


# Religions and Development Research Programme

## Religion, Politics and Governance in Pakistan

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Lahore University of Management Sciences (LUMS)



Working Paper 27- 2009

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# Religions and Development

## Research Programme

The Religions and Development Research Programme Consortium is an international research partnership that is exploring the relationships between several major world religions, development in low-income countries and poverty reduction. The programme is comprised of a series of comparative research projects that are addressing the following questions:

- How do religious values and beliefs drive the actions and interactions of individuals and faith-based organisations?
- How do religious values and beliefs and religious organisations influence the relationships between states and societies?
- In what ways do faith communities interact with development actors and what are the outcomes with respect to the achievement of development goals?

The research aims to provide knowledge and tools to enable dialogue between development partners and contribute to the achievement of development goals. We believe that our role as researchers is not to make judgements about the truth or desirability of particular values or beliefs, nor is it to urge a greater or lesser role for religion in achieving development objectives. Instead, our aim is to produce systematic and reliable knowledge and better understanding of the social world.

The research focuses on four countries (India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Tanzania), enabling the research team to study most of the major world religions: Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Sikhism, Buddhism and African traditional belief systems. The research projects will compare two or more of the focus countries, regions within the countries, different religious traditions and selected development activities and policies.

The consortium consists of six research partner organisations, each of which is working with other researchers in the four focus countries:

- University of Birmingham, UK: International Development Department, Department of Theology and Religion, Centre for West African Studies, Centre for the Study of Global Ethics.
- University of Bath, UK: Centre for Development Studies.
- Indian Institute of Dalit Studies, New Delhi.
- Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research, Ibadan.
- University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
- Lahore University of Management Sciences, Pakistan.

In addition to the research partners, links have been forged with non-academic and non-government bodies, including Islamic Relief.

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## Summary

This report presents the findings of a study of Islam in Pakistan that aimed at understanding and evaluating the relationships between Muslim organizations and activity in the formulation of development policy. The question at the heart of the inquiry is whether religion can play the role of a driver for change in terms of pro-poor policy and practice. The study analyses the nature and direction of the latent force and dynamism of the Islamic establishment, especially in its organizational setting, both in government and in opposition. It shows that the state in Pakistan has typically pursued a policy of exploiting the functional uses of Islam as a source of legitimacy in the absence of, or in combination with, a mass mandate. In so doing, it has played on the turf of Islamic groups by seeking to control the production and spread of the religious message, co-opting the *ulema* and managing religious affairs, ranging from levying Islamic taxes to the management of shrines, policies towards *madrasas* and a role in sectarian conflict. However, it is necessary to go beyond a purely instrumentalist explanation of how religion is used by the state to understand the structural dynamics of Islam as a constant, pervasive and intense force that includes, but at the same time transcends, the manipulations of the ruling elite. The genesis of Pakistan lay in the partition of India on the basis of religion, which therefore assumed a role with no parallel in recent history except in Israel. This, however, needs to be put in perspective in view of two countervailing forces: a secular constitutional state based on the Westminster model and the cosmopolitan, Westernized, liberal and secular character of the elite both in and outside the state. On the one hand, the state has all along struggled to define religion as part of its political discourse. On the other hand, the *ulema* have relied on the supreme legitimizing potential of religion to hold the state to its promise to establish Sharia in the country.

The present study regards Islam as an oppositional force that has consistently been engaged in carving out a niche for itself in the system, shaping the political discourse in the process. It focuses on the role of religion in governance, with reference to development policy formulation and public administration. This role is analysed in North West Frontier Province, where an alliance of religious political parties, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), was in power between 2002 and 2007. Drawing on an in-depth study of three districts, the paper examines how the Islamic government adjusted to the prevalent legal-institutional framework of authority in order to survive in office. It analyses the extent to which the government was able to translate its ideological objectives into development outcomes, noting that it suffered from the usual maladies of governance in Pakistan: corruption, nepotism and inefficiency.

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The willingness of our informants to respond to our questions is also acknowledged. Most assented to their responses being attributable; the desire of some for anonymity has been respected.

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# Acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADP	Annual Development Programmes
ANP	Awami National Party
CII	Council of Islamic Ideology
CM	Chief Minister
DFID	Department for International Development
DSP	Decentralization Support Program
EPI	Expanded Immunization
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
GRAP	Gender Reform Action Programs
GTZ	German Technical Cooperation
HUA	Harkat-ul-Ansar
HUM	Harkat-ul-Mujahideen
ICG	International Crisis Group
IRI	Islamic Research Institute
ISI	Inter Services Intelligence
ISO	Imamiya Students Organization
JAH	Jamiat Ahle Hadith
Jl	Jamaat-e-Islami
JUI	Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Islam
JUI-F	Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Islam (Fazlur Rehman Group)
JUP	Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Pakistan
LD	Lower Dir
LFO	Legal Framework Order
LHW	Lady Health Worker
MICS	Multiple-indicator Cluster Survey
MMA	Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
MPA	Member Provincial Assembly
NFC	National Finance Commission
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
NWFP	North West Frontier Province
OIC	Organisation of the Islamic Conference
PNA	Pakistan National Alliance
PPC	Public Private Sector Cooperation

PPP	Pakistan People's Party
PRP	Provincial Reform Program
SAC	Structural Adjustment Credit
SSP	Sipah-e-sahaba Pakistan
TA	Technical Assistance
TNFJ	Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i- Fiqah-i- Jafria
TNSM	Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-i-Muhammadi
TSP	Tameer-e-Sarhad Program
UD	Upper Dir
UP	Utter Pradesh
WAPDA	Water and Power Development Authority
WFP	World Food Programme

# Glossary

<i>Amir</i>	ruler
<i>bhatta</i>	extortion
<i>chaddar (chador)</i>	full length covering worn over clothes by women
<i>fiqh</i>	jurisprudence
<i>hakim</i>	practitioner of herbal medicine
<i>ijtihad</i>	innovation
<i>imambargah</i>	hall for Shia ritual ceremonies
<i>jihad</i>	(Islamic) struggle, striving, endeavour
<i>jirga</i>	a body of tribal elders
<i>madrasa</i>	Islamic seminary
<i>marla</i>	unit of area (25.2929 sq meters)
<i>maulvi</i>	honorific title for a Sunni religious scholar
<i>mujahideen</i>	guerrilla fighters; literally Muslims involved in a jihad,
<i>mulla</i>	Muslim cleric
<i>malik</i>	Pakhtun tribal leader
<i>nazim</i>	elected district officer
<i>Nizam-i-Mustafa</i>	the Prophet's system
<i>pirs</i>	(Barelvi) saints
<i>riba</i>	tribal lord
<i>shalwar kameez</i>	wide trousers and tunic
<i>shura</i>	consultative assembly
<i>ulema</i>	clerical scholars
<i>umma</i>	(global Muslim) community, brotherhood of all believers
<i>ushr</i>	Islamic land tax
<i>waqf</i>	Islamic trust for property
<i>zakat</i>	annual Sunni tax on wealth (2.5 per cent of the value)



# 1 Introduction

This report deals with the multi-faceted role of religion in the politics of Pakistan. The general framework is provided by the way Islamic elements have been increasingly active in the business of the state. First, they operated as a pressure group for the establishment of Sharia in the 1950s and 1960s. Second, they participated in electoral politics in the 1970s, and again in the 1990s and 2000s. Quite a few of them moved from ballot to bullet as the medium for their political expression during the Afghan resistance movement in the 1980s, insurgency in Kashmir in India in the 1990s, sporadic attacks on Christian and Hindu localities, militant Shia-Sunni strife in the 1990s and Taliban-style suicide bombing of public meetings, military personnel and political leaders in the middle 2000s. Most dramatically, while campaigning for election, the former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto fell to an assassin's bullet followed by a suicide bombing on 27 December 2007 in Rawalpindi. While the Musharraf government accused Al-Qaida of the heinous act, Bhutto's political heirs pointed to elements within the establishment, especially intelligence agencies led by Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). This accusation reflected the public perception that certain Islamic elements are 'invisible' cohorts of the government. The political context for the operations of Islamists is marked by an overarching mission to subjugate the structure of authority represented by the state. This mission focuses on the establishment of Sharia within the territorial state of Pakistan. Thus, nationalism has generally defined the *ulema's* latent ideological stance.<sup>1</sup> While religion operates through social, cultural, educational and family life, politics has shaped its public expression, provided an agenda for its activity, defined its collective vision and created space for a counter-narrative rooted in Islamic ideology. 'Bringing the state in' is a prerequisite for understanding the dynamics of Islam in Pakistan in both legal and institutional terms, especially because the modernist ruling elite led by the army has consistently cultivated divine sources of legitimacy to counter the appeal of a mass mandate as a constitutional basis for legitimacy. In its pursuit of ideational sanction for itself against populist challenges, the state has ended up massively strengthening the Islamic establishment. This report seeks to analyse Islamists' views of politics as an arena for the ultimate struggle for power. In this context, it is argued that they see the state as the power house and thus the prize for victory in the onward march to establish the rule of Sharia.

The study has two parts. First, a qualitative research-based evaluation of the role of Islam in Pakistan through various phases of its history is presented, relying on the available academic scholarship. It deals with the historical trajectory of Islamism, starting from the Pakistan movement to the post-partition discourse relating to the objectives of state policy and divine sources of legitimacy, as

sponsored by the ruling elite as well as the intelligentsia (Section 3). In Section 4, the emergence of the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), an alliance of religious political parties, is discussed, including its characteristics, dynamics and role in politics and government. Finally, a specific case study of the MMA government in North West Frontier Province (NWFP), where it held power from 2002 to 2007, was undertaken, based on secondary data and in-depth interviews with members of the ruling party, donor agencies, NGOs, local bodies and civil society in general (Section 5). The aim is to bring into focus the phenomenon of Islamist parties in government as well as in opposition, including their willingness in practice to operate in a pragmatic way by establishing channels of communication with the central government in Islamabad and donor agencies abroad. In the remainder of this introduction, the broad scope of the argument is outlined, together with a number of theoretical and definitional issues faced by the research.

The study of religion in the contemporary world faces certain methodological challenges. Research in this field usually draws on a secular social science perspective on religion. This is problematic inasmuch as there is a disconnect between this perspective and the transcendental and moralist dimensions of the subject matter, with a direct bearing on methodology on the one hand and the conceptual tools through which analysis seeks to understand the faith-based empirical social reality on the other. Moreover, outcomes of the study of local tradition by Western-educated academics are bound to be tinged by their preconceptions. A further concern relates to the scope of the religious community under study, which extends beyond the boundaries of a single state. In the contemporary world, no state is unaffected by transnational economic, legal, social, cultural, educational and ideological currents. Analysis of the state alone has limited potential to provide answers to questions relating to the dynamics of national culture, religion, identity and ideology. The transnational influences of the world organisations of churches, pan-Islamist institutions such as Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and Rabita Alam Islami, and Jewish, Sikh and Chinese diasporas, among others, have played important roles in shaping religious ideology.

At home, as the neo-institutionalists would remind us, the legal and institutional framework inherited from the colonial past has a significant, even deterministic, presence in such postcolonial states as Pakistan. In addition, secular state institutions, legal and judicial norms and public morality in general encapsulate the religious dimension of social life. States are supposedly legitimate, authoritative,

collective in their mode of operation, national in their scope and vision, and pragmatic in terms of tackling economic, administrative and security issues. On the other hand, it is often argued that society is weak, local, religious, and governed by custodians of customary law who are often visionary in terms of their normative ideals. In the Pakistan context, it will be argued, 'religion' seeks to define, understand and penetrate the state, while the latter attempts to make an instrument out of religion for its control function. Contacts between 'religion' and the state thus assume various characteristics, ranging from control dynamics, to co-option strategies and the political violence that accompanies a radical agenda to ideologically challenge the dominant ethos of public life. In the following pages, the sources and patterns of Islamic dissent and its project of change within the national and territorial boundaries of the Pakistani state will be identified.

After colonial states, such as Pakistan in 1947, gained independence, the two most important legacies of the erstwhile imperial power and the West in general, i.e. development and democracy, occupied the centre stage in the national vision. From seeking spiritual salvation from materialism and its authoritative embodiment in the state, it will be argued in this paper, Islamists have moved half way to the adoption of a formal agenda based on economic development and social welfare, as well as supporting societal input into the business of the state. Islam has increasingly informed public life in Pakistan against the backdrop of a state which has failed to deliver with respect to economic growth and social harmony on the one hand and the democratic framework of rule on the other. As the neo-liberal agenda of the 'Washington consensus' spread across the globe in the 1990s and 2000s, Islamic forces felt obliged to express general hostility to the West as well as opposing the 'Westernism' that they associated with the state and its functionaries. The opposition of Islamic elements to the Pakistani state has therefore been essentially ideological in character, even as they often garnered votes in elections and support on the street on the basis of public grievances relating to shortfalls in governance.

Engagement in public life exposes religious forces to requirements for high moral standards, as defined by the corruption-accountability nexus, the human rights regime, and the particular situations of women and minorities. As we shall note, the record of Islamic parties in Pakistan has been dismal on all these counts. Faith-based groups have failed to act as drivers of social change. Their short-term objectives of acquiring and using power, as well as their long-term transcendental goals, have, it will

be argued, thrived on the politics of identity at the grave cost of the politics of issues and policies. They have generally shied away from seeking to remove impediments to development and reform, including economic, social and gender inequality, patterns of tribal and feudal authority, and elitism in general. Islamists have lacked not only the will to challenge the structures of domination, but also the potential for joining agencies of change, such as political parties, civil society or the media, beyond the confines of religious politics.

Typically, the Islamic parties have one foot in the system and the other out of it. This explains the schizophrenic nature of their attitude towards the phenomenon of terrorism. They condemn suicide bombing because of the heavy toll that it takes of human life, but also condemn anti-terrorist operations such as those in Islamabad, Swat and FATA<sup>2</sup> in 2007 and 2008, stressing the need to reach a negotiated settlement with the Taliban. While peace at home remains elusive, peace abroad, especially with India, has moved ahead, despite Islamic parties led by Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) focusing on resolution of the Kashmir conflict prior to peace.

As we shall see, poverty is no longer a substantive issue on the national agenda. Instead, identity politics has gained the attention of voters in various parts of the country. The major initiative in the direction of what can be billed as a pro-poor policy was the Devolution Plan 2000, followed by elections for local government institutions at the district and sub-district levels in 2001 and 2005. Devolution generated a lot of interest and funds from the donor community as well as an active response from the public. However, in practice the government's strategy sought to undercut political parties, manipulate parliamentary elections with the help of local government officials and create a constituency for the Musharraf government through the selective allocation of development funds. Devolution did not enjoy the support of political stakeholders, leading eventually to its marginalization and the selective elimination, of the devolution framework after the 2008 elections.

Since the terms religion, governance and development play a pivotal role in this study, we need to define them and put them in perspective in order to bring out their explanatory potential. For the purposes of the present study, religion is understood as a transcendental force which operates in Pakistan as a political ideology. It has drawn on the public space provided initially by the partition of India and subsequently by the rise of political Islam in the Muslim world. Following a constructivist



approach, religion is understood as being constitutive of public and private behaviour, providing both scope for voluntary action and a formalized discourse.

We look at governance essentially in terms of the enhanced interest of the donor community in establishing a roadmap to good governance as a normative ideal in the 1990s, beyond the mere fact of governance in terms of the authoritative management of given policies and personnel. The normative agenda points to:

- i) Optimal use of available human, financial and organizational resources for delivering services at the grassroots level;
- ii) Judicious allocation of resources to various sectors of social life;
- iii) Institutional potential for conflict management; and
- iv) Public policy to improve the situation of the bottom layer of the society including the poor, women and minorities.

For the purposes of this study, development is defined as broad improvement in individual and collective patterns of life, including freedom from want; social harmony across ethnic, linguistic, tribal and religio-sectarian divisions; peace and stability as a prerequisite for all kinds of productive activity and economic growth; equal opportunities and distributive justice; and the moral and material welfare of the society in general.

## 2 Setting the analytical context

In this section, important analytical and contextual features are first identified and discussed. Second, the purpose and focus of the case study of NWFP are outlined.

Ishtiaq Ahmad identifies four ideological orientations in Pakistan to capture the spectrum of opinion covering major aspects of the politics of Islam: a sacred state excluding human will; a sacred state admitting human will; a secular state admitting divine will; and secular state excluding divine will (I. Ahmed, 1985, p 31-45). While all these orientations have persisted during the last six decades, there has been a shift in influence and popularity from the fourth model of a secular state excluding divine will to the first model of a sacred state excluding human will. For those with the latter ideological orientation, adult suffrage is repugnant to Islam, as is the whole gamut of government in Pakistan. The second model seeks adjustment, even cohabitation, between modernism and secularism on the one hand and theocracy on the other. The third model is based on separation between religion and the state. However, it seeks to bring in the spirit of consultative democracy derived from classical Islam, and in its populist version, developed an idea of Islamic socialism, somewhat akin to social democracy in European political thought and practice. The intellectual spokesman of the fourth model claimed that Jinnah was secular and that Zia's Islamization was an attempt to resurrect the past, which in his view would lead to bigotry and suppression of the spirit of free enquiry (Munir, 1980, p. 36).

Islamic intellectuals have variously maintained that the Amir (president) should preside over the legislature but not be bound by its decisions, because he executes God's will and thus commands unreserved allegiance of the people; sovereignty lies with God and thus the state can neither alter nor set aside divine law; elections to the consultative body ('house of belief') for Muslims should be based on constituencies based in mosques, and for others in their places of worship; parliament (*Shura*) is a consultative body for the Amir, to be nominated by a wider body not elected by the public at large; the electorate should be comprised of 'people of opinion', well-behaved persons, not the common people, and therefore the concept of a majority is redundant in the absence of the right of every adult person to vote; 'self-candidacy' is forbidden in Islam; political parties are un-Islamic for some because they divide the *Umma*, but admissible for others if they are subject to moral guidance; only a male can be the head of state, or a member of the *Shura*; and members of religious minorities are barred from the office of Amir (M.D. Ahmed, 1985).

Throughout the post-independence period, the ruling elite grappled with the *ulema*'s demand that law be based on Sharia. For the purpose of constitution-making, the compromise took the form of an agreement that un-Islamic laws would be taken off the statute book while the legal-institutional apparatus of the state continued to be based on English common law (Fazlurrehman, 1985). The more the level of accommodation on the part of the ruling establishment, for example under Zia, the more the Islamic legal-judicial structures were allowed to function in parallel to the mainstream law and courts. The state vacillated from partial agreement to disagreement with the *ulema*. For example, the 1960 Family Ordinance, which sought to restrain men from arbitrarily divorcing women and from polygamy, has been condemned as un-Islamic by the *ulema* for the last half century. They represent not only a steady constituency opposing birth control, but also a mechanism for disallowing the government's family planning programmes. At the other extreme, the most controversial Islamic legislation, which has been opposed for nearly three decades by liberal and progressive forces within Pakistan and elsewhere, has been the 1979 Hudood Ordinances, which will be discussed further below. We shall see how women activists, as well as the Women's Commission of Pakistan, demanded repeal of these Ordinances and how successive governments have balked at this for fear of a backlash from the *ulema*. The latter have shown an increasing potential to weld their followers together on these and other issues, thus cultivating 'bonding' social capital at the expense of 'bridging' social capital operating across the lines of faiths and sects. Over time, religious orders, parties and groups have assumed the character of a counter-state in the form of an emergent, though amorphous, Islamic establishment. This has developed a structural presence of its own, along with multiple links with the state that are characterised by patronage, parallelism, but also hostility with respect to different issues in different phases of Pakistan's history.

Often the unit of analysis for the growth and proliferation of religious activity is confined to the nation-state. However, as noted above, in Pakistan and elsewhere in the Muslim world, the emerging global dichotomy between Islam and the West has comprehensively shaped political attitudes along pan-Islamic lines. These attitudes have been defined by regional conflicts, for example in Palestine, Bosnia, Kosovo, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq, where Muslims have been widely perceived to be the victims of aggression. These conflicts are understood from the unique perspective that Islam is a mini-world operating in the larger world. There is no comparable Christian world combining the UK, France and Germany with Ethiopia, the Philippines and Chile, for example, or a Buddhist or Hindu

world operating in quite the same way. Thus, 52 Muslim countries, historical Muslim minorities in the Balkans, Russia, China and India and Muslim expatriates in the West are frequently mobilised for 'Muslim causes'. The war against the Taliban in Afghanistan after 9/11 has led to anti-Americanism everywhere in the Muslim world, especially among the Pakhtuns who gave birth to the Taliban. In Pakistan, it resulted in a strong electoral performance of the Islamic political parties in 2002 and to the establishment of government controlled by them in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). The present study analyses this phenomenon in detail, especially with respect to how it has contributed to the emergence of the two essentialisms and mega-constructs – 'Islam' and 'the (secular) West', and also because this reactive Islamism has engendered mistrust of the international donor and diplomatic communities and those perceived to be their allies in Pakistan.

This research reinforces the common finding that lived Islam is very different from the reified picture of that religion (Ahmed and Reifeld, 2004). Lived Islam incorporates pre-conversion beliefs and syncretic values and norms developed over centuries following conversion and expressed through Sufism and social structures such as caste. Moreover, the overarching context that impinges on religious beliefs and practices in contemporary Pakistan is secular. Here, Islamism operates within legal, institutional, bureaucratic, judicial, educational and developmental frameworks that are comprehensively and fundamentally characterized by secularism. The banking sector is predominantly secular, contrary to the express prohibition of interest in Sharia. Pakistan as a legatee of British colonial rule was part of the global process of Westernization of non-Western societies (Darling, 1979). In this context, Islamists have provided a counter narrative to the secular legal and ideological discourse of the state. We shall argue that religion has thrived in Pakistan essentially because of intra-elite conflict, whereby the state elite, especially the officer cadre of the army, has increasingly relied on divine sources of legitimacy to thwart populist challenges. It can be also be argued that the administrative units inherited from British India, such as provinces and districts, are based on village and tribal communities. In this local context, the term 'faith community' does not meaningfully reflect the national and international dimensions of the Islamic phenomenon. As opposed to concepts like 'the Muslim community in Birmingham' or 'the Jewish community in New York', in which groups are sometimes but not always identified with places of worship in the locality, Pakistan, like any other territorial state, is essentially a political rather than a religious entity. Nevertheless, as we shall see, the operational dynamics of the Islamic establishment in Pakistan cannot be understood without reference to the state.

It is difficult to understand the patterns of influence of Islamic parties and groups without reference to their links with other groups and communities from the conservative sections of the educated and professional middle class, as well as business. The religious right has often joined hands with the 'moral right' and the 'money right' to reinforce the status quo orientation of the state system. Thus the Islamist parties and the state establishment have typically shared an abhorrence of both ethnic and leftist politics and have upheld nationalism in its various modes, ranging from Muslim separatism in British India to nuclear deterrence against India in the 1990s and 2000s. The government's premier intelligence agency, ISI, has been credited with both mobilizing pro-jihad<sup>3</sup> sentiments against the backdrop of guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan and Kashmir and helping Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) since the 2002 elections<sup>4</sup>. While the MMA's election manifesto in 2002 focused on Sharia, anti-Americanism and *jihad*, it also called for increasing educational and health facilities and pro-poor policies, thereby reflecting an idiom shared by other political parties. In the end, the thinking in Islamabad and eventually in Washington was that formation of the MMA government in NWFP through an understanding with Musharraf on constitutional and foreign policy issues was the best strategy for co-option of the ascendant Islamic forces. The idea was that *mulla* (Muslim cleric) in was better than *mulla* out, the latter option being fraught with risks of anti-government agitation.

The MMA government in NWFP (2002-2007) provides a good case study of the governance-related issues of the allocation of resources and regulation of authority under the auspices of religion, given the ambiguity of the position and authority of the provincial government under a military-led government in Islamabad. Four major aspects of governance will be highlighted in this regard: devolution, pro-poor policies, women's empowerment and systemic inefficiencies.

The textbook approach to devolution has often led to idealization of measures leading to the decentralization of state authority in the name of taking government to the doorstep of the people. In reality in Pakistan, as will be explained below, it amounted to mere de-concentration of the administrative machinery, while the level of societal input into policy, especially by the underprivileged sections of the population, remained insignificant. In Pakistan, local government institutions have flourished only under the military rulers Ayub, Zia and Musharraf during the 1960s, 1980s and 2000s respectively. Nevertheless, the diplomatic and donor communities generally responded positively, with moral and financial support for devolution by way of providing expertise, training and infrastructural support.

Devolution needs to be contextualized within any political system. Contrary to its professed objectives, the real aim of devolution in Pakistan was to undermine the power base of political parties at the constituency level. The non-party elections for local bodies in 2001 and 2005 challenged the party base of elections for national and provincial assemblies by way of raising a cadre of elected officials at the district and sub-district levels, parallel and superior to the local party cadres and workers. After every local government election, power shifted away from the vassals and agents of political parties to the district and union councillors. The flow of development funds from the government to councillors, especially the newly-elected district officers called *nazims* from 2001 onwards, largely at the expense of provincial governments, turned political parties against devolution. Additionally, the 2005 elections for local bodies were rendered controversial by allegations of massive rigging. The indirect elections for district councils rendered them relatively less representative of the general public than directly elected provincial governments. The MMA government considered district *nazims* as their rivals from the moment it took over. It regarded them as Musharraf's constituency, which had the potential to challenge and undermine the MMA's authority because of their access to financial and administrative resources far beyond the capacity of the provincial government. In this report, we shall have the occasion to discuss the thorny issue of lack of trust and communication between the MMA government in NWFP and the local bodies that relied heavily on the central government for both their funds and legal and institutional protection.

Secondly, pro-poor policies based on commitments to the electorate about the re-allocation of resources across the social strata were not on the agenda of the MMA during the 2002 elections, in which their campaign was oriented essentially to the establishment of Sharia in the country, and only secondarily and indirectly to uplifting the poor. During its 5-year rule, the MMA government's focus remained on patronage rather than policy, in the form of allocation of resources to selected constituencies of cabinet ministers and party stalwarts. This comes out clearly from the comparative analysis of three districts, Peshawar, Dir and Bannu, which is presented in Section 5.3, where patronage and the preference given to underdeveloped regions served the political requirement of securing and expanding the MMA's electoral constituency. Thus it will be argued that the MMA government operated without a sustained, ideologically motivated and policy-oriented approach to the alleviation of poverty.

Thirdly, the women's issue has continued to be more complicated and in the end more depressing than the issue of poverty because of the MMA's continuing prejudice against the alleged Western agenda of women's empowerment. While it projected a commitment to female education and health, and struggled to draw funds from the World Bank, DFID and the Asian Development Bank on that basis, the outcome, as will be seen, remained far from satisfactory. This report brings out the ways in which the MMA government sought to discredit and marginalize donor-funded NGOs in general and women's NGOs in particular. While it claimed to uphold women's rights, these were typically understood in terms of women's physical protection from men, ensuring their basic ability to read and write, and provisions for health relating to pregnancy, delivery and childcare. The passage of the 2006 Hasba Act by the NWFP government in pursuit of its project of policing of public and private morality and its condemnation of the Women's Protection Act passed by the National Assembly on the following day were significant landmarks in the MMA's pursuit of governance on women-related issues.

Finally, this report deals with the contribution of the MMA government to improvement with respect to systemic inefficiencies. It focuses on the potential for change in terms of public access to justice, the corruption-accountability nexus and administrative reforms concerning service delivery. Our findings point to a lack of initiative on all these counts. For one thing, the policy scope of the provincial government was limited, given the centralization of bureaucracy, fiscal management and revenue raising authority. Moreover, the laws and courts, and the monopoly of lawyers and judges over knowledge relating to the justice system, compounded by the rampant illiteracy of the public, even in its own language, kept access to justice as difficult as ever. The MMA cultivated a general preference for resurrecting pre-colonial dispute-settling mechanisms such as *Jirga* (a body of tribal elders). However, it had no legal muscle, intellectual potential nor indeed an institutional framework compatible with the modern bureaucratic apparatus of the state to enable it to restore *Jirga* as part of the adjudication machinery of the state.

### 3 Islam and politics: a qualitative assessment

In Pakistan, the relationship between Islam and the state has been inconsistent and far from well-defined. The creation of Pakistan did not adequately address the place of religion in the political system. The academic literature dealing with the relationship between religion and the state provides broad chronological brush-strokes that trace the ways in which this relationship has evolved. Two distinct perspectives are apparent.

The first is a purely functional, almost instrumentalist, interpretation. It claims that the state, dominated by the military-bureaucratic oligarchy, has had either a 'reactive' or a 'strategic' end in mind when it has used Islam to pursue its agenda on both the domestic and foreign policy fronts (Nasr, 2001, p. 24-5). In the face of a persistent crisis of legitimacy, it argues, the state has typically turned to Islam. It has sought to encounter rising ethnic tensions through greater reliance on religion, especially its perceived and projected message of the unity of the Muslim community, the obligation of Muslims to obey their ruler and the moral duty of the state to take care of its citizens. In addition, the state has used Islam to outmanoeuvre opposition from ulema by co-opting them into the process of defining the role of Islam in society. During the 1980s, moreover, the army turned Islam into an instrument of foreign policy against the backdrop of war in Afghanistan. For example, it established a number of *madrasas* to produce *mujahideen* (guerrilla fighters) and used the idiom of *jihad* to mobilize the latter and attract financial, moral and diplomatic support from the Muslim world. However, critics argue that a functional explanation of the religion-state nexus does not explain why the state has had no choice but to resort to Islam as its only strategy to resolve the crises it faces.

Instead, it is suggested that the relationship between religion and the state needs to be analysed through a structural lens, embedding the analysis in a historical context. Pakistan's colonial past, it is argued, has determined the nature of the state and its institutions. It had a strong bearing on the way relations between the state and society were structured after partition. When studying the political uses of Islam as a mobilizing or unifying force, therefore, one needs to take into account how, according to Nasr, the "large swaths of colonial ideology of state have been replaced with Islamic ideology" (Nasr, 2001, p. 27). In Jamal Malik's view, "Islamic ideology formed under the rule of British law as a reaction was then spread by Islamization to areas untouched by colonial society" (Malik, 1996, p. 15-17).<sup>5</sup> The structural view of the religion-state nexus places a functional interpretation within a historical context. The functional and structural views complement each other because, in the longer



term perspective, the state's use of Islam has become a practice that is now structurally embedded in its institutions, social relations and discourse about national identity. In practice, the use of Islam has been 'role-specific' in the way political leaders have carefully selected certain aspects to meet their political objectives (Waseem, 1994, pp 388-389), with each attempt at Islamization paving the way for the next round by another political leader.

The state in Pakistan has been ruled by an elite immersed in an essentially secular legal and institutional framework of political legitimacy and public morality. It has preferred to manage Islam directly, rather than allowing religious organisations to be the sole guardians of faith. Selective Islamization was intended to create circumstances under which the state elite could deal with the problems of a weak, multi-ethnic society that lacked national integration. The Islamization efforts represent a "culmination of a gradual increase in Muslim consciousness" from the Pakistan movement onwards (Richter, 1987). While John Esposito (1996, p 122) and Mumtaz Ahmad (1997) recognize that there is a general consensus about the importance of Islam for a Muslim country, they argue that Islamization has not been able to bring national integration to disparate ethnic groups. In fact, it has worsened the situation by triggering sectarian conflict, inasmuch as Islamization was Sunni-based. Many would also argue that Islamization has not been about implementing Sharia. Instead, as Hassan Abbas maintains, it reinforced authoritarianism by bringing together "Allah, America and Army" on one side of the political spectrum (Abbas, 2005). Zahid Hussain points to an unholy alliance between Islamic militants and the military (Hussain, 2007). Hussain Haqqani notes a "mosque-military nexus," which has used Islam to serve the nation-building project while maintaining the military's dominance in the formation of domestic and foreign policy (Haqqani, 2005). In the process, the state has inadvertently given Islamist political parties, fundamentalist groups and other Islamic actors the room to increase their political clout and develop grassroots support networks by actively endorsing Islam as the prevailing norm in the society. By encouraging religious groups to play an active role in the political process during the 1980s, Zia hoped to co-opt them and establish control over their large constituency, so as to increase his own legitimacy to rule. He provided a lot of space to Islamists in a non-democratic and non-party set-up, using them to extend the *madrassa* network for *jihad* in Afghanistan and Kashmir. As the Islamic establishment has emerged as a formidable presence parallel to the state, it has become increasingly powerful.

The story of religion and politics in Pakistan thus has a temporal dimension inasmuch as the ideological basis of the state has changed periodically in line with generational transitions. The independence generation of Pakistan's political leadership was pro-Western, liberal and secular in its approach to politics. The second generation of political leaders in the late 1970s and 1980s sought to draw on Islamic sources of inspiration for consolidating the rule of the army as opposed to the rule of public representatives. 9/11 and the 'war against terror' pushed large segments of society, especially in the Pakhtun belt of NWFP and Baluchistan, back to primordial loyalties and identities. In 2007-8, the proto-Taliban movement in FATA, Malakand and Swat sought to implement Sharia law, thereby confronting the state head on.

The following overview of events that have shaped the religion-state nexus in Pakistan over the last 60 years serves to:

- 1) reveal the diverse and often contentious uses of Islam by the state elite;
- 2) highlight the debates between the religious right on the one hand and those that have drawn upon the legal-institutional framework of the postcolonial state as the ultimate source of legitimacy on the other; and
- 3) demonstrate how the issue of religion in politics is both enduring and unresolved.

First, the transition from colonial status and its implications for independent Pakistan are outlined. In Section 3.2, the period up to the 1971 split into Pakistan and Bangladesh is discussed, followed by an analysis of Pakistan's subsequent political evolution. Finally, in Section 3.4, the increased significance of Islamist and sectarian interests in the light of developments in and near Pakistan's border regions is outlined.

### **3.1 From colonialism to independent statehood**

The colonial experience of the Indian subcontinent formed the essential characteristics of the future state of Pakistan in general and its relations with Islam and society in particular. The British rule endowed north-west India, the area that later became (West) Pakistan, "with machinery of government, along with relations of patronage and powerful social organizations that were the vestiges of indirect rule" (Nasr, 2001, p 41). The colonial government relied on managing social divisions vertically between the masses and elite, and horizontally between ethnic and linguistic groups.

Colonial thinking, based on the idea of the ‘white man’s burden’, led to a paternalistic attitude towards people (Talbot, 1998; Waseem, 1994, p 51-9). In mapping out the society along the lines of tribe, race, language and ethnic identity, the British privileged cultural values for administrative and political purposes. This facilitated social control, but entrenched an internally fractured social structure that would confound state formation in Pakistan after partition (Nasr, 2001, p 42-3; see also Waseem, 1994, p 43).

One of the key instruments of the British rule was law (Waseem, 1994, p 48-51). The British legal system made everyone equal before the law. However, it indirectly consolidated group identity by reinforcing personal law premised on traditional, tribal and customary law. This had the effect of reifying identities that would later make claims on the Pakistani state. By lending the state’s authority to Muslim personal law in a modern legal setting, the British confirmed a place for it in the colonial order that was subservient to British laws (Nasr, 2001, p 43). The ulema were left out of this arrangement because their role as interpreters of faith could not be reconciled with the British law.<sup>6</sup> Colonial rule thus spurred Islamic movements whereby ulema have sought to preserve the role of Islam in the society by reviving faith and its claims on social and political life. They sought to create Sharia-based realms and spaces, such as the seminary at Deoband and political parties such as Jamiat Ulema Hind (JUH) and Jamaat-i-Islami (JI).<sup>7</sup> They also articulated Islam as a source of unity for the Muslim community, in contrast to colonial rule which thrived on social differences in Indian society (Nasr, 1994, p 44).

In British colonial India, with the exception of Uttar Pradesh (UP), Muslims everywhere lagged behind Hindus in education, commerce, political organization and leadership. Muslims considered British education, laws and norms an imposition. In contrast, Hindus learnt English and overtook Muslims in public offices. Muslim fears and suspicions were exacerbated when the British revoked the partition of Bengal in 1911. In addition, the British had conceded separate electorates to Muslims in 1909, allegedly to divide the electorate and disrupt the growing Indian nationalist movement. Hindus and Muslims competed with each other for jobs and economic gains. The British policy “oscillated between two points – concession to Hindu demands and support of Muslim interests” (Nasr, 1994, p 7). Pakistan is the culmination of Muslim separatism represented through the ideological expression of the Two-Nation theory, as it developed in almost a hundred years after 1857 (Ahmad, 1968).<sup>8</sup> The

formation of the Muslim League in 1906 was followed by efforts to create bridges between disparate Muslim communities by raising the banner of Islam that would transcend local and cultural differences on way to emergence of the Muslim nationalist movement.

There are two major explanations about the origins of Pakistan. First, Pakistanis generally believe that their state was the “final fulfilment of a clear, uninterrupted and separate stream of Muslim political consciousness”.<sup>9</sup> This view typically grapples with the question of whether Pakistan was created to fulfil the religious aspirations of Indian Muslims or whether it reflected the interest-based identity of the Muslim elite, which was grounded in economic considerations (Brass, 1974; Hardy, 1974).<sup>10</sup> The second explanation is that the creation of Pakistan can be attributed to the British policy of ‘divide and rule’. The Indian political and intellectual elite and the public at large typically adhered to a conspiracy theory about the creation of Pakistan. Since the movement for Pakistan was projected through social, cultural and religious distinctions between Muslims and Hindus, one might expect Muslim religious groups and individuals to have played a leading role in mobilizing the Muslim masses. Ironically, major Islamic organizations were bitterly opposed to Jinnah, the Muslim League and the demand for Pakistan because, in their view, the Western-educated leaders of the Pakistan movement were generally committed to the secular dynamics of politics. Hoodbhoy and Nayyar point out that the Muslim nationalists had to fight on three fronts. They had to persuade the British of their separate identity, convince the Congress of their determination to live as two separate nations and nullify the efforts of those *ulema* who opposed Pakistan on the ground that nationalism was antithetical to Islam (Hoodbhoy and Nayyar, 1985, p 171).

Hamza Alavi argues that the Pakistan movement was a movement of Muslims rather than Islam.

“It was not a millenarian movement seeking a divinely ordained political and social system. Rather, it was movement in which diverse Muslim ethnic groups from different regions of India, representing different social strata and interests at the centre of whom were the emerging Muslim *salarial*, allied in the pursuit of material objectives. The alliance as it was did not include all Muslims of India at all times. There was no automatic and universal translation of the attribute of Muslim by faith or Muslim by descent to Muslim ethnic identity. Practice of their faith did not bring Muslims together into one unified group” (Alavi, 1987, p 22).

Alavi criticizes scholars who attributed the same aspirations and ideology to all Indian Muslims. In his view, this was not only untrue but was also misleading (1987, p 27), especially in view of the difference in orientation between the Muslim majority and Muslim minority provinces of British India. He identifies various strains of Islamic traditionalism, represented by the Deobandi *ulema* and Barelvi *pirs* (saints); Islamic modernists such as Sir Syed Ahmed Khan and Iqbal; Islamic fundamentalists such as Maududi and the Jamaat-i-Islami; the landlord-dominated right wing political groups such as the Punjab Unionist Party; 'secular' non-communal radicals like the Krishak Proja party in Bengal led by A. K. Fazlul Haq; and 'nationalist' *ulema* belonging to the Congress (Alavi, 1987, p 28). Each of these, he argues, sought to mobilize Indian Muslims and in so doing sowed the seeds of the conflict in Pakistan that later arose between those promoting a constitutional state on the Westminster model and those demanding an Islamic state based on Sharia.

### 3.2 State-building and nation-building, 1947-1971

Initially, questions of national identity were overshadowed by the more basic problem of Pakistan's survival as a weak state, comprising two wings separated by a thousand miles of Indian territory. The five provinces of Pakistan had little in common by way of ethnic identity, linguistic aspirations, administrative traditions, political culture or even a shared history preceding British rule. Jinnah and his successor Liaquat, who had the charismatic appeal to steer the fledgling state out of troubled waters, died shortly after independence. That led to a serious crisis of leadership. Their successors did not possess the "national stature, lacked imagination and were unable to inspire the people, let alone deal with political and economic problems" (Hassan, 2000, p 3). The Muslim League, which had served as a vanguard of the Pakistan movement, failed to transform itself from a "nationalist movement into a national party" (Hassan, 2000, p 3) that could have served as a conduit for the articulation of diverse interests and identities into a democratic framework for politics.

Under these circumstances, the bureaucratic elite gained the upper hand. The appointment of senior bureaucrats Ghulam Muhammad and later Iskander Mirza as governor general and Choudhary Mohammad Ali as prime minister led to concentration of state power in the hands of extra-parliamentary forces. The latter patronized the feudal, industrial and commercial elite as instruments of their rule. This state of politics in Pakistan points to diarchy, comprising two constellations of interests, each with strong presumptions about what the Pakistani state should look like (Waseem,

1992). One grouping comprised the 'state elite', an oligarchy formed by the bureaucracy and the military officer corps, which had been in control of the levers of power since the days of British India.<sup>11</sup> K. B. Sayeed described it as the vice-regal tradition that emphasized the requirements of law and order far more than popular representation (Sayeed, 1968). The crisis of state-building following the chaos of partition put the administrative institutions in a commanding position. The Pakistan army, which was initially the junior partner in the military-bureaucratic oligarchy, emerged as the dominant partner in the institutional alliance after the 1958 coup. The second grouping consisted of political parties and leaders who represented broader social and economic interests in the society. For the most part, political parties in Pakistan have put forth an alternative source of political legitimacy rooted in the mass mandate. As opposed to the vice-regal system, politicians were trained in accordance with the Westminster model, which shaped their aspirations for parliamentary democracy as the right form of government for Pakistan. Philip Jones adds a third grouping, the *ulema*, the clerical scholars of the Sunni tradition, as the ideological dimension of the new state system (Jones, 2003).

While the ruling elite presided over the vice-regal state, it lacked constitutional legitimacy and therefore moral credibility. The endemic conflict between the state and political elites prevented the state from successfully pursuing development objectives and alleviating the problems of the inequitable distribution of resources across classes and regions. Almost by default, the state turned towards Islam to resolve the problems that were rooted in the mal-distribution of power between the state apparatuses of the army and the bureaucracy and political institutions such as parties and elected assemblies. Deep-seated ethnic divisions also posed a vehement problem for the project of national integration. Muslim identity within the framework of composite Indian nationalism had outlived its purpose after partition. Alavi argues that the Muslim salariat now redefined itself according to ethnic identities – a Punjabi and Mohajir elite salariat and under-privileged Bengali, Sindhi, Pathan and Baluch salariats (Alavi, 1987, p 43).<sup>12</sup> Esposito maintains that Islam had given birth to Pakistan, thus providing the ideological basis for a state that lacked any of the traditional prerequisites of a nation-state – territorial integrity, nationhood and linguistic unity (1987, p 335). The leadership first resisted the idea of giving Islam a central role in national politics but then gave in to the temptation of using Islamic symbols for the project of state formation. This provided space for religious activism, inspiring and enabling Islamic political parties to advocate an Islamic state based on Sharia.

In 1949, as Afzal Iqbal argues, the conception of Pakistan as a secular state for Muslims was compromised when the government adopted the Objectives Resolution (1984, p 42-58). The resolution envisaged an Islamic democratic state in which the powers and authority of the state would be exercisable through elected representatives of the people. The Islamic clauses in the resolution required observance of the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and justice, as enunciated by Islam in accordance with the teachings of the Holy Quran and Sunnah. Standing alone, the Objectives Resolution could well be the constitutional plan for a secular state, but it also introduced Islamic concerns into constitutional debates and committed Pakistan to greater Islamization (Iqbal, 1984, p 896). Nonetheless, what was actually meant by a modern Islamic state or the way its commitment to Islamic principles would inform the ideology of state institutions remained unclear (Zaman, 2004, p 87-93). While the state accepted a place for Islam in politics, it was unwilling to abandon its own legal-institutional framework, which was underscored by secularism, or permit any Islamization that was outside the purview of its own authority. This confusion was evident throughout the conflict that ensued between the religious and modernist elites in the nine-year long process of framing the first constitution of Pakistan. To appease the expectations of Islamists, the 1956 Constitution incorporated several Islamic clauses. Thus, the state was called the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; it was said to be a democratic state based on Islamic principles; the head of state was to be a Muslim; there would be an Islamic Research Centre to help reconstruct an Islamic society; and no law was to be enacted if it was contrary to the Quran and Sunnah (Esposito, 1987, p 336).<sup>13</sup> It was a document that skirted round the question of the Islamic character of the state by including no systematic statement on its formative principles. The relationship between modern constitutional concepts and Islamic principles was asserted but not delineated.

Indeed, Jinnah had made it clear after partition that, in a political sense, “Muslims ceased to be Muslims and Hindus ceased to be Hindus” (Jinnah, n.d., p. 9). He gave assurance to all minorities (Hindus, Christians and others) that religion would not be exploited in the new nation. However, the 1949 Objectives Resolution created a lot of misgivings on the part of religious minorities, who interpreted it as an encroachment of religion into the secular institutions of the state. The evolving constitutional thinking treated Muslims as a privileged majority and afforded minorities mere ‘protection’. The anti-Ahmadiya riots in 1953 and the demand for the Ahmadi sect to be declared non-Muslim did not help to alleviate the misgivings of minorities (Pande, 2005, p 163-92; Rais, 2005). The

subsequent Munir Report (1954) revealed many of the problems associated with the definition and implementation of a Muslim identity. For example, it found that no two *ulema* could agree on any one definition of a Muslim or on what the true character of an Islamic state should be.

This ideological quandary was further exacerbated by Ayub Khan (1958-1969), who was avowedly modernist and who justified his military coup as an effort to save the country from an Islamic takeover. The 1962 Constitution reflected his modernist outlook. The establishment of the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) and the Islamic Research Institute (IRI) was seen as a challenge to the traditional role of *ulema* as guardians of Islam. The 1960 Muslim Family Ordinance, which sought to reform the prevalent customs relating to divorce, marriage and inheritance in a bid to improve the conditions of women, was seen by *ulema* as overtly secular and antithetical to Sharia.<sup>14</sup> Similarly, this constitution initially omitted the word Islamic from the official name of the country (Esposito, 1987, p 336-8).

Ayub Khan tried to adopt a clear policy towards Islam. His agenda for state reconstruction replaced Islam with development as the glue to hold Pakistan together, although an Islamic backlash compelled him to tone down his secular rhetoric. His regime sought to manage the challenge of Islam by harnessing its energies for state-building. Central to Ayub's efforts was the appropriation of the right to interpret Islam and thus reduce the influence of *ulema* in politics. The West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance of 1959 led to the state's takeover of Islamic endowments and institutions such as mosques and religious shrines in a bid to organize the welfare services associated with them (Ahmad, 1997, p 105; Esposito, 1987, p 62). Thus, Ayub was able to shape the message propagated through these institutions to expand the developmental agenda. The success of his policies depended on two conditions: articulation and dissemination of his interpretation of Islam and effective marginalization of the *ulema*. However, neither of these conditions was met. The Islamic credentials of what was a secular state system were unconvincing in the presence of *ulema* as doctors of theology. It was obvious that the state was seeking to manipulate the ideological force of Islam, and that it had neither the authority nor the intention to promote Islamic principles.



### 3.3 From populism to praetorianism

The creation of Bangladesh not only led to a transfer of power from a discredited military regime to the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), but also resulted in a renewed concern with national identity. The religious political parties perceived the breakup of Pakistan as a result of the regime's lack of commitment to Islam (Hussain, 1994, p 52). Z. A. Bhutto, who rose to power as the elected leader of present-day Pakistan in a mini-coup after the debacle at Dhaka in December 1971, conceded the Islamic character of the new state. The 1973 Constitution selectively accommodated the demands of Islamic parties, which had emerged as the major opposition bloc in the National Assembly after the emergence of Bangladesh. Bhutto had been condemned by Islamic parties and groups during the 1970 elections as an infidel, atheist and agent of communist China. Yahya Khan's military establishment (1969-71) had allegedly supported Islamic parties in their drive to declare Islamic socialism, the intellectual basis of PPP, as anti-Islamic and Bhutto as the greatest enemy of Islam. Bhutto took a number of measures to appease, yet simultaneously undercut, the powerful Islamic interest groups in the country. Between 1973 and 1976, he changed the name of the Red Cross to the Red Crescent, thus Islamizing a humanitarian organization, established a ministry of religious affairs and removed the quota restriction for those who wanted to go for *Hajj* (Hussain, 1994, p 52-3). Bhutto sought to reinterpret Islam to serve the needs of populism and mass politics. When Islamic groups launched the second anti-Ahmadiya movement in 1974 to declare Ahmadis outside the pale of Islam, Bhutto conceded by passing the Second Amendment to the constitution, even though Ahmadis had professedly supported PPP in 1970. He also organized the second Islamic Summit Conference in Lahore in 1974, which facilitated Pakistan's export of manpower to the Middle East and return flows of remittances, as well as increasing aid from oil-rich Muslim countries. In addition, he initiated the development of Pakistan's nuclear programme, which some regarded as a way of developing an "Islamic bomb" (Malik, 1972).

The Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), an electoral alliance of nine parties, led a massive agitation against the alleged rigging of the 1977 elections and advocated the implementation of Nizam-i-Mustafa (Prophet's system). Bhutto was pressured into adopting a series of Islamic measures, such as a ban on alcohol and gambling, closing down of casinos and nightclubs, and commitment to Islamization of both civil and criminal laws. PNA, led by the Islamic opposition, was not ready to be taken in by the symbolic nature of the measures adopted by Bhutto, which were allegedly designed to appease them.

However, although the state elite and political leadership had come to accept the role of Islam in national politics, constitutional debate, political disputes and social conflicts, it did not countenance the prospects of incorporating Islamic practices into public policies, which kept alive the struggle between the religious right and the secular modernists about the ideological nature of the state.

Islamic political parties represented an interesting, even controversial, trajectory of the political discourse. Many among them had opposed the very idea of a separate Muslim homeland. But once Pakistan was created, they saw an opportunity to fulfil their vision of an Islamic state. The parties included the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Jamaat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI), Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP), Jamiat Ahle Hadith (JAH) and the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqah-i-Jafria (TNFJ). JI operated through colleges and universities, professional associations and trade unions, and print and electronic media. However, the others were professedly sectarian, operating through mosques and *madrasas*, and effectively employing ideological and political resources to uphold the Islamic basis of Pakistan's statehood.

When Zia came to power in 1977 in a military coup and proclaimed the establishment of a social order based on Nizam-i-Mustafa, he was hailed as a welcome change by the Islamic parties, which he later co-opted into his government. Acceptance of the military regime's Islamic credentials by Islamists was intended to enable them to utilize the state machinery for their own ends. Nevertheless, despite his personal piety and demeanour, Zia was very much part of the ruling oligarchy. He was willing to accede to Islamic demands so long as these did not undermine the structural base of his political power. As a "soldier of Islam", Zia consistently used Islamic symbols to legitimize the grip of the military on political power (Daechsel, 1997).

Zia's Islamization drive contemplated significant and ambitious reforms in public institutions. Changes in the economic sphere included the establishment of Islamic banks, provision for the abolition of interest (*riba*), mandatory collection of social welfare tax (*zakat*) from Sunni bank-holdings, an Islamic land tax (*ushr*) and various research institutions to study Islamic economics (Clark, 1987). Educational reforms included the establishment of the International Islamic University and Sharia Training Institute, enhancement of the importance of Arabic in the curriculum, and an increase in the Islamic content of textbooks. Social reforms stressed the sanctity of Ramadan, enforced pre-existing bans on drinking alcohol and gambling, and obliged women to wear the *chaddar*, and use little or no make up in

government offices, on the television screen and in other workplaces (Kennedy, 1996, p. 34). Legal reforms included the establishment of the Federal Sharia Court, parallel to the existing legal structures (Esposito, 1987, p. 349-50). Procedural reforms included redrafting of the Law of Evidence, whereby a woman's testimony was reduced to one-half the value of a man's testimony. This led to serious opposition from women activists, with the effect that the final draft was significantly different from the original Ordinance (Kennedy, 1996, p. 39-41). Finally, four new ordinances known collectively as the Hudood Ordinances were introduced, despite being opposed by the liberal intelligentsia, progressive forces on the left of the centre and activists from women and minority communities.

Zia underscored Islamic policies in the economic, political and administrative fields with an overarching cultural framework that was professedly religious. He preferred not to wear Western dress in public and instead opted for *shalwar kameez*. Most of his press conferences and public appearances started with a recitation from the Holy Quran. Cultural activity in all educational institutions was strictly monitored to ensure that it complied with Islamic standards of morality. Friday was officially designated as a holiday instead of Sunday, dancing and music were discouraged, calendars and billboards were increasingly adorned with sayings from the Holy Quran and Sunnah, and public places were renamed after eminent Muslims (Hussain, 1994, p 61). This was soon to lead to a vigilante culture, which in the following quarter of a century gradually took over the streets. It is worth assessing the impact of Zia's Islamization drive in the eyes of his opponents before moving on to the issue of how these reforms sowed the seeds of sectarian strife and eventual radicalization of Islam in Pakistan. Mumtaz Ahmad, for example, found in them a "trivialization of [the] Islamization process", inasmuch as social and political reforms were discounted in favour of personal piety (Ahmad, 1997, p 104). Kennedy lists five arguments of that Zia's modernist opponents used: 1) a human rights argument: that the punishments prescribed in the Hudood Ordinances were cruel and indeed bordered on the barbaric; 2) a reactionary argument: that Zia's policies were going to push Pakistan back into the medieval age; 3) an argument that the policies were undemocratic and designed to provide legitimacy to the military regime; 4) an argument that the Islamization policies were discriminatory towards non-Muslims, as well as non-Sunnis, and thus were anti-minority; and 5) a misogynist argument, that they were against the rights of women (Kennedy, 1996, p. 46).

An important feature of Islamization was the way the state appropriated religious functions, gradually undermining the autonomy of the religious parties and their institutions in order to discourage potential sources of protest and conflict. Second, *ulema* were co-opted into state structures. Imposition of the Islamic taxes, *zakat* and *ushr*, was used to ward off welfare and distributive demands made on the state and to legitimize the inequitable distribution of wealth. Interest-free deposits were used to generate savings in a faltering economy and to establish sources of patronage by giving interest-free loans to political supporters. The rhetoric of an Islamic system was, in addition, a convenient cover for the imposition of censorship, thereby restricting freedom of expression and detaining political opponents. The subsequent emergence of networks among the Islamic parties added to their support base and strength. Islamic revival was, therefore, not about resurgent religiosity on the part of the general public. Instead, the Islamization programme was more about i) giving religious groups an opportunity to be assertive in pursuit of goals set by the state, ii) the state assuming a more direct role in determining the role of religion in public life, and iii) politicization of religion as the ideological foundation of the state.

Islamization exacerbated religious conflict between the Shia and Sunni sects. The introduction of Sunni-based Islamic measures such as *zakat* and *ushr* alienated the Shia community.<sup>15</sup> Conflict over these issues escalated in the form of violence perpetrated by Shia and Sunni activists against each other. Assassinations and attacks on mosques and *imambargahs* claimed hundreds of casualties (Nasr, 2005, p 85). Among the main actors involved on the Sunni side, the Deobandi-oriented Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) stood for strict adherence to Sharia as interpreted through the Hanafi lens. The Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), a militant offshoot of JUI, pursued anti-Shia activities, sometimes joined by Sunni Tehrik and Tehrik-e-Nifaz-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM). Similarly, Jamiat Ahle Hadith (JAH) was heavily inclined towards uncompromising monotheism and rejection of all forms of intercession. It portrayed Shias as heretics. However, the Barelvi<sup>16</sup>-oriented Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP) did not share the views of JUI and JAH about the heretical nature of the Shia sect and volunteered to play the role of arbitrator in the conflict between the two sects. On the Shia side, TNFJ topped the list,<sup>17</sup> followed by its militant offshoots Sipah-e-Muhammad and youth organizations such as the Imamiya Students Organization (ISO). Supported by Iranians, Shia militants were mobilized to settle scores with the SSP.

As opposed to Mumtaz Ahmad's hypothesis about sectarian violence being the consequence of jurisprudential hair-splitting, Nasr explains the rise of sectarian conflict as having its roots in intensification of the regional conflict after the Iranian revolution of 1979, the start of the Afghan war in 1980 and Pakistan's failure to contain the impact of these developments (Nasr, 1994, p 87). Mariam Abou Zahab also points to the regional dimension of sectarian conflict, whereby religious parties were radicalized by foreign influences once they started receiving funds from abroad, money that was used to build mosques and *madarasas* with sectarian affiliations on state land. Thus, a new kind of *maulvi* (religious scholar) appeared, who was 'donor funded', travelled in a Pajero and was accompanied by armed guards (Abou Zahab, 2005, p 115). While not discounting the effects of Islamization or foreign influence, Zaman suggests that sectarianism was a vehicle for the revival of the *ulema's* influence and for its extension in areas where this influence had previously been minimal. According to him, the significance of sectarianism lay in bringing the traditions of an urban, text-based Islam to the rural areas, in the form of aggressive, self-conscious Sunni or Shia Islam (Zaman, 2004, p 715-6).

The leaders of the Iranian revolution were unhappy with Zia for having supported the Shah's regime and for forging a strong alliance between Pakistan and the US during the Afghan war. Even more importantly, Zia's regime was involved in its own programme of Islamization, which led to competition between the Iranian and Pakistani models as a basis for reforming their respective social orders in accordance with Sharia (Nasr, 2001). Islamabad started strengthening Sunni *madrasas*, which grew in number and became notable socio-political institutions with roots in local communities and ties with vested political interests. Much of this effort was undertaken by the ISI. As sectarianism increased, ISI developed organizational ties with militant Sunni networks. In 1988, the government sought to prevent Gilgit from becoming a Shia stronghold. The arrival of SSP in Gilgit paved the way for its offshoot Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA), renamed as Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) in Kashmir, to establish itself in the Northern Areas.<sup>18</sup>

### 3.4 Terrorism and anti-terrorism

The Soviet incursion into Afghanistan gave the military-led government in Pakistan an opportunity to fully exploit religious and ethnic connections with Pakhtuns across the border with Afghanistan, in order to assert itself regionally. It supported *madrasas*, which were provided with financial support from the Saudis. On their part, the Saudis fought their own proxy war against Shia Iran on the soil of

Pakistan, to the backdrop of relations between the *mujahideen* in the tribal belt and Pakistan's military. The availability of sophisticated weaponry on the black market led to what is widely known as a 'Kalashnikov culture' (Nasr, 2005). The Taliban movement emerged in the 1990s from amongst Afghan refugee settlements in Pakistan that had absorbed the influx of refugees from Afghanistan in the 1980s. The Taliban had received training in Deobandi *madrasas* in NWFP and Baluchistan (Jones, 2003). Supported financially by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, the Taliban managed to gain a regional foothold in southern and eastern Afghanistan by 1994. This advance needs to be explained in terms of a Pakistani defence policy focusing on 'strategic depth', the need for a Pakistani protégé in Kabul, ethnic ties with Pakhtuns across the border in Afghanistan and an opening up to post-Soviet Central Asia. The Taliban operated through the extension of *madrasa* networks and relationships with Islamist and fundamentalist parties in Pakistan (Dorronsorro, 2005). Western writers typically refer to *madrasas* as breeding houses for extremism and as *jihad* factories (Dorronsorro, 2005). Christopher Candland, however, argues that instead of viewing *madrasas* in a negative light, their important social function in providing education to those who cannot afford to go to school, thus compensating for the Pakistani state's failure to provide general education, should be acknowledged (Candland, 2006; see also Zaman, 1999).

Gilles Dorronsorro notes that most Islamist parties in Pakistan had little significant electoral success and so tried to mobilize people on emotional issues such as *jihad* in Kashmir and Afghanistan, keeping the Afghan jihad at the top of their agenda both before and after 9/11. JUI consistently supported the Taliban movement. At the other end, JI never fully supported the Taliban and JAH maintained its distance from the Taliban and refused to consider the war in Afghanistan as *jihad*. However, groups such as HUA, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and SSP remained active in the training camps established for the Kashmiri and Afghan *mujahideen* (Dorronsorro, 2005, pp168-170).

9/11 presented a challenge for Islamabad, because it required a new strategy to safeguard Pakistan's national interest, which had previously depended on the rule of the Taliban in Kabul to ensure the country's security on its western borders. It was also an opportunity for Musharraf to consolidate his rule because the American war against the Taliban sidelined the issue of the legitimacy of his government. Musharraf's anti-terrorism policies included an increase in the number of anti-terrorism courts; a crackdown on those *madrasas* that were breeding sectarian violence and *jihadi* training, a ban on radical Islamic groups such as Jaish-e-Muhammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba, moving swiftly

against Al Qaeda personnel by killing or apprehending them, and making an effort to control infiltration of militants across the border with Afghanistan.<sup>19</sup> Many observers questioned Musharraf's sincerity and ability to curtail terrorist activity. For example, while the *jihadi* group Lashkar-e-Taiba was banned as a terrorist organization, its parent organization Dawat-ul Irshad continued to operate without any hindrance (Abbas, 2005). The policy of apprehending and pursuing sectarian and *jihadi* activists was also considered half-hearted. Instead of being tried in Anti-Terrorism Courts, these activists were detained for only three months. Moreover, the government had no way of monitoring if the donations made to *madrasas* actually made their way to the Taliban and Al Qaeda and the *madrasa* reforms, which included registration, state regulation of the curriculum and monitoring of funding, remained without a legal basis (Abbas, 2005, p 25).

Obviously, international pressure rather than a desire for change shifted the support of the military government away from the Taliban, explaining why the Musharraf government was reluctant to fundamentally change its policy in this regard. Second, the military's policy towards Kashmir remained essentially unchanged. While under diplomatic pressure the government put a halt to cross-border infiltration, it allegedly maintained ties with *jihadis* (Ahmed, 2006, pp 129-33). Third, despite the evident threat posed by sectarian groups and religious extremists, the Musharraf government was reluctant to sever ties with them because they had played a useful role in the past by supporting Pakistan's regional agenda. Fourth, the collapse of the public school system led to a burgeoning of *madrasas*, explaining Musharraf's reluctance to clamp down on the religious establishment, which had developed formidable organizational networks and grassroots support by using Islam as a political ideology and receiving funds from external donors in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.

In the discussion so far we have demonstrated the nexus between religion and the state in Pakistan, which led to the emergence of a formidable religious establishment, which operated in four settings: sectarian, educational, iconoclastic and organizational. The sectarian setting is significant for understanding religious violence (Waseem, 2007). Sectarian groups aggressively promoted Shia or Sunni Islam, adversely affecting inter-communal harmony. In the educational setting, *madrasas* have been responsible for encouraging *jihad* as a form of political activism, even though most of them were committed to Islamic learning. Iconoclastic religious groups such as the Tablighi Jamaat and Al-Huda have been devoted to the non-militant activity of proselytizing. Their emphasis is on piety and the

spiritual self-enhancement of individuals rather than on collective political action. It is obvious that these three settings impacted only indirectly on governance or the political system of Pakistan, largely posing problems for administrative or cultural management. The remainder of this report, therefore, concentrates on the religious establishment in its organizational setting. It is argued that Islamic parties have been the major carriers of the Islamic message to the state and society. These parties have operated in mainstream politics by either contesting elections at the national and provincial levels or agitating in the street on specific issues. In Sections 4 and 5, a case-study of the MMA, an alliance of religious parties that directly exercised power in the political system of Pakistan for five years from 2002 to 2007, is presented, with particular reference to the NWFP.



## 4 The Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) in politics and government: national and provincial dynamics

A reversal in Pakistan's pro-Taliban policy, followed by Musharraf's alliance with the Bush administration in its war against terror after 9/11, led 26 religious groups to form the Pak-Afghan Defence Council. From this experience, the religious parties learned the benefits of throwing in their lot together. On 17 June 2001, leaders of the six main Islamic parties decided that they would contest the next elections under a common symbol, and implement the recommendations of the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) from the platform of a six-party electoral alliance known as MMA, comprised of JI, JUI-F, JUI-S, JUP, JUAH and Islami Tehrik Pakistan (ITP) (Khan, 2002). While the MMA did not represent all the voices of political Islam in Pakistan, it emerged as its most authentic voice. Rallying under the election symbol of *kitab* (book), which often reminded the public of the holy book of Islam, in the 2002 elections the MMA won 68 out of 124 seats in the NWFP Assembly and had 61 out of 342 seats in the National Assembly (45 out of the 272 directly elected members) (see Table 1) (Waseem, 2006, p 167, 185).

**Table 1: Party/Alliance positions: National Assembly 2002**

	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Baluch-istan	FATA	Islam-abad	Total*
PML-Q	68	4	4	2			78
MMA	3	6	29	6		1	45
PPP	35	27				1	63
PML-N	14			1			15
MQM		13					13
NA	7	5		1			13
PML-F		4					4
PML-J	2						2
PPP-S			2				2
BNP				1			1
PTI	1						1
PML-Z	1						1
MQM-H		1					1
JWP				1			1
TJ	1						1
PAT	1						1
PKMAP				1			1
Independents	15	1		1	12		29
<b>Total general seats</b>	<b>148</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>272</b>

Source: Compiled from Election Commission of Pakistan Data, Waseem (2006).

\* The National Assembly consists of 342 members, 272 of whom are directly elected, 60 reserved for women and 10 for minorities. Pakistani law requires that at least 20 per cent of the members are women, including 13 who are directly elected.

In NWFP, the MMA was elected to power on the basis of a manifesto that promised wide-ranging Islamic policies. Liberal elements feared that these policies would be detrimental to religious tolerance, freedom of expression and civil rights, and would be equivalent to the Talibanization of Pakistan. An ICG report suggested that the MMA's zeal could potentially encourage "members of component parties to take up arms against US forces in Afghanistan" (International Crisis Group, 2003, p 1). The MMA was in control of the NWFP government for five years. During this period, it was also a partner in the coalition government formed in Baluchistan. At the same time, it was the longest standing opposition in the National Assembly, led by the JUI-F chief. It is important for our present purposes to assess how MMA performed in areas of 'governance' and 'development' as defined earlier. In undertaking this task, the following questions will be addressed:

- 1) What were the respective constituencies of the MMA parties and what did they advocate? Did they benefit or lose out by being part of this alliance?
- 2) How did MMA rise to power? Was this success correctly judged to be 'spectacular' and 'unprecedented'? What did it mean for the future of the religion-state nexus in Pakistan?
- 3) What was the MMA's vision for democracy, constitutionalism and federalism in Pakistan?
- 4) What was the nature of the relationship between the MMA government in NWFP and the Musharraf government? Would it be fair to say that the five-year long MMA government was a manifestation of the military-mullah alliance?
- 5) What were the leading issues that motivated the MMA government's actions? Did it meet the expectations of the voters who elected it? More specifically, was it successful in implementing its Islamization agenda?
- 6) What was the MMA government's strategy and vision for development in NWFP? Did it perform better or worse than previous governments in this sphere?
- 7) Finally, what were the MMA's political goals? Why did it seek to participate in electoral politics and to mobilize public opinion?

In the remainder of this section, the first three of the above questions, which concern the MMA as a political entity, will be examined, before presenting a detailed case study of its government in NWFP in Section 5.

## 4.1 The MMA alliance

Religious differences within the MMA along sectarian and ideological lines were often considered unbridgeable and the MMA itself was referred to as an ‘unnatural’ alliance (International Crisis Group, 2003, p 5). In this section, we shall first discuss how major actors in the MMA interacted with one another, what they stood for and what accounted for their electoral success in 2002 and failure in 2008. As noted above, except for JI, the other parties in MMA were based on the extended *ulema* networks, the leaders of which were religious scholars trained in *madradas*. JUI is a typical *ulema* party, with its middle and top ranks filled by *madrada*-trained theologians. Its organizational hierarchy is determined by seniority in the acquisition of religious education rather than political weight. In contrast, JI is not a party of the *ulema* but a tightly knit organization based on the leadership of people educated in colleges and universities. It communicates with its constituency through written literature, while JUI and JUP rely on the oral tradition (Waseem, 2002, pp 128-34).

The six parties of the MMA represented different sects and sub-sects. JUI-F and JUI-S follow Deoband. *Ulema* in JUP belong to the Barelvi school of thought. While both schools believe in the Sunni Hanafi *fiqh* (jurisprudence), they are fundamentally divided on the role of hereditary saints as intermediaries to communicate with the Prophet in order to seek divine intervention, with the Barelvis supporting intercession and the Deobandis opposing it. JAH is a Wahhabi party that does not ascribe to any school of law, instead strictly adhering to the Prophet’s tradition. The ITP is a breakaway faction of what was formerly known as the TJP. It represents the Shia minority and is primarily motivated by Fiqh Jafria (Shia jurisprudence). JI propagates revivalist doctrines, more orthodox than the Barelvi syncretic doctrines, especially Sufism, but more modernist than the Deobandis in terms of its readiness for innovation (*ijtihad*) in order to meet the requirements of the modern world. JUI dominates the Pakhtun areas of NWFP and Baluchistan. The JUP’s Barelvi strongholds are in Punjab, with a significant presence in Karachi, Hyderabad and urban Sindh in general. JI’s catchment area is mainly the lower middle class from the big cities and enterprising individuals from smaller towns. Its popularity in the rural areas has always been low and it attracts mainly urban, educated, professional and business people. The ITP, with its claim to represent the Shia minority, and the tiny Wahhabist outfit JAH were both important for the legitimacy of MMA’s claim to be a broad-based, supra-sectarian alliance of religious groups.

The MMA has had a strong leadership profile. JI's leader Qazi Hussain Ahmed is known to be an uncompromising ideologue prone to making unguarded political statements and being avowedly anti-establishment. During the governments of Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto, Qazi Hussain began street agitation that challenged the writ of the government. At the other extreme, Fazlur Rahman of JUI-F is a *madrassa*-based Deobandi scholar. Son of Mufti Mahmood, the former JUI leader and chief minister of NWFP in the 1970s, he looked "deceptively benign" compared to Qazi Hussain (Waseem, 2002, p 10). He is a pragmatic politician who saw the benefits of establishing a cordial relationship with the Musharraf government in order to keep the pressure off the MMA government and sustain his chances of re-election. Fazlulrehman became controversial after he allegedly made a clandestine move to keep the dissolution of NWFP Assembly pending in order to help Musharraf get re-elected as president on 6 October 2007, despite his commitment to his allies within and outside the MMA. Senator Sami-ul Haq of JUI-S, also a Pakhtun from Akora Khattak, was always critical of JUI-F and JI, and issued statements about the NWFP government being run "by a few blue-eyed boys of the JUI-F" (Shehzad, 2003a). He even announced his decision to withdraw from the MMA. Similarly, Professor Sajid Mir of JAH always had ambivalent relations with the Islamist alliance. As a close ally of the former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, JAH broke away from the MMA in August 2003 when MMA chose not to support PML-N (Yusufzai, 2002).

The two breakaway parties pointed to the lack of cohesion amongst the MMA members. As a result of deep ideological divisions, the MMA existed essentially at the leadership level. At the grassroots level, the component parties continued to follow their individual agendas. The question therefore arises of how the MMA managed to hold together for five years. First, the MMA was not able to overcome sectarian and ideological differences among its component parties, which continued to adhere to their respective Deobandi, Brelvi, Shia and Wahhabi schools of thought. The prevalence of low-pressure bickering among the parties continued. Second, the alliance parties had different views about relations with the wider Muslim world. JI advocates pan-Islamism and closer ties with Iran. JAH and the two JUIs are reluctant to support Iran because of its predominantly Shia population. While the JAH, JI and JUI are all pro-Saudi Arabia, JUP and ITP find the Saudi royal family and its Salafi doctrines and practices objectionable (International Crisis Group, 2003, p 20). Third, JI took a much harder line than its compatriots on the issue of relationships with the military regime. It consistently agitated against Musharraf's uniform and his pro-US policies. The compromise reached between MMA and the

Musharraf government over the 17<sup>th</sup> Constitutional Amendment, which in 2003 restored presidential power to dissolve the National Assembly, was due to the political pragmatism of JUI's Fazlur Rahman. It also illustrates the military regime's carrot and stick policy towards the Islamic parties. Fourth, JI maintained that Kashmir issue was the "main hurdle in the normalization of relations with India" (Muqaddam Khan, 2002). However, JUI has been reluctant to pursue armed struggle on that score.

#### 4.2 The MMA's rise to power

The MMA leaders were acutely conscious that unless they remained united they would not be able to repeat their electoral performance. Qazi Hussain Ahmed declared that, "only a fool would leave the MMA now" (Ilyas Khan, 2002, p 55). One factor which seemed to play a crucial role in keeping unity in the ranks of the MMA was that its constituent parties had different sectarian and regional support bases and demarcated their respective voting districts to avoid competition. In Sindh, JI and JUP worked out a formula for distributing seats between them, in order to compete with their common adversary, MQM. In Punjab, MMA generally conceded to the mainstream parties. The political space in NWFP was evenly divided between JI and JUI. In Baluchistan, both JI and JUP deferred to JUI for almost all the assembly seats in the Pakhtun areas. In this way, the leaders of the alliance were very clear that MMA was a marriage of convenience for electoral gain (Abrar, 2002). They saw no need to venture into political mergers and abandon their separate identities as parties. Occasional misgivings on the part of the alliance parties was brushed aside as "sibling rivalry."<sup>20</sup>

In 1993, Islamic parties had won as few as four seats in NWFP. In 1997, they failed to win a single seat, largely because of JI's boycott. In 2002, MMA rose to prominence in the NWFP Assembly, the Baluchistan Assembly and the National Assembly (Waseem, 2006, pp 182-5, 188). However, MMA's share of the total polled votes was only 11 per cent, far less than PPP's 25 per cent and PML-Q's 24 per cent. While the MMA and PML-N won a roughly equal number of polled votes, the former won 30 more seats than the latter under the first-past-the-post electoral system. Second, the percentage of votes polled for all members of the MMA did not increase. In Punjab and Sindh, MMA was still not able to match the strength of the mainstream parties. What was unprecedented about the 2002 election was the larger number of seats won by MMA rather than a huge increase in the Islamic vote bank. Also, MMA gained at the expense of the Pakistan Muslim League (N) (PML-N) in many constituencies, thereby reversing the trend in the 1990s of Islamic votes being cast for Nawaz Sharif.<sup>21</sup>

In order to explain what led to MMA's emergence as the third biggest electoral force in the country in 2002, we can point to the following factors:

- 1) MMA made critical alliances with significant local groups. An example was its electoral arrangement with PPP-Sherpao group in NWFP. MMA left 17 of the 99 NWFP Assembly seats vacant for the latter. Formation of alliances between religious parties across the sectarian divide also helped, explaining how MMA won five out of 20 National Assembly seats and six Sindh Assembly seats in urban Sindh (Waseem, 2006, pp 216-8).
- 2) MMA capitalized on the public resentment against the policies of both the Musharraf government and the US government with reference to the Taliban. Emotions were especially strong in western and southern NWFP and western Baluchistan, where large numbers of *madrasas* had been operating since the 1980s, providing training to the Afghan *mujahideen*.
- 3) MMA benefited from the Musharraf government's attack on the mainstream and ethnic parties, especially PPP, PML-N and ANP. In NWFP, PPP and ANP were weakened due to the emergence of breakaway factions, PPP-S and National Awami Party Pakistan (NAPP).
- 4) MMA enjoyed indirect official patronage from the military regime. For example, various criminal cases against MMA candidates were withdrawn on the eve of the 2002 elections. The law department of the Government of Baluchistan issued an official letter to public prosecutors in four anti-terrorism courts in Quetta, apparently to put litigation on hold before the scrutiny of nomination papers by Election Commission officials. This helped several MMA leaders, including Fazlur Rahman and Hafiz Hussain Ahmed.<sup>22</sup> In addition, many suspected that there were longstanding relations between the military establishment and the Islamic parties. Having already alienated the PPP, PML-N, MQM and ANP, the Musharraf government felt that it could not afford to alienate another political grouping. It decided that one way of appeasing and thereby controlling Islamists was to engage them in mainstream politics (Waseem, 2006, pp 151-2). Some even saw a conspiracy behind the outcome, suggesting that the military had deliberately engineered the success of the Islamic parties in an effort to increase its bargaining power with the US.
- 5) MMA's success in alliance formation well before the polls gave them a head-start over other parties. The MMA central leaders were among the major contestants to speak at public gatherings as a team and to run an issue-based campaign (Yusufzai, n.d.). In urban Sindh, the MMA used the poor law and order situation to criticize the MQM for its alleged patronage of mafias and the *bhatta* (extortion) system (Shah, 2002). In NWFP and Baluchistan, people felt a sense of deprivation because of a weak industrial base, drying up of international smuggling routes following the Afghan war and economic difficulties consequent upon the influx of millions of Afghan refugees from across the border.

6) As a consequence of two decades of the Afghan war, the traditional power structures of NWFP, revolving around *maliks* and *sardars* (tribal leaders), who projected ethno-nationalist ideologies, collapsed. The emergent political void was eventually filled by Islamists. Ethnic de-alignment by default laid out the turf for the rival primordial loyalty of religion, unmediated through broad-based issue politics.

### 4.3 The MMA's political vision and practice

The third question posed above concerns the MMA's vision for democracy and constitutionalism in Pakistan. Aspects of this will be sketched in this section, with some reflections on how its political practice has matched this vision.

One of the public apprehensions about the role of MMA in the political process was its allegedly dubious commitment to democracy. This relates ultimately to the question of the compatibility of Islam with democracy. We need to assess the vision of MMA parties for the state, democracy, constitutionalism and federalism in Pakistan. Since the MMA had risen to power as a result of elections, it clearly recognized the legitimacy of universal suffrage. "We are truly democrats," said Liaquat Baluch, Vice President of JI. According to Baluch, the MMA had a tradition of internal democracy, manifest through regular elections within the party.<sup>23</sup> The MMA also upheld such causes as the independence of the judiciary, the separation of powers and the rule of law. However, the MMA was unwilling to conform to the classical ideals of liberal democracy. For example, MMA did not accept the idea of popular sovereignty, because in its view, sovereignty rests with God and no Parliament is qualified to enact a law that is contrary to the teachings of the Quran. However, the MMA's record on freedom of thought, speech and religion left much to be desired. Additionally, the issue of gender equality continued to be a thorn in the side of the MMA, which preferred to restrict the role of women in the public sphere.

One can argue that the act of balancing electoral promises with post-election and structural realities had a de-radicalising impact on the MMA. The strong anti-American flavour of its electoral campaign was rendered irrelevant in the post-electoral phase of the consolidation of power. Further, its interest in preserving the electoral outcome led to an accommodationist posture, overriding the ostensibly unbridgeable policy differences with the federal government. Consequently, while continuing with its Islamization drive, the MMA did not shy away from negotiating a space for itself within the system. For the MMA cadres, this was a positive development because it led to mainstreaming of the alliance.<sup>24</sup>

They argued that even though “MMA came to power on a negative vote, it should be allowed to prove its strengths.”<sup>25</sup>

The scope for strict implementation of various symbolic or substantive Islamization measures was restricted by two important structural constraints. First, the MMA desired not to be labelled as a disruptive force. Second, the NWFP government’s financial dependence on funds from foreign donors and the federal government played a critical role in making the MMA’s political thinking conform to the status quo. The MMA considered it necessary that other stakeholders, such as the federal government and the international community, would accept the MMA as a player willing to participate in the system. The project of building a more congenial image for itself against the background of the war on terror was the centrepiece of the MMA’s post-election strategy. It therefore took a cautious stance on the presence of the US bases and FBI personnel in Pakistan and on the banned religious outfits, which was inconsistent with its earlier hard-line stand on these issues during the elections.<sup>26</sup> The NWFP Chief Minister Akram Durrani also backtracked on MMA’s hard lines on education policy and cable TV.<sup>27</sup> Maulana Fazlur Rahman, leader of the Jamiat-e-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI-F) party, talked of formulating a balanced foreign policy and promotion of investment-friendly environment in the country, and struggled to distance himself from the Taliban in Afghanistan.<sup>28</sup>

The prime example of the MMA’s pragmatism was the way it dealt with the Legal Framework Order promulgated by President Musharraf, which was subsequently adopted with minor changes as the 17<sup>th</sup> Constitutional Amendment. The MMA agreed to 1) the establishment of a National Security Council; 2) keeping Article 58(2)(b), which enshrined the powers of the President to dissolve the National Assembly in the constitution; 3) preservation of the new system of local government; and 4) election of Musharraf as president for a five-year term. The MMA reportedly agreed to let Musharraf operate as Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) until 31st December 2004 in exchange for the assurance that the governments in NWFP and Baluchistan would not be adversely affected. Thus, the MMA provided the Musharraf regime with legitimacy and sustenance. It wanted to abide by the prevalent rules of game under the military-led government in order to stay in office. Second, what looked like political opportunism was declared to be part of the process of putting Pakistan back on the track to civilian rule (Abrar, 2002). Third, the MMA was generally perceived to be incompetent, given its leaders’ lack of exposure to Western education and professional expertise. Finally, the military-mosque alliance ran



deeper than mere political expediency. It meant that the establishment was determined to recognize Islam as a force of national integration in Pakistan. Islamists in turn perceived the military to be the true protector of the territorial and ideological frontiers of the country.

However, the MMA did challenge the federal government on several occasions. Qazi Hussain Ahmed, head of JUP, openly warned that “no one should be allowed to violate the constitution and run the country according to their own will because this country belongs to the people” (Muqaddam Khan, 2002). Similarly, Fazlur Rahman claimed that the Musharraf government’s actions were akin to “constitutional tampering” and that if the 1973 Constitution was rendered controversial then the “nation would not be in a position to reach another consensus” (Asim Hussain, 2002). The Musharraf government’s policy of enlightened moderation remained a bone of contention between the federal government and the MMA, as the latter considered it an idea put up as an alternative to Islamic ideology.

## 5 Religion, politics and governance: a case study of NWFP

In this section, the objectives and performance of the MMA government in NWFP is considered in some detail. Its aims and actions with respect to law and organizational change are outlined first. In Sections 5.1.2 and 5.1.3, two sets of constraints and their effects are discussed: the provincial government's fiscal dependence on the federal government and its political and administrative capacity and legitimacy. In Section 5.2, its main development initiatives with respect to education and health are briefly reviewed. Section 5.3 includes more detailed case studies of three districts: Dir, Bannu and Peshawar. Finally, in Section 5.4, relationships between the MMA government and external donors are discussed.

### 5.1 The MMA government in NWFP

#### 5.1.1 *Legal and organizational initiatives*

The MMA ran an electoral campaign on a manifesto that steered clear of both issues and ways of implementing policies. It chose to omit from its manifesto some of the most pressing issues, like the role of the military or the improvement of law and order. However, as part of its election rhetoric, it made concrete pledges on education, provincial autonomy, and accountability of members of the military and judiciary.<sup>29</sup> The overwhelming thrust of the campaign was its intention to run the government in accordance with the principles of Islam. When asked what vision he carried for the system of governance, Qazi Hussain Ahmed responded: "One that is run in accordance with the constitution, Objectives Resolution and the recommendations of the Council for Islamic Ideology." Sami-ul-Haq, leader of a faction in JUI, envisioned "a kind of Islamic welfare state." K. M. Azhar of JUP claimed that "Islam has not specified any form of government." Maulana Fazlur Rahman of JUI-F declared: "We want to enforce a complete Islamic system, the perfect code of human rights, one which guarantees justice, security and peace for all citizens and protects their honour and employment."<sup>30</sup> In November 2002, the MMA Chief Minister banned liquor and gambling and started the Islamization of society by announcing changes to appease the religious-minded electorate (Yusufzai, 2002). The NWFP Assembly passed resolutions declaring Friday a holiday, replacing trousers with the national dress in schools, and introducing Quranic studies at the primary and secondary levels, interest-free banking and punishments such as *rajm* (stoning to death) and *qatt-e-yadd* (amputating hands). Further, the government passed orders prohibiting the playing of audio and video cassettes in public and obliging public transport vehicles to make compulsory stops for prayers. The government appointed women coaches for female athletes, ordered that female patients should be examined only

by female doctors, and directed heads of government departments to ensure the observance of prayers.

In addition, a 21-member Nifaaz-e-Sharia Council was formed to guide the NWFP government's efforts to establish an Islamic system in the province. It prepared a draft that was unanimously passed by the NWFP Assembly as the Sharia Act 2003. This Act called for the enforcement of Islamic laws in the province in all fields, including the judiciary and education; discouraging bribery, obscenity and other social evils; protection of the lives and property of citizens; promotion of Islamic values in the media; and taking steps to introduce an interest-free economic system (Hassan Khan, 2003). Most members of the opposition in NWFP maintained that as Muslims they could not oppose a Muslim law. However, there were various criticisms of the Act. For example, one criticism was that it did not address the problems faced by the common people (health, education and security) and that the bill was merely a "face-saving device."<sup>31</sup> Others criticized the Act for being a duplication of the Sharia Act of 1991, which had been passed by the National Assembly, and thus said that it was not needed (Ilyas M. Khan, 2003).

The 2003 Sharia Act was followed by the 2006 Hasba (Accountability) Bill. This Bill provided for the establishment of the office of Mohtassib (ombudsman) at the provincial, district and *tehsil* levels. A Mohtassib would hold at least a matriculation degree and a Shahadatul Alamia certificate from a notable seminary. Each Mohtassib was to be responsible for appointing an advisory council consisting of two religious scholars, two lawyers, and two senior serving government officers. Unlike the federal Mohtassib, as provided for in the Federal Ombudsman Ordinance, the provincial Mohtassib was to be empowered to take *suo moto* action in addition to acting on complaints. Any member of the Hasba force acting on orders of the Mohtassib was to be authorized to enter any government office and demand documents. Furthermore, the Mohtassib was to enjoy court powers similar to the superior courts.

The Hasba Bill was widely criticized for creating a parallel administrative and judicial structure, with an enforcement wing that by way of the scope of its jurisdiction would enjoy unfettered capacity to intrude into people's lives. In contrast, the MMA claimed that the institution already existed at the federal level and in three other provinces, and that it was attempting to do nothing but make the law for NWFP. It argued that the Bill did not give any discretionary authority to the Mohtassib over and above the law of

the land, and that it was to be implemented through the existing administrative machinery of the province, including the judiciary and police (Kurshid Ahmed, 2005). It claimed that the proposed Hasba Act would discourage indecent behaviour in public places, reform the conduct of civil servants and discourage lavish spending on weddings and social functions. At the other extreme, human rights activists criticized the Hasba Bill as the “Pakistani edition of the Taliban style vice and virtue department”.<sup>32</sup> It was widely believed that by creating the Mohtassib at virtually every level of government, the Bill amounted to a massive job creation scheme for *madrassa* graduates.

None of the Islamic policies aimed at poverty alleviation. Indeed, the policies that were adopted had negative repercussions, such as driving out investment in a cash-strapped province, disempowerment of women by restricting their opportunities and mobility, and facilitation of the production of a “dull, stringent, colourless” society (Rahman, 2003). Arguably, however, the MMA was capitalizing on what was an already latent Islamic character of society in Pakistan. For example, Yusufzai cites the 2003 Global Attitudes Survey conducted by the Pew Research Centre for People and Press, which found out that three-quarters of Pakistan’s population wanted Islam to play a larger role in the political life of the country (Yusufzai, 2003).

### **5.1.2 Central-provincial relationships**

How did Islamic governance in one part of the country fit into the wider federal system? One of the disadvantages felt by the MMA government in Peshawar was its tense relationship with Islamabad. It pressed for increased provincial autonomy. As Liaquat Baluch succinctly put it, “the federal government should limit itself and not interfere in the rights and autonomy of provinces. The role of the provincial government is to meet the needs of the people. The Centre should not create problems.”<sup>33</sup> An MMA Minister pointed out that the MMA had a difficult time striking bargains or compromising with the centre because it had no party official in the central government.<sup>34</sup> In the context of provincial autonomy, the MMA government demanded that the curriculum should become a provincial subject and the Chief Secretary should be appointed by the government in Peshawar not in Islamabad.

Administrative issues were compounded by problems of fiscal transfers. In the case of NWFP, federal transfers constituted 90-92 per cent of the total revenue receipts (Table 2). In line with its population share, it received 13.82 per cent of the federal divisible pool, in addition to federal grants/subventions

and a share in the profits from the generation of hydro-electric power in the province. The federal divisible pool is calculated through the National Finance Commission (NFC) award every five years. In the previous NFC award, the share of the provinces was reduced to 37.5 per cent. After the 1999 military takeover, this ratio continued for some time, until the President decided to increase the share of provinces in the divisible pool to 50 per cent in five years. The new resource-sharing formula would have given NWFP an additional amount of Rs. 10 billion in the first year of the new NFC award (Amir, 2006).

**Table 2: Net Federal transfers to NWFP (2002-2005) in Rupees Million**

Year	Fed. tax assignment	Net Hydro-electricity profit	Federal grants/subvention	Non-obligatory grants	Total Federal transfers	Total prov. receipts	Fed. transfers as % of total
2002-3	22872	6000	3898	221	32991	37039	89
2003-4	25660	6000	3898	-	35558	39577	90
2004-5	30215	6000	4500	-	40715	45266	90
2005-6	36805	6000	5000	12473	60278	65463	92

Note: all figures are Revised Budget Estimates

Source: The figures in the table have been adapted from the official website of the NWFP government. <http://www.nwfp.gov.pk/Budget/Summaries/P17-18.pdf>

However, for the MMA government, the new NFC award had come too late in the day. It was followed by Islamabad's decision to set up a commission to arbitrate on NWFP's claim on the issue of profit from hydro-electric projects. In October 2006, the Commission directed WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority) to pay the NWFP government a sum of Rs. 110 billion in five instalments. The first instalment of Rs 22 billion was to be paid within three months of the Commission's directive. Following delay in this payment, the matter was taken to the Supreme Court. In the last year of its five year term, the MMA could have sued the government to recover this first instalment to buy valuable electoral support before the 2008 elections. WAPDA's unwillingness to pay was not only a reflection of its own poor financial state but also the central government's reluctance to transfer a huge sum to MMA in an election year for fear of enhancing the latter's electoral chances (Yusufzai, 2007).

The four MMA provincial budgets presented after 2003 demonstrated a complete reliance on the federal divisible pool. This reflected a failure to significantly increase the quantum of provincial taxes

as a percentage of the overall tax receipts of the provinces (see Table 3). Out of the total recurrent revenue receipts for the 2005-2006 budget, 92.3 per cent was to come from the federal government and 7.7 per cent from the province's own resources. Expenditure on pay and pensions alone accounted for over 50 per cent of the revenue receipts. The MMA government found it imperative to find fiscal space to grant relief to the common people. However, tax cuts for farmers with less than 5 acres of land and urban dwellers with plots of five *marla* (125 sq m) or less were the only meaningful relief measures that the government could afford. At the other end, debt-financing remained a burden on the provincial exchequer, accounting for nearly 2 per cent of the provincial revenues in 2005-2006 alone. In June 2005, the overall debt burden amounted to Rs 63.3 billion, of which Rs 39.7 billion was owed to the federal government, chiefly under the expensive Credit Development Loans, with an interest rate of 17 per cent. The MMA government put in place a Debt Management Retirement Facility, which included the strategy of retiring Credit Development Loans every year through inexpensive loans from international financial institutions, managing to retire Rs 10 billion to the federal government between 2002 and 2005 (Mohammad Ali Khan, 2007).

**Table 3: Provincial tax receipts as percentage of total tax receipts received by NWFP (2002-2006) in Rupees Million**

	Provincial Taxes			Federal Tax Assignment (RE)	Total Receipts From Taxes	Provincial Taxes as % of Total Tax Receipts
	Direct	Indirect	Total			
2002-3	422.134	1459.42	1774.68(A)	22872	24646.682	7.20
2003-4	458.816	979.629	1438.45(A)	25660	27098.445	5.31
2004-5	544.658	1307.4	1852.01(A)	30215	32067.005	5.78
2005-6	562.4	1554.09	2116.49(R)	36805	38921.486	5.44

(A) Actual, (RE) Revised Estimate

Source: The figures in the table have been adapted from the official website of the NWFP government. <http://www.nwfp.gov.pk/Budget/Summaries/P17-18.pdf>

### 5.1.3 *Political and administrative capacity*

Over the years, NWFP has lost an efficient and effective bureaucracy as a result of successive developments such as the Afghan war, the installation of the MMA government, Talibanization and the American military presence across the border. Bureaucrats shied from being posted to NWFP, especially as the MMA government displayed a very different working style. There was general discomfort about working with a religiously conservative government. Initially, the MMA's inexperience in governance and lack of expertise was obvious. But the MMA politicians proved to be fast and dedicated learners. Mohammad Asif Iqbal, principal secretary to the Chief Minister, said that, "there were no issues between the Chief Minister and the bureaucracy unless there were personal politics at play."<sup>35</sup> The MMA leadership realized very early that learning the ways of the prevalent legal institutions was essential to the smooth running of government. An additional major problem faced by the bureaucracy was the MMA government's decision, because several *madrasa*-educated members of the cabinet had no exposure to modern English-medium education, to adopt Urdu as the official language in the NWFP. This doubled the work of the bureaucracy, as summaries had to be written in English and then translated into Urdu. Shortages of staff and hardware lowered administrative efficiency. Many staffers and officials complained that, while they had been provided with dictionaries of official terms, certain phrases were just esoteric and confusing (Ali, 2003).

Many of the MMA's MNAs (Members of the National Assembly) and MPAs (Members of the Provincial Assembly) had a lower middle class background. They were expected to be more in touch with the needs of the people and to represent a refreshing change from previous governments. People also expected the MMA to deliver on the Islamic agenda and bring about changes in governance to that effect. Moreover, the MMA was elected with an absolute majority and therefore had a lot of leeway to implement development policies beneficial to poverty-stricken people. However, the MMA politicians were elected on the basis of their party affiliations and not their professional expertise. Not surprisingly, the MMA government fell short of delivering on its promises. Lack of experience was the most obvious explanation. Also, the MMA realized that post-electoral realities were substantially different from being in opposition and that ideology had to be put aside in order to retain control over the institutions of government. Hence, it was unable to deliver on the Islamic agenda as substantively as it would have liked to. Third, the MMA failed to develop new governance ideas or mobilize new constituencies of support because it was bogged down with details of everyday politics. Under the prevalent insecure circumstances, the MMA fell back on its traditional and loyal constituency in rural NWFP.

One of the biggest disappointments felt by people was that the MMA government was as, if not more, corrupt as previous governments. In the popular imagination of the generally conservative and religious Pakhtun public, candidates from the platform of the religious alliance were supposed to be different from the corrupt politicians of the past. However, that image gradually faded when MMA parliamentarians of humble origins were seen to be accumulating wealth and travelling in expensive official cars. Although the number of such parliamentarians was small, old images were replaced by new stereotypes. Charges of horse-trading were levelled against MMA parliamentarians during the 2003 Senate elections, later validated by the resignation of certain MPs who had been found guilty. This fuelled popular resentment, especially in the absence of a visible change on the ground in the shape of socio-economic development. However, as Professor Qibla Ayaz of Peshawar University noted, the prevalence of corruption was lower and rather than being direct, corruption took the form of donations to the *madrassa* network.<sup>36</sup> Nepotism and personal politics was rampant. The MMA promoted its own party cadres regardless of their lack of expertise and technical competence, thereby not only establishing a new patronage network but also encouraging clientelistic politics. The MMA government did not react very well to this criticism. The Information Minister, Asif Iqbal Daudzai, claimed that MMA officials were less corrupt than their predecessors, as manifested by the lower salaries taken and the budget austerity measures introduced. He claimed that, “no government funding had been made available for conferences in 5-star hotels, for foreign travel by ministers or MPAs and for foreign medical treatment.”<sup>37</sup> Moreover, the law and order situation visibly deteriorated. There were more kidnappings for ransom than before. The MMA’s argument was that these problems persisted because the Hasba Bill had not been passed.

In contrast, the MMA surprised many by showing unexpected strengths. Despite its inexperience, the MMA leadership was determined to learn the ropes. For example, the Additional Secretary to the NWFP Assembly claimed that the MMA government had performed better than the bureaucracy’s expectations and that their performance had been an improvement on previous governments in terms of the number of bills and resolutions passed.<sup>38</sup> There was also a widespread impression that the MMA government officials were very accessible to the people and the bureaucracy, due not only to their modest background but also because the Pakhtun culture is in some ways egalitarian. The MMA government encouraged the conduct of politics in ‘*jirga*-style’.<sup>39</sup> According to the MMA cadres, criticism was accepted and debate preferred over deadlock. Lastly, the MMA government tried very hard to



shake off the image of being fundamentalist. It endeavoured to prove to the international community and to the public that its electoral success was a positive rather than retrogressive development.

## 5.2 The MMA government's development initiatives

The NWFP Economic Report, written jointly by the World Bank and DFID, identified a number of problems faced by the province (World Bank and Government of NWFP, 2005):

- 1) NWFP's achievements in education and health were below the national average. The literacy rate was only 38 per cent, as compared to 45 per cent in Pakistan as a whole. The infant mortality rate was the highest in Pakistan at 56 per 1000 births.
- 2) Poor functioning of the land market tied up a large amount of resources in litigation between citizens and the government.
- 3) The bulk of employment in NWFP was rural, self-employment in family businesses and male. Paid employment was scarce and regular salaried jobs even fewer. This emerged as a key factor in explaining poverty.
- 4) Agriculture was the backbone of the economy. It contributed 20 per cent of the provincial GDP and 44 per cent of the labour force. However, only 30 per cent of the land was cultivable and additions to the cultivable area through irrigation had not kept pace with the growing needs of the population.
- 5) The mining sector in NWFP was undeveloped. However, its potential was hindered by the ambiguity of property rights. Most of the marble mines were in FATA and about 9 per cent of marble was wasted.

With these economic ground realities in mind, the MMA government sought to create new jobs; withdraw the general sales tax; ensure free education for all; arrange interest-free loans for low-cost housing; and ensure cheaper medicines for cancer, kidney and heart diseases, all within the first 100 days of taking office.<sup>40</sup> Health, education, clean drinking water, power and mineral development and tourism were the formally identified development priorities of the federal government. The MMA government sought to adjust its Annual Development Programmes (ADPs) in accordance with these priorities. However, Islamization was the cardinal point on MMA's agenda at that moment and by focusing on the introduction and implementation of Islamic laws, the government hoped to ensure social justice, equality and the peaceful existence of all members of society.

According to the World Bank, the NWFP government introduced a range of policy reforms in the education and health sectors after 2002. In education, it expanded primary school attendance, especially among girls. Overall, primary enrolment increased from by 34 per cent for girls and 19 per cent for boys between 2002/3 and 2006/7 (Table 4). For girls, this represented an increase in the proportion enrolled from 33 per cent in 2000/01 to 40 per cent in 2004/05 and for boys from 48 per cent to 53 per cent (World Bank, 2007). Free textbooks were provided to primary school children up to grade two. Essential school facilities such as classrooms, sanitation, and water and boundary walls were improved. To enhance access to schools, efforts were made to increase the number of primary school teachers and promote public-private partnerships in education.

**Table 4: Comparison of education indicators for NWFP**

	<b>2002-2003</b>	<b>2006-2007</b>	<b>% increase</b>
Education Budget	Rs 10.4 billion	Rs 20.4 billion	96.1%
Total number of students going to school	2,857,569 Female: 862,819 Male: 1,994,750	3,534,528 Female: 1,259,298 Male: 2, 375, 230	23.69% Female: 34.36% Male: 19.07%
Enrolment in primary schools	2,131,731 Female: 661,898 Male: 2,131,731	2,625,527 Female: 882,522 Male: 1,743,005	23.16% Female: 33.59% Male: 18.59%
Total number of teachers	102,661 Female: 30,332 Male: 72,339	109,100 Female: 34,234 Male: 74,866	6.27% Female: 12.86% Male: 3.51%
Total number of schools	25,581 Female: 8,497 Male: 17,084	26,498 Female: 9,023 Male: 17,475	3.58% Female: 6.15% Male: 2.29%

Source:


School and Literacy Department, "MMA's performance in the education sector from 2002-2006." Government of NWFP, 2006

EMIS Statistical Report of Schools in NWFP (2004-05), June 2005, Directorate of Schools and Literacy, NWFP, Peshawar.

EMIS Statistical Report of Schools in NWFP (2006-07), June 2007, Directorate of Schools and Literacy, NWFP, Peshawar.

In the health sector, key policies focused on widening public access to important preventive services against tuberculosis, maternal and child health and family planning. The immunization rates for children aged 12-23 months increased from 57 per cent in 2000-01 to 76 per cent in 2004/05, and antenatal coverage of pregnant women increased from 34 per cent to 39 per cent during the same period (World Bank, 2006). The overall budget allocated increased from Rs 292 million in 2002/3 to Rs 3,638 million in 2007/8 (see Figure 1) and for medicine increased from Rs 80 million to 170 million (Department of Health, 2006, p 20).

**Figure 1: Total number of projects and budget allocation from 2002-2006**



Source: Department of Health. *Annual Report 2005-2006*. Government of NWFP, Pakistan


Despite the provincial government's efforts, economic growth continued to be slower than in the rest of the country, not least due to the 2005 earthquake. The modest achievements of MMA were also tempered by its reluctance to accommodate NGOs, especially women's NGOs. MMA consistently tried to push down the visibility of women. It maintained that female images should not be allowed on billboards, and mannequins used to display clothing in shops should not have heads. However, a World Bank official pointed out that the restrictions on education for girls, as in Swat, Buner and Shangla, was a result of the more radical TNSM rather than MMA policy.<sup>41</sup> The flagship project of the MMA government in this regard was the establishment of the Khyber Medical Girls' College in Peshawar. However, the college had a very rocky start. It was poorly equipped and it made no provision for the hiring of faculty. Female students were forcibly enrolled in the college. The MMA government also established crisis centres for women in different localities. These centres remained ill-staffed and did not provide adequate security to female victims of male oppression who sought shelter. Instead, these victims were sent to Aurat Foundation shelters. Critics pointed out that the MMA government did not spend enough money on women's programmes. First, institutions for women were carelessly planned, with no adequate provision for staff and equipment. Second, often for the purpose of patronage, these institutions were staffed by male employees who happened to be MMA party workers.<sup>42</sup>

### 5.3 Regional development: a comparative analysis

Studying the regional dimension of MMA's programme for development sheds light on the contextual problems of implementation as well as the broader allocation of funds from the provincial to the district governments (Figure 2). In 2001, the 24 districts were ranked on the basis of a multiple-indicator cluster survey (MICS) (Table 5).<sup>43</sup> Interestingly, the ten poorest districts of NWFP include Bannu, Dir and DI Khan, from where Chief Minister Akram Khan Durrani, ex-Finance Minister Sirajul Haq and JUI leader Fazlur Rahman hail. The MMA government decided that, by prioritizing help to underprivileged regions, development would be made more equitable throughout the province. To this end, money was allocated to benefit the poorest districts, including Upper and Lower Dir, Tank, Kohistan, Batagram, Shangla and Bannu. In 2004, the Annual Development Plan (ADP) allocated Rs 433 million for 10 constituencies in Karak, Bannu and Dir and only Rs 430 million for 62 constituencies in 12 districts, although the latter generated 90 per cent of NWFP's revenue (Riaz, 2004). In response, the joint opposition in the NWFP Assembly criticized the MMA for making "unfair funds allocations" in the

Annual Development Plan (ADP). In addition, there were accusations that by disproportionately allocating funds to the three native districts of the Chief Minister (Bannu), finance minister (Dir) and law minister (Karak), the government was engaged in pork barrel politics.

**Figure 2: District map of NWFP.**



Source: <http://www.khyber.org/images/maps/nwfpmap01.gif> This map does not show Upper and Lower Dir as two separate districts

Another disbursement of development funds was carried out through the Tameer-e-Sarhad programme (TSP), which increased its share from 20 per cent to 40 per cent of the Annual Development Plan allocation. Under this programme, funds totalling approximately Rs 1 billion in 2007 were supposed to be equally distributed between MPAs. The opposition parties claimed that the TSP funds appeared to have been allocated to only two districts, Bannu and Dir. In addition, they criticized the delay in completion of development projects in their constituencies due to the non-release of funds. MPA Ikramullah Shahid from Mardan likened the discriminatory attitude of the MMA government in allocation of TSP and ADP funds to the treatment of small provinces by the federal government. Bashir Bilour of the ANP criticised the MMA for preaching Islam, a religion that teaches justice, but managing development programmes in a completely unjust manner (Hasnain, 2004).

In order to explore the regional characteristics of MMA's development policies and enrich the above analysis with micro-level and contextual detail, we focused on MMA's policies in education, health and women's rights in three districts: Dir, Bannu and Peshawar. The justification for choosing these districts was threefold. First, Dir and Bannu rank very low with respect to the combined index in the MICS survey (see Table 4). Second, Dir and Bannu are strongholds of JI and JUI, the two predominant political parties in the MMA, the senior leadership of which belonged to these areas. Thirdly, Peshawar is an interesting contrast, because it is a city district, and ranks higher than the other two cases in terms of social and economic indicators. It is also the provincial capital and home to the provincial assembly and administration. This comparison provides an opportunity to compare investment and development outcomes in districts with different levels of development at the outset and, in addition, because of the personal links of the MMA top brass with the two disadvantaged districts, to witness patronage networks in contrasting areas.

### **5.3.1 Dir**

Dir was a princely state that merged with Pakistan in 1969. In 1970, it was declared a district and in 1996 it was bifurcated into Upper and Lower Dir (estimated populations 718,000 and 576,000 respectively, see Table A2). For the purpose of this case study, Dir refers to both Upper Dir (UD) and Lower Dir (LD), unless mentioned otherwise. The local economy is based on agriculture, forestry and trading, as well as remittances from family members working overseas. Although Lower Dir fares better than Upper Dir, on the whole poverty and unemployment rates are very high. Based on the MICS

survey, in 2001 LD was ranked at 14th and UD at 22nd out of 24 districts. Politically, Dir has been a JI stronghold, although PPP provides a significant opposition in LD. Ahmed Asif Khan of PPP was elected Nazim of LD in 2005. The MMA senior minister Sirajul-Haq and health minister Inayatullah Khan hailed from Chakdarra (LD) and Barawal (UD) respectively. Due to these personal links, the MMA government regularly disbursed large sums of money for the development of this region. An example of this patronage was the allocation of Rs 80 million out of the TSP in 2007 to establish the Siraj-ul-Haq Public School in LD (Bureau Report, 2007).

The MMA government took several steps to improve education. First, the government focused its energies on encouraging girls to enrol in primary schools and to continue their education beyond class 10. In collaboration with the World Food Programme, girls enrolled in classes 1 to 5 were given one cooking oil container per month as an incentive to attend school. In addition, girls enrolled in classes 6 to 10 were given Rs. 200 as a monthly stipend. While both initiatives were geared towards pro-poor change and were successful in increasing enrolment, especially for girls (see Table 5), the long-term sustainability of such measures remained doubtful. Societal attitudes towards women's empowerment are major obstacles to development in this region. Local custom discourages women from seeking education and employment outside the home.

During its tenure, the MMA government invested heavily in the construction of schools in remote villages, especially in Lower Dir, for both boys and girls, especially at the higher secondary level, and the number of teachers increased (Table 6). However, because teachers are reluctant to accept postings to remote locations, not only did the number of teachers increase less rapidly than the number of pupils enrolled, neither primary nor secondary schools in Dir were well-staffed and achievement of the government's objectives was hindered by the dearth of qualified teachers at almost all levels of education (Table 7). The MMA relaxed the rules for hiring teachers, permitting anyone who had completed Class 8 to become a primary school teacher.<sup>44</sup> However, this lowered the quality and standard of education. To be competitive in the job market, most male students from Dir attend colleges in Peshawar. After graduating, in the absence of job opportunities, these students prefer not to return to Dir. Another problem relates to the absence of schools for vocational training in the region, leading to a shortage of skilled labour.

**Table 5: District-based Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) 2001**

District	Combined rank	Infant mortality	Enrolled in primary school	Adult literacy 15+	Use of safe water	Adequate toilet	Average income per day per capita	Urban pop
Haripur	1	1	2	2	14	2	3	12
Abbotabad	2	6	1	1	12	4	4	7
Malakand	3	2	3	7	4	8	8	15
Kohat	4	7	6	3	10	5	1	2
Mansehra	5	5	4	5	17	14	7	19
Peshawar	6	4	13	6	3	3	12	1
Nowshera	7	8	7	10	7	6	11	3
Mardan	8	12	5	11	6	13	9	5
Karak	9	3	14	4	11	19	15	17
Chitral	10	11	6	8	15	1	18	13
Hangu	11	10	16	14	16	9	5	4
Swabi	12	18	9	13	8	12	10	8
Bunner	13	9	20	22	19	18	2	22
Lower Dir	14	15	10	17	21	22	6	18
Swat	15	21	11	9	9	7	17	11
D I Khan	16	17	17	19	2	10	13	10
Charsadda	17	13	15	16	18	20	14	6
Bannu	18	16	19	12	1	16	20	16
Lakki Marwat	19	14	21	15	5	15	22	14
Tank	20	20	18	18	13	17	21	9
Batgram	21	23	12	21	20	21	16	21
Upper Dir	22	19	22	23	23	23	19	20
Shangla	23	22	23	20	22	11	24	24
Kohistan	24	24	24	24	24	24	23	23

Source: Planning and Development Department, Government of NWFP. *North West Frontier Province: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper*. April 2003: 11

**Table 6: District-wise comparison of enrolment in schools in 2002 and 2007**

Districts	Enrolment in Government Schools								
	2001-02			2006-07			% increase in enrolment		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Lower Dir	93,940	41,516	135,456	137,644	92,633	230,277	46.5	123.1	70.0
Upper Dir	70,168	16,142	86,310	82,968	42,404	125,370	18.2	162.7	45.3
Bannu	61,285	26,594	87,879	70,829	41,227	112,056	15.6	55.0	27.5
Peshawar	169,184	89,346	258,530	174,884	107,154	282,038	3.4	19.9	9.1

Source: Education Monitoring System, Schools and Literacy Department, Government of NWFP



**Table 7: District-wise comparison of the number of government schools in 2002 and 2007**

Districts	Number of Government Schools								
	2001-02			2006-07			% increase in institutions		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Lower Dir	884	438	1,322	995	497	1,492	12.6	13.5	12.9
Upper Dir	760	210	970	691	241	932	-9.1	14.8	-3.9
Bannu	729	472	1,201	793	559	1,352	8.8	18.4	12.6
Peshawar	785	467	1,252	821	519	1,340	4.6	11.1	7.0

Source: Education Monitoring System, Schools and Literacy Department, Government of NWFP

The MMA's efforts to improve education faced criticism from various quarters. One major critique pertained to its failure to create jobs for educated young people graduating from the schools and colleges. This was especially evident in the case of women, as the MMA was hesitant to be a pioneer in encouraging women to earn incomes. We can argue that the MMA invested heavily in the education sector in Dir but failed to bring about any sustainable improvement due to these various financial, structural and cultural factors.

According to the 1998 census report, there were only three hospitals and seven rural health centres in Dir for a combined population of 1.3 million persons (Table 8). The health sector in the region was clearly failing to meet the needs of the local population. After coming into power, the MMA government established new health units (a new hospital, two basic health units and twelve maternal and child health centres) and upgraded existing facilities. However, its efforts were hindered by several factors. For example, access to hospitals was a problem due to the poor transportation and communication network. Moreover, local hospitals lacked the capability to deal with serious ailments. Seriously ill patients were often referred which, given the poor transport facilities, was a hazardous task. To provide relief, the government announced that free health care in emergency wards would be provided 24 hours a day. This initiative was generally appreciated by the local population but full implementation was constrained by the scarcity of facilities and resources.

**Table 8: District-wise comparison of teaching staff in government schools in 2002 and 2007**

Districts	Teaching Staff in Government Schools								
	2001-02			2006-07			% increase in teachers		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Lower Dir	3,295	1,219	4,514	4,259	1,912	6,171	29.3	56.8	36.7
Upper Dir	2,322	480	2,802	2,339	661	3,000	0.7	37.7	7.1
Bannu	2,605	1,188	3,793	2,790	1,663	4,453	7.1	40.0	17.4
Peshawar	4,901	2,597	7,498	5,204	2,926	8,130	6.2	12.7	8.4

Source: Education Monitoring System, Schools and Literacy Department, Government of NWFP

Indicators of the coverage of basic health care showed improvements between 2002 and 2007 (Table 9, see also Table A1). However, the health services in NWFP suffer from a shortage of qualified medical staff and practitioners. To solve this problem, the health department prohibited those appointed to positions in Dir and other backward districts from transferring for at least 2 years. In addition, the government put in place special incentives for doctors to relocate to backward districts. Thus, if a doctor practised in Dir for 3 years, his/her chances of promotion increased. Female doctors were given special monetary benefits in addition to their monthly salaries (up to Rs. 20,000 and Rs.40-50,000 per month for singles and couples respectively). However, monitoring was weak. Many doctors relocated to Dir took the monetary benefits, but did not report to their actual place of duty. Such cases were not caught for two reasons: first, a lot of these employees were JI supporters, who used their political affiliation to their own advantage, and second, the health minister himself belonged to JI. The district health officer was not inclined to get into trouble with JI party workers by effectively monitoring fraudulent activity.

**Table 9: Health facilities in Dir, Peshawar and Bannu**

District	Hospitals		Rural Health Centres		Basic Health Units		Maternal Child Health Centres	
	1998	2007	1998	2007	1998	2007	1998	2007
Lower Dir	1	2	4	4	29	30	0	8
Upper Dir	2	2	3	3	35	36	-	4
Peshawar	13	45	3	3	50	49	19	4
Bannu	4	5	8	2	45	33	-	3

Source: Health Monitoring Information System

Social customs towards women also influence the quality of health services provided. The most common example of male chauvinism was found in the tendency to confine women to their homes for childbirth. Many families still prefer home delivery with the assistance of a traditional lady birth attendant (*dai*). Husbands and in-laws make these decisions and women not only do not have a choice in the matter but only about 5 per cent feel that they should have the freedom to make their own care decisions. Another important but controversial issue is the question of family planning. Only about 30 per cent of women in Dir claim to use contraception - most commonly the pill and hormonal injectables because they are regarded as easy to use and afford women some measure of discretion in usage (PAIMAN, 2004a, p, 39). Moreover, men rarely use contraception. The MMA government recognized the importance of maternal and child health-care and wholeheartedly supported a Lady Health Worker (LHW) programme. In Dir, any woman who had completed Class 8 was considered qualified to be a LHW. However, many women complain of the attitude of LHWs, who do not make regular visits to the local towns and villages. They declare that due to inefficient monitoring and evaluation, many LHWs fill out their daily activity reports without actually paying visits to the households in their assigned villages. There are also accusations of corruption against LHWs, with local people alleging that the LHWs charged for medicines and contraceptives instead of providing them free.<sup>45</sup> The only maternal and child health care initiative that was reported to have had any measure of success in Dir was the Safe Motherhood Project, under which four tins of oil were distributed to each pregnant and nursing woman, implementation of which was successfully continued by the MMA.<sup>46</sup>

Another controversial subject for the NWFP government was the immunization and vaccine programme. Even though both LD and UD ranked reasonably high on Expanded Immunization (EPI) coverage, cultural attitudes towards health care caused implementation difficulties for the health department, especially with regard to polio vaccine (Table 10). TNSM, an Islamic fundamentalist political party that was influential in the Malakand division, condemned polio vaccination as un-Islamic, arguing that the polio vaccine leads to sterility and that pre-emptive health care was un-Islamic. The TNSM used its FM radio channel to get this message out to people. In response, the MMA government used its own *ulema* to counter resistance to polio vaccination. These efforts were not very successful because in Dir, newspapers and TV are less popular sources of information than radio: it is estimated that in Upper Dir, about 66 per cent of population is influenced by what they hear on the radio (PAIMAN, 2004a, p 21-4). Contrary to its general reputation, the MMA government actively collaborated with donor agencies and NGOs to undertake health care projects based on public/private cooperation. For example, the TB DOTS programme to eradicate tuberculosis achieved good case detection rates and immunization coverage was one of the highest in the region (PAIMAN, 2004b). However, we also observed that people were suspicious if NGOs were involved in health initiatives, because they were viewed negatively and their workers, especially women, were considered to exert a harmful influence over local women.

**Table 10: District-wise comparison of the proportion of eligible people reached by selected health programme in 2002 and 2007**

District	SBA		ANC		Immunization Coverage		CDR for TB	
	2002	2007	2002	2007	2002	2007	2002	2007
Lower Dir	4%	26%	7%	52%	62%	95%	7%	80%
Upper Dir	3%	17%	28%	38%	121%	93%	18%	52%
Bannu	6%	24%	15%	39%	48%	84%	36%	48%
Peshawar	13%	4%	5%	54%	556%	91%	86%	103%

ANC- Ante-natal Coverage

CDR- Case Detection Rate

SBA- Births attended by Skilled Birth Attendant

Source: Health Monitoring Information System

Society in Dir is not very open to women's participation in the public sphere. In the 2005 local government elections, the community and religious leaders prevented women from voting or holding office. Oral agreements were made between party workers and the *ulema* in this regard. The provincial government decided to look the other way. Separate polling stations for men and women were purposely set up close to each other, so that women would be discouraged from leaving their homes to go to the polling station. Another way of denying female voters the ability to vote was reported to be the absence of pictures on their ID cards.<sup>47</sup> All union council meetings practised segregation and women were not allowed to participate openly. In fact, women in the absence of a *mahram* (husband or blood relation) were not allowed to speak at public meetings. Between 2001 and 2006, four women councillors were killed in UD. In 2004, Zubeida Begum, a prominent female political activist, and her nineteen year old daughter were shot by gunmen. In this way, local attempts to suppress female voters and marginalize and terrorize women in public office continued.<sup>48</sup> Women who attempted to exercise their political rights relied on the support of NGOs such as Khwendo Khor and the Aurat Foundation. Moreover, traditional practices such as *swara* and honour killings are quite common in Dir. Jirgas have been known to kill people reporting honour killings to the police or other authorities because, in their view, reports of honour killings gave the area a bad name. The MMA government professed that honour killings were un-Islamic and yet was unable to prevent these acts. Activists at Shirkatgah, an NGO, claimed that "the MMA government was silent on issues such as these because many party workers were involved in these practices." The only positive step taken by the MMA government was legislation against *swara*, the practice of child marriage, entailing the forced marriage of young girls into other clans to resolve tribal disputes. Thus, our investigation of MMA's development initiatives in Dir revealed that the government had attempted to ameliorate the situation in the education and health sectors but had failed to make any noteworthy improvements due to various societal and structural factors.

### 5.3.2 *Bannu*

Bannu, a southern district of the NWFP, is bounded on the north and west by the tribal area, making the political situation quite volatile (Figure 2). Like Dir, it is an underdeveloped district, with a population of 677,000, ranked 18<sup>th</sup> in terms of development (Table 4). Only 45 per cent of the land is irrigated.<sup>49</sup> There is a small industrial estate in Bannu that provides some employment. Politics in this area has been dominated by JUI-F and JI. In the past, the mainstream political parties had never undertaken any major initiatives to improve the politico-economic situation in this region. Under the MMA Chief Minister,

who was a native of Bannu, this region became the focus of ambitious development initiatives. The Tameer-e-Sarhad (TSP) programme was dubbed the 'Tameer-e-Bannu' (Construct Bannu) programme by critics, who accused the Chief Minister of rewarding his native region at the expense of the rest of the province (Hasnain, 2004). In 2007, he allocated Rs. 2,425 million for development schemes in Bannu from his special funds. The focus of the development projects was to improve the infrastructure. Roads were built and the irrigation system based on tube wells was expanded. In addition, the municipal administration was revamped, allegedly to increase the personal standing and prestige of the Chief Minister. Most of the projects targeted areas adjacent to his home village. The critics of the JUI-F claimed that the development projects only benefited JUI workers. Instances of corruption in the Bannu Development Agency have been brought to light, in which tenders were awarded to favoured contractors, who were alleged to have made exorbitant amounts of money on the side. A JI Senator, who stood for the office of Nazim in the 2005 local elections, accused the MMA government of completing projects by allocating funds to Bannu district. The Senator was critical of the way these funds were diverted to serve the Chief Minister and his son, the Nazim of Bannu.<sup>50</sup> Some of the high profile development projects included completion of the district jail building; creation of a hotel in Bannu township; establishment of the Bannu Divisional hospital, which was named after the Chief Minister's grandfather; and construction of the Indus Highway that connects Peshawar with D I Khan and passes close to Bannu.

In the education sector, the MMA government experienced familiar problems such as poor access to existing schools, shortage of teaching staff, lack of equipment, and low enrolment rates. The rate of increase in enrolment of boys and girls during the MMA government was more modest in Bannu than Dir, increasing by 28 per cent compared to 45 in Upper Dir and 70 per cent in Lower Dir (boys 16 per cent, girls 55 per cent) (Table 5). To ameliorate this problem, the government started providing free transportation facilities to female students and teachers. In Bannu, the MMA placed less emphasis on primary education and concentrated more on higher education, with a view to making Bannu an industrial zone that would provide access to markets in the Central Asian states. The new vocational training institutes and colleges included the University of Science and Technology, the Bannu School of Medicine and the Bannu campus of the Peshawar Engineering University. However, the establishment of these universities has been extremely controversial. It has been alleged that the MMA government did not make teaching appointments at the universities on the basis of merit.<sup>51</sup> A student attending the University of Science & Technology explained that "promotions and appointments of senior faculty

members were highly suspicious because their positions had been filled before the jobs were even created, often by loyal party supporters.”

In the health sector, the network of facilities is not matched by the resources needed to sustain them. For instance, a hospital with state of the art equipment was built (Table 8), but the dialysis centre in Bannu had to be shut down. While a large number of doctors were appointed, there were only a handful of paraprofessionals. A resident of Bannu explained that: “We take the patient to the hospital only when the condition becomes serious”. Another person said: “We treat our sick with home remedies and pray to Allah” (Javeed, 2002, p 2). Many female interviewees revealed that, in the absence of a male family member, women were barred from going to the city, ending up with the local, relatively untrained, doctor. Although the proportion of women attended by a Skilled Birth Attendant and receiving antenatal care increased from 6 per cent and 15 per cent respectively in 2002 to 15 per cent and 39 per cent, not dissimilar to Dir, immunization coverage increased less rapidly (Table 9). There were instances of doctors refusing treatment to patients to make them visit their private clinics. As a result people go to the local *hakim* (practitioner of herbal medicine), who provides health services on a credit basis or in exchange for livestock/produce (Javeed, 2002, p 17). Hence, in the health sector, the MMA government still had a long way to go to genuinely improve the state of health care in this region.

NGOs such as Khwendo Khor have been actively campaigning in Bannu to protect the rights of women. However, people in this area hold a negative opinion about NGOs. In an interview with members of Khwendo Khor, we were informed that people did not know much about the working of NGOs, and in their ignorance liken them to a “woman with a bad character.” It was reported that people would prefer to restrict NGOs to raising funds and providing them directly to people, rather than coming to Bannu and investing their funds in projects.<sup>52</sup>

### **5.3.3 Peshawar**

One of the oldest cities in Pakistan (population approximately 2 million), Peshawar is the capital city district of NWFP. Its economy is based on agriculture, trade and industry. Being the most populous city of NWFP and the hub of the provincial administration, Peshawar is well-connected by road, air and rail transport. It is an interesting case to study because, in comparison to Dir and Bannu, it has a thriving economy. It was ranked 6th in the MICS survey (Table 4). Traditionally, people in Peshawar have voted for mainstream political parties such as the ANP, indicating that the population was less

conservative than elsewhere. It is the centre of a relatively secular Pakhtun nationalist sentiment. Since the leadership of the MMA government did not belong to Peshawar, it had no incentive to invest in the city's development. During our interviews, we constantly heard complaints from the citizens of Peshawar about the neglect of their city by the MMA government. In addition, the Nazim of Peshawar Haji Ghulam Ali (a supporter of JUI-F) was severely criticized for corruption by members of rival parties.<sup>53</sup>

In the education sector, problems of affordability and access are not as crippling as they are in the other two districts and increases in enrolment, the number of educational institutions and teachers were less than in the other districts studied (Tables 5-7). The government had established the women's Khyber Medical College, but it had its fair share of teething problems and it was not possible to assess the quality of education provided because the first batch of female doctors was yet to graduate. Another effort made to improve the quality of education was to encourage public-private sector cooperation (PPC). The schools and literacy department of NWFP launched PPC to promote and strengthen education through the development of a self-reliant and economically viable system in the province, particularly among rural girls. The main objectives of the PPC programme were to make optimal use of existing school buildings and to make education available to all children at a minimum cost. However, this initiative received a lukewarm response from the community and a lot of the PPC schools later shut down. A principal of a PPC school in Peshawar Cantonment area complained that the school administration did not cooperate with the private sector, which had affected their teaching efforts. In addition, it was reported that few students joined evening classes and that the government had not given proper publicity to the programme.<sup>54</sup>

In the health sector, Peshawar district performs reasonably well (Table 9). The number of hospitals in the city increased from 13 in 1998 to 45 in 2007, of which the Lady Reading Hospital is the most well-known (Table 8). The MMA government contributed funds to improve the facilities and equipment available in the hospitals. Thus, as in Bannu, the problem in Peshawar was more about the lack of financial resources to maintain an adequate level of services. In addition to providing free emergency care, the government increased the time that out-patient facilities were available. However, major problems were reported in the way the activities of doctors and nurses were monitored. For example, many doctors remained absent from duty despite continuing to avail themselves of the perks of holding a government job. Beyond catering to the needs of people in Peshawar, the hospitals in the



city serve patients travelling from the more remote districts in search of better treatment. This put extra pressure on their resources, hindering the development of long-term solutions to the deficiencies in health treatment.

In Peshawar, the status of women has been better than other districts in NWFP. However, vigilantism to decrease the visibility of women has also been most obvious in this district. Here, women did participate in the political process to a limited extent. Female members of the MMA were organized, but did not question MMA's policies. They were nominated by male party members to run for election. Moreover, a female district councillor complained that the biggest challenge to women's rights came not from the conservative MMA government but from female councillors belonging to other parties, who created obstacles for each other and were not united in their demands. It was suggested that these demands should have included the need for female ministers for the Population and Welfare of Women Department and the Social Welfare Department at least and that developmental initiatives carried out for the benefit of women should have been planned and organized better.<sup>55</sup>

### **5.3.4 Conclusion**

The foregoing analysis of selected development activities in three districts in NWFP sheds light on a number of issues. First, prioritizing the backward districts incurred opposition from other districts, causing the MMA to lose wider support in the province. By prioritizing certain projects over others, the MMA government was often seen to be back-peddalling on its primary goal of implementing an Islamic way of life. Second, although people in Bannu were satisfied with the infrastructural development in their district, they supported Akram Khan Durrani rather than the MMA in general. In contrast, people in Dir expected more from the MMA government and were generally disappointed. Third, the funds for most of the development work came from international donor agencies and only 15 per cent of investment was generated by the province, threatening the long term sustainability of the development work.

## **5.4 Relations between the MMA government and donors**

A World Bank official admitted that he had feared the Talibanization of Pakistan when the MMA came to power.<sup>56</sup> Reasons that the donor community anticipated a difficult relationship with MMA included the latter's perceived lack of "education, skill, capacity, institutional background and experience to run a

government. Instead of tackling the real issues [it was alleged] they have plunged the province and the entire system into crisis” (Shehzad, 2003b). However, surprisingly, agencies such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) got into a cosy relationship with the MMA. While most were not sympathetic to the ideological commitments of the MMA, they had positive things to say about their experience of working with it. For example, Lead Education Specialist at the World Bank, said, “Over the past 5 years, the MMA has become quite sophisticated in the way it conducts business with the World Bank. It believes in dialogue and consistent interaction. MMA officials are well-informed, well-researched and carry out convincing and articulate conversations.”<sup>57</sup> Similarly, a Programme Officer at DFID Islamabad thought that MMA officials had been “receptive, open, good listeners and quite frank.”<sup>58</sup> An official at the GTZ claimed: “If you listen to them, they will listen to you.”<sup>59</sup>

The World Bank had become involved in the NWFP nearly a decade before the MMA took over. A budgetary support programme in the form of a Structural Adjustment Credit (SAC I) was implemented for a three to four year development cycle. In the first year of the MMA government, however, the second credit (SAC II) fell through because the proposed triggers for SAC II had not been met. As a result, the relationship between the province and the Bank faltered. In late 2003, Finance Minister Sirajul-Haq astutely pursued the World Bank to restart its support programme in NWFP and even though banking practices that included interest and usury were against the ideology of the MMA, an attempt was made to patch up the relationship between them. Sirajul Haq made sure that the bureaucracy and other government officials in NWFP cooperated with the World Bank. Akram Durrani was remembered in similar terms: “He speaks the language the Bank wants to hear and is well-versed in the details of the programs.”<sup>60</sup>

The involvement of DFID in NWFP began in the early 1990s and it worked closely with the MMA from 2003 to 2007. It funded the NWFP economic report, which set out a prioritized programme to accelerate development of the province and contributed approximately £35 million towards the post-earthquake support programme. It also agreed to a £90 million Maternal and Newborn Health programme for NWFP, Punjab and the Federal government. In education, DFID assisted a £90 million primary education programme. It was reported that the first year of implementing the Provincial Reform Programme (PRP) was very difficult, partly because of the MMA’s inexperience in government and partly because of the civil bureaucracy’s attempts to retain residual powers over local

governments. PRP II, worth £5.5 million, provided technical assistance in four areas: 1) the bureau of statistics; 2) human resource management; 3) coordination; and 4) financial support.<sup>61</sup>

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) implemented a Decentralization Support Programme (DSP) worth US\$300 million for two components in four provinces: 1) performance of local government; 2) gender and governance. There was a condition that the federal government and the four provinces would approve GRAPs (Gender Reform Action Programmes) before the second tranche of funds was released in the second half of 2004. This conditionality was imposed to gauge the seriousness of the government's commitment to implementation of the DSP. One aspect of the programme related to a technical assistance loan of US\$7million for gender and US\$ 23 million for building of local governments. When the MMA did not agree to the GRAP on the basis that gender development was not one of its priorities, the entire tranche was endangered. Dialogue between the ADB and the MMA led to the ADB saying that NWFP would be excluded from their share of the loan. This was a political setback for MMA, which was concerned not so much about the money but more about the fact that it would look bad in the eyes of international donors. The ADB eventually gave a waiver for the tranche to go forward without the NWFP. Eventually, after about two years, the Chief Minister formally approved the GRAP but without putting it before his cabinet.<sup>62</sup>

The MMA was very disapproving of non-governmental agencies carrying out developmental activity of any kind, on the grounds that they are anti-Islamic and promote Western culture. An MMA MNA from Chitral claimed that NGOs spread obscenity in the name of women's rights (Hasnain, 2002). Similarly, Liaquat Baluch of the MMA claimed that NGOs were alienated from issues at the grassroots level and that, instead of health, education and relief, they focused inordinately on women's rights, were not austere in their activities and, as they were mostly funded by foreign donors, were obliged to serve foreign interests. The MMA felt that NGOs were undermining the cultural identity of Pakistan. At the same time, they defended those Islamic NGOs which were doing "God's work", such as the Jamat-ul-Dawa (Ilyas M Khan, 2002; see also Muqaddam Khan, 2002).

In their defence, the NGOs advocating women's rights claimed that they were more in touch with reality than MMA, because they had strong networks at the grassroots level. The Aurat Foundation, for example, carried out effective dissemination of information about women's issues through public campaigns and monitoring systems such as Legislative Watch. They expressed concern regarding

the lack of security for NGO workers under the MMA government. NGO employees were reported to have received threats to their lives if they continued with their jobs.<sup>63</sup> The Aurat Foundation acknowledged that the MMA had been helpful at times but claimed that this only happened when it suited the government. Thus, it cooperated with NGOs on health and education issues but never on women's rights.<sup>64</sup> The relationship between MMA and the NGO sector was obviously strained. Indeed, the policy of publicly criticizing NGOs, especially if these were foreign funded, provided the MMA politicians with opportunities to fuel anti-American sentiments and retain the loyalty of their religious constituency. This left very little space for cooperation on developmental issues between the two sides.

## 6 Conclusion

The MMA failed to retain power after the February 2008 elections. This failure was due to:

- i) The absence of an immediate booster such as the American war effort against the Taliban in 2002;
- ii) The return of the erstwhile discredited politicians from the ethnic and mainstream parties to the arena, especially after the promulgation of the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) by Musharraf after a deal with Benazir Bhutto;
- iii) The intelligence community's withdrawal of support from Islamic parties prior to the elections, as per the orders of the new COAS General Kiani;
- iv) MMA's loss of advantage as an untried and thus idealized contender for power following its 5-year rule in NWFP that was tainted by allegations of corruption, nepotism, floor-crossing and generally poor performance;
- v) The two leading parties of MMA, JI and JUI, falling out with each other, leading to a collapse of the alliance in the midst of controversy about a secret understanding between Fazlurrehman and Musharraf, and a boycott of the election by JI.

While MMA has disappeared as an alliance, Islamic parties continue to cast their shadow on electoral politics and public policy. It can be surmised that, in the absence of the peculiar combination of domestic and international factors that were responsible for the MMA's ascendancy in 2002, the future role of religion in mainstream politics is likely to be confined to a small but vocal presence both in and outside the elected assemblies. Meanwhile, Taliban-style violence played havoc in the cities of Pakistan in 2007 and 2008. Islamic elements have arguably moved away from electoral politics to a fight for survival.

This report has examined the phenomenon of Islam in politics from a historical-structural perspective. The origins and patterns of growth of Islamic ideology, leadership and parties were traced to the period before and after partition. We have observed that the state system has typically operated as an independent variable, shaping the ideological expression and policy orientation of religious elements either directly or in a mode of reaction. As opposed to such Muslim countries as Iran and Afghanistan, which did not experience the colonial input into state formation, Pakistan represents a pattern of legal-institutional authority rooted in a constitutional state. Here, the informal clientelist structures based on the landed and tribal elite have functioned as a transmission belt around the body politic. In Iran and Afghanistan, the authority structures of the state did not enjoy autonomy from the ruling classes. As modernization gained momentum, the modern over-layers of these states collapsed in the face of

Islamic revolutionary upsurges in the late 1970s and 1980s respectively. Similarly, non-ex-British colonial societies such as Algeria failed to evolve clientelist structures as a cushion against revolutionary mobilization in the name of Islam. In Pakistan, the politics of Islam was played out within the available space, which permitted pressure groups to operate, electoral politics, militant activity and government formation. The present study has demonstrated that Islamism thrived on intra-elite conflict. Once in government, Islamic parties operated through the structural dynamics of the state, given such constraints as the quasi-unitarian federalism, centralist bureaucracy and an essentially secular body of laws. Research into the skewed pattern of regional distribution of patronage in NWFP showed that Islamists targeted future electoral gains over their ideological agenda.

Our observations point to the role religion has played both as a source of legitimacy for the ruling set-up and as a mobilizing force of immense potential in both electoral and agitational contexts. The state's agenda of national integration in the absence of the smooth functioning of democracy has increasingly relied on the manipulation of Islamic symbols and later the cooption of Islamic groups and parties. Typically, Pakistan's military rulers have turned to Islamists for ideological support against challenges from the left and ethno-nationalist forces. The leading Islamist parties had their roots in British India, even though they were not engaged in or on the margins of the Pakistan movement. This lent credence to the position of modernists that the movement was for Muslims and their interests and not for the establishment of a theocracy. However, this confused position was amply reflected in the long process of constitution-making in Pakistan, which vacillated between Islamic principles of rule on the one hand and a secular tradition rooted in the Westminster model on the other. The former position, which assumed greater importance over time, clearly operated at the cost of religious minorities. Both Ayub and Bhutto were avowed modernists in vision but were prone to accommodating religious pressure by acknowledging the Islamic identity of the nation and, in the latter's case, even promulgating Islamic laws. Under Zia, Islamization reached its legal, institutional and attitudinal climax. This led to sectarian strife and a Jihad culture related to Afghanistan and Kashmir. This process was accompanied by the mushrooming of *madrasas*, which contributed to the emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Talibanization in Pakistan. As Islamic militancy increased, the state responded by establishing an anti-terrorism regime during the 1990s and, more vehemently, after 9/11. However, the most conspicuous outcome of the long process of Islamization was the emergence of an Islamic establishment, with an organizational incarnation in the form of the MMA.

Analysis of the internal dynamics of the six constituent parties of the MMA in sectarian, ideological and regional terms showed dissension within its ranks. Nevertheless, the alliance was able to maintain a profile of unity from 2002 to 2007. Its rise to power can be explained in terms of anti-US sentiment, Musharraf's policy of discrediting the established political leadership after his takeover in 1999, leaving space for the MMA, and support from the erstwhile pro-jihad intelligence network. The MMA was able to assume a democratic profile on the basis of its mass mandate. However, once in power its ideological commitments were softened and its confrontationist posture vis-à-vis the Musharraf government in Islamabad gave way to selective accommodation and co-operation. The 2003 Sharia Act and the 2006 Hasba Bill represented the public profile of MMA in terms of its Islamic commitment. Nevertheless, it was able to keep its relations with Islamabad and the provincial bureaucracy on course, despite its ideological baggage and lack of experience. It also managed to establish communication, even trust, with the donor community. However, it was not able to establish good relations with NGOs, which it has continued to distrust as enemies of Pakistan and Pakistani culture. In the final analysis, its attitude towards a broad-based social agenda covering issues of gender, poverty, individual and collective security, equality, justice and the rule of law remained ambiguous and far from promising.

## Appendix 1: Additional tables

**Table A1: Ranking of districts in NWFP according to 5 main health indicators in 2005-2006**

District	Ranking	Indicators									
		Birth Attendance by SBA		Antenatal care		Immunization Coverage		CDR for TB		OPD Utilization	
		%	Ranking	%	Ranking	%	Ranking	%	Ranking		Ranking
Dir Lower	1	26	8	52	6	95	4	80	6	0.64	3
Chitral	2	17	17	44	9	100	1	93	2	0.75	2
Nowshera	3	26	7	56	4	90	12	75	7	0.59	5
Peshawar	4	41	2	54	5	91	9	103	1	0.25	20
Abbottabad	5	26	6	71	1	96	2	62	12	0.26	18
Haripur	6	28	5	66	2	92	8	73	8	0.26	19
Swat	7	24	11	39	15	95	5	69	9	0.64	4
Mardan	8	24	10	43	10	90	10	80	5	0.36	16
Malakand	9	19	15	45	7	93	6	0	23	0.77	1
Charsadda	10	19	14	43	11	95	3	37	19	0.49	9
Mansehra	11	14	19	60	3	86	13	80	4	0.11	22
Dir Upper	12	17	18	38	16	93	7	52	15	0.55	6
Swabi	13	19	13	39	14	90	11	48	17	0.50	8
Bannu	14	24	9	39	12	84	15	48	16	0.41	12
Karak	15	38	3	24	20	76	18	34	20	0.42	11
Kohat	16	36	4	19	21	65	23	55	13	0.41	13
Lakki Marwat	17	17	16	39	13	71	20	64	10	0.37	15
Hangu	18	58	1	44	8	71	21	0	22	0.09	23
D.I.Khan	19	10	22	37	17	83	16	63	11	0.39	14
Tank	20	6	23	27	19	72	19	55	14	0.50	7



**Table A1: Ranking of districts in NWFP according to 5 main health indicators in 2005-2006 (continued)**

District	Ranking	Indicators									
		Birth Attendance by SBA		Antenatal care		Immunization Coverage		CDR for TB		OPD Utilization	
		%	Ranking	%	Ranking	%	Ranking	%	Ranking		Ranking
Shangla	21	12	21	11	23	56	24	84	3	0.30	17
Buner	22	20	12	17	22	69	22	0	24	0.45	10
Batagram	23	12	20	28	18	84	14	0	21	0.19	21
Kohistan	24	2	24	8	24	79	17	44	18	0.08	24

ANC- Ante-natal Coverage  
 CDR- Case Detection Rate  
 OPD- Out-Patient Department  
 SBA- Skilled Birth Attendant

Source:

Adapted from Statistics provided by the Health Sector Reform and Research Unit, Department of Health, NWFP. The percentages for SBA, ANC and Immunization Coverage have been taken from Pakistan Living Standard Measurement 2004-2005; CDR for TB has been provided by the TB D.O.T.S program, NWFP and OPD utilization has been calculated by Health Monitoring Information System (HMIS)

**Table A2: District-wise comparison of population statistics**

District	Total Population	No. of children 12-23 yrs	Expected Pregnancies
Lower Dir	717,649	24,400	32,294
Upper Dir	575,858	19,579	25,914
Bannu	677,346	23,030	30,481
Peshawar	2,019,118	68,650	90,680

Source: Health Monitoring Information System

## Appendix 2: List of interviews

- Rukhshanda Naz, Aurat Foundation. July 13, 2007
- Senior official in the Chief Minister- Education Economist, World Bank. July 24, 2007
- Liaquat Baluch, Vice President, JI. July 24, 2007
- Altaf Afridi, ADB. July 24, 2007
- Khalid Masud, Chairman Council of Islamic Ideology. July 25, 2007
- Mushahid Hussain, Senator, Secretary General PML(Q). July 25, 2007
- Habibullah, Provincial Earthquake Authority, NWFP. July 30, 2007
- Arbab Shehzab, FATA Development Authority. July 30, 2007
- A JI Senator. September 1, 2007
- Islamuddin Sajid, Staff Reporter Daily Express. September 4, 2007
- Dr. Shabina Raza, Coordinator TAMA. September 6, 2007
- Yasmin Begum, Shirkatgah. September 6, 2007
- Liaquat Shah, Shirkatgah. September 6, 2007
- NGO worker, Khwendo Khor. September 6, 2007
- Dr. Shaheena Afridi, Health Sector Reform and Research Unit. September 7, 2007
- Afrasiyab Khattak, ANP. September 7, 2007
- Shafiullah Khan, Secretary Schools and Literacy Department. September 7, 2007
- District Councillor, Peshawar. 8 September 2007
- Omar Khattak, Pukhtun Millui Awam Party. September 8, 2007
- Tariq Zaman, NGO, Bannu. September 8, 2007
- Senior Minister, MMA government, NWFP. September 8, 2007
- Haji Ghulam Ali, Nazim Peshawar. September 9, 2007
- Bakhzada Yusufzai, Journalist, Frontier Post. September 9, 2007
- Mohammad Raza, Baccha Khan Markaz Trust. September 9, 2007

## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Islamic nationalism in Pakistan has largely overlapped with nuclear nationalism.
- <sup>2</sup> Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the area of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan that is outside the four provinces – Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province. Azad Jammu and Kashmir, along the disputed boundary with India, is an autonomous state, while the Islamabad Capital Territory and Northern Areas are, like FATA, territories directly governed by the federal government. Swat is a district in the NWFP.
- <sup>3</sup> Literally struggle, striving, endeavour.
- <sup>4</sup> The MMA is a coalition of five religious political parties.
- <sup>5</sup> On the link between military Islamization and colonization see Daechsel (1997).
- <sup>6</sup> For more details on the ulema in British India see, Qureishi (1972).
- <sup>7</sup> For an introduction to the Deobandi school of thought, see Metcalfe (2002). The Ahl-i-Hadith as a social movement that emerged in India in the second half of the 19th century. It advocated strict adherence to the Quran and Hadith as the only sources of guidance. For details on the origin, organization and development of the JI in Pakistan see Nasr (1994).
- <sup>8</sup> To understand Muslim separatism from 1857 to 1947, see Aziz Ahmad (1968).
- <sup>9</sup> Sayeed, 1968, 3.
- <sup>10</sup> For more on the interest-based explanation see Brass (1974); Hardy (1974).
- <sup>11</sup> For details on how the bureaucratic-military nexus was established see Hassan Askari Rizvi (2000), Alavi (1972).
- <sup>12</sup> For details on the emergent Bengali sub-elite, see Ronaq Jehan (1972).
- <sup>13</sup> For details on the repugnancy clause see Article 198, Clause 1, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, (1956)
- <sup>14</sup> For more on this law see Rahman (1966)
- <sup>15</sup> For details on Shias in Pakistan see Ahmad (1987).
- <sup>16</sup> A Sufi-oriented school of thought within Sunni Islam.
- <sup>17</sup> On the rise of the TNFJ see Haydar (1993).
- <sup>18</sup> For more details see Nasr (2001, p 92-94) and Abou Zahab (2005, p 120-124).
- <sup>19</sup> List of policies taken from Ahmed, Samina (2006). For more details on this subject see International Crisis Group (2002).
- <sup>20</sup> Interview with Hakim Abdul Wahid, Vice President of the MMA in NWFP on July 18, 2007
- <sup>21</sup> Pakistan Muslim League (N) (Nawaz Group), Prime Minister from 1990-3 and 1997-9
- <sup>22</sup> "Government helped MMA leaders contest Elections" Daily Times, Nov 8, 2002
- <sup>23</sup> Interview with Liaquat Baluch, Naib Ameer JI July 24, 2007
- <sup>24</sup> Interview with an MMA Minister, NWFP on July 17, 2007
- <sup>25</sup> Interview with Lead Education Specialist, World Bank on July 23, 2007
- <sup>26</sup> "MMA to stay moderate on presence of US forces," Dawn, October 15, 2002
- <sup>27</sup> "MMA not to ban co-education: Durrani," Daily Times, November 29, 2002
- <sup>28</sup> See "Fazl wants world to accept verdict", Dawn, October 15, 2002. Also see, "MMA proposes national government", The Nation, October , 2002
- <sup>29</sup> For comparative details on what the parties promised during the 2002 election see PILDAT (2002).
- <sup>30</sup> "Special report", The News, October 28, 2001, p 28.
- <sup>31</sup> "NWFP PA passes Shariat Bill," The News, June 3, 2003
- <sup>32</sup> See the comments of Afrasiyab Khattak, Chairman Human Rights Commission of Pakistan. Quoted in Dawn, May 3, 2003
- <sup>33</sup> Interview with Liaquat Baluch, July 24, 2007.
- <sup>34</sup> Interview with MMA Minister NWFP, on July 18 2007
- <sup>35</sup> Interview with MMA Minister, NWFP on July 17, 2007

- 36 Interview with Professor Qibla Ayaz, Dean of the Islamic and Oriental Studies Program at the Sheikh Zayed Center, PU on 18 July 2007
- 37 Interview with MMA Minister.
- 38 Interview with Mohammad Mushtaq, Secretary Provincial Assembly and Amanullah, Additional Secretary Provincial Assembly and Mohammad Ashfaq on July 18, 2007
- 39 Ibid
- 40 "MMA's plan for first 100 days in power" Dawn, Oct 10, 2002
- 41 Interview with Education Economist, World Bank, on July 24, 2007
- 42 Interview with NGO worker, Aurat Foundation, on July 13, 2007
- 43 The indicators used included infant mortality, enrolment in primary schools, adult literacy above 15 years of age, use of safe drinking water, adequate toilet facilities, average income per day per capita and urban population.
- 44 Interview with Islamuddin Sajid, Staff Reporter Daily Express on September 4, 007
- 45 Interview with NGO worker, Khwendo Khor, on September 6, 2007
- 46 Ibid
- 47 "Women's polling woes in NWFP: 'My name was on a male polling list'" Daily Times, August 20, 2005
- 48 Interview with NGO worker, Khwendo Khor, September 6, 2007
- 49 Aurat Foundation, District Profiles. Unpublished report
- 50 Interview with JI Senator.
- 51 Interview with Tariq Zaman, NGO Bannu on September 8, 2007
- 52 Interview with workers at Khwendo Khor on September 6, 2007
- 53 Interview with a district councillor in Peshawar September 7, 2007
- 54 Bureau Report "Peshawar: Public-private cooperation gets little response," Dawn, October 20, 2003
- 55 Interview with Shumaila Tabassum, District Councillor Peshawar, PPP on September 8, 2007
- 56 Interview with Lead Education Specialist, World Bank, July 23, 2007
- 57 ibid
- 58 Interview with a Programme Officer, DFID
- 59 Interview with an official at GTZ, Jul 19, 2007
- 60 Interview Lead Education Specialist, World Bank, July 23, 2007
- 61 Interview with Programme Officer, DFID, July 23, 2007
- 62 Interview with Altaf Afridi, ADB on July 24, 2007
- 63 Interview with NGO worker, Aurat Foundation, on July 13, 2007
- 64 Interview with NGO worker, Aurat Foundation, on July 17, 2007

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