tensions arise because while movements pressure parties to adopt policies that further the interests of their members, so parties also seek to influence the political position of the movement in the search for electoral support. It is perhaps such experiences that influenced Jockin Arputham, president of the National Slum Dwellers' Federation in India, to persuade the Federation to adopt a policy of avoiding alignment with any single political party in order to be able to negotiate with whichever party is in power (Appadurai 2001, 29).

3 Methods

Given that political relationships occupy a central place in this approach to social movements and poverty, the research reported on here sought countries with relatively consolidated state bureaucracies and party structures, as well as significant movement activity. This was one of the considerations that led us to conduct the work in South Africa and Peru. The selection was also driven by human and logistical criteria. The relative sensitivity of the issues being addressed required research in countries where we already had well established partnerships and relationships with movement organisations, and research centres themselves linked to or at least respected by such organisations. In each country, the research aimed to: assess the overall significance of social movements for poverty reduction; document and analyse the strategies used by these social movements; identify those social movement strategies that are recognised to have secured enhanced inclusion and recognition, and the redistribution, transfer or generation of material benefits; and analyse the influence of both state and movement characteristics on social movements' choice of strategy and the relative success of these strategies.

While much research on contemporary movements tends to hinge around case studies and/or have a sectoral and issue based focus (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992; Alvarez et al., 1998; Ballard et al., 2006; Robins 2008), this project took a different approach. At the centre of this was to conduct an overall 'mapping' of movements in each country, tracing the main domains of movement activity, the main organisations involved in this activity, and the interactions among these domains and organisations. The mapping also considered if and how movements thought about and addressed the question of poverty. This phase of

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9 Dagnino (2008) gives a personalised analytical account of the many things that went wrong in movement alliances with the PT in Brazil, while the relationships between MAS in Bolivia and the indigenous movement are also increasingly strained.
research involved interviews with established movement leaders, movement intellectuals and key informants and culminated in a mapping paper. In each country this was then discussed at a series of workshops with movement leaders, movement organisations, researchers and some activists.

This 'mapping' approach had distinct advantages. While not allowing the depth of analysis that case studies offer, it permitted a view of movements that has a broader reach over space and time. This has made it easier to identify and trace relationships among movements, and the ways in which some movements have grown out of or in relation to others. Likewise it gave a clearer sense of patterns in the ways that different movements interact with the state, political parties and NGOs. It also permitted comparison among different movements’ discourses on poverty, and among the strategies assumed for engaging with the state on issues defined as poverty reduction by government. Finally, it also helped understand how the most visible movements in each country exist in relation to other movements that while less visible, may nonetheless have played important roles in their emergence. Thus, while the following two sections focus on prominent movements in each of South Africa and Peru, they seek to understand these movements and their approaches to poverty and the state in relationship to other movements.

4 Struggles for shelter and services in South Africa

4.1 Mapping South African movements: political transition and movement emergence

Before 1994, most social movements rallied primarily around their opposition to apartheid. While movements emerged at different times and with different purposes, for example the trade unions sought to protect workers while more political groups sought an end to the apartheid regime, the nature of the anti-apartheid struggle dominated movement discourse and activities. One of the most important groupings within these earlier movements was the 'civics' who acted as quasi local government in black African townships and coordinated at the national level through the South African National Civic Association (SANCO). The civics illustrate both the significance of anti-apartheid movements and the scale of transition that such movements have experienced. With the transition to democracy they experienced a considerable loss of purpose as the political emphasis switched over to engaging and building the democratic state (see Cherry et al., 2000; Mayekiso, 2003). Their demise reflects the 'taken for granted' sense that the ANC’s Reconstruction and Development Programme would be implemented and poverty addressed.

10 These papers are available in English and Spanish at www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/socialmovements.
Decentering poverty, reworking government: movements and states in the government of poverty

The apartheid state faced, and ultimately fell because of an organised political opposition, sustained legal challenges from civil society, strong local civic organisations in black townships and spontaneous protests (Seekings, 2000; Robins 2008). Current movement organisations draw on these historical trajectories of action in multiple ways as they pursue their goals (Pieterse, 2006; Swilling, 2008). The historical strength of these movements is reflected both in a strong present-day sense of citizen entitlement towards the state and, on the part of the state, in a recognition of the potential power of street politics. The historic importance of these movement organisations is also reflected in the continued dominance of the African National Congress (ANC) which has just won its fourth election and remains the automatic party of choice for the majority of the black African population disenfranchised, exploited and dispossessed by the previous regime. The ANC government came to power in 1994 after several years of negotiations with the outgoing apartheid state in a managed transition. While the new government’s economic policy is widely considered to have been abruptly changed in 1996 away from the poverty driven approach of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and towards the more neo-liberal and market orientated policy of Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) (Peat, 2002; Everatt and Maphai, 2003), the government has maintained and extended social grant transfers to needy individuals and programmes to provide housing and to facilitate improved access to basic services (Van der Berg, et al., 2007; Rust, 2006; Muller, 2008).

The outcomes of the mapping exercise reflect this history. Eleven of the 36 movement organisations included in the mapping were formed between 1994 and 2000 and a further 18 movement organisations have been formed since that date. Organisations’ focus also changed with the political transition. Organisations formed before 1994 include unions and SANCO (South African National Civic Organisation). Of the 36 movement organisations in the study, 14 focused on shelter issues (broadly defined to include land, housing and services) and these organisations are distinguished by the scale of their mass organising. The other two principal areas of movement activity are around labour and human rights, while the environment and feminism constituted important, but less significant domains.

It is striking that despite increasing income poverty and inequality, labour relations do not emerge as a significant source of contestation. The long standing alliance between COSATU and the ANC may be a significant factor explaining this. However, it may also be that in comparison to labour issues, and perhaps because of the lack of employment opportunities, collective consumption struggles are more important for the informally employed urban poor (Castells, 1983; Mitlin, 2006). Certainly there is intense activity seeking to influence state policies in this domain, particularly at the level of city politics (Pieterse, 2005). This level of activity may also be rooted in political culture. Historical familiarity with neighbourhood struggles, a sense of entitlement based on the citizenship achieved with the end of the apartheid state, the scale of need, and the collective experiences related to income poverty all result in a diversity of political challenges to state programmes. While movement
organisations may not agree on the solution, they are united in a belief that the state needs to change delivery strategies, and in urban politics being a site of struggle.

Among collective consumption struggles, those around shelter are particularly prominent, even if among them there are various differing loci of activity (or sub-movements), each with distinctive constituencies, grievances and strategies/tactics. These include tenants (particularly tenants of formal housing), those who are in formal housing and struggling to pay bond (mortgage) payments, those presently living in shacks and/or informal settlements who seek housing, and households struggling to pay for services. Their activities respond to the difficulties faced by families struggling to purchase commodities within a number of shelter-related markets. Given that the state also addresses shelter issues, these movement organisations and activists are seeking to change policies and programmes in areas rich in state intervention.

4.2 Movements, poverty and poverty reduction

Economic opportunities remain limited for many of the urban poor. As noted above, the government has adopted a broadly neo-liberal approach to its economic policy. Poverty and inequality appear to have increased although recent figures are more encouraging, partly as a result of social transfers (Pauw and Mcnube, 2007; Van der Berg et al., 2007). Pay is low at the bottom of the labour market, and jobs are hard to find. Despite its economic policies, the government remains committed to investing in a range of social programmes (Seekings and Nattrass, 2006; Van der Berg et al., 2007), and some of the domains in which the government intervenes have also been those in which movements have emerged and sustained their activities. This raises the question of why citizen activism and movements have been so strong around areas of collective consumption and so relatively inactive on labour market issues or state financed income transfers. To address this, we first elaborate on state provision in this area (and highlight some of the considered deficiencies) and then discuss the engagement of these movement organisations with the state both within and beyond these programmes.

To improve shelter options, the government has introduced a number of different programmes. The ANC election campaign in 1994 placed emphasis on housing, reflecting a resonance between legal shelter, citizenship and the promises associated with democratic transformation. The government’s housing programme has been subject to little substantive modification since 1995. Provision is dominated by a capital subsidy with units being constructed primarily by private construction companies and local government (Gilbert, 2002). The programme has been large scale (in global terms) with some two million units

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11 The interests of private construction companies in the programme design and realisation have also been noted (see Gilbert 2002). Du Toit and Neves (2007) explain how the functioning of social grant distribution systems also favour the corporate sector although they do not elaborate on their role in the design of such fund.
having been constructed in the last 12 years. The government itself has conceptualised the programme as an asset transfer to low income households (DOH, 2004). In terms of access to basic services, the lack of water and sanitation has also been recognised and this has resulted in a programme to introduce free basic water and improve access to electricity (Muller, 2007; Muller, 2008).

However, for the landless and homeless, and in the context of a growing number of families in housing need, it has been recognised that the scale of the housing programme is inadequate (Statistics South Africa, 2001; SAIRR, 2008). Many low income families continue to secure shelter through informal housing solutions – and these households see access to state subsidies as the way to end their housing poverty (Smit, 2007). In terms of poverty effectiveness, the professional critique has centred primarily on the location of the dwellings and the creation or reinforcement of spatial exclusion (the apartheid city) with low income households being relocated far from services, jobs and in some cases their previous social networks (Huchzermeyer and Karam, 2006; Harrison, et al., 2003). The Department of Housing recognised these concerns in a strategy statement in 2004 (DOH, 2004) but the effectiveness of these new measures remains moot. There have also been concerns (if less widespread) about the tendency of such programmes to individualise the relationship between the needy citizen and the state, and in so doing to reduce the potential for movement type organising (Huchzermeyer, 2003: 597-8; Robins, 2008: 83).

Service provision constitutes another major area of intervention, and again there are important historical precedents. During the last 15 years, government, movement organisations and support organisations have all been active in this domain. The state has extended access to water and sanitation; meanwhile movement organisations have argued that the state’s efforts are inadequate and that restricting household access to services is disproportionate and disadvantageous to the poor (McDonald and Pape, 2002; Bond, 2008). These strategies have been combined with direct action (Egan and Wafer, 2006) while legal challenges in the courts have been made to prevent the use of pre-paid meters (which reduce providers’ financial risk) (Bond, 2008:1044).

4.3 Strategies, tactics and approaches to the state

Movement organisations respond to the needs, interests and expectations of their members. In engaging the state, shelter movement organisations use both confrontation and negotiation. This is not a simple continuum, however, as organisations also seek different ends - some favouring state housing provision and others favouring state-financed self-development, in part due to a Foucauldian based mistrust of the ability of state systems and structures to deliver what is needed (Robins, 2008; Appadurai, 2001). The range of

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strategies also exists because South African movement organisations have to respond to multiple ideological and pragmatic faces of a state which, within and between different programme areas, can be simultaneously neo-liberal and pro-market, developmentalist and redistributive, bureaucratic and regulatory, and clientelist and self-interested (Pieterse, 2005; Robins, 2008).

There is also ongoing adjustment between approaches as activists seek to draw out more favourable state responses to shelter need while at the same time contesting actions that are perceived as hostile. A representative of the Landless People’s Movement commented ‘[t]he relationship oscillates between confrontation and negotiation even if the former has an upper-hand…’ An interviewee from the iLitha Park Anti-Eviction Campaign stressed that for this network the balance between negotiation and confrontation depends on the particular context of individual organisations. The work of FEDUP (another network) is positioned more towards collaboration but the neighbourhood associations that make up its membership include land invasion as a potential tactic. The strategies spoken of by activists within organisations active in service provision also include confrontation and direct action, with tactics including the reconnection of cut-off meters, demonstrations and other protests. Interviewees from two such organisations consider that the balance for their organisations has shifted in recent years and they now place greater weight on negotiation. In both cases, these are organisations that have engaged with the courts to advance the interests of their members and it may be the case that legal processes have legitimated the position of the organisation enabling negotiations to take place within a more favourable context (Bond, 2008). In its willingness to negotiate in response to such initiatives, the state demonstrates both internal tensions between economic and social policy (alternately neo-liberal and redistributive), and other ideological and political contradictions which go well beyond addressing the needs of the poor.

While the above discussion assumes that movement organisations exist outside of the state and exert an autonomous influence on the state, the reality appears to be more complex. Three different contexts illustrate both the depth and diversity of their engagement with government, and the differing senses in which movement activists have to negotiate their way through the realities of contentious party politics and complex sets of rules and regulations. These three contexts are of movement-state interactions around issues of ideology, of rights and of political decision making.

Movement organisations working in the area of access to services have the most diverse ideological direction, in part influenced by a leadership that includes individuals expelled from the dominant political party (the ANC) alongside more local located grassroots activists (reference removed for double blind referring). The nature and direction of these organisations emphasise the importance of understanding movements within a broader political context and not as isolated phenomena. The formation of some movement organisations owes as much to the strategies of the ANC and its management of internal
opposition to its economic policy as it does to more autonomous grassroots processes. In the case of one organisation, the Anti-Privatisation Forum, an interviewee explained that the network was formed in direct response to the government’s cost recovery measures and associated labour restructuring. However other organisations in this sub-movement appear to have been initiated by local households seeking to access affordable services and avoid being cut-off because of failing to pay bills. In the case of the Soweto Electricity Crisis Committee, the interviewee noted that leaders came to adopt an anti-privatisation objective only after the initial formation of the organisation.

When individuals expelled from the ANC chose to locate themselves within movement organisations rather than attempt to create new political parties, they returned to the drama of the street protests that challenged and defeated apartheid. At the same time, they began to engage with the difficulties faced by low-income residents who cannot afford service payments. Such movement organisations experience the state as potentially antagonistic, and all of those interviewed spoke at length about how the state is active in legitimising some movements and movement organisations, and de-legitimising others, and generally government is seen as wanting to control movement activity (see also Oldfield, 2008). Yet despite such concerns, movement leaders legitimate their activities in terms of the government’s own poverty objectives and seek to participate in state programmes that enable them to address the needs of their members.

A second area in which relations between state and movements are complex is that of rights. The mapping exercise notes the significant overlap between the shelter movement and the human rights movement which occurs in part because ‘rights’ remains a significant discourse for civil society and one that is seen to have direct relevance for poverty reduction programming (Jones and Stokke, 2005). Not only are rights used as the basis for extending the provision of state support to those in need, but legal protection is seen as a means of preventing the scale of exploitation, dispossession and discrimination that existed under the apartheid regime. The historic power of a rights discourse has been enhanced by rights embedded within the state through the new Constitution and the creation of the Human Rights Commission, ‘a state institution supporting constitutional democracy… [and ensuring the] rights and values of the Constitution are observed, respected and promoted at all levels' (Sachs, 2005:134). ‘Rights’, as a movement goal, are now both inside and outside of the state. In terms of our research, the language of rights seems to be used by movement organisations to offer tactical advantages to the dispossessed, excluded or otherwise

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13 A broader network of organisations with a common political purpose are cooperating under the banner of Social Movements Indaba; for a summary of their position see, for example, http://apf.org.za/article.php3?id_article=177.

14 Sachs (2005) himself provides a further example of the integration of state and civil society in respect of the rights movement; he is a Justice of the Constitutional Court and was an active lawyer within the anti-apartheid movement.
disadvantaged; but the rights discourse is not an all-encompassing vision through which citizens challenge for power and negotiate their 'right to have rights'. The mention of rights, when made by interviewees, was related to court actions and legislative processes to prevent or delay evictions, to prevent cut-offs and more recently challenge the installation of pre-paid meters. There was no discussion about the use of rights to frame a more substantive anti-poverty discourse (see also Skuse and Cousins, 2007). Despite the importance of rights in strengthening claims and entitlements, movement organisations working in shelter did not identify themselves to be 'rights' organisations. This may reflect the fact that court actions depend on professionals and have dynamics that become delinked from those of local communities and their frustration with poverty and structural disadvantage (see Oldfield and Stokke, 2006). It may also be because of the high level of formalisation around the legal process which validates 'rights' but at the same time fits uneasily with the informal societal relations that are more dominant in the lives of the poor (Hickey and Mitlin, 2009). Finally, some rulings suggest that the law is as much to do with confirming disadvantage as it is about framing structures for equal citizenship (Sachs, 2005).

There is also evidence that a particular sort of movement politics is emerging in which they engage the state in order to re-negotiate how decisions are made, and to promote locally devolved decision-making in the face of otherwise hierarchical and state-centred authority. Within the housing subsidy programme, such a devolved space is provided through the People’s Housing Process, a community self-management option negotiated in part through the efforts of the South African Homeless People’s Federation (Miraftab, 2003; Khan and Pieterse, 2006). The People’s Housing Process has been promoted by the state with a clear commitment to embed empowerment and pro-active (and more recently collective) citizenship within approaches to poverty reduction (DOH, 2004). While not all movements engage with the PHP, leaders of more traditionally left movement organisations find this movement strategy hard to understand (Bond, 1996) and some accuse FEDUP (now active in realising this option) of 'selling out' through its attempts to negotiate with the state. These movement activists take a more traditional leftist position and argue that it is more important to capture the state and influence its programmes than to change the centralisation of power and negotiate for more autonomous locally-driven alternatives.

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Robins (2008) argues that many movement activists blend rights campaigning with the more pragmatic realities of clientelist politics.

For example, one representative of SECC spoke of encouraging old age pensioners to build rooms to rent, thereby augmenting their own income and helping to pay the costs of services, and developing a concrete example of community controlled densification which was a state objective raised in negotiations with the local community and in which the state was also developing its own initiative.
face of a highly and increasingly regulated sector (Huchzermeyer, 2006; Rust 2006), self-help solutions are unlikely in the absence of cooperative relationships with the state.

Faced with such an ambitiously developmental state that seeks to expand rights and deliver goods and services (Van der Berg et al., 2007), it may be as important for movements to influence the detail of policies and programmes as to change the nature of relations between the state and society. Whatever the case, movements work across the spectrum: some seek to influence explicit ANC ideologies (or the balance between competing ideologies) while others follow a more ‘Hirschmannian’ (1984) path in which the main contribution of civil society to enable citizens to influence agendas within a decentralised and devolved system of decision making. In this sense, as they engage the government of poverty reduction, movements tackle both the broader societal framings of poverty and development, as well as the nitty-gritty of state intervention.

5 Extractive industry movements in Peru

5.1 Mapping Peruvian movements: political economic change and movement emergence

Peru has seen significant movement activity since the second half of the twentieth century. Early movements contested questions of land and labour, above all in the rural economy (Cleaves and Scurrah, 1980). These movements intersected with those of the political left which, in addition to pursuing their own political agendas, played important roles in the struggles for peasant access to land and for fairer labour relations, as well as those for unionisation. Once Lima, Peru’s capital, began to grow, urban mobilisations and place based movements also appeared (Mangin and Turner, 1968; Stokes, 1995; Schönwälder, 2002), and more generally there is a clear relationship between the development of Peruvian political economy and movement dynamics. Thus, for instance, the human rights movement gained strength during Peru’s armed conflict (1980-1994/5), and the authoritarian regime of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) while the coca producers’ movement emerged in the context of US supported interdiction. At the same time historical movements, such as the movement for access to land, or of the political left, have steadily weakened since the late 1970s and late 1980s respectively for reasons related as much to their internal dynamics as to the changing political space for their agendas. In this historical context, the mapping exercise identified ten movements currently active in Peru: these were the agrarian, cocalero (coca growers), environmental, extractive industry, feminist, human rights, indigenous, union and popular women’s movements as well as a collective of regional movements each demanding government and fiscal decentralisation. The boundaries between these movements are far from clear cut, and many actors appear in more than one movement. Human rights groups are, for instance, active in a range of movements, and there are important overlaps between the extractive industry, indigenous and parts of the environmental movement (see below). Of
these ten movements, perhaps the most visible over the last decade has been that around extractive industry (certainly it has been the movement that has attracted most government opprobrium: Garcia, 2007). It is the subject of the following sections.

Over the last fifteen years, governments of Peru have prioritised the extractive over the agrarian and manufacturing economies and have increasingly tied their macroeconomic strategy to a rapid expansion of mineral, oil and gas investment. As indicators of the scale of this expansion, between 2003 and 2007 the proportion of the Peruvian Amazon affected by hydrocarbon concessions increased from 14 to over 70 percent, and experts estimate that over half of the country’s registered peasant communities are affected by mining, mostly by concessions for mineral exploration (de Echave, 2007). This has had significant macroeconomic effects – Peru’s economy has had sustained growth (at eight percent in 2008) and mining and hydrocarbons accounted for 63.8 percent of exports between 2000 and 2007. It also has implications for the relationship between growth strategy and poverty because the paths which link the two are much less direct than those that characterise growth based on small and medium scale agriculture. The potential contribution to poverty reduction is more circuitous (depending on the payment and then redistribution of taxes, and on indirect employment generation), while the potential effects on impoverishment due to asset dispossession, capital intensive technological change and environmental externalities become great (c.f. Harriss-White, 2005).

Several characteristics of this expansion are important for understanding how movements have emerged around the issue. First, the process is led by international companies. This spike in the increase of transnational capital (large and small scale) has raised concerns among traditionally nationalist and anti-imperialist organisations and movements. Second, it has been facilitated by incentives that give companies tax and royalty holidays and contractual guarantees that taxes will not be increased. This raises concerns among similar groups that the country is unable to benefit from its subsoil and convert those assets into other resources that could be used for development and poverty reduction. Third, the expansion necessarily involves competition over natural resources in rural areas. Deposits and concessions are mostly located in areas occupied by low income peasants and indigenous peoples. This raises concerns among peasant and indigenous movements regarding the vulnerability of their members’ livelihoods, the security of the land and water resources on which they depend, and their ability to exercise power over the territories and community spaces which they have historically governed. Fourth, expansion introduces new (perceived at least) environmental risks – particularly risks regarding the future quality and quantity of water resources. In addition to raising concerns among the same rural movements, this also raises urban and environmentalist worries regarding the water on which the consumption side of urban livelihoods depends. Furthermore these different dimensions have drawn the attention of human rights movements concerned about the negation of constitutional rights to property, safety and participation in a context of large scale intervention.
These rapid and multi-faceted changes have induced new forms of organisation and movement around extractive industries. This process has involved both the emergence of new movement organisations as well as their articulation with other movements. These processes have occurred both in localities where extractive industries are present as well as nationally. Territorially, urban and regional defence fronts have emerged to question the effects on water supplies, quality of life and the distribution of benefits between territory and central state. Within these defence fronts one encounters both new actors as well as more traditional leftist and anti-imperialist activists. At a national level, and for the case of mining, the formation of the Coordinator/Confederation of Communities Affected by Mining (CONACAMI) has been central to the emergence of a specific movement around mining. Unlike miners’ unions which represented workers and (à la Harvey, 2003) reflected responses to accumulation through exploitation, CONACAMI is an organisation that represents territories (peasant communities) within areas of mining influence whose assets are threatened by processes of accumulation through dispossession. Its roots lie in a particular conflict between one rural community (Vicco, Pasco) and a mining company. This conflict gave rise to forms of local leadership that, several years later, and through relationships with various NGOs and other sources of support, culminated in the creation of CONACAMI as a social organisation that seeks to represent communities affected by mining at the national level. Since 1999, CONACAMI has gained more and more visibility in the country’s mining conflicts. In a certain sense, its position has also become more radical with time and—above all—has incorporated increasingly indigenist discourses (Paredes, 2005). This indigenisation of the discourse of a formerly peasant organisation has its own explanation (an explanation in which certain international actors and Ecuadorian indigenous organisations also play a part (Paredes, 2006)). This discursive shift has helped to create ties with indigenous organisations as well as to link arguments around mining to other transnational indigenous processes, especially those around the ILO 169 convention. The visibility, activism and growing radicalisation of CONACAMI led to its ‘delisting’ as an officially registered NGO by the government in 2005, following concerns expressed by the Office of the President, the SNMPE and certain mining firms.

CONACAMI is a new organisation whose creation has served to articulate and give public face to a national movement around mining. The situation is rather different for the case of hydrocarbons. Given that almost all new hydrocarbon investment has occurred in the Peruvian Amazon, in areas within or close to indigenous territories, the response has been led by existing indigenous peoples’ organisations that come together under the umbrella of the Association of Indigenous Peoples of the Peruvian Jungle (AIDESEP). Thus, while a mining movement exists in Peru, a hydrocarbons one does not – rather the indigenous movement, its organisations and some of their already existing allies have assumed hydrocarbon extraction as one more issue of concern within their existing platforms. Another

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18 For more information and papers on this phenomenon see [www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/andes](http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/andes).
difference is that AIDESEP has been rather less successful than CONACAMI in forcing public debate on the livelihood implications of hydrocarbon expansion, and have depended far more on NGO support. In part, this weakness reflects the great difficulty of forging common platforms among indigenous groups among whom communication (for reasons of distance and ethno-territorial difference) is immensely difficult, though it also reflects weaknesses within AIDESEP itself. That said, when in 2008 the government attempted to pass legislation that would ease the sale of community lands to third parties (legislation designed particularly with the mining sector in mind), AIDESEP was able to mobilise an Amazonian strike that ultimately led the executive to suspend the legislative proposal. This mobilisation has continued to mid-2009. Likewise, in certain local conflicts indigenous organisations have been able – again through the use of direct action combined with negotiation – to induce shifts in company behaviour. The most notable case here is the success (albeit after three decades of failure) on the part of one of AIDESEP’s member organisations (FECONAC) to force the oil company Pluspetrol to re-inject polluted water rather than release it into the Río Corrientes (which had led to acute public and environmental health effects).

The extractive industry movement that has emerged in Peru has been, at its core, a movement around dispossession, inspired by concerns about imperialism, neoliberalism and loss. However, as it has evolved at a national level, its links to an already existing indigenous movement and movement organisations have become progressively stronger. This has led to a certain radicalisation of its discourse while also having implications for its interactions with the state and political processes (see below). At the same time, at a national level the movement has interacted in important ways with the human rights and agrarian movements, though the positions of these remain secondary in how the movement positions itself. At a sub-national level, the multiplicity of currents appears even greater, and there has been less dominance of a particular discourse. Movement positions in some sites seem mostly about environment, in others about threats to land and territory, in others about the need to nationalise extractive industry, and in others about employment and the local distribution of benefits. Thus, while there is a recognisable national movement around extraction, its faces and links to other movements are multifaceted, particularly at a local level.

5.2 Movements, poverty and government

Given the way in which it has emerged, it is not surprising that the extractive industry movement has framed its concerns around rights, dispossession, indigeneity, territory and environment, with one or other of these framings receiving greater emphasis depending on the moment and the particular sub-current concerned. Poverty has not been their leitmotiv –

19 While the company has met its commitments to FECONAC, none of the related commitments from the Peruvian government have been met.
however, concerns for development have been closer to the surface, above all locally. While in some instances movement activities have seemed opposed to the expansion of the extractive economy – at the very least any expansion that occurs without communities being given the right of free, prior and informed consent – in just as many cases movement initiatives have been oriented towards demanding an increase in the benefits that extraction brings to local populations. Movements have thus pressed (with some success) for: increases in the percentage of extraction generated tax income that is returned to the regions where extraction occurs; greater financial contributions from companies; and increased employment generation (this latter demand being particularly visible in local movement initiatives as opposed to national positions).

These concerns for ‘development’ have been framed in terms of rights and equity rather than poverty. This itself suggests discrepancy with the ways in which poverty is framed and understood in international development policy, counter-posing a view that embeds poverty in social relations against policy views that often extract it from these relations and turn it into an object of intervention (cf. Li, 2007). However, and notwithstanding such discrepancies, movements have had to engage in a debate on poverty not least because government and the industry have pushed the debate in this direction, framing the case for the expansion of extractive industry within a narrative of poverty reduction. In a recent intervention, Alan Garcia, the President of Peru, argued that transnational investment, above all in extractive industry, offers a pathway out of rural poverty that peasant agriculture does not (Garcia, 2007). In interviews and formal statements, industry representatives similarly insist that, to paraphrase, ‘at such high altitudes and primitive conditions mining is the only option’ for an escape from poverty. Technocrats and politicians alike argue that the extractive economy makes a vital contribution (through taxes and royalties) to the financing of social policy. Taken together, extractive industry growth is presented as a poverty reduction intervention and placed in contrast to the existing agrarian economy that, such actors insist, will only mean continued poverty. As part of this same discourse, organisations such as CONACAMI and NGOs critical of extraction, are framed as wanting to condemn rural communities to continuing poverty (Garcia, 2007).

This framing has forced movements to respond, though the nature of the response varies across different organisations. From NGOs and more professionalised social movement organisations, the response has been more analytical with books produced seeking to

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20 The redistribution of economic and financial benefits from mining has not been as high on CONACAMI’s agenda as one might expect perhaps because the tax redistribution mechanism passes through the regional and local governments that traditionally ignore and exclude the communities that are CONACAMI’s core constituency.

21 We refer to our own interviews and discussions with the industry conducted in Peru, Ecuador and UK.

22 There is a wider issue here. In the research, it was evident that leaders of CONACAMI and AIDESEP did not view such NGOs and sympathisers as being part of the movement. While welcoming their support, they did not see them as insiders. Other observers (including ourselves) would be more inclined to see these NGOs as part of
counter government and industry claims and to demonstrate that at best there is no link between extraction and poverty, and at worst regions of extraction are in fact poorer than others (de Echave and Torres, 2005). Some of these organisations also respond that given the multidimensional nature of poverty, even if incomes were to increase, the environmental damage, infringements of rights and general loss of prior forms of social order imply a net negative effect. For their part, membership organisations and their leaders have responded in less technically substantiated ways but have made similar points. The resonance of their claims was sufficiently strong that the absence of ‘trickle-down’ from the extractive economy became one of the core themes in the presidential elections of 2006.

The effects of these arguments about poverty and extraction are complex. On the one hand, they have induced increased efforts on the part of the mining sector (writ large) to increase its impact on poverty. Many companies have thought and rethought their social responsibility programmes with a view to increasing poverty reduction, and the World Bank group (a supporter of extractive industry development) has run pilots to improve the use of that part of mining generated tax revenue that is returned to the directly affected regions. There is far less evidence that the government has changed its view of the causal chain between extraction and poverty reduction; instead government response has been to intensify its attempts to delegitimise and in some cases partially criminalise movement organisations and activities. Furthermore, this authoritarian response has deepened state presence in the self-government of movement organisations. This takes various forms. Some organisations have toned down criticisms and distanced themselves from other movement organisations that are deemed more radical; some have had to self-govern in ways that protect or defend their staff against criminal investigations initiated by the state; and others have to dedicate resources responding to state demands for information and conformity. Many organisations also find themselves having to respond to that part of the state’s poverty discourse that insists that they want to trap the rural population in perpetual poverty. Increasingly they dedicate resources and time to elaborate ‘development alternatives’ rather than critique the adverse effects of extraction.

the same movement – understood as an assemblage of actors, organisations, ideas and discourses all pulling in the same normative direction. While this is in part a difference of view on the meaning of the term ‘movement’ it also suggests a difference of viewpoint on the permissible class and ethnic base of social movements.

23 Chorro in Spanish – ‘no hay chorreo’ has been the frequently made claim.
5.3 Approaches to the state

While the extractive industry movement – and its range of associated movement organisations – are to some extent reined in by these insinuations of government into their operations, they also suffer weaknesses of their own, in particular the ability to work across scales and coordinate national agendas and local concerns. However, it is undeniable that they have made extractive industry a topic of public and political debate in a way that would not have occurred otherwise. They have also challenged easy associations made between poverty reduction and extraction, and the ways in which these are debated in the public sphere.

As they have done this, strategies have mixed the confrontational and sometimes violent, with the negotiated and analytical, and also the occasional alliance with political parties and figures. There is not the space here to assess the relative effects of these distinct strategies, though analytically it appears to be the case that absent direct action, neither government nor companies pay attention (Scurrah, 2008). It also appears that the use of direct action has opened the political space within which other negotiations over policy have occurred, at both national and local scales (Bebbington et al., 2008 a,b). These negotiations have addressed issues as distinct as participatory water monitoring, the environmental impact assessment process, the rules governing the geographical redistribution of tax income from extraction, and the financial contributions that companies should make to development. While not all (perhaps none) of these discussions have evolved exactly as movement organisations hoped, they have challenged the way in which extraction is governed, and the effects that it has on the asset bases of local populations. They have also helped induce an increase in revenue transfers to mine affected areas, and have called into question on a public and national scale the adequacy of existing public institutions for ensuring that production growth results in poverty reduction. And finally, they have challenged how poverty is publicly discussed in Peru, if not in general at least in relation to a growth model based on extractive industry.

24 The effectiveness of direct action is perhaps what has induced an increasing criminalisation of protest – a phenomenon that may have made some movement organisations less inclined to continue using forms of direct action.
6 Conclusions

Several patterns emerge from the mapping exercises in South Africa and Peru. Movements contest a broad range of domains, and while class based identities are no longer dominant in movement organising (if ever they were) a range of other collective identities and platforms have emerged around which the organisation of society, state and economy are negotiated. In these negotiations the state is their primary interlocutor. They seek both to change its institutions, policies, presumptions about poverty and to make it the propagator of the changes in society that they, the movements, seek. While such strategies are often couched in terms that criticise the 'neoliberal' state, movements and movement organisations often seem more concerned to gain concessions from, rather than transformations of, this state and its dominant mode of engagement with the contemporary capitalist economy.

The mapping exercises also problematise any simple associations between movements and poverty. First, people do not mobilise primarily around poverty, even if the issues they address can be causally linked to the creation of poverty. Generally, movements resist being framed as 'poor' – other identities appear to be viewed as both more powerful and more empowering. The sense from interviews is that leaders view the label of 'poor' as demeaning, and some also see it to be a vehicle through which movements and their bases can be converted into objects of state programmes that divert attention from the issues of real concern to them.\(^{25}\) Indeed, it may be that the deeper issue is who governs the meaning of the terms 'the poor' and 'poverty'. Movements might be more inclined to assume those labels if they were able to given them meanings that are more empowering – but as long as the state and elites control the meaning of these terms, then movements worry that the labels can become mechanisms of social control.

Second, social movements are never only movements 'of the poor'. Important roles are played by political activists, NGOs and other social movement organisations that are more often than not staffed by professionals. Some movement leaders (e.g. those of the extractive industries and indigenous movements in Peru) insist that these support organisations are not movement members (they are just sympathisers). Analytically, however, it is hard to sustain the case that such organisations are not also part of the movement in question, particular given the process and discursive definition of social movement we have adopted here.

In addition to these observations, two larger and more important themes emerge from the mappings. The first is the importance of history. Contemporary movement dynamics – both for the sector as a whole as well as for the movements that we have discussed in more detail

\(^{25}\) There are echoes here of both Escobar's (1995) argument and Li’s (2007) more recent rehearsal and elaboration of the idea.
Decentering poverty, reworking government: movements and states in the government of poverty

– reflect histories of state-society interaction, of perceptions of the state, development and political parties, and of the formation of individuals who subsequently emerge as leaders, influenced by the culture that their own histories lead them to carry with them. The imaginaries that lead movements to frame demands about housing (South Africa) or extractive industry (Peru), are likewise embedded in histories: of white suburbanisation in South Africa, and of appalling environmental and social performance by pre-1990s extractive industry in Peru. Modern history also has much to do with movement emergence. As new forms of accumulation by dispossession unfold, as in Peru, new social movements have emerged to engage them (at the same time as union-based movements from earlier periods have weakened). As the post-apartheid state has assumed a more prominent role in service provision, it has marked out spaces of negotiation into which movements have stepped. At the same time, tensions among movements as well as between them and the South African state reflect debates over how to manage the relationship between economic management and the provision of collective consumption goods (cf. Ferguson, forthcoming).

Movements are, though, only partly derivative because their emergence also reflects people’s desire to exercise expanded control over the conditions of their existence. While political economy dynamics influence which among these conditions of existence becomes a domain of contention, these dynamics do not necessarily and always induce movements into being. In that process, people’s agency, habitus and simple sheer determination are also key (Crossley, 2002).

The second larger point relates to our distinction between capital accumulation, collective consumption and identities/convictions as the three basic domains of movement activity. Empirically, the distinction appears valid – movements in the two countries do prioritise one or other of these domains. However, to the extent that poverty reduction is a direct or indirect concern, then to operate in just one of these domains is insufficient. In South Africa, if employment generation is central to poverty reduction, struggles around shelter, land and services will, though of immense importance for citizenship, have little impact on the material dimensions of poverty. In Peru, if extraction will ever have any significant effect on poverty this will be because of the taxes that it generates and the ways in which they are spent. Therefore, while struggles around the effects of extraction on territory, land and environment are central to the defence of citizenship, if movements are to influence material poverty dynamics they will also need to engage seriously in arguments over how these fiscal resources should be invested and who should control decision making regarding this investment. In each instance, then, it becomes critical to engage production and collective consumption jointly if movements are ever to influence citizenship and poverty jointly.

There is a more general point here. The message of the mapping exercises is not only that the social movement sector is active; another message is that the sector is also fractured, with many movements co-existing (and overlapping) in sometimes confusing ways. Put another way, we might suggest that movements have emerged around issues and identities
within their respective societies, but not in response to the structure of their societies as a whole. To the extent that they elaborate alternatives (which is at best occasionally), they do so only for their specific issues. That they do this reflects the specialist nature of movement support organisations, the sectorally based responses of the state to movements, the issue specific expectations of their bases and the weakness of political parties (which, if stronger, would play the role of defining platforms and proposals combining a wide range of interests). Systemic alternatives that deliver proposals for rethinking the relationships between production and consumption are conspicuous by their absence. While some movements (like academics) call for alternatives to neoliberalism, it is difficult to claim that these calls are anything other than symbolic and rhetorical. Indeed, it may be that for movements to embrace the bigger picture requires that they themselves control the state (as happened with South Africa’s liberation struggle and has recently occurred in Bolivia). Taking the state, however, immediately presents them with unanticipated challenges and myriad other realities, including international definitions of responsible government. The irony is that having only been rhetorical in their pre-governmental calls for alternatives to neoliberalism, once in government some of their practices become neoliberal in ways that are much more substantive than rhetorical.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{26} As, arguably, is also the case in South Africa and Bolivia.
References


Decentering poverty, reworking government: movements and states in the government of poverty


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The Chronic Poverty Research Centre (CPRC) is an international partnership of universities, research institutes and NGOs, with the central aim of creating knowledge that contributes to both the speed and quality of poverty reduction, and a focus on assisting those who are trapped in poverty, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.

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