

# **Poverty reduction and social movements: A framework with cases**

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## Poverty reduction and social movements: a framework with cases

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### INTRODUCTION: POWER AND MOVEMENT

The idea that power relations lie at the core of social life finds a home in a wide range of analytical traditions: from Foucauldian currents in social theory, through Marxian approaches to power, and on to more orthodox positions in US social and political science. Relationships of power determine which actors are in a position to fashion and define policies, to influence market structures, to shape public debates, to govern the actions of others or more generally to participate effectively in economic, social and political life. In this sense power is implicated in all societal outcomes, poverty and distribution included.

To make such observations is not to imply either a negative or positive conception of power. Power simply is, residing in agents' capacities to act, but also to influence the actions of others. Such influence can be exercised directly (as when one agent requires others to perform certain roles) or indirectly, through influencing the environment in which other agents make decisions and live their lives.<sup>1</sup> The point is, simply, to suggest that if it is the case that power is so central to the organization and outcomes of social life, then any changes in those outcomes (including poverty and inequality) must in some sense also hinge around shifts in the relations and exercise of power.<sup>2</sup> This observation should also be relatively non-contentious. The exercise of power is clearly related to the "traditional" levers of social and poverty policy: as for instance in the power to define and implement employment policy, the power to determine the contents and targets of capacity building programs, or the power to design and initiate social protection interventions. All these initiatives occur, and occur in the way that they do, because certain actors have the power to make this so.

Social movements emerge as part of and in response to these prevailing relations of power.<sup>3</sup> They emerge to make visible identities rendered invisible or abnormal by these relationships, to challenge currently dominant ideas as to how society should be organized, to draw attention to needs not currently attended to under existing social arrangements, or to argue that existing arrangements need protecting and deepening. As we will elaborate below, relatively few social movements emerge specifically around the issue of poverty, in particularly poverty as defined by *lack* (of income, capacity, or other assets). However, if poverty (among other social outcomes) is a

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<sup>1</sup> This could be expressed in terms of influencing the enabling and constraining conditions of human agency, or influencing incentive structures.

<sup>2</sup> This is not to "over socialize" the argument and to suggest that social relations determine all aspects of social life. Outcomes are of course also affected by nature's internal dynamics, and physical laws that affect how, say, physical products or energy can be converted into other forms.

<sup>3</sup> The association between social movements and power is recurrent in social movement writing and even some of the key texts in the social movement literature – such as Tarrow's *Power in Movement* (1998).

product of prevailing relations of power, to the extent that different movements emerge to challenge or deepen these relations, and to the extent that power relationships at any one point in time reflect a balance among the capacities of these movements and other actors, then social movements are necessarily relevant to the existing status of poverty and the likelihood that it may change. This relevance is all the more apparent if poverty is understood in rights-based terms.

If the general relevance of social movements to poverty is therefore clear – if mediated through relationships of power – the specific senses in which movements and poverty connect requires much more elaboration. This is the primary purpose of this paper. The text will argue that there are many causal pathways that can run from movements to poverty, but that the relative significance of any particular pathway depends on the domain of contention in question, the type of social movement involved, and the more general political economy context at any one point in time. The paper will trace some of these different pathways first in a general sense, and then will explore how several of these operate in two particular domains: that of production and that of collective consumption. In doing this it elaborates elements of a framework for considering these relationships.

## **SOCIAL MOVEMENTS**

### **The nature of movements**

Just as “a swallow does not a spring make,” so too are social movements more than one-off mobilizations. A short term campaign or a week of street protests might be dramatic and attract press attention, but they are ultimately short lived events. However, when protests and campaigns are linked to a series of other activities, sustained over time and across different geographical locations, and all ultimately oriented towards making a similar set of arguments, then the phenomenon differs from a mere mobilization and specific campaign. Instead it reflects something that might be referred to as a “social movement.” However, while the term may be widely used, social movements are, like so many social phenomena, notoriously difficult to define more precisely. Indeed, one of the most influential authors on movements resisted engaging with them analytically on the grounds that the term was too vague (preferring instead to talk of “contentious politics” as a domain of political interaction rather than of movements as a specific sort of political actor [Tilly, 1995]).

Tilly’s reticence is useful, however, because it provides two starting points for delimiting social movements: first, they are associated with contention and disagreement; and second they are diffuse and not easily categorized. The first observation immediately implies that to talk of movements is to talk of something quite different from the types of self-help and non-governmental organization that have been much studied in third sector and community development research, as well as from the more general civic associationalism to which Robert Putnam’s work on democracy and social life in Italy and the US has drawn so much attention (Putnam, 1993). The second point, that movements are diffuse, is also useful because it insists from the outset that a distinction must be made between movements and organizations – for if movements were single organizations then they would have proven easy to

identify, catalogue, and categorize. We build from this second observation to elaborate a definition of movements to be used in this paper.

The distinction between organization and something that might be referred to as “movement” finds support (albeit argued in quite distinct ways) in different currents of literature. Post structural approaches, for instance, are more inclined to understand movements themselves as a sort of subaltern discourse, a process that makes an argument for the legitimacy of identities and claims that are typically marginalized or excluded within the current social order. Such a process might be carried forward by a composite of leaders, organizations and technologies,<sup>4</sup> though essential to it is the presence of a set of ideas and argument.

There is considerable overlap here with the idea that movements are a sort of “assemblage”, composed of parts that, though they have their own identities, also, when linked together, perform different but related roles within a larger entity. The concept has been used to consider various social phenomena (Ong and Collier, 2005), and is potentially useful for understanding movements which, understood as a larger entity, are nonetheless composed of organizations, ideas, social networks, technologies, repertoires of action etc. Once again, such ideas resonate with the longer-standing notion among some social movement theorists that distinctions can be made between movements and “social movement organisations” (SMOs: McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Here the argument is that movement actions and processes require financial, human, informational, social and other resources that more localised and/or informal social networks are unable to mobilise (Crossley, 2002; McAdam *et al.*, 1988; Ballard *et al.*, 2005: 627). Such resources can almost only be channeled by formal organisations. Potential such SMOs might include NGOs, churches, student organisations, formal peasant or ethnic organisations, and university programmes each of which can play an important role in keeping movements “moving” and alive, by maintaining debates, supporting events, nurturing leaders during those periods when movement activity has slowed down, and more generally in helping produce “Melucci’s submerged networks or latent social movements” (Townsend *et al.*, 2004: 871). Such organisations also play important roles in forming movement discourses, although in the process different SMOs may have distinct ideas of how movement discourse should evolve and can end up pulling a movement in somewhat different directions (c.f. McCarthy and Zald, 1977). Nonetheless, though important in these different ways, SMOs are only part of the structure or culture of movements – the social movement itself is a broader phenomenon.

### **The “why” of movements**

Thinking through how movements might be composed tells us little about why they come into being in the first instance. Again there are a range of arguments made to explain such phenomena. Habermas (1984, 1987) explains this emergence in terms of what he calls a progressive “colonization of the lifeworld,” a process in which external institutions (including the market) exercise progressively greater control over daily practices. The incursion of new forms of investment in rural environments, the accelerating effects of cultural modernisation on traditional practices, new practices of dispossession (cf. Harvey, 2003), the liberalisation of markets and upsetting of price

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<sup>4</sup> This composite form is, indeed, central to the idea of discourse in its more Foucauldian sense

bands, employment relations and more generally of the moral economy (Scott, 1976; Edelman, 2005; Ballard *et al.*, 2005) – all constitute forms of colonisation of everyday practice that are often associated with the interventions of central and external institutions. In the face of this colonisation, Habermas suggests that social movements emerge as efforts to defend, and recover threatened forms of life and social organisation.

A slightly distinct argument is that social movements emerge as part of a heightening sense of grievance around issues of identity and adverse social relationships (Escobar and Alvarez, 1992). Such grievance might intensify because of political economic changes that generate new reasons for grievance, or because of endogenous changes that lead social groups to become more aware of reasons to complain, and more articulate in framing and voicing such complaint. Such changes might occur due to processes of consciousness raising, education, experiences deriving from migration, the emergence of new charismatic and visionary leaders, the arrival of new support organizations (such as NGOs, churches etc) and so on.

A further, and again slightly distinct, elaboration of this argument would lay less emphasis on pure grievance, and instead also draw attention to movement emergence in response to opportunity. There is a resonance here with the “political opportunity structure” approach to movements, which understands their emergence and success in terms of shifts in the political and institutional environment that open up new possibilities. Such changes might mean that grievances become imaginable, and resources become claimable in ways that had not previously been the case (due to repression, authoritarianism or absolute resource scarcity). Transitions to democracy, rapid expansion of the presence of the state in social provisioning, or mineral booms generating unprecedented levels of public finance might all have this effect. For instance, one argument to explain the growth of housing and urban services movements in South Africa is that they have emerged precisely because the post-apartheid state has, through its own actions (albeit unconsciously so), legitimized claim-making around houses and services (Mitlin and Mogaladi, 2009).

Importantly, such responses to grievance or colonization need not only be self-oriented. There is something of a tendency in movement writing (as well as in the *realpolitik* of slandering movements) to assume that movements emerge to attend to their own needs, but this is not necessarily so. Indeed, it is possible to distinguish between movements with more particularistic interests and those with more universalistic orientations. Peasant, worker, squatter and indigenous movements might, for instance, generally be seen as more particularistic in orientation, making claims, expressing grievances and elaborating arguments that are primarily oriented towards meeting their own bases’ concerns. By contrast human rights and environmental movements are more universalistic in orientation. While specific organizations within them might make claims based on their own interests (e.g. groups of displaced people claiming reparation, or conservation NGOs wanting poor people removed from fragile ecologies so that they can then protect those ecologies), these movements as a whole make claims for principles more than interests – principles hinging around the respect of basic rights for all people and all environments.

A similar caveat is that – again, notwithstanding the sense given in much literature and even activism – movements are not only phenomena of the “classic subaltern.” There have also been neoliberal movements (indeed the incarnation of neoliberalism in all manner of policy domains has to be seen as a real movement success), movements for a return to theological purity within the Roman Catholic church, evangelical movements, and conservative movements. At a given point in time the ideas sustained by these movements have been considered (and indeed were) marginalized, and these movements reflect(ed) efforts to make them more possible, and progressively more hegemonic either within society as a whole (the neoliberal movement), a particular country (conservative movements in Evo Morales’ Bolivia – see below), or particular institutions (traditionalist Catholic and evangelical movements within the churches).

A further observation, and something of an implication of the above, is that movements are unlikely to emerge around issues of poverty *per se*, though they may emerge around rapid *impoverishment*. Rather, they are likely to emerge around economic and cultural phenomena that, albeit related to the causes of poverty, are not primarily framed by the movement in terms of poverty. On the other hand, the very fact that movements emerge around issues that are drivers, rather than symptoms or immediate sources, of poverty, and that they address these issues through protest and political action, means that they have the effect of politicizing poverty, placing it in its broader relational context. It also means that in certain contexts, the processes that can serve to deepen poverty might also serve to create the "demand" for movements contesting these same processes.

### **Why movements might matter**

The distinction between movements and movement organizations is a useful starting point for considering why social movements might be of particular relevance for poverty reduction. In general, academic and policy discussion of the relationships between civil society (or the third sector) and development has tended to focus on organizations. Non-governmental organizations have attracted most attention.<sup>5</sup> Initially this work had a tone that varied between the cautiously optimistic and the gung-ho, though over the course of two decades of research, conclusions have become progressively less sanguine regarding both the actual and potential effectiveness of NGOs as well as their accountability and legitimacy. Indeed, it has been noted that NGOs are but a small and recent part of civil society (Lewis, 2002), and that none of the major social advances in modern society have hinged around their work (or the work of similar sorts of organization). Similar conclusions can be drawn regarding community based organizations (that have also attracted attention). While such organizations might foster local participation in the resolution of localized problems, they have generally had neither the predisposition nor the capacity to engage larger and structural social problems head on.

Reflections such as these have led to a reframing of general questions about civil society and development, as well of more specific questions about NGOs and grassroots organizations. This reframing shifts from beginning from the question

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<sup>5</sup> For just a few of the now many books on this topic see: Clark, 1991; Edwards and Hulme, 1992, 1995; Hulme and Edwards, 1997; Lewis, 2001; Farrington and Bebbington, 1993; Bebbington et al., 2008.

“what is the role of a given civil society organization”, to asking “under what conditions have, and might, societies move towards more inclusive and equitable development trajectories.”<sup>6</sup> The analysis of actual changes illuminates the role played by different actors in these processes. One conclusion from such analyses is that important changes have generally involved political processes and have involved non-state actors.<sup>7</sup> Writing on social movements and contentious politics (Tilly, 2004 a, b; Tarrow, 1994) comes to similar conclusions, suggesting that many of the most important social reforms, and the most important social foundations of the modern welfare state, have emerged in a context of, and due to, social conflict.

These conclusions have several implications for the “civil society and development” literature. First, they affirm the importance of “civil society actors” in processes of social change, but demand that actors not be considered in isolation but rather as part of constellations of non-state actors. Specifically this means that NGOs, or CBOs even, only become significant (beyond localized interventions) when they are part of broader social processes. NGOs’ relationships with, or roles within, social movements thus seem particularly important in determining their relative effectiveness (Bebbington et al., 2008; Bolnick, 2008). Second, civil society is best understood not as a sphere of non-state collective action (as has often been the case in development writing) but rather as a sphere of contention in which dominant ideas about how society should be organized are argued over (Pearce Howell and Pearce, 2001; Bebbington and Hickey, 2006), with some becoming dominant and ultimately translating into law and policy. Third, in the light of the historical record suggesting that much of the contemporary state has origins in struggles within society, with new state institutions emerging to mediate, regulate and/or implement the outcomes of those struggles, then civil society and the state need to be understood in relation to each other. Civil society understood this way is not a residual category, performing roles that government does not, or partnering with government to implement programs. Instead the boundary between what is “in” the state and what is “in” civil society is itself an effect of a particular balance of power and hegemony of ideas. Understood this way, when “civil society organizations” implement programs with no state support, this ought to be understood as an indication of failure rather than of institutional capacity – the failure being that the ideas underlying these programs have not become hegemonic, and so the state has not yet assumed them.

Each of these three implications suggest the potential significance of social movements. First, the presence and strength of their relationships with NGOs go a long way in determining how relevant and potentially successful these NGOs will be in fostering poverty reduction or social inclusion. Or put another way, and more bluntly, NGOs without links to movements are not very interesting if the issue is social change. Second, because movements are those processes through which “invisible” and excluded identities are projected, made visible and given voice in society, and to the extent that these movements have a mass base, then they are likely to play significant roles in the determination of the ideas and ways of thinking that

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<sup>6</sup> This reframing can also be seen in more institutional interventions – see for instance the World Development Report on Equity and Development (World Bank, 2005) and the second Chronic Poverty Report (CPRC, 2008), which is quite different from the first (CPRC, 2004).

<sup>7</sup> Ironically one of the earlier “NGO books” (Clark, 1991) did something similar, arguing on the basis of historical analogy that voluntary action, often involving advocacy, was critical to pro-poor policy change.

dominate in a society. Third, the relative presence/absence, and strength/weakness of social movements are central in determining the nature and reach of the state as well as the boundary between what the state does for particular parts of society and what those parts of society have to do for themselves.

### **Summary**

To summarize then, this paper takes the notion of social movement to refer to processes of spatially and temporally diffuse collective action that—notwithstanding their diffuse nature and their ebbs and flows—are sustained over time and framed within a shared identity and set of programmatic commitments. This definition is similar to Ballard *et al's.* (2005: 617) notion of movements, for the South African case, as being "politically and/or socially directed collectives." Although the actors involved do not necessarily share exactly the same vision, there is an important degree of overlap between their respective goals and concerns and it is this overlap that sustains the movement and gives it a certain coherence. In this sense a social movement is a form of collective action but it is not itself an actor: rather it is a process, sustained by a set of actions and actors, in which what prevails is an action motivated by shared grievances and senses of injustice, and therefore by a vision—perhaps not specified—of the need to find another way of organizing society and thinking about development (Alvarez and Escobar 1992; Escobar 1995).

Finally, while reflections on social movements are frequently normative (the argument being that social movements necessarily look for something "*better*"), the approach taken here avoids this normative step. While it does take social movements to be reflections of discomfort and disagreement with the status quo, it understands their demands as being for something *different* rather than something "*better*". Social movements make visible alternative ideas and concepts about the forms that society (and development) should take. Social movements are, then, vectors of certain discourses and questionings and the extent to which a movement manages to change dominant discourse in a society is the principal indicator of its success.

### **ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK**

A potentially fruitful way of organizing an analysis of the relationships between movements and poverty is to explore the intersections between movements and two other frameworks often used in development: asset-based livelihoods frameworks (which helps focus attention on poverty, but with a broad conception of the term) and state-market-civil society frameworks which help focus attention on the institutional domains through which poverty is governed.<sup>8</sup> The advantage of this approach is not only that it provides a filter for organizing and clarifying an analysis of the points of contact between livelihoods and poverty, but also that it links a reflection on movements to other frameworks that have already been used to think through the relationships between poverty, human agency and political economy.

#### **Livelihoods, poverty and movements**

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<sup>8</sup> For sources on livelihoods frameworks see Bebbington (1999), Scoones (1998), Carney (1998) among many others.



### *Livelihoods approaches*

Livelihood approaches came into vogue in the 1990s<sup>9</sup> as part of a discussion that sought both to broaden understandings of poverty (with a view to emphasizing multidimensional approaches to poverty as opposed to income only views) and to insist that “poor” people are not powerless victims but rather human agents who have important knowledge regarding how their lots might be improved. Livelihood approaches argue that a careful analysis of how people compose livelihood strategies can suggest ways in which openings, however small, in the overall development model might be reworked and exploited by poor people and organisations that work alongside them.<sup>10</sup> Such improvements in livelihood would also imply reductions in poverty. These approaches have combined a concern for poor people’s agency, an interest in the asset bases of their livelihoods, and an acknowledgement of the ways in which institutions and structures affect livelihood options. Some such approaches focus particularly on the ways in which people – through both struggle and creativity – gain access to and control over resources.

Some livelihoods approaches – grounded more in actor-oriented sociology<sup>11</sup> – pay greater attention to what poor people *think and do*, while others (tracing their roots to farming systems research, participatory and rapid rural appraisal) lay more emphasis on what people *possess and control*. Such frameworks focus on ‘what the poor have, rather than what they do not have’ (Moser 1998: 1) and understand livelihood strategies as the ways in which people gain access to these assets, combine them and transform them into livelihood outcomes. In particular the following types of asset tend to be emphasised (Bebbington 1999):

- Human capital - the assets that one has as a consequence of one’s body: knowledge, health, skills, time etc.;
- Social capital - the assets that one has as a consequence of one’s relationships with others and one’s membership in organisations, and which also facilitate access to other resources;
- Produced capital – both physical assets (infrastructure, technology, livestock, seeds etc.) and financial assets (money, working capital and assets easily converted into money);
- Natural capital - the quality and quantity of the natural resources to which one has access;
- Cultural capital - the resources and symbols that one has as a result of the social structures within which one is embedded.

In addition to having a broad view of the assets upon which people draw, livelihood frameworks also have a wide view of what people pursue in their livelihoods - or, in

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<sup>9</sup> Livelihood approaches have a somewhat longer genealogy than that traced here. Work in the 1970s on peasant economy, functional dualism and urban survival strategies also invoked a livelihood like notion (de Janvry, 1981; Bromley and Gerry, 1979). The emphasis here, though, was on the structural constraints to livelihood – more recent approaches attend rather more to agency and asset based potentials. Parts of this and following paragraphs draw on Bebbington (2004a).

<sup>10</sup> See for instance: Bebbington (1997, 1999); Carney (1998); Moser (1998); Scoones (1998); Zoomers (1999).

<sup>11</sup> For instance, see Zoomers (1998, 1999).

another language, what they produce when they transform these assets. These frameworks thus work with a multidimensional view of poverty (Moser 1998) and aspiration (Appadurai 2004). The framework portrayed in Figure 1 conveys the notion that through their practices and strategies of asset management, people seek not only to generate material income (or income in kind), but also meaning and socio-political capabilities. There is thus an inherent relationship between livelihood and culture, and between livelihood and political capacity: livelihoods are in and of themselves meaningful, and a change or loss of livelihood possibilities necessarily implies cultural change. Likewise, a reworking of assets necessarily means a change in a person's ability to participate politically and in the concerns they will pursue in that political participation. Furthermore, just as livelihood trajectories and decisions have cultural and political consequences, they are also driven by cultural and political concerns.

The framework outlined in Figure 1 also identifies two sets of institutional domains that are critical in determining livelihood dynamics. The first refers to those relationships that determine people's *access* to resources. These relationships might be ones in which people seek and secure resources themselves, or ones that provide resources to people. The second institutional domain refers to those factors determining the productivity, sustainability and reproducibility of these resources. In each domain, relevant institutions might be formal (e.g. legislation, government policy), non-formal (e.g. market relationships, traditional tenure systems) or informal (e.g. community norms of redistribution, social networks); and, as intimated by these examples, these might be state, market or civil society institutions.<sup>12</sup>

In emphasizing both the wide range of assets on which people draw, the range of outcomes produced through composing a livelihood, and the different institutional domains that mediate these processes, what these approaches also do – and this is a feature that is less often noted – is to merge spheres of production and consumption. That is, the interest is in understanding how people produce the *life* outcomes that they desire, not just in understanding how they generate income, or how they reproduce the household as a domestic unit. In the pursuit of these *life* outcomes, people will access and transform some assets through spheres one might characterize as productive – for instance, accessing land through land tenure systems, or converting their human capital into income through participating in labour markets. Other assets, however, will be accessed and sustained through spheres more commonly associated with collective consumption. For instance, much human capital is accessed and sustained through engaging with state or market provided education

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<sup>12</sup> The influence of the state on livelihoods can be profound, and is exercised in many ways through: laws that influence who has access to resources; public policies and programmes that provide resources and influence market conditions; state sanctioned violence that renders assets insecure and depresses local economies; levels of repression or democratisation that influence the relative inclination of more powerful social groups to steal the assets of the poor; and so on. The influences of racism, patriarchy, and dominant notions of authority are equally significant. The politics of economic policy making – that privileges particular macroeconomic strategies, sectors of the economy and regions over others – also has a critical influence on what people can do with their assets and on their long term livelihood aspirations. While a policy framework that does little to offset the stagnation of peasant agriculture might elicit forms of collective rural radicalism as a response, at an individual level, it is at least as likely to translate into family strategies that aim to lay the bases for children to leave – to leave agriculture, to leave the countryside and to leave economically depressed regions.

and health care, and physical capital (for instance, housing and services) is accessed and sustained through engaging with state or market provided services.

### ***Movement interventions and livelihood dynamics***

The livelihoods framework allows a simple mapping of the ways and domains in which movements might engage with poverty. Three broad dimensions of such a mapping can be identified: livelihood outcomes, the factors determining *access* to resources, and the factors determining the productivity, sustainability and reproducibility of these resources. We take each in turn.

In broadening the notion of livelihood outcome to include cultural and socio-political dimensions as well as material ones, the framework in Figure 1 would suggest that poverty might be as much an issue of cultural exclusion and lack of capabilities as one of material well being. This notion is similar to the idea that the negation of rights (to cultural recognition, to voice, to participation) is a form of poverty, and the enhancement of rights is central to moving out of poverty. This broadening is useful as, *ex ante*, in the light of the earlier discussion of the nature of movements, it is probable that *at the level of outcomes* movements are more likely to engage issues of identity, rights, and exclusion as they are issues of material poverty. Indeed, as we will note later, many movement leaders when interviewed question the idea that their bases are poor (in the sense of “lacking” something), though insist that they *are* subject to discrimination, exclusion and dispossession and that this is what elicits movement emergence (Mitlin and Mogaladi, 2009; Bebbington, Scurrah and Bielich, 2008).

The second dimension in which engagement might be anticipated is around questions of access to resources. In some instances movements might address issues of access through engaging in direct provision of assets. In practice this is likely to be on a modest scale (Bebbington, 2007) as movements do not have many resources at their disposition. In most cases, one might anticipate that the only assets they might offer directly are certain forms of social capital and certain, more limited, forms of human capital (linked to the formation of leadership skills or certain forms of reflexive and critical knowledge such as human rights knowledge or environmental education). That said, collective consumption movements (discussed later) have engaged in more significant asset provision activities (of land, housing, microfinance). More likely is that movements might address issues of access by engaging the diverse institutional arrangements that affect people’s ability to secure, enhance and/or protect their access to particular assets. In some cases this engagement will be in spheres typically thought of as those of *production*, and in other cases in spheres of *collective consumption*. In principle one can imagine a range of engagements here: protesting loss of resources due to dispossession; negotiating land rights systems that favour excluded groups; contesting the introduction of cost recovery instruments in service provision; contesting gender or ethnic discrimination in labour markets or in access to public services; etc.

The third dimension of possible engagement is around the transformation, productivity, sustainability and reproducibility of the resource bases on which livelihoods draw. Once again this dimension involves engaging institutional arrangements – formal and non-formal – that govern what people are able to do with

the resources to which they have access. Some of these institutional arrangements will overlap with those related to access: for instance, the ways in which education and health care arrangements allow the reproduction and sustenance of human capital. Others involve the ways in which market structures, public policy or political arrangements facilitate or hinder conversion of assets into livelihood outcomes.

### ***Movement interventions and institutional domains***

State/market/civil society frameworks are useful means for organizing a reflection of the institutional domains in which movements operate. In a simple sense, movements intervene *from* the domain of civil society, though as they do so they may intervene *in* state, market or civil society domains. For the purposes of analysis, the domain of the state can be understood to encompass the judicial and legal institutions, the public bureaucracy, legislative institutions and political parties. The domain of the market encompasses those institutions and arrangements through which commercial and economic transactions occur. Civil society can be understood here in its joint sense – both as the domain in which social groups organize and associate (c.f. Putnam, 1993) and as that in which ideological hegemony is established and contested. In practice, of course, the domains are inherently related to each other and in large measure cannot exist separately (c.f. Platteau, 1994 a, b). Thus institutional arrangements and dispositions in state and market depend on dominant ideas in society (as does, indeed, the very nature of the relationship between state and market); the ways in which markets function depends on how they are regulated by the state as well as on dominant ideas about how markets *should* work; state legislation and policies regulate the forms that associational life can take legally; and state and market actors are deeply involved in the definition and contestation of hegemonic ideas.

Some writing on social movements, and particularly that from post-structural and post-marxist perspectives, has approached them in terms of this relationship with hegemony (e.g. Mouffe and Laclau, 1985; Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar, 1998). Here the argument is that movements have to be understood as phenomena that give visibility to meanings, ideas and values that are otherwise excluded or undervalued. They challenge existing sets of ideas and dominant meanings, and seek to replace them with others. They may seek to do this through negotiation, persuasion and reasoned communication (c.f. Habermas, 1984, 1988), or through protest, confrontation and the open exercise of power. In such strategies they may act alone, or seek to build alliances with other actors – alliances that, while often requiring a certain watering down of their position (in order to accommodate the alliance) allows for greater political leverage (Mitlin and Bebbington, 2007).

The larger point here is that the ideas that govern how society thinks about issues (in this case, poverty and livelihood) are causally related to the specific institutions that are put in place to act on these issues; and that the vectors for the rise of specific ideas can be understood as social movements. The ideas that are dominant at any one point in time are not those that are in some sense “right” and “true” but rather those that have become the most powerful. A similar argument has been made, albeit in quite different language, by Diane Stone (Stone, 2000) who has traced how networks, arguments, bodies of writing and research centres were put in place around the world with the ultimate effect that a way of thinking that became “neoliberalism” was established and positioned so as to become the dominant frame underlying all manner

of social and economic policy. In a more specific sense, Arturo Escobar (1995) argued that a similar process underlay the emergence and rise to dominance of a poverty discourse that had the effect of labelling certain groups as poor and making them subject to particular types of policy (and in his terms regulation). More recently, again with a different language, similar processes have been identified as underlying the way in which a particular poverty agenda embodied above all in the MDGs, also became a taken-for-granted assumption about what global public policy should address and why (Hulme and Shepherd, 2003).

In terms of the three dimensions mapped out in the prior section, this would mean that the most significant ways in which movements affect poverty are through:

- contesting the ideas that underlie how society understands poverty and the sorts of livelihood outcome that should be valued in public policy
- contesting the ideas and principles that underlie the institutional arrangements that govern people's access to resources, as well as the productivity and sustainability of these resources; and
- challenging, both in specific ways but also in terms of their foundational ideas, the institutions that govern these domains of access, transformation and sustainability. This would mean, just by way of example, that in the short term movements may play the role of lobbying for a change in how land rights are given to extractive industries operating in indigenous territories, but in the long term they have the effect of challenging the ideas that underlie how society and the state understand the role of extractive industry in development, and the role of ethnic territory in the constitution of the nation. Or, as a different example, movements might first contest the specific provisions for cost recovery in basic social service provision, but more foundationally would challenge the very idea of cost recovery in public services, and elaborate alternative principles on which services might be provided.

### ***Movement strategies of intervention***

As movements intervene in these domains, the strategies they use vary widely – from quiet ant-like persistent negotiation and argumentation through to publicly visible and contentious direct action. Ballard et al. (2005: 629) note “social movements’ engagements with the state fall on a continuum between in-system collaborative interactions on the one extreme and out-of-system adversarial relations on the other”, and much the same could be said for the range of movement interactions with business. There is not the space here to explore all these strategies, but select examples can illuminate both the strategies and some of the issues that they raise.

Ideas can be contested through various means. Overt direct action can disrupt thinking about issues. The massive marches and mobilizations for territory and land that have occurred since 1990 in Bolivia, Ecuador and even Peru more recently, have the effect of challenging dominant notions about the ways in which land should be titled if the goal is national development with both inclusion and well being. However, these techniques do relatively little to elaborate clear alternative ideas, and far less ideas that have the potential to translate into policy. This requires a joint process in which strategic thinking capacity is developed (Mitlin and Bebbington, 2006), both “in house” and through linkages to NGOs and academic research centres.

While the relationships involved (both between in house intellectuals and bases, or between movement and NGOs/academics) are never easy, these relationships seem critical for the elaboration of alternatives that might ultimately have policy, political and technocratic traction. Examples here might include relations between the South African Homeless People Federation and People's Dialogue in South Africa, or between the National Confederation of Mine Affected Communities and the NGO Cooperación in Peru.

The projection of these counter-hegemonic ideas into the public sphere involves its own challenges. Again direct action is one possible route, and the publications of supportive research centres might be another. Potentially more effective, but more difficult, are the routes that pass through the media or through elected politicians. For instance, a national mapping of social movements in Peru (Bebbington, Scurrah and Bielich, 2008) concluded that only the human rights movement had been successful in engaging the national mass media (as opposed to alternative media). This had allowed its points to be made through the media, a process made possible both because of the significant social ties linking human rights leaders and certain journalists, as well as the nature of the issues addressed (while not denying that parts of the media have also been quite hostile). This in turn has had material poverty implications, for one outcome of the movement's activities for reparations for victims of the internal armed conflict has been the creation of national programmes of collective (and at some future date, it is hoped, individual) reparations.

Engaging politicians and political parties is a more thorny and debated issue within movements. In some cases, political parties have been created by or emerged from movement processes – examples here might be the Movimiento al Socialismo in Bolivia, or the Communist party in Kerala. In these instances, the projection of movement ideas to a far wider terrain with policy impact is more likely though, as we discuss later for the case of Bolivia, not always straightforward either. At a local level one also finds movements creating electoral instruments (where electoral law allows this) through which movement leaders contest mayoral or similar positions, and often on an electoral platform closely linked to their movement's agenda. How far this legitimates the position and ideas of the movement is less clear, as such easy translations from movement to formal political process are just as likely to attract scepticism and criticism that movement leaders were only ever interested in formal politics and used the movement to that end.

Whatever the case, such instances are relatively rare, and the more usual scenario is one in which movements have to decide whether to ally with a political party or figure whose social bases, moreover, might be quite distinct from those of the movement. Again this might happen at both national levels or more locally.<sup>13</sup> Managing such relationships is, however, complex and there seem to be few examples where such conjunctural alliances lead ultimately to long standing relationships. Such alliances seem far more likely to lead ultimately to the political instrumentalisation of the movement. Perhaps for such reasons, some movements shy away from any clear allegiance with parties or politicians. This has been the position, for instance, of the National Slum Dwellers Federation in India – on the grounds that no party represents

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<sup>13</sup> Lavelle (2005: 954) reports that 33 per cent of neighbourhood associations in Sao Paulo supported specific political candidates during elections.

the needs of the poor and that therefore poor people's movements need to be free to negotiate with whoever is in power (Mitlin, 2006; Appardurai, 2001). The cost of this may be that the relationship with the political process is one oriented towards the negotiation of assets more than any projection into the public sphere (through political parties) of alternative views of poverty reduction, popular livelihoods and the poor.

Similar calculations are at play in those cases where movements eschew direct action or any particular effort to project counter-hegemonic ideas into the public sphere, and instead focus on negotiation and coordination with other actors (mostly state, but also business) in order to influence the rules of the game governing asset distribution, provision and productivity. The calculations that lead movements to such positions clearly depend on context: movements might anticipate that direct action will elicit repression, or may sequence activities, moving from direct action to negotiation once political space has opened up in order to enter into debate on the specifics of state led asset transfer and asset building initiatives among the movement's bases. In other cases, they may simply calculate that the political context is one that offers the potential to access assets and/or shift the rules of the game through negotiating, and at times engaging in directly collaborative forms of co-production of services and public programmes (Mitlin, 2008; see Ostrom, 1996 and Evans, 1996 on the idea of co-production). While in such initiatives social movements seek to engage the state on their own terms rather than those of the state, for there to be any chance of succeeding in this the poor have to offer something to state institutions to persuade them to support such activities. Above all, through their numbers and organization they can offer the state the chance to solve urban development problems that are otherwise unsolved. An example of this is the case of the Railway Slum Dwellers Federation in Mumbai (Patel *et al.*, 2002), in which the Federation was able to implement an enumeration scheme giving selected members secure tenure that then laid the base for a programme of resettlement entitlements, which in turn allowed more rapid improvement of transport services (see below also).

It should be emphasised that such outcomes are exceptional and can only be achieved with significant explicit political pressure as well as significant demonstrated self-help activities. In the absence of such pressure, reformist, negotiating approaches can have costs. Reflecting in particular on the cases of Chile and Brazil, Foweraker (2001) argues that the move towards negotiation and conciliation under conditions of neoliberal democracy has led to the taming of social movements. Much of this is a consequence, he argues, of the neoliberal context rather than negotiation *per se*; of particular importance is the fact that the livelihood crises triggered by neoliberalism have increasingly led movements that initially emerged around justice and citizenship issues to ask for specific handouts and programmes to help the poor cope with crisis. However, the very act of negotiation also seems to push in the same direction, leading - he argues - movements and movement organisations to "lose their edge as defenders of the excluded and impoverished" (ibid: p. 861) and become negotiators for, and at times implementers of, specific programmes. "This", he says, "does not mean that social movements and NGOs cannot achieve some positive impact on social policy or institutional reform, but it does indicate that their impact is unlikely to be fundamental" (ibid: p. 841). Broader enquiries into the roles of NGOs have come to similar conclusions (Hulme and Edwards, 1997; Bebbington *et al.*, 2008).

Such strategies of engaging the state can bring a different type of risk, especially for the case of movements. This is the risk that engagement may ultimately lead to little or no change on the part of the state and in the institutions governing access to assets, and that this disappointment has the effect of radicalizing movements. Again, as we will discuss in more detail below, this outcome can be a very real one, and progressive radicalization can lead to problems of governability at local and wider scales (Mitlin and Bebbington, 2006). In some sense the challenge is similar to the Exit, Voice and Loyalty framework of Hirschman (1970). In the face of limited state responsiveness, radicalization and refusal to engage any further reflects the exit option, while the decline into clientelism is a form of loyalty, but one which delivers no institutional change. The challenge is to ensure that movements continue to combine engagement and the exercise of voice, proposing innovations, changes and new pathways. Of course, movement bases will tolerate this option for only so long if the state continues to show little sign of responding.

### **Livelihoods and movement dynamics around poverty**

Livelihoods frameworks are helpful not only for mapping out the different entry points through which movements might (consciously or not) engage with poverty dynamics. They are also helpful for reflecting on movements' own dynamics in this process, and in particular on the relationships between movements and their social bases.

The relationship between poverty and movements does not only reside in the ways in which movements might affect livelihoods. It is also the case that all members of social movements themselves have livelihoods which are, as the livelihoods framework suggests, potentially complex. In addition, movements are themselves *part of* these livelihoods. On the input side, associations with movements constitute part of a person's social capital; and on the output side the extent to which people compose livelihoods in ways that build links to movements influences their own social and political capabilities. Several points derive from these simple observations.

First, while people might share broad identities (of class as defined by relations to means of production, of ethnicity, of gender etc.), their livelihoods are composed on the basis of a suite of assets. The relative significance of a particular asset (say human capital relative to natural capital) might vary among members of this broad identity group. Similarly, the relative importance they pay to the different dimensions of livelihood (material income, capability, meaning) may also vary. These variations may mean that at a certain point of movement activity some households may become less inclined to continue their involvement than are others. This is not a simple rational choice approach to understanding participation in movements. It is also an issue of identification with movements. At a certain point the cultural significance of education, say, for a person may mean that their identification with movements struggling for land and territory begins to wane.

Second, as part of livelihood, people balance the relative weight they give to social capital as opposed to other assets. The calculation of the role of these different assets in producing the mix of material well-being, capabilities and meaning that people aspire to will be both complex and in all likelihood as much un-conscious as strategic.



Whatever the case, within these calculations, the relevance of movement participation to a livelihood is likely to vary among people and over time.

Third, people's decisions to become involved in particular movements is likely to be affected by what is happening to their other assets and the institutional relationships that make them available, as well as what is happening to their ability to convert them into livelihood outcomes. For instance, in any given locality people with land dependent livelihoods are far more likely to be attracted to mobilize when natural resource dispossession is occurring due to the expansion of extractive industry than are people with trade oriented livelihoods. Conversely, people with labour dependent livelihoods – working on mine sites – are more likely to mobilize (but through union based movements) when salaries and benefits are squeezed. Meanwhile people/households combining agriculture and mine labour within the same livelihood face more complex decisions under these circumstances.

Fourth, the implication of all the above is that there is likely to be considerably more variance in the livelihood composition of movement bases than is implied by the political positions that movements assume. As a result, holding movements together and sustaining momentum and visibility is a real and continuing challenge, as is finding movement positions that can resonate with a broad set of (actual and potential) member concerns, without becoming inchoate.

A fifth and closely related implication is that the level of activity within movements is likely to wax and wane over time, and at certain moments may become greatly reduced. One response to such moments is that the movements should simply disappear. Another, however, is that just because activity has waned, the significance of the issue around which mobilization occurred continues to be real and there is a case to be made for sustaining the movement. Which response is most legitimate will vary across cases. However, the implication of the second response is that there is a case to be made for continued support to certain social movement organizations and leaders during such periods, precisely because the latent social energy they embody is likely to be needed again in the future (c.f. Hirschman, 1984; Fox, 1996). For this reason, notwithstanding criticisms often made of “NGOs who live off social organizations” or “leaders who keep going on and on simply to sustain their salary,” there maybe a case for sustaining certain movement based livelihoods precisely in order to keep this latent social energy alive and in a condition that will allow it to be mobilized when the need resurfaces.

## **SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN THE SPHERE OF PRODUCTION**

While production is essential for poverty reduction, increased production does not necessarily translate into reduced poverty – as discussions of the quality of growth make clear. Growth neither inevitably trickles down, nor does it necessarily dynamize the popular economy. Worse still, under certain circumstances – such as those highlighted by the resource curse literature (Humphreys et al., 2007; Bebbington et al., 2008; Auty, 1993) – increased production can also be associated with an aggravation of poverty.

Of the various channels linking production and poverty, perhaps the most significant are those that work via subsistence provisioning/livelihood security, employment and the generation of fiscal revenue (revenue that can then be redistributed through public sector spending). Each of these channels can be, and has been, a domain of social movement activity, even if in most instances this activity is driven by discourses other than ones grounded in the language of poverty. This section discusses the interactions between movements and poverty in the context of each of these channels as well as in their interaction effects. In order to ground and illustrate the discussion, the section focuses on the Andean region, and particularly on two sectors of the economy: extractive industries and agriculture.<sup>14</sup>

### **Movements and livelihood security**

While the livelihood framework merges production and consumption in the same model, it remains the case that most applications emphasize questions of production and do so assuming the household is the unit of production. In these conceptions, households combine their different assets to produce food, income and security. Such a livelihood system depends on continued access to these assets, as well as on an institutional and political economic environment that at least sustains, or better still increases the productivity of these assets. *Ipso facto*, such livelihoods will become poorer if there is a decline in asset availability or quality relative to competitor units of production, or if the wider institutional environment changes. Such changes can happen incrementally or rapidly – with different implications for the potential role of movements in confronting poverty.

### ***Movements and incremental decline in livelihood security***

Incremental decline in livelihood security – often discussed as a steady, “simple reproduction squeeze” (Bernstein, 1979; Watts, 1983) – can occur because of progressive declines in asset quality as education and skills become slowly outmoded, as access to appropriate finance becomes progressively more difficult to secure, or as land and resources degrade. It can also occur because of a steady decline in asset availability, as average plot size declines, herd size diminishes, savings are drawn down and so on. It might also occur because of iterative changes in the institutional environment, as formal or informal tax burdens slowly increase, as import restrictions are slowly lifted (leading to increasing competition), as technical assistance services are slowly wound down, or as petty corruption and pestering steadily increases.

Each of these causes of impoverishment are potential domains of movement activity. However, the evidence is that in the face of incremental increases in disadvantage, movement emergence is less likely than under circumstances of rapid deterioration. The number of movements that emerge to address, for instance, progressive soil erosion, resource desiccation, water table decline, or increased travel to work time due to urban congestion, are few and far between. Furthermore, those that do emerge often have a strong dependence on organizations that either end up inducing and leading such movements or at the very least serve as catalysts to spark consciousness about the progressively serious nature of the reproduction squeeze. This does not

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<sup>14</sup> For more information on the research underlying these points see the programs: Territories, Conflicts and Development ([www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/andes](http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/andes)) and Social Movements and Poverty ([www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/socialmovements](http://www.sed.manchester.ac.uk/research/socialmovements)).

necessarily mean such induced or “professionally-led” movements have no effects on these sources of poverty. In the agricultural sector, for instance, the steady emergence of a (largely) professional, middle class and NGO led agroecology movement in Latin America ultimately laid important foundations for both the slow but sure change that has occurred in the basic and strategic research being done in the international agricultural research centres (towards more environmentally aware research) as well as for the rise of fairly traded organic products, that has become an important movement with significant livelihood effects.<sup>15</sup> In a not dissimilar vein, the rise of micro-finance institutions in the region has also been a professionally led phenomenon that with time took on movement like characteristics, ultimately changing not only taken for granted thinking about how financial services should be delivered, but also transforming the urban physiognomy of many larger Andean towns whose market squares and adjoining streets are now adorned with signs advertising the presence of these microfinance institutions. In each instance, however, these are movements in which activists are mostly middle class and professional. Only after some time do poorer people also become involved, and even then mostly as clients or producers.

### ***Movements and abrupt shifts in livelihood security***

More movement activity is apparent around phenomena that lead to abrupt shifts in the security of livelihoods and associated threats of impoverishment. These shifts can occur because of a rapid loss of assets (or rapid increase in threats to asset security) due to, for instance, the arrival of new economic activities which can lead to asset dispossession or increased asset contamination (be this due to chemical pollutants that affect natural and human capital, or new incentives that affect existing forms of social capital). Threats of impoverishment can also occur because of rapid shifts in the institutional environment that brings actual or perceived threats to the viability of certain livelihood strategies. Examples of such institutional shifts might be the signing of free trade agreements, or changes in legislation governing land tenure and territorial rights. Indeed, in recent years in the Andean region, these two sources of shock to livelihood have been the most potent inducers of social movement activity – specifically around the expansion and behaviour of extractive industries, and around the negotiation of free trade agreements. We illustrate the nature of this movement activity with experiences around extractive industries and free trade and agriculture in Peru.

#### **Extractive industry movements in Peru**

Over the last fifteen years, governments of Peru have increasingly tied their macroeconomic strategy to a rapid expansion of mineral, oil and gas extraction. As indicators of the scale of this expansion, between 2003 and 2007 the proportion of the Peruvian Amazon affected by hydrocarbon concessions increased from 14 to over 70 percent, and experts estimate that over half of the country’s registered peasant communities are affected by mining, mostly by concessions for mineral exploration (de Echave, 2009).

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<sup>15</sup> One of the silent success stories in Peru, for instance, is its emergence as one of the world’s main sources of organic, niche market coffee (Fernando Eguren, 2008).

Several characteristics of this expansion merit note. First, it is made possible largely by international companies – while there are Peruvian companies involved, the bulk of investment is not national. This increase in transnational capital investment (large and small scale) has raised concerns among traditionally nationalist and anti-imperialist organizations and movements. Second, it has been facilitated by incentives that give tax and royalty holidays and contractual guarantees that taxes will not be increased. This raises concerns among similar groups that the country is unable to benefit from its subsoil and convert those assets into other resources that could be used for development and poverty reduction. Third, the expansion necessarily involves competition over natural resources in rural areas. Deposits and concessions are primarily located in areas of low income peasantries and indigenous peoples who often manage their lands collectively and in some cases have also made claims for indigenous territorial rights. This raises concerns among rural people regarding the security of their livelihoods, regarding the future of the land and water resources on which they depend, and regarding their ability to exercise power over the spaces they have historically governed. Fourth, expansion introduces new (perceived at least) environmental risks – particularly risks regarding the future quality and quantity of water resources. In addition to raising rural concerns this also raises some urban worries regarding the water on which the consumption side of urban livelihoods depends.

These rapid, and multi-faceted changes – “colonizations of the lifeworld” threatening potential impoverishment as a consequence of this particular form of production growth – have in turn induced new forms of organization and movement around extractive industries. These processes have occurred both locally (in areas where extractive industries are present) and nationally. At a national level, and for the case of mining, the formation of the Coordinator/Confederation of Communities Affected by Mining (CONACAMI) has been central to movement emergence. Unlike miners' unions, CONACAMI is an organization that represents territories (peasant communities) within areas of mining influence. Its roots lie in a particular conflict between one peasant community (Vicco, Pasco) and a mining company (Vittor 2008). This conflict gave rise to forms of local leadership that, several years later, and through relationships with various NGOs and other sources of support, ended up leading the process that culminated in the creation of CONACAMI as a social organization that seeks to represent at the national level, communities affected by mining. Since 1999, CONACAMI has gained more and more visibility in the country's mining conflicts. In a certain sense, its position has also become more radical with time and—above all—has incorporated increasingly indigenist discourses (Paredes 2006; Vittor 2009). This indigenization of discourse of a formerly peasant organization has its own explanation (an explanation in which certain international actors and Ecuadorian indigenous organizations also play a part: Paredes 2006). Without commenting on the legitimacy of such a discourse, there is no doubt that it has helped to create ties with other national indigenous organizations, and to “territorialize” the argument against mining. It has also helped link these arguments around mining to other transnational processes, especially those around the ILO 169 convention. The visibility, activism and growing radicalization of CONACAMI led

to its “delisting” as an officially registered NGO by the government agency APCI in 2005 as a result of pressure from other parts of the government and mining sector.<sup>16</sup>

While CONACAMI was a new organization, in the hydrocarbons sector the response has been led by existing indigenous peoples’ organizations, that come together under the umbrellas of the Association of Indigenous Peoples for the Development of the Peruvian Jungle (AIDSESEP). AIDSESEP, however, has been rather less successful in forcing public debate on the livelihood implications of hydrocarbon expansion. In part this reflects the great difficulty of forging common platforms among ethnically diverse indigenous groups among whom communication (for reasons of distance) is immensely difficult. That said, when in 2008 the government attempted to pass legislation that would ease the sale of community lands to third parties (legislation designed particularly with the mining sector in mind), AIDSESEP was able to mobilize an Amazonian strike that ultimately led the executive to retract and withdraw parts of this legislative proposal. In 2009 AIDSESEP mobilized once again, on a more massive and sustained scale, in an attempt to have other parts of this legislation revoked. The final effects of this are pending. Likewise, in certain local conflicts indigenous organizations have been able – again through the use of direct action combined with negotiation – to induce shifts in company behaviour. The most notable case here is the success (albeit after three decades of failure) on the part of indigenous federations in the Northeast of the country to get Pluspetrol (an oil company) to reinject polluted water rather than release it into the river (leading to acute public and environmental health effects).

These movements, anchored in CONACAMI and AIDSESEP but also involving a range of NGOs, researchers, religious groups and urban environmental defence fronts, suffer many weaknesses – in particular the ability to coordinate national agendas and local concerns. However, it is undeniable that they have made extractive industry and its links to poverty, the environment and indigenous peoples a topic of public and political debate in a way that would not have otherwise occurred. Techniques have often been confrontational and sometimes violent, and as noted, this has induced clamp down and repression. This is not the place to pass judgement on such techniques, though analytically at least it appears to be the case that neither government nor companies paid attention when direct action was not used. It also appears that the use of direct action has opened the political space within which other negotiations over policy have occurred, at both national and local scales (Bebbington et al., 2008). These negotiations have addressed issues as distinct as participatory water monitoring, the environmental impact assessment process, the rules governing the geographical redistribution of tax income from extraction, and the financial contributions that companies should make to development.

While not all (perhaps none) these negotiations discussions have evolved exactly as movements hoped, they have nonetheless led to material changes. In certain cases they have allowed for slightly more protection for the asset bases of local populations – for instance, as a result of the introduction of water monitoring programmes around extractive industry sites, or of greater recognition of land rights. They have also been one of the factors that have led to an increase in revenue transfers to mine affected

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<sup>16</sup> Arguably this was largely a symbolic gesture with few practical implications and thus was not viewed as a “punishment” by CONACAMI or its allies – though at the time it generated considerable debate.

**Comment [U1]:** I wonder whether you plan to mention the current paro amazónico here.

areas – in 2004 the government ruled that 50% of the mining canon (taxes paid by mining companies to central government) would be returned to the regions of extraction. And they have also called into question on a national scale the adequacy of existing public institutions for ensuring that production growth results in poverty reduction – as was made apparent by the prominence of this issue in debates surrounding the 2005/6 presidential election campaigns. In each of these instances, however, it is important to note that these changes have come about because other actors (including from the industry), partly in the face of so much protest, have also come to support such ideas.

### Agriculture and free trade in Peru<sup>17</sup>

What one might broadly refer to as an agrarian movement in Perú can trace its roots at least back to the 1960s (Bebbington, Scurrah, Bielich, 2008). This period saw mobilizations across the country that sought both to increase rural people's access to land, and to change the relationship between labour and land (with the emphasis varying depending on the region). The target of these mobilizations was the concentration of property in large estates as well as the control of labour by estate owners (under various forms, some involving the granting of access to small parcels in return for labour contributions to the estate).<sup>18</sup>

While the causal pathways are of course more complex, in a general sense these mobilizations catalyzed land reform (this is also a pattern to be found throughout Latin America, even when reform policies have not necessarily taken the form that movements most desired). These reforms had the effect of increasing household access to land and household control over their own labour. However, land reform policy was also a vehicle for increasing the (then military nationalist) state's regulation of production and of the agrarian movement itself. In the productive sphere the state insisted on collective forms of agrarian enterprise while also creating a new national agrarian organization (the National Agrarian Confederation, CNA) to, among things, counterbalance the more radical tendencies of the existing national peasant confederation (the Peruvian Peasant Confederation, CCP). Over the following decade (the 1970s) these collective enterprises encountered various management and organizational problems, while the vitality of the national agrarian movement declined. These trends became more acute in the 1980s as a combined effect of the violence of armed conflict within Peru, and the progressive privatization of property (an early neoliberal response to the stagnation of the collective enterprises). Conflict severely weakened both national and regional organizations, while privatization of land laid the early bases for the emergence of new forms of non-traditional agriculture along the coast, as well as of a new sort of small to medium scale farmer emerging from the reform movement, but this time more oriented towards market and product specialization.

This emergence of small and medium scale market oriented producers was to be the basis of a new agrarian movement that emerged during the later 1990s. This movement had several pillars: first, the progressive creation of product based

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<sup>17</sup> This section draws on Burneo, 2008.

<sup>18</sup> These general patterns – both in the control of land and labour, and in the social response to this – occurred across the Andean region and more widely in Latin America, albeit at different historical moments (Kay, 2004).

organizations (as opposed to broader “peasant movement organizations”); second a shift in thinking among movement support organization (particularly NGOs) in which earlier discourses hinging around land reform and peasant production were progressively replaced by a belief in the potential role that market oriented, small and medium scale farming could play in inclusive rural development; and third the creation of a national coordinating body (Conveagro) that brought together these different producer organizations, movement support organizations as well as what remained of the CCP and CNA.

While earlier periods of the agrarian movement had targeted issues of access and control over resources, Conveagro was a platform that focussed on shifting discourses around small and medium scale farming and pressuring for policy and institutional arrangements that would increase the productivity (and to a lesser extent sustainability) of assets controlled by these farmers.<sup>19</sup> The policy issue in which it has come to invest most effort has been Peru’s negotiation of free trade agreements. How it has done this, and with what effects, has partly to be understood in terms of the history just outlined. While the case is one, ultimately, of a failure to influence policy it is also one of success in changing the tone of debate and increasing the visibility of small agriculture in discussions of trade policy. By the same token the case reflects how movements can shift in time from focussing on political struggle to secure assets, towards discursive strategies to shift debates.

Peru’s participation in free trade negotiations began in 1998 as part of the (ultimately aborted) effort to build a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA, *ALCA* in Spanish). Both the CNA and CCP had been part of a larger platform that was completely opposed to ALCA. Once the ALCA initiative failed, Peru began to negotiate a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA, *TLC* in Spanish).<sup>20</sup> Conveagro assumed leadership (with Oxfam support) of advocacy around the agrarian elements of the TLC. This platform was, however, less categorical, lobbying instead for “Not this sort of TLC”<sup>21</sup> as opposed to no free trade at all (which had been CCP’s and CNA’s ALCA campaign).

While Conveagro existed as a platform for the small/medium agrarian sector as a whole, as it elaborated a strategy and position on the TLC specific actors led and fashioned the process. Of particular importance were a small group of leaders (all from coastal, product based organizations) and a small (and young) technical team providing research to help Conveagro elaborate its positions and support them empirically. In the process a mixed strategy emerged of (i) direct engagement in negotiations with the government, (ii) participation in broader campaigns with other actors and movements (e.g. the labour movement) and (iii) mobilization of its own bases for occasional direct action.

In these negotiations, one of the greatest difficulties (that in some sense Conveagro did not surmount) was the diversity of positions among organizations existing within

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<sup>19</sup> While these issues resonate more with medium scale market oriented farmers rather than subsistence farmers, the issues arising are certainly relevant to peasant agriculture, as are free trade agreements more generally.

<sup>20</sup> This section draws on Burneo (2008), research conducted as part of the Territories, Conflicts and Development in the Andes programme at Manchester.

<sup>21</sup> “TLC: ¡Así no!”

the platform. Two examples help illustrate the issue. Conveagro's technical team deemed it possible to negotiate differential liberalization processes on a product by product basis, affording more protection to some products than others during the process of liberalization. Indeed, it generated the information to try and make this case. However, politically it was not possible for leaders to make such distinctions in negotiations because of the demands from the bases of organizations whose products would not receive protection:

“there was a rigidity in the position assumed that limited room for manoeuvre in the negotiations. To say that “no product should lose protection” was to go into the negotiation without negotiating. As a result the other side [ie. the government negotiating team] viewed this as showing the “Conveagro does not want to negotiate”. We failed to elaborate a negotiation strategy. It would perhaps have been possible to negotiate an interesting compensation programme for cotton, for instance, but if the logic was “don't touch my product”, to cede any ground was not acceptable for the bases” (head of Conveagro's technical team, quoted in Burneo, 2008: 69-70).

Such constraints on Conveagro's ability to negotiate stemmed from livelihood differences among its members (represented through different product based organizations). Geographic differences among organizations had a similar effect. While Conveagro as a whole, and its coastal members in particular, assumed a “Not this sort of TLC” position, the organizations whose bases were predominantly in the highlands were more militantly opposed to any sort of TLC at all. While those on the coast worried more about compensation mechanisms, highland organizations (such as the CCP) worried more about the implications of the TLC for control of territory, access to resources, and food sovereignty and security. Moreover, some of the department level organizations in the highlands were motivated by anti-neoliberal and anti-imperialist sentiments, at times leading to mobilizations assuming a quite clear position against any form of trade agreement. Indeed, the positions elaborated by Conveagro's technical team had little or no purchase (or even presence) in these regions. Meanwhile, the positions assumed by these more radical bases were again interpreted by the government and business community as reflecting complete intransigence on Conveagro's part. It became seen as a group with which the government could not negotiate.<sup>22</sup>

In the final instance the movement around the FTA in Peru achieved very little (Burneo, 2008). Certainly it remained marginalized from the main negotiating tables of the FTA, a consequence of deliberate government strategy as well as of the inability of movement leaders to develop the necessary political linkages to gain access. While their main success was in gaining concessions from the Ministry of Agriculture, this part of government was also ultimately marginal to the main negotiations and indeed the lead negotiating team did not recognise any agreements made between the Ministry and Conveagro. Another important factor in Conveagro's failure to affect any change in the TLC was that in the joint ALCA-TLC process, it was only late in the day that the movement began to elaborate alternative proposals. Furthermore, it had such a long trajectory of anti-FTA position that by the time it began talking of the need for a *different* sort of FTA, negotiations had moved on too

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<sup>22</sup> A position expressed in interviews by Peru's lead negotiator.



far, and the movement had generated too much of a negative image. And as a further constraint, the movement had limited capacity to imagine other, feasible trade arrangements that could compete with those elaborated by government and business actors. These capacity constraints were all the more apparent when its technical capacity was compared with that of the Peruvian negotiation team (not to mention the US team).

Yet notwithstanding all this, leaders in Conveagro interpret the TLC experience as a success. While they may not have changed the agreement, they had learnt much about free trade negotiations, preparing them for the next round of negotiations between Peru and the European Union. And just as importantly, while at the beginning of the TLC process small scale agriculture had been a non-issue, more or less absent from public debate, the work of Conveagro and its bases had made it more visible, a subject of discussion in the press and public sphere. Whether this ultimately translates into poverty effects is of course another issue, but the simple recognition of the importance of small scale agriculture in trade agreements is essential if any future negotiation is to benefit the sector.

#### Final comment

These three movements share an important feature – namely that, though they emerged in response to relatively abrupt changes in livelihood systems, they emerged out of already existing movements and networks. Some of these were more local (e.g. around environmental justice issues), some ethnic (indigenous peoples organizations), some were peasant based (the CCP), and some more farmer based (Conveagro). None of these pre-existing movements had, nor did they have in their emergent forms as extractive industry and free trade movements, a poverty agenda. Their agendas were many and varied, but all hinged around questions of identity, rights, political ideology, anti-imperialism and policy reforms. These prior forms and commitments underlie, it would seem, the strength of the new movement processes that emerge from them, but also have the effect that inevitably these processes are framed in more political and ideological terms than in the language of poverty reduction.

#### **Movements and employment**

In the language of the framework outlined earlier, employment is an institutional arrangement through which a person is able to transform one or more of their own assets into outcomes that contribute to the satisfaction of one or more of their livelihood goals. Typically the asset involved is human capital, though other assets may also be relevant. Where households are employed on a contract basis to provide food, for instance, natural and physical capital (or land and technology) might be needed; and where a person is employed in order, say, to mobilize labour gangs, then social capital will also be needed. Potentially, movements might affect the employment route from production to poverty reduction under two broad scenarios: first, where employment relations are already established, and employees seek to enhance the poverty reduction effects of employment; second, where employment relations are not established, and movements demand that jobs be created.

Historically, labour and union movements have been some of the most powerful forces in enhancing and institutionalizing the poverty reducing effects of production.

In seeking improved work conditions, employment benefits and wages, they have increased the share of production that passes to labour, a process that has also involved the institutionalization of the mechanisms that allow this transfer in the form of the welfare state. Such gains have not been permanent, however, and the combined effect of movements over-egging their demands, of global pressures on competitiveness and of the success of a counter-movement arguing for more neoliberal readings of the relationship between capital, labour and social policy, has been to move the frontier between what the state does, and what society has to do for itself back towards society. Indeed, in this context it has been suggested that such movements are in terminal decline and as such are largely irrelevant to anti-poverty (or any other) policy agendas. At the same time, the increasing tertiarization of labour relations has reduced the scope for union formation and the emergence of labour movements. This tertiarization (coupled with the active discouragement of union organization) has characterized the organization of employment of the growth sectors in the Andean economies, and in particular export oriented agriculture and new investment in mining and hydrocarbons (where the tendency has been to subcontract all manner of services, including labour recruitment). That said, the general confederations of trade unions still provide important platforms and points of reference for other unions, and are still able to mobilize their own and other bases. Labor organizing is still apparent on a sectoral basis also. Some unions have been formed among women farm workers on agro industrial farms on the north coast of Peru, for instance and in the mining sector in each of Peru and Chile there has an apparent re-vivification of some of the main labour unions, coupled with an ability on their part to engage in direct action and to mobilize their bases. While the extent to which this has had poverty impacts to date is unclear, what it has done is to place the issue of tertiarization on the public and policy agenda. Indeed the use of third party companies and the absence of labour rights in the so-called “services” that extractive industries contract has become a topic of debate in the national press, and a certain amount of pressure has been placed on companies to engage in more direct recruitment. While it would be incorrect to suggest that this resurgence of labour movement activity has established a new set of dominant ideas about employment organization, it *has* at least helped make some topics increasingly visible, and has publicly challenged previous taken-for-granted ideas about the topic.

Interestingly, more movement activity has been apparent around the issue of job creation. One of the more contentious issues surround extractive industry expansion has been its limited direct employment effects, above all within the regions where extraction occurs. This is because modern extraction has substituted technology for labour – and furthermore, as a consequence of this, the labour required is of a skill level in very short supply in the zones of production. One study in Peru (CISEPA, 2008) has concluded that the main demand of populations living in mine affected areas is precisely for jobs (see also Hinojosa, 2008, on Oruro, Bolivia). This failure to create employment (and thus to open one of the main channels through which extractive industry growth might reduce poverty) has been grouped with other concerns regarding contamination, land acquisition (see above), transnational ownership, low taxes and mineral royalties, and poor corporate behaviour into broad movement platforms at both national and sub-national levels.

This broad platform, distilled into an agenda of discontent about the ways in which modern mining is transforming rural economies and societies, has allowed the

emergence of movements that have been able to mobilize broad bases, and to project their issues onto the national agenda. As noted above, these movements have shifted debates on extraction, development and poverty, and have induced some degree of change in some companies and parts of government. One area in which some companies have changed behaviour has been precisely that of local employment generation. In various instances, companies have introduced schemes for rotating unskilled work opportunities for communities neighbouring mines. While details vary, a general pattern is that community members are selected to work periods of two weeks, to then be replaced by other community members. Interviewees have suggested that while welcome, the amount of work made available is not sufficient to make a significant difference to their livelihood – as any one worker will work only several 2 week periods over the year. Another constraint is that the capital intensive nature of modern mining means that the mine itself will never generate that much direct employment. In response to this, some companies (generally the largest) have created programs that seek to support local microenterprise creation as a means of creating alternative employment possibilities. Sometimes this may be coupled with training activities, with a view to increasing residents' employment prospects. Again, they do this as a response to pressure from local mobilizations demanding more benefits from the mine.<sup>23</sup> At least for direct beneficiaries, these shifts might imply improvements in income dimensions of poverty. The corollary of this, however, is that in doing so it may diminish the proclivity of these beneficiaries to continue participating in movement activities – an effect that is presumably not lost on the companies either. This in turn might lead to movement weakening and thus reduced capacity to influence other channels linking extractive industry and livelihood-poverty dynamics.

### **Movements and public investment for poverty reduction**

For certain productive sectors, and in particular that of the extractive industries, by far the most significant channel through which they can contribute to poverty reduction is through their tax and royalty payments to government. The extent to which these contributions are made in practice, and how they are then used, has become a particularly conflictive axis of social movement activity, and one which brings movements and states particularly close together. One extreme, but revealing, case of this has been that of Bolivia.

In this discussion we focus on the last decade in Bolivia, but as context it merits note that the modern Bolivian state dates, arguably, to the revolution of 1952. Among the key actors in bringing the revolution to pass were the mine workers. As a consequence of the revolution, the mining sector was brought into national ownership in part for ideological reasons, in part to respond to the demands of mine workers (some of whose leaders became part of the state following the revolution), and in part as a source of revenue for the new revolutionary government.<sup>24</sup> Ultimately the model

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<sup>23</sup> An example of a mine that has responded in these different ways is Minera Yanacocha in Cajamarca, Peru.

<sup>24</sup> Myrna Santiago (2006) notes the similarly important role played by oil workers unions in the nationalization of Mexico's oil industry.

failed to meet all three purposes simultaneously, and the nationalized industry proved unable to sustain significant public investment.<sup>25</sup>

Bolivia has, then, a history of movement consolidation around extractive industry, and a certain blurring of boundaries between movement and state as a consequence of this. Something not dissimilar, though even more movement based, has occurred since 2000. While it would be wrong to suggest that movement emergence around natural gas extraction in the period served as the primary basis for the consolidation and subsequent election of the current governing party, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), it is the case that this party emerged out of social movement processes (especially among coca producers and the more historic syndicalist highland peasant movements). These origins inevitably gave the movement/party a heavy anti-imperialist ideology, which in turn meant a clear resonance between these movement processes, and the two major “resource wars” in Bolivia over the last decade (over water in 2000, and over gas between 2003 and 2005) each of which contested the control of strategic national interests by international companies. Not surprisingly then, within the first year of its election, MAS passed decrees to nationalize ownership of hydrocarbons and refineries.

While this legislation was partly ideological, it was also motivated by concerns for poverty reduction in that the government needed increased revenue to finance an expansion of various social protection instruments. This in itself is interesting in the sense that issues of social protection and targeted support to the elderly and to mothers only became an issue for the movement on becoming government. However, the need to fund these and further instruments generated other challenges, both with sub-movements within the broader base of MAS, as well as with movements (as opposed to parties) of the opposition. Tensions with movements that otherwise support MAS derive in considerable measure from the apparent urgency with which MAS feels the need to expand gas production – in order to maintain fiscal stability, fund expanded social programs and also (for political reasons) diversify the geography of hydrocarbon extraction. Much of this expansion is set to occur on land occupied by and/or claimed as territory by lowland indigenous groups who – though not necessarily anti-hydrocarbons – worry about the environmental and territorial implications of this, as well as about the precedent that would be set (in which a national [movement based] government determines activities on lands that these regional movements argue ought fall within their own sphere of control). Further compounding the tensions that this creates is the already existing sense among most lowland organizations and leaders that the highland indigenous groups who are dominant within MAS look down on them. Thus here we have a situation in which a movement-in-government’s push to expand one form of production in order to enhance revenue for social investment (among other uses) is perceived as compromising the livelihood security and political autonomy of other groups within this larger movement. To date, given their overall support to MAS lowland groups have not publicly criticized this situation, though it has certainly created tensions which in turn lead to a double risk – that groups will either begin to voice complaints, increasing fissures within the wider movement; or that, in order to offset this, the wider movement-in-government will attempt to co-opt lowland leaders.

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<sup>25</sup> And whatever contribution it did make is almost impossible to discern because public accounts do not allow for such disaggregation.

The tension with movements of the opposition arises because MAS has sought to claw back some of the hydrocarbons revenues that are currently returned to the departments in which extraction occurs. This has catalysed renewed dynamism within far older separatist movements among non-indigenous (and politically conservative) populations in the lowland provinces who complain that this policy change is taking assets away from them. During 2008, movements harnessed this concern and were able to initiate civil obedience and direct action on a massive scale that for a short while called into question the viability of the MAS government. Ultimately the government survived and emerged strengthened, but the more general point is that one movement's efforts to use the instruments of government to increase the capture of resources for poverty reduction investments can – depending on where those resources come from – elicit responses from other movements resisting this.

### **SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN THE SPHERE OF COLLECTIVE CONSUMPTION**

A further attraction of the livelihoods framework is that its attention to a range of assets highlights the important role that collective consumption can play in poverty reduction and livelihood enhancement. Assets such as human capital (which may be accessed, *inter alia*, through education and health services), natural capital (which may be accessed through water and sanitation or irrigation services), and physical capital (shelter, roads, electricity etc.) are each, frequently, made available through mechanisms of collective consumption. Even when the moment of use is individualized (as when visiting a doctor, or opening one's own irrigation gate), the asset provision service exists because a collectivity consumes it. Otherwise, neither political nor economic calculations would justify provision.

The provision of collectively consumed assets, however, occurs neither automatically nor according to a pre-defined set of rules. Provision to the poor can often be obstructed because of cost, bureaucratic inefficiency, political bias (in favour of non-poor groups) or capacity constraints on government. And even when provided, the impacts on poverty will depend on the rules governing provision (e.g. payment for services) as well as on factors influencing how far households are able to take advantage of these services and turn them into desirable livelihood outcomes.

This sphere of collective consumption activity has, like production, witnessed significant movement activity. Indeed, the provision of collectively consumed assets has often only come into being because movements have demanded such services.<sup>26</sup> The dynamics of such demands differ somewhat from those exercised in the sphere of production. For instance, while contention around production often involves movements confronting business as much as the state, contention around collective

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<sup>26</sup> While in this paper we do not talk about social protection measures, it is also the case that many of these are a response to movement demands. Historically in Europe, for instance, the origin of many such measures is to be found in organized contentious politics (Tilly, 1985); and more recently, the origin of, for instance, unconditional cash transfer programs in Brazil and South Africa is to be found in state response to (real or anticipated) pressures from social movements (Barrientos, 2008).

consumption almost always involves conflicts between movements and the state.<sup>27</sup> Also, there seems to be more movement involvement in the direct provisioning of collective consumption assets than there is in the provision of income.

This section reviews elements of these experiences with a particular focus on movement involvement in shelter and services in urban environments, on the basis of material from South Africa, India and Peru. As will be seen some of these experiences also illuminate broader issues, such as the relationships between membership organizations and professionalized NGOs, the relationships between protest and proposal within movements, and the challenge of sustaining movement autonomy.

The section first discusses asset provisioning activities in these movements, before considering the ways in which they engage government in relations of both contestation and negotiation. It then discusses the scale at which they operate and closes with a reflection on NGO-membership organization relationships within these movements. This discussion overlaps with the earlier one of relationships with government and the state, in that both are indicative of the challenges that movements face in gaining and sustaining their autonomy at the same time as sustaining relations with other actors. While these challenges of autonomy are just as real for movements contesting forms of production and accumulation, and are certainly not limited to collective consumption or urban movements, we discuss them here as several of the urban experiences, especially those of Shack/Slum Dwellers International, are especially useful in illuminating the issues and suggesting ways forward.

### **Demanding, proposing, facilitating: movements and collective consumption**

The domain of collective consumption covers the provision of assets, the rules that govern how they will be provided, and the conditions that determine how they can be used and converted into livelihood outcomes. In the case of shelter and services, assets might include land, housing, water and electricity supply, and neighbourhood security services; rules governing provision might include rules of entitlement, rules governing degrees of subsidy and cost-recovery in service provision, rules governing allocation of costs between government and community; and rules covering asset transformation might include rules regarding sub-letting, use of shelter for commercial activity etc. The literature provides examples of movements working across all these domains (e.g. Mitlin and Mogaladi, 2008; Mitlin and Satterthwaite, 2004; Bolnick, 2008; Barrig, 2000, 2007; Castells, 1983; Mitlin, 2006; *Environment and Urbanization*, various years).

If one were to distinguish (without over-stating the case) between these and the movements discussed in the previous section, the differences of emphasis in movement strategy and practice might be the following: a greater proclivity toward self-provisioning of assets; a greater inclination to negotiate with the state and other holders of power; and somewhat less use of direct action except perhaps at the moment of initial land invasion. Another difference might be that such movements'

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<sup>27</sup> That said, movements *may* confront business in conflicts over the privatization of service provision, as for instance in the so-called Bolivian "water wars" in which water consumers protested the price increases that followed on from the transfer of water provision concessions to international companies (Perreault, 2006).

discourses tend to hinge more around basic needs and less around ideology: with some exceptions (movements contesting service privatization and cost recovery), these are discourses containing less reflection on the overall development model. While in the words of a Kenyan member of Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI),

“The people in Shack Dwellers International, in the leadership of the Federations and in the support organizations, are mainly people who are discontent. They are discontent with the current status quo. They are discontent or are very unhappy about evictions. They are people who feel very strongly that it is wrong for communities, whole families to live on the streets of Bombay or to live on the garbage dumps of Manila. They feel strong enough to do something about these things. But their discontent runs even deeper. They have looked around them, at the poverty eradication strategies of state institutions, private sector institutions, multi-laterals and other donors. They have looked at the NGOs and the social movements from which they have come and they are unhappy with most of what they see” (Weru, cited in Bolnick, 2008)

these movements are less likely to be channelling other political discourses than they are channelling discontent.

### *Asset provisioning*

While over time shelter and service movements often become more demand oriented, many have their origin in self-provisioning activities, often emerging from processes in which members sought to resolve problems for themselves. One variant of this is the mobilization to occupy vacant land – a process documented early on for the case of Lima by Mangin (1967), but also across South Asian and African cities. These are mobilizations to resolve a problem of access to the basic input for shelter – a piece of land. Once the land is occupied, movements then begin to negotiate for tenure changes, and services – a process in which their orientation shifts from self-provisioning to contestation and negotiation.

Several particularly significant movements have made similar transitions. The member federations of SDI each begin from savings and loans initiatives among vulnerable urban residents, generally women. SDI’s approach is to identify pavement dwellers, homeless groups, scavengers and similar excluded groups and initiate savings and loan programmes with them. Similar to dynamics encountered in village banking in Peru (Humphreys Bebbington and Gomez, 2005), the practices and rituals surrounding saving and borrowing together have the (deliberate) effect of rebuilding trust among women (D’Cruz and Mitlin, 2007). This trust is an essential ingredient for any future collective action around shelter – financial capital becomes a vehicle for producing social capital which, with time, facilitates subsequent empowerment and enhancement of income:

“The formula is simple: without poor women joining together, there can be no savings; without savings there can be no federating; without federating, there is no way for the poor themselves to enact change in the arrangements that disempower them.” (Appadurai 2001, 33)

D’Cruz and Mitlin note this same sequencing of concerns within SDI affiliates, from self-provision of financial services to shelter issues:

“Despite appearances, the federations are not primarily vehicles to deliver low-income housing. Ongoing evictions and the scale of insecure tenure leads to the prioritisation of housing” (2007).

A very similar transition from self-provisioning to wider concerns about shelter is found within SEWA, the Self-Employed Women’s Association in India. Viewing itself as a movement more than an organization, SEWA counted 300,000 members across India by 2003 (Mitlin, 2006). While primarily concerned with employment and income issues, SEWA has also engaged with housing issues. Housing is critical to its members, given that their homes are also often their workplaces or storage sites. Consequently, SEWA has become involved in slum-upgrading programs, as for instance in Ahmedabad.

To some extent, examples such as these counter arguments that microfinance tends necessarily to be neoliberalizing in its effects (Fernando, 2005). Rather, they suggest that, in urban environments at least, collective savings and loan interventions might serve as a basic infrastructure for the emergence of movement processes, even among the most destitute (Harriss-White, 2005).

These cases also draw attention to an important gendered component to shelter movements, at least those among the most vulnerable. The national homeless peoples’ federations that constitute SDI are primarily rooted in and led by women. The experience in urban Lima has been not dissimilar, with women leaders, and women’s groups (initially created around other needs – in particular food provisioning) playing an important role in urban place based movements seeking support with services (Barrig, 2007; Stokes, 1995; Bebbington, Scurrah and Bielich, 2008).

### ***Demanding, contesting, negotiating***

Tenure regulations, urban development plans, budget allocation for infrastructure investment, site and service provision, education and health services all involve government – either as direct provider or as regulator. Consequently, protesting and negotiating collective consumption necessarily requires that movements engage with government if members’ needs are to be addressed. Furthermore, movements must engage governments that rarely have sufficient resources to meet all such demands, are often subject to pressures and incentives from other interest groups, and administer bureaucracies with their own Weberian imperative to regulate and control. It is a genuine challenge to engage such government-state machinery in a way that successfully resolves collective consumption demands while also protecting autonomy from political instrumentalization, bureaucratic absorption, or simple corruption, is very real.

When government evidently lacks resources to respond adequately or completely to the sorts of collective consumption demands made by movements, strategies that hinge wholly around protest and confrontation imply real risk. More than the risk of repression (though real) is the risk of movement fatigue. If government is not in a position to respond to movement demands, to continue protesting without showing



progress can ultimately lead to frustration and a tailing off of support from the bases. In such circumstances, the alternative option is to seek some form of collaboration with the government, and indeed, while collective consumption movements also contest rights, their strategies tend to be less confrontational than are those of movements oriented around production.

Mitlin (2006) has suggested a framework for thinking about these interactions between urban movements and the state. She distinguishes among four types of state position - clientelist, bureaucratic, participatory democratic and co-productive – while noting that in most cases these different positions will be found co-existing across different offices of the same state and government (see Fox, 1996; 2008 also). On the basis of this classification she approaches the risks to movements and the strategies open to them as they pursue their goals.

For Mitlin, clientelist government is the most difficult to engage successfully because it is a political culture that always seeks to trade some sort of collective consumption provision (or corruption) in return for political support. Such deals very easily undermine movement legitimacy and internal coherence. This has been, for instance, the case with the women's popular movement in Lima where one encounters different base groups sponsored by different parties, and which was greatly weakened by the clientelist practices of the Fujimori government in the 1990s (Barrig, various; Blondet and Trivelli, 2004; Bebbington, Scurrah and Bieliach, 2008). As a result of such risks and experiences, some movements, such as NSDF in India, has a strategy of working with the party in power, whoever it is, rather than being political clients of specific groups and in pre-electoral moments. While this might maintain autonomy, however, there are limits on what can be achieved in terms of outcomes. Mitlin also suggests that mass protest is often the best strategy in moments of clientelist politics because it is more likely to induce a response from politicians in the hope that this will deliver support. Whatever the case, clientelist government is less likely to deliver systematic solutions to movements' collective consumption demands.

In Mitlin's framework, bureaucratic government works from recognition that rights constitute the basis for the provision of collective consumption services. Such government might in principle take more systematic approaches to problem solving. It tends, however, to be less pervious to social movement pressure, or even to movement ideas and proposals. The worst case, and not infrequent, scenario is a bureaucratic government with scarce resources – a scenario that can lead to the provision of rules without solutions, and thus an environment that can be stultifying for movements.

The implication for movements is that in the face of clientelist government or underfunded bureaucracy, the most feasible strategy may be one of self-provisioning of assets, with occasional but partial gains following protests. This model, however, requires that movements are able to mobilize significant external resources in order to finance the collective consumption that their bases demand. For this to occur requires solid relations with NGOs (given the experience that donor support will not be forthcoming absent these relationships: Bolnick, 2008).

Participatory democratic models of government offer movements many more possibilities through their structured participation in the definition of policy and

programmes and in the allocation of budget. Various authors (e.g. Cabannes, 2004; Abers, 1998) suggest that as a result of such participation more investment resources have been channelled to poorer urban areas than would otherwise have been the case. Others, however, question how far the poorest are able to participate or make their voices heard in such processes (Clever, 2005).

For Mitlin, as for many others, the most attractive state/government posture is that which favours the co-production of both collective consumption services (Ostrom, 1996) and of the rules governing development processes (Fox, 1996). In these visions, co-production is not merely the sub-division of tasks between government and movements, but rather a negotiation (one, interestingly, that to some extent by-passes formal democratic and participatory processes) in which the movement takes its own plan to government and the different parties ultimately agree a programme of collective consumption service provision on the basis of this plan (whose implementation *is* then shared between movements and government).

Commentators who work within the SDI system insist that it is precisely this sort of relationship that SDI's affiliate federations have sought with their respective city governments, and with some success. It is one, however, which requires that the movement have particular capacities and strategic orientations. An example often given of such an experience is the strategy of the Railway Slum Dwellers Federation in Mumbai (D'Cruz and Mitlin, 2007). By 1999, nearly 32,000 households were living in shacks next to the city's rail tracks. This slowed down trains, as well as created livelihood risks to dwellers. The city wanted to evict such dwellers. Rather than protest eviction, the Federation and the city negotiated a programme for the voluntary relocation of dwellers. Land sites were identified and the Federation managed the resettlement process. It enumerated all dwellers, provided identity cards (to identify those families that were entitled to resettlement), and provided improved settlement units on the new sites. In the authors' words "In this case and in other programmes, the objective is not to work out a way for the state to provide essential services albeit with the financial and organizational support of residents, but rather it is for the community to work out new ways of developing cities that are inclusive and then to secure state resources to enable the implementation of such solutions at scale" (D'Cruz and Mitlin, 2007).

This is a model in which collectively consumed assets (land, services, tenure) are provided while the movement also retains autonomy. While it is a very particular case, the SDI experience seems to suggest paths along which other processes of urban social mobilization around collective consumption issues could also progress. It also shows that this can have demonstrable poverty reducing effects. However, it is not clear how far the strategy can operate across all domains of contestation over urban collective consumption. It may be that the strategy can work when the issue at hand is to gain access to land, shelter, services or supportive forms of public investment. However, when the discrepancies are not only over the provision of livelihood assets, but also over the rules governing how they are provided, then co-production may be more problematic. Why?

In very simple terms one can distinguish between two broad types of rule governing asset provision – the procedural and the substantive. By *procedural* rules, we mean those that relate to how decisions about asset provision are taken. These rules might

pertain to who participates in planning processes, in decisions about the distribution of investments, in the definition of what a new settlement might look like, and in the implementation of the services necessary to establish that settlement. Here it is easier to see room for negotiation over rules, and thus for the possibility of co-producing rules. *Substantive* rules are different in that they govern how collective consumption services will be provided, who will be eligible for them, and how they will be sustained. We hypothesize that these rules are less negotiable, particularly when they are themselves specific manifestations of more general rules governing the economy of a country. An example here would be the rule that services should be paid for by consumers, rather than be considered a basic right to be funded by public budget. The very difficulty of negotiating this rule might help explain why it is that, although water and sanitation feature in the United Nation's Millennium Development Goals (partly as a result of movement pressures), actual service provision reforms across the globe continue to emphasize corporatization and cost recovery regardless of the impacts on low-income households (von Weizsäcker et al. 2005).

These substantive rules have been contested by urban movements – generally different movements from those that are able to enter into co-productive relations with the state. In South Africa, movements that contest payment for services are more likely to engage in direct action than are most other collective consumption movements. They engage in confrontation and in the reconnection of meters of households whose services have been cut-off due to non-payment of rates. They also contest the introduction of pre-paid supply arrangements which favour the provider. Unsurprisingly these movements often have more difficult relationships with the state (Mitlin and Mogaladi, 2008). While Mitlin and Mogaladi (2008) conclude that, even so, “it appears that in the case of some providers and some local governments there is room for negotiation (for example, to delay and prevent families having their services cut off because of non-payment of bills)”, this is still only negotiation at the margin. It is negotiation over the implementation of the rule, not the nature of the rule.

### ***Learning and linking***

A particular challenge for urban collective consumption movements relates to questions of scale. Because the services they demand are largely ones provided or regulated by city or municipal governments, these movements exist primarily at district and city scales. Their strong base in shared place-based identities also lends itself to this scale of organizing (Castells, 1983; Sasson, 2004). This is somewhat different from the cases noted in the previous section in which peasant and farmers organizations contest national trade policy, or CONACAMI contests the impacts of extractive industry and national mining policy on communities. The nature of these contestations elicits national level coordination and organization. For urban collective consumption this is not the case. This is ultimately a disadvantage for movements because it limits their ability to “jump scales” or to mobilize wider constituencies.

This same limitation is also apparent at higher scales. While several of the movements discussed in earlier sections are able to develop alliances with international actors on issues of trade, environment, human rights or indigeneity, this is far more difficult for collective consumption movements. In some sense, collective consumption issues have less of a transnational constituency – with the exception, perhaps, of access to drinking water. This makes it very difficult for them to engage

in the sorts of transnational politics described so effectively by Keck and Sikkink (1998). To the extent that this transnational activism is one more instrument through which national and local movements can pursue their objectives, urban collective consumption movements are thus at a disadvantage compared to other movements. This may be one more factor in explaining their greater proclivity to use negotiation as a strategy. Movements with international allies can rely on them to intervene if they are severely repressed at the moment of engaging in direct action – urban collective consumption movements cannot.

One very important exception to this pattern has been, again, Shack/Slum Dwellers International. SDI emerged out of the experience of the National Slum Dwellers Federation (NSDF) in India in the 1970s. With time, and assisted by certain intermediaries, it began to have contact with similar processes in other countries. One of these led to the creation of a similar organization in South Africa, following an invitation made to NSDF in 1991 to visit an initiative to organize the poor in the informal settlements of South Africa. As D’Cruz and Mitlin (2007) explain it, “[t]he Indians explained that at independence they had been promised a lot by their leaders; but the poor received nothing and were soon evicted by the newly elected government. The message from Jockin [Arputham, the founder of NSDF] was clear ‘...you need to do your own homework and organize yourself to make it easier for your government to deliver houses’. Shack dwellers in South Africa set up savings schemes and initiated regular exchanges between members. In 1994, the South African Homeless People’s Federation was formed with 200 savings schemes.” Two years later, in 1996, SDI was formed as an alliance by leaders from savings schemes in Cambodia, India, Namibia, Nepal, South Africa, Thailand and Zimbabwe. This alliance built on links that had been built over the years through international exchanges among federations. The idea was to create an international network that could support national initiatives. It has since grown and now has fifteen members (Bolnick, 2008), has become an international point of reference on urban shelter, and it has become a vehicle for continued exchange of lessons among its members.

The emergence of SDI owes a great deal to the support of certain international activists and donor organizations. However, compared to the variety of, say, transnational environmental networks that exist today, the number of similar structures for urban collective consumption is small. This is even more the case if this number is considered in relation to the global population of the urban poor.

### **The autonomy problem: professional organizations and membership organizations**

One of the thorniest relational issues within social movements is the relationship between membership organizations and NGOs. Indeed, many movement leaders do not consider NGOs and professional sympathizers, even those with which they have a close relationship, to be part of the movement. The following table summarizes responses from leaders of 10 movements in Peru regarding which organizations and actors are and are not part of the movement. In fully half of the movements noted in the Table, professionals are considered to exist outside the movement. This does not mean that they do not play important roles. It does, however, indicate an awkward relationship that can often become a tense one.

Social movement	Part of the social movement?			Self-oriented/other oriented
	Membership organizations	NGOs	Sympathizers	
Agrarian	Yes	Yes	Yes	Self
Coca producers	Yes	No	No	Self
Environmental	No	Yes	Yes	Other
Extractives	Yes	No	No	Self
Feminist	No	Yes	Yes	Other
Human Rights	Yes	Yes	Yes	Other
Indigenous	Yes	No	No	Self
Unionist	Yes	No	No	Self
Regional	Yes	Yes	Yes	Self
Popular Women's	Yes	No	No	Self

Source: Bebbington, Scurrah, Bielich (2008)

Joel Bolnick (2008) of the Urban Resource Centre in Cape Town, South Africa and one of four coordinators of Slum Dwellers International, has recently reflected on this relationship. He discusses how, over time, SDI has tried to manage it in order to sustain autonomy but also draw advantage from NGOs (see also d’Cruz and Mitlin, 2007). As already discussed, SDI is an international federation of NGOs, based on country level collaborations between national federations and NGOs. It has not always been so, however. SDI finds its origins in slum residents’ struggles against evictions in Mumbai in the 1970s. These urban struggles led to the creation of the National Slum Dwellers Federation (NSDF). In its early years NSDF interacted with a number of NGOs, but “Persistent attempts at domination by the NGOs, coupled with strategic strangulation of resources, led NSDF to decide to break ties with all NGOs and to go it alone.” This, however, was not a solution and “A decade of non-collaboration brought its own litany of problems” as donors declined direct funding to the federation, the government demanded more technical analyses than the federation could offer, internal accountability difficulties emerged, and so on (Bolnick, 2008: 324). Given these problems, NSDF decided it did need some sort of relationship with an NGO and in 1986 it began, and has over the years evolved, a close relationship with an NGO called SPARC, the Society for the Promotion of Area Research Centres (Patel and Mitlin, 2004; D’Cruz and Mitlin, 2007). NSDF’s founder Jockin Arputham describes this relationship as follows:

“The NGOs and the Social Movement – they take care of each other. Look out for each other. Make sure the money is spent in the right way. Make sure Government is willing to dialogue with us. I say SPARC is our washing machine, our *dobi*. It takes the community process and makes it clean” (Arputham, cited in Bolnick, 2008: 325)

This sort of relationship between federation and NGO has been copied and adapted in other countries within the SDI alliance. An important part of this relationship relates to the management of the urban development funds that federations seek to establish to finance investments once members have been able to secure land and services

(Bolnick, 2008). D’Cruz and Mitlin (2007), each part of SDI (but on the professional NGO side) describe the relationship as follows.

“The role of the support NGO is to play a catalytic function to support the federations to claim their own economic, social and political rights. In general, the NGOs manage the finance and take on the administration, helping to create accountability between the two organizations. The NGOs are accountable to the national federation for financial decisions and other choices that affect the federation (and must avoid exercising control), whilst the members are responsible for the finance that they receive. This tension is healthy (despite being difficult). The support NGOs also bridges the gap between development professionals (especially those within the state) and the communities, and this role is extended internationally when dealing with staff in funding and other agencies. They may take the lead when negotiating if city officials are hostile and are not willing to talk to slum dwellers.”

This is, perhaps, more of an ideal typical representation of the relationship than it is of actual relationships. Indeed, the types of tensions that emerged early on in NSDF’s process have spilled over beyond India. Indeed a couple of partner federations do not have NGO counterparts, and in South Africa the relationship broke down because, according to analysis from the federation’s side, the NGO sought to exercise too much control over fund management and decision making, and ultimately sought to divide the federation by fostering a parallel leadership endorsing the NGO’s position (Bolnick, 2008). Regardless of the veracity of this interpretation, the important points are that the relationship came to an end and that this led to the paralysation of federation activity (because of a freezing of the development fund). However, and this is also important, notwithstanding this negative experience, the federation still concluded (as they did in India) that it was necessary to collaborate with some sort of support organization along the lines that D’Cruz and Mitlin outline (see above). So, once again, they entered into a relationship with a different NGO. However, learning from the prior experience, in this new relationship the development fund has been established as a trust, rather than as a fund held by the NGO.

These SDI experiences have broader relevance. First, they show that a large, and now international poor people’s social movement sees NGOs as an important – so far essential – part of its infrastructure. Second, they suggest that even if this relationship is always tense, with a certain proneness on the NGO’s part to dominate, this does not negate its importance. Third, they imply that the presence of NGOs within movements is not only desirable but is also a critical part of a process that has had significant impacts on poverty (SDI has a membership of 2 million women slum dwellers, and claims that 250,000 families have gained secure tenure and services as a result of the work of SDI affiliates). This final point is important. In an effort to delegitimize movements, critics often point to the activity of NGOs within them as evidence of manipulation, of the movement not being genuine, and of political manoeuvring being more important than poverty reduction. The SDI experience suggests this is not a reasonable interpretation.<sup>28</sup>

## CONCLUSIONS

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<sup>28</sup> Cases such as the social movement around mining in Peru would be another example.

### *On framing the movements – poverty relationship*

Poverty research has said relatively little about social movements<sup>29</sup> and social movement research has said relatively little about poverty.<sup>30</sup> This is not surprising – it reflects the fact that most social movements say little, *directly*, about poverty, and very few social movements emerge on the basis of a poverty discourse. In this sense, the balance of the literature reflects the balance of the empirical situation. Movements rarely take on the mantle of “being poor” as an identity based grievance with which to negotiate, and many movement leaders interviewed in our own research do not want to think of themselves or their bases in this way. Instead they think of their bases as people who have been denied or excluded from something, or who are being treated unjustly and inequitably either by particular actions or by institutions and policies that in their view discriminate unfairly against them.

This does not mean that movements are irrelevant to poverty – it does imply, though, that to bring the two themes together requires a particular framing of poverty (as more than income based), of the causes of poverty (as rooted, ultimately, in relationships of power), and of policy (as determined, ultimately, by political processes in which movements are one of many actors). This paper has aimed to do this through combining livelihoods frameworks and a simple state/civil society/market framework. Livelihoods frameworks help think about poverty in terms of material well being, power and meaning/cultural identity, and approach the causes of poverty in terms of access to and control over assets, and of the institutional and policy arrangements that structure people’s possibilities. The state-market-civil society frameworks help frame the policies and institutions within livelihoods frameworks as products of the interactions and power relations among actors operating in these three spheres. These same interactions and power relationships determine the dominant discourses which shape livelihoods and policy in a more general sense. This combined framework then helps map the different points at which movements might interact with poverty dynamics. In some sense, it makes social movements and power relationships endogenous to livelihoods and poverty.

As thinking on the place of social movements in poverty dynamics and poverty reduction unfolds, it will be essential to avoid an error that was made in discussions of NGOs, poverty and development. This mistake was that debates on, and policy appropriations of, NGOs treated them as a sort of institutional default phenomenon that existed because other more “real” and significant institutions either did not exist or were not strong enough (“yet”). Analytically NGOs were ultimately viewed as transitional organizations (existing until stronger states and markets emerged), and in policy terms they were seen as gap fillers and service providers, playing roles that market and state did not (yet) provide. They were not seen as an institutional reflection of tendencies in society that might exist whatever the capacity of the state and the social responsibility of the market.

The risk is that social movements might be viewed the same way – as phenomena whose existence reflects weaknesses in political parties and which therefore should be

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<sup>29</sup> This is changing, however. For recent statements see CPRC (2008).

<sup>30</sup> For reference to some exceptions see discussion in Bebbington, 2007.

viewed as transitional and of secondary importance. This would be an error. That movements continue to exist in OECD societies with consolidated states and parties, strong institutions and even advanced social democracies, suggest that movements do not solely exist as default manifestations of weaknesses in state and party. Rather, they have to be taken as important social phenomena on their own grounds – they are a part of society. Their existence is a reflection of unresolved arguments within society as well as within its institutions, and a reflection of grievances of different types that exist under existing social arrangements.

That said, while movements must be understood on their own terms, they do not exist in isolation – rather they exist, and pursue their goals, in relation to other parts of society and the state, sometimes in relations of tension and conflict, sometimes of negotiation, and sometimes of alliance. The relations with other actors are more likely to be characterized by conflict and tension when movements engage issues in the domain of production than when they pursue goals in the domains of collective consumption. The distinction, however, cannot be pushed too far: the water wars in Bolivia, and even some of the arguments over water pricing in South Africa show that movement-state interactions can also be quite tense and conflictive when issues of collective consumption are at stake; nor is all movement activity around production conflictive. Perhaps the more general point is that conflict is more likely when movements contest the underlying ordering of economy and society. While such questioning is more likely to occur in the domain of production it *can* also occur around collective consumption. Indeed in the Bolivian water wars, the conflict was as much about the increasing dominance of an economy based on concessions to international interests as it was about water per se, and government's initial refusal to listen to popular complaints reflected its reluctance to call into question an economic arrangement (the stability of contracts with international companies) whose sanctity was deemed of central importance to the economy (Perreault, 2006).

### ***On movement strategy***

The countries referred to most frequently in this paper vary in terms of their political context and institutions. South Africa is an instance of a still emerging (post-apartheid) democracy that happens also to be relatively wealthy. This wealth, coupled with the ideological predisposition of government, has translated into efforts to build a developmental state with strong welfare programs. Bolivia is a case of a state controlled by a government sharing some of the ANC's ideological predispositions, but with more of a populist-socialist agenda. At the same time, while there is much potential for natural resource based wealth, this has still to be realized. In each of Bolivia and South Africa, the governing party had a strong movement base and has had to deal with conservative movement responses (though far more in the Bolivian case).

Peru and India are quite different contexts. Peru affords another case of a relatively new democracy, with a government committed to neoliberal forms of economic management in the presence of resource rents that are also significant. Meanwhile India is a consolidated democracy, also with a growing economy but one that is much more diversified than any of the other three countries, and which is therefore characterized by particular strong middle and bureaucratic classes.



This raises the question as to whether the diverse movement strategies (running from confrontation to coproduction) noted in the paper might reflect, in part, responses to distinct political contexts. Indeed, it is perhaps not surprising that movement strategies in Bolivia and South Africa are less confrontational. There is an awareness of what could be lost, politically, if confrontation were to become too intense, and at the same time there are important normative convergences between movements and government. In these circumstances, the state has an upper hand, and is more able to define the terrain on which movements might negotiate with the state. Even when movements have fractured, with some parts assuming more critical postures on government policy, this critique has been relatively muted and there is unwillingness to call the government's economic model too profoundly into question (as this would cede too much ground to conservative movements). In such contexts, negotiations are not surprisingly focused around issues that lie at the margin of the macroeconomic model, and are instead related to collective consumption and social policy more than to production relations.

Peru is at the other extreme – a context in which movements identify very little with government, and have very little presence within it. Here there is less to lose through being confrontational, at the same time as there are far more issues related to the organization of the economy and society on which movements and government disagree, often profoundly. Furthermore the government, though in the presence of important resource rents, has, for ideological and political reasons, not converted these rents into significant social policy and poverty reduction instruments. Instead, economic policy is its main instrument of poverty reduction. It seems therefore unsurprising that movement-state interactions are characterised more by recurring cycles of conflict, and focused more on production than consumption.

The Indian case is different again, though perhaps closest to the South African in the sense that the state is strong (in a bureaucratic sense) and legitimate. In a far more diversified economy it is less easy for movements to fall into quickly and easily defined oppositional stances vis-à-vis the organization of production. Meanwhile, in the presence of a state with clear institutional capacities, there is potentially more to be gained through negotiated and co-productive strategies.

The implication is that the roles of movements in poverty reduction will vary significantly depending on the political regime of the moment – and that context defines both the most likely, as well as the potentially most productive, strategy for movements to assume.

### ***On production and collective consumption***

Both movement emergence as well as the relative balance of movement activity between production and collective consumption varies over time and according to the political economy of the country. Contemporary movement dynamics – both for the sector as a whole as well as for the movements that we have discussed in more detail – reflect histories of state-society interaction, of perceptions of the state, development and political parties, and of the formation of individuals who subsequently emerge as leaders, influenced by the culture that their own histories lead them to carry with them. The imaginaries that lead movements to frame demands about housing (South Africa) or extractive industry (Peru), are likewise embedded in histories: of white

suburbanization in South Africa, and of appalling environmental and social performance by pre-1990s extractive industry in Peru. Modern history also has much to do with movement emergence around particular issues. This helps explain why Peru has in recent years seen far more movement activity around production while South Africa has seen more around collective consumption. Peru's government has encouraged a rapid expansion of the extractive economy in the absence of institutions to deal with the distributional conflicts that this elicits. While it has done this partly on the grounds (or at least with the rhetoric) that extractive led growth is essential for poverty reduction because of the employment and taxes it will generate, movements have nonetheless emerged to challenge what they perceive as unjust distribution of the associated costs and benefits of extraction. Meanwhile, in South Africa the post-apartheid state has intervened heavily in areas of collective consumption (housing, services, water etc.) again as part of its own approach to social investment and poverty reduction. Here again government strategy has induced movement activity. Mitlin and Mogaladi (2009) argue that this level of state activity in these domains legitimizes housing and service provision as spaces that can be negotiated and contested, and movements have taken up the challenge.

Not all social movement activity happens in response to state policy. Indeed, movements have often helped to place issues on the political agenda: issues such as gender relations, civil rights, ethnicity and racism. However, at least in the domains of poverty and economic policy the sense is that movements might be more reactive to existing policy regimes than they are positive. If this is the case, then the extent to which movement concerns address the sources of poverty will depend to a considerable extent on how far state policy is also doing so. In this sense, in those cases where movements emphasise collective consumption as opposed to production, then serious issues for poverty reduction arise. To quote Mitlin and Mogaladi:

“The pattern of movement activity is, arguably, opportune for capital. The South African state has shifted the arena of protest for the low-paid, disadvantaged and otherwise excluded away from the labour market and the productive sphere to the sphere of collective consumption. Movements do not appear to make any significant challenges to capital or to the state over the way in which they are regulating the wider economy and/or the behaviour of particular corporations. The programmes of collective consumption are important in adding to the incomes of low-income households and there are real gains to be secured. However, employment income remains important in determining household well-being and it is difficult to imagine that poverty and inequality can be addressed without significant changes to the distribution of employment-related income” (Mitlin and Mogaladi, 2009).

Historical analogy would support this contention insofar as poverty reduction has hinged around: the establishment of taxation systems that redistribute from wages to public investment in services; long term increases in real wages; and a broadening of access to entitlements that come with participation in the formal economy. How far movement activities have contributed to such changes in the OECD countries is a topic for a quite different paper, though there is reason to argue that the emergence of labour movements and civil rights movements have played important roles.

This brings us to the observation on which to close. Not all institutions of the welfare state are born of movement activity, but many have at least some relationship to the mobilization and negotiation conducted by broad-based social organizations existing outside the state and political parties.<sup>31</sup> Indeed, one of the most important effects of movements (when they are “successful”) is to induce the creation of new public institutions that contribute to poverty reduction and favour a certain evening out of power relationships in society. In this sense, just as social movements are endogenous to livelihood, so they are also to state formation. Understood this way, there can be no way out of recognizing their importance for poverty reduction.

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<sup>31</sup> Though of course some of these later gave rise to political parties that subsequently became government: for instance, the Labour party in the UK, PT in Brazil and MAS in Bolivia.

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